• Political and Economic Situation
• Political Background and Colombia's Internal Conflict
• Roots of the Conflict
• The Uribe Administration (2002-2010)
• The Santos Administration Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations October 26, 2020 Colombia, a key U.S. al y in Latin America, endured from the mid-1960s more than a half of century of internal armed conflict. To address the country’s prominence in il egal June S. Beittel drug production, the United States and Colombia have forged a close relationship over Analyst in Latin American the past two decades. Plan Colombia, a program focused initial y on counternarcotics Affairs and later on counterterrorism, laid the foundation for an enduring security partnership. President Juan Manuel Santos (2010-2018) made concluding a peace accord with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)—the country’s largest leftist guerril a organization at the time—his government’s primary focus. Following four years of peace negotiations, Colombia’s Congress ratified the FARC-government peace accord in November 2016. During a U.N.-monitored demobilization in 2017, approximately 13,200 FARC disarmed, demobilized, and began to reintegrate. The U.S.-Colombia partnership, original y forged on security interests, now encompasses sustainable development, human rights, trade, and wider cooperation. Support from Congress and across U.S. Administrations has been largely bipartisan. Congress appropriated more than $10 bil ion for Plan Colombia and its follow -on programs between FY2000 and FY2016, about 20% of which was funded through the U.S. Department of Defense. U.S. government assistance to Colombia over the past 20 years has totaled nearly $12 bil ion, with funds appropriated by Congress mainly for the Departments of State and Defense and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The United States also has provided Colombia with assistance to receive Venezuelans fleeing their country and, as of August 2020, some $23 mil ion to respond to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. For FY2020, Congress provided $448 mil ion for State Department- and USAID-funded programs for Colombia. The House-passed FY2021 foreign aid appropriations bil , H.R. 7608, would provide $457.3 mil ion to Colombia. The 2016 Peace Accord Remains Polarizing Iván Duque, a former senator from the conservative Democratic Center party, won the 2018 presidential election and was inaugurated for a four-year term in August 2018. Duque has been critical of the peace accord, and soon after coming to office he suspended peace talks with the National Liberation Army (ELN), currently Colombia’s largest leftist guerril a group. President Duque’s approval ratings slipped early in his presidency. His government faced weeks of protests and strikes in late 2019 for a host of policies, including delays in peace accord implementation. By late 2019, 25% of the peace accord’s more than 500 commitments had been fulfil ed, though the 15-year trajectory to fulfil the ambitious accord has been stymied by several factors, including public skepticism. Violence and COVID-19 Among Ongoing Challenges The FARC’s demobilization and abandonment of il egal activities triggered violence by other armed actors competing to replace the insurgents. In August 2019, a FARC splinter faction announced its return to arms. Venezuela appears to be sheltering and perhaps collaborating with FARC dissidents and ELN fighters, causing the U.S. and Colombian governments significant concerns. Colombia’s il icit cultivation of coca peaked in 2019, and violence targeting human rights defenders and social activists, including many leading peace-related programs, has escalated. The Duque administration took early measures to contain the COVID-19 pandemic when it arrived in Colombia. However, by early October 2020, Colombia had the fifth-highest number of COVID-19 infections in the world, though its mortality rate was near the region’s average. Prior to the pandemic, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) forecast that Colombia’s economy would exceed 3% growth in 2020. In October, the IMF revised its forecast to a contraction of more than 8%. The United States remains Colombia’s top trading partner, although investment from China has grown. The Trump Administration has outlined a new $5 bil ion United States-Colombia Growth Initiative, Colombia Crece, Congressional Research Service Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations which could accelerate Colombia’s economic recovery and boost long-term growth by bringing investment to Colombia’s marginalized rural areas. For additional background, see CRS In Focus IF10817, Colombia’s 2018 Elections, and CRS Report RL34470, The U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Background and Issues. Congressional Research Service link to page 6 link to page 6 link to page 7 link to page 9 link to page 10 link to page 12 link to page 13 link to page 15 link to page 17 link to page 19 link to page 21 link to page 21 link to page 22 link to page 22 link to page 23 link to page 24 link to page 28 link to page 29 link to page 31 link to page 31 link to page 34 link to page 35 link to page 37 link to page 38 link to page 39 link to page 40 link to page 41 link to page 43 link to page 8 link to page 19 link to page 45 link to page 45 link to page 36 link to page 36 link to page 37 link to page 37 Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations Contents Political and Economic Situation ....................................................................................... 1 Political Background and Colombia’s Half Century Conflict ............................................ 1 Roots of the Conflict............................................................................................. 2 The Uribe Administration (2002-2010) ......................................................................... 4 The Santos Administration (2010-2018) ........................................................................ 5 The Government of Iván Duque ................................................................................... 7 Countering Il icit Crops, Corruption, and the COVID-19 Pandemic ............................. 8 Economic Issues and Trade ....................................................................................... 10 Peace Accord Implementation ................................................................................... 12 Progress and Setbacks over Four Years Implementing the Peace Accord ..................... 14 The Current Security Environment ............................................................................. 16 FARC ............................................................................................................... 16 ELN ................................................................................................................. 17 Paramilitary Successors and Criminal Bands .......................................................... 17 Humanitarian Crisis in Venezuela and Its Consequences for Colombia............................. 18 Ongoing Human Rights Concerns .............................................................................. 19 Regional Relations................................................................................................... 23 Colombia’s Role in Training Security Personnel Abroad .......................................... 24 U.S. Relations and Policy ............................................................................................... 26 Plan Colombia and Its Follow-On Strategies ................................................................ 26 National Consolidation Plan and Peace Colombia.................................................... 29 Funding for Plan Colombia and Peace Colombia .......................................................... 30 Department of Defense Assistance ............................................................................. 32 Human Rights Conditions on U.S. Assistance .............................................................. 33 Cocaine Continues Its Reign in Colombia ................................................................... 34 Drug Crop Eradication and Other Supply Control Alternatives .................................. 35 New Counternarcotics Direction Under the Duque Administration ............................. 36 Outlook ....................................................................................................................... 38 Figures Figure 1. Map of Colombia............................................................................................... 3 Figure 2. Implementation of the Colombia Peace Accord .................................................... 14 Figure A-1. Relationship of U.N. and U.S. Estimates of Coca Cultivation and Cocaine Production in Colombia............................................................................................... 40 Tables Table 1. U.S. Assistance for Colombia by State Department and USAID Foreign Aid Account: FY2012-FY2020 ......................................................................... 31 Table 2. Department of Defense Assistance to Colombia (Preliminary Figures), FY2016-FY2019 ........................................................................................................ 32 Congressional Research Service link to page 40 link to page 40 link to page 44 link to page 47 link to page 47 Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations Table 3. U.S. Estimates of Coca Cultivation in Colombia .................................................... 35 Table 4. U.S. Estimates of Pure Cocaine Production in Colombia ......................................... 35 Appendixes Appendix A. Assessing the Programs of Plan Colombia and Its Successors ............................ 39 Appendix B. Selected Online Human Rights Reporting on Colombia .................................... 42 Contacts Author Information ....................................................................................................... 42 Congressional Research Service Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations (2010-2018)
• The Duque Government and a New Legislature
• Economic Issues and Trade
• Peace Accord Implementation
• The Current Security Environment
• Humanitarian Crisis in Venezuela and Its Consequences for Colombia
• Ongoing Human Rights Concerns
• Regional Relations
• Colombia's Role in Training Security Personnel Abroad
• U.S. Relations and Policy
• Plan Colombia and Its Follow-On Strategies
• National Consolidation Plan and Peace Colombia
• Funding for Plan Colombia and Peace Colombia
• Department of Defense Assistance
• Human Rights Conditions on U.S. Assistance
• Cocaine Continues Its Reign in Colombia
• Drug Crop Eradication and Other Supply Control Alternatives
• New Counternarcotics Direction Under the Duque Administration
• Outlook

Political and Economic Situation Political Background and Colombia's Internal Conflict

’s Half Century Conflict Colombia, one of the oldest democracies in the Western Hemisphere and the third most populous Latin American country, endured a multisided civil conflict for more than five decades until . Two-term President Juan Manuel Santos declared the conflict over in August 2017 at the end of a U.N.-monitored disarmament.¹1 According to the National Center for Historical Memory 2013 report, presented to the Colombian government as part of the peace process, some 220,000 Colombians died in the armed conflict through 2012, 81% of them civilians.²

In August 2017, President Santos announced the "end of the conflict," following the FARC's disarmament and demobilization. House. (Each chamber Colombia has become one of Latin has 6 additional seats in the 2018-2022 Congress due to America’s most attractive locations for a constitutional change and peace accord requirements) foreign direct investment. Yet, after steady Sources: International Monetary Fund (IMF); growth over several years, Colombia’s Central Intel igence Agency (CIA); Trade Data economy began to slow in 2015. It declined Monitor (TDM); World Bank (WB). 1 Juan Manuel Santos, “Palabras del Presidente Juan Manuel Santos en el Acto Final de Dejación de Armas de las Farc,” Presidencia de la Republica, June 27, 2017, http://es.presidencia.gov.co/discursos/170627-Palabras-del-Presidente-Juan-Manuel-Santos-en-el-acto-final-de-dejacion-de-armas-de-las-Farc and “ Aquí Estamos Viendo que lo Imposible Fue Posible,” Presidencia de la Republica, August 15, 2017. 2 Basta Ya! Colombia: Memorias de Guerra y Dignidad, Center for Historical Memory, at http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/micrositios/informeGeneral/. 3 About half of Colombia’s 32 departments (states) have land mines, and the government has estimated that nearly 12,000 Colombians have been injured or killed by the weapons since 1990. “Estadísticas de Asistencia Integral a las Víctimas de MAP y MUSE.” Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz. August 31, 2020, http://www.accioncontraminas.gov.co/Estadisticas/estadisticas-de-victimas. 4 Statistics from Embassy of Colombia in the United States and Parker Asmann and Eimhin O’Reilly, “InSight Crime’s 2019 Homicide Round-Up,” InSight Crim e, January 28, 2020. Congressional Research Service 1 Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations to 1.7% gross domestic product (GDP) growth in 2017 but recovered in 2018.5 For 2019, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimatesd Colombia’s GDP expanded by 3.3%. Although the IMF had predicted the Colombian economy would expand by a similar amount in 2020, it now forecasts an 8% contraction due to the recession triggered by the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic and another crash in the price of oil, which remains one of Colombia’s top exports.6 President Iván Duque, who took office in August 2018, acknowledged that his administration faced multiple challengeschal enges related to the long internal conflict. He noted that a majority of the peace accord'’s implementation had yet to be started, and that the country faced a volatile internal security situation where the FARC had demobilized but the state had failed to assert control in rural and peripheral parts of the country, as well as an areas most affected by the conflict. This situation was exacerbated by an enormous influx of Venezuelan migrants, who sought refuge in Colombia and continue to arrive. Later in 2019, as Venezuelans residing in Colombia surpassed 1.4 million, President Duque described Colombia as undergoing a migration "shock"—a mass movement of migrants flowing out of Venezuela across its borders.

as they fled the authoritarian government of Nicolás Maduro. As of early 2020, some 1.8 mil ion Venezuelans were residing in Colombia. Roots of the Conflict Roots of the Conflict

The Colombian conflict predates the formal founding of the FARC in 1964, as the FARC had its beginnings in the peasant self-defense groups of the 1940s and 1950s. Colombian political life has long suffered from polarization and violence based on the significant inequalities suffered by landless peasants in the country'’s peripheral regions. In the late 19^th19th century and part of the 20^th 20th century, the elite Liberal and Conservative parties dominated Colombian political life. Violence and competition between the parties erupted following the 1948 assassination of Liberal presidential candidate Jorge Gaitán, which set off a decade-long period of extreme violence, known as La Violencia.

After a brief military rule (1953-1958), the Liberal and Conservative parties agreed to a form of coalition governance, known as the National Front. Under the arrangement, the presidency of the country alternated between Conservatives and Liberals, each holding office in turn for four-year intervals. This form of government continued for 16 years (1958-1974). The power-sharing formula did not resolve the tension between the two historic parties, and many leftist, Marxist-inspired insurgencies took root in Colombia, including the FARC, launched in 1964, and the smallersmal er National Liberation Army (ELN), which formed the following year. The FARC and ELN conducted kidnappings, committed serious human rights violations, and carried out a campaign of terror that aimed to unseat the central government in Bogotá.

Figure 1. Map of Colombia (departments and capitals shown)

Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS).

Rightist paramilitary groups formed in the 1980s when wealthy ranchers and farmers, including drug traffickers, hired armed groups to protect themselves from the kidnapping and extortion plots of the FARC and ELN. In the 1990s, most of the paramilitary groups formed an umbrella umbrel a organization, the United-Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). The AUC massacred and assassinated suspected supporters of the insurgents and directly engaged the FARC and ELN in military battles. The Colombian military has long been accused of close collaboration with the AUC, accusations ranging from ignoring their activities to actively supporting them. Over time, the AUC became increasingly engaged in drug trafficking and other illicit il icit businesses. In the late 5 Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Colombia: Country Report, October 2018. Many analysts identified Colombia’s dependence on oil and other commodity exports as the primary cause of the slowdown between 2014 and 2017. 6 International Monetary Fund (IMF), “Outlook for Latin America and the Caribbean: An Intensifying Pandemic,” IMF Blog, June 26, 2020; October 2020 World Economic Outlook, Statistical Appendix, at https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2020/09/30/world-economic-outlook-october-2020. Congressional Research Service 2 Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations businesses. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the U.S. government designated the FARC, ELN, and AUC as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs).⁷ The AUC was formally dissolved in a collective demobilization 7 Figure 1. Map of Colombia (departments and capitals shown) Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS). 7 For additional background on the Foreign T errorist Organizations (FT Os) in Colombia and their evolution as part of the multisided conflict, see CRS Report R42982, Colom bia’s Peace Process Through 2016, by June S. Beittel. Congressional Research Service 3 link to page 21 link to page 8 Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations The AUC was formal y dissolved in a collective demobilization between 2003 and 2006 after many of its leaders stepped down. However, many former paramilitaries joined armed groups (called(cal ed criminal bands, or Bacrim, in Spanish, Bacrim, by the Colombian government) that have continued to participate in the lucrative drug trade and commit other crimes and other crime and have committed grave human rights abuses. (For more, see " “The Current Security Environment,"” below.)

The Uribe Administration (2002-2010)

The inability of Colombia'’s two dominant parties to address the root causes of violence in the country led to the election of an independent, Álvaro Uribe, in the presidential contest of 2002. Uribe, who served two terms, came to office with promises to take on the violent leftist guerrillas, guerril as, address the paramilitary problem, and combat illegalil egal drug trafficking.

During the 1990s, Colombia had become the region'’s—and the world'’s—largest producer of cocaine. Peace negotiations with the FARC under the prior administration of President Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002) had ended in failure; the FARC used a large demilitarized zone located in the central Meta department (see mapmap, Figure 1) to regroup and strengthen itself. The central Colombian government granted the FARC this demilitarized zone, a traditional practice in Colombian peace negotiations, but the FARC used it to launch terror attacks, conduct operations, and increase the cultivation of coca and its processing, while failing to negotiate seriously. Many analysts, noting the FARC'’s strength throughout the country, feared that the Colombian state might fail and some Colombian citizens thought the FARC might at some point successfully take power.⁸8 The FARC was then reportedly at the apogee of its strength, numbering an estimated 16,000 to 20,000 fighters under arms.

This turmoil opened the way for the aggressive strategy advocated by Uribe. During President Uribe'Uribe’s August 2002 inauguration, the FARC showered the event with mortar fire, signaling the group' group’s displeasure at the election of a hardliner, who believed a military victory over the Marxist rebels was possible. In his first term (2002-2006), President Uribe strengthened and expanded the country'country’s military, seeking to reverse the armed forces'’ prior losses to the FARC. Uribe entered into peace negotiations with the AUC.

President Pastrana had refused to negotiate with the rightist AUC, but Uribe promoted the process and urged the country to back a controversial Justice and Peace Law that went into effect in July 2005 and provided a framework for the AUC demobilization. By mid-2006, some 31,000 AUC paramilitary forces had demobilized. The AUC demobilization, combined with the stepped-up counternarcotics efforts of the Uribe Administrationadministration and increased military victories against the FARC'FARC’s irregular forces, helped to bring down violence, although a high level of human rights violations still stil plagued the country.⁹9 Uribe became widely popular for the effectiveness of his security policies, a strategy he called "cal ed “Democratic Security."” Uribe'’s popular support was evident when Colombian voters approved a referendum to amend their constitution in 2005 to permit Uribe to run for a second term.

Following his reelection in 2006, President Uribe continued to aggressively combat the FARC. For Uribe, 2008 was a critical year. In March 2008, the Colombian military bombed the camp of FARC' 8 Peter DeShazo, Johanna Mendelson Forman, and Phillip McLean, Countering Threats to Security and Stability in a Failing State: Lessons from Colom bia, Center for Strategic & International Studies, September 2009. 9 Many Colombians have expressed disappointment in the AUC demobilization for failing to provide adequate punishments for perpetrators and adequate reparations to victims of paramilitary violence. It has also been seen as incomplete because those who did not demobilize or those who re-mobilized into criminal gangs have left a legacy of criminality. For a concise history of the AUC, see “AUC Profile,” InSight Crime: Organized Crime in the Americas, at http://www.insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/auc-profile. Congressional Research Service 4 Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations FARC’s second-in-command, Raul Reyes (located inside Ecuador a short distance from the border), killingkil ing him and 25 others. Also in March, another of FARC'’s ruling seven-member secretariat was murdered by his security guard. In May, the FARC announced that their supreme leader and founder, Manuel Marulanda, had died of a heart attack. The near-simultaneous deaths of three of the seven most important FARC leaders were a significant blow to the organization. In July 2008, the Colombian government dramatically rescued 15 long-time FARC hostages, including three U.S. defense contractors who had been held captive since 2003 and Colombian senator and former presidential candidate Ingrid Bentancourt. The widely acclaimed, bloodless rescue further undermined FARC morale.¹⁰

Uribe'10 Uribe’s success and reputation, however, were marred by several scandals, including the "parapolitics"“parapolitics” scandal in 2006 that exposed links between illegal il egal paramilitaries and politicians, especiallyespecial y prominent members of the national legislature. Subsequent scandals that came to light during the former president'’s tenure included the "“false positive"” murders allegedlyal egedly carried out by the military (primarily the Colombian Army), in which innocent civilians were killed extrajudiciallykil ed extrajudicial y. In 2009, the media revealed illegal il egal wiretapping and other surveillancesurveil ance carried out by the government intelligence agency, the Department of Administrative Securityintel igence agency, which attempted to discredit journalists, members of the judiciary, and political opponents of the Uribe government. (In early 2012, the tarnished national intelligence intel igence agency was replaced by Uribe'’s successor, Juan Manuel Santos.)

However, military use of wiretapping continued to raise controversy, including a contentious revelation in late 2019.11 Despite the controversies, President Uribe remained popular and his supporters urged him to run for a third term. Colombia'’s Constitutional Court turned down a referendum proposed to alter the constitution to allowal ow President Uribe a third term in 2010.

The Santos Administration (2010-2018)

Once it became clear that President Uribe was constitutionally ineligible constitutional y ineligible to run again, Juan Manuel Santos of the pro-Uribe National Unity party (or Party of the U) quickly consolidated his preeminence in the 2010 presidential campaign. Santos is, a centrist from an elite family that once owned the country'’s largest newspaper. He served as, became Uribe'’s defense minister through 2009. In 2010, Santos campaigned on a continuation of the Uribe government'’s approach to security and its role encouraging free markets and economic opening, calling his reform policy "Democratic Prosperity." In the May 2010 presidential race, Santos took almost twice as many votes as his nearest competitor but did not win a majority. Santos won the. Santos handily won a June 2010 runoff with 69% of the vote. Santos's "’s “National Unity"” ruling coalition, formed during his campaign, included the center-right National Unity and Conservative parties, the centrist Radical Change Party, and the center-left Liberal party.¹¹

On August 7, 2010, during his first inauguration speech, President Santos said he planned to follow in the path of President Uribe, but "the door to [peace] talks [with armed rebels] is not locked."¹² 12 During his first two years in office, President Santos reorganized the executive branch, built on the market opening strategies of the Uribe Administrationadministration, and secured a free-trade agreement with the United States, Colombia'’s largest trade partner. The trade agreement went into effect in May 2012. To address U.S. congressional concerns about labor relations in Colombia, including the issue of violence against labor union members, the United States and Colombia agreed to an Action Plan Related to Labor Rights (Labor Action Plan) in April 2011. Many of the steps 10 T he rescue operation received U.S. assistance and support. See Juan Forero, “In Colombia Jungle Ruse, U.S. Played A Quiet Role; Ambassador Spotlights Years of Aid, T raining,” Washington Post, July 9, 2008. 11 See below for more on the wiretapping issues that plagued subsequent governments. Joe Parkin Daniels, “Colombia: Spying on Reporters Shows Army Unable to Shake Habits of Dirty War,” Guardian, September 22, 2020. 12 In July 2011, the coalition contained 89 senators out of 102 in the Colombian upper house. However, in late September 2013, the Green Party (renamed the Green Alliance) broke away from the ruling coalition, although it sometimes continued to vote with the government. Congressional Research Service 5 Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations Action Plan Related to Labor Rights (Labor Action Plan) in April 2011. Many of the steps prescribed by the plan were completed in 2011, while the U.S. Congress was considering the free trade agreement.

Significantly, the Santos government maintained a vigorous security strategy and struck hard at the FARC'’s top leadership. In September 2010, the Colombian military killed kil ed the FARC'’s top military commander, Victor Julio Suárez (known as "“Mono Jojoy"”), in a bombing raid. In November 2011, the FARC'’s supreme leader, GuillermoGuil ermo Leon Saenz (aka "“Alfonso Cano"”) was assassinated. He was replaced by Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri (known as "“Timoleón Jiménez" or "Timochenko"” or “Timochenko”), the group'’s current leader.

While continuing the security strategy, the Santos Administrationadministration began to re-orient the Colombian government'’s stance toward the internal armed conflict through a series of reforms..13 The first legislative reform that moved this new vision along, signed by President Santos in June 2011, was the Victims'’ and Land Restitution Law (Victims'’ Law), to provide comprehensive reparations to an estimated (at the time) 4 million to 5 million mil ion to 5 mil ion victims of the conflict. Reparations under the Victims'’ Law included monetary compensation, psycho-social support and other aid for victims, and the return of mil ionsof millions of hectares of stolen land to those displaced.¹³14 The law was intended to process an estimated 360,000 land restitution cases.¹⁴15 (For more on the law, see textbox below on "“Status of Implementation of the Victims'’ Law.") In June 2012, another government initiative—the Peace Framework Law, also known as the Legal Framework for Peace—was approved by the Colombian Congress, which signaled that congressional support for a peace process was growing.¹⁵

”) In August 2012, President Santos announced he had opened exploratory peace talks with the FARC and was ready to launch formal talks. The countries of Norway, Cuba, Venezuela, and Chile each held an international support role, with Norway and Cuba serving as peace talk hosts and "guarantors." Following the formal start in Norway, the actual negotiations began a month later in mid-November 2012 in Cuba, where the FARC-government talks“guarantors.” Launched in Norway, FARC-government talks moved to Cuba, where the negotiations continued until their conclusion in August 2016.

In the midst of extended peace negotiations, Colombia'’s 2014 national elections presented a unique juncture for the country. As a result of the elections, the opposition Centro Democrático (CD) party gained 20 seats in the Senate and 19 in the less powerful Chamber of Representatives,¹⁶16 and its leader, former President Uribe, became a popular senator. His presence in the Senate challenged chal enged the ruling coalition that backed President Santos, who won reelection in a second-round runoff in June 2014 against a CD-nominated presidential candidate.

In February 2015, the Obama Administration provided support to the peace talks by naming Bernard Aronson, a a former U.S. assistant secretary of state for Inter-American Affairs, as the U.S. Special Envoy to the Colombian peace talks. Talks with the FARC concluded in August 2016. In early OctoberIn early October, after peace negotiations had ended, to the surprise of many, many, approval of the accord was narrowly defeated in a national plebiscite by less than a half percentage point of the votes cast. Regardless, President Santos was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in December 2016, in part demonstrating strong international support for the peace agreement. In response to the voters'’ criticisms, the Santos government and the FARC crafted a modified agreement, which they signed on November 24, 2016. Rather than presenting this agreement to a plebiscite, President Santos sent it directly to the Colombian Congress, where it was ratified on November 30, 2016. Although both chambers of Colombia'’s Congress approved the agreement 13 In August 2014, for instance, the Colombian Constitutional Court ruled that demobilized guerrillas who had not committed crimes against humanity could eventually run for political office. 14 T he Victims’ and Land Restitution Law (Victims’ Law) covers harms against victims that date back to 1985, and land restitution for acts that happened after 1991. 15 Embassy of Colombia, “Victims and Land Restitution Law: Addressing the Impact of Colombia’s Internal Armed Conflict,” fact sheet, January 2013. 16 Final results for the 2014 legislative elections provided to the Congressional Research Service (CRS) by a Colombian Embassy official, July 22, 2014. Congressional Research Service 6 Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations s Congress approved the agreement unanimously, members of the opposition CD party, who criticized various provisions in the accord that they deemed inadequate accord, boycotted the vote.

The peace process was recognized as the most significant achievement of the Santos presidency and lauded outside of Colombia and throughout the region. Its innovative involvement of conflict victims in the peace talks and other features received widespread approval, but it did not win consistent support for President Santos inside Colombia, whose approval ratings fluctuated. Disgruntled Colombians perceived Santos as an aloof president whose energy and political capital were expended accommodating an often-despised criminal group. Thevictims in the peace talks and, ultimately, its focus on victims in the final 2016 accord have been viewed as a major contribution. Yet, it did not win support for President Santos inside Colombia, as his approval ratings fluctuated significantly. His crowning achievement, the accord—negotiated over accord—negotiated over 50 rounds of talks—covered five substantive topics: rural development and agricultural reform; political participation by the FARC; an end to the conflict, including demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration; and chapters on drug policy and justice for victims.

The Duque Government and a New Legislature

The Government of Iván Duque Colombians elected a new congress in March 2018 and a new president in June 2018. Because no presidential candidate won more than 50% of the vote onin May 27, 2018, as required for a victory in the first round, a June 2018 second-round runoff was held June 17 between thebetween rightist candidate Iván Duque and the and leftist candidate Gustavo Petro. Duque was carried to victory with almost 54% of the vote. Runner-up Petro, a former mayor of Bogotá, a former Colombian Senator, and once a member of the M-19 guerilla gueril a insurgency, nevertheless did better than any leftist candidate in a presidential race in the past century;, winning 8 million votes, mil ion votes (or 42% of the votes cast). Around 4.2% cast blank bal ots in protest. Through al iance. Around 4.2% were protest votes, signifying Colombian voters who cast blank ballots.

Through alliance building, Duque achieved a functional majority, or a "unity"“unity” government, which involved the Conservative Party and Santos'’s prior National Unity (or Party of the U) joining the CD, although compromise would be required to keep the two centrist parties in sync with the more conservative CD. In the new Congress, two extra seats for the presidential and vice presidential runners-up became automatic seats in the Colombian Senate and House, due to a 2015 constitutional change that allowedal owed presidential runner-up Gustavo Petro to return to the Senate. The CD party, which gained seats in both houses in the March vote, won the majority in the Colombian Senate (see Figure 2 for seat breakouts by party). However, the legislative majority fractured during President Duque'’s first year in office, which has left his government with limited support in Congress to accomplish major legislative objectives.

Figure 2. Legislative Election Results (March 11, 2018, results and the 12 automatic seats shown)

Source: "Nueva Composición del Senado a Partir del 20 Julio," Senado de Colombia, March 14, 2018, at http://www.senado.gov.co/noticiero-del-senado/item/27756-nueva-composicion-del-senado-a-partir-del-20-julio; http://especiales.semana.com/big-data-electoral/distribucion-camara-representantes/index.html. Notes: FARC=Revolutionary Alternative Common Force; MIRA=Absolute Renovation Independent Movement; PDA=Alternative Democratic Pole; OC=Citizens' Option; DC=Decentes; MAIS=Alternative Indigenous and Social Movement; CJL=Colombia Justa Libres; CAS=Alternate Santander Coalition; ACN=Ancestral Afro-Colombian Communal Council of Playa Renaciente; CCM=La Mamuncia Communal Council; VP (Second Place Presidential in the Senate; Second Place Vice Presidential in House); AICO=Indigenous Authorities of Colombia.

left his government with limited support in Congress to accomplish major legislative objectives.17 President Duque campaigned on his experience as a technical y oriented politician and presented himself as a modernizer. Duque was inaugurated in August at the age of 42—Colombia’s youngest president elected in a century. He possessed limited prior experience in Colombian politics. Duque was partial y educated in the United States and worked for a decade at the Inter-American Development Bank in Washington, DC. He was the handpicked candidate of former president Uribe, who vocal y opposed many of Santos’s policies. 17 T he FY2018-2022 Colombian Congress has 280 seats, including 10 for FARC party representatives (9 of which are currently filled). T he two legislative sessions run from July 20 to December 16 and from March 16 to June 20. T he Senate members are elected nationally (not by district or state), with two coming from a special ballot for indigenous communities. T he House of Representatives has two members from each of Colombia’s 32 departments (states) and 1 more for each 125,000-250,000 inhabitants in a department, beyond the first 250,000. In the House, two seats are reserved for the Afro-Colombian community, one for indigenous communities, one for Colombians residing abroad, and one for political minorities. Congressional Research Service 7 link to page 41 link to page 41 Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations In a September 2018 speech before the U.N. General Assembly, the new president outlined his policy objectives.¹⁷ Duque called.18 Duque cal ed for increasing legality, entrepreneurship, and fairness by (1) promoting peace; (2) combating drug trafficking and recognizing it as a global menace; and (3) fighting corruption, which he characterized as a threat to democracy. He also maintained that the humanitarian crisis in neighboring Venezuela was an emergency that threatened to destabilize the region. Duque proposedembraced a leadership role for Colombia in denouncing the authoritarian government of President Nicolás Maduro. By late 2018, Colombia'’s acceptance of more than 1 milliona mil ion Venezuelans was adding pressure on the government'’s finances, generating a burden estimated at nearly 0.5% of the country'’s GDP.¹⁸

President Duque also campaigned on returning to spraying coca crops with the herbicide glyphosate. This would reverse Colombia'19 The influx of Venezuelan refugees and migrants continued in 2020; despite some reverse migration during the COVID-19 pandemic, nearly 1.8 mil ion Venezuelans remained in Colombia in early September 2020, according to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).20 Colombian authorities have registered over 8 mil ion victims in the country’s five-decade internal conflict—equivalent to about 15% of the current population—with 7.2 mil ion currently eligible for reparations under the peace accord. The most common form of victimization is internal displacement; Colombia has the world’s second-highest number of internal y displaced persons, numbering nearly 8 mil ion. Many observers raise concerns about human rights conditions inside Colombia and the ongoing lack of governance in remote rural areas, such as the nearly 1,400-mile border area alongside Venezuela. Countering Illicit Crops, Corruption, and the COVID-19 Pandemic President Duque campaigned on restarting the practice of spraying coca crops with the herbicide glyphosate to reduce supply. This would reverse Colombia’s decision in mid-2015 to end aerial spraying, which had been a central—albeit controversial—feature of U.S.-Colombian counterdrug cooperation for two decades.¹⁹21 In 2017, Colombia'’s Constitutional Court decided to retain the suspension of the use of glyphosate until the government took measures to limit its impact on humans. In 2020, Colombia continues to face chal enges in destroying and removing coca crops, as rural areas contend with rising levels of violence and economic desperation due to competition over the FARC’s former il icit economies. (For more, see “New Counternarcotics Direction Under the Duque Administration” below.) Corruption has become a top concern in Colombian politics, as members of the judicial branch, politicians, and other officials have faced a series of corruption charges.22 Colombians’ concerns 18 Embassy of Colombia in the United States, “T he Pact for Fairness and Progress,” Remarks by the President of the Republic, Iván Duque Márquez, before the General Assembly of the United Nations in the 73 rd period of ordinary sessions. September 26, 2018. 19 Antonio Maria Delgado, “ Colombia Will Find It Hard to Accept Another 1 Million Venezuelan Migrants,” Miami Herald, November 27, 2018. 20 U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), “Venezuela Regional Crisis – Complex Emergency, Fact Sheet #3, FY2020,” September 25, 2020. 21 For additional background, see CRS Report R44779, Colombia’s Changing Approach to Drug Policy, by June S. Beittel and Liana W. Rosen. 22 A corruption national referendum in August 2018 was backed by President Duque but did not reach its threshold (failing to do so by less than half a percentage point). T he actual vote favored all seven proposed changes on the ballot, and Duque pledged to address some of the anti-corruption measures presented in the referendum through legislation. For recent polling on the public concern about corruption, see U.S. State Department, Office of Opinion Research, “Colombia: Nearly Four Years On, the Public Down on FARC Peace,” OPN-X-20, September 23, 2020. Congressional Research Service 8 Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations about corruption became particularly acute during the 2018 elections, as major scandals were revealed. Several government officials were discovered to have received funding from Odebrecht, a Brazilian construction company embroiled in a region-wide corruption scandal.23 In December 2018, presidential runner-up Gustavo Petro also was accused of taking political contributions from Odebrecht, suggesting corrupt practices had taken hold across the Colombian political spectrum.24 Despite an early and long-lasting national lockdown from March to September 2020, Colombia was unable to stop a severe COVID-19 outbreak that led to one of the Western hemisphere’s highest daily death tolls from the virus. Observers note that government measures failed to reach and protect the poor, who tend to be more vulnerable to COVID-19 infection due to their living conditions and high levels of informal employment.25 By mid-October 2020, Colombia had some 28,000 deaths (56.4 deaths per 100,000). Nevertheless, Colombia’s mortality rate was wel below several other countries in the hard-hit Latin American region. Although Colombia had registered 1 mil ion COVID-19 infections as of October 2020 (for a time, the fifth-highest number in the world), some experts suggested widespread testing was stil lagging.26 The Duque administration struggled with low approval ratings and dissent within its governing coalition throughout 2019. The administration’s first budget for 2019 (presented in late October 2018) was linked to an unpopular tax reform that would subject food and agricultural commodities to a value-added tax. Duque’impact on humans.

