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Ukraine: Background, Conflict with Russia, and U.S. Policy

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Ukraine: Background, Conflict with Russia, and U.S. Policy

Updated September 19, 2019April 29, 2020 (R45008)
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Contents

Summary

After Ukraine's transitionIn 2019, Ukraine transitioned to a new government under President Volodymyr Zelensky and his Servant of the People party, the country continues to grapple with serious challenges. President Zelensky has expressed a commitment to implementing difficult economic and governance reforms, promoting Ukraine's Western integration, rebuilding ties with residents of Russian-controlled areas of eastern Ukraine, and revitalizing talks with Russia on conflict resolution. The U.S. government has congratulated President Zelensky and all Ukrainians on their "vibrant democracy" and expressed "steadfast support" to Ukraine "as it undertakes essential reforms."

. During Zelensky's presidency, Ukraine has enacted difficult economic and governance reforms and renewed talks with Russia on conflict resolution. In March 2020, a reshuffling of a six-month-old cabinet that had gained international confidence but lost domestic popularity raised concerns for some. The emergence in Ukraine of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) created further difficulties but also led the government to advance key reforms necessary to unlock international financial support.

The United States supports Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders, while actively promoting the continuation and consolidation and promotes the implementation of domestic reforms. Since Ukraine's independence in 1991, and especially after Russia's 2014 invasion and occupation of Ukrainian territory, Ukraine has been a leading recipient of U.S. foreign, humanitarian, and military aid in Europe and Eurasia. Nonmilitary, non-humanitarian assistance totaled an average of $320 aid averaged about $321 million a year from FY2015 to FY2018. The United States provides substantial military assistance to Ukraine, including via the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, which provides "appropriate security assistance and intelligence support" to help Ukraine defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Since 2014, many Members of CongressFY2019, plus a total of almost $240 million in humanitarian aid since 2014. The United States also provides military assistance to Ukraine: more than $1.6 billion since 2014, mainly though the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative. In 2019, U.S. relations with Ukraine became a prominent issue in U.S. domestic affairs, as the House of Representatives agreed to articles of impeachment related in part to alleged presidential actions regarding Ukraine. The Senate acquitted the President of the charges in February 2020. Since 2014, many Members of Congress on a bipartisan basis have condemned Russia's invasion of Ukraine, promoted sanctions against Russia for its actions, and supported increased economic and security aid to Ukraine. Key legislation includes the Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (SSIDESH.R. 4152; P.L. 113-95; 22 U.S.C. 8901 et seq.),; the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (UFSAH.R. 5859; P.L. 113-272; 22 U.S.C. 8921 et seq.),; and the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (CRIEEA; Title II ofH.R. 3364; P.L. 115-44, Title II, Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act [CAATSA]; 22 U.S.C. 9501 et seq.).

In November-December 2018, Members of the 115th Congress passedagreed to resolutions condemning a Russian attack on Ukrainian naval vessels (S.Res. 709, H.Res. 1162). The 115th Congress also passed a resolution and calling for the cancellation of Nord Stream 2, a new Baltic Seanatural gas pipeline Russia is constructing, and the imposition of sanctions with respect to the project to reduce reliance on Ukraine for transit to Europe (H.Res. 1035). In July 2019, during the 116th Congress, the Senate passedagreed to S.Res. 74 to mark the fifth anniversary of Ukraine's Revolution of Dignity.

Several pieces of Ukraine-related legislation are under consideration in the 116th Congress. In March 2019, the House of Representatives voted 427-1 to pass H.R. 596, the Crimea Annexation Non-recognition Act, which asserts that it is the policy of the United States not to recognize Russia's claim of sovereignty over Crimea, its airspace, or its territorial waters. Several Members of Congress have sought to further respond to Russia's November 2018 attack on Ukrainian naval vessels (S.Res. 27, H.Res. 116, S. 482), express continuing opposition to Nord Stream 2 (S.Res. 27, H.R. 2023, H.R. 3206, S. 1441, H.Res. 116, S. 1830), and enhance U.S.-Ukraine security cooperation (H.R. 3047).

In December 2019, Congress passed the Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act of 2019, which established sanctions related to the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline (S. 1790; P.L. 116-92, Title LXXV).

Other Ukraine-related legislative initiatives in the 116th Congress include the Crimea Annexation Non-recognition Act (H.R. 596), the U.S.-Ukraine Security Cooperation Enhancement Act (H.R. 3047), the Defending American Security from Kremlin Aggression Act of 2019 (S. 482), and the Ukraine Religious Freedom Support Act (H.R. 5408, S. 3064). A resolution introduced in the House (H.Res. 802) would affirm the United States' "resolute support for Ukraine in its efforts to counter Russian aggression and continue its trajectory among the community of democracies."

For related information, see CRS Report R45415, U.S. Sanctions on Russia, and CRS In Focus IF11138, Russia's Nord Stream 2: A Fait Accompli Pipeline: Will Sanctions Stop It?


Introduction

Ukraine has accomplished much in the five years since the country's 2013-2014 Revolution of Dignity (also known as the Euromaidan). Forced to confront a Russian invasion and occupation of the Crimea region, a Russian-instigated conflict in eastern Ukraine, and a tightening of Russian control in the nearby Sea of Azov and Black Sea, Ukraine has developed a military capable of territorial defense, haltedreversed a decline in economic growth, implemented reforms, maintained a democratic path, and gained formal independence for the Orthodox Church of Ukraine.

Ukraine at a Glance

Population: 42.241.9 million (January 20192020 est., excluding about 2.2 million in Crimea)

Size: Slightly smaller than Texas

Capital: Kyiv

Ethnicity: 78% Ukrainian, 17% Russian, 0.5% Crimean Tatar (2001 census)

Languages: Ukrainian (official), 68%; Russian (regional status), 30% (2001 census)

Religion: About 75% Orthodox Christian (mostly Ukrainian Orthodox), 8%-10% Greek Catholic

GDP/GDP per capita: $125153 billion/$2,963 (2018 est.3,649 (2019)

Top Exports: cereals (corn, wheat, barley), iron and steel, sunflower oil, iron ore, electrical equipment and parts, oil seeds iron and steel, cereals, fats and oils, ores, electrical machinery, oil seeds, industrial machinery

Leadership: President Volodymyr Zelensky, Prime Minister Oleksiy HoncharukDenys Shmyhal, Foreign Minister Vadym PrystaikoDmytro Kuleba, Defense Minister Andriy ZahorodniukAndrii Taran, Parliamentary Chairperson Dmytro Razumkov

Sources: State Statistics Service of Ukraine, International Monetary FundWorld Bank, Pew Research Center.

Ukraine continues to grapple with serious challenges. Earlier this yearIn 2019, the country transitioned to a new government. President Volodymyr Zelensky and his Cabinet have pledged to implement difficult economic and governance reforms, promote Ukraine's Western integration, rebuild ties with residents of Russian-controlled areas of eastern Ukraine, and revitalize talks with Russia on conflict resolution under President Volodymyr Zelensky and his Servant of the People party. During Zelensky's presidency, Ukraine has enacted difficult economic and governance reforms and renewed talks with Russia on conflict resolution. In March 2020, a reshuffling of a six-month-old cabinet that had gained international confidence but lost domestic popularity raised concerns for some. The emergence in Ukraine of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) created further difficulties but also led the government to advance key reforms necessary to unlock international financial support.

The United States has long supported Ukraine's independence, sovereignty, and democratic trajectory. Since 2014, many Members of Congress, on a bipartisan basis, have condemned Russia's invasion of Ukraine, promoted sanctions against Russia for its actions, and supported increased economic and security aid to Ukraine (see "Role of Congress," below). In 2019, U.S. relations with Ukraine became a prominent issue in U.S. domestic affairs, as the House of Representatives agreed to articles of impeachment related in part to alleged presidential actions regarding Ukraine. The Senate acquitted the President of the charges in February 2020.

This report provides an overview of Ukraine's domestic politics and reform efforts; challenges; Ukraine's conflict with Russia and the conflict settlement process; andthe Ukrainian economy; and Ukraine's relations with the United States, the European Union (EU), and NATO.

Politics and Governance

Ukraine, an independent country since 1991, is one of the largest successors, by territory, population, and economy, to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR, or Soviet Union) (for map, see Figure 1). Historically, Ukrainians trace their lineage to medieval Kievan Rus, an early Orthodox Christian state that Russians also consider a core part of their heritage. Most of Ukraine's territory was incorporated over time into the USSR's predecessor, the Russian Empire, although several western regions of Ukraine were first annexed by the Soviet Union during World War II. In December 1991, Ukraine's leaders joined those of neighboring Russia and Belarus to dissolve the USSR.1 Since

In over a quarter century of independence, many observers have considered Ukraine to have a "hybrid" political regime, containing both democratic and nondemocratic elements. Since 2011, the U.S.-based nongovernmental organization (NGO) Freedom House has given Ukraine an annual "freedom rating" of "partly free."1

2 According to Freedom House, Ukraine's democratic credentials improved after the ouster of former President Viktor Yanukovych in 2014, in Ukraine's Revolution of Dignity (for details, see "From Orange Revolution to Revolution of Dignity" text box, below). The interim government that followed pledged to embrace reforms that would facilitate Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration, and an energized civil society supported its efforts. Within weeks, however, the new government had to confront Russian armed interventions in southern and eastern Ukraine. Russia occupied and annexed Ukraine's Crimea region in March 2014 and instigated a separatist conflict in eastern Ukraine that continues to this day.

From Orange Revolution to Revolution of Dignity

Ukraine's first two presidents, Leonid Kravchuk (1991-1994) and Leonid Kuchma (1994-2005), were former CommunistsCommunist Party officials who claimed to promote Ukraine's national interests but also presided over economic mismanagement, corruption, and other abuses of power. Most prominently, Kuchma came to be suspected of involvement inresponsibility for the 2000 murder of journalist Georgiy Gongadze.

In 2004, a popular movement known as the Orange Revolution thwarted the efforts of Kuchma's team—with Russian support—to fraudulently elect as president a handpicked successor, then-Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, as president. Yanukovych's reformist opponent, Viktor Yushchenko, was allegedly poisoned during the election campaign, won the first round, and was elected in a rerun of the fraudulent second round. However, infighting and poor governance led to popular disillusionment with the "Orange government" and eventually to Yanukovych's return to power, first as prime minister (2006-2007) and then as president (2010-2014).

Many observers considered Yanukovych to be a corrupt and authoritarian president who preferred to preserve power with Russia's economic and political assistancesupport rather than to pursue Western-oriented reforms. Yanukovych also appearedwas reluctant to fulfill a key demand of Western partners, the release from prison of Yulia Tymoshenko, a former prime minister whom he defeated in the 2010 presidential election. In 2011, Tymoshenko was sentenced to seven years in prison for abuse of power and other charges that many observers considered to be politically motivated.

In November 2013, protests erupted over the Yanukovych governmentYanukovych's decision to postpone a move toward closer relationsconcluding an association and free trade agreement with the European Union. The government suppressed the initial protests, leading to larger protests and, violent clashes with police that eventually killed, and the killing of over 100 protestors (whom many Ukrainians refer to these victims as the Heavenly Hundred) and); almost 20 police officers also were killed. In February 2014, Yanukovych's government collapsed. Yanukovych had agreed to a deal with the opposition that was to lead to an early presidential election, but instead he departed for eastern Ukraine amid government defections. Subsequently, Tymoshenko was freed from prison, Ukraine's legislatureparliament voted to remove Yanukovych from office, and Yanukovych left Ukraine for Russia. In January 2019, Yanukovych was found guilty of treason and sentenced in absentia to 13 years in prison.

Sources: Adrian Karatnycky, "Ukraine at the Crossroads," Journal of Democracy 6, no. 1 (January 1995), pp. 117-130; Dominique Arel, "Kuchmagate and the Demise of Ukraine's Geopolitical Bluff," and Keith A. Darden, "Blackmail as a Tool of State Domination: Ukraine Under Kuchma," East European Constitutional Review 10, no. 2/3 (Spring/Summer 2001), pp. 54-59, 67-71; Andrew Wilson, Ukraine's Orange Revolution (Yale University Press, 2005); Anders Aslund and Michael McFaul, Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine's Democratic Breakthrough (Carnegie Endowment, 2006); Andrew Wilson, Ukraine Crisis: What It Means for the West (Yale University Press, 2014); RFE/RL, "Ukraine Sentences Ex-President Yanukovych in Absentia to 13 Years in Prison," January 24, 2019.

Ukraine's New Government

Political Developments

Ukraine has a mixed presidential-parliamentary system, in which the president shares power with a prime minister chosenappointed by Ukraine's legislature, the Verkhovna Rada. Presidential election rounds were held in March and When the legislature is dominated by the president's party, as is currently the case, observers consider the president more powerful than the prime minister (whom the president typically chooses in such circumstances). The most recent presidential election was held in March-April 2019, and snap parliamentary elections were held in July 2019. The victories of political novice Volodomyr Zelensky and his Servant of the People party appeared to reflect widespread disillusionment with Ukraine's political establishment.

2019 Presidential Election. On April 21, 2019, popular actor-comedian, television producer, and political novice and producer Volodomyr Zelensky (now aged 4142) overwhelmingly won the second round of Ukraine's presidential election, defeating incumbent Petro Poroshenko 73% to 24%.23 International and domestic observers considered the election to be generally free and fair. The U.S. Department of State said the elections were "peaceful, competitive, and the outcome represented the will of the people."3

Before the election, opinion polls indicated relatively low levels of support for Ukraine's political leaders. In a September-October 2018 poll, 16%-18% of respondents expressed approval of the government.4 For months before the election, then-President Poroshenko was in third place in most opinion polls. In the last two months of the campaign, he managed to reach second place, which is where he placed in the election's March 2019 first round, with 16% of the vote.5

A strong supporter of Ukraine's integration with the EU and NATO, Poroshenko had unofficially campaigned under the slogan of "Army! Language! Faith!" that appeared on billboards early in the campaign.64 The slogan reflected Poroshenko's efforts to gain popular support as a defender of Ukraine's sovereignty and national identity. Poroshenko portrayed himself as Ukraine's wartime commander in chief, who had built up Ukraine's military forces and was standing firm against Russian aggression. He also backed legislation that prioritized use of the Ukrainian language in education, media, and government.7 Finally, he sought credit for the January 2019 recognition by the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople of an independent (autocephalous) Ukrainian Orthodox Church, officially separate from the Russian Orthodox Church (see "Ukraine's Church Becomes Independent of Moscow," below).

At the same time, many Ukrainians believed Poroshenko did not do enough to restore the country's economic health after almost five years of conflict and generally did not live up to the high expectations for reform that arose from the 2013-2014 Revolution of Dignity, which set the stage for his election as president in May 2014.8 A widespread perception that Poroshenko failed to adequately combat corruption also appears to have been a factor in his defeat.9

Observers note, however, that the public did not express much confidence in the opposition to Poroshenko. This began to change after the popular Zelensky announced his candidacy on New Year's Eve in 2018. Zelensky quickly took the lead in opinion polls and won the first round of the election with 30% of the vote.

Many Ukrainians, however, believed Poroshenko had failed to combat corruption and, generally, had not done enough to restore the country's economic health after almost five years of conflict.5

Zelensky ran as an outsider ostensibly untainted by politics or corruption. His appeal stemmed in part from his starring role in a popular television show, Servant of the People, as a beloved schoolteacher who is unexpectedly elected president of Ukraine after a video of him delivering an anti-corruption rant goes viral.

The election outcome suggested that issues of ethnic and linguistic identity mattered less to voters than expected. Zelensky demonstrated broad appeal across the country, coming in first in all but one of Ukraine's regions (he lost to Poroshenko in the western region of Lviv). Despite his outsider status, Zelensky did not campaign as a nationalist or a populist. On the contrary, Zelensky is a native Russian speaker who also speaks Ukrainian, is of Jewish descent, and supports closer relations with the West. He is from Kryvih Rih (Kryvoi Rog) in Ukraine's Dnipropetrovsk region, north of Crimea.

2019 Parliamentary Elections. Zelensky consolidated his political victory with snap parliamentary elections held on July 21, 2019 (see Table 1). Zelensky's victoryearlier victory in the presidential election boosted the fortunes of his nascent and politically untested party, Servant of the People (named after one of his popular television shows). The party won 60% of seats, including 43% of the party-list vote and almost two-thirds of majoritarian seats, making it the first party in independent Ukraine to win an outright majority of seats. The6 Many of the party's leading members are mostly under the age of 40 and include, among others, Zelensky associates, anti-corruption activists, and former members of other political parties.10

Ukraine's new legislature held its first plenary session on August 29, 2019. Parliamentarians selected as prime minister Oleksiy Honcharuk (aged 35), an economic adviser to President Zelensky and former head of an EU-funded business policy institute. The new parliamentary chairperson is Dmytro Razumkov (aged 35), a political consultant who was the head of Zelensky's election campaign. The Cabinet is relatively young; almost all ministers are under the age of 50.11

Table 1. July 7

Another four parties received enough party-list votes to enter parliament. These are the eastern Ukrainian-based (and Russian-leaning) Opposition Platform–For Life (13%); former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko's Fatherland (8%); ex-President Poroshenko's European Solidarity (8%); and Voice (6%), a new party of reformists and professionals led by rock musician Svyatoslav Vakarchuk. Fatherland, European Solidarity, and Voice all are considered to be pro-Western parties. A few other parties won seats in the majoritarian races, but independent candidates received most of the seats that were not won by Servant of the People candidates. Parliamentary chairperson Dmytro Razumkov (aged 36) was head of Zelensky's election campaign and is a former political consultant.

Table 1. 2019 Parliamentary Elections

Party

Party List Seats (%)

Majoritarian Seats

Total Seats

(Current Seats)

Servant of the People

124 (43%)

130

254

(248)

Opposition PlatformFor Life

37 (13%)

6

43

(44)

Fatherland

24 (8%)

2

26

(24)

European Solidarity

23 (8%)

2

25

(27)

Voice

17 (6%)

3

20

(20)

Opposition Bloc

—(3%)

6

6

Freedom

—(2%)

1

1

Self Reliance

—(<1%)

1

1

Other/Independents

48

48

Total

225

199

424

Sources: Central Election Commission of Ukraine; Ukrainska Pravda.

Notes: Only parties that won seats are listed. Five other parties received between 1%- and 5% of the party-list vote (and another nine received less than 1% of the vote). Single-mandate seats from 26 districts in occupied Crimea and the nongovernment-controlled areas of eastern Ukraine are unfilled.

Another four parties received enough votes to enter the legislature on party lists. These are the eastern Ukrainian-based (and Russian-leaning) Opposition Platform–For Life (13%); former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko's Fatherland (8%); ex-President Poroshenko's European Solidarity (8%); and Voice (6%), a new party of reformists and professionals led by rock musician Svyatoslav Vakarchuk. Fatherland, European Solidarity, and Voice are all considered to be pro-Western parties. A few other parties won some seats in the majoritarian races, but independent candidates received most of the seats that were not won by Servant of the People candidates.

The presidential and parliamentary election outcomes suggested that Ukraine's population was highly dissatisfied with Ukraine's political establishment. Zelensky ran as an outsider ostensibly untainted by politics or corruption. His appeal stemmed in part from his starring role in a popular television show, Servant of the People, as a beloved schoolteacher who is unexpectedly elected president of Ukraine after a video of him delivering an anti-corruption rant goes viral. Zelensky is from the city of Kryvih Rih (Kryvoi Rog) in Ukraine's Dnipropetrovsk region, north of Crimea, which observers feared might become another flashpoint of conflict in 2014.

The election outcomes also suggested that issues of ethnic and linguistic identity mattered less to voters than expected. Zelensky demonstrated broad appeal across the country, coming in first in all but one of Ukraine's regions (he lost to Poroshenko in the western region of Lviv). Despite his outsider status, Zelensky did not campaign as a nationalist or a populist. On the contrary, Zelensky is a native Russian speaker who also speaks Ukrainian, is of Jewish descent, and supports closer relations with the West. Earlier in the campaign, observers anticipated that he would attract votes mainly from southern and eastern Ukrainians who reject the alleged corruption and pro-Russian sentiments of traditional regional elites but have felt marginalized in Ukrainian politics since 2014.

Reform Challenges

Under ex-President Poroshenko, the Ukrainian government pursued an ambitious reform agenda. In 2017, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) praised Ukraine's implementation of key reforms, including a reduction of the fiscal deficit, increase in gas prices (while retaining subsidies for lower-income households), reform of the banking system, and reduction in inflation.12 Observers also noted progress in decentralization, health care reform, and judicial reform.13

At the same time, domestic and international stakeholders criticized the Poroshenko government for slowly implementing, failing to complete, or backsliding on key reforms, particularly with regard to anti-corruption efforts (see discussion below). International partners and donors also have underlined the importance of further reforms in the energy sector, sustainable pension reform, the privatization of state-owned enterprises, and land sales (a moratorium has existed on land sales since 2001).14

In May 2019, President Zelensky was inaugurated amid some uncertainty about his administration's future course. Zelensky's electoral platform lacked a detailed policy agenda, although he attracted some reform-oriented economists to his campaign team.15 Many observers have expressed concern about Zelensky's lack of foreign policy and leadership experience at a time of ongoing conflict with Russia.16 Some also have questioned his relationship with wealthy businessperson (or "oligarch") Ihor Kolomoysky, who reportedly controls Ukraine's most popular television station (which airs Zelensky's shows); a former lawyer of Kolomoysky was appointed the president's chief of staff.17

Since taking power, Ukraine's new president and government have unveiled an ambitious reform program. They have proposed to implement rapidly a series of measures to tighten anti-corruption legislation; promote long-awaited judicial, security, land, and privatization reforms; and invest in infrastructure and defense.18 Some of the first votes of Ukraine's newly elected legislature were to reduce the size of parliament, enact a fully proportional electoral system, and lift parliamentary deputies' impunity from prosecution.19

Anti-corruption Efforts Under the Poroshenko Government. Under ex-President Poroshenko, the implementation of anti-corruption reforms was a major concern of domestic and international stakeholders. Combating corruption was to be a central focus of the Ukrainian government after the 2014 Revolution of Dignity. Observers considered that high levels of corruption persisted, however, and that many officials resisted anti-corruption measures. In public opinion polls, respondents ranked corruption as one of the country's most important issues. The NGO Transparency International ranked Ukraine 120 out of 180 countries in its 2018 Corruption Perception Index.20

The Poroshenko government's initial reforms included the establishment of three related institutions: the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU), the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAP), and the National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (NAPC).21

NABU and the SAP were to constitute the investigative and prosecutorial arms of Ukraine's anti-corruption efforts. Many observers believed, however, that these institutions did not have the government's full support. After repeatedly encountering resistance from within the government, NABU came under legal pressure in February 2019 to close dozens of investigations into alleged corruption, after Ukraine's Constitutional Court ruled that the underlying basis for these investigations, related to the crime of "illicit enrichment," did not have a constitutional foundation.22 In addition, many observers believed the SAP did not exhibit the independence necessary to fulfill its functions.

NAPC, a third institution, was supposed to develop and implement Ukraine's anti-corruption strategy, with a focus on prevention, as well as establish a public electronic system for the mandatory disclosure and verification of government officials' assets and incomes. Over 100,000 officials submitted the first required declarations in 2016, with members of parliament (many of whom come from the business world) appearing to openly report their assets.23 However, NAPC's work moved forward slowly, and the verification process stalled.

The Poroshenko government repeatedly postponed the establishment of a fourth anti-corruption institution, the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC). In summer 2018, the government finally established the HACC, after the United States, the EU, the IMF, and the World Bank called on the government to move forward with the court's establishment in line with international recommendations.24 Observers note that the HACC, which officially began to function in 2019, requires the full empowerment and independence of NABU and the SAP, as well as legislative changes that will allow for the prosecution of illicit enrichment.

Far Right and Attacks on Civil Society and Minorities. Some observers have expressed concern about the rise of far-right Ukrainian nationalist groups in Ukraine. Such groups gained attention during the 2013-2014 Euromaidan protests, when activists from groups like the Freedom (Svoboda) political party and the Right Sector (Praviy Sektor) movement participated in a violent wing of the resistance against the Yanukovych government.25 Some of these groups transformed into wartime volunteer battalions, like the Azov Battalion, fought against Russian-controlled forces in eastern Ukraine, and eventually were incorporated into Ukraine's National Guard. Some groups also established political parties.26

Although some far-right organizations have gained a certain legitimacy in Ukrainian society, they have not been successful politically. In the 2019 parliamentary elections, the most prominent far-right political parties and movements competed as a single bloc and won 2% of the vote (not enough to receive party list seats) and one majoritarian seat. In comparison, the Freedom party won less than 5% of the vote and received six majoritarian seats in the 2014 parliamentary elections. In the 2014 presidential election, the Freedom party's leader won 1% of the vote and the Right Sector's former leader won less than 1% of the vote.

Far-right groups and others have been implicated in violent attacks against civil society activists, journalists, and minorities, including members of the Roma and LGBT communities.27 Human rights NGOs reported more than 50 attacks on activists and human rights defenders in 2018 and a few dozen more in the first half of 2019. Many of the attacks appeared to be at the local level, allegedly as reprisals for investigations of corruption and other illegal activities. One prominent case was that of Kateryna Handzyuk, an activist and city council employee who was the victim of a severe acid attack in July 2018; she died of her wounds in November 2018. Another case is that of local investigative journalist Vadym Komarov, who was attacked in May 2019 and died of his wounds in June 2019.28

During the previous government, observers expressed concern that authorities did not thoroughly investigate such cases and that, when prosecutions did occur, perpetrators may have been punished but not always those who ordered the attacks.29 In some cases, observers believe that local government officials, rather than far-right groups, instigated attacks (although far-right members also reportedly have been hired to carry out attacks).

Conflict with Russia

Many observers consider that of all the post-Soviet states, Ukraine's independence has been the most difficult for Russians to accept. Many Russians traditionally have considered much of Ukraine to be a historical province of Russia and Ukrainians to be close ethnic brethren. In June 2019, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that "Russians and Ukrainians are one people ... one nation."30 Most Ukrainians can speak Russian, whether as a primary or secondary language. An estimated 15%-20% of the population identifies as ethnic Russian, mostly concentrated in the south (Crimea) and east, where ties to Russia are stronger than in the rest of the country. In Soviet times, eastern Ukraine became home to a heavy industrial sector (including defense-related manufacturing) that retained close economic ties to Russia after independence.

