link to page 1 link to page 1 
Updated March 26, 2021
Boko Haram and the Islamic State’s West Africa Province
Since 2009, an Islamist insurgency based in northeastern
Figure 1. The Lake Chad Basin Region
Nigeria has killed tens of thousands of people and triggered
a massive humanitarian crisis in the Lake Chad Basin
region of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger (see Figure
1). Founded in the early 2000s as a Salafist Sunni Muslim
reform movement, Boko Haram, which roughly translates
to “Western culture is forbidden,” has evolved into one of
the world’s deadliest Islamist armed groups. Since 2016, an
Islamic State (IS)-affiliated splinter faction, the Islamic
State’s West Africa Province (IS-WA, aka ISIS-WA or
ISWAP) has surpassed Boko Haram in size and capacity,
and now ranks among IS’s most active affiliates.
Source: CRS graphic.
Boko Haram and IS-WA have proven resilient despite
Operations and Presence
military pressure. Regional governments have periodically
reasserted control over contested territory and killed or
IS-WA. In 2020, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD)
detained scores of alleged militants, yet security gains often
publicly estimated that IS-WA had between 3,500 and
have been short-lived. Human rights groups also have
5,000 fighters, primarily operating in northeast Nigeria near
documented extensive human rights violations by regional
Lake Chad and in border zones of Niger and Cameroon. IS-
militaries. The United States has provided counterterrorism
WA initially distanced itself from the indiscriminate
and other security assistance to governments in the region
violence associated with Boko Haram, renouncing the
and obligated more than $2.3 billion for the Lake Chad
killing of Muslim civilians and pledging to focus attacks on
Basin humanitarian response since 2015. As of mid-2020,
state targets and Christians. It reportedly has provided basic
nearly 13 million people required some form of aid in the
services and law enforcement in areas under its control,
Lake Chad Basin region, and over 3 million people were
potentially building ties with some communities—though it
displaced, according to U.N. estimates.
also has attacked humanitarian personnel and imposed taxes
on local trade and agriculture, sometimes in exchange for
Background and Leadership
protection and other services. Moreover, IS-WA recently
Boko Haram originated in northeast Nigeria, in an area long
claimed several mass-casualty attacks on Muslim civilians,
afflicted by poverty and economic inequality, corrupt and
which some observers attribute to a leadership change in
contentious politics, and fierce intra-communal debate over
February 2020 favoring more hardline commanders.
the proper role of Islam in governance and social life. Its
founder, Muhammad Yusuf, preached an especially militant
The extent of IS-WA’s ties with IS global leadership, and
interpretation of Sunni Islam, rejecting Western education
with other IS affiliates, is debated. Core IS reportedly has
and influence as well as more moderate Islamic practices.
provided financial and technical support to the group, but
The group launched an armed uprising in several northern
IS-WA appears to remain operationally independent and
cities in 2009. In response, state security forces executed
focused on local objectives. According to U.N. sanctions
Yusuf and killed hundreds of his adherents. Boko Haram
investigators, IS-WA maintains a “logistical relationship”
regrouped under Yusuf’s deputy, Abubakar Shekau,
with the Islamic State-Greater Sahara (IS-GS), based in
West Africa’s
expanding its operations from suicide bombings and other
Sahel region; global IS media recently have
sought to portray IS-GS as part of or subordinate to IS-WA.
targeted attacks to larger raids and assertions of territorial
control. The group gained notoriety for its brutal tactics,
Boko Haram. With some 1,500-2,000 fighters, according
including the use of women and children as suicide
to a DOD estimate published in 2020, Boko Haram operates
bombers, and drew global attention with its 2014 abduction
primarily in northeast Nigeria and northern Cameroon.
of 276 girls from a school in Chibok, northeast Nigeria.
Annual fatalities attributed to Boko Haram have fallen from
In 2015, Shekau pledged loyalty to the Islamic State, and
a 2014 peak of roughly 4,500 to less than 1,000 in 2020, per
Boko Haram rebranded as IS-WA. An ensuing leadership
Council on Foreign Relations figures. Nonetheless, the
dispute fractured the group; “core” IS leadership recognized
group remains capable of overrunning military bases,
another IS-WA leader, and Shekau’s faction reassumed the
staging attacks in urban areas, raiding villages, and taxing
group’s original name. Shekau remains Boko Haram’s
local commerce. Some experts contend that Boko Haram is
leader, while IS-WA has undergone a series of leadership
seeking to expand into northwest Nigeria by forming ties
changes. A third, smaller faction that operates near Lake
with local jihadists and criminal actors in that area, though
the extent and implications of such efforts remain uncertain.
Chad has reportedly allied with Shekau. Overlapping areas
of operation can complicate the attribution of attacks.
