Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking July 28, 2020 Organizations June S. Beittel Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) pose the greatest crime threat to the United States Analyst in Latin American and have “and have "the greatest drug trafficking influence,"” according to the annual U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA's) Affairs Administration’s (DEA’s) annual National Drug Threat Assessment. These organizations work across the Western Hemisphere and globally. They are involved in extensive money laundering, bribery, gun trafficking, and corruption, and they cause Mexico's homicide rates, often referred to as transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), continue to diversify into crimes of extortion, human smuggling, and oil theft, among others. Their supply chains traverse the Western Hemisphere and the globe. Their extensive violence since 2006 has caused Mexico’s homicide rate to spike. They produce and traffic illicit drugs into the United States, including heroin, methamphetamine, marijuana, and powerful synthetic opioids such as fentanyl, and they traffic South American cocaine. Over the past decade, Congress has held numerous hearings addressing violence in Mexico, U.S. counternarcotics assistance, and border security issues.

Mexican DTO activities significantly affect the security of both the United States and Mexico. As Mexico'’s DTOs expanded their control of the opioids market, U.S. overdoses rose sharply according to the Centers for Disease Control, setting a record in 2019to a record level in 2017, with more than half of the 72,000 overdose deaths (47,000) involving opioids. Although preliminary 2018 data indicate a slight decline in overdose deaths, many analysts believe trafficking continues to evolve toward opioids. The major Mexican DTOs, also referred to as transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), have continued to diversify into such crimes as human smuggling and oil theft while increasing their lucrative business in opioid supply. According to the Mexican government's latest estimates, illegally siphoned oil from Mexico's state-owned oil company costs the government about $3 billion annually.

Mexico's DTOs have been in constant flux70% of overdose deaths involving opioids, including fentanyl. Many analysts believe that Mexican DTOs’ role in the trafficking and producing of opioids is continuing to expand. Evolution of Mexico’s Criminal Environment Mexico’s DTOs have been in constant flux, and yet they continue to wield extensive political and criminal power. In 2006, four DTOs were dominant: the Tijuana/Arellano Felix organizationFélix Organization (AFO), the Sinaloa Cartel, the Juárez/Vicente Carillo Fuentes Organization (CFO), and the Gulf Cartel. Government operations to eliminate DTO leadership sparked organizational changes, whichthe cartel leadership increased instability among the groups andwhile sparking greater violence. Over the next dozen years, Mexico'’s large and comparatively more stable DTOs fragmented, creating at first seven major groups, and then nine, which are briefly described in this report. The DEA has identified those nine organizations as Sinaloa, Los Zetas, Tijuana/AFO, Juárez/CFO, Beltrán Leyva, Gulf, La Familia Michoacana, the Knights Templar, and Cartel Jalisco-New Generation Nuevo Generación (CJNG). In mid-2019, the leader of the long-dominant Sinaloa Cartel, Joaquin ("Joaquín “El Chapo")” Guzmán, was sentenced to life in a maximum-security U.S. prison, spurring further fracturing of athe once-hegemonic DTO. In December 2019, Genaro García Luna, a former head of public security in the Felipe Calderón Administration (2006-2012), was arrested in the United States on charges he had taken enormous bribes from Sinaloa, further eroding public confidence in Mexican government efforts. Since his inauguration in late 2018, Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador has implemented what some analysts contend is an ad hoc approach to security that has achieved little sustained progress. Despite reform promises, the president has relied on a conventional policy of using the military and a military-led national guard to help suppress violence. The president has targeted oil theft that siphons away billions in government revenue annually. Recent Developments In 2019, Mexico’s national public security system reported more than 34,500 homicides, setting another record in absolute homicides and the highest national homicide rate since Mexico has published this data. In late 2019, several cartel fragments committed flagrant acts of violence, killing U.S.-Mexican citizens in some instances. Some Members of Congress questioned a U.S. policy of returning Central American migrants and others to await U.S. asylum proceedings in border cities, such as Tijuana, because these cities have reported among the highest urban homicide rates in the world. The Trump Administration also raised concerns over whether Mexican crime groups should be listed as terror organizations. In June 2020, two high-level attacks on Mexican criminal justice authorities stunned Mexico, including an early morning assassination attempt targeting the capital’s police chief, allegedly by the CJNG. He survived the attack, but three others were killed in one of Mexico City’s most affluent neighborhoods. The other was the murder of a Mexican federal judge in Colima who had ruled in significant organized crime cases, including extradition of the CJNG’s top leader’s son to the United States. once-hegemonic DTO.

For more background, see CRS Insight IN11205, Designating Mexican Drug Cartels as Foreign Terrorists: Policy Implications, CRS Report R45790, The Opioid Epidemic: Supply Control and Criminal Justice Policy—Frequently Asked Questions, and CRS Report R42917, Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations. Congressional Research Service link to page 4 link to page 7 link to page 9 link to page 12 link to page 14 link to page 16 link to page 19 link to page 19 link to page 20 link to page 22 link to page 23 link to page 24 link to page 25 link to page 27 link to page 28 link to page 29 link to page 30 link to page 31 link to page 32 link to page 5 link to page 8 link to page 12 link to page 18 link to page 34 link to page 37 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations Contents Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 Congressional Concerns .................................................................................................................. 4 Escalation of DTO-Related Homicide, Corruption, and Impunity .................................................. 6 Corruption and Government Institutions ................................................................................... 9 Criminal Landscape in Mexico ...................................................................................................... 11 Illicit Drugs in Mexico and Components of Its Drug Supply Market ..................................... 13 Evolution of the Major Drug Trafficking Groups.......................................................................... 16 Nine Major DTOs.................................................................................................................... 16 Tijuana/Arellano Félix Organization ................................................................................ 17 Sinaloa DTO ..................................................................................................................... 19 Juárez/Carrillo Fuentes Organization ................................................................................ 20 Gulf DTO .......................................................................................................................... 21 Los Zetas ........................................................................................................................... 22 Beltrán Leyva Organization .............................................................................................. 24 La Familia Michoacana..................................................................................................... 25 Knights Templar ................................................................................................................ 26 Cártel Jalisco Nuevo Generación ...................................................................................... 27 Fragmentation, Competition, and Diversification ................................................................... 28 Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 29 Figures Figure 1. Map of Mexico ................................................................................................................. 2 Figure 2. Stratfor Cartel Map by Region of Influence .................................................................... 5 Figure 3. Major Ports of Entry at the U.S.-Mexico Border ............................................................. 9 Figure 4. U.S. Customs and Border Patrol Seizures of Fentanyl and Methamphetamine ............. 15 Appendixes Appendix. Drug Trafficking in Mexico and Government Efforts to Combat the DTOs ............... 31 Contacts Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 34 Congressional Research Service link to page 5 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations Introduction Implications, CRS In Focus IF10578, Mexico: Evolution of the Mérida Initiative, 2007-2020, and CRS Report R42917, Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations. On the issues of fentanyl and heroin, see CRS Report R45790, The Opioid Epidemic: Supply Control and Criminal Justice Policy—Frequently Asked Questions.

Mexico shares a nearly 2,000-mile border with the United States, and the two countries have historically close trade, cultural, and demographic ties. Mexico'’s stability is of critical importance to the United States, and the nature and intensity of violence in Mexico has been of particular concern to the U.S. Congress. Over the past decade, Congress has held numerous hearings addressing violence in Mexico, U.S. counternarcotics assistance, and border security issues. According to one Mexican think tank that publishes an annual assessment, the top five cities in the world for violence in 2019 were in Mexico.1 Increasing violence, intimidation of Mexican politicians in advance of elections, and assassinations of journalists and media personnel have continued to raise alarm. From 2017 through 2019, a journalist was murdered nearly once a month on average, leading to Mexico’s status as one of the world’concern to the U.S. Congress. Increasing violence, intimidation of Mexican politicians in advance of the 2018 elections, and assassinations of journalists and media personnel have continued to raise alarm. In 2018, some 37 mayors, former mayors, or mayoral candidates were killed, and murders of nonelected public officials rose above 500.¹ In 2017 and 2018, a journalist was murdered nearly once a month, leading to Mexico's status as one of the world's most dangerous countries to practice journalism.2 In the run-up to the 2018 local and national elections, some 37 mayors, former mayors, or mayoral candidates were killed, and murders of nonelected public officials rose above 500.3 Over many years, Mexico’s brutal drug-trafficking-related violence In 2019, press reports indicate that 12 journalists were assassinated in Mexico, in a year that appears to be on track for a new overall homicide record.²

Mexico's brutal drug trafficking-related violence over many years has been dramatically punctuated by beheadings, public hanging of corpses, car bombs, and murders of dozens of journalists and public officials. Beyond these brazen crimes, violenceofficials. Violence has spread from the border with the United States tointo Mexico's interior, flaring in the Pacific states of Michoacán and Guerrero and in the border states of Tamaulipas, Chihuahua, and Baja California, where Mexico's largest border cities are located. ’s interior. Organized crime groups have splintered and diversified their crime activities, turning to extortion, kidnapping, autooil theft, oilhuman smuggling, human smugglingsex trafficking, retail drug sales, and other illicit enterprises. These crimes often are described as more "parasitic"“parasitic” for local communities and populations inside Mexico, degrading a sense of citizen security. The violence has flared in the Pacific states of Michoacán and Guerrero, in the central states of Guanajuato and Colima, and in the border states of Tamaulipas, Chihuahua, and Baja California, where Mexico’s largest border cities are located (for map of Mexico, see Figure 1). populations inside Mexico.

Drug traffickers exercised significant territorial influence in parts of the country near drug production hubs and along drug- trafficking routes during the six-year administration of President Enrique Peña Nieto (2012-2018), much as they had under the previous president. Although homicide rates declined early in Peña Nieto'’s term, total homicides rose by 22% in 2016 and 23% in 2017, reaching a record level. In 2018, homicides in Mexico rose above 33,000, or for a national rate of 27 per 100,000 people. According to the U.S. Department of State, Mexico exceeded 34,500 intentional homicides in 2019 for a national rate of 29 per 100,000.4 Thus, for each of the most recent three years, records were set and then eclipsed. 1 El Consejo Ciudadano para la Seguridad Pública y la Justicia Penal (Citizen Council for Public Security and Criminal Justice), “Boletín Ranking 2019 de las 50 Ciudades más Violentas del Mundo,” June 1, 2020, http://www.seguridadjusticiaypaz.org.mx/sala-de-prensa/1590-boletin-ranking-2019-de-las-50-ciudades-mas-violentas-del-mundo. The survey found in 2019 the world’s top most violent cities (all in Mexico) were (1) Tijuana, (2) Ciudad Juárez, (3) Uruapan, (4) Irapuato, and (5) Ciudad Obregon. 2 For background on Mexico, see CRS Report R42917, Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations, by Clare Ribando Seelke. See also Juan Albarracín and Nicholas Barnes, “Criminal Violence in Latin America,” Latin American Research Review, vol. 55, no. 2 (June 23, 2020), pp. 397-406. 3 For more background, see Laura Y. Calderón et al., Organized Crime and Violence in Mexico, University of San Diego, April 2019. See also CRS Report R45199, Violence Against Journalists in Mexico: In Brief, by Clare Ribando Seelke. 4 Testimony of Richard Glenn, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade, for a hearing on “Assessing U.S. Security Assistance to Mexico,” February 13, 2020. Congressional Research Service 1 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations Figure 1. Map of Mexico Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS). rate of 27 per 100,000 people, about a 33% increase over the record set in 2017.⁴

Figure 1. Map of Mexico

Source: Congressional Research Service.