Even before 2014, however, the Russia-Ukraine relationship occasionally suffered turbulence, with disputes over Ukraine's ties to NATO and the EU, the status of Russia's Crimea-based Black Sea Fleet, and the transit of Russian natural gas via Ukraine to Europe. Under ex-President Yanukovych, such disputes largely were resolved. By the end of 2013, Yanukovych appeared to make a decisive move toward Russia, postponing the conclusion of an Association Agreement to establish closer political and economic ties with the EU and agreeing instead to substantial financial assistance from Moscow. This decision provoked the Euromaidan protests and, ultimately, led to Yanukovych's removal from power.

Figure 1. Ukraine

Sources: Graphic produced by CRS. Map information generated using data from the Department of State, Esri, and DeLorme.

Crimea

The Russia-Ukraine conflict aroseanother nine received less than 1% of the vote). Since the elections, two non-party "deputies' groups" have been established: For the Future (22 seats) and Trust (17 seats). Twenty-two members of parliament currently are not affiliated with any party or group.

2020 Government Reshuffle. Ukraine's new parliament held its first session at the end of August 2019. The parliament appointed as prime minister 35-year-old Oleksiy Honcharuk, formerly an economic adviser to Zelensky and head of an EU-funded business policy institute. Almost all ministers in the Honcharuk cabinet were under the age of 50.8

The first Servant of the People government was in power for six months. In March 2020, Honcharuk submitted his resignation after Zelensky expressed dissatisfaction with his cabinet, leading parliament to dismiss the government. Zelensky praised the outgoing government for being clean and hardworking but expressed a lack of confidence in its ability to address mounting challenges, including budgetary shortfalls, declining industrial production, wage arrears, high utility prices, low pensions, and a slow pace in prosecuting high-level corruption cases.9

The reshuffling followed a minor political scandal. In January 2020, alleged covert recordings of government meetings were leaked, with one purporting to capture Honcharuk saying that Zelensky had a "primitive understanding" of the economy.10 Honcharuk offered to resign, but Zelensky expressed confidence in the prime minister and called on security agencies to identify those responsible for the recording.

Observers suggest a decline in public opinion ratings influenced Zelensky's desire to replace the government. In one regular poll, approval of the Honcharuk cabinet declined from 51% in October 2019 to 21% in February 2020.11 Zelensky's approval rating, while higher, also declined during Honcharuk's time in office. From the president's May 2019 inauguration through September 2019, his approval rating was about 70% or higher. In February 2020, Zelensky's approval rating was about 50% or lower.12

The second Servant of the People government is headed by Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal (aged 44). Under Zelensky, Shmyhal served as head of administration in the western Ukrainian region of Ivano-Frankivsk and then as deputy prime minister and minister for community and territorial development. Shmyhal previously was a local official in the western region of Lviv and entered the private sector in 2015. From 2017, he worked for DTEK, a major energy conglomerate, including since 2018 as head of a large power plant.

The cabinet includes several officials with previous government experience and two former military officials. In addition to Shmyhal, about one-third of ministers remained from the Honcharuk cabinet, including Minister of Internal Affairs Arsen Avakov (an unpopular but powerful carryover from the Poroshenko government).13 Outgoing Prosecutor General Ruslan Riaboshapka defended his office's work and implied that corrupt interests seeking to undermine reforms were behind his removal.14

Some observers expressed concern about Zelensky's decision to reshuffle the government, which had gained the support of international lenders and donors.15 One concern was that the Honcharuk government had launched major reforms but was not given sufficient time to achieve results; observers feared the new cabinet might be less willing to carry out reforms. A related concern was that the reshuffle could strengthen oligarchic influences, especially given Shmyhal's recent tenure at DTEK, which is owned by Ukraine's wealthiest individual, Rinat Akhmetov.

Observers also debated the implications of the reshuffle for another wealthy businessperson, Ihor Kolomoysky, who some believe has become more influential since Zelensky's election.16 Kolomoysky controls Ukraine's most popular television station, which aired Zelensky's shows. He has sought to recover or be compensated for the loss of PrivatBank, Ukraine's largest commercial bank, which the National Bank of Ukraine nationalized in 2016 after $5.5 billion went missing (Kolomoysky and other owners were suspected of benefitting from fraudulent lending).17 Many observers had seen Honcharuk as acting against Kolomoysky's interests, and some believed the government reshuffle would permit Kolomoysky to retain influence.18

Far Right and Attacks on Civil Society and Minorities. Some observers have expressed concern about the rise of far-right Ukrainian nationalist groups. Such groups gained attention during the Euromaidan protests, when activists from groups such as the Freedom (Svoboda) political party and the Right Sector (Praviy Sektor) movement participated in a violent wing of the resistance against the Yanukovych government.19 Some of these groups transformed into wartime volunteer battalions, such as the Azov Battalion (which Kolomoysky reportedly financed), fought against Russian-led forces in eastern Ukraine, and eventually were incorporated into Ukraine's National Guard in the Ministry of Internal Affairs (in Azov's case, as a regiment formally called the Azov Special Purpose Detachment).20 Azov reportedly also is influential in Ukraine's veterans' movement.21 Some groups, including Azov, have established political parties and ties with far-right movements outside Ukraine.22

Although Azov and other far-right organizations have gained a certain legitimacy in Ukrainian society and government, they have not been successful electorally. In 2014 parliamentary elections, the Freedom party won less than 5% of the vote (not enough to receive party-list seats) and received six majoritarian seats; Right Sector won one majoritarian seat. In the 2014 presidential election, the Freedom party's leader won 1% of the vote and Right Sector's then-leader won less than 1% of the vote. In 2019 parliamentary elections, the Freedom party, the Azov-affiliated National Corps, Right Sector, and other far-right parties and movements united in a single bloc; the bloc won 2% of the vote and one majoritarian seat. In the 2019 presidential election, the united right-wing candidate won less than 2% of the vote.

Far-right groups and others have been implicated in violent attacks against civil society activists, journalists, and minorities, including members of the Roma and lesbian/gay/bisexual/transgender (LGBT) communities. Human rights NGOs reported more than 50 attacks on activists and human rights defenders in 2018 and more than 80 attacks in 2019.23 Many of the attacks appeared to be related to local affairs, allegedly as reprisals for investigations of corruption and other illegal activities. One prominent case was that of Kateryna Handzyuk, an activist and city council employee who was the victim of a severe acid attack in July 2018; she died of her wounds in November 2018. Another lethal attack victim was local investigative journalist Vadym Komarov, who died of his wounds in June 2019.

During Poroshenko's presidency, observers expressed concern that authorities did not thoroughly investigate such cases and that, when prosecutions did occur, perpetrators may have been punished but not always those suspected of ordering the attacks.24 In some cases, observers believe local government officials, rather than far-right groups, have instigated attacks (reportedly often hiring far-right members to carry out the attacks).

Reform Challenges After 2014, Ukraine embarked on an ambitious reform agenda. In 2017, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) praised key reforms, including a reduction of the fiscal deficit, increase in gas prices (retaining subsidies for lower-income households), and reform of the banking system.25 During Poroshenko's presidency, observers also noted progress in public procurement transparency, decentralization, health care reform, and judicial reform.26

At the same time, domestic and international stakeholders criticized the government under Poroshenko for slowly implementing, failing to complete, or backsliding on key reforms, particularly with regard to anti-corruption efforts (see "Anti-corruption Efforts," below). International partners and donors underlined the importance of further reforms in the energy sector (see "Energy," below), sustainable pension reform, the privatization of state-owned enterprises, and land sales (a moratorium has existed on land sales since 2001).27

In 2016, the IMF warned that stalled reforms could lead to a halt in loan disbursements to Ukraine. The IMF eventually issued two more disbursements under a four-year loan package (2015-2019) but did not release any more funds from that package after April 2017.28 The IMF approved a new short-term loan package in December 2018.29

After taking power in 2019, Zelensky and his Servant of the People government unveiled their own ambitious reform program. Their program included tightening anti-corruption legislation; promoting long-awaited judicial, security, land, and privatization reforms; and investing in infrastructure and defense.30 Some of the first votes of Ukraine's newly elected parliament were to enact a fully proportional electoral system, lift parliamentary deputies' immunity from prosecution, and reduce the size of parliament (the latter reform has not been enacted yet).31

In its first few months, the new Ukrainian parliament engaged in a flurry of legislative activity, popularly referred to as "turbo-mode." By the end of 2019, more than 130 laws had been enacted and dozens of others were under consideration.32 Legislation attempted to advance anti-corruption and rule-of-law reforms; accelerate decentralization efforts; introduce fiscal, trade, and pro-business reforms; and pave the way for the privatization of state assets and the establishment of a land market.33 In December 2019, the IMF commended Ukraine for "impressive progress ... in advancing reforms and continuing with sound economic policies," and it announced an agreement for a new $5.5 billion three-year loan package conditional on the passage of legislation on land sales and on safeguarding the restructuring of the banking sector.34

At the same time, observers have expressed some concerns that the rapid pace of lawmaking has introduced various substantive and procedural deficiencies in reform legislation. Observers also have raised concerns about implementation, especially with regard to judicial reforms (see "Justice Sector Reform," below) and other reforms that face resistance by wealthy businesspeople, corrupt actors, or (in the case of land reform) the public.35 In addition, some observers have expressed disapproval of what they consider the government's pursuit of politically motivated cases against ex-President Poroshenko.36

Although Ukraine's March 2020 reshuffling raised some concerns about the government's reform commitment, the emergence in Ukraine of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) led to a series of rapid reform measures. Within weeks, parliament dismissed two controversial new ministers of health and finance. To reach an agreement with the IMF, and to receive greater COVID-19-related funding, the Ukrainian parliament preliminarily approved legislation to prevent the return of nationalized banks to their former owners. The parliament also passed land reform legislation, which had been bogged down with more than 4,000 draft amendments.37 Starting in July 2021, Ukrainian nationals will be able to buy and sell land of up to 100 hectares (about 250 acres); from 2024, Ukrainian entities will be able to buy and sell up to 10,000 hectares (about 25,000 acres).38

COVID-19 Response

As of April 29, 2020, Ukraine had almost 10,000 confirmed cases of COVID-19 and 250 deaths attributed to the virus. The first confirmed case was reported on March 2. In response to the pandemic, the Ukrainian government adopted measures similar to those in other European countries, including restricted movement into and within the country, school closures, social distancing, and mask usage. In April 2020, the Ukrainian parliament amended the national budget to establish a $2.4 billion coronavirus fund and increase spending on health care and pensions. Ukraine is hoping to receive billions of dollars in emergency financing and other assistance from the International Monetary Fund and the European Union.

In February 2020, protesters violently resisted the arrival of more than 70 Ukrainian and foreign national evacuees from Wuhan, China, who had tested negative for COVID-19 and were to be quarantined in a nearby sanatorium. Ukraine's then-minister of health (dismissed in the March 2020 government reshuffle) reportedly joined the evacuees in quarantine to calm public fears.

Sources: Pavel Polityuk and Natalia Zinets, "With Selfie, Ukrainian Health Minister Joins Coronavirus Evacuees in Quarantine," February 21, 2020; President of Ukraine, "Address by the Head of State on Counteraction to Coronavirus," March 16, 2020; Bermet Talant, "Timeline of Ukraine's Response to Coronavirus Outbreak," Kyiv Post, March 19, 2020; Katya Gorchinskaya, "Ukraine Approves a Crisis Budget, But Has No Way to Cover Deficit," Forbes, April 13, 2020.

Anti-corruption Efforts

Combating corruption was to be a central focus of the Ukrainian government after the Revolution of Dignity. High levels of corruption allegedly persisted during Poroshenko's presidency, however, and many officials resisted anti-corruption measures. In opinion polls, respondents consistently rank corruption as one of the country's two most important issues (the other is the conflict with Russia).39 Since 2013, Ukraine's score in the NGO Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index has improved slowly; in 2019, it ranked 126 out of 180 countries.40

A major focus of anti-corruption reforms has been the establishment of three related institutions: the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU), an investigative body; the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office; and the High Anti-Corruption Court.41 NABU and the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office were established in 2015. After years of delay, Poroshenko agreed in 2018 to establish the Anti-Corruption Court, after the United States, the EU, the IMF, and the World Bank called on the government to do so in line with international recommendations. Judges were selected via a competitive process that included the participation of international experts.42

Various obstacles have impeded the functioning of Ukraine's anti-corruption institutions, although their situation appears to have improved under the Servant of the People government. NABU repeatedly has encountered resistance from within the government, reportedly due to the agency's investigative activities and independence. In 2017, a NABU operation targeting alleged corrupt officials at the State Migration Service was intercepted and exposed by Ukraine's security service and the prosecutor general's office.43 In early 2019, NABU came under legal pressure to close dozens of investigations into alleged corruption, after Ukraine's Constitutional Court issued a controversial ruling that the underlying basis for the investigations, related to the crime of illicit enrichment, was unconstitutional. A new law on illicit enrichment enacted in November 2019 has allowed cases to proceed. 44

NABU's director also has faced opposition. In 2019, a district court found the director, Artem Sytnyk, guilty of a misdemeanor related to vacation expenses paid by an acquaintance; an appeals court upheld the ruling in December 2019. Sytnyk says the charges were politically motivated. Many officials and members of parliament have sought Sytnyk's removal.45

The Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office has been more controversial than NABU. During Poroshenko's presidency, many observers believed that prosecutor Nazar Kholodnytskyi did not exhibit the independence necessary for the position. By 2017, concerns emerged that Kholodnytskyi was hindering the progress of NABU-initiated investigations.46 In 2018, NABU obtained wiretaps that purported to reveal actions indicative of witness tampering and obstruction of justice.47 No charges were brought against Kholodnytskyi, however, and he remained in his position.48 During the first few months of the Servant of the People government, the prosecutor general and NABU director said cooperation with the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office had improved.49

By the end of 2019, NABU had opened almost 900 corruption investigations. Together with the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office, NABU had returned 245 indictments against 438 accused persons and secured 38 convictions. Most of these cases are under the Anti-Corruption Court's jurisdiction.50

A fourth anti-corruption institution, the National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (NAPC), also was established in 2015. The NAPC's main task was to establish a public electronic system for the mandatory disclosure and verification of government officials' assets and incomes. By 2018, up to 1 million officials reportedly had submitted required annual declarations.51 The verification process moved slowly, however, and eventually stalled. Former NAPC employees accused agency officials of corruption and collusion with other government officials to avoid asset and income verifications.52 The Servant of the People government has restructured NAPC and appointed a new director.53

Justice Sector Reforms

Ukraine's anti-corruption reforms are part of broader justice sector reforms. Zelensky's first prosecutor general, Ruslan Riaboshapka (2019-2020), embarked on a reform of the prosecutor general's office that included a recertification process for central and regional prosecutors. Of more than 1,300 central prosecutors, 54% were removed after they declined to be vetted, failed knowledge-based tests, or did not pass interviews designed as "integrity" checks. As of March 2020, about a quarter of the regional prosecutors who agreed to be vetted reportedly had failed knowledge-based tests. Many observers praised the recertification process, although some said integrity checks were arbitrary and nontransparent.54 In his departure speech to parliament, Riaboshapka said the prosecutor general's office had opened hundreds of new cases targeting corruption and illicit financial outflows, illegal deforestation and gambling, police torture, and war crimes.55

After the March 2020 government reshuffling, the future of prosecutorial reforms became uncertain. The new prosecutor general, Iryna Venediktova, was a leading member of parliament from Servant of the People who served as chair of the committee on legal policy. In December 2019, Venediktova was appointed acting director of the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI), a new law enforcement agency that had been the focus of several scandals and was restructured at the time of her appointment.56 Many criticized Venediktova for appointing as her SBI deputy director a lawyer who previously represented ex-President Yanukovych.57

As of April 2020, other justice sector reforms also remain uncertain. In March 2020, Ukraine's Constitutional Court rejected several elements of a November 2019 judicial reform law.58 Observers considered the legislation to be a reboot of a Poroshenko-era judicial reform many believed to be flawed.59 Key measures were to include the reform of a commission that hires and fires judges and a reduction in the size of the Supreme Court (by half, to 100 judges). The Constitutional Court also ruled against the establishment of an ethics commission that was to oversee both the rebooted hiring commission and the High Council of Justice, the judiciary's governing body, which "has been accused of blocked judicial reform and promoting tainted judges."60 In addition, the court ruled against reducing the size of the Supreme Court, a change that international experts also had opposed. The Constitutional Court did not appear to invalidate new vetting regulations that some observers say are intended to keep control of the hiring process in the hands of the High Council of Justice.61 The judicial hiring commission, like the Anti-Corruption Court, is to be formed with the involvement of international experts.

Orthodox Church of Ukraine

In January 2019, the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople recognized the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) as an independent (i.e., autocephalous) church, officially separate from the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). Many Ukrainians viewed this as a major achievement in the evolution of Ukraine's national identity. Previously, most Ukrainian Orthodox churchgoers in Ukraine had been divided between a Kyiv Patriarchate, which was not officially autocephalous, and another wing of the church subordinated to the ROC.62

Observers consider the OCU's development to be a long-term process. In a January 2020 poll, 34% of respondents said they were adherents of the OCU and 14% said they were adherents of the ROC-subordinated wing. Another 28% identified as Orthodox but not with a particular church (8% said they belonged to the western Ukrainian-based Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church).63 As of January 2020, about 5% of the ROC-subordinated parishes in Ukraine had transferred their allegiance formally to the OCU.64 The Greek Orthodox Church and the Patriarchate of Alexandria have recognized the OCU; other Orthodox Churches have yet to do so.65

Russia opposes the OCU's autocephaly and initially claimed it would threaten the religious freedom and safety of ROC parishioners.66 U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo called the granting of autocephaly "a historic achievement" and encouraged "government and Church officials to promote tolerance and respect for the freedom of members of all religious affiliations to worship as they choose."67 In a January 2020 visit to Kyiv, Secretary Pompeo met with OCU Metropolitan Epiphany I and said he was "impressed by his efforts to ensure the independent Orthodox Church of Ukraine is open to all believers."68

Conflict with Russia

Many observers believe that of all the post-Soviet states, Ukraine's independence has been the most difficult for Russians to accept. Many Russians traditionally have considered much of Ukraine to be a historical province of Russia and Ukrainians to be close ethnic brethren. In June 2019, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that "Russians and Ukrainians are one people ... one nation."69 Most Ukrainians can speak Russian, whether as a primary or secondary language. In Ukraine's last national census (2001), 17% of the population identified as ethnic Russians, mostly concentrated in the south (Crimea) and east, where ties to Russia are stronger than in the rest of the country. In Soviet times, eastern Ukraine became home to a heavy industrial and defense production sector that retained close economic ties to Russia after independence.

Before 2014, the Russia-Ukraine relationship occasionally suffered turbulence, with disputes over Ukraine's ties to NATO and the EU, the status of Russia's Crimea-based Black Sea Fleet, and the transit of Russian natural gas via Ukraine to Europe. By the end of 2013, ex-President Yanukovych appeared to make a decisive move toward Russia, postponing an Association Agreement to establish closer political and economic ties with the EU and agreeing instead to substantial financial assistance from Moscow. This decision provoked the Euromaidan protests and, ultimately, led to Yanukovych's removal from power.

Figure 1. Ukraine

Sources: Graphic produced by CRS. Map information generated using data from the Department of State, Esri, and DeLorme.

Crimea Russia's invasion of Ukraine occurred soon after Yanukovych fled to Russia in February 2014. The Russian government soon after Yanukovych fled to Russia in February 2014.31 Moscow covertly deployed forces to Ukraine's Crimea region and, after holding what most observers consider to have been an illegal referendum on secession in March 2014, declared it was incorporating Crimea (with a population of about 2 million people) directly into the Russian Federation.70 In explaining these actions, Russian government officials characterized the change in power in Kyivcast the Revolution of Dignity as a Western-backed "coup" that, among other things, could threaten the security of the ethnic Russian population in Crimea, eject Russia's Black Sea Fleet from the region, and potentially even bring Ukraine into NATO, something Moscow firmly opposed.

Since 2014, Russia has significantly increased its military presence in Crimea and suppressed local dissent. Ukrainian officials say Russia has deployed more than 3031,000 troops to the regionCrimea, as well as S-400 surface-to-air missile systems and other advanced weaponry.3271 The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has documented "multiple and grave" human rights violations in Crimea and said that minority Crimean Tatars, who are generally opposed to Russia's occupation, have been "particularly targeted."33

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Much of the international community does not recognize Russia's purported annexation of Crimea. Many states and international organizations have condemned Russia's occupation of Ukraine as a violation of international law and Russia's own commitments under the 1975 Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. More specifically, they alsomany consider it to be a violation of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, in which Russia, together with the United States and the United Kingdom (UK), reaffirmed its commitment "to respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine," as well as the "obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force" against Ukraine.34 In March73 Since 2014, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) voted 100 to 11, with 58 countries abstaining, to affirm Ukraine's territorial integrity. The UNGA has passed further resolutions, most recently in December 2018, thathas voted several times, most recently in December 2019, to affirm Ukraine's territorial integrity, condemn the "temporary occupation" of Crimea, and reaffirm nonrecognition of its annexation.35

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The Ukrainian government and state-owned companies seek to uphold their rights in and around Crimea through international arbitration. In August 2019, the Paris-based International Court of Arbitration awarded state-owned Oschadbank $1.3 billion in damages from Russia.3675 Ukrainian state-owned energy company Naftogaz seeks $5.2about $8 billion in compensation for its seized assets in the Hague-based Permanent Court of Arbitration; the court ruled in March 2019 that Russia had violated its bilateral investment treaty with Ukraine.37.76 In a separate case before the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the Ukrainian government seeks to broadly uphold its maritime rights around Crimea under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (for more on Russia's maritime aggression, see "Sea of Azov and Kerch Strait," below).38 The Russian government refuses to recognize the international rulings against it.

77 In November 2019, the International Court of Justice ruled that it has jurisdiction to hear a case Ukraine filed in 2017 against Russia for its actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine.78

Eastern Ukraine

After occupying Crimea, Moscow engineered the rise of new separatist movements in eastern Ukraine (the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, collectively known as the Donbas; see Figure 1). Beginning in April 2014, militants forcibly took power in several cities and towns, announced the establishment of two separatist entities (the so-called Donetsk People's Republic, or DPR, and the so-called Luhansk People's Republic, or LPR), and gradually expanded their control over Ukrainian territoryin the two regions. Ukrainian government and volunteer forces restoredfought back, restoring state control over some areas, but they also suffereda portion of each region but also suffering some major defeats. These defeats included, including in battles in which regular Russian forces reportedly participated,: near Ilovaisk (August-September 2014), the Donetsk Airport (September 2014-January 2015), and Debaltseve (January-February 2015).39

79 In 2017, the Ukrainian government estimated that about 60% of the 6.4 million residents of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (3.8 million) were living under the control of Russian proxies.80

For Russia, the establishment of separatist entities in eastern Ukraine may have served multiple purposes. The Russian government claimed it was seeking to "protect" relatively pro-Russian populations in these regions. Many observers believe, however, that Moscow sought to complicate Ukraine's domestic development and foreign policy and increase Russian leverage in potential negotiations over Ukraine's future trajectory.

Moscow continues to officially deny Russia's involvement in the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Many observers agree, however,Unlike Russia's policy toward Crimea, Moscow officially recognizes the areas it controls in eastern Ukraine as Ukrainian territory. Although the Russian government denies military involvement in eastern Ukraine, many observers assert that the Russian government has deployed troops to fight unofficially, encouraged other Russian "volunteers" to join these troops, and supplied weaponsweaponry and equipment to local fighters. In 2018, then-U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations Kurt Volker has stated thatstated, "Russia has 100 percent command and control of what is happening in the occupied areas there—military forces, political entities, and direct economic activity."40 In May 2018, then-U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley said "militants in eastern Ukraine report directly to the Russian military, which arms them, trains them, leads them and fights alongside them."41

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The estimated number of Russian troops in eastern Ukraine has declined since peaking in 2015 at about 12,000.4282 In February 2019, Ukraine's ambassador to the United Nations said that "over 2,100 Russian regular militarymilitary forces, mostly in key command and control positions," were fighting in eastern Ukraine, with the total number of Russian-backed fighters about 35,000.43

83 In February 2020, Ukraine's minister of defense said there were more than 25,000 Russian forces (presumably including local fighters) in the region.84

The conflict's intensity has declined since 2015, but fighting continues. In 2018, then-Special Representative Volker characterized the conflict as a "hot war."44 U.S. officials and others regularly call attention to the "humanitarian catastrophe" in eastern Ukraine.4585 According to OHCHR, the conflict has led to around 10,000 combat deaths and more than 3,000an estimated 9,750 combatant deaths and at least 3,350 civilian fatalities.4686

ThisThe conflict's casualty count includes the 298 foreign nationals killed in the July 17, 2014, downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17, or MH17, a commercial aircraft en route from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur that was shot down in Ukrainian airspace. Intelligence sources indicateindicated that separatist forces brought down the plane using a missile supplied by the Russian military.87 The MH17 tragedy helped galvanize EU support for more substantial sanctions on Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine (see "Ukraine-Related Sanctions," below). In June . In 2019, the Dutch government announced a decision to prosecute three Russian citizens and a Ukrainian citizen for the downing of MH17.47

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In April 2019, days after Zelensky was elected president, the Russian government introduced new procedures to expedite the process of acquiringgranting Russian citizenship forto residents of "certain areas" of Donetsk and Luhansk (a diplomatic euphemism for the nongovernmentRussian-controlled areas). In July 2019, these procedures were expanded to apply to all residents of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.89 In January 2020, Russian officials stated that Russia had granted citizenship to more than 196,000 residents of the two regions (about 30% of whom live in areas controlled by Ukraine).90 Humanitarian Issues.48 Russia has provided citizenship to residents in regions of other countries it has militarily occupied (including Georgia's Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions and Moldova's Transnistria region). Although the Russian government claims the policy has a humanitarian justification, many observers contend it is intended to entrench Russia's position in these regions and could provide a potential pretext for future military action.49

Internally Displaced Persons and Transit Across the Contact Line

The conflict has led to a large number of internally displaced persons (IDPs). As of July 2019, the Ukrainian government officially counted almost 1.4 million IDPs.50The Ukrainian government has registered more than 1.4 million people as IDPs.91 International organizations estimate the number of actually displaced persons to be closer to 800,000under 1 million, as many IDPs still live in or have returned to their homes but remain registered as IDPs to receive pensions (a requirement established by the Ukrainian government).5192 International organizations and NGOs have called on Ukrainethe government to allow residents of the "nongovernment-controlled areas" of eastern Ukraine (the official term for the Russian-controlled areas) to receive their pensions without having to register as IDPs.5293

UkrainiansResidents are permitted to cross the approximately 300-mile long "contact line" that divides the government- and nongovernment-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk. In the first half of 2019, an average of about 1.12 million total crossings occurred per month via five official crossing points.5394 According to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), most crossings are by female and elderly residents of nongovernment-controlled areas, mainly to collect pensions.54 Vehicular traffic is permitted, although the bridge that serves as the sole crossing point in Luhansk (near the town of Stanytsia Luhanska) is too damaged for vehicles to cross and is generally unsafe for pedestrian traffic.55

The Ukrainian government is taking measures to facilitate transit to and from the nongovernment-controlled areas. In July 2019, the government 95

The Ukrainian government has taken measures to facilitate transit to and from the nongovernment-controlled areas. In 2019, the government repaired the bridge that serves as the sole crossing point in the Luhansk region; the bridge was previously unsafe for pedestrian traffic (and it can only accommodate emergency vehicular traffic).96

In 2019, the government also issued an order to liberalize the crossing regime by allowing individuals to carry all goods through crossing points except those specifically prohibited (previously, the crossing regime currently prohibitsprohibited all goods except those specifically permitted).56 That month, the government also announced its intent to repair the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the sole crossing point in the Luhansk region.57

The Ukrainian government currently prohibits cargo traffic to and from the nongovernment-controlled areas. Until 2017, the Ukrainian government permitted some trade with the separatist regions of eastern Ukraine, especially in coal used in domestic power plants and sold abroad. In particular, energy companies in the separatist regions owned by prominent Ukrainian businessman Rinat Akhmetov recognized Ukrainian authority and paid taxes.58 After some Ukrainians launched an unofficial blockade against this trade in early 2017, the separatist entities reportedly took control of companies including those owned by Akhmetov. In response, the Ukrainian government officially suspended all cargo traffic, until the proper owners of the companies regain control.59

Minsk Agreements

Efforts at conflict resolution are structured around a set of measures known as the Minsk agreements97 In March 2020, the government restricted most movement across the contact line as part of its effort to combat the coronavirus pandemic.98 Since 2017, the Ukrainian government has prohibited cargo traffic to and from the nongovernment-controlled areas.99 Conflict Resolution Process Russia and Ukraine participate in a conflict resolution process structured around a set of measures known as the Minsk agreements (Russia refuses to engage in a similar conflict resolution process with respect to Crimea, since it claims to have annexed that region). The Minsk agreements were signed in 2014 and 2015 by representatives of Russia, Ukraine, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)—members of what is known as the Trilateral Contact Group—together with de facto representatives of the nongovernment-controlled areas of eastern UkraineRussian proxy authorities. The agreements are supported by a broader international grouping known as the Normandy Four (or Normandy Format): France, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine.

The first Minsk agreements were signed in September 2014. They included a 12-point agreement known as the and February 2015. The 2014 agreements included the 12-point Minsk Protocol, signed just days after the defeat of Ukrainian government and volunteer forces at the battle of Ilovaisk, and a follow-up memorandum outlining measures for a cease-fire and international monitoring mission.60100 The Minsk Protocol failed to end fighting or prompt a political resolution to the conflict.

The Normandy Four met again in February 2015, amid the battle at Debaltseve, to develop a more detailed "package of measures" known as Minsk-2 (see "Summary of Minsk-2 Measures" text box).101

Summary of Minsk-2 Measures

1. Immediate and comprehensive cease-fire.

2. Withdrawal of heavy weapons from defined security zones.

3. OSCE monitoring and verification of the cease-fire regime and withdrawal of heavy weapons.

4. Dialogue on (1) modalities of local elections in accordance with Ukrainian legislation and (2) the future status of "certain areas" in Donetsk and Luhansk and specification of the areas in eastern Ukraine to which this status applies.

5. Amnesty via a law forbidding persecution and punishment of persons "in connection with the events" that took place in certain areas in Donetsk and Luhansk.

6. Release and exchange of all hostages and other illegally detained people based on a principle of "all for all."

7. Safe access and delivery of humanitarian aid to those in need, on the basis of an international mechanism.

8. Determining modalities for fully restoring social and economic links with nongovernment-controlled areas of eastern Ukraine, including pensions and taxes (and, consequently, functioning of the Ukrainian banking system in those areas).

9. Restoration of full Ukrainian control over its border with Russia, beginning from the first day after local elections and ending after a comprehensive political settlement, following the introduction of a new constitution and permanent legislation on the special status of certain areas in Donetsk and Luhansk.

10. Withdrawal of all foreign armed groups, weapons, and mercenaries from Ukrainian territory and disarmament of all illegal groups.

11. Constitutional reform, including on decentralization, and permanent legislation on the special status of certain areas in Donetsk and Luhansk, in agreement with representatives of nongovernment-controlled areas.

12. Local elections to be held in certain areas in Donetsk and Luhansk, in agreement with representatives of those districts and in accordance with OSCE standards.

13. Intensification of the work of the Trilateral Contact Group, including through working groups on implementation of the Minsk agreements.

The Normandy Four met again in February 2015, amid the battle at Debaltseve, to develop a more detailed "package of measures" known as Minsk-2.61 This package included, among other provisions, a cease-fire, the withdrawal of heavy weapons and foreign troops and fighters, full Ukrainian control over its border with Russia, local elections, and a "special status" for certain districts in eastern Ukraine (see "Summary of Minsk-2 Measures" text box).

The signing of Minsk-2, on February 12, 2015, was intended to trigger an expedited timeframe for a "comprehensive political settlement" to the conflict. This timeframe included a cease-fire from February 15, 2015; full withdrawal of heavy weapons after 15 days of a cease-fire; full exchange of prisoners within the subsequent 5 days; and the introduction of special status for nongovernment-controlled areas, corresponding constitutional reforms, local elections, and Ukraine's full control of its border by the end of 2015. Although Minsk-2 established a specific timeline and/or sequencing for several of its measures, the sequencing of some key measures is ambiguous.62

The Minsk agreements have been endorsed by the U.N. Security Council, which includes Russia as a permanent member;Several measures in Minsk-2 consist of steps for ending hostilities. These measures include a cease-fire, the withdrawal of heavy weapons, international monitoring, the release of all illegally detained individuals, safe access for humanitarian aid, the withdrawal of foreign fighters, and restoration of Ukrainian control over an approximately 250-mile stretch of its border with Russia.

The restoration of Ukrainian border control is to be implemented concurrently with measures designed to establish a political settlement to the conflict. The return of Ukraine's border is to begin immediately after the holding of democratic local elections in the nongovernment-controlled areas. It is to conclude after Ukraine enacts permanent legislation providing special local government status to the nongovernment-controlled areas, as well as constitutional reforms on decentralization that reference "specificities" of these areas. Other measures include amnesty for conflict participants and the restoration of social and economic links across the contact line.

The U.N. Security Council, which includes Russia as a permanent member, has endorsed the Minsk agreements. U.N. Security Council Resolution 2202 (2015) endorses and calls on all parties to fully implement the package of measures.63102 In June 2018, a Security Council "presidential statement" condemned ongoing cease-fire violations and called for the implementation of disengagement commitments and withdrawal of heavy weapons. It also urged "[the] parties to recommit to the peace process [and] achieve immediate progress in the implementation of the Minsk agreements."64 The statement underlined the Security Council's "full support for the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Ukraine."

103

The United States supports the efforts of the Trilateral Contact Group and the Normandy Four. In the last two yearsFrom 2017 to 2019, U.S. policy towardon the Ukraine conflict has beenwas directed mainly through the office of the U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations. In July 2017, the U.S. Department of State established this position to advance "U.S. efforts to achieve the objectives set out in the Minsk agreements" and "to hold regular meetings with Ukraine and the other members of the Normandy Format."65

Implementation Status of the Minsk-2 Agreement

Of Minsk-2's 13 measures, only one (measure 13) arguably has been fully implemented: the establishment of working groups within the Trilateral Contact Group to address the implementation of various aspects of the Minsk agreements.

Many of Minsk-2's most significant measures104 Ambassador Volker resigned from this position in September 2019 prior to the start of the presidential impeachment inquiry in the House of Representatives. As of April 2020, the Administration has not appointed a successor.

Implementation Status

The signing of Minsk-2, on February 12, 2015, was intended to trigger an expedited timeframe for a "comprehensive political settlement" to the conflict. This timeframe included a cease-fire from February 15, 2015; full withdrawal of heavy weapons after 15 days of a cease-fire; full exchange of prisoners within another 5 days; and the introduction of a special status for nongovernment-controlled areas, related constitutional reforms, local elections, and Ukraine's full control of its border by the end of 2015. Although Minsk-2 established a specific timeline and/or sequencing for several of its measures, the sequencing of some key measures is ambiguous.105

Measures in Minsk-2 for ending hostilities largely remain unfulfilled to date:

  • No lasting cease-fire exists, and heavy weapons have not been fully withdrawn from the defined security zones (measures 1 and 2).66106 Although cease-fires are declared periodically (including, most recently, a "harvest cease-fire" from July 21, 2019), such cease-fires are temporary, often violated, and eventually break down.67At the end of June 2019, the parties implemented a related step, such cease-fires are temporary, often violated, and eventually break down.In 2019, Ukrainian and Russian-led forces implemented a related confidence-building measure agreed upon in 2016: the withdrawal of armed forces and hardware within a smallfrom three "disengagement areaareas" near the towntowns of Stanytsia Luhanska (which allowed for repairs to the nearby crossing point), Zolote, and Petrivske.107
  • Foreign (namely Russian) armed formations, weapons, and mercenaries reportedly still are present in the region (measure 10).
  • Russia has not returned control of Ukraine's border to the government of Ukraine (measure 9).
  • Some of Minsk-2's measures for ending hostilities have been at least partially fulfilled:

  • An international monitoring mission monitors cease-fire violations and the presence of heavy weaponry within defined security zones (measure 3). The OSCE's Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine is an unarmed civilian monitoring mission that was established in 2014 after Russia's occupation of Crimea. The SMM is deployed throughout Ukraine but focuses on the nongovernment-controlled areas in Donetsk and Luhansk. As of March 2020, the SMM includes 756 international monitors, including 54 from the United States, the SMM's largest contributor.108 The SMM issues daily and spot monitoring reports on the security situation and facilitates the delivery of humanitarian aid.109
  • Donors and nongovernmental organizations direct humanitarian assistance to nongovernment-controlled areas, but of Stanytsia Luhanska.68 If this withdrawal holds, observers believe it will improve security for civilian transit in the Luhansk region, including by allowing for repairs to the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge.69
  • Foreign (namely Russian) armed formations, weapons, and mercenaries reportedly still are present in the region (measure 10).
  • Although Ukraine has adopted and twice extended a law providing for a special form of local government in certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk and amnesty for participants in the conflict, these provisions are to enter into force only after local elections are held and illegal armed formations withdraw from the country. The law is neither permanent nor accompanied by constitutional amendments on decentralization (that are to reference "specificities" of certain areas of Donetsk and Lugansk). The law is scheduled to expire on December 31, 2019 (measures 5, 11).70
  • Although local authorities in the nongovernment-controlled areas claim to have held elections in November 2018, neither Ukraine nor international stakeholders recognize these elections as in accordance with Ukrainian law, international standards, or the Minsk agreements (measure 12).
  • In the absence of permanent legislation on the special status of the nongovernment-controlled areas, constitutional reform, and legitimate local elections, Russia has not returned full control of Ukraine's state border to the government of Ukraine (measure 9).
  • Although donors and nongovernmental organizations direct some humanitarian assistance to nongovernment-controlled areas, aid organizations' access to these areas is not ensured and aid delivery and distribution does not operate on the basis of an agreed-upon international mechanism.71110 According to the International Crisis Group, "the overwhelming bulk of aid to rebel-held areas comes from the Russian government ... but independent aid workers say it's unclear how many of those goods actually reach the people in need" (measure 7).72

Some of Minsk-2's other measures have been at least partially fulfilled:

  • An international monitoring mission in the nongovernment-controlled areas monitors cease-fire violations and the presence of heavy weaponry within defined security zones (measure 3) (see "OSCE Special Monitoring Mission for Ukraine" text box, below).
  • Ukraine's law on interim local self-government appears to address what Minsk-2 refers to as the "modalities" of local elections and the future "special regime" that is to govern certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk. In addition, Ukraine's legislature passed a resolution on March 17, 2015, listing the cities, towns, and other settlements to which the law on local self-government applies.73 The extent to which these issues have been the subject of a "dialogue" with representatives of the nongovernment-controlled areas might be open to interpretation (measure 4).
  • Prisoner exchanges occasionally have occurred, although as of September 2019 Ukrainian officials state that more than 110 Ukrainians remain illegally detained in Russia and occupied Crimea and more than 225 remain illegally detained in nongovernment-controlled regions in eastern Ukraine (measure 6).74

    A major prisoner exchange took place in December 2017, when the Ukrainian government and de facto authorities in the nongovernment-controlled areas arranged a prisoner swap in which over 230 prisoners held by the government were exchanged for over 70 prisoners in the nongovernment-controlled areas.75

    Another major prisoner exchange took place in September 2019, when Russia and Ukraine each freed 35 individuals. Among those Russia freed were some of Moscow's most prominent Ukrainian political prisoners and prisoners of war, including 24 sailors Russia illegally detained in November 2018; Crimea-based filmmaker Oleh Sentsov; and 21-year-old Pavlo Hryb, who was forcibly removed from Belarus in 2017. Prisoners Ukraine freed included Kirill Vyshinsky, a Ukrainian-Russian journalist charged with treason; Volodymyr Tsemakh, a person of interest in the downing of MH17 whom Dutch prosecutors interviewed before his release; separatist and volunteer fighters; and suspected spies.76
  • Although some "modalities" for resuming socioeconomic ties with the nongovernment-controlled areas appear to have been defined, "full" social and economic linkages with nongovernment-controlled areas have not been restored (measure 8). Residents may receive pensions and other social benefits, and they may conduct individual trade and transit across the contact line. As of August 2019, however, transit remains restricted to official crossing points that continue to be in need of improvements, cargo traffic remains prohibited, and Ukraine's banking system does not operate in the nongovernment-controlled areas.77

OSCE Special Monitoring Mission for Ukraine

The OSCE's Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) for Ukraine is an unarmed civilian monitoring mission that was established in 2014 after Russia's occupation of Crimea but prior to the outbreak of hostilities in eastern Ukraine (and, hence, prior to the September 2014 signing of the Minsk Protocol). The SMM is deployed throughout Ukraine but focuses especially on the nongovernment-controlled areas in Donetsk and Luhansk. As of July 2019, the SMM includes 760 international monitors, including 57 from the United States, the SMM's largest contributor. The SMM issues daily and spot monitoring reports on the security situation and facilitates the delivery of humanitarian aid. In addition to the SMM, the OSCE operates an Observer Mission at the Russian Checkpoints Gukovo and Donetsk (both within Russia) to monitor border crossings to and from eastern Ukraine.

Sources: OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, "Status Report as of July 15, 2019," July 19, 2019, at https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/426140; OSCE Observer Mission webpage at https://www.osce.org/observer-mission-at-russian-checkpoints-gukovo-and-donetsk.

With regard to the Minsk agreements' implementation, the Ukrainian and Russian governments emphasize what they consider to be the other party's failures in fulfilling key responsibilities. Ukrainian officials prioritize an end to the armed conflict and Russian occupation, both on principle and as a necessary condition for establishing a secure environment to hold democratic local elections. They call on Russia to enforce a cease-fire among Russian-controlled forces, withdraw heavy weapons, withdraw its official and unofficial military forces, and create an environment that allows local elections to be held in accordance with Ukrainian law and international standards, leading to restoration of Ukraine's control over its state border.78 Under ex-President Poroshenko, the Ukrainian government also called for the establishment of an international peacekeeping mission throughout the nongovernment-controlled areas that would111 Detainee exchanges occasionally have occurred (measure 6). A major exchange took place in 2017, when more than 230 individuals held by Ukrainian authorities were exchanged for more than 70 individuals in the nongovernment-controlled areas.112A second major exchange took place in September 2019, when Russia and Ukraine each freed 35 individuals. Among those freed were some of Russia's most prominent Ukrainian political prisoners and prisoners of war, including 24 sailors Russia detained in November 2018 and Crimea-based filmmaker Oleh Sentsov. Detainees Ukraine freed included a person of interest in the downing of MH17, whom Dutch prosecutors interviewed before his release.113A third major exchange took place in December 2019, when more than 120 individuals held by Ukrainian authorities were exchanged for more than 75 individuals in the nongovernment-controlled areas.114 Among those freed by Russian proxy authorities were Ukrainian servicemen, local residents alleged to have been cooperating with the Ukrainian government, and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty journalist Stanislav Aseyev.The December 2019 exchange was somewhat controversial. Ukrainian authorities released not only fighters but also individuals who had not been involved in the conflict. Released detainees included five members of Ukraine's Berkut special police force accused of killing dozens of protesters during the Revolution of Dignity, as well as alleged Russian-hired hitmen and the perpetrators of a 2015 bomb attack in the city of Kharkiv. Some observers criticized Zelensky for accommodating Moscow's demands to release these detainees. Others argued that Moscow's demands confirmed its involvement in these crimes.115In March 2020, Ukrainian officials said they were negotiating with Russia for the release of more than 200 Ukrainians (including 86 Crimean Tatars) who remained in illegal detention in nongovernment-controlled areas of eastern Ukraine, occupied Crimea, or Russia.116 In a smaller exchange in April 2020, 20 individuals held in the nongovernment-controlled areas were exchanged for 14 individuals held by Ukrainian authorities.117

Of Minsk-2's other measures, one (measure 13) largely has been implemented: the establishment of working groups to address the implementation of various aspects of the Minsk agreements. Others remain partially fulfilled or unfulfilled:

  • Although Russian proxy authorities in the nongovernment-controlled areas claim to have held elections in November 2018, neither Ukraine nor international stakeholders recognize these elections as in accordance with Ukrainian law, international standards, or the Minsk agreements (measure 12).118
  • Ukraine has adopted and thrice extended a temporary law that establishes an amnesty and special status for the nongovernment-controlled areas but only after illegal armed formations withdraw from the areas and democratic local elections are held.119 The law is not permanent (it needs to be renewed annually) and has not been accompanied by constitutional amendments on decentralization (measures 4, 5, 11).
  • Although some socioeconomic ties with the nongovernment-controlled areas have been established, "full" social and economic linkages have not been restored (measure 8). Before the emergence of the coronavirus pandemic, residents could conduct individual trade and transit across the contact line, including to receive pensions and other social benefits. Even when transit is open, however, it remains limited to five official crossing points, cargo traffic is prohibited, and Ukraine's banking system does not operate in the nongovernment-controlled areas.

The Ukrainian and Russian governments each emphasize what they consider to be the other party's responsibilities for implementing the Minsk agreements. Ukrainian officials have emphasized the need for a permanent cease-fire and withdrawal of Russian official and unofficial forces, both on principle and as a necessary condition for establishing a secure environment to hold democratic local elections.

The Russian government, for its part, disavows direct responsibility for cease-fire violations and the failure to withdraw heavy weapons. Russia has called on Ukraine, irrespective of the security environment, to fulfill certain political measures, including a permanent grant of special status to the nongovernment-controlled areas and related constitutional reforms.

Separate from the Minsk agreements, the Ukrainian government has called for the establishment of an international peacekeeping mission throughout the nongovernment-controlled areas to help enforce a cease-fire. The U.S. government has expressed support for a peacekeeping mission as a means to establish the security conditions necessary to implement Minsk-2's package of measures.120 Russian officials have rejected the proposal.121

Ukraine and Russia Relaunch Talks

President Zelensky has sought to invigorate what had been a relatively dormant conflict resolution process in eastern Ukraine. It remains to be seen whether his efforts can lay the groundwork for discussion on thornier issues, including withdrawal of Russian forces and the legal status of Russian-controlled areas. Flare-ups of conflict also may overtake new efforts.

In December 2019, Zelensky and Putin met alongside German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron in the first meeting of leaders of the Normandy Four since 2016. The meeting mostly produced expressions of support for the implementation or extension of prior commitments and confidence-building measures, including the securing of a "full and comprehensive" cease-fire, release of all conflict-related detainees, establishment of new disengagement areas, opening of new crossing points, and creation of an updated demining plan.122

Meeting participants also addressed more contentious issues related to a political settlement to the conflict. The parties expressed "interest" in the further legal development of special status for the nongovernment-controlled areas. The four leaders also stated they consider it "necessary" to incorporate into Ukrainian law the so-called Steinmeier formula, a previously defunct proposal for establishing a particular sequence for the holding of local elections in, and granting of special status to, the nongovernment-controlled areas.123 According to the formula, special status is to come into effect on a temporary basis at the close of local elections. If international observers conclude elections were held in accordance with international standards and Ukrainian law, the special status is to become permanent. Russia made acceptance of the Steinmeier formula a precondition of the December 2019 meeting.

It is unclear when or if Ukraine will codify the Steinmeier formula. Many Ukrainians appear to oppose the formula, as they do special status more generally. The Ukrainian government's initial announcement that it would accept the Steinmeier formula was met with protests.124 Opponents of the formula express concern that Moscow will manipulate the process to entrench its proxy regimes. Many also are concerned that Russia will refuse to withdraw its forces or restore control of the border to Ukraine after local elections. Ukrainian officials say that Russia should return control of the border before local elections, although this would reverse the order stipulated in the Minsk agreements.125 To date, the Russian government has rejected this proposal.

Meeting participants expressed interest in holding another Normandy summit in four months' time, although a date has yet to be set. In addition to uncertainty caused by the coronavirus pandemic, the Ukrainian and Russian governments have said the next meeting should be held only after implementation of the measures agreed in December 2019, including a comprehensive cease-fire.126 Ukrainian and foreign governments blamed Russia-led forces for a brief but serious escalation of conflict in February 2020.127 In March 2020, a tentative agreement to establish dialogue between the Ukrainian government and representatives from nongovernment-controlled areas met with domestic opposition, including from within the Servant of the People party.128

Sea of Azov and Kerch Strait Russia seeks to establish greater control over maritime regions adjacent to Crimea and eastern Ukraine, including in the Sea of Azov, the Black Sea, and the Kerch Strait, the waterway that connects the two seas. In May 2018, Russian President Putin opened a 12-mile-long bridge over the Kerch Strait linking Russia to occupied Crimea. The bridge was designed to accommodate an existing shipping lane, but it imposed new limits on the size of ships that transit the strait. Since the bridge's opening, Russia has stepped up its interference with commercial traffic traveling to and from Ukrainian ports on the Sea of Azov help enforce a cease-fire.

The Russian government, for its part, claims the Ukrainian government is as responsible as the de facto authorities in the nongovernment-controlled areas for cease-fire violations and the failure to withdraw heavy weapons (for which Moscow disavows responsibility). Russia also calls on Ukraine, irrespective of the security environment, to fulfill its political and economic obligations, including the enactment of a permanent and immediate grant of special status to the nongovernment-controlled areas and related constitutional reforms, restoration of economic links, and an amnesty for all conflict participants.79

Russian officials also have criticized the Ukrainian government's earlier call to establish an international peacekeeping mission throughout the nongovernment-controlled areas as something not envisioned by the Minsk agreements. However, Russian President Putin also has proposed the establishment of an international peacekeeping force in the region, albeit only along the line of contact to protect OSCE monitors and help separate the conflicting sides.80

Many observers have questioned Russia's commitment to implementing the Minsk agreements, despite the U.N. Security Council's endorsement and Russia's official expressions of support. Unlike Russia's policy toward Crimea, Moscow formally recognizes the nongovernment-controlled areas in eastern Ukraine as Ukrainian territory. Moscow denies its own leading political and military role in the conflict, however, and disavows responsibility for implementing the Minsk agreements or for the actions of local authorities and armed forces. Ukraine, the EU, and the United States consider the holding of so-called DPR and LPR elections in November 2018 to be in violation of the Minsk agreements (Russia says these elections fall outside the agreements' scope).81 Ukraine, the EU, and the United States also consider Russia's new policy of facilitating citizenship for residents of Donetsk and Luhansk to be contrary to "the spirit and the objectives" of the Minsk agreements.82

Some observers have questioned whether Ukraine is committed to the Minsk agreements. In general, Ukrainian officials view the agreements through a wide lens: the need to roll back Russian aggression throughout Ukraine, including Crimea, and avoid any legitimization of its effects. In February 2018, then-President Poroshenko signed a law on "ensuring state sovereignty" in "temporarily occupied territories" that designates Russia as an aggressor state and does not refer to the Minsk agreements.83 For his part, President Zelensky has said that Ukraine is "prepared to do everything required by the Minsk agreements [and] to follow all the steps needed to implement the agreements in order to finally achieve peace."84 In July 2019, Zelensky appeared to propose a new format for peace talks that would expand the Normandy Format to include the United States and the UK, both signatories (together with Russia and Ukraine) of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum that offered security assurances to Ukraine.85

Sea of Azov and Kerch Strait

On November 25, 2018, Russian coast guard vessels in the Black Sea forcibly prevented two small Ukrainian artillery boats and a tugboat from passing through the Kerch Strait, the waterway connecting the Black Sea to the Sea of Azov (see Figure 2).86 Russian authorities detained the boats and their crew and took them to the town of Kerch, in Crimea. The sailors were arrested and placed in pretrial detention on charges of illegally crossing what Russia refers to as its state border (i.e., territorial waters around occupied Crimea). Previously, in September 2018, a Ukrainian command ship and tugboat transited the Kerch Strait without incident, escorted by Russian coast guard vessels (other ships have arrived over land).87

Ukraine and its international partners (including the EU and the United States) considered the November 2018 incident to be a major violation of international law and an escalation in Russia's efforts to control maritime access to eastern Ukraine.88 In May 2018, President Putin opened a new 12-mile-long bridge over the Kerch Strait linking Russia to occupied Crimea. The bridge was designed to accommodate an existing shipping lane, but it imposed new limits on the size of ships that transit the strait. Observers note that since the bridge's opening, Russia has stepped up its interference with commercial traffic traveling to and from Ukrainian ports in Mariupol and Berdyansk, which export steel, grain, and coal.89 Russia also has bolstered its maritime forces in the Sea of Azov.90

The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights considered the 24 Ukrainian sailors to be prisoners of war.91 On May 25, 2019, the U.N.-established International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea issued an order requiring Russia to release the sailors and ships.92 Although the Russian government said it did not recognize the tribunal's authority in this matter, it released the sailors as part of a prisoner exchange in September 2019.

in Mariupol and Berdyansk, which export steel, grain, and coal. One Ukrainian organization that tracks Russian regional activities has reported about 2,250 cases of delayed maritime transit to and from Ukrainian ports through the end of 2019.129 Russia also has bolstered its maritime forces in the Sea of Azov.130

Figure 2. Southern Ukraine and the Sea of Azov

Sources: Graphic produced by CRS. Map information generated using data from the Department of State, Esri, and DeLorme.