Local and International Responses
Regional security forces have struggled to contend with a
threat that has adapted in response to military pressure. In
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Boko Haram and the Islamic State’s West Africa Province
2013-2015, Boko Haram mounted an offensive in which it
based personnel management, and outright embezzlement
came to assert control over extensive territory in northeast
have left frontline troops severely under-resourced. A 2018
Nigeria and carried out its first large attacks in adjacent
study by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
areas of Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. A subsequent regional
found that “decades of unchecked corruption have hollowed
campaign led by Chadian forces recaptured much of this
out the Nigerian military and security services.”
self-declared state, prompting Boko Haram to revert to
U.S. Engagement and Considerations
asymmetric attacks and increasingly target Nigeria’s
The United States has provided military capacity-building
neighbors. Ensuing Chadian-led regional offensives have
assistance for national security forces (among which Niger
periodically disrupted militant strongholds and supply lines,
has been the largest cumulative recipient), sales of military
but Nigeria’s government has consistently struggled to
equipment (particularly to Nigeria, which has the region’s
restore stability in cleared zones. Since a surge in attacks on
largest military budget), and logistics and advisory support
Nigerian security forces in 2018, the Nigerian military has
for the MNJTF. In 2020, under the Trump Administration’s
concentrated troops in urban “super camps,” ceding control
effort to reduce and reorient the U.S. military footprint in
over highways and rural areas and limiting humanitarian
Africa, U.S. Africa Command ended an intelligence,
access and civilian protection beyond select garrison towns.
surveillance, and reconnaissance operation based in
Regional military coordination has improved with the 2014
Cameroon that deployed in 2015 and involved up to 300
activation of the African Union-authorized Multi-National
U.S. military personnel. Past engagement also included the
Joint Task Force (MNJTF), comprising troops from Nigeria
temporary deployment, in 2014, of an unmanned aerial
along with Benin, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, but low
vehicle and roughly 80 U.S. military personnel to assist in
capacity and interoperability gaps limit its effectiveness.
efforts to recover the schoolgirls that Boko Haram abducted
Meanwhile, Nigerian and Cameroonian authorities have
from Chibok. U.S. humanitarian aid for the region totaled
encouraged the emergence of local vigilante groups that
$469 million in FY2019 and $499 million in FY2020.
have aided military efforts through intelligence gathering
Several factors have complicated U.S. support for regional
and patrolling. Residents in both countries have accused
counterterrorism efforts, including human rights concerns.
militias of abuses, however, including extortion and sexual
In 2014, the Obama Administration blocked a transfer of
violence; some groups reportedly have recruited children.
U.S.-origin military helicopters from Israel to Nigeria,
Prospects for their future disarmament are uncertain.
reportedly in part due to human rights concerns, and in
In 2016, the Nigerian government launched Operation Safe
2017, it froze the sale of 12 A-29 Super Tucano attack
Corridor, a de-radicalization program for ex-combatants.
aircraft to Nigeria after a Nigerian jet bombed a displaced
Several hundred men and boys reportedly have “graduated”
persons camp. The Trump Administration later approved
from the program, though the extent of their reintegration
the latter sale, over opposition from some Members of
into society is unclear. Observers also have raised various
Congress; delivery of the aircraft is due in 2021. U.S.
concerns related to Safe Corridor, including over poor
“Leahy laws,” which prohibit most kinds of U.S. security
screening processes whereby civilians reportedly have been
assistance to foreign security force units or individuals
misclassified as ex-combatants, inhumane camp conditions,
implicated in gross human rights violations, have also
and the exclusion of women and girls from the program.
resulted in some U.S. aid being curtailed or redirected.
De-radicalization efforts in Niger have been slow to
Governments in the Lake Chad Basin region face
advance, and are nascent, at best, in Cameroon and Chad.
competing security priorities, which may draw attention and
Security Force Abuses and Other Issues
resources away from U.S.-backed efforts to counter Boko
Human rights groups have accused security forces in the
Haram and IS-WA. In Cameroon, for instance, some
region of extensive abuses, including extrajudicial killings,
personnel from an elite U.S.-trained battalion reportedly
enforced disappearances, and arbitrary arrest and torture. In
have redeployed from the IS-WA-affected north to the west
2020, Amnesty International estimated that “likely more
since the onset of a separate secessionist conflict in 2017.
than 10,000” alleged militants, including many children,
More broadly, governance deficits and development
had died in Nigerian custody since 2011 due to excessive
challenges across the Lake Chad Basin region may impede
heat, overcrowding, and inadequate food, water, and health
the realization of enduring security gains, notwithstanding
services. The Nigerian Air Force, which has received U.S.
U.S. security capacity-building efforts. Some Members of
training and equipment, has reportedly killed hundreds of
Congress may debate whether U.S. engagement with and
civilians during air raids. Military abuses may discourage
assistance to the region are appropriately weighted between
combatant defections and/or drive recruitment by stoking a
security, development, and governance activities.
sense of victimization by the government. In 2020, the
The United States has designated Boko Haram, IS-WA, and
International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor closed a
a separate splinter faction known as Ansaru (whose present
preliminary inquiry into abuses committed in northeast
operational status is debated, after a period of dormancy) as
Nigeria by Boko Haram, IS-WA, and the Nigerian military,
Foreign Terrorist Organizations. The State Department also
finding evidence sufficient to merit a full investigation.
has designated several associated individuals as Specially
Nigerian authorities, for their part, have conducted inquiries
Designated Global Terrorists subject to U.S. sanctions.
into alleged abuses, but findings generally have not been
made public, and few personnel appear to have been held to
Tomás F. Husted, Analyst in African Affairs
account. Meanwhile, the government has accused human
rights groups of undermining its counterinsurgency efforts.
IF10173
Defense sector corruption has reportedly sapped military
effectiveness. In Nigeria, procurement fraud, patronage-
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Boko Haram and the Islamic State’s West Africa Province
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to
congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has
been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the
United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be
reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include
copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permissio n of the copyright holder if you
wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10173 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED