Updated June 28, 2018
Boko Haram and the Islamic State’s West Africa Province
Boko Haram emerged in the early 2000s as a small Sunni
tactics against Muslim civilians, including his use of child
Islamic sect in Nigeria advocating a strict interpretation and
suicide bombers. In 2016, a new faction emerged, led by
implementation of Islamic law, and has evolved since 2009
Yusuf’s son, Abu Musab al Barnawi, a former Boko Haram
to become one of the world’s deadliest terrorist groups. The
spokesman. Barnawi renounced attacks against Muslim
nickname Boko Haram was given by local communities to
civilians; he claims to focus on government and security
describe the group’s narrative that Western education and
force targets. In August 2016, IS leadership recognized
culture are corrupting influences and haram (“forbidden”).
Barnawi as IS-WA’s new wali (“governor”), notionally
The group called itself Jama’a Ahl as-Sunna Li-da’wa wa-
replacing Shekau, who denounced Barnawi as an apostate.
al Jihad (roughly translated from Arabic as “People
He has not renounced his allegiance to Islamic State.
Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings
and Jihad”)
The name “Boko Haram” is still often used to refer to both
. In 2015, its leadership pledged allegiance to
factions, reflecting their common history. There is also
the Islamic State (IS, aka ISIS/ISIL), and renamed itself as
the Islamic State’s West Africa Province
ongoing debate over the extent to which the groups are
(aka ISWAP,
distinct. Many, including the U.S. government, now refer to
ISIS-WA, hereafter IS-WA). The group, still widely
Shekau’s faction as Boko Haram and Barnawi’s as IS-WA.
referred to as Boko Haram, subsequently split into two
In February 2018, a U.S. Africa Command official
factions. Both pose an ongoing security threat in Nigeria
described IS-WA as being a “longer term strategic threat”
and the surrounding Lake Chad Basin region.
than the Shekau faction.
Civilians in Nigeria’s impoverished, predominately Muslim
The United States has designated both groups as Foreign
northeast have borne the brunt of Boko Haram’s violence,
Terrorist Organizations (FTOs): Boko Haram in 2013 and
which also impacts the border areas of Cameroon, Chad,
IS-WA in 2018. In 2012, the State Department designated
and Niger. By some estimates Boko Haram has killed more
three individuals linked to Boko Haram, including Shekau,
than 15,200 people since 2011, including over 950 in 2017.
as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs), and in
The conflict has sparked a major humanitarian emergency,
2013 it offered $7 million for information on his location
with more than 2.4 million people in the region displaced.
through its Rewards for Justice program. The two other
Boko Haram has attracted international headlines with its
individuals were cited as having close links to a regional
brutal tactics and targeting of civilians, including the
terrorist network, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
abduction of over 270 schoolgirls from the town of Chibok
(AQIM), and have since been reportedly killed or arrested.
in 2014. Amnesty International estimated a year later that
In 2015, two others linked to Boko Haram were designated
Boko Haram had abducted more than 2,000 women and
as SDGTs: Mustapha Chad, a Chadian commander, and
girls in total, forcing some to participate in attacks.
Mohammed (Mamman) Nur, who is rumored to be aligned
UNICEF estimates that in 2014-2016 nearly 20% of Boko
with Barnawi. He was designated as an SDGT in 2018.
Haram suicide bombers were children, 75% of them girls.
Objectives and Areas of Operation
Boko Haram conducted its first lethal attack against an
Boko Haram has called for an uprising against secular
international institution in August 2011, with the bombing
of the United Nations building in Nigeria’s capital, Abuja.
authority and for the establishment of an Islamic state in
Nigeria. It draws on a narrative of resentment and
That has been its most prominent assault on an international
vengeance against state abuses to elicit sympathizers and
(non-regional) target. Boko Haram has issued threats to
recruits. Some attacks have targeted Christian communities
attack the United States, but to date no U.S. citizens are
in the north, fueling sectarian tensions in the country.
known to have been kidnapped or killed by the group.
According to the group’s narrative, the state and Christians
In mid-2014, Boko Haram launched a territorial offensive
have collaborated against Nigerian Muslims. Most of
that Nigerian forces struggled to reverse until regional
Shekau’s victims have nonetheless been Muslim, consistent
forces, primarily from Chad, launched a counteroffensive in
with his exclusivist interpretation of Islam, which justifies
early 2015. Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari, elected
brutality against moderates. Barnawi has pledged to shift
later that year, has taken a more aggressive approach
the group’s focus to Western, Christian, and secular targets.
toward countering the group, which has since reverted to
Key factors that have given rise to the insurgency include a
asymmetric attacks, operating from remote border areas in
legacy of overlapping intercommunal, Muslim-Christian,
the Lake Chad Basin region.
and north-south tensions within Nigeria and frustration with
Leadership and Group Divisions
elite corruption and other state abuses. The Nigerian
security forces’ heavy-handed response in the northeast
Abubakar Shekau assumed leadership of Boko Haram after
may have driven recruitment in some areas. Financial
its founding leader Mohammed Yusuf was killed in police
incentives, social pressures, and coercion have also been
custody in 2009. Analysts suggest that Shekau fostered
cited in studies on the group’s recruitment. Defectors and
divisions in the group with his brutal and indiscriminate
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Boko Haram and the Islamic State’s West Africa Province
former captives of Boko Haram often face persecution or
Analysts warn that Boko Haram’s leadership dispute may
discrimination after returning home.