Ukraine's Church Becomes Independent of Moscow

The Kerch Strait incident emerged against the backdrop of an increase in tensions between Russia and Ukraine over the issue of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church's formal independence (i.e., autocephaly) from the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). In Ukraine, Orthodox churchgoers traditionally have been divided mainly between parishes belonging to a self-declared Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP) and those belonging to the ROC-subordinated Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP). In January 2019, the Ecumenical Patriarch recognized an autocephalous Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), which incorporated both the Kyiv Patriarchate and a smaller self-declared Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church.93

Observers consider the OCU's development to be a long-term process. As of July 2019, less than 5% of the Moscow-subordinated parishes in Ukraine had formally transferred their allegiance to the OCU.94 In recent months, the pace of transferring parishes has slowed. Observers attribute this shift to a combination of ROC opposition and parish reluctance, as well as the OCU's internal strife: three months after the establishment of the OCU, the UOC-KP's former spiritual leader, Patriarch Emeritus Filaret, attempted to reestablish the UOC-KP under his authority (Filaret had agreed not to serve as the OCU's Metropolitan).95 Other Orthodox Churches have yet to recognize the OCU.

Russia strongly opposes Ukrainian autocephaly and claims that it threatens the religious freedom and safety of ROC parishioners.96 Ukrainian officials and some observers have cautioned that Russia could use such allegations to justify new interventions.97 U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo has called the granting of autocephaly "a historic achievement" and encouraged "government and Church officials to promote tolerance and respect for the freedom of members of all religious affiliations to worship as they choose."98

In November 2018, Russian coast guard vessels in the Black Sea forcibly prevented two small Ukrainian naval vessels and a tugboat from passing through the Kerch Strait and reportedly fired upon the vessels as they were departing the area (see Figure 2).131 Russian authorities detained the ships and their crew and took them to the town of Kerch, in Crimea. The sailors were arrested and placed in pretrial detention on charges of illegally crossing what Russia referred to as its state border (i.e., territorial waters around occupied Crimea). Ukraine and its international partners considered the incident to be a major violation of international law and an escalation in Russia's efforts to control maritime access to eastern Ukraine.132

The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights considered the 24 Ukrainian sailors to be prisoners of war.133 On May 25, 2019, the U.N.-established International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea issued an order requiring Russia to release the sailors and ships.134 Although the Russian government said it did not recognize the tribunal's authority in this matter, it released the sailors as part of a prisoner exchange in September 2019 and returned the heavily damaged ships to Ukraine two months later.

Economy

As part of the Soviet Union, Ukraine was responsible for a large share of the country's agricultural and industrial production. The Soviet Union's collapse led to a severe economic contraction: Ukraine's gross domestic product (GDP) reportedly dropped by over 60% from 1989 to 1999.99135 Ukraine's economy recovered for much of the 2000s but was hit hard by the 2008-2009 global recession, with GDP declining by almost 15% in 2009financial crisis; in 2009, its GDP declined by almost 15%. After returning to growth in 2010-2011, the economy stagnated in 2012-2013 and then again declined after Russia's 2014 invasion, with; GDP fallingfell by 7% in 2014 and 10% in 2015.100136

In recent years, Ukraine's economy has shown signs of stabilization, due in part to international assistance, including about $1013 billion in loans from the IMF.101 GDP IMF loan disbursements.137 GDP annual growth was about 2.4% a year 5% in 2016-2017 and 3.3% in 2018. The IMF forecasts annual growth of about 2.7%-3.1% from 2019 to 2021.

Poverty has declined in recent years, although it remains higher than before Russia's 2014 invasion. The World Bank estimates that the percentage of Ukrainians living in moderate poverty was 16% in 2018, down from a height of 27% in 2016 (but up from 14% in 2013).102 The official unemployment rate for 2018 was about 9%. About 20% of Ukrainian laborers work in agriculture, a sector of the economy that accounts for about 10% of GDP.103

Ukraine's economy depends in part on remittances from labor migration. From 2015 to 2018, remittances made up about 10% of Ukraine's GDP. In 2017, Russia was estimated to be the source of more than 50% of Ukrainian remittances, followed by the United States (8%) and Germany (5%).104

Trade

In 2013, Russia, Ukraine's largest trading partner,2% in 2018-2019. In the last two years, observers noted several positive trends in Ukraine's economy. These trends included declining inflation, rising incomes, growing retail trade, increased agricultural exports, and (in 2019) growing international reserves and a strengthening currency, in part due to an increase of foreign investment in Ukraine's sovereign bonds.138

Nonetheless, Ukraine faces many economic challenges, and the coronavirus pandemic has worsened the country's economic outlook. In early March 2020, President Zelensky cited concerns about declining industrial production, contracting exports, and budgetary shortfalls (in part due to Ukraine's stronger currency) when he expressed support for a change in government. Subsequent challenges related to the coronavirus pandemic included rapid currency depreciation, rising borrowing costs, and a decrease of more than $2 billion in Ukraine's international reserves (from $27 billion) in March 2020.139 These developments led the government to intensify efforts to secure a new IMF program (see "Reform Challenges" above). The IMF estimates that Ukraine's GDP could decline by more than 7% in 2020 due to the coronavirus pandemic.140

Poverty in Ukraine has declined in recent years. The World Bank estimated that the percentage of Ukrainians living in moderate poverty was 15% in 2019, down from 27% in 2016.141 The official unemployment rate for 2019 was under 9%. About 20% of Ukrainian laborers work in agriculture, a sector of the economy that accounts for about 10% of GDP.142

Ukraine is the largest recipient of migrant remittances in Europe, according to the World Bank. From 2015 to 2019, remittances were equivalent to about 8% of Ukraine's annual GDP. Since 2016, Poland has been the largest source of remittances to Ukraine, followed by Russia, the Czech Republic, and the United States.143

Trade In 2013, Russia began to impose restrictions on trade in response to Ukraine's plans to conclude a free trade agreement with the EU. Further restrictions followed in 2014-2015, and Russia suspended its own free trade agreement with Ukraine in 2016. Ukraine also introduced trade restrictions against Russia. Excluding exports from occupied Crimea and nongovernment-controlled areas in eastern Ukraine, the total value of Ukraine's merchandise exports declined by 43% from 2013 to 2016, with the value of merchandise exports to Russia declining by 76%.105144

In 2017, Ukraine's overall merchandise trade started to recover. Trade with the EU, as a whole Ukraine's largest trading partner, made up about 42% of total trade in 2018.106 Individually, Ukraine's four largest merchandise trading partners were Russia ($11.8 billion, or 11% of Ukraine's trade), China ($9.8 billion, 9%), Germany ($8.2 billion, 8%), and Poland ($6.8 billion, 7%). The top three destinations for Ukraine's merchandise exports in 2018 were Russia (8%), Poland (7%), and Italy (6%), and its top three sources of imports were Russia (14%), China (13%), and Germany (10%). Ukraine's main exports were iron and steel, cereals, fats and oils, ores, and electrical machinery.

After severe declines in foreign direct investment (FDI) in 2013-2014, FDI inflows have partially recovered since 2015. According to official statistics, total FDI declined from $53.7 billion at the start of 2014 to $31.2 billion at the start of 2017 (and was $32.3 billion at the start of 2019). FDI inflows during 2018 amounted to $2.9 billion, mainly in finance (42%), wholesale and retail trade (21%), real estate (14%), and industry (11%). About two-thirds of FDI in 2018 came from the Netherlands (33%), Russia (17%), and Cyprus (17%).107

Energy

Ukraine has significant energy resources, but the sector traditionally has performed below its potential in an environment of low domestic energy prices, subsidies, and high consumption.108 After Russia's invasion, Ukraine's government began to reform the energy sector, including raising tariffs for households (while retaining subsidies for lower-income households). Observers commended Ukraine for initial energy reforms, although concerns arose among stakeholders that energy reforms slowed down in 2017.109 In 2018, observers noted some renewed progress, including another rise in gas prices and a commitment to the unbundling of Ukraine's state-owned energy company, Naftogaz, into separate production and transmission companies by the end of 2019. Preparations for the unbundling of Naftogaz continued through 2019, and Ukraine's new government has confirmed that the process will proceed.110

Ukraine has traditionally depended on Russia for its natural gas supplies. Many observers argue that Russia has used price hikes, debt repayments, and energy cutoffs as leverage in various disputes with Ukrainian governments.111 Since 2015, however, Ukraine has reduced its dependence on Russian gas imports. In 2013, 92% of Ukraine's natural gas imports came directly from Russia (51% of Ukraine's total gas consumption). By 2015, 37% of Ukraine's natural gas imports came from Russia (18% of consumption), and in 2016, Ukraine halted Russian gas imports entirely.112 In addition to reducing its gas consumption, Ukraine managed this reduction in Russian imports by importing gas from Slovakia, as well as from Poland and Hungary (all of which import gas from Russia).113

In recent years, Russia has sought to reduce the amount of its gas that flows through Ukraine to Europe by working with various countries to build pipelines that bypass Ukraine. Before the 2011 opening of the first Nord Stream gas pipeline connecting Russia directly to Germany via the Baltic Sea, most of Russia's natural gas exports to Europe transited Ukraine. Currently, about 40%-50% of these exports transit Ukraine.114 According to Naftogaz, the company's operating profit for gas transit was over $900 million in 2016 and $535 million in 2017.115 The current gas transit contract between Ukraine and Russia expires at the end of 2019.

In February 2018, a Swedish arbitration court issued a final ruling on several disputes between Naftogaz and Russia's state-owned gas company Gazprom about their earlier gas trade. Combined, the court's rulings required Gazprom to pay Naftogaz over $2.5 billion and required Naftogaz to buy 5 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year of Russian gas in 2018-2019 (about 10% of its previous contractual commitment). Gazprom said it would not supply gas to Ukraine and appealed the rulings.116

Russia is constructing a new Baltic pipeline, Nord Stream 2, with the financial support of several European energy companies.117 If the pipeline enters into operation, it is expected to further reduce Russian gas transit through Ukraine. This development would not necessarily increase Ukraine's vulnerability to energy supply cutoffs since, as noted above, Ukraine stopped importing natural gas directly from Russia in 2016; it could, however, increase Ukraine's strategic vulnerability, as Russia's dependence on Ukraine for gas transit would no longer be a potential constraining factor in its policies toward Ukraine.

In an April 2018 meeting with Russian President Putin, German Chancellor Angela Merkel addressed a chief concern of some critics by stating that Nord Stream 2 could not proceed without guarantees that Gazprom will continue to export gas through Ukraine. Merkel did not specify in what form such guarantees could be made. A 2019 modification to EU gas regulations, extending key principles such as third-party access and ownership unbundling to pipelines located in the offshore territorial waters of EU members, is likely to affect the ownership structure of Nord Stream 2 but might not prevent its completion. Germany and France stated that the change was to be "indispensable for a fruitful discussion on the future gas transit through Ukraine."118

U.S.-Ukraine Relations

U.S. relations with Ukraine are deep and multifaceted. In 1994, former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski justified U.S. engagement with the newly independent Ukraine by arguing that a strong Ukraine not only would benefit Ukrainians but also would help prevent the rise of a new Russian empire, bolstering regional and global security. "It cannot be stressed strongly enough that without Ukraine," Brzezinski said, "Russia ceases to be an empire, but with Ukraine suborned and then subordinated, Russia automatically becomes an empire."119

Less frequently cited are Brzezinki's 1994 assessment of Ukraine's fragility and theSince 2017, Ukraine's merchandise trade has grown. In 2019, Ukraine's total merchandise trade reached $111 billion (around 80% of the value of its total 2013 trade). Ukraine's main exports include cereals, iron and steel, sunflower oil, iron ore, electrical equipment and parts, and oil seeds. In 2019, Ukraine surpassed Russia to become the world's largest grain exporter (including corn, wheat, and barley).145

In 2019, Ukraine's largest merchandise trading partner was the EU, which accounted for about 41% of Ukraine's total trade.146 Individually, Ukraine's four largest trading partners were China ($12.8 billion, or 12% of Ukraine's trade), Russia ($10.2 billion, 9%), Germany ($8.4 billion, 8%), and Poland ($7.4 billion, 7%). The top three destinations for Ukraine's merchandise exports in 2019 were China (7%), Poland (7%), and Russia (6%), and its top three sources of imports were China (15%), Russia (11%), and Germany (10%).

After a severe decline in foreign direct investment (FDI) in 2014, FDI inflows recovered somewhat. According to official statistics, total FDI declined from $56.0 billion at the end of 2013 to $33.9 billion at the end of 2016. By the end of 2019, total FDI had risen to $39.2 billion. FDI inflows in 2018-2019 were mainly in finance, industry, wholesale and retail trade, and real estate. The top sources of FDI in 2018-2019 were Cyprus, the Netherlands, and Russia.147 Energy

Ukraine has significant energy resources, although the sector historically has performed below its potential, given an environment of low domestic energy prices, subsidies, high consumption, and corruption.148 Ukraine's primary energy mix consists of around 31% natural gas, 31% coal, and 23% nuclear.149 Ukraine currently produces around two-thirds of its total energy supply, including two-thirds of its natural gas and 55% of its coal.150

With regard to natural gas, prior to Russia's 2014 invasion, Ukraine depended on Russian imports for more than half its total consumption.151 Many observers contend that Russia traditionally has used gas price hikes, debt repayments, and cutoffs as leverage in disputes with various Ukrainian governments.152 After Russia's invasion, Ukraine's gas usage and, consequently, dependence on Russian gas declined, due to lower industrial production, the halting of gas supplies to nongovernment-controlled areas of eastern Ukraine, and higher tariffs.153 In 2016, Ukraine halted direct gas imports from Russia entirely, replacing them with supplies from Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary (all of which import gas from Russia).

After Russia's 2014 invasion, the Ukrainian government began to reform its energy sector, including raising tariffs for households (while retaining subsidies for lower-income consumers). Ongoing reform priorities include strengthening the independence of the energy regulator, increasing competition and transparency in the electricity sector, and facilitating private investment in oil and natural gas development.154

At the end of 2019, the Ukrainian government fulfilled a long-standing commitment to unbundle Ukraine's state-owned energy company, Naftogaz, into state-owned production and transmission companies. The unbundling is intended to align Ukraine's energy system with the EU's "Third Energy Package," an effort to liberalize and increase energy sector competition by separating ownership and control of gas supply and production activities, on the one hand, and delivery, on the other.155 The United States and the IMF also advocated for the unbundling.

Gas Transit to Europe

Ukraine is a transit state for Russian natural gas exports to Europe. In recent years, Russia has sought to reduce the amount of natural gas it transits through Ukraine. Before the 2011 opening of the first Nord Stream pipeline from Russia to Germany via the Baltic Sea, most of Russia's gas exports to Europe transited Ukraine. Since the opening of the first Nord Stream pipeline, about 40%-50% of these exports have transited Ukraine.156 In 2018, Ukrainian revenues from gas transit totaled $2.65 billion.157

Nord Stream 2, currently under construction, is a second Baltic Sea pipeline that runs parallel to Nord Stream.158 Prior to the December 2019 introduction of U.S. sanctions related to the construction of Nord Stream 2, the pipeline was scheduled for completion in early 2020. The pipeline currently is scheduled for completion by the end of 2020 or early 2021 (see "Sanctions Related to Russia's Invasion of Ukraine," below).

If Nord Stream 2 becomes operational, observers expect it to further reduce gas transit through Ukraine. This outcome would not necessarily increase Ukraine's vulnerability to energy supply cutoffs; Ukraine stopped importing natural gas directly from Russia in 2016. It could lead to declines in transit revenues, however, and it could increase Ukraine's strategic vulnerability, if reduced dependence for gas transit leads Moscow to be less constrained in its policies toward Ukraine.

On December 30, 2019, Gazprom, Naftogaz, and the new Gas Transmission System Operator of Ukraine (GTSOU) concluded a renewal contract for the transit of Russian natural gas to Europe from 2020 to 2024.159 The contract provides for transit of at least 65 billion cubic meters (BCM) of natural gas in 2020, a volume equal to about 73% of the 2019 volume of 89.6 BCM, and 40 BCM a year from 2021 to 2024, a volume equal to about 45% of the 2019 volume. According to Naftogaz, the contract will lead to at least $7.2 billion in transit revenue over five years. In addition, Gazprom agreed to accept the 2018 ruling of a Swedish arbitration court concerning several trade disputes with Naftogaz and paid the latter $2.9 billion in damages and interest.

Relations with the EU and NATO

Since 2014, the Ukrainian government has prioritized closer integration with the EU and NATO. In 2019, a new constitutional amendment declared the government responsible for implementing Ukraine's "strategic course" toward EU and NATO membership.160 Zelensky's first foreign trip as president was to Brussels, where he met with EU and NATO leaders and reaffirmed Ukraine's "strategic course to achieve full-fledged membership in the EU and NATO."161

The EU's main framework for political and economic engagement with Ukraine is an Association Agreement, which encourages harmonization with EU laws and regulations and includes a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA).162 According to the EU, the DCFTA "appears to be having a significant positive impact on trade in goods."163 In 2017, the EU granted Ukrainian citizens visa-free entry to the EU's Schengen area of free movement, which allows individuals to travel without passport checks between most European countries.

The EU is a major provider of foreign aid to Ukraine, totaling more than €13 billion (about $14.2 billion) in loans and €2 billion ($2.2 billion) in grants from 2014 to 2019. During this period, EU member states provided an additional €1.4 billion ($1.5 billion) in bilateral assistance.164 In April 2020, the EU announced it would provide more than €190 million ($205 million) in emergency support to Ukraine to address the coronavirus pandemic. The European Commission subsequently proposed another €1.2 billion ($1.3 billion) in macro-financial assistance to help "limit the economic fallout" of the pandemic.165

The EU has imposed sanctions on Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine. The EU also has supported Ukraine against Russia's maritime aggression near the Kerch Strait. In 2019, the EU announced an increase in tailored assistance to Ukraine "to help mitigate the impact of Russia's destabilizing actions in the Sea of Azov region."166

Ukraine has close relations with NATO. In 1994, Ukraine was the first post-Soviet state (excluding the Baltic states) to join NATO's Partnership for Peace. A NATO-Ukraine Commission, established in 1997, provides the framework for cooperation. Under ex-President Yanukovych, Ukraine adopted a non-bloc (i.e., nonaligned) status, rejecting aspirations of NATO membership, but invited NATO to launch a Defense Education Enhancement Program and participated in the NATO Response Force, a rapid reaction force. After Russia's 2014 invasion, Ukraine's parliament rejected its non-bloc status and, in 2017, voted to make cooperation with NATO a foreign policy priority.167 In February 2020, Ukraine's minister of defense said NATO was considering Ukraine's request to become an Enhanced Opportunity Partner, a cooperative status currently granted to five of NATO's close strategic partners.168

Ukraine supports NATO peacekeeping and maritime operations. Ukrainian forces have long contributed to the NATO-led Kosovo Force. Ukraine contributes to the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan and participated in the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, the counterterrorism Operation Active Endeavour maritime mission, and the antipiracy Operation Ocean Shield. In addition, Ukraine has supported NATO's maritime Sea Guardian operation.

At a 2016 summit in Warsaw, NATO pledged additional training and technical support for the Ukrainian military and endorsed a Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP). The CAP includes "tailored capability and capacity building measures ... to enhance Ukraine's resilience against a wide array of threats, including hybrid threats."169 In addition, NATO established six trust funds "working in critical areas of reform and capability development in Ukraine's security and defense sector."170 NATO members and partners provide training to the Ukrainian armed forces in a multinational framework (see "Foreign and Military Aid," above).

Many observers contend that closer integration with the EU and NATO has not enabled Ukraine to improve its near-term prospects for membership in these organizations. According to recent polls, over half of Ukrainians support membership in the EU (polls do not include occupied Crimea or Russian-controlled areas of eastern Ukraine).171 The EU is unlikely to consider Ukraine a candidate for membership soon, however, given Ukraine's domestic challenges, the conflict with Russia, the EU's own internal challenges, and the lack of support for further enlargement among many EU members.

Ukraine also faces a challenge to NATO membership. In 2008, NATO members agreed that Ukraine and Georgia "will become" members of NATO, but Ukraine has not been granted a clear path to membership.172 Most observers believe NATO will not move forward with membership as long as Russia occupies Ukrainian territory and the conflict remains unresolved. Ukrainians themselves remain divided over NATO membership. Since 2014, about 40%-50% of opinion poll respondents support membership in NATO (compared to about 25%-40% against); these polls do not include occupied Crimea and Russian-controlled areas of eastern Ukraine, where support for NATO membership likely would be lower even in the absence of conflict.173 U.S.-Ukraine Relations U.S. relations with Ukraine are deep and multifaceted. In 1994, former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski justified U.S. engagement with the newly independent Ukraine by arguing that a strong Ukraine would not only benefit Ukrainians but also help prevent the rise of a new Russian empire, bolstering regional and global security. "It cannot be stressed strongly enough that without Ukraine," Brzezinski said, "Russia ceases to be an empire, but with Ukraine suborned and then subordinated, Russia automatically becomes an empire."174 Less frequently cited are Brzezinki's 1994 assessment of Ukraine's fragility and his ensuing policy prescriptions, which successive U.S. administrations appear to have followed:

American policymakers must face the fact that Ukraine is on the brink of disaster: the economy is in a free-fall, while Crimea is on the verge of a Russia-abetted ethnic explosion. Either crisis might be exploited to promote the breakup or the reintegration of Ukraine in a larger Moscow-dominated framework. It is urgent and essential that the United States convince the Ukrainian government—through the promise of substantial economic assistance—to adopt long-delayed and badly needed economic reforms. At the same time, American political assurances for Ukraine's independence and territorial integrity should be forthcoming.120

Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity

175

Soon after Brzezinki's article was published, the United States provided "political assurances" to Ukraine with the signing of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum (see "Crimea," above). Twenty years later, after Russia's 2014 invasion of Ukraine, U.S. officials came to express more emphatically and frequently U.S. support for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders. In recent years, Trump Administration officials have called this policy "unbending," "unwavering," and "ironclad."121

U.S. support for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity applies as much to Crimea as it does to the nongovernment-controlled areas in eastern Ukraine. In February 2018,

In 2019, U.S. relations with Ukraine became a prominent issue in U.S. domestic political affairs. On September 24, 2019, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi announced that the House would begin an impeachment inquiry related in part to alleged presidential actions regarding Ukraine.176 On December 18, 2019, the House of Representatives agreed to H.Res. 755, which impeached President Trump on charges of abuse of power (Article I) and obstruction of Congress (Article II).177 The first article of impeachment in part accused the President of

soliciting the Government of Ukraine to publicly announce investigations that would benefit his reelection, harm the election prospects of a political opponent, and influence the 2020 United States Presidential election to his advantage. President Trump also sought to pressure the Government of Ukraine to take these steps by conditioning official United States Government acts of significant value to Ukraine on its public announcement of the investigations.

President Trump and White House officials acknowledged the President's interest in Ukrainian investigations but said those interests were tied to legitimate concerns. White House officials generally denied that U.S. government acts had been contingent on an announcement of such investigations.178 Other U.S. officials presented their views during the impeachment inquiry. On February 5, 2020, the Senate adjudged that President Trump was not guilty as charged in the two articles of impeachment (for more, see "Foreign and Military Aid," below).

Security Trump Administration officials have called U.S. support for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity "unbending," "unwavering," and "ironclad."179 This applies to both occupied Crimea and the Russian-controlled areas in eastern Ukraine. In February 2018, then-Deputy Secretary of State John J. Sullivan said in Kyiv that "Crimea is Ukraine.... We will never accept trading one region of Ukraine for another. We will never make a deal about Ukraine without Ukraine."122180 In July 2018, Secretary Pompeo issued the "Crimea Declaration," which

reaffirms as policy [the United States'] refusal to recognize the Kremlin's claims of sovereignty over territory seized by force in contravention of international law. In concert with allies, partners, and the international community, the United States rejects Russia's attempted annexation of Crimea and pledges to maintain this policy until Ukraine's territorial integrity is restored.123181

The Crimea Declaration explicitly links U.S. policy toward Crimea to the Welles Declaration of 1940, which marked the start of a U.S. policy not to recognize the Soviet Union's annexation of the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania).124

U.S. officials frequently call attention to Russia's human rights violations in occupied Crimea. In March 2018, the State Department stated that in Crimea "Russia has engaged in a campaign of coercion and violence, targeting anyone opposed to its attempted annexation [including] Crimean Tatars, ethnic Ukrainians, pro-Ukrainian activists, civil society members, and independent journalists."125 In February 2019, Secretary Pompeo said "the United States remains gravely concerned by the worsening repression by Russia's occupation regime in Crimea" and "calls on Russia to release all of the Ukrainians, including members of the Crimean Tatar community, it has imprisoned in retaliation for their peaceful dissent."126

The United States is equally supportive of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity with respect to the nongovernment-controlled areas in eastern Ukraine. The United States supports the efforts of the Normandy Four and the Trilateral Contact Group to implement the Minsk agreements, particularly through the office of the U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations. Appointed in July 2017, Special Representative Kurt Volker holds discussions with Ukrainian and other government officials; promotes implementation of the Minsk agreements; and regularly publicizes the status of the conflict, settlement efforts, and humanitarian consequences.127

For a time, the U.S. Special Representative established a bilateral channel with a Russian counterpart. From August 2017 to January 2018, Special Representative Volker and Russian Presidential Aide Vladislav Surkov held four meetings, at which they discussed, among other issues, the possible deployment of international peacekeepers to the nongovernment-controlled areas of eastern Ukraine.128 Russia proposed the deployment of peacekeepers along the line of contact, while the U.S. government supported Ukraine's call for a peacekeeping mission throughout the areas as a means to establish the security conditions necessary to implement Minsk-2's package of measures.129 After these discussions, Russia declined to hold a follow-on meeting for much of 2018. Plans for a new meeting were postponed (on the U.S. side) after Russia's use of force against Ukrainian naval vessels in November 2018 and (on the Russian side) during Ukraine's 2019 election campaign season.130

The United States has criticized Russia repeatedly for failing to fulfill its commitments under the Minsk agreements. In October 2018, the State Department stated that Ukraine's law on special status for the nongovernment-controlled areas of eastern Ukraine "demonstrates Ukraine's continued commitment to a peaceful resolution of the conflict" and "stands in sharp comparison to Russia's continued failure to fulfill its Minsk commitments."131 The State Department condemned the November 2018 "sham elections" in the nongovernment-controlled areas and called for the dismantling of the so-called DPR and LPR as "having no place within the Minsk agreements or within Ukraine's constitutional government."132 The State Department similarly condemned the Russian government's April 2019 decision to facilitate the granting of Russian citizenship to residents of Donetsk and Luhansk.133

Maritime and Energy Security

The United States supports Ukraine against Russian efforts to tighten control over the Kerch Strait and Sea of Azov. In May 2018, several months before Russia's attack on the Ukrainian vessels, the State Department condemned Russia's construction of a bridge to Crimea, which, it182

The Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (CRIEEA) states that it is the policy of the United States "to never recognize the illegal annexation of Crimea by the Government of the Russian Federation or the separation of any portion of Ukrainian territory through the use of military force" (§257).183

Since FY2015, foreign operations appropriations have prohibited foreign assistance to governments that take "affirmative steps" to support Russia's annexation of Crimea and have restricted funds from implementing policies and actions that would recognize Russian sovereignty over Crimea (P.L. 116-94, §7047(b)).