The Duque Administration's first budget for 2019 (presented in late October 2018) was linked to an unpopular tax reform that would expand a value-added tax to cover basic food and agricultural commodities. The 2019 budget totals $89.7 billion, providing the education, military and police, and health sectors with the biggest increases, and reducing funding for peace accord implementation.²¹ Duque's own Democratic Center party split with him on the value-added tax, which quickly sank his approval ratings from 53% in early September 2018 to a low of 27% in November 2018.27 Duque’s national coalition was further weakened when some parties broke from it and, in October 2019, when Defense Minister Guil ermo Botero was threatened with censure in the Colombian Congress. Botero was forced to resign, leading to a major cabinet reshuffle.28 Weeks of protest in autumn 2019 centered on concern about the peace accord’s stal ed implementation, social leader kil ings, and pension and tax matters.29 However, in the wake of the COVID-19 outbreak, the government coalition expanded to include the centrist right-leaning Cambio Radical party and others, providing a majority in the Senate and a near majority for the government coalition in the Chamber of Representatives.30 This expanded coalition provided the Duque administration with sufficient legislative support to enact several pandemic-related measures. Duque’s approval ratings improved in April 2020 to over 50% in light of the government’s success with managing the virus outbreak and settled at 48% in a poll taken in early October 2020.31 23 In 2014, President Santos’s reelection campaign and the opposition candidate’s campaign were both accused of accepting Odebrecht funding. 24 “Corte Suprema Llama a Declaración a Varios T estigos en el Caso del Video de Petro,” El Espectador, December 10, 2018. 25 Ana Vanessa Herrero, “Locked-Down Colombians Fly Red Flags to Call for Help,” Washington Post, May 11, 2020. 26 Sara T orres and Avery Dyer, “Argentina and Colombia, A T ale of T wo Lockdowns,” Weekly Asado, Wilson Center, October 2, 2020. 27 See Invamer’s Colombia Opina #2,” Semana, November 2018. 28 Arthur Dhont, “Colombian Government Likely to Struggle to Implement Economic Policies in 2020 Because of Social and Legislative Opposition,” HIS Global Insight Analysis, November 12, 2019; “Colombia: Embattled Duque Prepares for Protests,” LatinNews Weekly Report, November 14, 2019. 29 “Will Protesters Keep T aking to the Streets in Colombia?,” Latin America Advisor (blog), Dialogue, September 23, 2020. 30 EIU, Country Report: Colombia, October 2020. 31 Invamer polling results from April 8-26, 2020, at https://docs.google.com/viewerng/viewer?url=https:// Congressional Research Service 9 Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations In September 2020, amid a rise in mass kil ings and violence in the Colombian countryside, protests against police brutality and abuse in response to social protest were fueled by the death of a Colombian lawyer at the hands of the Bogotá police.32 In mid-October, a national mobilization of indigenous groups that traveled across the country to come to the capital joined a national strike by students; labor unionists; and those concerned with flagging peace accord implementation, political violence, and pandemic response in largely peaceful protest in cities and towns across Colombia.33 low of 27% in November 2018,²² among the lowest levels in the early part of a presidential mandate. In August 2019, Duque's approval rating rested near 29% (with a disapproval level of 63%), and he faced a continued lack of unified congressional backing.²³ His coalition, which had established a congressional majority with other center and center-right parties, appeared to fall apart in early 2019, when some of the parties abandoned the ruling coalition; this process accelerated in October 2019. At that time, Defense Minister Guillermo Botero, threatened with censure in the Colombian Congress, resigned, leading to a major Cabinet reshuffle.²⁴

Economic Issues and Trade

Economic Issues and Trade The Colombian economy is the fourth largest in Latin America after Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina (as measured at the end of 20182019). The World Bank characterizes Colombia as an upper-middle-income country, although its commodities-dependent economy has been hit by oil price declines and peso devaluations, at times eroding fiscal revenue. The United States is Colombia's ’s largest trade partner, and bilateral economic relations have deepened since the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement entered into force in May 2012.²⁵34 By 2021, the agreement willis to phase out all al tariffs on consumer and industrial products. The total stock of U.S. investment in Colombia was $7.2 billionrose to $7.2 bil ion in 2017, with mining, manufacturing, and wholesale trade as the leading sectors. According to the 2020 National Trade Estimate Report, U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in Colombia was $7.7 bil ion in 2018, a 7.1% increase over 2017, led by mining, manufacturing, finance, and insurance.35 In common with most Latin American nations, Colombia has sought over the past decade to increase the attractiveness of investing. Some analysts contend that Colombia’s FDI increase came not only from the extractive industries, such as petroleum and mining, but also from such areas as agricultural products, transportation, and financial services. Investment from China in Colombia has increased at a slow but steady rate in recent years, including in the Bogotá metro system and communications.36 Over the past decade, the bulk of Chinese investment has been in oil and gas.37 manufacturing, and wholesale trade as the leading sectors.²⁶ Colombia's GDP expanded by 2.6% in 2018, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit, and is projected to grow by slightly more than 3% in 2019.²⁷

Promoting more equitable growth and ending the internal conflict were twin goals of the two-term Santos Administration. Unemployment, which historically has been high at over 10%, fell below that double-digit mark during Santos's first term and remained at 9.2% in 2016. It rose slightly to 9.7% in 2018. For the first three quarters of 2019, unemployment exceeded 10%.²⁸ Despite its relative economic stability, high poverty rates and inequality have contributed to social upheaval in Colombia for decades. The poverty rate in 2005 was slightly above 45%, but it declined to below 27% in 20162018. The issues of limited land ownership and high rural poverty rates remain contentious.²⁹ According to a United Nations study published in 20112011 U.N. study, 1.2% of the population owned 52% of the noticias.caracoltv.com/sites/default/files/encuesta_invamer_abril_2020.pdf; “ Encuesta de Opinión” and Centro Nacional de Consultoría, S.A.. October 5, 2020, at https://www.valoraanalitik.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Encuesta-CNC.pdf. 32 Juan Pappier, “T he Urgent Need to Reform Colombia\’s Security Policies,” Human Rights Watch, Americas Quarterly, September 22, 2020; Steven Grattan and Anthony Failoa, “ In Colombia, a Death in Police Custody Follows a History of Brutality,” Washington Post, October 6, 2020. 33 ”Protesters in Colombia Decry Government Pandemic Response,” Associated Press, October 21, 2020; Bocanegra, Nelson. “T housands, Including Indigenous People, March in Peaceful Colombia Protests,” Reuters, October 21, 2020. 34 T he agreement is officially known as the U.S.-Colombia T rade Promotion Agreement. For more background, see CRS Report RL34470, The U.S.-Colom bia Free Trade Agreem ent: Background and Issues, by M. Angeles Villarreal and Edward Y. Gracia. 35 United States T rade Representative, “2019 National T rade Estimate Report,” March 2019; “2020 National T rade Estimate Report,” March 2020. 36 “China’s Strong Push into Colombia,” Al Jazeera, February 22, 2020; “Foreign Investment in Colombia Holds Firm, says T rade Minister,” Financial Tim es, October 7, 2020. 37 “Colombia: OFDI China a Nivel de Empresa (200-2019),” accessed October 28, 2020, distributed by Red Académica de América Latina y el Caribe sobre China y Monitor de la OFDI de Chin a en América Latina y el Caribe, at https://www.redalc-china.org/monitor/informacion-por-pais/busqueda-por-pais/31-colombia. Congressional Research Service 10 Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations land, and data revealed in 2016 indicated about half of working Colombians were employed in the informal economy. Promoting more equitable growth and ending the internal conflict were twin goals of the two-term former Santos administration. Unemployment, which historical y has been at over 10%, fel below that double-digit mark during Santos’s first term and remained so until it nudged just over 10% in 2018. In 2019, the Duque administration’s first full year in office, Colombia’s unemployment rate climbed to 10.5%. The Economist Intel igence Unit estimates that in 2020, in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, Colombia’s unemployment rate wil exceed 16% (adding a mil ion newly unemployed).38 Colombia’s Stimulus to Foster a Recovery Fol owing one of the longest national lockdowns in South America, begun in March 2020, Colombia lifted its pandemic-related restrictions to reopen ful y in September. The government enacted measures to counter a historic economic contraction (more than 15%, from April to June 2020), the country’s worst quarter-on-quarter economic performance on record. The Colombian government announced fiscal measures, including flexibility in the use of income to finance extraordinary operating expenditures and a relaxation of debt rules. In a May 2020 executive decree, the government announced it would subsidize 40% of the $250-per-month minimum wage for workers at companies that have seen revenues drop by at least 20% during the pandemic. On September 22, the government announced it would issue another round of subsidies in December to such businesses. In late September, Colombia’s government signaled its plans to draw from an International Monetary Fund (IMF) flexible credit line that was recently increased by the IMF to $17.2 bil ion. This is the first time any country has tapped resources from that mechanism since it was set up in 2009. The Colombian government’s recovery strategy includes three planks: (1) refocusing on renewable energy, (2) speeding development in its rural periphery most affected by the 50-year internal conflict, and (3) extending broadband as part of a Colombian digital transition. These approaches aim to transform Colombia from a commodity-based economy to a value-added services economy. Sources: Economist Intel igence Unit (EIU), Country Report: Colombia, September 2020; EIU, “Colombia to Draw from IMF Flexible Credit Line,” October 6, 2020; Mariana Palau, “Colombia Pins Recovery Hopes on Technology not Oil,” Financial Times, October 7, 2020; Luisa Horwitz, Paoloa Nagovitch, Hol y Sonneland, and Carin Zissis, “The Coronavirus in Latin America,” Americas Society/Council of the Americas, September 23, 2020. According to State Department, 1.2% of the population owned 52% of the land,³⁰ and data revealed in 2016 that about 49% of Colombians continued to work in the informal economy.

Although Colombia is ranked highly for business-friendly practices and has a favorable regulatory environment that encourages trade across borders, it is still plagued by persistent corruption and an inability to effectively implement institutional reforms it has undertaken, particularly in regions where government presence is weak. According to the U.S. State Department in its analysis of national investment climates, Colombia has demonstrated a political commitment to create jobs, develop sound capital markets, and achieve a legal and regulatory system that meets international norms for transparency and consistency.

Colombia is a founding member of the Pacific Alliance along with Chile, Mexico, and Peru. It has sought to deepen trade integration and cross-border investment with its partners in this alliance. The Pacific Alliance aims to go beyond reducing trade barriers by creating a common stock market, allowing for the eventual free movement of businesses and persons, and . Within a framework of relative economic stability, Colombia has a complicated tax system, high corporate tax burden, and ongoing piracy and counterfeiting concerns. In Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, Colombia ranked 96 out of the 180 countries polled in 2019, placing it regional y just behind Ecuador and ahead of Peru, Brazil, and Mexico.39 Colombia’s rural sector activists periodical y have demanded long-term and integrated-agricultural reform in a country with one of the most unequal patterns of land ownership in the world and many landless rural poor. The Duque government also has faced pressure from student mobilizations and other groups demanding more public education funding, full peace accord compliance, and greater employment opportunity.40 Although protests waned during the pandemic, they may reemerge with increased demands as restrictions are lifted. 38 EIU, Country Report: Colombia, September 2020. 39 T ransparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2019,” January 2020, at https://www.transparency.org/cpi2019. 40 Steven Grattan, “Colombia Protests: What Prompted T hem and Where Are T hey Headed?,” Al Jazeera, November 26, 2019. Congressional Research Service 11 Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations The United States is Colombia’s leading trade partner. Colombia accounts for a smal percentage of U.S. trade (approximately 1%), ranking 23rd among U.S. export markets and 25th among foreign exporters to the United States in 2019. Colombia has secured free-trade agreements with the European Union, Canada, and the United States, as wel as with most nations in Latin America. Colombia is a founding member of the Pacific Al iance along with Chile, Mexico, and Peru. The Pacific Al iance aims to go beyond reducing trade barriers by creating a common stock market, al owing for the eventual free movement of businesses and persons, and by serving as an export serving as an export platform to the Asia-Pacific region. Colombia's role in the Pacific Alliance and Colombia's accession to the Organization forIn April 2020, Colombia became the third Latin American country to join the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, which it is in the process of completing after being invited to become a member in May 2018 (following a review of the country's macroeconomic policies), are relatively new developments.

after a seven-year accession process. In August 2020, the Trump Administration announced a new United States-Colombia Growth Initiative, Colombia Crece, to harness assistance from a variety of U.S. agencies, such as the International Development Finance Corporation, to bring investment to Colombia’s rural areas and fight crime through sustainable development and growth. According to U.S. National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien, on an official visit to Colombia in August 2020, investment levels wil reach $5 bil ion.41 Peace Accord Implementation Peace Accord Implementation

The four-year peace talks between the FARC and the Santos Administrationadministration started in Norway and moved to Cuba, where negotiators worked through a six-point agenda during more than 50 rounds of talks. Over the course of four years, the Colombian government and the FARC negotiated several central issues, with the following major sub-agreements:

•  land use and rural development (May 2013);
•  the FARC'’s political participation after disarmament (November 2013);
• illicit  il icit crops and drug trafficking (May 2014);
• victims'  victims’ reparations and transitional justice (December 2015); and
•  the demobilization and disarmament of the FARC and a bilateral cease-fire (June 2016).