Violence is an intrinsic feature of the trade in illicit drugs. Traffickers use it to settle disputes, and a credible threat of violence maintains employee discipline and provides a semblance of order with suppliers, creditors, and buyers, while also serving to intimidate potential competitors.¹¹5 This type of drug -trafficking-related violence has occurred routinely and intermittently in U.S. cities since the early 1980s. The violence now associated with drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) in Mexico is of an entirely different scale. In Mexico, the violence is not only is associated with resolving disputes, maintaining discipline, and intimidating rivals but also has has also been directed toward the government, political candidates, and the media. Some observers note that the excesses of some of Mexico'some of Mexico’s violence might be considered exceptional by the typical standards of organized crime.¹² 6 Periodically, when organized -crime-related homicides in Mexico have spread tobreak out in important urban centers or resultedresult in the murder of U.S. citizens, Members of Congress have considered the possibility of designating the criminal groups as foreign terrorists, as in late 2019.7 However, the 2019.¹³ The DTOs appear to lack a discernible political goal or ideology, which is one element of a widely recognized definition of terrorism.

Figure 2. 2018 Homicide Rates by Mexican State (per 100,000)

Source: Secretariat of Security and Citizen Protection and population projections from the National Population Council in Mexico, adapted from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) publication authored by Mary Speck, "Great Expectations and Grim Realities in AMLO's Mexico," Washington, DC, May 2019. Notes: Homicide rates were calculated using intentional homicides (homicidos dolosos).

Corruption and Government Institutions

Evolution of Efforts to Combat Criminal Groups over 14 Years

President Peña Nieto continued cooperation with the United States under the Mérida Initiative, which began during President Calderón's term. The Mérida Initiative, a bilateral anticrime assistance package launched in 2008, initially focused on providing Mexico with hardware, such as planes, scanners, and other equipment, to combat the DTOs. The $3 billion effort (through 2018) shifted in recent years to focus on training and technical assistance for the police and enactment of judicial reform, including training at the local and state levels, southern border enhancements, and crime prevention. After some reorganization of bilateral cooperation efforts, the Peña Nieto government continued the Mérida programs. Peña Nieto's focus on crime prevention, which received significant attention early in his term, eventually was ended due to budget cutbacks.²⁷

Congressional Concerns

The U.S. Congress has expressed concern over the violence and has sought to provide oversight on U.S.-Mexican security cooperation. The 116^th Congress may continue to evaluate how the Mexican government is combating the illicit drug trade, working to reduce related violence, and monitoring the effects of drug trafficking and violence challenges on the security of both the United States and Mexico. In March 2017, the U.S. Senate passed S.Res. 83 in support of both Mexico and China and their efforts to achieve reductions in fentanyl production and trafficking.

Crime Situation in Mexico

Forced disappearances in Mexico also have become a growing concern, and efforts to accurately count the missing or forcibly disappeared have been limited, a problem that is exacerbated by underreporting. Government estimates of the number of disappeared people in Mexico have varied over time, especially of those who are missing due to force and possible homicide. In the Gulf Coast state of Veracruz, in 2017, a vast mass grave was unearthed containing some 250 skulls and other remains, some of which were found to be years old.³⁹ Journalist watchdog group Animal Politico, which focuses on combating corruption with transparency, concluded in a 2018 investigative article that combating impunity and tracking missing persons cannot be handled in several states because 20 of Mexico's 31 states lack the biological databases needed to identify unclaimed bodies. Additionally, 21 states lack access to the national munitions database used to trace bullets and weapons.⁴⁰

Background on Drug Trafficking in Mexico

As Mexico's DTOs rose to dominate the U.S. drug markets in the 1990s, the business became even more lucrative. This shift raised the stakes, which encouraged the use of violence in Mexico to protect and promote market share. The violent struggle among DTOs over strategic routes and warehouses where drugs are consolidated before entering the United States reflects these higher stakes. Today, the major Mexican DTOs are poly-drug, handling more than one type of drug, although they may specialize in the production or trafficking of specific products. According to the U.S. State Department's 2019’s 2020 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR)), Mexico is a significant source and transit country for heroin, marijuana, and synthetic drugs (such as methamphetamine and to a lesser degree fentanylfentanyl) destined for the United States. Mexico remains the main trafficking route for U.S.-bound cocaine from the major supply countries of Colombia and (to a lesser extent) Peru and Bolivia.53 The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) notes that traffickers and retail sellers of fentanyl and heroin combine them in various ways, such as pressing the combined powder drugs into highly addictive and extremely powerful counterfeit pills. destined for the United States.

The extent of Mexico's role in production of the synthetic opioid fentanyl, which is 30 to 50 times more potent than heroin, is less known, although Mexico's role in fentanyl trafficking is increasingly well documented.⁴⁹ Mexico remains the main trafficking route for U.S.-bound cocaine from the major supply countries of Colombia and (to a lesser extent) Peru and Bolivia.⁵⁰ The west coast state of Sinaloa, with its long coastline and difficult-to-access areas, is favorable for drug cultivation and remains the heartland of Mexico'’s drug trade. Marijuana and opium poppy cultivation has flourished in the state for decades.⁵¹54 It has also been the sourcehome of Mexico's ’s most notorious and successful drug traffickers.

Components of Mexico's Drug Supply Market

Cocaine. Cocaine. Cocaine of Colombian origin supplies most of the U.S. market, and most of that supply is trafficked through Mexico, with. Mexican drug traffickers are the primary wholesalers of cocaine to the United States. According to the State Department's 2019 INCSR published in March 2019U.S. cocaine. According to the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), coca cultivation and cocaine production in Colombia rose sharply, with the U.S. government estimating that Colombia producedincreased to a record 921951 metric tons of pure cocaine in 2019, an 8% rise over 2018.55 Cutting cocaine with synthetic opioids (often unbeknownst to users) has become more commonplace and increases the dangers of overdose. cocaine in 2017.⁵² For 2018, the U.S. government reported that Colombia's coca cultivation dropped slightly to 208,000 hectares and its potential cocaine production declined to an estimated 887 metric tons.⁵³

Heroin and Synthetically Produced Opioids. In its 2018Heroin and Synthetically Produced Opioids. In its 2019 National Drug Threat Assessment (NDTA), the DEA warns that Mexico’s crime organizations, aided by corruption and impunity, (NDTA), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) warns that Mexican TCOs present an acute threat to U.S. communities given their dominance in heroin and fentanyl exports. In Mexico, the drug traffickers have driven up the homicide and extortion rates and led to a rising homicide rate in recent years, projected to climb to 29 homicides per 100,000 individuals in 2019, based on current estimates.⁵⁴ Mexico's heroin traffickers, who traditionally provided black or brown heroin to U.S. cities west of the Mississippi, began in 2012 and 2013 to innovate and changed their opium processing methods to produce white heroin, a purer and more potent product, which they trafficked mainly to the U.S. East Coast and Midwest. DEA seizure data determined in 2017 that 91% of heroin consumed in the United States was sourced to Mexico, and the agency maintains that no other crime groupsMexico’s heroin traffickers, who traditionally provided black or brown heroin to the western part of the United States, in 2012 and 2013 began to change their opium processing methods to 51 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Mexico Travel Advisory, June 17, 2020, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/traveladvisories/traveladvisories/mexico-travel-advisory.html. 52 Juan Arvizo, “Crimen Displazó a 380 Mil Personas,” El Universal, July 24, 2019. See also Parker Asmann, “Is the Impact of Violence in Mexico Similar to War Zones?,” InSight Crime, October 23, 2017. 53 U.S. State Department, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March 2020. 54 The region where Sinaloa comes together with the states of Chihuahua and Durango is a drug-growing area sometimes called Mexico’s “Golden Triangle” after the productive area of Southeast Asia by the same name. In this region, a third of the population is estimated to make their living from the illicit drug trade. 55 White House, ONDCP, “United States and Colombian Officials Set Bilaeral Agenda to Reduce Cocaine Supply,” press release, March 5, 2020. Congressional Research Service 13 link to page 18 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations produce white heroin, a purer and more potent product. The DEA maintains that no other crime groups, foreign or domestic, have a comparable reach to distribute within the United States.56 According to the ONDCP, 41,800 hectares of opium poppy were cultivated in Mexico in 2018—down 5% compared to 2017 but up 280% since 2013. Mexico’s potential production of pure heroin rose to 106 metric tons (MT) in 2018 from 26 MT in 2013.57 The DEA reports that 90% of U.S. seized heroin comes from Mexico, which is increasingly laced with fentanyl. The extent of Mexico’s role in production of fentanyl, which is 30-50 times more potent than heroin, is less well understood than Mexico’s role in fentanyl trafficking, which is increasingly well documented.58 What is known is that seizures of fentanyl, fentanyl analogs, and methamphetamine—the leading synthetic lab-produced drugs entering the U.S. illicit drug market—have been rising along the Southwest border. (For U.S. Customs and Border Protection seizure data, see Figure 4.) Illicit imports of fentanyl from Mexico involve Chinese-produced fentanyl or fentanyl precursors coming most often from China. Many analysts contend have a comparable reach to distribute within the United States.⁵⁵

According to the 2019 INCSR and the U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy, Mexico has cultivated an increasing amount of opium poppy. Mexico cultivated an estimated 32,000 hectares (ha) in 2016, 44,100 ha in 2017, and 41,800 ha in 2018. The U.S. government estimated that Mexico's potential production of heroin rose to 106 metric tons in 2018 from 26 metric tons in 2013, suggesting Mexican-sourced heroin is likely to remain dominant in the U.S. market.⁵⁶ Some analysts believe, however, that plant-sourced drugs, such as heroin and morphine, are going to be increasinglymay be gradually replaced in the criminal market by synthetic drugs. If that happens, it is possibleIn the first half of 2019, according to the State Department, Mexico seized 157.3 kilograms of fentanyl, a 94% increase over the same time period in 2018.59 Some observers suggest that if synthetic drugs continue to expand their market share, the drug cartel structure that has relied upon control of opium production, heroin manufacture, and the distribution channels ofdistribution using the plaza system in Mexico and the criminal distribution systemfor trafficking drugs for sale inside the United States may be transformed. Simultaneously, poor Mexican farmers who cultivate opium to produce heroin maycould be disrupted. Synthetic drug trafficking with distribution arranged over the internet via the Dark Web would replace it. Abandoning heroin for the cheaper-to-produce fentanyl might cause Mexican opium farmers to be thrown out of work.60 56 ONDCP, “New Annual Data Released by White House Office of National Drug Control Policy Shows Poppy Cultivation and Potential Heroin Production Remain at Record-High Levels in Mexico,” press release, June 14, 2019. 57 For background on Mexico’s heroin and fentanyl exports, see CRS In Focus IF10400, Trends in Mexican Opioid Trafficking and Implications for U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation, by Liana W. Rosen and Clare Ribando Seelke. 58 DEA, 2017 National Drug Threat Assessment, DEA-DCT-DIR-040-1, October 2017. See also Steven Dudley, “The End of the Big Cartels: Why There Won’t Be Another El Chapo,” InSight Crime, March 18, 2019. 59 U.S. State Department, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March 2020. 60 For sources of the concepts here, see Dudley, “The End of the Big Cartels;” testimony of Bryce Pardo, RAND Corporation, to House Homeland Security on Intelligence and Counterterrorism Subcommittee and Border Security, Facilitation, and Operations Hearing, “Homeland Security Implications of the Opioid Crisis,” July 25, 2019; Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Fending Off Fentanyl and Hunting Down Heroin: Controlling Opioid Supply from Mexico,” Brookings Institution, July 2020. Congressional Research Service 14 link to page 18 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations Figure 4. U.S. Customs and Border Patrol Seizures of Fentanyl and Methamphetamine Data from FY2014-FY2019 Fentanyl Methamphetamine 3,000 Number of Seizures in Pounds (lbs) 80,000 2,250 60,000 1,500 40,000 750 20,000 0 0 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Office of Field Operations’ Nationwide Drug Seizures and U.S. Border Patrol’s Nationwide Seizures, https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/cbp-enforcement-statistics. Notes: Prepared by CRS Graphics. However, the economic devastation of the coronavirus pandemic, projected by the International Monetary Fund to reduce economic growth in Mexico by more than 10% in 2020 (estimated as of June 2020), may temporarily push former opium growers back into cultivation. The medium- and longer-term impact of the pandemic and coming recession on drug markets and consumer demand remains unknown.61 of work.⁵⁷

Methamphetamine. Mexican-produced methamphetamine has overtaken U.S. sources of the drug and expanded into nontraditional methamphetamine markets inside the United States, allowing Mexican traffickers to control the wholesale market inside the United States, according to the DEA. The expansion of methamphetamine seizures inside Mexico, as reported by the annual INCSR, is significant. In 2017, Mexico seized some 11.3 metric tons of methamphetamine, but in 2018, as of AugustAs of August 2018, as reported in the 2019 INCSR, Mexican authorities had seized 130 metric tonsMT of methamphetamine, due in part to a large seizure of some 50 MT in Sinaloa.62 U.S. methamphetamine seizures significantly increased between 2014 and 2019, as shown in Figure 4. in part the result of an arrest and seizure of some 50 metric tons of the drug in Sinaloa.⁵⁹ The purity and potency of methamphetamine has driven up overdose deaths in the United States, according to the 2018 NDTA. Most Mexican trafficking organizations include a portion of the methamphetamine business in their trafficking operations and collectively control the wholesale methamphetamine distribution system inside the United States.

Evolution of the Major Drug Trafficking Groups

. Cannabis. In the first six months of 2019, Mexico seized 91 MT of marijuana and eradicated more than 2,250 hectares of marijuana, according to the State Department’s 2020 INCSR. 61 Many analysts have made observations about the near-term impacts of the pandemic, but there is a diversity of perspectives on the long term. See Parker Asmann, Chris Dalby and Seth Robbins, “Six Ways Coronavirus Is Impacting Organized Crime in the Americas,” InSight Crime, May 4, 2020; Ernst, “Mexican Criminal Groups See Covid-19 Crisis as Opportunity to Gain More Power;” Robert Muggah, “The Pandemic Has Triggered Dramatic Shifts in the Global Criminal Underworld,” Foreign Policy, May 8, 2020. 62 Arthur DeBruyne, “An Invisible Fentanyl Crisis Emerging on Mexico’s Northern Border,” Pacific Standard, February 6, 2019. See also “50 Tonnes of Meth Seized in Sinaloa; Estimated Value US $5 Billion,” Mexico New Daily, August 18, 2018; Mike La Susa, “Massive Mexico Methamphetamine Seizure Reflects Market Shifts,” InSight Crime, August 21, 2018. Congressional Research Service 15 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations Authorities are projecting a continued decline in U.S. demand for Mexican marijuana because drugs “other than marijuana” will likely predominate. This is also the case due to legalized cannabis or medical cannabis in several U.S. states and Canada, reducing its value as part of Mexican trafficking organizations’ portfolio. Mexico is also considering cannabis legalization and regulation. Evolution of the Major Drug Trafficking Groups The DTOs have been in constant flux in recent years.63The DTOs have been in constant flux in recent years.⁶¹ By some accounts, when President Calderón came to office in 2006, there were four dominant DTOs: the Tijuana/Arellano Felix Félix organization (AFO), the Sinaloa Cartel, the Juárez/Vicente Carillo Fuentes Organization (CFO), and the Gulf Cartel. Since then, the large, moreformerly stable organizations that existed in the earlier years of the Calderón administration have fractured into many more groups. For several years, the U.S. Drug Enforcement AdministrationDEA identified the following seven organizations as dominant: Sinaloa, Los Zetas, Tijuana/AFO, Juárez/CFO, Beltrán Leyva, Gulf, and La Familia Michoacana. In some sense, these might be viewed as the "traditional"“traditional” DTOs. However, many analysts suggest that those 7 groups have fragmented to between 9 and as many as 20 major organizations. Today, fragmentation, or "balkanization," of the major crime groupsseven groups have fragmented. In the past decade, as fragmentation has produced many more criminal actors, it has been accompanied by many groups'’ diversification into other types of criminal activity, as noted earlier. The following section focuses on nine DTOsthe nine currently most prominent DTOs (about which the most information is readily available) and whose current status illuminates the fluidity of all the crime groups in Mexico as they face new challenges from competition and changing market dynamics.

Some analysts maintain there may be as many as 20 major organizations and more than 200 criminal groups overall.64 Nine Major DTOs Nine Major DTOs

Reconfiguration of the major DTOs—often called transnational criminal organizations, or TCOs,referred to as TCOs due to their diversification into other criminal businesses——preceded the intensive fragmentation that is commonexists today. The Gulf Cartel, based in northeastern Mexico, had a long history of dominance in terms ofdominant power and profits, with the height of its power in the early 2000s. However, the Gulf cartel'Cartel’s enforcers—Los Zetas, who were organized from highly trained Mexican military deserters—split to form a separate DTO and turned against their former employers, engaging in a hyper-violent competition for territory.

The well-established Sinaloa DTO, with roots in western Mexico, has fought brutally for increased control of routes through the border states of Chihuahua and Baja California, with the goal of remaining the dominant DTO in the country. Sinaloa has a more decentralized structure of loosely linked smaller organizations, which has been susceptible to conflict when units break away. Nevertheless, the decentralized structure has enabled it to be quite adaptable in the highly competitive and unstable environment that now prevails.⁶²

65 Sinaloa survived the arrest of its billionaire founder Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzmán in 2014. The federal operation to capture and detain Guzmán, which gained support from U.S. intelligence, was viewed as a major victory for the Peña Nieto government. Initially the kingpin'’s arrest did not 63 See Patrick Corcoran, “How Mexico’s Underworld Became Violent,” InSight Crime, April 2, 2013. According to this article, constant organizational flux, which continues today, characterizes violence in Mexico. 64 Muggah, “The Pandemic Has Triggered Dramatic Shifts in the Global Criminal Underworld;” Esberg, “More Than Cartels.” 65 Oscar Becerra, “Traffic Report: Battling Mexico’s Sinaloa Cartel,” Jane’s Information Group, May 7, 2010. The author describes the networked structure: “The Sinaloa Cartel is not a strictly vertical and hierarchical structure, but instead is a complex organization containing a number of semiautonomous groups.” Congressional Research Service 16 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations s arrest did not spawn a visible power struggle within the DTO. His dramatic escape in July 2015 followed by his rearrestre-arrest in January 2016, however, raised speculation that his role in the Sinaloa Cartel might have become more as a figurehead, rather than a functional leader.

The Mexican government'’s decision to extradite Guzmán to the United States, carried out on January 19, 2017, appears to have led to violent competition from a competing cartel, the Cartel Jalisco-New Generation (CJNG), CJNG, which had split from Sinaloa in 2010. Over 2016 and the early months of 2017, CJNG'the CJNG’s quick rise and a possible power struggle inside of Sinaloa between El Chapo'’s sons and a successor to their father, a longtime associate known as "“El Licenciado,"” reportedly caused increasing violence.⁶³

66 In the Pacific Southwest, La Familia Michoacana—a DTO once based in the state of Michoacán and influential in surrounding states—split apart in 2015. It eventually declined in importance as its successor, the Knights Templar, grew in prominence in the region known as the tierra calienteTierra Caliente of Michoácan, Guerrero, and in parts of neighboring states Colima and Jalisco. At the same time, the CJNG rose to prominence between 2013 and 2015 and is currently deemed by many analysts as Mexico’s largest and most dangerous DTO. Themany analysts to be the most dangerous and largest Mexican cartel. CJNG has thrived with the decline of the Knights Templar, which was targeted by the Mexican government.⁶⁴

67 The CJNG has assassinated numerous public officials in an effort to intimidate the Mexican government. Open-source research about the "traditional" DTOs,traditional DTOs and their successors mentioned above is more available than information about smaller factions. With as many as 200-400 criminal groups, it is hard to assess longevity or even do a census of which ones are major actors. Current information about the array of new regional and local crime groups, numbering more than 45 groups, is more difficult to assess. The once-coherent organizations and their successors are still operating, both in conflict with one another andand, at times, cooperatively.

Tijuana/Arellano FelixFélix Organization

The AFO is a regional "tollgate"“tollgate” organization that historically hashas historically controlled the drug smuggling route between Baja California (Mexico) to southern California.⁶⁵68 It is based in the border city of Tijuana. One of the founders of modern Mexican DTOs, Miguel Angel FelixÁngel Félix Gallardo, a former police officer from Sinaloa, created a network that included the Arellano FelixFélix family and numerous other DTO leaders (such as Rafael Caro Quintero, Amado Carrillo Fuentes, and Joaquín "El Chapo"El Chapo Guzman). The seven "“Arellano Felix"Félix” brothers and four sisters inherited the AFO from their uncle, Miguel Angel FelixÁngel Félix Gallardo, after his arrest in 1989 for the murder of DEA Special Agent Enrique "Kiki" Camarena.⁶⁶

“Kiki” Camarena.69 66 Anabel Hernández, “The Successor to El Chapo: Dámaso López Núñez,” InSight Crime, March 13, 2017. 67 Juan Montes and José de Córdoba, “Cartel Becomes Top Mexico Threat,” Wall Street Journal, July 9, 2020; Luis Alonso Pérez, “Mexico’s Jalisco Cartel—New Generation: From Extinction to World Domination,” InSight Crime and Animal Politico, December 26, 2016. 68 John Bailey, “Drug Trafficking Organizations and Democratic Governance,” in The Politics of Crime in Mexico: Democratic Governance in a Security Trap (Boulder: FirstForum Press, 2014), p. 121. Mexican political analyst Eduardo Guerrero-Gutiérrez of the Mexican firm Lantia Consulting defines a “toll-collector” cartel or DTO as one that derives much of the organization’s income from charging fees to other DTOs using its transportation points across the U.S.-Mexican border. 69 Special Agent Camarena was an undercover DEA agent working in Mexico who was kidnapped, tortured, and killed in 1985. The Guadalajara-based Félix Gallardo network broke up in the wake of the investigation of its role in the murder. Congressional Research Service 17 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations The AFO was once one of the two dominant DTOs in Mexico, infamous for brutally controlling the drug trade in Tijuana in the 1990s and early 2000s.⁶⁷70 The other was the Juárez DTO, also known as the Carrillo Fuentes Organization. The Mexican government and U.S. authorities took vigorous enforcement action against the AFO in the early years of the 2000s, with the arrests and killings of the five brothers involved in the drug trade—the last of whom was captured in 2008.

In 2008, Tijuana became one of the most violent cities in Mexico. That year, the AFO split into two competing factions when Eduardo Teodoro "“El Teo" Garcia” García Simental, an AFO lieutenant, broke from Fernando "“El Ingeniero" Sanchez” Sánchez Arellano (the nephew of the Arellano FelixFélix brothers who had taken over the management of the DTO). GarciaGarcía Simental formed another faction of the AFO, reportedly allied with the Sinaloa DTO.⁶⁸71 Further contributing to the escalation in violence, other DTOs sought to gain control of the profitable Tijuana/Baja California-–San Diego/California plaza in the wake of the power vacuum left by the earlier arrests of the AFO'’s key leadership. s key players.

Some observers believe that the 2010 arrest of GarciaGarcía Simental created a vacuum for the Sinaloa DTO to gain control of the Tijuana/San Diego smuggling corridor.⁶⁹72 Despite its weakened state, the AFO appears to have maintained control of the plaza through an agreement made between SanchezSánchez Arellano and the Sinaloa DTO'’s leadership, with Sinaloa and other trafficking groups paying a fee to use the plaza.73 In 2013, the DEA identified Sánchezpaying a fee to use the plaza.⁷⁰ Some analysts credit the relative peace in Tijuana to a law enforcement success, but it is unclear how large of a role policing strategy played.

In 2013, the DEA identified Sanchez Arellano as one of the six most influential traffickers in the region.⁷¹74 Following his arrest in 2014, however, SanchezSánchez Arellano'’s mother, Enedina Arellano FelixFélix, who was trained as an accountant, reportedly took over. It remains unclear if the AFO retains enough power through its own trafficking and other crimes to continue to operate as a tollgate cartel. Violence in Tijuana rose to more than 100 murders a month in late 2016, with the uptick in violence attributed to Sinaloa battling its new challenger, CJNG, according to some analyses.⁷² CJNG apparently hasthe CJNG.75 The CJNG has apparently taken an interest in both local drug trafficking inside Tijuana and cross-border trafficking into the United States. As in other parts of Mexico, the role of the newly powerful CJNG organization may determine the nature of the area'’s DTO configuration in coming years.⁷³ 76 Some analysts maintain that the resurgence of violence in Tijuana and the spiking homicide rate in the nearby state of Southern Baja California are linked to the CJNG forging an alliance with remnants of the AFO. In 2018As noted previously, Tijuana was the city with the highest number of homicides in the country in both 2018 and 2019. 70 Mark Stevenson, “Mexico Arrests Suspected Drug Trafficker Named in US Indictment,” Associated Press, October 24, 2013. 71 Steven Dudley, “Who Controls Tijuana?,” InSight Crime, May 3, 2011. Sánchez Arellano took control in 2006 after the arrest of his uncle, Javier Arellano Félix. 72 E. Eduardo Castillo and Elliot Spagat, “Mexico Arrests Leader of Tijuana Drug Cartel,” Associated Press, June 24, 2014. 73 “Mexico Security Memo: Torreon Leader Arrested, Violence in Tijuana,” Stratfor Worldview, April 24, 2013, http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/mexico-security-memo-torreon-leader-arrested-violence-tijuana#axzz37Bb5rDDg. In 2013, Nathan Jones at the Baker Institute for Public Policy asserted that the Sinaloa-AFO agreement allows those allied with the Sinaloa DTO, such as the CJNG, or otherwise not affiliated with Los Zetas to also use the plaza. For more information, see Nathan P. Jones, “Explaining the Slight Uptick in Violence in Tijuana,” Baker Institute, September 17, 2013, http://bakerinstitute.org/files/3825/. 74 Castillo and Spagat, “Mexico Arrests Leader.” 75 Christopher Woody, “Mexico Is Settling into a Violent Status Quo,” Houston Chronicle, March 21, 2017. 76 Sandra Dibble, “New Group Fuels Tijuana’s Increased Drug Violence,” San Diego Union-Tribune, February 13, 2016; Christopher Woody, “Tijuana’s Record Body Count Is a Sign That Cartel Warfare Is Returning to Mexico,” Business Insider, December 15, 2016. Congressional Research Service 18 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations homicides in the country, with 2,246 homicides, or a homicide rate of 115 per 100,000, suggesting the violence that receded in 2012 has returned to the municipality.⁷⁴

Sinaloa DTO

Sinaloa DTO Sinaloa, described as Mexico'’s oldest and most established DTO, is comprised of a network of smaller organizations. In April 2009, then-President Barack Obama designated the notorious Sinaloa Cartel as a drug kingpin entity pursuant to the Kingpin Act.⁷⁵ Often77 Frequently regarded as the most powerful drug trafficking syndicate in the Western Hemisphere, the Sinaloa Cartel was an expansive network at its apex;: Sinaloa leaders successfully corrupted public officials from the local to the national level inside Mexico and abroad to operate in some 50 countries. Traditionally one of Mexico'’s most prominent organizations, each of its major leaders was designated a kingpin in the early 2000s. At the top of the hierarchy was Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzmán, listed in 2001, ; Ismael Zambada Garcia ("García (“El Mayo"”), listed in 2002,; and Juan Jose "José “El Azul"” Esparragoza Moreno, listed in 2003.

By some estimates, Sinaloa had grown to control 40%-60% of Mexico'’s drug trade by 2012 and had annual earnings calculated to be as high as $3 billion.⁷⁶78 The Sinaloa Cartel has long been identified by the DEA as the primary trafficker of drugs to the United States.⁷⁷79 In 2008, a federation dominated by the Sinaloa Cartel (which included the Beltrán Leyva organizationOrganization and the Juárez DTO) broke apart, leading to a battle among the former partners that sparked the most violent period in recent Mexican history.

Since its 2009 kingpin designation of Sinaloa, the United States has attempted to dismantle Sinaloa'Sinaloa’s operations by targeting individuals and financial entities allied with the cartel. For example, in October 2010, the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control identified Alejandro Flores Cacho, along with 12 businesses and 16 members of his financial and drug trafficking enterprise located throughout Mexico and Colombia, as collaborators with Sinaloa. (In August 2017, OFAC identifiedAugust 2017, the U.S. Department of Treasury, sanctioned the Flores DTO and its leader, RaulRaúl Flores Hernandez, as Kingpins.⁷⁸)

Hernández, as kingpins.80 The Sinaloa Cartel'’s longtime most visible leader, "El Chapo" Guzmán, escaped twice from Mexican prisons in 2001 and again in 2015. The second escape in July 2015—after re-arrest the year prior, was a major embarrassment to the Peña Nieto administration, and that incident may have convinced the Mexican government to extradite the alleged kingpin rather than try him in Mexico after his recapture.

In January 2017, the Mexican government extradited Guzmán to the United States. He was indicted in New York District'’s federal court in Brooklyn and tried for four months, from November 2018 to February 2019. His lawyers maintained he was not the head of the Sinaloa enterprise and instead a "lieutenant" following orders.⁷⁹enterprise.81 Nevertheless, he was convicted by a federal jury in February 2019 and sentenced by a U.S. district judge in July 2019 to a life term in prison, with the addition of 30 years, and ordered to pay $12.6 billion in forfeiture for being the principal leader of the Sinaloa Cartel and for 26 drug-related charges, including a murder conspiracy.⁸⁰

After Guzman's trusted deputy "El Azul"82 77 At the same time, the President identified two other Mexican DTOs as Kingpins: La Familia Michoacana and Los Zetas. The Kingpin designation is one of two major programs by the U.S. Department of the Treasury imposing sanctions on drug traffickers. Congress enacted the program sanctioning individuals and entities globally in 1999. 78 From 2012 on, cartel leader El Chapo Guzmán was ranked in Forbes Magazine’s listing of self-made billionaires. 79 “Profile: Sinaloa Cartel,” InSight Crime, January 8, 2016. 80 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Longtime Mexican Drug Kingpin Raul Flores Hernandez and His Vast Network: OFAC Kingpin Act Action Targets 22 Mexican Nations and 43 Entities in Mexico,” press release, August 9, 2017. 81 Alan Feuer, “El Chapo May Not Have Been Leader of Drug Cartel, Lawyers Say,” New York Times, June 26, 2018. 82 DEA, “Joaquín ‘El Chapo’ Guzmán, Sinaloa Cartel Leader, Sentenced to Life in Prison Plus 30 Years,” press release, July 17, 2019. Congressional Research Service 19 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations After Guzmán’s trusted deputy El Azul Esparragoza Moreno was reported to have died in 2014, the head of the Sinaloa DTO was assumed to be Guzmán'’s partner, Ismael Zambada GarciaGarcía, alias "“El Mayo,"” who is thought to continue in that leadership role.⁸¹83 Sinaloa may operate with a more horizontal leadership structure than previously thought.⁸²84 Sinaloa operatives control certain territories, making up a decentralized network of bosses who conduct business and violence through alliances with each other and local gangs. Local gangs throughout the region specialize in specific operations and are then contracted by the Sinaloa DTO network.⁸³85 The shape of the cartel in the current criminal landscape is evolving, however, as Sinaloa'’s rivals eye a formidable drug empire built on the proceeds from trafficking South American cocaine, and locally sourced methamphetamine, marijuana, and heroin to the U.S. market.

For a former hegemon in the cartel landscape, the Sinaloa Cartel is now under pressure and its future remains unclear The Sinaloa Cartel has appeared under a certain amount of pressure thus far in 2020. Some analysts warn that Sinaloa remains powerful given its dominance internationally and its infiltration of the upper reaches of the Mexican government. Other analysts maintain that Sinaloa is in decline, citing its breakup into factions and violence from inter- and intra-organizational tensions. The CJNG tensions. Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación–CJNG–has evidently battled withagainst its former partner, Sinaloa, in a number of regions, and has been deemed by several authorities Mexico's new most powerful and expansive crime syndicate.

to be Mexico’s new most expansive cartel. Friction between the two factions of the Sinaloa organization intensified in May and June 2020, with violent infighting between a faction led by El Chapo’s children (known collectively as “Los Chapitos”) and those aligned with a faction under El Mayo.86 Juárez/Carrillo Fuentes Organization Juárez/Carrillo Fuentes Organization

Based in the border city of Ciudad Juárez in the central northern state of Chihuahua, the once-powerful Juárez DTO controlled the smuggling corridor between Ciudad Juárez and El Paso, TX, in the 1980s and 1990s.⁸⁴87 By some accounts, the Juárez DTO controlled at least half of all Mexican narcotics trafficking under the leadership of its founder, Amado Carrillo Fuentes. Vicente Carrillo Fuentes, Amado'’s brother, took over the leadership of the cartel when Amado died during plastic surgery in 1997 and reportedly led the Juárez organization until his arrest in October 2014.

In 2008, the Juárez DTO broke from the Sinaloa federation, with which it had been allied since 2002.⁸⁵88 The ensuing rivalry between the Juárez DTO and the Sinaloa DTO helped to turn Ciudad Juárez into one of the most violent cities in the world. From 2008 to 2011, the Sinaloa DTO and the Juárez DTO fought a "“turf war,"” and Ciudad Juárez experienced a wave of violence with 83 Kyra Gurney, “Sinaloa Cartel Leader ‘El Azul’ Dead? ‘El Mayo’ Now in Control?,” InSight Crime, June 9, 2014. Juan José Esparragoza Moreno supposedly died of a heart attack while recovering from injuries sustained in a car accident. 84 Observers dispute the extent to which Guzmán made key strategic decisions for Sinaloa. Some maintain he was a figurehead whose arrest had little impact on Sinaloa’s functioning, as he ceded operational tasks to “El Mayo” and Esparragoza long before his arrest. 85 “Revelan Estructura y Enemigos de ‘El Chapo’,” Excélsior, March 26, 2014; Bailey, “Drug Trafficking Organizations and Democratic Governance,” p. 119. 86 Parker Asmann, “Three Massacres Expose Weakness of Mexico’s ‘Catch-all’ Security Policy,” InSight Crime, July 9, 2019. 87 Bailey, “Drug Trafficking Organizations and Democratic Governance,” p. 121. 88 Some analysts trace the origins of the split to a personal feud between El Chapo Guzmán of the Sinaloa DTO and former ally Vicente Carrillo Fuentes. In 2004, Guzmán allegedly ordered the killing of Rodolfo Carrillo Fuentes, another of Vicente’s brothers. Guzmán’s son, Edgar, was killed in May 2008, allegedly on orders from Carrillo Fuentes. See Alfredo Corchado, “Juárez Drug Violence Not Likely to Go Away Soon, Authorities Say,” Dallas Morning News, May 17, 2010. Congressional Research Service 20 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations and Ciudad Juárez experienced a wave of violence with spikes in homicides, extortion, kidnapping, and theft—at one point reportedly experiencing 10 murders a day.⁸⁶89 From 2008 to 2012, the violence in Juárez cost about 10,000 lives. Reportedly, more than 15% of the population displaced by drug-related violence inside Mexico between 2006 toand 2010 came from the border city, while havingeven though it had only slightly more than 1% of Mexico's ’s population.⁸⁷

90 Traditionally a major trafficker of both marijuana and South American cocaine, the Juárez Cartel has becomebecame active in opium cultivation and heroin production, according to the DEA. Between 2012 and 2013 , violence dropped considerably and this was attributed by, which some analysts attributed to both the actions of the police and to President Calderón'’s socioeconomic program Todos Somos JuárezJuárez, or We Are All Juarez.⁸⁸ Other analysts credit the Sinaloa DTO withJuárez.91 Some analysts posit Sinaloa’s success in its battle over the JuarezJuárez DTO after 2012. They consider Sinaloa's dominance, perhaps abetted by local authorities, to be as the reason for the relatively peaceful and unchallenged control of the border city despite the Juárez DTO'’s continued presence in the state.92 s continued presence in the state of Chihuahua.⁸⁹

Many residents who fled during the years of intense drug-related violence remain reluctant to return to Juárez and cite the elevated homicide rate as one reason.⁹⁰ The El Paso and Juárez transit route experienced regular violenceroute again appears to be in flux with the rise in killings on the Mexican side of the border since 2016, however, largely thought to be a battle for control between Sinaloa and CJNG and through their proxies.93 since 2016.⁹¹ In 2018, the two cities with the highest number of intentional homicides were Tijuana in Baja, California, followed by Ciudad Juárez.⁹²

Gulf DTO

Gulf DTO Based in the border city of Matamoros, Tamaulipas, with operations in other Mexican states on the Gulf side of Mexico, the Gulf DTO was a transnational smuggling operation with agents in Central and South America.⁹³94 The Gulf DTO was the main competitor challenging Sinaloa for trafficking routes in the early 2000s, but it now battles its former enforcement wing, Los Zetas, over territory in northeastern Mexico. The Gulf DTO reportedly hashas reportedly split into several competing gangs. Some analysts no longer consider it a whole entity and maintain that it is so fragmented that factions of its original factions are fighting.⁹⁴

95 The Gulf DTO arose in the bootlegging era of the 1920s. In the 1980s, its leader, Juan García AbregoÁbrego, developed ties to Colombia'’s Cali Cartel as well as to the Mexican federal police. García AbregoÁbrego was captured in 1996 near Monterrey, Mexico.⁹⁵96 His violent successor, Osiel Cárdenas Guillén, successfully corrupted elite Mexican military forces to become his hired assassins. Those corrupted military personnel became known as Los Zetas when they fused with the Gulf Cartel. In the early 2000s, Gulf was considered one of the most powerful Mexican DTOs. Cárdenas was 89 Steven Dudley, “Police Use Brute Force to Break Crime’s Hold on Juárez,” InSight Crime, February 13, 2013. Some Mexican newspapers such as El Diario reported more than 300 homicides a month in 2010 when the violence peaked. 90 For an in-depth narrative of the conflict in Juárez and its aftermath, see Steven Dudley, “Juárez: After the War,” InSight Crime, February 13, 2013. For a discussion of out-migration from the city due to drug-related violence, see Viridiana Rios Contreras, “The Role of Drug-Related Violence and Extortion in Promoting Mexican Migration: Unexpected Consequences of a Drug War,” Latin America Research Review, vol. 49, no. 3 (2014). 91 Calderón launched Todos Somos Juárez and sent the Mexican military into Ciudad Juárez in an effort to drive out DTO proxies and operatives. “Calderón Defiende la Estrategia en Ciudad Juárez en Publicación de Harvard,” CNN Mexico, February 17, 2013. See also CRS Report R41349, U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond, by Clare Ribando Seelke and Kristin Finklea. 92 See Steven Dudley, “How Juárez’s Police, Politicians Picked Winners of Drug War,” InSight Crime, February 13, 2013. 93 Daniel Borunda, “Mexican Army Again to Patrol Juárez; Military to Increase Presence After Surge in Violence Across Chihuahua,” El Paso Times, May 14, 2018. 94 Bailey, “Drug Trafficking Organizations and Democratic Governance,” p. 120. 95 Scott Stewart, “Tracking Mexico’s Cartels in 2018,” Stratfor Worldview, February 1, 2018. 96 Steven Dudley and Sandra Rodríguez, Civil Society, the Government and the Development of Citizen Security, Wilson Center Mexico Institute, Working Paper, August 2013, p. 11. Congressional Research Service 21 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations In the early 2000s, Gulf was considered one of the most powerful Mexican DTOs. Cárdenas was arrested by Mexican authorities in 2003, but he continued to run his drug enterprise from prison until his extradition to the United States in 2007.⁹⁶

97 Tensions between the Gulf DTO and Los Zetas culminated in their split in 2010. Antonio "Tony Tormenta"“Tony Tormenta” Cárdenas Guillén, Osiel'’s brother, was killed that year, and leadership of the Gulf went to another high-level Gulf lieutenant, Jorge Eduardo Costilla SanchezSánchez, also known as "“El Coss,"” until his arrest in 2012. Exactly what instigated the Zetas and Gulf split has not been determined, but the growing strength of the paramilitary group and its leader was a factor. Some analysts say theLos Zetas blamed the Gulf DTO for the murder of a Zeta close to their leader, which sparked the rift.⁹⁷98 Others posit that the split happened earlier, but the Zetas organization that had brought both military discipline and sophisticated firepower to cartel combat was clearly acting independently by 2010. independently by 2010. Regardless, the ensuing bitter conflict between the Gulf DTO and Los Zetas has been identified as the "most violent in the history of organized crime in Mexico."⁹⁸

Mexican federal forces identified and targeted a dozen Gulf and Zeta bosses they believed responsible for the wave of violence in Tamaulipas in 2014.⁹⁹99 Analysts have reported that the structures of both the Gulf DTO and Los Zetas have been decimated by federal action and combat between each other, and both groups now operate largely as fragmented cells that do not communicate with each other and often take on new names.¹⁰⁰

From 2014 through 2016, some media sources outside of the state of Tamaulipas and anonymous social media accounts from within Tamaulipas100 From 2014 through 2016, Tamaulipas state reported daily kidnappings, daytime shootings, and burned-burned down bars and restaurants in towns and cities in many parts of the state, such as the port city of Tampico. Like theLos Zetas, fragmented cells of the Gulf DTO have expanded into other criminal operations, such as fuel theft, kidnapping, and widespread extortion. In the 20182019 NDTA, the DEA maintains that the Gulf Cartel, which has been around for several decades, today concentrates ontraditionally focused on the cocaine and marijuana trade but "also recentlyhas expanded into heroin and methamphetamine ... [and], and it smuggles a majority of its drug shipments into South Texas through the border region between the Rio Grande Valley and South Padre Island."¹⁰¹

.101 Los Zetas

This group originally consisted of former elite airborne special force members of the Mexican Armyarmy who defected to the Gulf DTO and became its hired assassins.¹⁰²102 Although Zeta members are part of a prominent transnational DTO, their main asset is not drug smuggling but organized violence. They have evolved from the armed wing of the Gulf Cartel to an outfit in their own right that amassed significant power to carry out an extractive business model—, thus generating revenue from crimes, such as fuel theft, extortion, human smuggling, piracy, and kidnapping, that are widely seen to inflict more suffering on the Mexican public than which are 97 George W. Grayson, Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State? (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2010). 98 Eduardo Guerrero Gutiérrez, “El Dominio del Miedo,” Nexos, July 1, 2014. Suspecting the Gulf DTO of the death of Sergio Mendoza, the founder of Los Zetas, Heriberto “El Lazco” Lazcano reportedly offered a 24-hour amnesty period for Gulf operatives to claim responsibility, which they never did. This event, some scholars maintain, was the origin of the split between the groups. 99 Jorge Monroy, “Caen Tres Lideres de Los Zetas y Cartel de Golfo,” El Economista, June 18, 2014. In June 2014, Mexican marines captured three of those identified. 100 Interview with Eduardo Guerrero, June 2014. “Balkanization,” or decentralization of the structure of the organization, does not necessarily indicate that a criminal group is weak but simply that it lacks a strong central leadership. Also, news outlets inside Tamaulipas remain some of the most threatened by DTO cells, so they are reluctant to report on criminal violence and its consequences. 101 DEA, 2019 NDTA. 102 Most reports indicate that Los Zetas were created by a group of 30 lieutenants and sublieutenants who deserted from the Mexican military’s Special Mobile Force Group (Grupos Aeromóviles de Fuerzas Especiales, GAFES) to join the Gulf Cartel in the late 1990s. Congressional Research Service 22 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations widely seen to inflict more suffering on the Mexican public than does transnational drug trafficking.¹⁰³

103 Los Zetas had a significant presence in several Mexican states on the Gulf (eastern) side of the country, and extended their reach to Ciudad Juárez (Chihuahua) and some Pacific states, and. They also operate in Central and South America. More aggressive than other groups, Los Zetas used intimidation as a strategy to maintain control of territory, making use of social media and public displays of bodies and body parts to send messages to frighten Mexican security forces, the local citizenry, and rival organizations. Sometimes smaller gangs and organizations use the "Zeta" “Zeta” name to tap into the benefits of the Zeta reputation or "“brand."

” Unlike many other DTOs, Los Zetas have not attempted to win the been less inclined to attempt to win support of local populations inof the territory in which they operate, and they have allegedly killed many civilians. They are linked to a number of massacres, such as the 2011 firebombing of a casino in Monterrey that killed 53 people and the 2011 torture and mass execution of 193 migrants who were traveling through northern Mexico by bus.¹⁰⁴104 Los Zetas are known to kill those who cannot pay extortion fees or who refuse to work for them, often targeting migrants.¹⁰⁵

105 In 2012, Mexican marines killed longtime Zeta leader Heriberto Lazcano (alias "“El Lazca"”), one of the founders of Los Zetas, in a shoot-outshootout in the northern state of Coahuila.¹⁰⁶106 The capture of his successor, Miguel AngelÁngel Treviño Morales, (alias "“Z-40”),," notorious for his brutality, in 2013 by Mexican federal authorities was a second blow to the group. Some analysts date the beginning of the "“loss of coherence"” of Los Zetas to Lazcano's killing and consider the ensuing arrest of Treviño Morales to be the event which accelerated the group's decline. In March 2015, Treviño Morales's brother Omar, who was thought to have taken over leadership of Los Zetas, also was arrested in a joint operation by the Mexican federal police and military’s killing. According to Mexico's’s former attorney general, federal government efforts against the cartels through April 2015, hit theLos Zetas the hardest, with more than 30 of their leaders removed.¹⁰⁷

107 Los Zetas are known for their diversification and expansion into other criminal activities, such as fuel theft, extortion, kidnapping, human smuggling, and arms trafficking. According to media coverage, losses by Pemex, Mexico's state oil company, announced that it lost more than $1.15 billion in 2014 due to oil siphoning and about three times that amount in recent years from siphoned off oil’s state oil company, from siphoned off oil in recent years have exceeded $3 billion. In 2017, the Atlantic Council released a report estimating that Los Zetas controlcontrols about 40% of the market in stolen oil. Los Zetas have resisted government attempts to curtail their sophisticated networks,¹⁰⁸ Most incidents of illegal siphoning occur in the Mexican Gulf states of Tamaulipas and Veracruz.

.108 Although many observers dispute the scope of the territory now held by major Los Zetas factions and how that fragmentation influenced the formerly cohesive group'’s prospects, most concur that the organization is no longer as powerful as it was during the peak of its dominance in 2011 and 2012. Two knownrival factions are Cartel del Noreste (CDN), a re-branded version of the traditional core of Los Zetas, and the Old School Zetas, known by their Spanish acronym EV. One scholar has characterized how Los Zetas succeeded in spinning off powerful franchises or cells after 103 Bailey, “Drug Trafficking Organizations and Democratic Governance,” p. 120; interview with Alejandro Hope, Wilson Center, July 2014. 104 George Grayson, The Evolution of Los Zetas in Mexico and Central America: Sadism as an Instrument of Cartel Warfare (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2014), p. 9. 105 According to Grayson, Los Zetas are also believed to kill members of law enforcement officials’ families in revenge for action taken against the organization, reportedly even targeting families of fallen military men. 106 Will Grant, “Heriberto Lazcano: The Fall of a Mexican Drug Lord,” BBC News, October 13, 2012. 107 “Los Zetas Are the Criminal Organization Hardest Hit by the Mexican Government,” Southernpulse.info, May 13, 2015. 108 Michael Lohmuller, “Will Pemex’s Plan to Fight Mexico Oil Thieves Work?,” InSight Crime, February 18, 2015; Ian M. Ralby, Downstream Oil Theft: Global Modalities, Trends, and Remedies, Atlantic Council, January 2017. Congressional Research Service 23 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations leadership decapitation.109 According to the 2019 NDTA, Los Zetas continue to traffic a range of drugs, including heroin and cocaine, through distribution hubs in Laredo, Dallas, and New Orleans. factions are Old School Zetas (Escuela Vieja, or EV) and the more mainstream faction that has continued with the traditional core of the Zetas, Cartel del Noreste (CDN).

Beltrán Leyva Organization

Beltrán Leyva Organization Before 2008, the Beltrán Leyva Organization (BLO) was part of the Sinaloa federation and controlled access to the U.S. border in Mexico'’s Sonora state. The Beltrán Leyva brothers developed close ties with Sinaloa head Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzmán and his family, along with other Sinaloa-based top leadership. The January 2008 arrest of BLO'’s leader, Alfredo Beltrán Leyva, through intelligence reportedly provided by Guzmán, triggered BLO'’s split from the Sinaloa DTO.¹⁰⁹110 The two organizations have remained bitter rivals since.

The organization suffered a series of setbacks at the hands of the Mexican security forces, beginning with the 2009 killing of Arturo Beltrán Leyva, followed closely by the arrest of Carlos Beltrán Levya. In 2010, the organization broke up when the remaining brother, Héctor Beltrán Leyva, took the remnants of BLO and rebranded it as the South Pacific (Pacifico Sur) Cartel. Another top lieutenant, Edgar "“La Barbie"” Valdez Villarreal, took a faction loyal to him and formed the Independent Cartel of Acapulco, which he led until his arrest in 2010.¹¹⁰111 The South Pacific Cartel appeared to retake the name Beltrán Leyva Organization and achieved renewed prominence under Hector Beltrán Leyva'’s leadership, until his arrest in 2014.

Splinter organizations have arisen since 2010, such as the Guerreros Unidos and Los Rojos, among at least five others with roots in BLO. Los Rojos operates in Guerrero and relies heavily on kidnapping and extortion for revenue as well as trafficking cocaine, although analysts dispute the scope of its involvement in the drug trade.¹¹¹112 The Guerreros Unidos traffics cocaine as far north as Chicago in the United States and reportedly operates primarily in the central and Pacific states of Guerrero, México, and Morelos. The Guerreros Unidos, according to Mexican authorities, was responsible for taking theauthorities in the Peña Nieto government, murdered 43 Mexican teacher trainees, who were handed to them by local authorities in Iguala, Guerrero; the group subsequently murdered the students and burned their bodies.¹¹² The lack of a hegemonic DTO in Guerrero has led to significant infighting between DTO factions and brutal intra-cartel competition, resulting in the state of Guerrero having the highest number of homicides and kidnappings in the country in 2013 and the second most after the state of México in 2014.¹¹³ In the 2017 NDTA, DEA maintains that the Guerreros Unidos are known to traffic heroin and other drugs into the United States.

