Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province
Updated February 24, 2022
Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province
Armed Islamist violence continues to roil northeast Nigeria
Figure 1. The Lake Chad Basin Region
and nearby border regions more than a decade since Boko
Haram launched an insurgency against the Nigerian state.
In recent years, an Islamic State-affiliated offshoot, the
Islamic State West Africa Province (IS-WA, aka ISIS-WA
or ISWAP), has established itself as the stronger faction and
one of the most active IS affiliates globally. The conflict in
the Lake Chad Basin (Fig. 1) has killed tens of thousands,
displaced millions, and fueled a vast humanitarian crisis.
The United States has provided counterterrorism and other
assistance to governments battling Boko Haram and IS-
WA, and has been the top country donor of humanitarian
Source: CRS Graphic.
assistance in the Lake Chad Basin. Abuses by local security
forces in the region have been a source of concern among
Shekau’s Death and Recent Trends
some Members of Congress and have raised challenges for
In May 2021, IS-WA militants killed Boko Haram leader
U.S. security assistance and military sales.
Shekau, prompting thousands of people—including former
Background and the Rise of IS-WA
Boko Haram fighters, their families, and civilians fleeing
Boko Haram-held zones—to surrender to Nigerian and
Boko Haram emerged in the early 2000s as a Salafist Sunni
Cameroonian authorities. A number of Boko Haram
Muslim reform movement based in Borno State, northeast
commanders reportedly joined IS-WA following Shekau’s
Nigeria—an area long afflicted by poverty and inequality,
death. One remnant Boko Haram faction remains active
corrupt and contentious politics, and fierce debate over the
around Lake Chad, in far northeastern Borno State.
proper role of Islam in governance and society. Its founder,
Muhammad Yusuf, opposed Western influence and
Shekau’s death signified the demise of one of the world’s
Christianity as well as more moderate forms of Islam. After
most notorious extremists, and it appears to have left Boko
falling out with local authorities, Boko Haram launched
Haram in disarray. Still, prospects for an end to violence in
attacks on police stations in several northern Nigerian cities
northeast Nigeria appear tenuous. Analysts and Nigerian
in 2009. In response, Nigerian security forces detained and
officials have warned that IS-WA may prove to be a more
executed Yusuf and killed hundreds of his adherents.
resilient threat, citing IS-WA’s efforts to build legitimacy in
areas it governs and its reputedly strong resource base. As
Boko Haram regrouped under Yusuf’s former deputy,
of early 2022, U.N. analysts estimated IS-WA to have
Abubakar Shekau, expanding operations to include large-
4,000-5,000 fighters. The group continues to attack military
scale bombings, assertions of territorial control, and cross-
facilities, killing soldiers and looting materiel, and funds
border attacks in neighboring countries. It earned notoriety
itself through raiding, kidnapping for ransom, and taxing
for its brutality, including its use of women and children as
local populations and commerce. Primarily active in
suicide bombers, and drew global attention with its 2014
northeast Nigeria, IS-WA also continues to mount attacks
abduction of 276 girls from a school in Chibok, Borno
in adjacent zones of neighboring countries, primarily
State, which gave rise to the “Bring Back Our Girls” social
targeting local military positions.
media campaign. In 2015, Shekau pledged allegiance to IS,
and Boko Haram rebranded as IS-WA. An internal dispute
Amid rising insecurity in other parts of northern Nigeria
later fractured the group; IS recognized another IS-WA
and in the Sahel region, to Nigeria’s north, concern has
leader in 2016, and Shekau’s faction reassumed its original
mounted over a possible convergence of security threats.
name, continuing to be commonly known as Boko Haram.
U.N. investigators report that IS-WA has links to another IS
faction, known as IS-Greater Sahara, active in Burkina
IS-WA has distanced itself from the indiscriminate violence
Faso, Mali, and Niger, though each group appears primarily
that came to characterize Boko Haram, renouncing the
focused on local aims. Some Boko Haram members have
killing of Muslim civilians and vowing to focus attacks on
reportedly moved west, establishing a cell in Nigeria’s
Christians and state targets. It reportedly has provided some
Niger State (Fig. 2) that claimed several attacks in 2021. In
state-like services (e.g., basic law enforcement) in its areas
neighboring Kaduna State, another Boko Haram splinter
of operation, forging ties with some communities. By 2020,
group known as Ansaru, which claims affiliation with Al
U.N. monitors assessed that IS-WA had “outstripped” Boko
Qaeda, has apparently reactivated after a period of
Haram in size and capacity and was operating “with a high
dormancy, preaching in local mosques and clashing with
degree of success [...] including by conducting raids on
criminal groups. Other former Boko Haram combatants
security forces, which have yielded significant war spoils in
reportedly have joined criminal gangs in rural northwest
the form of materiel and other supplies.”
and north-central Nigeria known locally as “bandit” groups.
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Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province
Figure 2. Nigeria’s Niger and Kaduna States
U.S. Policy and Issues for Congress
The United States has supported efforts to combat Boko
Haram and IS-WA through capacity-building assistance for
security forces in the region, the provision of equipment to
regional militaries (e.g., through the Foreign Military Sales
and Excess Defense Articles programs), and logistics and
advisory support for the MNJTF. From 2015 to 2020, U.S.
Africa Command maintained an intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance operation in northern Cameroon,
involving up to 300 U.S. personnel; the Trump
Administration ended that deployment. The State
Department has managed some counterterrorism assistance
for Lake Chad Basin militaries, and is supporting the
Source: CRS graphic.
development of a Nigerian Police Force unit to assume
Nigerian and Regional Responses
civilian law enforcement duties in the northeast. From 2014
Nigerian security forces have struggled to maintain pressure
to 2020, the U.S. Agency for International Development
on Boko Haram and IS-WA. For several years, Nigeria’s
(USAID) administered a program in Nigeria to help counter
military has concentrated its troop presence in semi-urban
extremist recruitment and reintegrate former extremists.
“super camps,” ceding control over highways and rural
Between FY2014 and FY2020 (latest full year available),
areas and limiting humanitarian access and civilian
the State Department and USAID provided roughly $2.3
protection beyond garrison towns. Aerial bombing raids and
billion in humanitarian assistance for the Lake Chad Basin
ground offensives periodically claim numerous militant
region, most of it for Nigeria. Humanitarian groups in
fatalities, but Nigerian authorities often have proven unable
Nigeria have raised concerns with access constraints and
to restore stability and state authority in cleared zones.
other operational challenges in the northeast, including
restrictions imposed by the Nigerian military. Congress
Regional military coordination has improved since the 2014
may consider to what extent such restrictions may impede
activation of the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF),
U.S.-supported humanitarian relief efforts.
comprising troops from Nigeria, Benin, Cameroon, Chad,
Abuses by regional security forces have posed challenges
and Niger. MNJTF operations have been episodic, and
for U.S. security cooperation, particularly with Nigeria and
interoperability has been an enduring challenge. Each
Cameroon. In 2014, the Obama Administration blocked a
MNJTF participating country faces other pressing security
planned transfer of U.S.-origin military helicopters from
challenges, diverting attention and resources away from the
Israel to Nigeria, partly due to human rights concerns; in
campaign against Boko Haram and IS-WA.
January 2017, it froze a planned sale of 12 A-29 Super
Tucano aircraft to Nigeria after a Nigerian jet bombed a
The Nigerian government’s Safe Corridor program aims to
displacement camp. The Trump Administration revived the
encourage defections and de-radicalize former combatants.
latter sale; Nigeria received the aircraft in 2021. In 2021,
Hundreds of men and boys have participated. Analysts have
some Members of Congress reportedly placed an informal,
raised concerns related to the program, including with poor
pre-notification hold on a proposed sale of 12 AH-1 Cobra
screening that has resulted in misclassification of civilians
helicopters to Nigeria. The National Defense Authorization
as militants, abuses against participants, and opposition by
Acts for FY2018 and FY2020 (P.L. 115-91, P.L. 116-92)
some officials and local communities to the reintegration of
required executive branch reports to Congress on Nigerian
ex-militants into society. Nigerian efforts to reintegrate
efforts to improve civilian protection and accountability for
women and girls have been more limited. De-radicalization
security force abuses. In Cameroon, the State Department
efforts in other countries have been slow to advance.
withheld nearly $18 million in planned security assistance
Human Rights Issues
in 2019 amid mounting concerns over the conduct of
Cameroon’s military, including in the context of a separatist
Human rights groups have accused regional security forces
conflict in the country’s west that began in 2017. Some
of extensive abuses during counterinsurgency operations,
funds had reportedly been subject to congressional holds.
including arbitrary arrests, extrajudicial killings, enforced
disappearances, and torture. Nigeria’s Air Force, which has
U.S. “Leahy laws,” which prohibit most types of U.S.
been a focus of U.S. security assistance and military sales,
security assistance to foreign security force units implicated
has killed hundreds of civilians in bombing raids. Regional
in gross human rights violations, have prohibited U.S.
militaries have arrested thousands of people for alleged ties
assistance for certain units in the Lake Chad Basin region.
to Boko Haram or IS-WA, often with little evidence,
In 2021, the State Department designated Nigeria under the
according to human rights observers. Many detainees have
Child Soldiers Prevention Act (Title IV, P.L. 110-457) due
been held in inhumane conditions for years while awaiting
to the use of child soldiers by state-backed militias battling
trial; in Nigeria alone, Amnesty International estimated that
Boko Haram and IS-WA, triggering restrictions on U.S.
“likely more than 10,000” people, many of them children,
security assistance in FY2022. President Biden waived
died in military custody between 2011-2020 in connection
restrictions pursuant to the Act, citing U.S. national interest.
with the conflict. The United Nations and others have cited
state abuses as a leading trigger of extremist recruitment.
Tomás F. Husted, Analyst in African Affairs
IF10173
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Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10173 · VERSION 11 · UPDATED