August 1, 2018
Iran’s Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Programs
Overview
The Fateh-110 is a solid-fuel, road-mobile battlefield or
Iran has been acquiring, developing, and testing its ballistic
tactical ballistic missile with a range of about 250-300 km.
missile capabilities for decades. The United Nations
There may be four versions of the Fateh-110 in service; one
Security Council in 2015 adopted resolution 2231, calling
is apparently called the Khalij-Fars (“Persian Gulf”).
on, but not requiring, Iran to not develop nuclear-capable
ballistic missiles and to halt other ballistic missile activity.
Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles
Nevertheless, Iran continues to invest in developing
(MRBMs)
ballistic missiles and in building an extensive network of
Iran is developing and producing MRBM capabilities with
facilities, although missile inventory information is scarce.
ranges estimated up to about 2,000 kilometers (some non-
U.S. government sources cite slightly higher ranges),
Iran’s short- and medium-range ballistic missile tests
sufficient to strike targets throughout the Middle East.
indicate that Iran is focused on increasing the accuracy of
its missiles. Once forecasted to have an intercontinental-
According to the National Air and Space Intelligence
range ballistic missile before now, Iran has not yet
Center (NASIC) in 2017, Iran has perhaps fewer than 50
demonstrated this capacity. Furthermore, Iran’s space
MRBM launchers and an unknown number of associated
launch program continues to experience significant delays,
missiles. Iran continues to develop, test, and build more
and may be slowing.
capable and increasingly accurate MRBMs. Iran argues
these missiles constitute an important deterrent and
Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs)
retaliatory force against U.S. and other forces in the region
The majority of Iran’s heavy artillery rockets and ballistic
in the event of war. Iran has also constructed an
missiles are tactical or short-range (less than 500
underground network of bunkers and silo-like missile
kilometers). Most of Iran’s ballistic missiles are Scud-B and
launch facilities, and is seeking improved air defenses,
Scud-C derivatives, with a majority likely being Scud-Cs.
presumably to enhance the survivability of their MRBMs
Iran has less than 100 SRBM reusable transporter-erector-
against preemptive attack.
launchers (TELs) and likely has hundreds of SRBMs.
Like the SRBM program, Iran relies to some extent on
Iran views its SRBM capability as necessary for battlefield
others, particularly North Korea, for certain key missile
and tactical military purposes. Iran often test-fires these
components and materials in its MRBM program. Export
missiles as part of its military exercises. Iran’s SRBMs
controls and sanctions have made it increasingly difficult,
could strike U.S. and allied bases in the Gulf region if
but not impossible, for Iran to acquire the best of such
moved from their operating bases, as well as targets
items, causing Iran to try to exploit weaknesses in existing
throughout Iraq, but they could not reach Israel.
export and nonproliferation regimes, or to try to find
foreign sellers willing to circumvent those laws.
Iran has grown increasingly self-sufficient in producing
SRBMs, but still probably relies on outside sources, such as
Shahab-3, Ghadr-1/Emad, and Sajil/Ashura
North Korea, for some key components and materiel.
The Shahab-3 is a ballistic missile imported from the
Stricter international enforcement of export controls and
DPRK and based on the No-dong 1. The Shahab-3 has been
broadening missile-related sanctions—which remain in
given various names by Iran and others over time. There
place under the Iran nuclear agreement—have reportedly
reportedly have been several different versions of this
slowed Iran’s efforts.
liquid-fueled missile flight tested with various other
modifications made to it, perhaps providing the Shahab-3
Shahab-1/2, Qiam, and Fateh-110
with ranges varying from about 800-1,000 km. The missile
The Qiam ballistic missile was first tested in August 2010,
is reportedly both road-mobile and silo-based.
and continues to be operational. UN Reports and U.S.
government reports released in recent years have
Because the range of the Shahab-3 lies at the low end of an
highlighted escalations in both its use by Iran and transfer
MRBM, Iran has sought to develop, test, and deploy a
to regional forces allied with Iran. The Qiam was launched
much longer-range ballistic missile. Iran’s first efforts in
from Iran targeting ISIL fighters in Syria in June 2017, and
extending the range of the Shahab-3 manifested in what
modified versions of the SRBM have also been used in
some have variously referred to as the Ghadr-1. The
Yemen on several occasions in 2018. The Qiam rocket is
Shahab-3 variant is road-mobile, liquid-fueled, and single-
road-mobile, liquid-fueled, and finless, and it is capable of
stage, and it is believed by some experts to carry a smaller
achieving a range of 800 km.
payload and a modified reentry vehicle (RV). Modified
Ghadr MRBMs were reportedly tested in March 2016. The
Emad, which began being publicized in 2015 as a longer-
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Iran’s Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Programs