U.S. officials frequently call attention to Russia's human rights abuses in occupied Crimea. In March 2018, the State Department stated that in Crimea, "Russia has engaged in a campaign of coercion and violence, targeting anyone opposed to its attempted annexation [including] Crimean Tatars, ethnic Ukrainians, pro-Ukrainian activists, civil society members, and independent journalists."184 In September 2019, the State Department welcomed Russia's release of 35 Ukrainians as part of an exchange of detained persons but called on Russia "to immediately release all other Ukrainians, including members of the Crimean Tatar community, who remain unjustly imprisoned."185

With regard to the Russian-controlled areas in eastern Ukraine, the U.S. government supports Ukraine's efforts to pursue a diplomatic solution to the conflict and has criticized Russia for failing to fulfill its commitments under the Minsk agreements (see "Conflict Resolution Process," above).186 During a media appearance with Zelensky in New York in September 2019, President Trump said he hoped Zelensky and Putin could "get together and ... solve [their] problem. That would be a tremendous achievement."187

The United States supports Ukraine against Russia's efforts to tighten control over the Kerch Strait and Sea of Azov. In May 2018, several months before Russia's attack on Ukrainian naval vessels, the State Department condemned Russia's construction of a bridge to Crimea, which, the State Department said, "represents not only an attempt by Russia to solidify its unlawful seizure and its occupation of Crimea, but also impedes navigation" and "serves as a reminder of Russia's ongoing willingness to flout international law."134 Since188 In November 2018, Secretary Pompeo and other U.S. officials have responded to Russia's use of force by calling on Russia to free Ukraine's sailors, return the vessels, and restore freedom of passage through the Kerch Strait.135

189

The United States supports Ukraine's energy security. The Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (CRIEEA; Title II of P.L. 115-44, Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act [CAATSA]; 22 U.S.C. 9501 et seq.) against Russian efforts to reduce Ukraine's role as a transit state for natural gas exports. CRIEEA states that it is U.S. policy to "continue to oppose the Nord Stream 2 pipeline given its detrimental impacts on the EU's energy security, gas market development in Central and Eastern Europe, and energy reforms in Ukraine."" (§257). In November 2018, Secretary Pompeo said that Nord Stream 2 "undermines Ukraine's economic and strategic security and risks further compromising the sovereignty of European nations that depend on Russian gas."136

Domestic Reforms

The United States also actively promotes the continuation and consolidation of domestic reforms in Ukraine. In February 2018, Deputy Secretary Sullivan said that "Ukraine has great, untapped potential" and that the U.S. interest is served by "a stable democratic, prosperous and free Ukraine [that] will be less vulnerable to external threats and serve as a beacon to other nations facing Russian aggression."137 Since 2018, expressions of U.S. support for Ukrainian reforms include the following:

  • In March 2017, then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson called on the Ukrainian government "to redouble its efforts to implement challenging reforms, including uprooting corruption, increasing transparency in the judicial system, strengthening the banking sector, and pursuing corporate governance reform and the privatization of state-owned enterprises." He said that "[i]t serves no purpose for Ukraine to fight for its body in Donbas if it loses its soul to corruption."138
  • In February 2018, the State Department stated that "there is still more work needed to fulfill the promise of the [Maidan] and unlock Ukraine's potential." The statement called on "Ukraine's leaders to redouble their efforts to implement the deep, comprehensive and timely reforms that are necessary to build the stable, democratic, prosperous, and free country Ukrainians deserve."139
  • In March 2019, then-U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Marie Yovanovitch stated that "Ukraine's once-in-a-generation opportunity for change ... has not yet resulted in the anti-corruption or rule of law reforms that Ukrainians expect or deserve."140

In supporting Ukraine's reform efforts, the U.S. government has urged the implementation of specific measures and criticized perceived backsliding. Since 2018, examples include the following:

  • In February 2018, Deputy Secretary Sullivan delivered a speech in Kyiv focused, in part, on Ukraine's anti-corruption reforms. He emphasized the importance of strengthening Ukraine's National Anti-Corruption Bureau and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office, as well as the need to stand up an "independent and successful" Anti-Corruption Court. He also commended Ukraine for "bold education, healthcare, and pension reforms" and "deregulating certain business sectors and increasing tax transparency."141
  • In June 2018, the State Department commended Ukraine for establishing an independent Anti-Corruption Court and expressed support for the IMF's recommendation to "quickly amend the law so the proposed court will be able to hear all cases under its jurisdiction, including existing corruption cases."142
  • In July 2018, the State Department "welcome[d]" Ukraine's Law on National Security as "consistent with Western principles" and noted that it provided "a framework for increasing the Ukrainian Armed Forces' NATO interoperability" and would "further deepen Ukraine's Western integration."143
  • In July 2018, the State Department was "pleased to note" the Ukrainian government's commitment to unbundle Naftogaz and create a gas transmission system operator that would "function under anti-corruption and corporate governance standards." The State Department stated that the unbundling of Naftogaz would represent "a positive step for Ukraine as an important transit country for gas delivered to Europe, and also for European energy security more broadly."144
  • In March 2019, then-U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Yovanovitch criticized the Constitutional Court decision removing the criminal status of "illicit enrichment," calling it "a serious setback in the fight against corruption." She called for a "new and better" amendment to the criminal code and the replacement of the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor "to ensure the integrity of anticorruption institutions."145

Foreign Aid

Since independence, Ukraine has been a leading recipient of U.S. foreign and military aid in Europe and Eurasia. In the 1990s (FY1992-FY2000), the U.S. government provided almost $2.6 billion in total aid to Ukraine ($287 million a year, on average).146 In the 2000s (FY2001 to FY2009), total aid to Ukraine amounted to almost $1.8 billion ($199 million a year, on average).147190 The FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA; P.L. 116-92) includes the Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act of 2019 (PEESA; Title LXXV), which established sanctions related to the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline (see "Sanctions Related to Russia's Invasion of Ukraine," below).191

U.S. Concerns About Technology Transfer to China: Case of Motor Sich

Since 2018, U.S. officials reportedly have sought to deter Ukraine from approving the sale to Chinese companies of Motor Sich, a privately-owned Ukrainian company that is a major producer of airplane and helicopter engines. The issue reportedly was a subject of discussion during an August 2019 visit to Ukraine by then-National Security Council Advisor John Bolton. U.S. concerns about the sale relate to the transfer of sensitive technologies that could boost Chinese domestic military production and cooperation with Russia. U.S. officials have warned Ukraine that the sale could lead China to displace Ukraine as a leading aircraft engine exporter.

U.S. concerns date back to 2017, when Ukrainian court documents revealed that a Chinese company had acquired majority ownership of Motor Sich. A Ukrainian court froze 41% of the Chinese-owned shares after the Security Service of Ukraine said the company was intending to move Motor Sich's assets abroad. Earlier in 2017, a Ukrainian official announced a planned $250 million Chinese investment in Motor Sich, as well as plans to develop a plant in Chongqing, China, to "produce and service aircraft engines based on Ukrainian technologies."

In 2019, media reports stated that the Ukrainian government had tentatively agreed with two Chinese companies on the purchase of Motor Sich. The agreement allegedly would grant the companies a majority stake, while state-owned defense production agency Ukroboronprom would receive a blocking stake of at least 25%. As of April 2020, Ukraine's Anti-Monopoly Committee reportedly was reviewing the agreement. Media reports indicate that U.S. companies recently have explored the possibility of purchasing Motor Sich.

Sources: Centre for Transport Strategies, "Motor Sich Planning Factory in China and Investment of USD 250 Million in Ukrainian Production Facilities," May 17, 2017; Askold Krushelnycky, "Washington Worries Over Kyiv Defense Ties to China," Kyiv Post, September 14, 2018; Brett Forrest, "U.S. Aims to Block Chinese Acquisition of Ukrainian Aerospace Company," Wall Street Journal, August 23, 2019; Todd Prince, "'Serious American' Companies Studying Purchase of Ukraine Motor Sich, U.S. Diplomat Says," RFE/RL, December 27, 2019; Natalia Zinets, "Ukraine Court Rejects Chinese Appeal in Aerospace Deal Opposed by Washington," Reuters, April 17, 2020.

Reforms

The United States has promoted domestic reforms in Ukraine since Ukraine's Revolution of Dignity. In the Obama Administration, officials criticized the Yanukovych government for suppressing the Euromaidan protests and said the United States "stands with the Ukrainian people in solidarity in their struggle for fundamental human rights and a more accountable government."192 The Obama Administration supported a negotiated resolution to Ukraine's domestic crisis and the establishment of an interim government before Yanukovych fled to Russia in February 2014.

During Poroshenko's presidency, the Obama Administration supported a wide range of governance and economic reforms in Ukraine, including the establishment of new anti-corruption institutions.193 Then-Vice President Joseph Biden led "the Administration's effort to support a sovereign, democratic Ukraine," visiting Kyiv several times after the Revolution of Dignity to express solidarity with Ukraine and to promote domestic reforms.194 In 2015, Biden reportedly told Ukrainian officials the United States would withhold a $1 billion loan guarantee (the third since 2014) if Ukraine's then-Prosecutor General Viktor Shokin did not resign.195 U.S. and European officials had criticized the prosecutor general's office for hindering corruption investigations, including an investigation of an ex-Ukrainian official who reportedly controlled Burisma Group, a Ukrainian natural gas company (for more on U.S. aid, see "Foreign and Military Aid," below).196

Trump Administration officials have continued to support domestic reforms in Ukraine. In 2017, then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson called on the Ukrainian government "to redouble its efforts to implement challenging reforms, including uprooting corruption, increasing transparency in the judicial system, strengthening the banking sector, and pursuing corporate governance reform and the privatization of state-owned enterprises."197 In 2018, then-Deputy Secretary Sullivan emphasized the importance of strengthening the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office, as well as the need to stand up an "independent and successful" Anti-Corruption Court.198 In 2019, then-U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Marie Yovanovitch criticized the Constitutional Court decision removing the criminal status of "illicit enrichment," calling it "a serious setback in the fight against corruption." She called for a "new and better" amendment to the criminal code and the replacement of the anti-corruption prosecutor "to ensure the integrity of anticorruption institutions." 199

In September 2019, Vice President Mike Pence met with President Zelensky in Warsaw, Poland. According to the White House, Vice President Pence "commended [Zelensky] for his government's efforts to introduce bold reform legislation to combat corruption and improve the business climate to encourage foreign investment." In a subsequent telephone conversation, Vice President Pence "offered full U.S. support for those efforts."200

Foreign and Military Aid Since independence, Ukraine has been a leading recipient of U.S. foreign and military aid in Europe and Eurasia. In the 1990s (FY1992-FY2000), the U.S. government provided almost $2.6 billion in total aid to Ukraine ($287 million a year, on average).201 In the 2000s (FY2001 to FY2009), total aid to Ukraine amounted to almost $1.8 billion ($199 million a year, on average).202 In the five years before Russia's 2014 invasion of Ukraine (FY2010 to FY2014), State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) assistance (including foreign military financing) totaled about $105 million a year, on average. Separate nonproliferation and threat reduction assistance administered by the Departments of Energy and Defense amounted to an average of over $130 million a year in obligated funds.148

203

Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the United States has provided higher levels of annual assistance to Ukraine. Nonmilitary, non-humanitarian development aid totaled an average of $320 aid averaged about $321 million a year from FY2015 to FY2018.149 FY2019.204 In addition, the United StatesU.S. government has provided a total of more than $239 million in humanitarian assistance since FY2014 to assist internally displaced persons (IDPs) and other victims of conflict.205 The United States also has provided three $1 billion loan guarantees to Ukraine from 2014 to 2016.150.206 For FY2019FY2020, Congress appropriated $327.8330.1 million in nonmilitary aid. The President's FY2020FY2021 nonmilitary aid request for Ukraine was $198.6 million, and the House Appropriations Committee recommended $327.8199 million.151

The United States provides separate humanitarian assistance to Ukraine in cooperation with UNHCR and other countries to assist internally displaced persons (IDPs) and other victims of conflict. As of June 2019, USAID reported a total of more than $200 million in humanitarian assistance provided to Ukraine since 2014.152

Military Aid

The United States provides substantial military assistance to Ukraine. In June 2019, the Department of Defense stated that the United States had provided $1.5 billion in total security (mostly military) assistance since the Ukraine conflict began in 2014 (on average, about $300 million a year).153 U.S. military assistance to Ukraine has included, in part, foreign military financing (which reached $115 million in FY2019), as well as emergency and reprogrammed aid during FY2014 and FY2015.

U.S. military assistance also includes the Department of Defense-managed Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (P.L. 114-113, §9014), which Congress established in FY2016. The Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative provides "appropriate security assistance and intelligence support" to support Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity and to help it defend against further aggression. From FY2016 to FY2019, Congress appropriated $850 million for this initiative. FY2020 appropriations, as passed by the House (H.R. 2740), would provide another $250 million. FY2019 funds for military assistance, which had not been obligated by the start of September 2019, were released in mid-September 2019 after some Members of Congress expressed concern about authority for this funding potentially expiring at the end of the fiscal year.154

In June 2019, the Department of Defense said the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative's FY2019 allocation of $250 million would

provide equipment to support ongoing training programs and operational needs, including capabilities to enhance: maritime situational awareness and operations as part of ongoing U.S. efforts to increase support for Ukraine's Navy and Naval Infantry; the defensive capacity and survivability of Ukraine's Land and Special Operations Forces through the provision of sniper rifles, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, and counter-artillery radars; command and control; electronic warfare detection and secure communications; military mobility; night vision; and, military medical treatment.155

The Trump Administration has provided major defensive lethal weaponry to Ukraine. During the Obama Administration, arguments against the provision of lethal assistance centered on Russia's ability and willingness to steadily escalate conflict in response.156 In August 2017, then-U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis said in Kyiv that the Trump Administration was "actively reviewing" the question of lethal assistance.157 In 2018, the State Department approved a foreign military sale of 210 Javelin portable anti-tank missiles, as well as launchers, associated equipment, and training, at a total estimated cost of $47 million. According to media reports, the missiles are stored away from the frontline.158

The United States also provides military training assistance. Since 2015, U.S. forces have advised and assisted Ukrainian forces as part of the Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine (JMTG-U), which also has included military trainers from Canada, Denmark, Lithuania, Poland, Sweden, and the UK (see "Yavoriv Combat Training Center" text box, below). In addition to the JMTG-U, a Multinational Joint Commission on Defense Reform and Security Cooperation serves as an advisory body that "assesses Ukrainian requirements and prioritizes training, equipment, and advisory initiatives."159 In September 2016, then-U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter and Ukrainian Minister of Defense Stepan Poltorak signed a framework document "to enhance the defense capacity of Ukraine's forces, advance critical Ukrainian defense reforms, improve resource management processes, and boost defense technology cooperation."160

The United States and Ukraine host annual joint military exercises in Ukraine with the participation of NATO allies and partners. Sea Breeze, a maritime exercise, has been held regularly since 1997; the exercise "seeks to build combined capability and capacity to ensure maritime regional security and foster stronger friendships among partnering nations."161 Another exercise, Rapid Trident, has been held annually since 2011. Originally a peacekeeping exercise for NATO and Partnership for Peace members, Rapid Trident has evolved to serve as the "validation" for Ukrainian armed forces undergoing training at the Yavoriv Combat Training Center "under the advisement of allied and partner nations."162 In 2018, Ukraine hosted a new U.S.-sponsored multinational air force exercise, Clear Sky 2018.163

Yavoriv Combat Training Center

Since 2015, U.S. and other allied

The United States also has provided military assistance to Ukraine: more than $1.6 billion since Russia's 2014 invasion.207 In addition to bilateral foreign military financing ($115 million appropriated annually in FY2019 and FY2020), U.S. assistance includes the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI; P.L. 114-92, §1250), which provides security assistance to support Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity and to help Ukraine defend against further aggression. From FY2016 to FY2020, Congress appropriated $1.1 billion for USAI. Ukraine also has received security assistance through additional Department of Defense and other accounts, including emergency and reprogrammed aid in 2014-2015, the European Deterrence (formerly Reassurance) Initiative, the Global Security Contingency Fund, Section 333 (Building Partner Capacity), and regional Foreign Military Financing (FMF).

The Obama Administration provided nonlethal security assistance to Ukraine, due to concerns about potential conflict escalation.208 Such assistance included "body armor, helmets, vehicles, night and thermal vision devices, heavy engineering equipment, advanced radios, patrol boats, rations, tents, counter-mortar radars, uniforms, first aid equipment and supplies, and other related items."209

The Trump Administration has provided nonlethal aid to Ukraine and has provided major defensive lethal weaponry. Security assistance has included

equipment to support ongoing training programs and operational needs, including capabilities to enhance: maritime situational awareness and operations as part of ongoing U.S. efforts to increase support for Ukraine's Navy and Naval Infantry; the defensive capacity and survivability of Ukraine's Land and Special Operations Forces through the provision of sniper rifles, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, and counter-artillery radars; command and control; electronic warfare detection and secure communications; military mobility; night vision; and, military medical treatment.210

In March 2018, the Department of Defense notified Congress of a Foreign Military Sale to Ukraine of 210 Javelin portable anti-tank missiles, as well as launchers, associated equipment, and training, at a total estimated cost of $47 million (to be paid through FMF).211 According to media reports, these missiles were to be stored away from the frontline.212

In October 2019, the Defense Department notified Congress of a second Foreign Military Sale to Ukraine of 150 Javelin missiles, at a total estimated cost of $39.2 million (reportedly paid for with national funds).213 The following month, the United States transferred two retired Coast Guard Island-class patrol boats to the Ukrainian navy. FY2020 USAI assistance reportedly includes at least one Mark VI patrol boat.214

Ukraine Aid and the U.S. Presidential Impeachment

In August and September 2019, some Members of Congress expressed concern about a reported hold of security assistance funds to Ukraine that were to expire at the end of the fiscal year (September 30, 2019).a The Department of Defense had notified Congress of its intent to obligate a total of $250 million in Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) funds in February 2019 and May 2019. The Administration released the USAI funds on September 12, 2019. In addition, the State Department notified Congress of its intent to obligate $141.5 million in Foreign Military Financing for Ukraine on September 11, 2019.b

Questions persisted about the hold, especially after media reports alleged that a whistleblower complaint received by the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community in August 2019 was related to presidential communications regarding Ukraine.c After the Acting Director of National Intelligence (DNI) declined to transmit the complaint to Congress, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi announced on September 24, 2019, that the House would start an impeachment inquiry. The next day, the White House released a memorandum of a July 25, 2019, telephone conversation between President Trump and President Zelensky; in addition, the Office of the DNI provided Congress with a declassified version of the whistleblower complaint.

The December 2019 articles of impeachment in part accused the President of linking security aid and a head of state White House meeting to an agreement by the Ukrainian government to announce investigations into two matters: (1) what President Trump alleged was potential Ukrainian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election and (2) the role of then-Vice President Joseph Biden in securing the removal from office of Ukraine's then-Prosecutor General Viktor Shokin in 2016 (see "Reforms," above).

President Trump and White House officials said the hold on Ukraine's security aid had been in place while they assessed Zelensky's commitment to combatting corruption and the amount of aid European states were providing to Ukraine.d In January 2020, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded that the withholding of aid by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) was a violation of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. The OMB, which in December 2019 stated that the hold had been a legal "pause in obligations," said that it "disagree[d] with GAO's opinion."e

Sources: a Caitlin Emma and Connor O'Brien, "Trump Holds Up Ukraine Military Aid Meant to Confront Russia," Politico, August 28, 2019; U.S. Senator Rob Portman, "Portman, Shaheen Lead Bipartisan Ukraine Caucus Leadership Letter Urging Trump Administration to Release Military Security Assistance Funds for Ukraine," press release, September 3, 2019; U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, "Three House Committees Launch Wide-Ranging Investigation into Trump-Giuliani Ukraine Scheme," press release, September 9, 2019.

b Caitlin Emma et al., "Trump Administration Backs Off Hold on Ukraine Military Aid," Politico, September 12, 2019.

c Ellen Nakashima et al., "Whistleblower Complaint About President Trump Involves Ukraine, According to Two People Familiar with the Matter," Washington Post, September 19, 2019.

d See, for example, White House, "Remarks by Vice President Pence and President Duda of Poland in Joint Press Conference," September 2, 2019; White House, "Remarks by President Trump and President Niinistö of the Republic of Finland in Joint Press Conference," October 2, 2019; White House, "Remarks by Vice President Pence in a Press Gaggle," October 10, 2019; New York Times, "Read Mulvaney's Conflicting Statements on Quid Pro Quo," October 17, 2019.

e Office of Management and Budget, "OMB OGC Letter to GAO on Authority to Pause Obligation of Ukraine Funds," December 11, 2019; U.S. Government Accountability Office, Office of Management and Budget—Withholding of Ukraine Security Assistance, B-331564, January 16, 2020; Andrew Duehren, "Hold on Ukraine Aid Violated Law, Nonpartisan Watchdog Finds," Wall Street Journal, January 16, 2020.

Since 2015, U.S. forces have provided training and mentoring to members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces as part of the Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine, which also has included military trainers from Canada, Denmark, Lithuania, Poland, Sweden, and the UK (see "Yavoriv Combat Training Center" text box, below). In addition, a Multinational Joint Commission on Defense Reform and Security Cooperation serves as an advisory body that "assesses Ukrainian requirements and prioritizes training, equipment, and advisory initiatives."215

The United States and Ukraine host regular joint military exercises in Ukraine with the participation of NATO allies and partners. Sea Breeze, a maritime exercise, has been held regularly since 1997; the exercise "seeks to build combined capability and capacity to ensure maritime regional security and foster stronger friendships among partnering nations."216 Another exercise, Rapid Trident, has been held annually since 2011. Originally a peacekeeping exercise for NATO and Partnership for Peace members, Rapid Trident has evolved to serve as the "validation" for Ukrainian armed forces undergoing training at the Yavoriv Combat Training Center "under the advisement of allied and partner nations."217 In 2018, Ukraine hosted a new U.S.-sponsored multinational air force exercise, Clear Sky 2018.218

Yavoriv Combat Training Center

Since 2015, U.S., allied, and partner forces have provided training and mentoring to members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces as part of the Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine (JMTG-U), based at the Yavoriv Combat Training Center in the western Ukrainian region of Lviv. The combat training center is "co-located" with Ukraine's International Center for Peacekeeping and Security, a preexisting multinational training center.

The U.S. training mission in Ukraine is overseen by U.S. Army Europe's 7th Army Training Command. Military trainers deployed to the JMTG-U and a predecessor mission (Fearless Guardian, which provided training to interior ministry troops) serve on rotational deployments. U.S. personnel have been drawn from the U.S. Army and National Guard, including

  • U.S. Army Europe's 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team (2015-2016)
  • California Army National Guard's 79th Infantry Brigade Combat Team (2016) (the California National Guard has a broad partnership with Ukraine through the National Guard's State Partnership Program)
  • U.S. Army's 2nd Infantry (now Armored) Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division (2016)
  • Oklahoma Army National Guard's 45th Infantry Brigade Combat Team (2017)
  • New York Army National Guard's 27th Infantry Brigade Combat Team (2017-2018)
  • Tennessee Army National Guard's 278th Armored Cavalry Regiment (2018-2019)
  • U.S. Army's 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) (2019)

The Ukrainian Armed Forces are expected to assume full training responsibility at the Yavoriv Combat Training Center in 2020.

  • Wisconsin Army National Guard's 32nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team (2019-2020)
  • Sources: Andrew Roth, "U.S. Army Trainers Arrive in Ukraine," New York Times, April 17, 2015; Capt. Russell Gordon, "Progress Made on Ukrainian Military Reform as Fearless Guardian II's First Rotation Nears End," U.S. Army, February 4, 2016; Oriana Pawlyk, "California Guard May Send More Troops to Ukraine in 2017," Military.com, December 28, 2016; Sgt. Alexander Rector, "N.Y. Army Guard Soldiers Mentor and Learn in Ukraine," National Guard, June 22, 2018Oriana Pawlyk, "California Guard May Send More Troops to Ukraine in 2017," Military.com, December 28, 2016; 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), "101st Airborne Division Soldiers to Case Colors for Ukraine Deployment," press release, April 5, 2019; additional media and U.S. military reports, available to congressional clients upon request.

    The United States also provides cybersecurity assistance to Ukraine. U.S. interagency teams visited Ukraine in 2016 regarding December 2015 cyberattacks against Ukrainian power companies.219 The United States and Ukraine have held twothree annual Bilateral Cybersecurity Dialogues in Kyiv, and. Since 2017, the United States has pledged $1018 million in cybersecurity assistance since 2017.164

    to Ukraine.220 Bilateral Trade

    The United States granted Ukraine permanent normal trade relations status in 2006.165221 From 2014 to 2016, bilateral trade declined in line with an overall decline in Ukraine's trade after being invaded by RussiaRussia's invasion. U.S.-Ukraine trade began to recover in 2017. In 20182019, the United States was Ukraine's 6th-largest source of merchandise imports and 1314th-largest destination for exports.166 The value of Ukraine's merchandise imports from the United States—mainly oil and mineral fuels, motor vehicles and parts, and industrial and electrical machinery—was $2.96 billion in 2018. The value of merchandise exports to the United States—mainly iron and steel—was $1.11 billion in 2018.

    In July 222 The value of U.S. merchandise exports to Ukraine—mostly coal, motor vehicles, and industrial machinery—was $2.35 billion in 2019. The value of U.S. merchandise imports from Ukraine—mainly iron and steel—was $1.30 billion in 2018. In 2017, President Trump and then-President Poroshenko agreed to increase the sale of U.S. coal to Ukraine, stating that it could help replace now-halted supplies of coal from the nongovernment-controlled areas of eastern Ukraine.167223 In 20182019, U.S. coal accounted for almost one-third of Ukraine's total coal imports.