A sixth topic provided for mechanisms to implement and monitor the peace agreement. All Al parties to the accord recognized that implementation would be challengingchal enging, with many Colombians questioning whether the FARC would be held accountable for its violent crimes.³⁵ The42 In August 2016, the Santos administration and FARC negotiators announced they had concluded their talks and achieved a 300-page peace agreement. The accord was narrowly defeated in a popular referendum held in early October 2016, but it was revised by the Santos government and agreed to by the FARC. The Colombian Congress ratified a revised accord at the end of November 2016. 41 White House, “Statement by National Security Advisor Robert C. O’Brien, Press Release, August 17, 2020; “Colombia y Estados Unidos Lanzan Iniciativa ‘Colombia Crece.’” El Tiempo. August 17, 2020. https://www.eltiempo.com/politica/gobierno/colombia-y-estados-unidos-lanzan-iniciativa-colombia-crece-530200. 42 For more background on the peace talks and the actors involved in the conflict, see CRS Report R42982, Colombia’s Peace Process Through 2016, by June S. Beittel. Congressional Research Service 12 link to page 19 Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations Colombia’s Constitutional Court ruled in October 2017 that over the next three presidential terms (until 2030), Colombia must follow the peace accord commitments.43The Special Jurisdiction of Peace (JEP by its Spanish acronym), set up to adjudicate the most heinous crimes of Colombia's ’s decades-long armed conflict, began to hear cases in July 2018. However, Colombians remain skeptical of itsthe JEP’s capacity. Some analysts have estimated that implementing the programs required byin the accord may cost up to $45 bil ion over 15 years.44 the accord may take 15 years and cost from $30 billion to $45 billion.³⁶ The country faces steep challenges chal enges to underwrite the post-accord peace programs in an era of declining revenues and competing challengeschal enges, such as the influx of Venezuelan migrants.

and the health and economic crises resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. The Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame is responsible for monitoring implementation of the peace agreement. The latest assessment, covering developments through November 2019, shows the portions of the agreement furthest along in implementation are disarmament and demobilizationagreement. It released its latest assessment in April 2019. In the Kroc Institute review of implemented commitments shown in Figure 3, disarmament and demobilization is the most complete. During a U.N.-monitored demobilization effort in 2017, some 13,200 FARC (armed combatants and militia members) disarmed, demobilized, and began the reintegration process.³⁷ 45 By contrast, the least-implemented commitments include landpeace accord elements (see Figure 2) involve land reform and and rural development elements,, particularly measures concerned with more equitable access to land for rural inhabitants. There also have been limited advances in implementation of the National Program for the Substitution of Il icit Crops and the Comprehensive Community and Municipal Substitution and Alternative Development Programs in some 3,053 vil ages in 19 departments.46 43 “Colombia Peace Deal Cannot Be Modified for 12 years, Court Rules,” Reuters, October 11, 2017. 44 See, for instance, “Implementacíon del Acuerdo de Paz Necesitaria $76 Billones Adicionales,” El Espectador, September 21, 2018. 45 T he 13,200 demobilized FARC include those who had been imprisoned for crimes of rebellion, who were accredited by the Colombian government as eligible to demobilize. (T ally of demobilized from Luisa Fernando Mejía, “How Colombia Is Welcoming Migrants—and Staying Solvent,” Am ericas Quarterly, September 11, 2019, at https://www.americasquarterly.org/content/how-colombia-welcoming-migrants-and-staying-solvent .) 46 Germán Valencia and Fredy Chaverra, “PDET -PNIS T erritories in T ension with the Future Zones,” Fundacion Paz y Reconciliacion. July 20, 2020, at https://pares.com.co/2020/07/21/territorios-pdet-pnis-en-tension-con-las-zonas-futuro/. Congressional Research Service 13 Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations Figure 2 concerned with more equitable access to land, including connecting the impoverished rural parts of Colombia to the main economy, and counternarcotics programs to support the transition to licit crops.

Figure 3. Implementation of the Colombia Peace Accord

. Implementation of the Colombia Peace Accord Source: Created by CRS with data drawn from executive summary offrom the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame. Notes: The Kroc Institute is the first university-based research center to directly support the implementation of a peace accord. Territorial y Focused Development Programs (PDETs in Spanish) are a tool outlined in the peace accord for planning and managing a broad rural development process, with the aim of transforming 170 municipalities (11,000 vil ages in 19 departments) most affected by the armed conflict. PDETs target counties (municipios) known to have the highest concentration of conflict victims, with the highest numbers of mass kil ings and forced disappearances.47 These conflict- battered areas general y have chronic poverty, high inequality, and il icit crops. The development program outlined for the PDETs includes roads and transportation, health care and education, and programs to foster economic development in these rural areas over a 10- to 15-year timeline. According to an October 2019 U.N. Verification Mission report, some 650 such projects are complete; the government reported that 500 more were under way. The Defense Ministry’s strategy for “post-conflict” Colombia also identifies priority zones for stabilization, known as Zonas Futuros, (Future Zones/Strategic Zones of Comprehensive Intervention). The 995 vil ages identified by the Defense Ministry are located within the PDETs.48 Progress and Setbacks over Four Years Implementing the Peace Accord Although progress has been uneven across al of Notre Dame, State of Implementation of the Colombian Final Accord: December 2016 – April 2019, April 2019, at https://kroc.nd.edu/assets/333274/executive_summary_colombia_print_single_2_.pdf. Notes: The Kroc Institute is the first university-based research center to directly support the implementation of a peace accord.

While progress has been uneven across the all commitments, some programs received external commitments, some programs received external and international pressure to proceed quickly and were "“fast tracked"” by the Colombian Congress. For example, in a December 2016 ruling, the Colombian Constitutional Court granted fast-track implementation to the revised peace accord that was approved in late 2016, particularly as it applied to the FARC's disarmament and demobilization. In a 2017 ruling, however, the court determined that all legislation related to implementation of the accord needed to be fully debated rather than approved in an expedited fashion, which some analysts suggested slowed implementation significantly. ’s disarmament and demobilization. Other factors that became obstacles to quick implementation included efforts by the Duque government to revise the accord. In March 2019, the Duque government sought changes to 6 of the 159 articles that make up the law governing the peace accord, including proposed changes to the JEP.⁴¹ Those changes were defeated in the Colombian Congress, however, and rejected by Colombia's Constitutional Court.⁴² In July 2018, the JEP began to hear cases, including confessions from those alleged to have engaged in crimes against humanity. Some FARC members have sought to avoid the process due to fears it would not guarantee them the rights to transitional justice promised at the peace table.⁴³

47 Ibid. 48 For more background, see Colombian Ministry of Defense, Defense and Security Policy – DSP: For Legality, Entrepreneurship, and Equity, January 2019. Congressional Research Service 14 Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations accord, including proposed changes to the JEP. Those changes were defeated in the Colombian Congress, however, and rejected by Colombia’s Constitutional Court.49 FARC assets are of interest to the U.S. State Department, which lists the FARC as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, and the Colombian government, which will use theseplanned to use the assets for remuneration to victims in compliance with Colombia'’s peace accord. The FARC disclosed in September 2017 what it claimed were its total hidden assets, listing more than $330 millionmil ion in mostly real estate investments. This announcement drew criticism from several analysts who maintain that FARC assets are likely much greater, with some estimating that FARC profits from the various criminal economies it controlled prior to demobilization total above $500 million annually.⁴⁴

mil ion annual y.50 One of Colombia'’s greatest challengespost-conflict chal enges continues to be ensuring personal the personal security for ex-combatants and demobilized FARC. The FARC'’s reintegration into civil society remains a charged topic; in the 1990s, FARC attempts to start a political party, known as the Patriotic Union, resulted in more than 3,000 party members being killedkil ed by right-wing paramilitaries and others.51 The demobilized FARC face numerous risks, although most remain committed to the peace process. The U.N. Security Council’paramilitaries and others.⁴⁵ By late August 2019, 120 demobilized FARC members reportedly had been killed or forcibly disappeared, according to press reports.⁴⁶ The U.N. Security Council's October 1, 2019, report of the s October 1, 2019, report of the Verification Mission in Colombia stated that 147 former FARC members who demobilized (more than 1%) had been murdered and another 12 demobilized FARC were missing or disappeared.52 In October 2020, the JEP court announced it would take up the issue of ex-combatant kil ings, which by then had reached 230 kil ings of former and demobilized FARC.53 In addition to unmet government guarantees of security, the FARC has criticized the government for not adequately preparing for the group’s demobilization and reintegration. The U.S. State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism covering 2018 noted that reintegration program delays could encourage more ex-combatants to return to criminal activities, including terrorism. The State Department’s terrorism report covering 2019 (and published in June 2020) stated that “roughly 13,000 FARC ex-combatants and former militia members continued to participate in social and economic reincorporation activities.” 54 According to observers, the government failed to provide basic resources to FARC members gathered throughout the country in special y designated zones for disarmament and demobilization (later renamed reintegration zones). Several U.N. reports have flagged the dangers of failing to reintegrate former FARC combatants and not providing viable options for 49 T he rejected changes reasserted that FARC must pay victims of their crimes with seized assets, revised extradition rules, and toughened rules concerning sentencing of war crimes. 50 Jeremy McDermott, “The FARC’s Riches: Up to %580 Million in Annual Income,” InSight Crime, September 6, 2017. 51 For more about the decimation of the former FARC-linked party called the Patriotic Union in the 1980s, see CRS Report R42982, Colom bia’s Peace Process Through 2016 , by June S. Beittel. 52 United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, Report of the Secretary-General, S/2019/780, October 1, 2019. 53 “JEP Cites Minister and Prosecutor for Murders Against Former Combatants, Fundación Paz & Reconciliación,” October 16, 2020. 54 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism : Colombia Report, June 24, 2020, at https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2019/. Reporting from September 2019 suggests 35 collective reintegration productive projects have been approved; of those project s, funding has been dispersed for 22 projects. Unit ed Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, Report of the Secretary-General, S/2019/780, October 1, 2019. However, FARC living in the zones (around 3,000 in the fall of 2019) questioned their safety following the October 2019 murder of a demobilized FARC fighter within a reintegration zone, the first to take place in an area under government protection. Congressional Research Service 15 Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations income.55than 1%) had been murdered and another 12 demobilized FARC members had disappeared.⁴⁷ The top three departments for the homicides were Cauca, Nariño, and Antioquia.

In addition to unmet government guarantees of security, the FARC has criticized the government for not adequately preparing for the group's demobilization and reintegration. The U.S. State Department's Country Reports on Terrorism covering 2018 noted that reintegration program delays could encourage more ex-combatants to return to criminal activities, including terrorism.⁵⁰ According to observers, the government failed to provide basic resources to FARC members gathered throughout the country in specially designated zones for disarmament and demobilization (later renamed reintegration zones). Several U.N. reports have flagged the dangers of failing to reintegrate former FARC combatants and not providing viable options for income.⁵¹ Peace process advocates have cited inadequate attention to the inclusion of ethnic Colombians such as Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities—who are among those victimized and hit hardest by the conflict—in peace accord implementation, as required by the "ethnic chapter" of the accord.⁵²

in the peace accord’s ethnic chapter.56 As agreed in the peace accord, the demobilized rebels transitioned to a political party that became known as the Common Alternative Revolutionary Force (retaining the acronym FARC) in September 2017.57September 2017.⁵³ In November 2017, the FARC announced its party's presidential ticket, topped by FARC leader Rodrigo Londoño (aka Timochenko) for president.⁵⁴ The FARC party ran several candidates in congressional races in March 2018 but failed to win any additional congressional race for which it competed. (FARC former combatants took only the legislative seats set aside for them in the lower house and Colombian Senate, which are non-voting.) In department and municipal elections held in October 2019which it competed. In October 2019department and municipal elections, the FARC party won a mayoral contest in the Bolivar department but lost most of the other races it entered, although it won some seats on city councils in more rural municipalities or in coalitions with other leftist candidates.⁵⁵

58 The Current Security Environment

Colombia has confronted a complex security environment of armed groups: two violent leftist insurgencies, the FARC and the ELN, and groups that succeeded the AUC following its demobilization demobilization during the Uribe Administration.

Several sources suggest that between 8% and 13% (1,000 to 1,700) of the FARC have become dissidents, who reject the The State Department’s 2019 Country Reports on Terrorism, published in June 2020, stated that the major terror attacks in the country during 2019 included bombings, attacks on police and military, and violence against civilians carried out by FARC dissidents and ELN fighters. FARC Several sources estimate that nearly 3,000 former FARC are dissidents who either rejected the peace settlement or have, since demobilizing, rejected it and returned to illicit activities.⁵⁶il icit activities.59 These armed individuals remain a threat.⁵⁷ A controversial case in Colombia's transitional justice system involves a FARC leader who was also a lead negotiator in the peace process, Seuxis Hernández, known by his alias Jesús Santrich, was a case example. Colombian authorities jailed Santrich for allegedlyal egedly committing drug trafficking crimes involving exporting 10,000 kilograms of cocaine in 2017, after the peace accord was ratified. Santrich did not show up in court and left the FARC reintegration camp where he was residing. He then joined the former FARC leader and former head peace negotiator known by the alias Iván Márquez. On August 29, 2019, a FARC splinter faction lead by Márquez and Santrich cal ed for a return to armed struggle, al eging the Colombian government had not complied with the peace accord and had failed to protect demobilized FARC. Rodrigo Londoño, the former top 55 Edith Lederer, “UN Official: Reintegrating Colombia’s Rebels is Not Going Well,” Associated Press, October 20, 2017; op. cit, United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, Report of the Secretary -General, S/2019/780, October 1, 2019. 56 Colombia recognizes some 710 indigenous reserves, while Afro -Colombian territories encompass some 6.5 million hectares of land. For more, see Gimena Sanchez-Garzoli, “ T he Slow Death of Colombia’s Peace Deal,” Foreign Affairs, October 30, 2019; and “ Colombia Update: Attacks on Social Leaders, Forced Eradication Operations, and the Ongoing Abuses Amid the Pandemic,” June 26, 2020. 57 Lisa Haugaard and Andrea Fernández Aponte, “Colombia’s Peace Process: Successful Disarmament, But Other Implementation Proceeds Slowly,” Latin America Working Group, September 28, 2017. 58 EIU, “Colombia Politics: Quick View-Local Elections Highlight Weakening of Party Machine,” ViewsWire, October 28, 2019. 59 Many analysts estimate the level of dissidence at under 10% though this may be increasing. In a mid-2019 study, Ideas for Peace Foundation, a respected Colombian think tank, found that 8% of demobilized FARC are unaccounted for, although some of those are unlikely to have rearmed. See Ideas for Peace Foundation, “ La Reincorporación de los excombatientes de las FARC,” July 2019. In June 2020, the State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism , maintained that 2,600 FARC had become peace accord dissidents, including those who never demobilized, who left the peace process, or who constitute new recruits. Congressional Research Service 16 Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations guerril a leader who heads the FARC political party,60 immediately denounced the cal ratified. However, a JEP ruling announced on May 15, 2019, freed Santrich on the grounds that a U.S. undercover operation to investigate Santrich's crimes was illegal and there was insufficient evidence to hold him or to extradite him to the United States. In response, Colombian Attorney General Néstor Humberto Martínez resigned in protest. Subsequently, Colombian authorities rearrested Santrich, allegedly without plans to extradite him, because the Colombian government said it possessed new evidence implicating him.⁵⁸ Santrich did not show up in court in late June 2019 to be questioned on the new evidence, however, and had left the former FARC reintegration camp where he was residing.⁵⁹

On August 29, 2019, a FARC splinter faction called for a return to arms, alleging the Colombian government had not complied with the peace accord and had failed to protect demobilized FARC members, with many demobilized FARC killed. Luciano Marín Arango (alias Iván Márquez), who announced this action, was the FARC's most prominent negotiator during the peace talks. Among his armed followers shown in the video announcement was Jesús Santrich. Rodrigo Londoño, the former top guerrilla leader who heads the FARC political party,⁶⁰ immediately denounced the call to return to war and said this faction of dissidents would have to pay theface consequences. He calledcal ed for continuing implementation and enforcement of the peace accord.⁶¹

Colombia'61 ELN Colombia’s second-largest rebel movement, the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional, or ELN), began formal peace talks with the Colombian government after the FARC peace accord was approved in sessions held first in Ecuador and later in Cuba. On January 17, 2019,In January 2019 the ELN exploded a car bomb at a National Police academy in southern Bogotá shattered illusionsshattering il usions that Colombia'’s long internal conflict with insurgents was coming to an end. The bombing, allegedlyal egedly carried out by an experienced ELN bomb maker, killedkil ed 21 police cadets (as wel (as well as the bomber) and injured several dozen more. The ELN took responsibility for the attack in a published statement. Large demonstrations followed in Bogotá, protesting the return of violence to Colombia'’s capital city.