Guerrero, and then burned their bodies.113 Like other DTOs, the BLO was believed to have infiltrated the upper levels of the Mexican government for at least part of its history, but whatever reach it once had has likely declined significantly after Mexican authorities arrested many of its leaders. According to the 2019 NDTA, 109 See, for example, Guadaulpe Correa-Cabrera, Los Zetas Inc.: Criminal Corporations, Energy, and Civil War in Mexico (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2017). 110 See InSight Crime profile, “Beltrán Leyva Organization.” The profile suggests that Guzmán gave authorities information on Alfredo Beltrán Leyva to secure Guzmán’s son’s release from prison. 111 Edgar Valdez is an American-born smuggler from Laredo, TX, and allegedly started his career in the United States dealing marijuana. His nickname is “La Barbie” due to his fair hair and eyes. Nicholas Casey and José de Córdoba, “Alleged Drug Kingpin Is Arrested in Mexico,” Wall Street Journal, August 31, 2010. La Barbie, a former Beltrán Leyva Organization (BLO) operative and Sinaloa Cartel ally, was arrested in Mexico in 2010 and later extradited to the United States in 2015. After originally pleading not guilty, he eventually reached a plea deal with U.S. prosecutors and in June 2018 was sentenced to nearly 50 years in prison. Parker Asmann, “Was Mexico Cartel Enforcer ‘La Barbie’ a U.S. Informant?,” InSight Crime, June 15, 2020, https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/mexico-la-barbie-informant/. 112 Marguerite Cawley, “Murder Spike in Guerrero, Mexico Points to Criminal Power Struggle,” InSight Crime, May 30, 2014; “Mexico Nabs Drug Gang Leader in State of Guerrero,” Associated Press, May 17, 2014. 113 According to the profile of Guerreros Unidos on the InSight Crime website, an alleged leader of the group is the brother-in-law of the former mayor of Iguala. Congressional Research Service 24 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations the BLO splinter factions rely on loose alliances with the CJNG, the Juárez Cartel, and elements of Los Zetas to move drugs across the border.114 La Familia Michoacana La Familia Michoacana

Based originally in the Pacific state of Michoacán, La Familia Michoacana (LFM) traces its roots back to the 1980s. Formerly aligned with Los Zetas before the group'’s split from the Gulf DTO, LFM announced its intent to operate independently from Los Zetas in 2006, declaring that LFM's ’s mission was to protect Michoacán from drug traffickers, including its new enemies, Los Zetas.¹¹⁵ 115 From 2006 to 2010, LFM acquired notoriety for its use of extreme, symbolic violence, military tactics gleaned from theLos Zetas, and a pseudo-ideological or religious justification for its existence.¹¹⁶116 LFM members reportedly made donations of food, medical care, schools, and other social services to benefit the poor in rural communities to project a populist "“Robin Hood"” image.

In 2010, however, LFM played a less prominent role, and in November 2010, LFM reportedly called for a truce with the Mexican government and announced it would disband.¹¹⁷117 A month later, spiritual leader and co-founder Nazario "“El Más Loco"” Moreno González reportedly was was reportedly killed, although authorities claimed that his body was stolen.¹¹⁸118 The body was never recovered, and Moreno González reappeared in another shoot-outshootout with Mexican federal police in 2014, after which his death was officially confirmed.¹¹⁹119 Moreno González had been nurturing the development of a new criminal organization that emerged in early 2011, calling itself the Knights Templar and claiming to be a successor or offshoot of LFM.¹²⁰

Though "officially"120 Though “officially” disbanded, LFM remained in operation, even after the 2011 arrest of leader José de Jesús Méndez Vargas (alias "“El Chango"”), who allegedly took over after Moreno González'González’s disappearance.¹²¹121 Though largely fragmented, remaining cells of LFM are still active in trafficking, kidnapping, and extortion in Guerrero and Mexico states, especially in the working-class suburbs around Mexico City through 2014.¹²²122 Observers report that LFM had been largely driven out of Michoacán by the Knights Templar, although a group calling itself the New Family Michoacan, La Nueva Familia Michoacana, has been reported to be active in parts of Guerrero and Michoacán. As a DTO, LFM has specialized in methamphetamine production and smuggling, along with some trafficking of other synthetic drugs. It also hashas also been known to traffic marijuana and cocaine and to tax and regulate the production of heroin.

Knights Templar

The Knights Templar began as a splinter group from La Familia Michoacana 114 DEA, 2019 NDTA. 115 Alejandro Suverza, “El Evangelio Según La Familia,” Nexos, January 1, 2009. For more on its early history, see InSight Crime’s profile on La Familia Michoacana (LFM). 116 In 2006, LFM gained notoriety when it rolled five severed heads allegedly of rival criminals across a discotheque dance floor in Uruapan. La Familia Michoacana was known for leaving signs (“narcomantas”) on corpses and at crime scenes that referred to LFM actions as “divine justice.” William Finnegan, “Silver or Lead,” New Yorker, May 31, 2010. 117 “Mexican Drug Wars: Bloodiest Year to Date,” Stratfor Worldview, December 20, 2010. 118 Dudley Althaus, “Ghost of ‘The Craziest One’ Is Alive in Mexico,” InSight Crime, June 11, 2013. 119 Mark Stevenson and E. Eduardo Castillo, “Mexico Cartel Leader Thrived by Playing Dead,” Associated Press, March 10, 2014. 120 The Knights Templar was purported to be founded and led by Servando “La Tuta” Gómez, a former school teacher and a lieutenant to Moreno Gonzáles. However, after Moreno González’s faked demise, taking advantage of his death in the eyes of Mexican authorities, Moreno González and Gómez founded the Knights Templar together in the wake of a dispute with LFM leader José de Jesús Méndez Vargas, who stayed on with the LFM. See Falko A. Ernst, “Seeking a Place in History—Nazario Moreno’s Narco Messiah,” InSight Crime, March 13, 2014. 121 Adriana Gómez Licón, “Mexico Nabs Leader of Cult-Like La Familia Cartel,” Associated Press, June 21, 2011. 122 CRS interview with Dudley Althaus, June 2014. Congressional Research Service 25 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations Knights Templar The Knights Templar began as a splinter group from LFM, announcing its presence in Michoacán in 2011. Similar to LFM, the Knights Templar began as a vigilante group, claiming to protect the residents of Michoacán from other criminal groups, such as theLos Zetas, but in reality it operated as a DTO. The Knights Templar is known for the trafficking and manufacture of methamphetamine, but the organization also moves cocaine and marijuana north. Like LFM, it preaches its own version of evangelical Christianity and claims to have a commitment to "“social justice,"” while being the source of much of the insecurity in Michoacán and surrounding states.

In 2013, frustration Frustration with the perceived ineffectiveness of Mexican law enforcement in combating predatory criminal groups led to the birth in Michoacán of "“autodefensa"” or self-defense organizations, particularly in the tierra calienteTierra Caliente region in the southwestern part of the state. Composed of citizens from a wide range of backgrounds—farmers, ranchers, businessmen, former DTO operatives, and others—the self-defense militias primarily targeted members of the Knights Templar.¹²³ Local business owners, who had grown weary of widespread extortion and hyper-violent crime that was ignored by corrupt local and state police, provided seed funding to resource the militias in Michoacán, but authorities cautioned that some of the self-defense groups had extended their search for resources and weapons to competing crime syndicates, such as the CJNG. Despite some analysts'’ contention that ties to rival criminal groups are highly likely, other observers are careful not to condemn the entire self-defense movement. These analysts acknowledgeThey note some gains in the effort to combat the Knights Templar that had not been made by government security forceswhen government security forces had been unsuccessful, although conflict between self-defense groups also has led to violent battles.

has also led to violence. The Knights Templar reportedly has has reportedly emulated LFM'’s penchant for diversification into other crime, such as extortion. The Knights Templar battled the LFM, and by 2012 its control of Michoacán was nearly as widespread as LFM's once hadLFM’s had once been, especially by demanding that local businesses pay it tribute through hefty levieslevies. According to avocado growers in the rural state who provide more than half the global supply, the LFM and the Knights Templar have seriously cut into their profits. The Knights Templar also moved aggressively into illegal mining, such as mining iron ore from illegally operated mines. Through mid-2014, the Knights Templar reportedly had had reportedly been using Mexico'Mexico’s largest port, Lázaro Cárdenas, located in the southern tip of Michoacán, to smuggle illegally mined iron ore, among other illicit goods.¹²⁴123 Analysts and Mexican officials, however, suggest that a 2014 federal occupation of Lázaro Cárdenas resulted in an "“impasse,"” rendering DTOs unable to receive and send shipments.124 rendering DTOs unable to receive and send shipments.¹²⁵

The Mexican government and self-defense forces delivered heavy blows to the Knights Templar, especially with the confirmed killing in March 2014 of Nazario Moreno González, who led the Knights, and the killing of Enrique Plancarte, another top leader, several weeks later.¹²⁹125 Previously, the self-defense forces and the Knights Templar reportedly hadhad reportedly split Michoacán roughly into two, although other criminal organizations continued to operate successfully in the area. In February 2015, the Knights Templar DTO leader Servando "“La Tuta" Gomez” Gómez was captured. The former schoolteacher had taken risks by being interviewed in the media. With La Tuta'’s arrest, the fortunes of the Knights Templar plummeted. 123 Reuters, “Mexico Seizes Tonnes of Minerals in Port Plagued by Drug Gangs,” March 3, 2014. The Knights Templar shared control with the powerful Sinaloa DTO. Both groups reportedly received shipments of cocaine from South America and precursor chemicals used to produce methamphetamines largely from Asia. 124 Interview with Eduardo Guerrero, July 2014. 125 Olga R. Rodriguez, “Mexican Marines Kill Templar Cartel’s Leader,” Associated Press, April 1, 2014. Congressional Research Service 26 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations Cártel Jalisco Nuevo Generación fortunes of the Knights Templar plummeted.

Cartel Jalisco-New Generation

Originally known as the Zeta Killers, the CJNG made its first appearance in 2011 with a roadside display of the bodies of 35 alleged members of Los Zetas.¹³⁰ The group is based in Jalisco state with operations in central Mexico, including the states of Colima, Michoacán, MexicoMéxico State, Guerrero, and Guanajuato.¹³¹126 It has grown into a dominant force in the states of the Tierra Caliente, including Guerrero and Michoacán. Reportedly, it has been led by many former associates of slain Sinaloa DTO leader Ignacio "Nacho" Coronel, who operated his faction in Jalisco until he was killed by Mexico's security forces in July 2010.¹³², including parts of Guerrero, Michoacán, and the state of Mexico. The CJNG has early roots in the Milenio Cartel, which was active before 2010 in the Tierra Caliente region of southern Mexico.127 The CJNGin the tierra caliente region of southern Mexico before it disintegrated in 2009.¹³³ The group is a by-product of the Milenio Cartel's collapse and was allied with the Sinaloa federation until 2014.¹³⁴