    Role of Congress

    Since 1991, Congress has supported Ukraine's independence, sovereignty, and democratic trajectory. In addition to appropriating funds for foreign and security assistance, the House and Senate have passed several resolutions in support of Ukraine's independence and democratization.168224 Congress especially supported Ukraine's democratic transition during the 2004-2005 Orange Revolution.169225 Congress also has passedagreed to several resolutions to commemorate the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster, which took place in Soviet Ukraine, and to support related U.S. and international assistance.170 In addition, 226 Congress has regularly commemorated the Soviet Ukraine famine of 1932-1933, most recently in 2018 (H.Res. 931/S.Res. 435).171227

    During Ukraine's 2013-2014 Revolution of Dignity, Congress supported a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Before ex-President Yanukovych fled Ukraineto Russia in February 2014, the House and Senate passedagreed to resolutions to support Ukrainians' democratic aspirations, call for a peaceful resolution to the standoff between the government and protestors, and raise the prospect of sanctions "against individuals responsible for ordering or carrying out the violence" (S.Res. 319, H.Res. 447). Prior to the start of the Euromaidan protests, the Senate also passedagreed to a resolution calling upon the Ukrainian government to release Yulia Tymoshenko from prison and the EU to make her release a condition for signing the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (S.Res. 165).

    Congressional Response to Russia's Invasion

    Since March 2014, many Members of Congress have condemned Russia's invasion of Ukraine, promoted sanctions against Russia for its actions, and supported increased economic and security aid to Ukraine. In 2014 and 2015, the House and Senate passed a number of resolutions condemning Russia's aggression in Ukraine and expressing support for increased aid.172

    In April 2014, Congress passed, and President Obama signed into law, the, and supported increased aid to Ukraine.228 The Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (SSIDES; P.L. 113-95; 22 U.S.C. 8901 et seq.) was enacted in April 2014. SSIDES authorized aid to help Ukraine pursue reform, provided security assistance to Ukraine and other countries in Central and Eastern Europe, requiredneighboring countries, directed the U.S. government to assist Ukraine to recover assets linked to corruption by the former government, and established a variety of sanctions (see "Ukraine-Related SanctionsSanctions Related to Russia's Invasion of Ukraine," below). At this time, Congress also passed, and the President signed into law, a bill authorizing increased funds to boost programming in Ukraine, Moldova, "and neighboring regions" by U.S. government-funded broadcasters Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) and Voice of America (VOA) (P.L. 113-96).

    In December 2014, Congress passed, and President Obama signed into law, theThe Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (UFSA; P.L. 113-272; 22 U.S.C. 8921 et seq.) was enacted in December 2014. UFSA stated that it is the policy of the United States "to further assist the Government of Ukraine in restoring its sovereignty and territorial integrity [and] to deter the Government of the Russian Federation from further destabilizing and invading Ukraine and other independent countries in Central and Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia." The act required or authorized a variety of expanded sanctions (see "Ukraine-Related Sanctions," below); authorized increased nonmilitary and military assistance to Ukraine; and authorized an expansion of RFE/RL and VOA broadcasting throughout the post-Soviet states, giving priority to Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova.

    In July-August 2017, Congress passed, and President Trump signed into law, CAATSA (P.L. 115-44), with CRIEEA as its Title II. CRIEEA codified sanctions on Russia provided for in existing Ukraine-related (and cyber-related) executive orders, strengthened additional sanctions, and required or recommended several new sanctions (see "Ukraine-Related Sanctions," below). In addition, the act established a congressional review of any potential presidential move to ease or lift sanctions. Among additionalThe Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA; P.L. 115-44; U.S.C. 9501 et seq.), with CRIEEA as its Title II, was enacted in August 2017. CRIEEA codified Ukraine-related executive orders (EOs) establishing sanctions on Russia, strengthened sanctions authorities initiated in Ukraine-related EOs and legislation, and established several new sanctions (see "Sanctions Related to Russia's Invasion of Ukraine," below). It also established congressional review of any action the President takes to ease or lift a variety of sanctions. Among other measures, the act authorized $30 million in FY2018-FY2019 to promote energy security in Ukraine and required the State Department to submit a semiannual report to Congress on U.S. efforts to promote energy security in Ukraine (§257). measures, the act authorized $30 million in FY2018-FY2019 to promote energy security in Ukraine (§257).

    Since FY2015, foreign operations appropriations have restricted funds for implementing policies and actions that would recognize Russian sovereignty over Crimea and have imposed restrictions on foreign assistance to the governments of countries that support Russia's annexation of Crimea (P.L. 116-6, Division F, §7047). In addition, CRIEEA states that it is the policy of the United States "to never recognize the illegal annexation of Crimea by the Government of the Russian Federation or the separation of any portion of Ukrainian territory through the use of military force" (§257).173

    Since 2014, Congress has supported the provision of defensive lethal weapons to Ukraine. UFSA authorized the President to provide to Ukraine "defense articles ... including anti-tank and anti-armor weapons [and] crew weapons and ammunition."229 The FY2016 to FY2019FY2020 National Defense Authorization Acts authorized "appropriate security assistance" to Ukraine, including "lethal assistance" such as "anti-armor weapon systems, mortars, crew-served weapons and ammunition, grenade launchers and ammunition," and (since FY2020) "coastal defense and anti-ship missile systems and small arms and ammunition." Since FY2016, defense appropriations have provided for military assistance to Ukraine, to include "lethal weapons of a defensive nature" and (forsince FY2019) "lethal assistance."174 In December 2016, a bipartisan group of 27 Senators asked the incoming Trump Administration to provide defensive lethal assistance "to help Ukrainians better defend themselves" and "deter future aggression."175

    In February 2018, during the 115th Congress, the House passed the Ukraine Cybersecurity Cooperation Act of 2017 (H.R. 1997), which called for greater cybersecurity cooperation with and aid to Ukraine.176 In November-December 2018, Members of the 115th Congress passed In 2019, S.Res. 74 affirmed the United States' "unwavering commitment to ... providing additional lethal and non-lethal security assistance to strengthen Ukraine's defense capabilities on land, sea, and in the air in order to improve deterrence against Russian aggression."

    Some Members of Congress have expressed concern about the emergence of far-right movements in Ukraine.230 Since FY2017, defense appropriations have prohibited funds from being used "to provide arms, training, or other assistance to the Azov Battalion" (P.L. 116-93, §8124).

    In November-December 2018, Members of the 115th Congress agreed to resolutions condemning Russia's attack on Ukrainian naval vessels (S.Res. 709, H.Res. 1162) and calling for the cancellation of Nord Stream 2 and the imposition of sanctions on entities for investing in or supporting the project (H.Res. 1035).

    In July 2019, during the 116th Congress, the Senate passedagreed to S.Res. 74 to mark the fifth anniversary of Ukraine's Revolution of Dignity "by honoring the bravery, determination, and sacrifice of the people of Ukraine during and since the Revolution, and condemning continued Russian aggression against Ukraine." The resolution, among other things, applauds Ukraine's reform progress, encourages the continued implementation of reforms, affirms the Crimea Declaration, and expresses the belief that "the strengthening of Ukraine's democracy ... should serve as a positive example to other post-Soviet countries."

    Several pieces of Ukraine-related legislation are under consideration in the 116th Congress. In December 2019, Congress passed PEESA, which established sanctions related to the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline (P.L. 116-92, Title LXXV). Before the passage of PEESA, several Members of Congress had expressed opposition to Nord Stream 2.231 Other Legislative Initiatives

    The Ukraine Cybersecurity Cooperation Act of 2017 (H.R. 1997), which passed the House during the 115th Congress, called for greater cybersecurity cooperation with and aid to Ukraine.232

    In March 2019, the House of Representatives voted 427-1 to pass H.R. 596, the Crimea Annexation Non-recognition Act, which assertswould assert that it is the policy of the United States not to recognize Russia's claim of sovereignty over Crimea, its airspace, or its territorial waters. Several Members of Congress have sought to further respond to Russia's November 2018 attack on Ukrainian naval vessels, express continuing opposition to Nord Stream 2, and enhance U.S.-Ukraine security cooperation.177

    Ukraine-Related Sanctions

    Most U.S. designations of Russian persons subject to sanctions have been

    The U.S.-Ukraine Security Cooperation Enhancement Act (H.R. 3047), introduced in May 2019, would enhance U.S.-Ukraine security cooperation, including by authorizing the provision of more lethal defense articles. The bill also would authorize the President to treat Ukraine as a major non-NATO ally.233

    The Defending American Security from Kremlin Aggression Act of 2019 (S. 482), which was reported and placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar in December 2019, contains a statement of policy not to recognize Russia's "illegal attempted annexation of Crimea" and to reaffirm the United States' "unwavering support for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law for all individuals in Crimea." The act would impose additional sanctions on Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine and for interfering with freedom of navigation through the Kerch Strait.234

    The Ukraine Religious Freedom Support Act (H.R. 5408, S. 3064) was introduced in the House and Senate in December 2019 and ordered to be reported in the House in March 2020. The act would seek to deny U.S. visas to Russian officials if they committed particularly severe violations of religious freedom in occupied Ukrainian territory. It also would require the President to consider such violations for the purposes of making a determination of whether to designate Russia as a country of particular concern for religious freedom.

    H.Res. 802, introduced in January 2020, would affirm the United States' "resolute support for Ukraine in its efforts to counter Russian aggression and continue its trajectory among the community of democracies."

    Sanctions Related to Russia's Invasion of Ukraine Most U.S. sanctions designations of Russian individuals and entities have been imposed in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. In 2014, the Obama Administration said it would impose increasing costs on Russia, in coordination with the EU and others, until Russia "abides by its international obligations and returns its military forces to their original bases and respects Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity."178 To date235 As of April 2020, the United States has imposed Ukraine-related sanctions on more than 665almost 700 individuals and entities.179

    The basis for most Ukraine-related sanctions is a236 A series of executive orders issued in 2014 (EOs 13660, 13661, 13662, and 13685) issued in 2014 and codified by CRIEEA (CAATSA, Title II). The EOs provide for sanctions against, based on national emergency authorities and codified by CRIEEA, establish a framework for Ukraine-related sanctions on those the President determines have undermined Ukraine's security and stability; misappropriated Ukrainian state assets; or conducted business, trade, or investment in occupied Crimea. They also provide for sanctions against , stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity or have misappropriated state assets. The EOs also establish sanctions against designated Russian government officials and those who offer them support, thosepersons who operate in the Russian arms sector, and those who operate in key sectors of the Russian economy, or occupied Crimea. In addition, they prohibit U.S. business, trade, or investment in occupied Crimea. Among those designated are Ukrainian individuals and entities, including former government officials and de factoRussian proxy authorities in occupied Crimea and the nongovernment-controlled areas in eastern Ukraine.

    In addition, sectoral sanctions apply to specific entities in Russia's financial, energy, and defense sectors. U.S. persons are restricted from engaging in certain transactions with these entities related to new equity investment and/or financing. Sectoral sanctions also prohibit U.S. trade related to the development of Russian deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale projects that have the potential to produce oil and, as amended by CRIEEA, such projects worldwide in which those entities have an ownership interest of at least 33% or a majority of voting interestsSectoral sanctions imposed in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine apply to certain kinds of transactions with specific entities in Russia's financial, energy, and defense sectors.

    SSIDES and UFSA, signed into law in 2014, expanded upon the sanctions on the actions the Obama Administration took in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. President Obama, however, did not cite SSIDES or UFSA as an authority for designations or other sanctions actions.180237 In November 2018, President Trump cited SSIDES, as amended by CRIEEA (§228), to designate two Ukrainian individuals and one entity for committing serious human rights abuses in territories forcibly occupied or controlled by Russia. President Trump has not cited UFSA as an authority for any sanctions designations. SSIDES and UFSA contain additional sanctions provisions that the executive branch could use, including potentially wide-reaching secondary sanctions against foreign individuals and entities that facilitate significant transactions for Russia-related sanctions designees.

    PEESA, signed into law in December 2019, requires sanctions on foreign persons whom the President determines have sold, leased, or provided subsea pipe-laying vessels for the construction of Russian natural gas pipelines Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream, or any successor pipeline, since December 20, 2019 (both pipelines are considered to undercut Ukraine's role as a transit state). PEESA provides for a 30-day wind-down period; exceptions for repairs, maintenance, environmental remediation, and safety; and a national security waiver. In addition, PEESA provides for the termination of sanctions if the President certifies to Congress "that appropriate safeguards have been put in place"

    • to minimize Russia's ability to use the sanctioned pipeline project "as a tool of coercion and political leverage" and
    • to ensure "that the project would not result in a decrease of more than 25 percent in the volume of Russian energy exports transiting through existing pipelines in other countries, particularly Ukraine, relative to the average monthly volume of Russian energy exports transiting through such pipelines in 2018."

    As of April 2020, PEESA's impact on completion of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline was uncertain. The company laying the pipeline has suspended its activities, but Russian officials have said that Russia should be able to finish construction of Nord Stream 2 on its own.238 TurkStream was inaugurated in January 2020.

    Like the United States, the EU has imposed sanctions ("restrictive measures") against Russia for its invasion of Ukraine. EU sanctions are similar, although not identical, to U.S. sanctions designees.

    Like the United States, the EU has imposed sanctions—or restrictive measures, in EU parlance—against Russia since 2014 for its invasion of Ukraine. The EU imposed these sanctions largely in cooperation with the United States, and EU sanctions are similar, although not identical, to U.S. sanctions. Imposing these sanctions requires the unanimous agreement of all 28 EU member states. Most EU sanctions are imposed for a defined period of time (usually six months or a year) to incentivize change and provide the EU with flexibility to adjust the sanctions as warranted. Unanimity among EU member states also is required to renew (i.e., extend) EU sanctions. A number of other statesOther countries, including Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway, and Switzerland, also have imposed Ukraine-related sanctions on Russia.

    Relations with the EU and NATO

    Since 2014, the Ukrainian government has prioritized closer integration with the EU and NATO. In February 2019, Ukraine adopted a constitutional amendment declaring the government responsible for implementing Ukraine's "strategic course" toward EU and NATO membership.181 Zelensky's first foreign trip as president was to Brussels, where he met with EU and NATO leaders and reaffirmed that Ukraine's "strategic course [was] to achieve full-fledged membership in the EU and NATO."182

    The EU's main framework for political and economic engagement with Ukraine is the Association Agreement, which encourages harmonization with EU laws and regulations and includes a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA).183 According to the EU, the DCFTA has shown "positive results." 184 Since the DCFTA's entry into force, Ukraine's trade with the EU, its largest trading partner (42% of Ukraine's total trade in 2018), has grown faster than Ukraine's total trade, and Ukraine has begun to export new products to EU markets, including butter and washing machines.185 The EU also is a major provider of foreign aid, totaling more than €15 billion (about $16.4 billion) in grants and loans since 2014.186 The EU granted Ukrainian citizens visa-free travel in 2017.

    As mentioned, the EU has imposed wide-ranging sanctions in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The EU also has supported Ukraine against Russia's maritime aggression near the Kerch Strait. In July 2019, the EU announced an increase in tailored assistance to Ukraine "to help mitigate the impact of Russia's destabilizing actions in the Sea of Azov region."187

    Ukraine also has close relations with NATO. In 1994, Ukraine was the first post-Soviet state (not including the Baltic states) to join NATO's Partnership for Peace. A NATO-Ukraine Commission, established in 1997, provides the framework for cooperation. Under ex-President Yanukovych, Ukraine adopted a "non-bloc" (i.e., nonaligned) status, rejecting aspirations of NATO membership, but invited NATO to launch a Defense Education Enhancement Programme and participated in the NATO Response Force, a rapid reaction force. After Russia's invasion in 2014, Ukraine's parliament rejected its non-bloc status and, in 2017, voted to make cooperation with NATO a foreign policy priority.188

    Ukraine has supported several NATO peacekeeping and maritime operations. Ukrainian forces have long contributed to the NATO-led Kosovo Force. Ukraine also contributes to the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan and participated in the previous International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, the counterterrorism Operation Active Endeavour maritime mission, and the antipiracy Operation Ocean Shield. In addition, Ukraine has supported NATO's maritime Sea Guardian operation.

    NATO has expressed strong support for Ukraine since Russia's 2014 invasion. At a 2016 summit in Warsaw, NATO pledged additional training and technical support for the Ukrainian military and endorsed a Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP). The CAP includes "tailored capability and capacity building measures ... to enhance Ukraine's resilience against a wide array of threats, including hybrid threats."189 In addition, NATO established six trust funds "working in critical areas of reform and capability development in Ukraine's security and defense sector."190

    Many observers consider that closer integration with the EU and NATO has not enabled Ukraine to improve its near-term prospects for membership in these organizations. According to recent polls, over half of Ukrainians support membership in the EU (polls do not include the Crimea region and nongovernment-controlled areas of Ukraine).191 The EU is unlikely to consider Ukraine a candidate for membership soon, however, given Ukraine's domestic challenges, the conflict with Russia, the EU's own internal challenges, and lack of support for enlargement among many EU members.

    Ukraine also faces a challenge to NATO membership. In 2008, NATO members agreed that Ukraine and Georgia would become members of NATO, but Ukraine has not been granted a NATO Membership Action Plan or other clear path to membership.192 Most observers believe NATO will not move forward with membership as long as Russia occupies Ukrainian territory and the conflict remains unresolved. Moreover, Ukrainians themselves remain divided over NATO membership. Since 2014, about 40%-50% of opinion poll respondents support membership in NATO (compared to about 25%-40% against); these polls do not include the Crimea region and nongovernment-controlled areas of Ukraine, where support for NATO membership likely would be low even in the absence of conflict.193

    Outlook

    Five years after Ukraine's Euromaidan protests and Russia's invasion, Ukraine continues to face a number of internal and external challenges. Issues that Members of Congress may consider in seeking to influence or shape U.S. relations with Ukraine could include the following:

    • How the United States can best assist Ukraine's new government to implement governance reforms that are supported by the international community and Ukrainian civil society;
    • Whether Ukraine's new government will sustain a reform-minded and democratic trajectory;
    • The extent to which the change of government in Ukraine provides new opportunities for implementing the Minsk agreements to resolve the conflict in eastern Ukraine and to address humanitarian needs in and around the nongovernment-controlled areas;
    • The appropriate level of military assistance to Ukraine and whether the United States should provide new forms of defensive lethal weapons;
    • The other kinds of U.S. assistance that may be especially important to Ukraine at this time; and
    • Additional ways to increase Ukraine's benefits from its free trade agreement with the EU and its closer integration with the EU and NATO.

    Author Contact Information

    Cory Welt, Specialist in European Affairs ([email address scrubbed], [phone number scrubbed])

    Footnotes

    The Corruption Perception Index includes absolute and relative scores. Ukraine's absolute score rose from 25 to 32 between 2013 and 2018 and declined to 30 in 2019 (primarily on the basis of Poroshenko-era developments). Transparency International, "Ukraine," Corruption Perceptions Index 2019, at https://www.transparency.org/country/UKR; Transparency International Ukraine, "Corruption Perception Index 2019," at https://ti-ukraine.org/en/research/corruption-perceptions-index-2019/. EEAS, "Ukraine and the EU," at https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/1937/ukraine-and-eu_en. Also see European Council, "EU Relations with Ukraine," at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eastern-partnership/ukraine/. Also see U.S. House of Representatives, Trial Memorandum of the United States House of Representatives in the Impeachment Trial of President Donald J. Trump, January 18, 2020. For additional documents and materials associated with the impeachment process, including related to Ukraine, see U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, "The Impeachment of Donald John Trump, Evidentiary Record from the House of Representatives," at https://judiciary.house.gov/the-impeachment-of-donald-john-trump/, and "Markup of H. Res. 755, Articles of Impeachment Against President Donald J. Trump," at https://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=110331. Since FY2010, the U.S. government has not provided a comprehensive accounting of foreign aid to post-Soviet states similar to that included in the annual Section 104 reports issued through FY2009. From FY2010, State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) assistance cited in the text refer to actual funds, as reported in the State Department's annual Congressional Budget Justifications. Nonproliferation and threat reduction assistance refers to obligated funds from the Department of Energy Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation and Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) accounts, as reported by USAID. FY2014 CTR funds include some assistance provided in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. USAID Foreign Aid Explorer, at https://explorer.usaid.gov/. For related resolutions in the House, seeH.Res. 499, H.Res. 726, and H.Res. 758 in 2014, and H.Res. 50, H.Res. 162, and H.Res. 348 in 2015. The Senate passedFor related resolutions in the Senate, see S.Res. 378and S.Res. 520in 2014, and S.Res. 52and S.Res. 72in 2015.

    See), H.Res. 162 (2015), S.Res. 72 (2015), and H.R. 5094 (2016). Subsequently, in July 2019, S.Res. 74 affirmed the United States' "unwavering commitment to ... providing additional lethal and non-lethal security assistance to strengthen Ukraine's defense capabilities on land, sea, and in the air in order to improve deterrence against Russian aggression."

    236 reported and placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar). H.R. 3047 would enhance U.S.-Ukraine security cooperation, including by authorizing the provision of more lethal defense articles, such as "anti-tank weapons systems, anti-ship weapons systems, and anti-aircraft weapons systems." The bill also would authorize the President to treat Ukraine as a major non-NATO ally. Proposals to treat Ukraine as a major non-NATO ally were previously included in legislation introduced in 2014 (H.R. 5190, S. 2828, H.R. 5782).

    1.

    Freedom House ranks all countries in the world on a "freedom" scale, which includes measures of political rights and civil liberties. Freedom House also scores post-Communist states on an index of "democratic progress" ranging between 1 (most democratic) and 7 (least democratic). States that receive a "democracy score" between 4 and 5 are considered "transitional governments or hybrid regimes." Ukraine has received a democracy score between 4 and 5 since at least 1999. See annual reports in Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2019, at https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/ukraine, and Nations in Transit 2018, at https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2018/ukraine.

    2.

    Poroshenko, a wealthy businessman, then-member of parliament, ex-government official, and supporter of the Euromaidan protests, won 55% of the popular vote in a May 2014 election to succeed Viktor Yanukovych. His closest competitor, former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, won 13%. Poroshenko held political office under Ukraine's two previous presidents, including as foreign minister (2009-2010) under Viktor Yushchenko and minister of trade and economic development (2011-2012) under Yanukovych.

    3.

    U.S. Department of State, "Ukrainian Presidential Elections," April 22, 2019.

    4.

    See the U.S.-based International Republican Institute's Center for Insights in Survey Research, "Public Opinion Survey of Residents of Ukraine, September 29-October 14, 2018."

    5.

    Former Prime Minister Tymoshenko came in third place in the first round, with 13% of the vote. She ran on a populist platform that was critical of government-led economic reforms, including pension reform, increased gas prices, and land sales. Ian Bateson, "The Fall and Troubled Rise of a Ukrainian Populist," Atlantic, March 28, 2019.

    6.

    Leonid Bershidsky, "Religion Will Be on Ukraine's Ballot," Bloomberg, December 18, 2018.

    7.

    Ukraine's language laws have been the subject of considerable debate. See, for example, Gwendolyn Sasse, "Ukraine's Poorly Timed Education Law," Carnegie Europe, October 2, 2017; Alessandra Prentice, "Criticism of Ukraine's Language Law Justified: Rights Body," Reuters, December 8, 2017; Tetyana Ogarkova, "The Truth Behind Ukraine's Language Policy," Atlantic Council, March 12, 2018; and Natalia Kudriatvtseva, "Ukraine's Language Agenda: When Aspiration Meets Practice," Wilson Center, April 23, 2018.

    8.

    Volodymyr Yermolenko, "Does Poroshenko Have a Chance at a Second Term?" UkraineAlert, Atlantic Council, October 1, 2018.

    9.

    Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, "The Fight Against Corruption in Ukraine: Public Opinion," June 1, 2018.

    10.

    Oksana Grytsenko and Vyacheslav Hnatyuk, "What We Know About People Zelensky Will Take to Next Parliament," Kyiv Post, July 8, 2019.

    11.

    Two ministers are holdovers from the previous government: Minister of Internal Affairs Arsen Avakov and Minister of Finance Oksana Markarova. "Here's Every Member of Ukraine's New Cabinet of Ministers," Kyiv Post, August 29, 2019.

    12.

    International Monitoring Fund (IMF), "Ukraine Receives IMF Support but Must Accelerate Reforms," IMF Country Focus, April 4, 2017.

    13.

    Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Maintaining the Momentum of Decentralization in Ukraine (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2018); Maryna Rabinovych, Anthony Levitas, and Andreas Umland, Revisiting Decentralization After Maidan: Achievements and Challenges of Ukraine's Local Governance Reform, Kennan Institute, July 16, 2018; UNIAN Information Agency, "Council of Europe Praises Judicial Reform in Ukraine," June 13, 2019; Iryna Budz, "What Prevents Ukrainian Judiciary From Becoming Truly Effective And Independent?" Vox Ukraine, July 24, 2019; Government of Ukraine, "Health Care System Reform," at https://www.kmu.gov.ua/en/reformi/rozvitok-lyudskogo-kapitalu/reforma-sistemi-ohoroni-zdorovya.

    14.

    See, for example, Sagatom Saha and Ilya Zaslavskiy, Advancing Natural Gas Reform in Ukraine, Council on Foreign Relations, December 2018; IMF, "Reforming Ukraine's Pension System," in Ukraine: Selected Issues, March 7, 2017, pp. 19-37; World Bank, Ukraine Special Focus Note: Reforming Land Markets for Agricultural Growth, October 3, 2017; World Bank Group, Reducing Market Distortions for a More Prosperous Ukraine: Proposals for Market Regulation, Competition Policy, and Institutional Reform, March 2019.

    15.

    Christopher Miller, "So Far, Zelenskiy Is High on Charisma and Light on Policy. Do Ukrainians Care?" RFE/RL, April 8, 2019.

    16.

    Others suggest, however, that Moscow may be less enthusiastic about Zelensky's victory if he brings new energy to Ukraine's anti-corruption and democracy reforms. Alexander Baunov, "Putin Should Fear Ukraine's Russia-Friendly Front-Runner," Foreign Policy, April 18, 2019.

    17.

    Kolomoysky served as Dnipropetrovsk's governor for one year until falling out with Poroshenko in 2015. Before the second-round presidential election, Kolomoysky won some preliminary court cases regarding the 2016 nationalization of Ukraine's largest commercial bank, PrivatBank, which he previously controlled. Matthias Williams and Natalia Zinets, "Comedian Faces Scrutiny over Oligarch Ties in Ukraine Presidential Race," Reuters, April 1, 2019; Natalia Zinets, "Ukraine Could Nationalize PrivatBank Again if Needed: Central Bank," Reuters, May 15, 2019; Roman Olearchyk, "Volodymyr Zelensky Hires Oligarch's Lawyer as Chief of Staff," Financial Times, May 22, 2019.