As a result of the bombing, the Duque government broke off peace talks with the ELN.⁶² 62 President Duque requested the extradition of the team of ELN peace negotiators in Cuba to face charges of terrorism in Colombia.⁶³63 He maintained that the ELN delegation members must have had prior knowledge of the car bombing, which they denied. ELN is far more regionally oriented, decentralized, and nonhierarchical in its decisionmaking than the FARC, and it remains a primary security challenge. In September 2019, President Duque threatened to denounce Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism at the United NationsU.N. General Assembly if the ELN leaders were not turned over to his government.⁶⁴ In his U.N. speech on September 25, 2019, 64 In a speech at the United Nations, President Duque described military intelligenceintel igence concerning some 1,400 ELN fighters present in Venezuela.65 According to State Department’s 2019 terrorism report, there are about 3,000 active members of the ELN. Paramilitary Successors and Criminal Bands The FARC’s demobilization has triggered open conflict among armed actors who fight to control the il icit markets that the demobilized insurgentsVenezuela.⁶⁵

The FARC's demobilization has triggered open conflict among armed actors (including FARC dissidents and transnational criminal groups), which seek to control drug cultivation and trafficking, illegal mining, and other businesses that the demobilized FARC abandoned. The ongoing lack of governance in remote rural areas recallsrecal s the conditions that originally original y gave rise to the FARC and other armed groups. The AUC, (as noted earlier), was thea national umbrellaumbrel a organization of paramilitaries that officially disbanded a decade ago. The U.S. State Department removed the organization from the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations in July 2014. More thanofficial y disbanded a more than decade ago.66 Some 31,000 AUC members demobilized between 2003 and 2006, and Colombia’s 2005 Justice and Peace Law required demobilized AUC combatants to confess to crimes such as forced disappearances and provided for victim compensation. However, many former AUC paramilitaries subsequently joined criminal gangs, which are more focused on profits than ideology.67 Opposing the national government does not 60 T he FARC political party retained the insurgency acronym. 61 “FARC Splinter T akes Up Arms, Jeopardizing Peace Accord,” Latin News Weekly Report, September 5, 2019. 62 Joshua Goodman, “Colombia Asks Cuba to Arrest ELN Negotiators for Car Bombing,” Associated Press, January 19, 2019. 63 T he Cuban government was a host and guarantor of the peace talks with the ELN. 64 “Colombia T hreatens to Denounce Cuba as a Sponsor of T errorism,” Associated Press, September 10, 2019. 65 President Iván Duque Márquez, “Llegó el Momento de Pasar de los Discursos a las Acciones, Y Colombia Está Actuando,” Speech before the United Nations General Assembly, United Nations, September 25, 2019. 66 T he U.S. State Department removed the organization from the list of Foreign T errorist Organizations in July 2014 . 67 According to some analysts, all but one of the major Bacrim have their roots in the AUC. See Jeremy McDermott, “T he BACRIM and T heir Position in Colombia’s Underworld,” InSight Crime, Organized Crime in the Americas, May 2, 2014. Congressional Research Service 17 Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations appear to be their objective, although some of these criminal groups have at times sought territorial control in parts of Colombia.68 The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration’s National Drug Threat Assessment, published in January 2020, maintained that large-scale Colombian crime groups work closely with Mexican and Central American transnational criminal organizations to export quantities of cocaine out of Colombia every year.69 Typical y, despite ideological differences, the FARC (now dissident FARC) and ELN cooperate with paramilitary successor groups in drug trafficking and other il icit activities, frequently using Venezuela as a drug transit corridor.70 Humanitarian Crisis in Venezuela and Its Consequences for Colombia71 Overlaying the chal enges that Colombia faces domestical y, the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela 2003 and 2006, and many AUC leaders stepped down. However, many former AUC paramilitaries continued their illicit activities or rearmed and joined criminal groups known as Bacrim. Many observers view the Bacrim as successors to the paramilitaries,⁶⁶ and the Colombian government has characterized these groups as the biggest threat to Colombia's security since 2011.⁶⁷ Overthrowing the national government does not appear to be their objective, although various Bacrim groups have at times sought territorial control in some parts of Colombia.⁶⁸

The State Department's 2018 Country Reports on Terrorism, published in early November 2019, noted a modest increase in Colombian terrorist activity in 2018 over the low level in 2017. In 2018, ELN guerrillas reportedly moved from seeking safe haven in Venezuela to taking control of illicit gold mining areas near Venezuela's border with Guyana.⁷⁵ Both the ELN, which is still engaged in armed conflict, and its rival, the Popular Liberation Army (EPL), reportedly recruit Venezuelans to cultivate coca in Colombia. Human trafficking and sexual exploitation of Venezuelan migrants throughout Colombia is prevalent. Dissident FARC guerrillas are using border areas and other remote areas in the countryside to regroup and could seek to consolidate into a more unified organization or coordinate with the ELN inside Venezuela.⁷⁶

Humanitarian Crisis in Venezuela and Its Consequences for Colombia⁷⁷

Overlaying the challenges that Colombia faces domestically, the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela has set in motion a mass exodus of migrants, the majority of whom are now residing in Colombia. In early May 2019, the Director General of Colombia'’s migration services announced that of the more than 1 mil ion Venezuelans living in Colombia, some 770,000 had a form of legal status granting them access to social services and employment.⁷⁸72 Providing services to those migrants has increased pressure on the Colombian government's finances equivalent to roughly 0.5%-0.6% of the country's GDP.⁷⁹ Of the 1.4 million Venezuelans inside Colombia in August 2019, about half had regular status (visas and accreditation) and another 699,000 had irregular status. The major concerns for these migrants and refugees are their vulnerability to becoming victims of’s finances. The arrival of the COVID-19 pandemic led Colombia to close its borders with Venezuela, however, ending what had been a welcoming approach to displaced Venezuelans. Venezuelan migrants and refugees are vulnerable to a variety of threats, including sexual violence, the use of minors in armed violence, exposure to excessive force, and homicide. Several humanitarian organizations attempt to provide the VenezuelansVenezuelan arrivals with situational knowledge in Colombia, as many come with few to no economic resources,destitute, with significant health and emergency care needs, and with almost no understanding of the precarious areas where they may reside inside Colombia, increasing their susceptibility to criminal exploitation.

be residing in Colombia. Since early 2019, more than 1,000 Venezuelan security forces have deserted into Colombia. The Colombian military has disarmed them and placed them in hotelshousing near the border, along with their family members.⁸⁰73 In May 2019, Colombia'’s migration agency signed an agreement with the interim government of Venezuela to permit security forces (military and police) who have defected from the Maduro government to have temporary legal status to work and receive assistance.⁸¹assistance in Colombia.74 As part of what many have seen as a more welcoming policy to Venezuelan migrants fleeing their country and living in Colombia, President Duque announced on August 5, 2019, that Colombia would grant citizenship to more than 24,000 children born to Venezuelans inside Colombia since 2015 and to those born in Colombia by August 2021.⁸²

In early September 2019, tensionsobservers consider a more tolerant policy to 68 For a discussion of the informal justice provided by Bacrim, see International Crisis Group, Colombia’s Armed Groups Battle for the Spoils of Peace, October 19, 2017. 69 U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), 2019 National Drug Threat Assessment, DEA-DCT -DIR-007-20, January 30, 2020. 70 Since 2005, U.S. Administrations have made an annual determination that Venezuela has failed demonstrably to adhere to its obligations under international narcotics agreements. President T rump made the most recent determination for FY2021 in September 2020. 71 T his section is drawn largely from CRS Insight IN11163, New U.S. Sanctions on Venezuela, coordinated by Clare Ribando Seelke, and CRS In Focus IF11029, The Venezuela Regional Hum anitarian Crisis and COVID-19, by Rhoda Margesson and Clare Ribando Seelke. For background on Venezuela, see CRS Report R44841, Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations, coordinated by Clare Ribando Seelke. 72 Gobierno de Colombia, “Más de 1 Millón 260 Mil Venezolanos se Encuentran Radicados en el País: Director de Migración Colombia,” May 2, 2019. 73 Karen DeYoung and Mary Beth Sheridan, “Venezuelan Military Foils U.S. Hopes,” Washington Post, April 14, 2019. T he article states that more than 2,000 troops and family members from Venezuela were waiting in border -area hotels. 74 Gobierno de Colombia, “Colombia Determina Esquema de Atención para Ex -Militares y Ex-Policias Venezolanos Congressional Research Service 18 Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations receiving Venezuelan migrants, the Duque government also granted citizenship to more than 24,000 children born to Venezuelans inside Colombia since 2015 and to those who may be born in Colombia until August 2021.75 Some observers predict a prolonged stalemate. By early 2020, Colombia had received more than 1.8 mil ion Venezuelans. Tensions heightened between the Maduro government and the Duque government when Venezuela started to amass some 150,000 troops along the border with Colombia for "“military exercises"” planned to take place through the end of September.⁸⁶in September 2019.76 The situation was taken up by the signatories of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, also known as the Rio Treaty. In a regional response to the crisis in Venezuela, at a meeting held on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly, 16 of the 19 signatories of the treaty agreed to impose targeted sanctions on individuals and entities associated with the Maduro government.77 From FY2017 through May 2020, the U.S. government provided more than $610.6 mil ion in humanitarian and emergency food assistance in response to the Venezuela regional crisis. This included $534.4 mil ion to support Venezuelan refugees and migrants who fled to other countries, with the largest concentration in Colombia.78 The United States also is helping to coordinate and support a broader regional response to the Venezuelan migration crisis. the Rio Treaty. On September 11, 2019, a majority of the treaty's 19 signatories, including the United States, invoked the treaty to facilitate a regional response to the crisis in Venezuela, and on September 23, at a meeting held on the sidelines of the United Nations, 16 of the 19 signatories agreed to impose targeted sanctions on individuals and entities associated with the government of Nicolás Maduro.⁸⁷

Ongoing Human Rights Concerns

Colombia'Ongoing Human Rights Concerns Colombia’s multisided internal conflict over a half century generated a lengthy record of human rights abuses. Although it is widely recognized that Colombia'’s efforts to reduce violence, combat drug trafficking and terrorism, and strengthen the economy have met with success, many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and human rights groups continue to report significant human rights violations. These violations include violence targeting noncombatants, such as killingskil ings, torture, kidnappings, disappearancesenforced disappearance, forced displacements, forced recruitments, massacres, and sexual attacks.

According to official data reported in Colombia, more than 83,000 people were victims of enforced disappearances during the armed conflict.79 Colombia continues to experience murders and threats of violence against journalists, human rights defenders, labor union members, social activists such as land rights leaders, and others. Crimes of violence against women, children, Afro-Colombian and indigenous leaders, and other vulnerable groups continue at high rates. In December 2018, the U.N. special rapporteur on human rights defenders strongly criticized the heightened murders of human rights defenders, which he maintained were committed by hitmen paid less than $100 per murder, according to reports from activists and other community members.⁸⁸80 These ongoing assaults reflect constraints que se Encuentran en el T erritorio Nacional,” May 15, 2019. 75 USAID, “ Venezuela Regional Crisis: Fact Sheet #3, FY2019,” September 4, 2019; Luisa Fernando Mejía, “How Colombia Is Welcoming Migrants – and Staying Solvent,” Am ericas Quarterly, September 11, 2019. 76 Morgan Phillips, “Venezuela Starts Military Exercises at Colombia Border, U.S. Promises ‘Full Support,’” Fox News, September 10, 2019. 77 CRS Insight IN11116, The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance and the Crisis in Venezuela , by Peter J. Meyer. 78 CRS In Focus IF11029, The Venezuela Regional Humanitarian Crisis and COVID-19, by Rhoda Margesson and Clare Ribando Seelke. 79 Statement of Frederico Andreu-Guzmán, Witness, “Enforced Disappearance in Latin America,” Hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, T om Lantos Human Rights Commission, October 1, 2020. T he statement also notes only 130 convictions have been won for this gross human rights violation over recent decades. 80 “UN: Human Rights Activists Say Hitmen T argeting T hem in Colombia,” Reuters, December 3, 2018. Congressional Research Service 19 link to page 47 Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations These ongoing assaults reflect constraints of the Colombian judicial system to effectively prosecute crimes and overcome impunity. (See Appendix B for additional resources on human rights reporting in Colombia.)

Extrajudicial Executions and "“False Positives.".” For many years, human rights organizations have raised concerns about extrajudicial executions committed by Colombian security forces, particularly the military. In 2008, it was revealed that several young men from the impoverished community of Soacha, neighboring the capital city of Bogotá, were lured, allegedlyal egedly by military personnel, from their homes to another part of the country with the promise of employment and executed. The Soacha murder victims had been disguised as guerrillaguerril a fighters to inflate military claims of enemy body counts, and reporters labeled the deaths false positives. Following an investigation into the Soacha murders, the military fired 27 soldiers and officers, including three generals, and the army'’s top commander resigned.⁸⁹

81 In 2009, the false positive phenomenon, which was happening more broadly in Colombia, was investigated by the U.N.'’s Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions, which issued a report. The report concluded "“the sheer number of cases, their geographic spread, and the diversity of military units implicated, indicate that these killingskil ings were carried out in a more or less systematic fashion by significant elements within the military."⁹⁰”82 The majority of the cases took place between 2004 and 2008, when U.S. assistance to Colombia peaked.

The Attorney General'’s Office reported that from 2017 to mid-2018, 246 security forces were convicted in cases related to false positives, 716 cases were in the prosecution phase, and 10 new investigations had been opened. In total, the government had convicted 1,176 members of the security forces in cases related to false positives by mid-2018, including at least eight colonels.⁹¹

In May 2019, a New York Times For 2019, the State Department reported that in a similar period, from January through September, investigations of past kil ings continued but slowed, resulting in seven new cases of aggravated homicide by state agents. A new case was opened against a colonel for al egedly ordering the kil ing of a demobilized member of the FARC, and the soldier who carried out the shooting was convicted and sentenced to 20 years in prison. In addition, the Attorney General’s office reported two new convictions of security force members committing homicides of persons protected under international humanitarian law, and by mid-2019 it had 2,504 open investigations related to false positive kil ings or other extrajudicial kil ings.83 In May 2019, a New York Times press investigation revealed that several top Colombian military officials had reintroduced a policy to reward high kill kil counts, causing an outpouring of criticism regarding recreating the possibility for more false positives.⁹²84 In 2017, the U.S. Congress added to its criteria for human rights reporting to release the final tranche of U.S. military financing assistance that Colombia should demonstrate that senior military officers had been held to account for their role in false positives, including being the intellectual intel ectual authors for such crimes. The Duque government responded to the 2018 scandal by rescinding the order to increase results of guerrilla 81 For example, as of mid-2013, 18 colonels were accused of links to the crimes committed in Soacha; two had been convicted. See U.S. Department of State, Mem orandum of Justification Concerning Hum an Rights Conditions with Respect to Assistance for the Colom bian Arm ed Forces, September 11, 2013. 82 United Nations, “Statement by Professor Philip Alston, U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions–Mission to Colombia, 8-18 June 2009,” press release, at http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view01/C6390E2F247BF1A7C12575D9007732FD?opendocument. 83 U.S. State Department, Colombia: 2018 Human Rights Report, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, March 2019; Colom bia: 2019 Hum an Rights Report, Country Reports on Hum an Rights Practices, March 2020. 84 Nicholas Casey, “Colombia Debates Censuring Ministers for Army Kill Order,” New York Times, June 11, 2019; Colombia’s Return to the discredited “Body Count” Strategy,” Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), June 2, 2019. Congressional Research Service 20 Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations of guerril a fighter deaths, and President Duque established an independent commission to quickly make recommendations to him to reinforce the respect for human rights within the armed forces.85 Wiretapping scandals have periodical y rocked the Colombian military and intel igence services; in May 2020, one such scandal was revealed that is al eged to involve U.S foreign assistance to spy on dozens of public figures and journalists.86 Human Rights Defenders and Journalists. According to forces.⁹³

Human Rights Defenders and Journalists. Although estimates diverge, the number of human rights defenders murdered in 2016 totaled 80, according to Somos Defensores (" (“We are Defenders"Defenders”), a Colombian NGO that tracks violence against defenders. Despite the end of the conflict being declared,, the deaths of human rights defenders and activists increased even after the end of the conflict was declared, with more , with more than 100 such individuals killed kil ed each year from 2017 through 2019 (and even before year'’s end in 2019). Such deaths have shot up in 2020, with massacres (defined as kil ing of more than three persons) that included ethnic teens and activists2019), according to the Washington Office on Latin America, a human rights advocacy group.⁹⁴87 Cases against those making threats and those responsible for ordering or carrying out assassinations are rarely resolved. In 2018, the Duque government launched a national Pact for Life and the Protection of Social Leaders and Human Rights Defenders (PAO) and installedinstal ed a commission to operationalize the PAO, but the killing of kil ing of social leaders continues. According to many human rights activists, perpetrators of abuses still stil have little to fear in terms of legal consequences.

Violence toward social leaders began to rise after the implementation of the 2011 Victims'’ Law, which authorized the return of stolen land. A September 2013 report by Human Rights Watch pointed to the rise in violence against land activists and land claimants who had received positive rulings but were too intimidated to return to their land. Within the first 18 months of the law's ’s implementation, the Colombian government reported some 25 killingskil ings and Human Rights Watch documented 500 serious threats against land claimants.⁹⁵88 The land return or full compensation promised to victims in the law has been slow to date. (See textbox on "“Status of Implementation of Colombia'’s Victims'’ Law,"” below.)