diversify the threat rather than alleviating it. Some argue
that AQIM, which had links to Boko Haram prior to its
Boko Haram attacks have been primarily concentrated in
alignment with IS, may seek to build ties with one or both
northeast Nigeria, but the group has claimed responsibility
of the factions, although evidence for this is scarce.
for attacks across north and central Nigeria. In 2014, Boko
Haram attempted several attacks in Lagos, but to date its
Outlook
reach in southern Nigeria appears limited. In 2014, the
The significance and consequences of Boko Haram’s
group launched attacks into northern Cameroon, southern
leadership dispute are subject to discussion. While some
Niger, and eastern Chad, prompting clashes with the
argue that the “internal civil war” suggests Boko Haram’s
security forces of those countries. Attacks in neighboring
degradation, others downplay the importance of the
countries increased after those militaries became involved
divisions, noting that the group has long been fractious.
in the regional offensive against the group in 2015. Boko
Regardless, analysts agree that the threat posed by both
Haram has also been linked to various kidnapping
factions persists, as do the factors contributing to militancy
operations in northern Cameroon.
in the Lake Chad Basin region.
Figure 1. The Lake Chad Basin Region
The regional military offensive in 2015 and subsequent
operations have reversed Boko Haram’s territorial advance,
but Nigeria and its neighbors have limited capacity to
protect civilians in the remote border areas where Boko
Haram continues to operate. Nigeria has sought to improve
regional coordination, but the African Union-authorized,
donor-backed Multinational Joint Task Force has struggled
to provide security in territory regained from Boko Haram,
threatening the return of displaced populations.
The Nigerian military has repeatedly claimed to have
militarily defeated Boko Haram, but many analysts disagree
with the assertion. Multiple factors have undermined the
military’s response to the insurgency. Corruption is
systemic and drains resources from the security apparatus.
By many accounts, Nigerian troops have not been
Size, Financing, and Capabilities
adequately resourced or equipped to counter the insurgency,
Estimates of Boko Haram’s size vary. U.S.
despite a substantial defense budget by regional standards.
military
Abuses by Nigerian forces during operations—including
officials suggest that it has roughly 1,500 fighters, while IS-
mass detentions of civilians—and civilian casualties during
WA may have up to 3,500. Boko Haram’s membership
operations have taken a toll and reportedly fueled extremist
appears to draw predominately from the minority ethnic
recruitment. The Nigerian army launched Operation Safe
Kanuri community in northeast Nigeria, where it has been
Corridor mid-2016 to encourage defections and facilitate
most active, but both factions are reported to have fighters
the rehabilitation of former militants. Reviews of its
from the other Lake Chad Basin countries as well. Experts
implementation and impact are mixed.
suggest Boko Haram funds its operations largely through
criminal activity, including bank robberies, kidnappings,
U.S.-Nigeria relations were strained under President
assassinations for hire, trafficking, cattle rustling, and
Buhari’s predecessor, due to disagreements over Nigeria’s
extortion. The group reportedly collected several million
counterterrorism approach and U.S. concern over the
dollars in ransoms in exchange for the release of Chibok
military’s human rights record. U.S. counterterrorism
schoolgirls. Both factions have seized vehicles, weapons,
assistance to Nigeria has been limited in comparison to that
and ammunition from the Nigerian and Nigerien armies.
provided to its Lake Chad Basin neighbors, which have
received increasing amounts of military aid to address the
Relationship with IS and Al Qaeda
threat. The U.S.-Nigeria security relationship has improved
In March 2015, Shekau released a statement pledging
since 2015, but slowly. In 2016, the Obama Administration
loyalty to the leader of the Syria/Iraq-based Islamic State.
notified Congress of the sale of 12 military aircraft and
An IS spokesman welcomed the pledge, urging followers to
related equipment to Nigeria. The deal was subsequently
travel to West Africa to support Boko Haram. The Islamic
frozen over concerns regarding Nigeria’s procedures to
State’s English-language magazine, Dabiq, heralded the
prevent civilian casualties following airstrikes on an IDP
alliance, declaring that “the mujahidin of West Africa now
camp, but was approved by the Trump Administration in
guard yet another frontier of the Khilāfah (caliphate).”
late 2017. While counterterrorism cooperation has
improved since President Buhari and President Trump took
Branding itself part of the Islamic State may have provided
office, challenges remain as the two countries seek to
recruitment and fundraising opportunities by raising Boko
Haram’s
improve security cooperation.
profile, but the extent to which affiliation has
facilitated operational ties is unclear. Such ties may also
Lauren Ploch Blanchard, Specialist in African Affairs
hold less promise today given territorial losses by “core” IS.
Katia T. Cavigelli, Research Associate
Potential links between Boko Haram/IS-WA and IS
affiliates in Libya may be of more immediate concern.
IF10173
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Boko Haram and the Islamic State’s West Africa Province
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