    18.

    Oleksiy Sorokin and Anna Myroniuk, "Zelensky to Cabinet: Adopt Budget, Lift Land Moratorium, Legalize Casinos—Fast!" Kyiv Post, September 2, 2019; "Quick Wins, Big Promises: Zelensky's Agenda for Parliament, Government," Kyiv Post, September 6, 2019.

    19.

    Oleksiy Sorokin, "Zelensky's Changes to Ukrainian Constitution, Explained," Kyiv Post, September 6, 2019.

    20.

    Transparency International, "Ukraine," Corruption Perceptions Index 2018, at https://www.transparency.org/country/UKR.

    21.

    For details, see John Lough and Vladimir Dubrovskiy, Are Ukraine's Anti-Corruption Reforms Working?, Chatham House, November 2018.

    22.

    Transparency International, "Constitutional Court Ruling Undermines Anti-corruption Achievements in Ukraine," March 1, 2019; Oleksandra Drik, "Why the West Should Be Worried About Ukraine's Flagging Fight Against Graft," Atlantic Council, March 12, 2019.

    23.

    Kateryna Boguslavska, "Full Disclosure: Tackling Public Corruption in Ukraine," Chatham House, November 30, 2016.

    24.

    Marc Jones, "IMF Backs Ukraine Anti-corruption Court Plan," Reuters, July 25, 2018.

    25.

    See, for example, Andrew Higgins and Andrew E. Kramer, "Converts Join with Militants in Kiev Clash," New York Times, February 21, 2014.

    26.

    Christopher Miller, "Azov, Ukraine's Most Prominent Ultranationalist Group, Sets Its Sights on U.S., Europe," RFE/RL, November 14, 2018.

    27.

    Amnesty International, Ukraine: Human Rights Under Pressure, Their Advocates Under Attack, February 8, 2019; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Civic Space and Fundamental Freedoms Ahead of the Presidential, Parliamentary and Local Elections in Ukraine in 2019-2020, March 12, 2019.

    28.

    Human Rights Watch, "Ukraine: Address Attacks Against Activists and Human Rights Defenders," October 3, 2018; Ukrinform, "39 Attacks on Journalists and Activists Recorded in Ukraine This Year," June 21, 2019; Human Rights Watch, "Ukraine: Investigate Journalist's Killing," June 25, 2019.

    29.

    Tetiana Kozak, "Who Is Ordering Attacks on Activists in Ukraine," Open Democracy, August 23, 2018; RFE/RL, "Ukrainian Court Sentences Five Men in Activist's Death Following Acid Attack," June 6, 2019.

    30.

    Associated Press, "Putin: Russians, Ukrainians Are 'One People,'" July 20, 2019.

    31.

    Studies of the conflict include Richard Sakwa, Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands (I.B. Tauris, 2016); Michael Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine (RAND Corporation, 2017); Samuel Charap and Timothy J. Colton, Everyone Loses: The Ukraine Crisis and the Ruinous Contest for Post-Soviet Eurasia (Routledge/IISS, 2017); Lawrence Freedman, Ukraine and the Art of Strategy (Oxford University Press, 2019); and Sabine Fischer, The Donbas Conflict: Opposing Interests and Narratives, Difficult Peace Process, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), 2019.

    32.

    Patrick Tucker, "U.S. Intelligence Officials and Satellite Photos Detail Russian Military Buildup on Crimea," Defense One, June 12, 2019; UNIAN Information Agency, "Ukraine Intel Assesses Size of Russia's Military Force Amassed in Occupied Crimea," June 21, 2019.

    33.

    OHCHR, "Situation of Human Rights in the Temporarily Occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol (Ukraine)," September 25, 2017.

    34.

    These assurances were provided in connection with Ukraine's assent to the removal of nuclear weapons from its territory. The official title of the Budapest Memorandum is the Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine's Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. United Nations General Assembly/Security Council (A/49/765, S/1994/1399), December 19, 1994, at https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/169471?ln=en. For details, see Steven Pifer, The Trilateral Process: The United States, Ukraine, Russia and Nuclear Weapons, Brookings, May 2011.

    35.

    U.N. General Assembly Resolutions A/RES/68/262, March 27, 2014; A/RES/71/205, December 19, 2016; A/RES/72/190, December 19, 2017; and A/73/L.47, December 5, 2018.

    36.

    Reuters, "Ukraine's Oschadbank Awarded $1.3 Bln from Russia over Crimea Loss," November 27, 2018;

    37.

    Ukrinform, "Permanent Court of Arbitration: Russia Illegally Seizes Assets of Naftogaz in Crimea," March 1, 2019; RFE/RL, "Ukraine's Naftogaz Seeks $5.2 Billion in Damages from Russia over Seized Crimea Assets," August 1, 2019.

    38.

    Roman Olearchyk, "Ukraine Hits Russia with Another Legal Claim," Financial Times, September 14, 2016; Ukrinform, "Ukraine v. Russia: Permanent Court of Arbitration Publishes Positions of Parties," June 11, 2019.

    39.

    See, for example, Maj. Michael Cohen, "Ukraine's Battle at Ilovaisk, August 2014: The Tyranny of Means," Military Review, June 10, 2016; Maj. Amos C. Fox, "Cyborgs at Little Stalingrad": A Brief History of the Battles of the Donetsk Airport, Institute of Land Warfare, May 2019; and Maj. Amos C. Fox, "Battle of Debal'tseve: The Conventional Line of Effort in Russia's Hybrid War in Ukraine," Armor (Winter 2017), pp. 45-52.

    40.

    U.S. Department of State, "Press Briefing with Kurt Volker, Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations," November 8, 2018.

    41.

    Remarks at the U.N. Security Council (S/PV.8270, 16), May 29, 2018, at https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.8270.

    42.

    Reuters, "Some 12,000 Russian Soldiers in Ukraine Supporting Rebels: U.S. Commander," March 3, 2015.

    43.

    Remarks at the U.N. Security Council (S/PV.8461, 23), February 12, 2019, at https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.8461.

    44.

    U.S. Department of State, "Latest Developments on Ukraine Negotiations," April 13, 2018.

    45.

    U.S. Department of State, "Press Briefing on Ukraine Negotiations," January 29, 2018.

    46.

    OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine: 16 November 2018 to 15 February 2019, p. 6.

    47.

    Among MH17's passengers were 193 Dutch citizens and 18 citizens of other EU countries. Government of the Netherlands, "Suspects To Be Prosecuted for the Downing of Flight MH17," press release, June 19, 2019; Claire Parker, "Here's What We Know About the Four Suspects Charged with Downing Flight MH17," Washington Post, June 19, 2019.

    48.

    The measures also apply to, among others, former residents of Ukraine's Crimea region who left the region before Russia's occupation. Nataliya Vasilyeva, "Russia Offers Ukrainians in Conflict Zones Quick Citizenship," AP, April 24, 2019; RFE/RL, "Putin Widens Citizenship Offer to All Residents of Ukraine's Donetsk, Luhansk Regions," July 18, 2019.

    49.

    Observers note that Russia justified its invasion of Georgia in 2008 in part by asserting the need to defend Russian citizens in Georgia's South Ossetia region. See, for example, Yuri Zoria, "Is Russia's Passport Scheme in Donbas a Harbinger of Full-Scale Invasion Like in 2008 Georgia?" Euromaidan Press, May 14, 2019.

    50.

    Ukrainian Ministry of Social Policy, July 15, 2019, at https://www.msp.gov.ua/news/17351.html.

    51.

    Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, at http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/ukraine; Krzystof Nieczypor, "In the Shadow of War: Ukraine's Policy Towards Internally Displaced Persons," OSW Centre for Eastern Studies (Warsaw), January 16, 2019.

    52.

    Previously, the government could deny internally displaced persons (IDPs) pensions if they failed to be present at their place of registration during spot checks (i.e., because they had returned to their homes in the nongovernment-controlled areas). In September 2018, Ukraine's Supreme Court upheld an earlier ruling that the government could not deny pensions based on residency verification mechanisms. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), "Supreme Court of Ukraine Takes Landmark Decision to Protect Pension Rights of IDPs," September 7, 2018; Human Rights Watch, "Ukraine: Pension Issues, Crossing Conditions," July 10, 2019.

    53.

    UNHCR, "Checkpoints Monthly Crossings – Online Dashboard," at https://www.unhcr.org/ua/en/resources.

    54.

    UNHCR/Right to Protection, "Eastern Ukraine Checkpoint Monitoring – Online Dashboard – 2019," at https://www.unhcr.org/ua/en/resources.

    55.

    Human Rights Watch, "Ukraine: Barriers to Free Movement for Older People," November 29, 2018.

    56.

    This change in policy was initially proposed by the previous government in June 2018 but was not implemented prior to the change in government. UNHCR, Freedom of Movement Across the Line of Contact in Eastern Ukraine, July 2018, pp. 1, 4; Ukrainian Ministry of Temporarily Occupied Territories and Internally Displaced Persons, "A New Order for Crossing the Contact Line in the East Approved," July 18, 2019.

    57.

    Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), "OSCE Chair Lajčák Welcomes New Recommitment to Ceasefire in Eastern Ukraine and Plans for Urgently Needed Repairs to Stanystia Luhanska Bridge; Urges Sides to Honour and Implement Them," press release, July 18, 2019; UNIAN Information Agency, "Russia Occupation Troops Impede Experts' Access to Damaged Bridge in Donbas Disengagement Area," July 24, 2019.

    58.

    Nataliya Vasilyeva, "Ukraine's Richest Man Plays Both Sides of War's Frontline," Associated Press, September 22, 2015.

    59.

    Fred Weir, "In Ukraine, Blockade Threatens to Force Issue at Heart of Civil War," Christian Science Monitor, February 28, 2017; RFE/RL, "Ukraine Announces Suspension of Cargo Traffic with Separatist-Held Areas," March 15, 2017.

    60.

    "Protocol on the Outcome of Consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group on Joint Steps Aimed at the Implementation of the Peace Plan of the President of Ukraine, P. Poroshenko, and the Initiatives of the President of the Russian Federation, V. Putin," September 5, 2014, at https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/UA_140905_MinskCeasfire_en.pdf; and "Memorandum on the Implementation of the Provisions of the Protocol […]," September 19, 2014, at https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/UA_140919_MemoImplementationPeacePlan_en.pdf.

    61.

    "Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements," February 12, 2015, at https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/UA_150212_MinskAgreement_en.pdf.

    62.

    See, for example, "What Are the Minsk Agreements?" Economist, September 14, 2016; U.S. Department of State, "U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations Kurt Volker," November 3, 2017; Tim B. Peters and Anastasiia Shapkina, The Grand Stalemate of the Minsk Agreements, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, February 2019; and Anna Hess Sargsyan, Unpacking Complexity in the Ukraine Peace Process, Center for Security Studies (ETH Zurich), April 2019.

    63.

    U.N. Security Council Resolution 2202 (2015), at https://undocs.org/S/RES/2202(2015).

    64.

    U.N. Security Council, "Condemning Continuous Ceasefire Violations in Eastern Ukraine, Security Council Presidential Statement Expresses Grave Concern About Severe Impact on Civilians," SC/13367, June 6, 2018.

    65.

    U.S. Department of State, "Secretary Tillerson Appoints Ambassador Kurt Volker Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations," July 7, 2017.

    66.

    See, for example, remarks by Ertuğrul Apakan, Chief Monitor, OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, in the U.N. Security Council, February 12, 2019 (S/PV.8461, 4-5/28), at https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.8461.

    67.

    On August 7, 2019, Ukrainian Armed Forces Commander and Chief of Staff Ruslan Khomchak said that six Ukrainian servicemen had been killed since the start of the cease-fire less than three weeks before. Ukrinform, "Six Ukrainian Soldiers Killed, Nine Wounded During 'Harvest Ceasefire,'" August 7, 2019.

    68.

    Disengagement areas are provided for not in the Minsk-2 measures but in a September 2016 Framework Decision on Disengagement of Forces and Hardware. See OSCE, "Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine Sajdik Welcomes Framework Decision on Disengagement of Forces and Hardware," September 21, 2016.

    69.

    Hromadske International, "Ukraine's War-Torn Stanytsia Luhanska Sees Historic Separation of Forces," June 27, 2019; UNIAN Information Agency, "OSCE Officially Confirms Disengagement Near Stanytsia Luhanska in Donbas," June 30, 2019.

    70.

    Law of Ukraine No. 1680-VII, as amended, at https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/en/1680-18.

    71.

    See, for example, Ukrinform, "U.N. Sends over 180 Tonnes of Humanitarian Aid to ORDLO," July 26, 2019.

    72.

    Anna Arutunyan, "Getting Aid to Separatist-Held Ukraine," International Crisis Group, May 13, 2019.

    73.

    Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine No. 252-VIII, at https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/252-viii.

    74.

    Iryna Matviyishyn, "What Price Did Ukraine Pay for Prisoner Exchange?" UkraineAlert, Atlantic Council, September 8, 2019.

    75.

    Other prisoners also were released in December 2017 but reportedly chose not to be transferred across the conflict lines. Inna Varenytsia, "Ukrainian Authorities and Separatist Rebels Swap Prisoners," Associated Press, December 27, 2017.

    76.

    Oksana Grytsenko, "What We Know About 35 Ukrainian Political Prisoners Released from Russia," Kyiv Post, September 7, 2019; Hromadske International, "The Great Exchange: Whom Did Ukraine Send to Russia?" September 7, 2019.

    77.

    See, for example, Olga Malchevska, "The Killer Queues of Ukraine," BBC World Service, May 28, 2019; UNHCR, "UNHCR Voices Needs for Improvements at Stanytsia Luhanska Entry-Exit Crossing Point to the President of Ukraine and the President of the EU Council," press release, July 8, 2019.

    78.

    See, for example, United Nations, "Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on the Fifth Anniversary of the Beginning of Russian Armed Aggression Against Ukraine," February 20, 2019, at https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/S/2019/180.

    79.

    Moscow claims that Ukraine's law on interim self-government postpones the grant of special status in a way that is contrary to Minsk-2, as the law first requires the withdrawal of illegal armed formations and the holding of local elections. Minsk-2 appears to call for Ukraine to implement constitutional decentralization reforms before local elections are to be held (it makes no reference to the timing of the withdrawal of illegal armed formations). See, for example, United Nations, "Brief Overview of Actions by the Kiev Authorities That Undermine the Prospects of a Peaceful Settlement in Ukraine," February 19, 2019, at https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/S/2019/163.

    80.

    Tony Wesolowsky, "Explainer: Does Putin's Peacekeeper Proposal for Ukraine Have Any Merit?" RFE/RL, September 6, 2017.

    81.

    See, for example, European Council, "Declaration by the High Representative on Behalf of the EU on the 'Elections' Planned in the So-Called 'Luhansk People's Republic' and 'Donetsk People's Republic' for 11 November 2018," November 10, 2018; and U.S. Department of State, "Condemning Sham 'Elections' in Russia-Controlled Eastern Ukraine," November 12, 2018.

    82.

    European Council, "European Council Conclusions on the MFF, Climate Change, Disinformation and Hybrid Threats, External Relations, Enlargement and the European Semester, 20 June 2019," June 20, 2019. Also see U.S. Department of State, "Russia's Decision to Grant Expedited Citizenship to Residents of Russia-Controlled Eastern Ukraine," April 24, 2019; U.N. News, "Security Council: U.N. Calls for 'Spirit and Letter' of Ukraine Agreements to Be Upheld, as Russia Issues Simplified Citizenship Decree," April 25, 2019, and RFE/RL, "Volker: Moscow's Passport Move For Donbas Residents Diverges from Peace Plan," July 19, 2019.

    83.

    Law of Ukraine No. 2268-VIII, at https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2268-19.

    84.

    Nicholas Connolly, "Ukraine Ready for Peace, President Volodomyr Zelenskiy Tells DW," DW (Germany), July 5, 2019.

    85.

    Zelensky did not state that his proposal was linked to the status of the United States and the United Kingdom (UK) as signatories of the Budapest Memorandum. Former Prime Minister and presidential candidate Yulia Tymoshenko has called for international discussions to be held within the framework of the Budapest Memorandum, which provides for consultations among signatories "in the event a situation arises that raises a question concerning these commitments." RFE/RL, "Exclusive: Tymoshenko Defends Decision Not to Fight over Crimea, Attacks Minsk Process," March 18, 2019; UNIAN Information Agency, "Zelensky Offers Putin Talks Involving Trump," July 8, 2019.

    86.

    After ramming the tugboat and blockading all three boats for hours, the Russian vessels reportedly fired on them as they sought to leave the area, injuring six sailors. Dmitry Gorenburg and Michael Kofman, "Russia and Ukraine Had a Short Naval Battle. Here's What You Need to Know," Washington Post, November 28, 2018; and Andrzej Wilk, "The Russian Attack on Ukrainian Ships in the Black Sea: The Military Aspects," Centre for Eastern Studies (Warsaw), November 28, 2018.

    87.

    Ridvan Bari Urcosta, "Ukraine's Strategic Aims in the Sea of Azov," Eurasia Daily Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, October 17, 2018; Yuri Zoria, "Ukrainian Warships Break Russian De-Facto Blockade in Azov Sea to Create Naval Base," Euromaidan Press, September 25, 2018.

    88.

    A 2003 bilateral agreement between Ukraine and Russia affirms freedom of navigation through the strait for both countries. Some argue that customary international law as reflected in the United Nations Charter on the Law of the Sea, or UNCLOS, also does that. See http://www.fao.org/fishery/shared/faolextrans.jsp?xp_FAOLEX=LEX-FAOC045795, and https://www.iucn.org/theme/marine-and-polar/our-work/international-ocean-governance/unclos.

    89.

    Russian authorities reportedly have imposed delays at the bridge and conducted inspections of vessels. They also have established notification and transit procedures for ships seeking to pass through the strait; during the November 25, 2018, incident, Russian authorities invoked what they considered noncompliance with these procedures as partial justification for denying passage to the Ukrainian vessels. Oksana Grytsenko and Kostyantyn Chernichkin, "Dangerous Waters: As Russia Monopolizes Azov Sea, Mariupol Feels Heightened Danger," Kyiv Post, August 3, 2018.

    90.

    Joshua Kucera, "Russia Transfers Five Warships Out of Caspian Sea," Eurasianet, June 25, 2018.

    91.

    OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine: 16 November 2018 to 15 February 2019, p. 3.

    92.

    International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, "Tribunal Prescribes Provisional Measures Ordering the Russian Federation to Release Three Ukrainian Naval Vessels and Their 24 Servicemen," press release, May 25, 2019.

    93.

    Ecumenical Patriarchate, "Patriarchal and Synodol Tomos for the Bestowal of the Ecclesiastical Status of Autocephaly to the Orthodox Church in Ukraine," January 14, 2019, at https://www.patriarchate.org/-/patriarchikos-kai-synodikos-tomos-choregeseos-autokephalou-ekklesiastikou-kathestotos-eis-ten-en-oukraniai-orthodoxon-ekklesian.

    94.

    Bohdan Ben, "New Independent Church and Moscow Patriarchate Vie for Parishes in Ukraine," Euromaidan Press, January 30, 2019; UNIAN Information Agency, "Over 500 Moscow Patriarchate Parishes in Ukraine Join New Orthodox Church – Leader," July 28, 2019.

    95.

    Oksana Grytsenko, "Power Struggle Shakes New Ukraine's Orthodox Church," Kyiv Post, June 26, 2019; Alya Shandra, "Honeymoon Over for Orthodox Church of Ukraine as Its 'Creator' Goes into Schism," Euromaidan Press, July 6, 2019.

    96.

    Gabby Deutch, "Ukraine's Spiritual Split from Russia Could Trigger a Global Schism," Atlantic, October 11, 2018; Robert Person and Aaron Brantly, "The Ukrainian Orthodox Church Is Trying to Withdraw from Moscow's Control. The Kremlin Is Not Happy," Washington Post, October 31, 2018; Christine Borovkova and Andreas Umland, "How Russia's Orthodox Church Rejects Ukrainian Autocephaly," Vox Ukraine, August 6, 2019.

    97.

    Mykola Vorobiov, "Kremlin's Destabilization Strategy Ahead of Ukrainian Presidential Elections," Eurasia Daily Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, March 11, 2019.

    98.

    U.S. Department of State, "Declaration of Ukrainian Autocephaly," January 10, 2019.

    99.

    Anders Aslund, Ukraine: What Went Wrong and How to Fix It (Washington, DC: PIIE Press, 2015), p. 5.

    100.

    IMF World Economic Outlook Database, April 2019, at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2019/01/weodata/index.aspx.

    101.

    In March 2015, the IMF approved a four-year, $17.5 billion loan package to Ukraine under its Extended Fund Facility (EFF). The IMF tied disbursement of funds to implementation of specific reforms and disbursed around half of the funds in the loan package. In December 2018, the IMF replaced the expiring EFF program with a 14-month Stand-By Arrangement, worth around $3.9 billion, and initially disbursed around $1.4 billion. Natalia Zinets, "Ukraine Goes Back to the Future as IMF Programme Stutters," Reuters, August 1, 2018; IMF, "IMF Executive Board Approves 14-month US$3.9 Billion Stand-By Arrangement for Ukraine, US$1.4 Billion for Immediate Disbursement," press release, December 18, 2018.

    102.

    World Bank, Ukraine Economic Update, April 10, 2018, at https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2019/05/23/ukraine-economic-update-spring-2019; World Bank, Ukraine Economic Update, May 23, 2019, at https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2019/05/23/ukraine-economic-update-spring-2019.

    103.

    State Statistics Service of Ukraine, at http://ukrstat.gov.ua/.

    104.

    World Bank, Migration and Remittances Data, at http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migration-remittances-data.

    105.

    The total value of Ukraine's merchandise imports declined by 51% from 2013 to 2015, with the value of merchandise imports from Russia declining by 78% from 2013 to 2016. Trade data are from the State Customs Committee of Ukraine, as presented by Global Trade Atlas.

    106.

    European Commission, "European Union, Trade in Goods with Ukraine," June 3, 2019, at https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/isdb_results/factsheets/country/details_ukraine_en.pdf.

    107.

    State Statistics Service of Ukraine.

    108.

    See, for example, Anders Aslund, Securing Ukraine's Energy Sector, Atlantic Council, April 2016.

    109.

    Four of five members of the supervisory board of Ukraine's state-owned energy company, Naftogaz, resigned in 2017, citing delays in further reform and government interference in Naftogaz operations. Reuters, "Board of Ukraine's Naftogaz Resigns, Cites Reform Blockage by Govt," September 19, 2017.

    110.

    Naftogaz, "Naftogaz Reports on Progress of Unbundling," July 4, 2019; Interfax-Ukraine, "Honcharuk – Issue of Naftogaz's Unbundling to Be Settled in Coming Weeks," August 30, 2019.

    111.

    In particular, after Ukraine's 2004-2005 Orange Revolution, Russia clashed with Ukraine on several issues, including natural gas supply volumes, prices, and debt repayment. After gas contract negotiations failed, Russia twice briefly reduced and, in 2009, cut gas exports to Ukraine, leading to temporary dips in supplies to some EU countries. For more, see Jonathan Stern, The Russian-Ukrainian Gas Crisis of January 2006, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, January 16, 2006, and Simon Pirani, Jonathan Stern, and Katja Yafimava, The Russo-Ukrainian Gas Dispute of January 2009: A Comprehensive Assessment, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, February 2009.

    112.

    Data come from Naftogaz annual reports for 2014-2016.

    113.

    Natural gas consumption in Ukraine was already in decline since 2012-2013 (by around 8% a year), and it declined even more markedly in 2014 and 2015 (by 16% and 20%, respectively) due to a decline in industrial production, the halting of gas supplies to the nongovernment-controlled areas of eastern Ukraine, and higher tariffs. In 2016, the annual decline in consumption slowed to 2%. Naftogaz of Ukraine, Annual Report 2016, p. 75, at http://www.naftogaz.com/files/Zvity/Anual_report_eng_170608.pdf.

    114.

    Calculated on the basis of International Energy Agency, "Facts in Brief: Ukraine, Europe, Oil & Gas," March 4, 2014; Naftogaz of Ukraine, Annual Report 2016, p. 71; and Gazpromexport, "Gas Supplies to Europe."

    115.

    In October 2017, then-U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Marie Yovanovitch said that Nord Stream 2 would "cost Ukraine up to $2.7 billion in lost revenues, or almost 3% of GDP every year." According to the Nord Stream 2 project website, these revenues include operating costs. Naftogaz, 2017 Annual Report, p. 101; U.S. Embassy in Ukraine, "Remarks by Ambassador Yovanovitch at Opening of Naftogaz Oil and Gas Forum," October 24, 2017; Nord Stream 2 website, at www.nord-stream2.com.

    116.

    Reuters, "Ukraine's Naftogaz Claims $2.56 Billion Victory in Gazprom Legal Battle," February 28, 2018; TASS Russian News Agency, "Gazprom Appeals Against Court Decision on Gas Transit Contract with Ukraine's Naftogaz," March 30, 2018; Reuters, "Swedish Appeals Court Suspends Gazprom Vs Naftogaz Arbitration Ruling," June 14, 2018.

    117.

    For more, see CRS In Focus IF11138, Nord Stream 2: A Fait Accompli?, by Paul Belkin et al.

    118.

    DW, "EU Adopts French, German Compromise on Nord Stream 2 Pipeline to Russia," February 8, 2019.

    119.

    Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Premature Partnership," Foreign Affairs 73, no. 2 (March/April 1994), p. 80.

    120.

    See footnote 119.

    121.

    U.S. Department of State, "Acting Secretary Sullivan's Meeting with Ukrainian Foreign Minister Klimkin," April 21, 2018; U.S. Department of State, "Crimea Is Ukraine," February 27, 2019.

    122.

    U.S. Department of State, "Remarks at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Diplomatic Academy," February 21, 2018.

    123.

    U.S. Department of State, "Crimea Declaration," July 25, 2018.

    124.

    U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, "Press Release Issued by the Department of State on July 23, 1940," at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1940v01/d412. Also see U.S. Department of State, "Seventy-Fifth Anniversary of the Welles Declaration," July 22, 2015, at https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2015/07/245160.htm.

    125.

    U.S. Department of State, "Crimea Is Ukraine," March 14, 2018.

    126.

    U.S. Department of State, "Crimea Is Ukraine," February 27, 2019.

    127.

    Since November 2017, Special Representative Volker has conducted at least nine on-the-record press briefings, available at https://www.state.gov/countries-areas-archive/ukraine/.

    128.

    U.S. Department of State, "Latest Developments on Ukraine Negotiations," April 13, 2018.