For more than a decade, the Colombian government tried to suppress violence against groups facing extraordinary risk through the National Protection Unit (UPN by its Spanish acronym). Colombia'Colombia’s UPN provides protection measures, such as bodyguards and protective gear, to individuals individuals in at-risk groups, including human rights defenders, journalists, trade unionists, and others. However, according to international and Colombian human rights groups, the UPN has been plagued by corruption issues and has inadequately supported the prosecution of those responsible for attacks. The State Department'’s certification concerning human rights compliance published in August 2019 notes that the UPN protected about 7,300 individuals at extraordinary 85 U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, “Certification Related to Foreign Military Financing for Colombia Under Section 7045 (b) (4) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2019 (Div. F, P.L. 116-6). T he certification is described in more detail below in section on Human Rights Conditions on U.S. Assistance. In addition, in November 2019, Defense Minister Guillermo Botero stepped down to avoid censure for mishandling a raid against a FARC dissident camp in which several recruited children were alleged to have been extrajudicially murdered. 86 Keyal Vyas, “Colombia Used U.S. Gear for Internal Spying,” Wall Street Journal, May 5, 2020. 87 Human rights defenders include community leaders, land rights activists, indigenous and Afro-Colombian leaders, and women’s rights defenders., Gimena Sanchez-Garzoli, “T he Slow Death of Colombia’s Peace Deal,” October 30, 2019; Steven Grattan, “Dozens of Young People Killed in Colombia, Perpetrators Unknown,” August 24, 2 020. 88 Human Rights Watch, The Risk of Returning Home: Violence and Threats Against Displaced People: Reclaiming Land in Colom bia, September 2013. Congressional Research Service 21 Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations published in August 2019 notes that the UPN protected about 7,300 individuals at extraordinary risk, including trade unionists and leaders, journalists, human rights defenders, social leaders, and more than 330 land restitution claimants.⁹⁶

Violence and Labor. The issue of violence against the labor movement in Colombia has sparked controversy and debate for years. In April 2011, the United States and Colombia agreed to an "“Action Plan Related to Labor Rights"” (the Labor Action Plan, LAP), which contained 37 measures that Colombia would implement to address violence, impunity, and workers'’ rights protection. Before the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement entered into force in April 2012, the U.S. Trade Representative determined that Colombia had met all al the important milestones in the LAP to date.⁹⁷

90 Despite the programs launched and measures taken to implement the LAP, human rights and labor organizations claim that violence targeting labor union members continues. (Some analysts continue to debate whether labor activists are being targeted because of their union activities or for other reasons.) The Colombian government has acknowledged that violence and threats continue, but points to success in reducing violence generallygeneral y and the number of homicides of labor unionists specificallyspecifical y. Violence levels in general are high in Colombia, but have steadily been decreasing. According to the data reported by the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in its annual homicide report, rates have decreased dramaticallydramatical y since 2002, when the homicide rate was at 68.9 per 100,000.⁹⁸ In 2017, Colombia's national homicide rate fell below 25 per 100,000.⁹⁹ Murders of labor unionists also have declined; according68.9 89 Op. cit., U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, “Certification Related to Foreign Military Financing for Colombia Under Section 7045 (b) (4) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs A ppropriations Act, 2019. 90 U.S. T rade Representative (UST R), “FACT SHEET : Historic Progress on Labor Rights in Colombia,” April 15, 2012, at http://www.ustr.gov/about -us/press-office/fact -sheets/2012/april/historic-progress-labor-rights-colombia. Congressional Research Service 22 Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations per 100,000.91 Colombia’s national homicide rate fel below 25 per 100,000 in 2017; after a slight increase in 2018, it returned to a rate of 25.4 per 100,000 in 2019.92 Murders of labor unionists also have declined. According to the Colombian labor rights NGO and to the Colombian labor rights NGO and think tank the National Labor School (Escuela Nacional Sindical, ENS), there has beenwas a significant decline from 191 labor union murders in 2001 to 29 reported in 2018. In 2018, the Colombian government reported 11 fewer murders than ENS, or 18 homicides of labor activists and union members.¹⁰⁰

InternalFrom January 2018 to June 2019, the Attorney General’s Office reported 27 labor union members were kil ed. Although prosecutions were slow, the rate of case resolution improved due to the standing up of an “elite group” to implement a strategy to prioritize the resolution of labor unionist homicides.93 Internal Displacement. The internal conflict has been the major cause of a massive displacement of the civilian population that has many societal consequences, including implications for Colombia'Colombia’s poverty levels and stability. Colombia has one of the largest populations of internally internal y displaced persons (IDPs) in the world. Most estimates place the total at more than 7 million mil ion IDPs, or more than 10% of Colombia'’s estimated population of 49.8 million. 50 mil ion. This number of Colombians, forcibly displaced from some 6 millionmil ion hectares of land and impoverished as a result of the armed conflict, continues to grow. The number of mass displacements (talliestal ies of forced displacement of 10 or more families or 50 individuals) spiked in 2019. The Colombian ombudsman'’s office reported some 58 instances of mass displacement in the first three-quarters of 2019, resulting in more than 15,000 Colombians becoming IDPs. Indigenous and Afro-Colombian people make up an estimated 15%-22% of the Colombian population, but they are disproportionately represented among those displaced.¹⁰¹

94 IDPs suffer stigma and poverty and are often subject to abuse and exploitation. In addition to the disproportionate representation of Colombia'’s ethnic communities among the displaced, other vulnerable populations, including women and children, have been disproportionallydisproportional y affected. Women, who make up more than half of the displaced population in Colombia, can become targets for sexual harassment, violence, and human trafficking. Displacement is driven by a number of factors, though the leading cause is confrontations between insurgents and crime groups and the Colombian security forces. Inter-urban displacement, which often results from violence and threats by organized crime groups, is a growing phenomenon in cities such as Buenaventura and Medellin.

Medel in. Regional Relations

Colombia shares long borders with neighboring countries, and some of these border areas have been described as porous to illegalil egal armed groups that threaten regional security. Colombia has a 1,370-mile border with Venezuela, approximately 1,000-mile borders with both Peru and Brazil, and shorter borders with Ecuador and Panama. Much of the territory is remote and rugged and suffers from inconsistent state presence. Although all al of Colombia'’s borders have been problematic and subject to spilloverspil over effects from Colombia'’s armed conflict, the most affected are Venezuela, Ecuador, and Panama.

Over the years, Colombia's relations with Venezuela and Ecuador have been strained by Colombia' 91 U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, Global Study on Homicide, 2013, March 2014. 92 Chris Dalby and Camilo Carranza, “InSight Crime’s 2018 Homicide Round-Up,” InSight Crime, Janaury 22, 2019; Asmann and O’Reilly, “InSight Crime’s 2019 Homicide Round-Up,” InSight Crime, January 28, 2020. 93 State Department, Colombia: 2019 Human Rights Report, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, March 2020. 94 T he government’s victims’ registry is a national database that includes in it victims going back to the 1960s. It counts a total of 7.2 million individuals displaced since that time. See also Maria Alejandra Navarrence, “ Increase in Violence Leads to More Forced Displacements in Colombia,” InSight Crime, October 23, 2019. Congressional Research Service 23 link to page 40 link to page 40 Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations Over the years, Colombia’s relations with Venezuela and Ecuador have been strained by Colombia’s counterinsurgency operations, including cross-border military activity. The FARC and ELN insurgents have been present in shared-border regions and in some cases the insurgent groups used the neighboring countries to rest, resupply, and shelter.

Former President Uribe accused the former Venezuelan government of Hugo Chávez of harboring the FARC and ELN and maintained that he had evidence of FARC financing the 2006 political campaign of Ecuador'’s leftist President Rafael Correa. Relations between Ecuador and Colombia remained tense following the Colombian military bombardment of a FARC camp inside Ecuador in March 2008. Ecuador severed diplomatic relations with Colombia for 33 months. Also in 2008, Ecuador filed a suit against Colombia in the International Court of Justice (ICJ), claiming damages to Ecuadorian residents affected by spray drift from Colombia's aerial eradication of drug crops. In September 2013, Colombia reached an out-of-court settlement awarding Ecuador $15 million.

Venezuela's economic crisis significantly worsened throughout 2018 and 2019, prompting a sharp increase in migrants seeking to escape into or through Colombia.¹⁰² 95 Venezuela’s economic crisis significantly worsened throughout 2018 and 2019, prompting a sharp increase in migrants seeking to escape into or through Colombia.96 Venezuela’s instability, porous border with Colombia, and corrupt and lawless environment have attracted drug traffickers and other Colombian armed actors, such as the ELN and dissident FARC, who operate openly there. President Duque acknowledged that Venezuela had once served as a vital escape valve for Colombian refugees and displaced fleeing their half-century conflict, for which he was grateful. Part of the welcoming policy his government has forged toward Venezuelan migrants was in recognition of the escape valve that Venezuela provided for conflict victims of Colombia.

For many years, the region in Panama that borders Colombia, the Darien, was host to a permanent presence of FARC soldiers who used the remote area for rest and resupply as well wel to transit drugs north. By 2015, according to the State Department, the FARC was no longer maintaining a permanent militarized presence in Panamanian territory, in part due to effective approaches taken by Panama'’s National Border Service in coordination with Colombia. Nevertheless, the remote Darien region still faces challenges from smallerstil faces chal enges from smal er drug trafficking organizations and criminal groups such as Bacrim and experiences problems with human smuggling with counterterrorism implications.

implications. Colombia'’s Role in Training Security Personnel Abroad

When Colombia hosted the Sixth Summit of the Americas in April 2012, President Obama and President Santos announced a new joint endeavor, the Action Plan on Regional Security CooperationCooperation (USCAP). This joint effort, built on ongoing security cooperation, addresses hemispheric challengeschal enges, such as combating transnational organized crime, bolstering counternarcotics, strengthening institutions, and fostering resilient communities.¹⁰³97 The Action Plan focuses on capacity building for security personnel in Central America and the Caribbean by Colombian security forces (both Colombian military and police). To implement the plan, Colombia undertook several hundred activities in cooperation with Panama, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic, and between 2013 and 2017 95 Also in 2008, Ecuador filed a suit against Colombia in the International Court of Justice, claiming damages to Ecuadorian residents affected by spray drift from Colombia’s aerial eradication of drug crops. In September 2013, Colombia reached an out -of-court settlement with Ecuador. See section, “ Drug Crop Eradication and Other Supply Control Alternatives.” 96 For more on Venezuela, see CRS Report R44841, Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations, coordinated by Clare Ribando Seelke, and Juan Forero, “ Venezuela’s Misery Fuels Mass Migration —Residents Flee Crumbling Economy in Numbers that Echo Syrians to Europe,” Wall Street Journal, February 14, 2018. 97 U.S. Department of State, “Joint Press Release on the United States-Colombia Action Plan on Regional Security Cooperation,” April 15, 2012, at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/04/187928.htm. Congressional Research Service 24 Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic, and between 2013 and 2017 trained almost 17,000 individuals.¹⁰⁴98 The Colombian government notes that this program grew dramaticallydramatical y from 34 executed activities in 2013 to 441372 activities planned for 2018.¹⁰⁵

completed in 2019.99 Although as of October 2020 USCAP activities fel below 50 as a result of the pandemic, the Colombian government is in discussion to resume the training. Colombia has increasingly trained military and police from other countries both under this partnership and other arrangements, including countries across the globe. According to the Colombian Ministry of Defense, around 80% of those trained were from Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean. U.S. and Colombian officials maintain that the broader effort is designed to export Colombian expertise in combating crime and terrorism while promoting the rule of law and greater bilateral and multilateral law enforcement cooperation.

Critics of the effort to "“export Colombian security successes"” maintain that human rights concerns have not been adequately addressed.¹⁰⁶100 Some observers question the portion of these activities that are funded by the U.S. government and want to see more transparency.¹⁰⁷101 In one analysis of the training, a majority of the training was provided by Colombian National Police rather than the Colombian Army, in such areas as ground, air, maritime, and river interdiction; police testimony; explosives; intelligenceintel igence operations; psychological operations; and Comando JUNGLA, Colombia'’s elite counternarcotics police program.¹⁰⁸

102 Other analysts praise the Colombian training and maintain that U.S. assistance provided in this way has helped to improve, professionalize, and expand the Colombian military, making it the region' region’s second largest. As that highly trained military shifts from combating the insurgency and the Colombian National Police take the dominant role in guaranteeing domestic security, Colombia may play a greater role in regional security and even in coalition efforts internationally.¹⁰⁹ international y.103 In September 2017, President Trump announced he had considered designating Colombia in noncompliance with U.S. counternarcotics requirements. He did not take the step in part because of Colombian training efforts to assist others in the region with combating narcotics and related crime.¹¹⁰

U.S. Relations and Policy

Colombia is a key U.S. ally in the region. With diplomatic relations that began in the 19^th century following Colombia'104 98 Colombian Embassy to the United States, “Colombia: Exporter of Security and Stability,” March 2015. 99 Colombian Ministry of Defense, “International Cooperation Balance, 2010 -2018,” September 2018; Ministry of Defense information provided by Colombian Embassy personnel, October 27, 2020. 100 See, for example, Sarah Kinosian, John Lindsay-Poland, and Lisa Haugaard, “T he U.S. Should not Export Colombia’s Drug War ‘Success,’” InSight Crime: Investigation and Analysis of Organized Crime, July 9, 2015. 101 For example, critics have raised concerns that such programs circumvent congressionally imposed human rights restrictions on U.S.-funded security cooperation, such as vetting participants to identify and bar human rights violators. See Adam Isacson et al., Tim e to Listen: Trends in U.S. Security Assistance to Latin Am erica and the Caribbean , Latin America Working Group Education Fund, Center for International Policy, and the Washington Office on Latin America, September 2013. For more on the Leahy Law provisions that seek to bar assistance to human rights violators, see CRS Report R43361, “Leahy Law” Hum an Rights Provisions and Security Assistance: Issue Overview, coordinated by Nina M. Serafino. 102 See interview with Professor Arlene T ickner at “Security Diplomacy Centerpiece of Colombia’s Foreign Policy,” World Politics Review, September 5, 2014. 103 Colombia and NAT O signed a memorandum of understanding focused on future security cooperation and consultation in 2018, which was affirmed by the Constitutional Court. According to a consultation with the Colombian Embassy in December 2019, Colombia has a standing International Partnership Cooperation Program with NAT O and is the only global partner presently in the region. Areas of cooperation include demining, gender, and cyber. 104 For more information on the certification process, see CRS Report RL34543, International Drug Control Policy: Background and U.S. Responses, by Liana W. Rosen. Congressional Research Service 25 Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations U.S. Relations and Policy Colombia is a key U.S. al y in the region. With diplomatic relations that began in the 19th century following Colombia’s independence from Spain, the countries have enjoyed close and strong ties. Because of Colombia'’s prominence in the production of illegal il egal drugs, the United States and Colombia forged a close partnership over the past two decades. Focused initiallyinitial y on counternarcotics, and later counterterrorism, a program calledcal ed Plan Colombia laid the foundation for a strategic partnership that has broadened to include sustainable development, human rights, trade, regional security, and many other areas of cooperation. Between FY2000 and FY2016, the U.S. Congress appropriated more than $10 billionbil ion in in assistance from U.S. State Department and Department of Defense (DOD) accounts to carry out Plan Colombia and its follow-on strategies. During this time, Colombia made notable progress combating drug trafficking and terrorist activities and reestablishing government control over much of its territory. Its economic and social policies have reduced thelowered poverty ratelevels, and its security policies have lowered the policies reduced Colombia’s homicide rate.

Counternarcotics policy has been the defining issue in U.S.-Colombian relations since the 1980s because of Colombia'’s preeminence as a source country for illicitil icit drugs. Peru and Bolivia were the main global producers of cocaine in the 1980s and early 1990s. However, successful efforts there in reducing supply pushed cocaine production from those countriesin reducing supply in those countries pushed cocaine production to Colombia, which soon surpassed both its Andean neighbors. At least since the 1990s, Colombia’s long internal armed conflict was supercharged by profits from il icit crops, primarily cocaine. Other large il icit businesses sustained both leftist guerril a groups and Colombia’s paramilitaries, including human trafficking and il icit resource extraction, such as logging and gold mining.105 both its Andean neighbors. The FARC and other armed groups in the country financed themselves primarily through narcotics trafficking, and that lucrative illicit trade provided the gasoline for the decades-long internal armed conflict at least since the 1990s.¹¹¹ Colombia emerged to dominate the cocaine trade by the late 1990s. National concern about the crack cocaine epidemic and extensive drug use in the United States led to greater concern with Colombia as a source. As Colombia became the largest producer of coca leaf and the largest exporter of finished cocaine, heroin produced from Colombian-grown poppies was supplying a growing proportion of the U.S. market.¹¹²106 Alarm over the volumes of heroin and cocaine being exported to the United States was a driving force behind U.S. support for Plan Colombia at its inception.

inception. The evolution of Plan Colombia took place under changing leadership and changing conditions in both the United States and Colombia. Plan Colombia was followed by successor strategies such as the National Consolidation Plan, described below, and U.S.-Colombia policy has reached a new phase anticipating post-conflict Colombia.