range MRBM, appears to be a Ghadr variant with a
low-earth orbit and as such is not considered to be capable
modified RV.
of providing a long-range nuclear weapons capability. The
Safir-1B is the second-generation Safir SLV capable of
The Sajil (also transliterated Sejil/Sejjil) is a solid-fueled,
putting a 60 kilogram payload into low-earth orbit.
two-stage, ground-mobile ballistic missile that Iran says has
a range of about 2,000 km, according to official U.S.
A more powerful rocket was displayed as a mockup in 2010
sources. This MRBM was first announced under the name
and named the Simorgh, which is designed to carry heavier
Ashura in November 2007, but either the missile or the
satellites into orbit using four main engines. Having
solid propellant motor tested unsuccessfully at the time.
postponed its first launch for several years, the design may
Subsequently renamed the Sajil, it was flight tested
have undergone various modifications. Iranian state media
successfully in November 2008. Additional tests of the Sajil
claimed on July 27, 2017, that a Simorgh launched from the
or a modified and apparently more capable version of it, the
Imam Khomeini Space Center, a newly built space complex
Sajil-2, took place in May, September, and December 2009.
in southeastern Iran, placed a 250 kilogram satellite into
The Sajil-2 has since highlighted significant progress in
low-earth orbit. Some U.S. media reports at the time
Iran’s solid-propellant program, which could afford Iran’s
indicated the Simorgh exploded shortly after launch and
missiles reduced response time and risk of detection.
there is no evidence it achieved orbit.
Figure 1.MRBM Sites and Ranges
Space Launch and Long-Range Missiles
Some have long believed Iran’s space launch program
could mask the development of an intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM) with ranges in excess of 5,500 km that
could threaten targets throughout Europe, and even the
United States (at least 10,000 km). According to the
intelligence community (IC) in 2018, “Tehran’s desire to
deter the United States might drive it to field an ICBM.
Progress on Iran’s space program, such as the launch of the
Simorgh SLV in July 2017, could shorten a pathway to an
ICBM because space launch vehicles use similar
technologies.”
ICBMs share many similar technologies and processes
inherent in a space launch program, but many years ago
Iran outlined a long-term dedicated space launch effort (that
has since slowed considerably) that is not simply a cover
for ICBM development. In addition, no country has
developed an ICBM from its space launch technology base;
space launch programs have generally developed from
military ballistic missile programs.
In 1999, the IC first assessed that Iran could test an ICBM
Source: CRS.
by 2015 if it received sufficient foreign assistance,
Space Launch Program
especially from a country such as China or Russia (whose
Iran has an ambitious space launch and satellite program,
support reportedly subsequently diminished in the 2000s).
CRS assessed in 2012 that it was “increasingly uncertain
which seeks to enhance its national pride and, perhaps more
importantly, its international reputation as a growing
whether Iran will be able to achieve an ICBM capability by
advanced industrial power. Iran also views itself as a
2015 for several reasons: Iran does not appear to be
receiving the degree of foreign support many believe would
potential leader in the Middle East offering space launch
and satellite services. Iran has stated that it plans to use
be necessary; Iran has found it increasingly difficult to
future launches for placing intelligence-gathering satellites
acquire certain critical components and materials because
of sanctions; and Iran has not demonstrated the kind of
into orbit, although proliferation experts assess such a
flight test program many view as necessary to produce an
capability is likely a decade or so in the future.
ICBM.” Those assessments remain valid.
Space Launch Vehicles (SLVs)
Iran currently operates two types of SLVs: the Safir
Although not representing the IC, Adm. Gortney (Northern
(“Envoy”) and the Simorgh (“Phoenix”). Iran’s SLVs are
Command) seemingly updated the U.S. government
assessment, stating on March 10, 2016: “Iran has
liquid-fueled, two-stage rockets capable of placing a
successfully orbited satellites using its ICBM-class booster
payload into low-earth orbit.
as early as this year. In light of these advances we assess
Iran may be able to deploy an operational ICBM by 2020 if
Iran used the Safir SLV to launch the OMID satellite into
the regime chooses to do so.”
orbit in February 2008. The Safir SLV used a first stage

based on the single-stage Shahab-3 with a specially
designed second stage. Iran still develops this liquid-fueled
Steven A. Hildreth, Specialist in U.S. and Foreign
SLV. The Safir is designed to carry a light payload into
National Security Programs
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Iran’s Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Programs

IF10938
Cyrus A. Jabbari, Research Associate


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10938 · VERSION 2 · NEW

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