Cartel Jalisco-New Generation reportedly served as an enforcement group for the Sinaloa DTO until summer 2013.the summer of 2013.128 Analysts and Mexican authorities have suggested that the split between Sinaloa and CJNG is one of the many indications of a general fragmentation of crime groups. Ruben Oseguera Cervantes, alias "El Mencho," a top wanted fugitive by the DEA, is the group's current leader.¹³⁵ The Mexican military delivered a blow to the CJNG with the July 2013 capture of its leader'’s deputy, Victor Hugo "“El Tornado"” Delgado Renteria. He was replaced by the current leader, Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, known as El Mencho Delgado Renteria. In January 2014, the Mexican government arrested the leader's son, Rubén Oseguera González (also known as "El Menchito")’s son, Rubén “El Menchito” Oseguera, believed to be CJNG'the CJNG’s second-in-command. However, El Menchito, who was released by Mexican judges twice, was re-arrested by Mexican authorities and later extradited to the United States in February 2020.129 In 2015, the Mexican government declared the CJNG one of the most dangerous cartels in the country. In El Menchito, who has dual U.S.-Mexican citizenship, was released in December 2014 due to lack of evidence in a federal case. Captured again in late June 2015, El Menchito was again released by a judge. On July 3, 2015, he was rearrested by Mexican authorities; he is being held in the Miahutlan, Oaxaca, maximum-security prison.¹³⁶

In 2015, the Mexican government declared CJNG one of the most dangerous cartels in the country and one of two with the most extensive reach.¹³⁷ In October 2016, the U.S. Department of the Treasury echoed the Mexican government when it described the group as one of the world's "’s “most prolific and violent drug trafficking organizations."¹³⁸”130 According to some analysts, the CJNG has operations throughout the Americas, Asia, and Europe. The group allegedly isis allegedly responsible for distributing cocaine and methamphetamine along "“10,000 kilometers of the Pacific coast in a route that extends from the Southern Cone to the border of the United States and Canada."¹³⁹

”131 To best understand CJNG'the CJNG’s international reach, it is important to first consider its expansion within Mexico. In 2016, many analysts maintained the cartel had presence throughout the country in a combined area that made up nearly half of Mexico.¹⁴⁰ Recent reports indicate the group has pushed further into Aguas Calientes, San Luis Potosi, and Zacatecas statesthat CJNG controlled a territory equivalent to almost half of Mexico. The group has battled Los Zetas and Gulf Cartel factions in Tabasco, Veracruz, and Guanajuato, and it has battled the Sinaloa federation in the Baja peninsulas and Chihuahua.¹⁴¹132 The CJNG'’s ambitious expansion campaign has led to high levels of violence, particularly in Ciudad Juarez and Tijuana, where it has clashed with the Sinaloa federation for control of the lucrative heroin trade and corresponding smuggling routes.¹⁴²Juárez and Tijuana.133 The group also has has also been linked to several mass graves in southwestern Mexico and was responsible for shooting down ana Mexican army helicopter in 2015, the first successful takedown of a military asset of its kind in Mexico.¹⁴³

CJNG'134 126 “Se Pelean el Estado de México 4 Carteles,” El Siglo de Torreón, March 2, 2014; CRS interview with Dudley Althaus, 2014. 127 “Tracking Mexico’s Cartels in 2017,” Stratfor Worldview, February 3, 2017. 128 Reportedly, CJNG’s leadership was originally composed of former associates of slain Sinaloa DTO leader Ignacio “Nacho” Coronel, who operated his Sinaloa faction in Jalisco until he was killed by security forces in July 2010. 129 Juan Carlos Huerta Vázquez, “‘El Menchito’, un Desafío para la PGR,” Proceso, January 15, 2016. 130 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Individuals Supporting Powerful Mexico-Based Drug Cartels,” press release, October 27, 2016. 131 Luis Alonso Pérez, “Mexico’s Jalisco Cartel—New Generation: From Extinction to World Domination,” InSight Crime and Animal Político, December 26, 2016. 132 “Tracking Mexico’s Cartels in 2017,” Stratfor Worldview, February 3, 2017. 133 Deborah Bonello, “After Decade-Long Drug War, Mexico Needs New Ideas,” InSight Crime 2016 GameChangers: Tracking the Evolution of Organized Crime in the Americas, January 4, 2017. 134 Angel Rabasa et al., Counterwork: Countering the Expansion of Transnational Criminal Networks, RAND Corporation, 2017. Congressional Research Service 27 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations The CJNG’s efforts to dominate key ports on both the Pacific and Gulf Coasts have allowed it to consolidate important components of the global narcotics supply chain. In particular, the CJNG asserts control over the ports of Veracruz, Mazanillo, and Lázaro CardenasCárdenas, which has given the group access to precursor chemicals that flow into Mexico from China and other parts of Latin America.¹⁴⁴ 135 As a result, the CJNG has been able to pursue an aggressive growth strategy, underwritten by U.S. demand for Mexican methamphetamine, heroin, and fentanyl.¹⁴⁵

Despite leadership losses, Cartel Jalisco-New Generation136 Despite leadership losses, the CJNG has extended its geographic reach and maintained its own cohesion while exploiting the splintering of the Sinaloa organization. It is considered a newer and an extremely powerful cartel, based in Mexico's second-largest city of Guadalajara, and haswith a presence in 2227 of 32 Mexican states in 2020.. Its reputation for extreme and intimidating violence continues, as well. In August 2019, 19 bodies were found on display in Uruapan in the southwestern state of Michoacán accredited to CJNG, including several bodies that were dismembered and 9 that were hung from an overpass.¹⁴⁶

. The daylight ambush of Mexico City’s chief of police Omar García Harfuch in late June 2020 was preceded by publicized threats that targeted him and the Jalisco state governor, Enrique Alfaro. Press reports say the tally of CJNG’s attacks on Jalisco public officials exceeds 100, including lawmakers, federal, state and local police, soldiers, and Jalisco’s minister of tourism. Notably, the DEA considers CJNG a top U.S. threat and Mexico’s most well-armed DTO and has offered a $10 million reward for information leading to the arrest of El Mencho, who is believed to be hiding in the mountains of Jalisco, Michoacán, and Colima. He is a former police officer who once served time for heroin trafficking in California. CJNG was the target of a major DEA operation in March 2020 that resulted in some 600 arrests.137 Fragmentation, Competition, and Diversification Fragmentation, Competition, and Diversification

As stated earlier, DTOs today are more fragmented and more competitive than in the past. However, analysts disagree about the extent of this fragmentation, its importance, and whether the group of smaller organizations will be easier to dismantle. Fragmentation that began in 2010 and accelerated in 2011 redefined the "battlefield"“battlefield” and brought new actors, such as Los Zetas and the Knights Templar, to the fore. In 2018, an array of smaller organizations were active, and some of the once-small groups, such as the CJNG, entered the space left after other DTOs were dismantled. Recently, some analysts have identified the CJNG as a cartel with national reach like the Sinaloa DTO, although it originally waswas originally an allied faction or the armed wing of Sinaloa organization.

A newer cartel, known as Los Cuinis, also was was also identified as a major organization in 2015. In April 2015, the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)’s OFAC named both the CJNG and Los Cuinis as Specially Designated Narcotics Traffickers under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act. According to an OFAC statement, the Los Cuinis DTO has become "“one of the most powerful and violent drug cartels in Mexico."¹⁴⁷”138 Other analysts view the fragments as the cause of heightened violence but note that groups appear less able to challenge the national government and engage in some types of transnational crimecrimes, including drug trafficking.

Contrary to the experience in Colombia in the 1980s and 1990s, with the sequential dismantling of the enormous MedellinMedellín and Cali cartels, fragmentation in Mexico has been associated with resurging violence.¹⁴⁸ A "kingpin strategy" 135 “Tracking Mexico’s Cartels in 2017,” Stratfor Worldview, February 3, 2017. 136 Bonello, “After Decade-Long Drug War.” 137 Montes and Córdoba, “Cartel Becomes Top Mexico Threat.” Sieff, “Mexico’s Bold Jalisco Cartel Places Elite in Its Sights.” See also U.S. Department of Justice, “DEA-Led Operation Nets More Than 600 Arrests Targeting Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación,” press release, March 11, 2020. 138 See U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Business Network of the Los Cuinis Drug Trafficking Organization,” press release, August 19, 2015. Congressional Research Service 28 link to page 34 Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations resurging violence.139 A kingpin strategy implemented by the Mexican government has incapacitated numerous top- and mid-level leaders in all the major DTOs, either through arrest or deaths in arrest efforts. However, this strategy contributed to violent succession struggles, shifting alliances among the DTOs, a proliferation of new gangs and small DTOs, and the replacement of existing leaders and criminal groups by even more violent ones.

The ephemeral prominence of some new gangs and DTOs, regional changes in the power balance betweenamong different groups, and their shifting allegiances often catalyzed by government enforcement actions make it difficult to portrayelusive an accurate portrait of the current Mexican criminal landscape. The Stratfor Global Intelligence group contends that the rival crime networks are best understood in regional groupings and that at least three geographic identities emerged by 2015, which essentially endure. Those umbrella groups are Tamaulipas State, Sinaloa State, and Tierra Caliente regional group. This framework also shows several states and regions of Mexico where the activities of these three regional groups mix, as in the eastern state of Veracruz, which is a mix of elements from the Tierra Caliente and the Tamaulipas umbrella groups. (See map by Stratfor, Figure 3.)¹⁴⁹

Some believe diversificationcriminal landscape. As noted earlier, in the last months of 2019, almost all the investigations of flagrant incidents of violence involving the DTOs in Sinaloa state, the Tierra Caliente region, and the Mexican border states were committed by fragments of formerly cohesive criminal groups. Diversification of the DTOs and their evolution into poly-crime outfits may be evidence of organizational vitality and growth. Others contend that diversification signals that U.S. and Mexican drug enforcement measures are cutting into profits from drug trafficking or constitutes a response to shifting U.S. drug consumption patterns. This includespatterns, such as legalization of marijuana in some states and Canada and a large increase in demand for plant-based and synthetic opioids.140 Outlook The goal of successive Mexican governments has been to diminish the extent and character of the DTOs’demand for plant-based and synthetic opioids.¹⁵⁰

Figure 3. Stratfor Cartel Map by Region of Influence (2018) (map indicates the range of TCOs or cartels by region of influence and origin)

Source: Stratfor Global Intelligence.

Outlook

The goal of successive Mexican governments has been to diminish the extent and character of the DTOs' activity from a national security threat to a law-and-order problem and, once this is achieved, to transferreturn responsibility for addressing this challenge from military forces back to the police. Former President Peña Nieto did not succeed in reducinga stated objective to reduce the scope of the military's domestic policing function during his tenure. Instead, the Mexican military has faced accusations of extrajudicial executions by members of its forces and the use of torture and other severe human rights violations.

Many U.S. government officials and policymakers have deep concerns about the Mexican government's capacity to decrease violence in Mexico and curb the power of the country's criminal groups. Many analysts have viewed as problematic a continued reliance on a controversial kingpin strategy, which they argue has not lowered violence in a sustainable way. Some analysts back a new strategy of targeting the middle operational layer of each key criminal group to handicap the groups' regeneration capacity.¹⁵⁵