Plan Colombia and Its Follow-On Strategies

Announced in 1999, Plan Colombia originally original y was a six-year strategy to end the country's ’s decades-long armed conflict, eliminate drug trafficking, and promote development. The counternarcotics and security strategy was developed by the government of President Andrés 105 Nick Miroff, “Colombia Is Preparing for Peace. So Are Its Drug T raffickers,” Washington Post, February 2, 2016. 106 According to State Department testimony, by 2001, Colombia was providing 22% to 33% of the heroin consumed in the United States. Paul E. Simons, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, testimony before a hearing of the House of Representatives, Committee on Government Reform, December 12, 2002. Congressional Research Service 26 Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations Pastrana in consultation with U.S. officials.107Pastrana in consultation with U.S. officials.¹¹³ Colombia and its alliesal ies in the United States realized that for the nation to gain control of drug trafficking required a stronger security presence, the rebuilding of institutions, and extending state presence where it was weak or nonexistent.

Initially, nonexistent. Initial y, the U.S. policy focus was on programs to reduce the production of illicitil icit drugs. U.S. support to Plan Colombia consisted of training and equipping counternarcotics battalions in the Colombian Army and specialized units of the Colombian National Police, drug eradication programs, alternative development, and other supply reduction programs. The original 1999 plan had a goal to reduce "“the cultivation, processing, and distribution of narcotics by 50%"” over the plan'plan’s six-year timeframe. The means to achieve this ambitious goal were a special focus on eradication and alternative development; strengthening, equipping, and professionalizing the Colombian Armed Forces and the police; strengthening the judiciary; and fighting corruption. Other objectives were to protect citizens from violence, promote human rights, bolster the economy, and improve governance. U.S. officials expressed their support for the program by emphasizing its counterdrug elements (including interdiction). The focus on counternarcotics was the basis for building bipartisan support to fund the program in the U.S. Congress because some Members of Congress were leery of involvement in fighting a counterinsurgency, which they likened to the "“slippery slope"” of the war in Vietnam.¹¹⁴

108 President George W. Bush came to office in 2001 and oversaw some changes to Plan Colombia. The primary vehicle for providing U.S. support to Plan Colombia was the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, which was included in foreign operations appropriations. The Bush Administration requested new flexibility so that U.S.-provided assistance would back a "“unified campaign against narcotics trafficking, terrorist activities, and other threats to [Colombia'’s] national security"security” due to the breakdown of peace talks between the FARC and the Pastrana government in February 2002.¹¹⁵109 Congress granted this request for a unified campaign to fight drug trafficking and terrorist organizations as Members of Congress came to realize how deeply intertwined the activities of Colombia'’s terrorist groups were with the illicitil icit drug trade that funded them.¹¹⁶ 110 However, Congress prohibited U.S. personnel from directly participating in combat missions. Congress placed a legislative cap on the number of U.S. military and civilian contractor personnel who could be stationed in Colombia, although the cap was adjusted to meet needs over time. The current limit (first specified in the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act, as amended) caps total military personnel at 800 and civilian contractors at 600, although numbers deployed have been far below the 1,400-person cap for years and now total fewer than 200.¹¹⁷

111 107 For a nuanced description of U.S. involvement in the development of Plan Colombia, see Stuart Lippe, “T here is No Silver Bullet and Other Lessons from Colombia,” Interagency Journal, vol. 5, no. 3 (Fall 2014). 108 Ibid. 109 Cynthia J. Arnson, “T he Peace Process in Colombia and U.S. Policy,” in Peace, Democracy, and Human Rights in Colom bia, eds. Christopher Welna and Gustavo Gallón (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), pp. 132-164. 110 Congress granted the expanded authority requested by the Bush Administration in an emergency supplemental appropriations bill (H.R. 4775, P.L. 107-206), which gave the State Department and the Department of Defense (DOD) flexibility to combat groups designated as terrorist organizations as well as to fight drug trafficking. T he legislation was signed into law on August 2, 2002. Congress granted this new authority in the aftermath of terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, and during a period when there was growing support in the U.S. Congress to combat terrorism. 111 T he FY2005 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4200) raised the military cap from 400 to 800 and the civilian cap from 400 to 600. T he number of U.S. personnel has declined significantly from the peak years of 2005 -2007, reflecting the gradual nationalization of U.S.-supported programs. Congressional Research Service 27 Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations President Uribe (2002-2010) embraced Plan Colombia with an aggressive strategy toward the insurgent forces that prioritized citizen security. His Democratic Security Policy, implemented first in a military campaign calledcal ed Plan Patriota, relied on the military to push FARC forces away from the major cities to remote rural areas and the borderlands. Like his predecessor, President Pastrana, Uribe continued to expand the Colombian military and police. He enhanced the intelligence intel igence capacity, professionalization, and coordination of the forces, in part with training provided by U.S. forces. His strategy resulted in expanded state control over national territory¹¹⁸ territory112 and a significant reduction in kidnappings, terrorist attacks, and homicides. In 2007, the Uribe Administration announced a shift to a "“Policy of Consolidation of Democratic Security."” The new doctrine was based on a "“whole-of-government"” approach to consolidate state presence in marginal areas that were historicallyhistorical y neglected—vulnerable to drug crop cultivation, violence, and control by illegal il egal armed groups. CalledCal ed a strategic leap forward by then-Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos, in 2009 the new strategy came to be calledcal ed the National Consolidation Plan (see below).

Colombian support for Plan Colombia and for the nation'’s security program grew under Uribe's ’s leadership. President Uribe levied a "“wealth tax"” to fund Colombia'’s security efforts, taxing the wealthiest taxpayers to fund growing defense and security expenditures. Overall Overal U.S. expenditures on Plan Colombia were only a portion of what Colombians spent on their own security. By one 2009 estimate, U.S. expenditures were not more than 10% of what Colombians invested in their total security costs.¹¹⁹113 In 2000, Colombia devoted less than 2% of its GDP to military and police expenditures and in 2010 that investment had grown to more than 4% of GDP. One assessment notes "“in the end there is no substitute for host country dedication and funding" ” to turn around a security crisis such as Colombia faced at the beginning of the millennium.¹²⁰

mil ennium.114 In 2008, congressional support for Plan Colombia and its successor programs also shifted. Some Members of Congress believed that the balance of programming was too heavily weighted toward security. Prior to 2008, the emphasis had been on "“hard side"” security assistance (to the military and police) compared with "“soft side"” traditional development and rule of law programs. Members debated if the roughly 75%/25% mix should be realigned. Since FY2008, Congress has reduced the proportion of assistance for security-related programs and increased the proportion for economic and social aid. As Colombia'’s security situation improved and Colombia'’s economy recovered, the United States also began turning over to Colombians operational and financial responsibility for efforts formerly funded by the U.S. government. The Colombian government "nationalized" “nationalized” the training, equipping, and support for Colombian military programs, such as the counterdrug brigade, Colombian Army aviation, and the air bridge denial program. U.S. funding overall overal began to decline. The nationalization efforts were not intended to end U.S. assistance, but rather to graduallygradual y reduce it to pre-Plan Colombia levels, adjusted for inflation.¹²¹

115 A key goal of Plan Colombia was to reduce the supply of illegal il egal drugs produced and exported by Colombia but the goals became broader over time. Bipartisan support for the policy existed 112 Although Democratic Security evolved over Uribe’s two-terms in office, the strategy is credited by some analysts for its coherence. “Uribe and his advisors developed a coherent counterinsurgency strategy based on taking and holding territory, protecting local populations, controlling key geographic cor ridors ... and demobilizing the paramilitary forces that threatened democracy and state authority as much as did the FARC.” Stuart Lippe, “T here is No Silver Bullet and Other Lessons from Colombia,” Interagency Journal, vol. 5, no. 3 (Fall 2014). 113 Peter DeShazo, Johanna Mendelson Forman, and Phillip McLean, Countering Threats to Security and Stability in a Failing State: Lessons from Colom bia, Center for Strategic & International Studies, September 2009. 114 Stuart Lippe, “T here is No Silver Bullet and Other Lessons from Colombia,” Interagency Journal, vol. 5, no. 3 (Fall 2014). 115 U.S. Department of State, Report on Multiyear Strategy for U.S. Assistance Programs in Colombia, Report to Congress, April 2009. Congressional Research Service 28 link to page 44 Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations Colombia but the goals became broader over time. Bipartisan support for the policy existed through three U.S. Administrations—President Bill Bil Clinton, President George W. Bush, and President Barack Obama. Plan Colombia came to be viewed by some analysts as one of the most enduring and effective U.S. policy initiatives in the Western Hemisphere. Some have lauded the strategy as a model. In 2009, William Wil iam Brownfield, then-U.S. Ambassador to Colombia, described Plan Colombia as "“the most successful nation-building exercise that the United States has associated itself with perhaps in the last 25-30 years." ” Other observers, however, were critical of the policy as it unfolded. Many in the NGO and human rights community maintained the strategy, with its emphasis on militarization and security, was inadequate for solving Colombia'’s persistent, underlying problems of rural violence, poverty, neglect and institutional weakness. Nevertheless, it appears that improvements in security conditions have been accompanied by substantial economic growth and a reduction in poverty levels over time. (SeeSee Appendix A for additional information on assessments of Plan Colombia.)

and its successors.) National Consolidation Plan and Peace Colombia

The National Consolidation Plan first launched during the Uribe Administration, (renamed the National Plan for Consolidation and Territorial Reconstruction), was designed to coordinate government efforts in regions where marginalization, drug trafficking, and violence converge. The whole-of-government consolidation was to integrate security, development, and counternarcotics to achieve a permanent state presence in vulnerable areas. Once securitysec urity forces took control of a contested area, government agencies in housing, education, and development would regularize the presence of the state and reintegrate the municipalities of these marginalized zones into Colombia. The plan had been restructured several times by the Santos government.

Some analysts criticize the Colombian government’s failure to assert control throughout the national territory in the wake of the FARC’s demobilization.116 The United States supported the Colombian government'’s consolidation strategy through an inter-agency program calledcal ed the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI). CSDI provided U.S. assistance to "fill gaps"“fil gaps” in Colombian government programming. At the U.S. Embassy in Colombia, CSDI coordinated efforts of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the State Department'’s Narcotics Affairs Section, the U.S. Military Group, and the Department of Justice to assist Colombia in carrying out the consolidation plan by expanding state presence and promoting economic opportunities in priority zones.¹²²117 It combined traditional counternarcotics assistance for eradication, interdiction, alternative development, and capacity building for the police, military, and justice sector institutions with other economic and social development initiatives.

As the peace agreement between the FARC and the government moved forward into implementation, the focus of U.S. assistance to Colombia has shifted again. With a foundation of the work done to advance consolidation, U.S. assistance has begun to aid in post-conflict planning and support Colombia'’s transition to peace by building up democratic institutions, protecting human rights and racial and ethnic minorities, and promoting economic opportunity. USAID'USAID’s country cooperation strategy for 2014-2018 anticipated the Colombian government reaching a negotiated agreement with the FARC, but remained flexible if an agreement was not 116 Remarks of Paul Angelo, Fellow, Council of Foreign Relations, “Waiting for Peace: Violence Against Social Leaders in Colombia,” webinar from the Inter-American Dialogue, Washington, DC, October 21, 2020, at https://www.thedialogue.org/events/online-event -waiting-for-peace-violence-against -social-leaders-in-colombia/. 117 Ibid. Congressional Research Service 29 Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations if an agreement was not signed. It recognized early implementation efforts, especiallyespecial y in the first 24 months after signature, would be critical to demonstrate or model effective practices. In the next five years, it envisioned Colombia evolving from aid recipient to provider of technical assistance to neighbors in the region.¹²³

118 Consolidating state authority and presence in the rural areas with weak institutions remains a has been a significant challengechal enge since the FARC'’s disarmament in the summer ofsummer 2017. Reintegration of the FARC and possibly other insurgent forces, such as the ELN, will wil be expensive and delicate. In particular, critics of the Colombian government’s consolidation efforts maintain the Santos administration critics of the consolidation efforts of the Colombian government maintain that the Santos Administration often lacked the commitment to hand off targeted areas from the military to civilian-led development and achieve locallylocal y led democratic governance.¹²⁴119 Consolidation efforts suffered from low political support, disorganization at the top levels of government, and failure to administer national budgets effectively in more remote areas, among other challenges.

In August 2018, shortly chal enges. The Territorial y Focused Development Programs (PDETs) for rural development (the land and rural development sub-agreement of the 2016 peace accord) incorporated a participatory process to achieve local development, which required sustained effort. In August 2018, after President Duque took office, USAID announced a framework of priorities for U.S. economic development assistance to Colombia. Some of these priorities include promoting and supporting a whole-of-government strategy to include the dismantling of organized crime; increasing the effectiveness of Colombia'’s security and criminal justice institutions; promoting enhanced prosperity and job creation through trade; improving the investment climate for U.S. companies; and advancing Colombia'’s capacity to strengthen governance and transition to sustainable peace, including reconciliation among victims, ex- combatants, and other citizens.¹²⁵

120 Funding for Plan Colombia and Peace Colombia

The U.S. Congress initially initial y approved legislation in support of Plan Colombia in 2000, as part of the Military Construction Appropriations Act of 2001 (P.L. 106-246). Plan Colombia was never authorized by Congress, but it was funded annuallyannual y through appropriations. From FY2000 through FY2016, U.S. funding for Plan Colombia and its follow-on strategies exceeded $10 billion bil ion in State Department and Defense Department programs. From FY2000 to FY2009, the United States provided foreign operations assistance to Colombia through the Andean Counterdrug Program (ACP) account, formerly known as the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, and other aid accounts. In FY2008, Congress continued to fund eradication and interdiction programs through the ACP account, but funded alternative development and institution building programs through the Economic Support Fund (ESF) account. In the FY2010 request, the Obama Administration shifted ACP funds into the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account.

Since FY2008, U.S. assistance has graduallygradual y declined because of tighter foreign aid budgets and nationalized nationalized Plan Colombia-related programs. In FY2014, in line with other foreign assistance reductions, funds appropriated to Colombia from State Department accounts declined to slightly below $325 million. mil ion. In FY2015, Congress appropriated $300 millionmil ion for bilateral assistance to Colombia in foreign operation. The FY2016 Omnibus Appropriations bill (bil (P.L. 114-113) provided Colombia from U.S. State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development accounts, 118 USAID/Colombia, Country Development Cooperation Strategy 2014-2018, A Path to Peace, June 13, 2014. 119 See, for example, Adam Isacson, Consolidating “Consolidation,” Washington Office on Latin America, December 2012. 120 USAID, Colombia: Integrated Country Strategy, August 14, 2018. Congressional Research Service 30 link to page 36 Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations slightly under $300 mil ionslightly under $300 million, nearly identical to that appropriated in FY2015 (without P.L. 480, the Food for Peace account, the total for FY2016 was $293 millionmil ion as shown inin Table 1).. In FY2017, Congress funded a program the Obama Administration had proposed called "cal ed “Peace Colombia"” to re-balance U.S. assistance to support the peace process and implementation of the accord. The FY2017 omnibus appropriations measure, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 115-31 31), funded the various programs of Peace Colombia at $391.3 million.

mil ion. In the FY2017 legislation, Congress appropriated the following:

•  The ESF account increased to $187 millionmil ion (from $134 millionmil ion in FY2016) to build government presence, encourage crop substitution and provide other assistance to conflict victims, including Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities. However, only $180 million was subsequently allocated.
• mil ion was subsequently al ocated.  INCLE funding increased to $143 million mil ion with a focus on manual eradication of coca crops, support for the Colombian National Police, and judicial reform efforts.
• efforts.  INCLE funding also included $10 million mil ion for Colombian forces'’ training to counterparts in other countries.
• $38.5 million  $38.5 mil ion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF); and
• $21 million  $21 mil ion in Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR), which was a relatively large increase from under $4 million mil ion in FY2016 to focus on demining.

Table 1, below, provides In the table, account data from the annual international affairs congressional budget justification documents and shows Congressionalshow congressional appropriations for foreign aid for Colombia from FY2012 to FY2019. In November 2019FY2020. In October 2020, Congress approved a continuing resolution to fund U.S. foreign assistance programs at the FY2019FY2020 levels through December 20, 2019. For FY2020, the Trump Administration's request would decrease the amount of assistance to $344 million for Colombia (11% below funding allocated in FY2018). However, the House and Senate legislation suggests that Congress prefers a higher level of support. H.R. 2740 would provide Colombia more than $457 million in assistance, and S. 2583 would provide $403 million.

Department of Defense Assistance

A variety of funding streams support DOD training and equipment programs. Some DOD equipment programs are funded by annual State Department appropriations for FMF, which totaled $38.5 million in FY2019mil ion in FY2020 and for the most recent four years. International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds, which totaled $1.3 million in FY20199 mil ion in FY2020, support training programs for the Colombian military, including courses in the United States. Apart from State Department funding, DOD provides additional training, equipping, and other support through its own accounts. Individuals and units receiving DOD support are vetted for potential human rights issues in compliance with the Leahy Law (see "“Human Rights Conditions on U.S. Assistance," ,” below). DOD programs in Colombia are overseen by U.S. Southern Command. Between FY2013 and FY2017FY2016 and FY2018, DOD-funded programs aimed at counternarcotics and security goals averaged $80 million for Colombia per year. In FY2018, the DOD programs in Colombia totaled approximately $55.5 million.

70 mil ion per year for Colombia, as indicated in Table 2. Table 2. Department of Defense Assistance to Colombia (Preliminary Figures), FY2016-FY2019 (in mil ions of current U.S. dol ars) FY2016 FY2017 FY2018 FY2019 Counternarcotics—Former Section 15.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 1004 Authorities Counternarcotics—Section 284 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 Authorities as of NDAA 2017 Counternarcotics—Former 1033 71.93 56.71 1.55 0.00 Authorities, Became 333 Authorities Global Train and Equip Program— 0.00 0.00 53.81 26.02 Section 333 Authorities as of NDAA 2017 Combating Terrorism Fel owship 0.87 1.13 0.70 Pending Program response from DOD DOD HIV/AIDS Prevention 0.51 0.30 0.27 Pending Program—F Operational Plan response from Programs DOD Defense Institution Reform 1.51 1.97 1.87 1.58 Initiative Humanitarian Mining Action 3.00 3.50 2.24 4.00 Humanitarian Assistance Program 1.17 3.00 5.30 21.80 Traditional Commanders Activities Pending 0.65 0.37 0.42 response from DOD Defense Institution Reform 1.51 2.00 1.87 1.58 Initiative Total 95.95 69.26 69.97 55.39 Source: Department of Defense, Office of Secretary of Defense, response to CRS request in October 2020. Congressional Research Service 32 Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations Notes: NDAA 2017 = National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (P.L. 114-328). The categorization of funding shifted between FY2017 and FY2018, accounting for some of the funding al ocation changes, including the change of 1033 Authorities into 333 Authorities. Figures may not sum to the total due to rounding. Data are preliminary from source and were al that was available at the time of publication. Human Rights Conditions on U.S. Assistance Human Rights Conditions on U.S. Assistance

Some Members of Congress have been deeply concerned about human rights violations in Colombia—especiallyespecial y those perpetrated by any recipients or potential recipients of U.S. assistance. In Colombia'’s multisided conflict, the FARC and ELN, the paramilitaries and their successors, and Colombia'’s security forces have all al committed serious violations. Colombians have endured generations of noncombatant killingskil ings, massacres, kidnappings, forced displacements, forced disappearances, land mine casualties, and acts of violence that violate international humanitarian law. The extent of the crimes and the backlog of human rights cases to be prosecuted have overwhelmed the Colombian judiciary, which some describe as "inefficient" and overburdened. The United Nations and many“inefficient” and overburdened. Many human rights groups maintain that although some prosecutions have gone forward, most remain unresolved and the backlog of cases has been reduced slowly. In addition to the problem of impunity for serious crimes addition, continued violations remain an issue.

Since 2002, Congress has required in annual foreign operations appropriations legislation that the Secretary of State certify annuallyannual y to Congress that the Colombian military is severing ties to paramilitaries and that the government is investigating complaints of human rights abuses and meeting other human rights statutory criteria. (The certification criteria have evolved over time.¹²⁶) ) For several years, certification was required before 30% of funds to the Colombian military could be released. The FY2014 appropriations legislation reduced that to 25% of funding under the FMF program be held back pending certification by the Secretary of State. Some human rights groups have criticized the regular certification of Colombia, maintaining that evidence they have presented to the State Department has contradicted U.S. findings. However, even some critics have acknowledged the human rights conditions on military assistance to Colombia to be "“a flawed but useful tool"” because the certification process requires that the U.S. government regularly consult with Colombian and international human rights groups. Critics generallygeneral y acknowledge that over time, conditionality can improve human rights compliance.¹²⁷

Additional 121 Additional tools for monitoring human rights compliance by Colombian security forces receiving U.S. assistance are the so-called "cal ed “Leahy Law"” restrictions, which Congress first passed in the late 1990s prior to the outset of Plan Colombia. First introduced by Senator Patrick Leahy, these provisions deny U.S. assistance to a foreign country'’s security forces if the U.S. Secretary of State has credible information that such units have committed "“a gross violation of human rights."” The provisions apply to security assistance provided by the State Department and DOD. The Leahy Law under the State Department is authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, as amended, and is codified at 22 U.S.C. 2378d (§520M of the FAA). The DOD Leahy provisions, which for years applied just to DOD training, now include a broader range of assistance, as modified in the FY2014 appropriations legislation.¹²⁸ The provision related to the Leahy Laws for DOD assistance is codified at 10 U.S.C. 362, and prohibits "“any training, 121 Lisa Haugaard, Adam Isacson, and Jennifer Johnson, A Cautionary Tale: Plan Colombia’s Lessons for U.S. Policy Toward Mexico and Beyond, Latin America Working Group Education Fund, Center for International Policy, Washington Office on Latin America, November 2011. T he authors caut ion that the benefits of the certification are present only under certain conditions: “Human rights conditions only became a useful lever in extreme circumstances and with enormous effort by human rights groups.” Congressional Research Service 33 Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations any training, equipment, or other assistance,"” to a foreign security force unit if there is credible information that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights.¹²⁹

122 Both the State Department and DOD Leahy provisions require the State Department to review and clear—or vet—foreign security forces to determine if any individual or unit is credibly believed to be guilty of a gross human rights violation. Leahy vetting is typicallytypical y conducted by U.S. embassies and State Department headquarters. Reportedly on an annual basis about 1% of foreign security forces are disqualified from receiving assistance under the Leahy provisions, although many more are affected by administrative issues and are denied assistance until those conditions are resolved. Tainted security force units that are denied assistance may be remediated or cleared, but the procedures for remediation differ slightly between the DOD and State (or FAA) provisions.

Because of the large amount of security assistance provided to Colombian forces (including the military and police), the State Department reportedly vets more candidates for assistance in Colombia than in any other country.¹³⁰123 In the late 1990s, poor human rights conditions in Colombia were a driving concern for developing the Leahy Law provisions.¹³¹124 The U.S. Embassy in Bogotá, with nearly two decades of experience in its vetting operations, has been cited as a source of best practices for other embassies seeking to bring their operations into compliance or enhance their performance. enhance their performance. State Department officials have cited Colombia as a model operation that has helped Colombia to improve its human rights compliance.

However, some human rights organizations are critical of the Leahy vetting process and assert that U.S. assistance under the Leahy process have failed to remove human rights violators from the Colombian military. A human rights NGO, FellowshipFel owship of Reconciliation, has published reports allegingal eging an association between false positive killings kil ings and Colombian military units vetted by the State Department to receive U.S. assistance.¹³²125 However, some have questioned the group'group’s methodology. Some human rights organizations contend that the U.S. government has tolerated abusive behavior by Colombian security forces without taking action or withholding assistance. At the end of October 2019, the Duque government formallyformal y renewed the mandate of the U.N.'’s High Commissioner of Human Rights for three more years, which has had a significant presence in Colombia during the internal conflict and beyond.

Cocaine Continues Its Reign in Colombia¹³³

According to U.S. government estimates, Colombia's potential production of pure cocaine fell to In another human rights-related matter regarding the armed services wiretapping scandal in 2020, House action included in the House-passed version of FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA; H.R. 6395), Section 1298, which would require a report on possible misuse of U.S. security-sector funds for il egal surveil ance by Colombia’s armed services. Cocaine Continues Its Reign in Colombia126 According to U.S. government estimates, Colombia’s potential production of pure cocaine fel to 170 metric tons in 2012, the lowest level in two decades. However, it started to rise slightly in 122 See CRS In Focus IF10575, Human Rights Issues: Security Forces Vetting (“Leahy Laws”), by Liana W. Rosen. 123 See “Colombia Case Study” in CRS Report R43361, “Leahy Law” Human Rights Provisions and Security Assistance: Issue Overview, coordinated by Nina M. Serafino. 124 T he first enactment of the Leahy provisions restricted international narcotics control assistance in an amendment to the 1997 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act . 125 See Fellowship of Reconciliation and U.S. Office on Colombia, Military Aid and Human Rights: Colombia, U.S. Accountability, and Global Im plications, 2010; Fellowship of Reconciliation and Colombia-Europe-U.S. Human Rights Observatory, The Rise and Fall of “False Positive” Killings in Colom bia: The Role of U.S. Military Assistance, 2000-2010, May 2014. 126 For more background, see CRS Report R44779, Colombia’s Changing Approach to Drug Policy, by June S. Beittel and Liana W. Rosen. Congressional Research Service 34 link to page 40 link to page 40 link to page 45 link to page 40 link to page 40 Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations 2013 and more dramatical y from 2014 through 2017 (see Table 3 and Table 4,170 metric tons in 2012, the lowest level in two decades. However, it started to rise slightly in 2013 and more dramatically from 2014 through 2017 (see Table 2 and Table 3, which show the U.S. estimates for coca cultivation and cocaine production in Colombia over several years, and Figure 4,A-1, which compares U.S. and U.N. estimates). Following a U.N. agency affiliate's ’s determination that the herbicide used to spray coca crops was probably carcinogenic, Colombia's ’s minister of health determined that aerial eradication of coca was not consistent with requirements of Colombia'’s Constitutional Court. In 2018, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration reported that 93% of cocaine seized in the United States originated in Colombia. At the same time, Colombia has set records for many years in drug interdiction and general y is considered a strong and reliable U.S. counternarcotics partner. However, even with record seizures in both 2017 and 2018, the interdiction of cocaine was insufficient to counter the large increases in production. The slight decrease of pure cocaine production in 2018 from above 920 metric tons to 887 metric tons was hailed by the U.S. and Colombian governments as a stabilizing of the upward trajectory of the coca crop and its yield, but production remains at historicallyAs indicated in Table 3 and Table 4, cultivation and production remain at historical y high levels. Table 3 high levels.

Figure 4. Relationship of U.N. and U.S. Estimates of Coca Cultivation and Cocaine Production in Colombia

Source: Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report, U.S. Counternarcotics Assistance Achieved Some Results, But State Needs to Review the Overall U.S. Approach, (GAO-19-106), December 2018.

Drug Crop Eradication and Other Supply Control Alternatives

Drug Crop Eradication and Other Supply Control Alternatives Both manual eradication and aerial eradication were central components of Plan Colombia to reduce coca and poppy cultivation. Manual eradication is conducted by teams, usuallyusual y security personnel, who uproot and kill kil the plant. Aerial eradication involves spraying the plants from aircraft with an herbicide mixture to destroy the drug crop, but it may not kill kil the plants. In the context of Colombia'’s continuing internal conflict, manual eradication was far more dangerous than aerial spraying. U.S. and Colombian policymakers recognized the dangers of manual eradication and, therefore, employed large-scale aerial spray campaigns to reduce coca crop yields, especiallyespecial y from large coca plantations. Colombia is the only country globally that aerially sprayed its illicit global y that aerial y sprayed its il icit crops, and the practice has been controversial for health and environmental reasons, resulting in a Colombian decision to end aerial eradication in 2015.

In late 2013, Ecuador won an out-of-court settlementset lement in a case filed in 2008 before the International Court of Justice in The Hague for the negative effects of spray drift over its border with Colombia.¹³⁴ Congressional Research Service 35 Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations with Colombia.127 In negotiations with the FARC in the peace talks, the government and the FARC provisional yFARC provisionally agreed in May 2014 that voluntary manual eradication would be prioritized over forced eradication. Aerial eradication remained a viable tool in the government'’s drug control strategy, according to the agreement, but would be permitted only if voluntary and manual eradication could not be conducted safely.

At the U.S.-Colombia High Level Dialogue held in Bogotá in March 2018, a renewed commitment to the enduring partnership between the United States and Colombia was announced. A major outcome was a U.S.-Colombia pledge to reduce illegal il egal narcotics trafficking through expanded counternarcotics cooperation. The new goal set was to reduce Colombia's ’s estimated cocaine production and coca cultivation to 50% of current levels by 2023.¹³⁵

128 After President Duque took office, USAID announced a framework of priorities for U.S. development assistance to Colombia in August 2018. Some of these priorities to stabilize the peace include promoting and supporting a whole-of-government strategy to dismantle organized crime; increasing the effectiveness of Colombia'’s security and criminal justice institutions; promoting enhanced prosperity and job creation through trade; and strengthening governance and civil society to transition to sustainable peace, including reconciliation among victims, rural communities, and combatants.¹³⁶129 The causes of conflict in Colombian society, such as lack of access to land addressed in the peace accord, need to be resolved to promote a sustainable peace, according to USAID.

U.S. assistance administered by the State Department'’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement includes funding with a focus on the manual eradication of coca crops, support for the Colombian National Police, and judicial reform efforts. The assistance also supports Colombian training to counterpart security forces in other countries to counter transnational organized crime and drug trafficking. Several programs attempt to increase accountability and transparency in troubled rural regions, expand access to justice, and increase coordination between municipal and regional governments to access Colombian resources at the national level.

New Counternarcotics Direction Under the Duque Administration

Experimentation with delivering glyphosate by drones (rather than planes) began in June 2018 under the Santos Administration and is continuingadministration and continues under the Duque government.130 under the Duque government.¹³⁷ On October 1, 2018, President Duque authorized police to confiscate and destroy any quantity of drugs found on persons in possession of them, resulting in the seizure of more than 7 metric tons of drugs in less than two weeks. This enforcement measure may violate a 1994 Colombian Constitutional Court ruling, however, in which Colombians may carry small doses of drugs for personal use, including marijuana, hashish, and cocaine.¹³⁸ Several court challenges have been filed that seek to nullify the Duque decree on constitutional grounds of protected personal use.¹³⁹

Drug trafficking Drug trafficking continues to trigger conflict over land in Colombia while affecting and affects the most vulnerable groups, including Afro-Colombian, peasant, and indigenous populations. Some analysts warn that national and international pressure for drug eradication could also lead to increased human rights violations, including health consequences by reviving aerial spraying of drug crops and government actions to forcibly break up demonstrations by coca producers who resist eradication. Some analysts maintain that investments to lower drug supply need to go beyond eradication, which has not proven itself a lasting approach to reducing drug crop cultivation.¹⁴⁰ For instance, the government could provide economic and education opportunities to at-risk youth to enhance their role in peace building and to prevent their recruitment into the drug trade and other illegal activity.

Outlook

Appendix A. Assessing the Programs of Plan Colombia and Its Successors

According to the U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy, Colombia in 2017 cultivated an unprecedented 209,000 hectares of coca, capable of yielding 921 metric tons of cocaine. The United Nations estimates for 2017, which typically differ in quantity but follow the same trends as U.S. estimates, maintained that Colombia's potential production of cocaine reached nearly 1,370 metric tons, 31% above its 2016 estimate (For a comparison of U.S. and UN estimates, see Figure 4). Several analysts contend the record production levels that have stabilized (but have yet to decrease significantly) are due to a variety of causes. These causes include the peace accord's commitment to pay peasant coca producers to voluntarily eradicate and shift to alternative crops (which became an adverse incentive to expand cultivation) and the government's inability to assert control in the areas once dominated by the FARC (which was replaced by criminal groups seeking to buy coca). Many observers argue that these complex causes will require an integrated approach to influence and reverse.¹⁴²

Appendix B. Selected Online Human Rights Reporting on Colombia