    129.

    U.S. Department of State, "Detainee Exchange Between Ukraine and Russia-Led Forces," December 28, 2017; U.S. Department of State, "Latest Developments on Ukraine Negotiations," April 13, 2018.

    130.

    U.S. Department of State, "Press Briefing with Kurt Volker, Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations," January 31, 2019; U.S. Department of State, "LiveAtState With Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations Kurt Volker," May 28, 2019.

    131.

    U.S. Department of State, "Ukraine Passes Key Hurdle in Implementation of Minsk Peace Agreements," October 11, 2018.

    132.

    U.S. Department of State, "Condemning Sham 'Elections' in Russia-Controlled Eastern Ukraine," November 12, 2018.

    133.

    U.S. Department of State, "Russia's Decision to Grant Expedited Citizenship to Residents of Russia-Controlled Eastern Ukraine," April 24, 2019.

    134.

    Subsequently, in August 2018, the State Department called on Russia "to cease its harassment of international shipping in the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait." U.S. Department of State, "The Opening of the Kerch Bridge in Crimea," May 15, 2018; U.S. Department of State, "Russia's Harassment of International Shipping Transiting the Kerch Strait and Sea of Azov," August 30, 2018.

    135.

    See, for example, U.S. Department of State, "Russia's Dangerous Escalation in the Kerch Strait," November 26, 2018. In response to Russia's actions, according to the White House, President Trump canceled a scheduled meeting with President Putin at a G-20 summit in Buenos Aires.

    136.

    U.S. Department of State, "Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin Statements to the Press," November 16, 2018.

    137.

    U.S. Department of State, "Remarks at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Diplomatic Academy," February 21, 2018.

    138.

    U.S. Department of State, "Remarks to NATO-Ukraine Commission," U.S. Department of State, March 31, 2017.

    139.

    U.S. Department of State, "Fourth Anniversary of Ukraine's Revolution of Dignity," February 19, 2018.

    140.

    U.S. Embassy in Ukraine, "Remarks by Ambassador Yovanovitch on the Occasion of the 5th Anniversary of the Ukraine Crisis Media Center's Founding," March 5, 2019.

    141.

    U.S. Department of State, "Remarks at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Diplomatic Academy," February 21, 2018.

    142.

    U.S. Department of State, "Ukraine's Anti-Corruption Court Legislation," June 20, 2018. Also see U.S. Department of State, "The Importance of an Independent Anti-Corruption Court for Ukraine," June 5, 2018.

    143.

    U.S. Department of State, "Ukraine's New Law on National Security," July 6, 2018.

    144.

    U.S. Department of State, "Progress on Ukraine Energy Reforms," July 24, 2018.

    145.

    U.S. Embassy in Ukraine, "Remarks by Ambassador Yovanovitch on the Occasion of the 5th Anniversary of the Ukraine Crisis Media Center's Founding," March 5, 2019.

    146.

    Foreign aid totals from FY1992 to FY2000 include all agencies and accounts. See U.S. Department of State, U.S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities With the New Independent States of the Former Soviet Union (submitted pursuant to Section 104 of the FREEDOM Support Act, P.L. 102-511), FY2000 Annual Report (Appendix), January 2001, at https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/nisasst/index.htm.

    147.

    CRS calculations, based on data available in the U.S. Department of State's annual U.S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with Eurasia reports for FY2001 to FY2009, at https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/c10250.htm.

    148.

    Since FY2010, the U.S. government has not provided a comprehensive accounting of foreign aid to post-Soviet states similar to that included in the annual Section 104 reports issued through FY2009. From FY2010, State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) assistance cited in the text refer to actual funds, as reported in the State Department's annual Congressional Budget Justifications. Nonproliferation and threat reduction assistance refers to obligated funds from the Department of Energy Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation and Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) accounts, as reported by USAID. FY2014 CTR funds include some assistance provided in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. USAID Foreign Aid Explorer, at https://explorer.usaid.gov/.

    149.

    This total includes all State Department and USAID bilateral assistance, except for the Foreign Military Financing and International Military Education and Training accounts.

    150.

    The subsidy cost of the third loan guarantee ($290 million) was included in the total amount of State Department/USAID assistance for FY2016 but is not included in the calculations in the text. On loan guarantees, see CRS In Focus IF10409, U.S. Foreign Assistance: USAID Loan Guarantees, and USAID, "USAID Announces U.S. Issuance of $1 Billion Loan Guarantee to the Government of Ukraine," press release, September 30, 2016.

    151.

    H.Rept. 116-78 to accompany H.R. 2839.

    152.

    CRS calculations, based on USAID's end-fiscal year (and June 24, 2019) Ukraine - Complex Emergency Fact Sheet for FY2015 to FY2019, at https://www.usaid.gov/crisis/ukraine/ukraine-disaster-response-archive.

    153.

    U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), "DOD Announces $250M to Ukraine," press release, June 18, 2019.

    154.

    Rachel Oswald, "Trump Released Hold on Ukraine Aid; Democrats Unsatisfied," CQ, September 13, 2019.

    155.

    See footnote 154.

    156.

    See, for example, Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy, "How Aiding the Ukrainian Military Could Push Putin into a Regional War," Washington Post, February 5, 2015.

    157.

    U.S. Department of Defense, "Secretary Mattis Joint Press Conference with Ukrainian President Poroshenko," August 24, 2017.

    158.

    Defense Security Cooperation Agency, "Ukraine – Javelin Missiles and Command Launch Units," Transmittal No. 18-02, March 1, 2018; Mike Eckel and Christopher Miller, "Next Up for U.S. Weapons Supplies to Ukraine? Possibly Surface-to-Air Missiles," RFE/RL, June 11, 2019.

    159.

    The Multinational Joint Commission on Defense Reform and Security Cooperation originated in 2014 as a bilateral U.S.-Ukraine commission and expanded to include Canada, Lithuania, and the UK and, subsequently, Poland, Denmark, and Sweden. The White House, "Fact Sheet: U.S. and NATO Efforts in Support of NATO Partners, Including Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova," July 9, 2016; Government of Canada, "Operation UNIFIER," December 3, 2018; Interfax-Ukraine, "War Won't Prevent Ukraine from Completing Army Reform, Adopting NATO Standards – Turchynov," February 1, 2019.

    160.

    U.S. Department of Defense, "Readout of Secretary Carter's Meeting with Ukrainian Minister of Defense General Stepan Poltorak," September 8, 2016.

    161.

    U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa, "Sixth Fleet Announces Sea Breeze 2019 Participation," press release, June 25, 2019; Ed Adamczyk, "U.S. Navy Prepares for 'Sea Breeze 2019' Naval Exercises in Ukraine," UPI, June 28, 2019.

    162.

    7th Army Training Command, "Rapid Trident," n.d.; Spc. Michael Sword, "Secretary of Army Witnesses Rapid Trident 2011 in Ukraine," U.S. Army, August 5, 2011; John Vandiver, "Rapid Trident Exercise Takes Place in Ukraine, a Country at War," Stars and Stripes, September 18, 2014; Lacey Justinger, "Exercise Rapid Trident 2018 Enables Relationships to Cross Borders," U.S. Army, September 14, 2018.

    163.

    During the exercise, a Ukrainian SU-27 fighter jet crashed, killing a U.S. fighter pilot from the California Air National Guard and a Ukrainian air force officer. Oriana Pawlyk, "Air National Guard Identifies Pilots Killed in Ukraine Crash," Military.com, October 17, 2018; Kyle Rempfer, "U.S. Air Force's Huge Exercise in Ukraine Fuels Growing Partnership and That Country's NATO Ambitions," Air Force Times, November 13, 2018.

    164.

    ICS-CERT, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure," February 25, 2016; Kim Zetter, "Inside the Cunning, Unprecedented Hack of Ukraine's Power Grid," Wired, March 3, 2016; U.S. Department of State, "Second U.S.-Ukraine Cybersecurity Dialogue," November 5, 2018.

    165.

    P.L. 109-205. Before then, Ukraine was subject to Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-618; 19 U.S.C. 2101 et seq.), pursuant to which Russia and other post-Soviet states were denied permanent normal trade relations status. The Trade Act had originally imposed restrictions on trade with the Soviet Union, due to its nonmarket economy and prohibitive emigration policies (the latter through Section 402, popularly cited as the Jackson-Vanik amendment). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, these trade restrictions formally continued to apply to Russia and other post-Soviet states, even though they received conditional normal trade relations in 1992.

    166.

    Data in this section are from the State Customs Committee of Ukraine, as presented in Global Trade Atlas.

    167.

    Ari Natter, "Ukraine Coal Exports Part of Trump Bid to Counter Russia," Bloomberg News, July 31, 2017; Alessandra Prentice, "How a U.S. Coal Deal Warmed Ukraine's Ties with Trump," Reuters, February 19, 2018.

    168.

    See, for example, H.Con.Res. 120 (1996), S.Res. 205 (2002), and S.Res. 422 (2010).

    169.

    See, for example, S.Res. 473 (2004), S.Res. 487 (2004), and H.Con.Res. 16/S.Con.Res. 7 (2005).

    170.

    See H.Res. 440 (1986), H.Con.Res. 167/S.Con.Res. 56 (1996), H.Res. 703 (2006), and S.Res. 153 (2011).

    171.

    Historians attribute the famine, which Ukrainians refer to as the Holodomor, to the coercive policies of Joseph Stalin's regime. The famine killed almost 4 million Ukrainians, according to current estimates. In 1985, Congress established a Commission on the Ukraine Famine (P.L. 99-180), which held hearings with eyewitnesses, published findings, and conducted a related oral history project. In 2006, Congress passed legislation authorizing the government of Ukraine to establish a memorial on federal land to honor the victims of the Ukraine famine (P.L. 109-340). The memorial was established in 2015. Anne Applebaum, Red Famine: Stalin's War on Ukraine (Doubleday, 2017); Commission on the Ukraine Famine, Investigation of the Ukrainian Famine, 1932-1933, Report to Congress, submitted to Congress on April 22, 1988; Roma Hadzewycz, "Over 5,000 Witness Dedication of Holodomor Memorial in Washington," Ukrainian Weekly, November 13, 2015.

    172.

    The House passedsanctions on Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine. Outlook

    More than six years after Ukraine's Euromaidan protests and Russia's invasion, Ukraine continues to grapple with a number of internal and external challenges. Issues that Members of Congress may consider in seeking to influence or shape U.S. relations with Ukraine could include the following:

    • How to assist Ukraine's new government in sustaining a democratic and reform-minded trajectory;
    • How to help Ukraine implement and consolidate governance and anti-corruption reforms supported by the international community and Ukrainian civil society;
    • How to assist Ukraine in its efforts to restore sovereignty over its territory, re-engage Russia in the conflict resolution process, achieve a sustainable political settlement, and promote security and humanitarian needs in and around conflict-affected regions;
    • How to assess the effectiveness of current levels and kinds of economic and security (including lethal) assistance to Ukraine;
    • How to further promote Ukraine's energy security; and
    • How to increase Ukraine's benefits from its free trade agreement with the EU and its overall partnerships with the EU and NATO.

    Author Contact Information

    Cory Welt, Specialist in European Affairs ([email address scrubbed], [phone number scrubbed])

    Footnotes

    1.

    Historical surveys of Ukraine include Orest Subtelny, Ukraine: A History, 4th ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009); Paul Robert Magosci, A History of Ukraine: The Land and Its Peoples, 2nd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010); and Serhii Plokhy, The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine (New York: Basic Books, 2015).

    2.

    Freedom House ranks all countries in the world on a "freedom" scale, which includes measures of political rights and civil liberties. Freedom House also scores post-Communist states on an index of "democratic progress" ranging between 1 (most democratic) and 7 (least democratic). States that receive a "democracy score" between 4 and 5 are considered "transitional governments or hybrid regimes." Ukraine has received a democracy score between 4 and 5 since at least 1999. See annual reports in Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2020, at https://freedomhouse.org/country/ukraine/freedom-world/2020, and Nations in Transit 2018, at https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2018/ukraine.

    3.

    In the first round of the election in March 2019, Volodomyr Zelensky won 30% of the vote. Petro Poroshenko came in second place, with 16%. Poroshenko is a wealthy businessman and member of parliament who supported the Euromaidan protests and won 55% of the popular vote in a May 2014 election to succeed Viktor Yanukovych. Poroshenko held government positions under Ukraine's two previous presidents, including as foreign minister (2009-2010) under Viktor Yushchenko and minister of trade and economic development (2011-2012) under Yanukovych.

    4.

    Leonid Bershidsky, "Religion Will Be on Ukraine's Ballot," Bloomberg, December 18, 2018.

    5.

    Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, "The Fight Against Corruption in Ukraine: Public Opinion," June 1, 2018; Volodymyr Yermolenko, "Does Poroshenko Have a Chance at a Second Term?" UkraineAlert, Atlantic Council, October 1, 2018.

    6.

    Single-mandate seats from 26 districts in occupied Crimea and the nongovernment-controlled areas of eastern Ukraine are unfilled.

    7.

    Oksana Grytsenko and Vyacheslav Hnatyuk, "What We Know About People Zelensky Will Take to Next Parliament," Kyiv Post, July 8, 2019.

    8.

    "Here's Every Member of Ukraine's New Cabinet of Ministers," Kyiv Post, August 29, 2019.

    9.

    Kyiv Post, "Zelensky on Cabinet Replacement: 'This Government Achieved More Than All the Rest, Combined,'" March 5, 2020.

    10.

    Anton Troianovski, "A Leak, a Resignation and Another Chance: Ukraine Infighting Grows," New York Times, January 17, 2020.

    11.

    Kyiv Institute of International Sociology, "Assessment of Authorities' Activities and Reaction to Current Events: February 2020" (in Ukrainian), February 27, 2020, at https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=920&page=1&t=1. Hereinafter, Kyiv Institute of International Sociology, "Assessment."

    12.

    Kyiv Institute of International Sociology, "Assessment"; Ukrinform, "Over Half of Ukrainians Trust President – Razumkov Center," February 24, 2020.

    13.

    A few ministers reportedly were invited to remain in the cabinet but declined, citing uncertainty about the government's policy course. Kyiv Post, "These Are the 10 Ministers Ousted in Ukraine's Cabinet Shakeup," March 9, 2020.

    14.

    Kyiv Post, "Riaboshapka to Parliament: 'I'm Leaving to Return,'" March 6, 2020.

    15.

    RFE/RL, "Ukraine's Government Reshuffle Raises Concerns over Reform Agenda," March 4, 2020, and Oleh Havrylyshyn and Basil Kalymon, "Ukraine's New Government Must Act Fast or Face Failure," Atlantic Council, March 5, 2020.

    16.

    Ihor Kolomoysky served as the head of administration in the Dnipropetrovsk region for one year until falling out with then-President Poroshenko in 2015.

    17.

    The former head of the National Bank of Ukraine now resides in London, where she has reported multiple attacks against her and her family related to the PrivatBank case and policies she implemented while in office. In September 2019, a house she owns outside Kyiv was the target of an alleged arson attack, for which she held Kolomoysky responsible. Matthias Williams and Natalia Zinets, "Comedian Faces Scrutiny over Oligarch Ties in Ukraine Presidential Race," Reuters, April 1, 2019; Shaun Walker and Andrew Roth, "'It's Revenge': Ukraine's Ex-Central Banker Blames Oligarch for Attacks," Guardian, November 12, 2019.

    18.

    Kolomoysky's influence also appeared to wane in February 2020, when Zelensky replaced as his chief of staff a lawyer who previously worked for Kolomoysky. Zelensky's current chief of staff is Andriy Yermak, a former foreign policy aide and media executive. Konstantin Sorokin, "Ukraine's Unromantic Reshuffle," Carnegie Moscow Center, March 6, 2020; Todd Prince, "Out Went the Cabinet, In Came the Coronavirus: Pressure Mounts for Reforms in Ukraine," RFE/RL, March 22, 2020.

    19.

    See, for example, Andrew Higgins and Andrew E. Kramer, "Converts Join with Militants in Kiev Clash," New York Times, February 21, 2014.

    20.

    Hromadske International, "Ukraine's 'Battalions' Army, Explained," September 17, 2014; Vera Mironova and Ekaterina Sergatskova, "How Ukraine Reined in Its Militias: The Lessons for Other States," Foreign Affairs, August 1, 2017; Kimberly Marten and Olga Oliker, "Ukraine's Volunteer Militias May Have Saved the Country, But Now They Threaten It," War on the Rocks, September 14, 2017.

    21.

    Bellingcat, "Ukraine's Ministry of Veterans Affairs Embraced the Far Right – with Consequences to the U.S.," November 11, 2019.

    22.

    Christopher Miller, "Azov, Ukraine's Most Prominent Ultranationalist Group, Sets Its Sights on U.S., Europe," RFE/RL, November 14, 2018; Oleksiy Kuzmenko, "'Defend the White Race': American Extremists Being Co-Opted by Ukraine's Far-Right," Bellingcat, February 15, 2019; Michael Colborne, "Inside the Extremist Group that Dreams of Ruling Ukraine," Haaretz, February 23, 2019.

    23.

    Amnesty International, Ukraine: Human Rights Under Pressure, Their Advocates Under Attack, February 8, 2019; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Civic Space and Fundamental Freedoms Ahead of the Presidential, Parliamentary and Local Elections in Ukraine in 2019-2020, March 12, 2019; Interfax Ukraine, "More than 80 Cases of Harassment of Public Activists in Ukraine Documented by Human Rights Groups in 2019 – Report," January 28, 2020.

    24.

    Tetiana Kozak, "Who Is Ordering Attacks on Activists in Ukraine," Open Democracy, August 23, 2018; RFE/RL, "Ukrainian Court Sentences Five Men in Activist's Death Following Acid Attack," June 6, 2019.

    25.

    International Monetary Fund (IMF), "Ukraine Receives IMF Support but Must Accelerate Reforms," IMF Country Focus, April 4, 2017.

    26.

    See, for example, Rowland Manthorpe, "From the Fires of Revolution, Ukraine Is Reinventing Government," Wired, August 20, 2018; Maryna Rabinovych, Anthony Levitas, and Andreas Umland, Revisiting Decentralization After Maidan: Achievements and Challenges of Ukraine's Local Governance Reform, Kennan Institute, July 16, 2018; UNIAN Information Agency, "Council of Europe Praises Judicial Reform in Ukraine," June 13, 2019; Melinda Haring, "Finally Some Good News from Ukraine," Atlantic Council, June 26, 2018.

    27.

    See, for example, IMF, "Reforming Ukraine's Pension System," in Ukraine: Selected Issues, March 7, 2017, pp. 19-37; World Bank, Ukraine Special Focus Note: Reforming Land Markets for Agricultural Growth, October 3, 2017; World Bank Group, Reducing Market Distortions for a More Prosperous Ukraine: Proposals for Market Regulation, Competition Policy, and Institutional Reform, March 2019.

    28.

    IMF, "Statement by the Managing Director on Ukraine," press release, February 10, 2016; Natalia Zinets, "Ukraine Goes Back to the Future as IMF Programme Stutters," Reuters, August 1, 2018.

    29.

    IMF, "IMF Executive Board Approves 14-Month US$3.9 Billion Stand-By Arrangement for Ukraine, US$1.4 Billion for Immediate Disbursement," press release, December 18, 2018.

    30.

    Oleksiy Sorokin and Anna Myroniuk, "Zelensky to Cabinet: Adopt Budget, Lift Land Moratorium, Legalize Casinos—Fast!" Kyiv Post, September 2, 2019; "Quick Wins, Big Promises: Zelensky's Agenda for Parliament, Government," Kyiv Post, September 6, 2019.

    31.

    Laws amending the election code and removing parliamentary immunity were enacted by the end of 2019. RFE/RL, "Ukraine Lifts Prosecutorial Immunity for Members of Parliament," December 19, 2019; International Foundation for Electoral Systems, "Ukraine's Parliament Adopts Historic Election Code," December 19, 2019; UNIAN Information Agency, "Rada Paves Path Toward Cutting Number of Parliament Seats," February 4, 2020.

    32.

    Razumkov Center, Ukraine 2019-2020: Broad Opportunities, Contradictory Results (2020), p. 151.

    33.

    Tetyana Tyshchuk, "iMoRe: Quarterly Review, Quarter III, 2019: Calm Before the Storm?" Vox Ukraine, December 12, 2019, and Kseniia Alekankina, "Turbo-Mode of the Ukrainian Government: Reforms in the 4th Quarter of 2019," Vox Ukraine, January 29, 2020. Also see Razumkov Center, Ukraine 2019-2020: Broad Opportunities, Contradictory Results, 2020.

    34.

    IMF, "Statement by the IMF Managing Director on Ukraine," December 7, 2019; IMF, "Statement by the IMF Managing Director on Ukraine," March 26, 2020.

    35.

    Hromadske International, "Looking Back at Ukraine's 2019: A New Government at the Center of Attention," December 23, 2019; Roman Olearchyk, "Ukraine Sows Seeds of Suspicion with Land Sale Plans," Financial Times, January 19, 2020; Ilona Sologoub, "Ukraine's Top Five 2020 Reform Priorities," Atlantic Council, January 21, 2020; and Anders Aslund, "Zelenskyy Must Not Miss His Chance to Change Ukraine," Atlantic Council, February 6, 2020.

    36.

    Andrew E. Kramer, "Ukraine Is Threatening to Arrest Its Former President," New York Times, February 28, 2020; RFE/RL, "Ukraine's Ex-President Calls on President 'To Stop Persecuting Opposition,' Before Questioning," February 28, 2020.

    37.

    Ben Aris, "Final Version of Ukraine's Banking Law Agreed with IMF," bne Intellinews, March 24, 2020; Roman Olearchyk, "Ukraine Seeks to Unblock IMF Aid with Bank Clean-Up Law," Financial Times, March 26, 2020; Iuliia Mendel, "Two Historic Votes for Ukraine," Atlantic Council, March 30, 2020.

    38.

    Land reform was more gradual than originally planned. The original draft provided for sales of up to 200,000 hectares. Hromadske International, "Ukrainian Parliament Passes Land Market Law," March 31, 2020.

    39.

    International Republican Institute and Rating Group Ukraine, "Public Opinion Survey: Residents of Ukraine, December 13-29, 2019," March 6, 2020, at https://www.iri.org/resource/new-national-survey-ukraine-highlights-ukrainian-views-economic-and-geopolitical-issues.

    40.
    41.

    For an overview, see John Lough and Vladimir Dubrovskiy, Are Ukraine's Anti-Corruption Reforms Working?, Chatham House, November 2018.

    42.

    Marc Jones, "IMF Backs Ukraine Anti-corruption Court Plan," Reuters, July 25, 2018; Ukrinform, "How Judges of High Anti-Corruption Court Were Selected," April 16, 2019.

    43.

    Jessica Donati and James Marson, "Feud Thwarts FBI-Backed Anti-corruption Efforts in Ukraine," Wall Street Journal, December 7, 2017.

    44.

    Transparency International, "Constitutional Court Ruling Undermines Anti-corruption Achievements in Ukraine," March 1, 2019; Oleksandra Drik, "Why the West Should Be Worried About Ukraine's Flagging Fight Against Graft," Atlantic Council, March 12, 2019; Ukrinform, "World Bank Welcomes Signing of Law on Illicit Enrichment in Ukraine," November 26, 2019.

    45.

    Interfax-Ukraine, "Sytnyk Put on Public Register of Persons Committed Corruption-Related Crimes," December 20, 2019; Matthew Kupfer and Olga Rudenko, "Ukraine's Top Anti-Corruption Official Under Fire from Targets of His Investigations," Kyiv Post, February 20, 2020.

    46.

    Melinda Haring, "Ukraine Is Sliding Back, Sergii Leshchenko Warns," Atlantic Council, March 2, 2017. Also see UNIAN Information Agency, "Chief Anti-Corruption Prosecutor Nazar Kholodnytsky: 'As a Citizen, I Also Crave to See the Verdicts Handed Down Quickly… It's So Hard to Be a Pioneer," April 27, 2017; Anti-Corruption Action Center (Kyiv), "General Kholodnytskyi – Go Away," July 25, 2018.

    47.

    Oleg Sukhov and Olena Goncharova, "Anti-Corruption Prosecutor Alleged to Have Blocked Cases Against Powerful Suspects," Kyiv Post, April 6, 2018; Olena Makarenko, "Divorce of Ukrainian Anti-corruption Institutions: Will It Affect the Investigations Against Top-Corrupts?" Euromaidan Press, July 19, 2018.

    48.

    Olena Makarenko, "Ukraine's Main Anti-Corruption Prosecutor Keeps Office Despite Gross Violations of Professional Ethics," Euromaidan Press, July 27, 2018; Oleg Sukhov, "Criminal Case Against Anti-Corruption Prosecutor Kholodnytsky Closed," Kyiv Post, January 29, 2019.

    49.

    Ukrinform, "Kholodnytsky Hopes Anti-Corruption Court Will Put End to Top Corruption Cases," October 29, 2019; Matthew Kupfer and Olga Rudenko, "Ukraine's Top Anti-Corruption Official Under Fire from Targets of His Investigations," Kyiv Post, February 20, 2020.

    50.

    National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine: Results and Challenges, July-December 2019 Report, pp. 23, 38-39, at https://nabu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/reports/zvit_-_ii_2019_all_0.pdf.

    51.

    Blerta Cela, "Electronic Asset Declarations for Public Officials – Two Years After Its Launch. A Panacea Against Corruption?" UNDP Ukraine, August 25, 2018.

    52.

    Oleg Sukhov, "Top Anti-graft Official Accuses Her Own Agency of Corruption, Political Persecution," Kyiv Post, November 14, 2017; Olena Prokopenko, "Why Ukraine's Major Achievement in Government Transparency May Fail," Atlantic Council, April 2, 2018.

    53.

    Government of Ukraine, "Government Appoints Oleksandr Novikov as Head of the National Agency on Corruption Prevention," press release, January 15, 2020.

    54.

    Oleg Sukhov, "Riaboshapka's Housecleaning: Will It Bring Justice for Ukraine?" Kyiv Post, January 17, 2020; Robyn Dixon and David L. Stern, "How Ukraine's Zelensky Lost the Anti-corruption Movement," Washington Post, March 17, 2020.

    55.

    Kyiv Post, "Riaboshapka to Parliament: 'I'm Leaving to Return,'" March 6, 2020.

    56.

    Olena Makarenko, "Ukrainian Parliament Reboots State Bureau of Investigations, Unblocks Probe into Maidan Massacre," Euromaidan Press, December 5, 2019.

    57.

    Hromadske International, "Yanukovych's Ex-Lawyer Becomes Deputy Head of Bureau That Probes Euromaidan Crimes," January 21, 2020.

    58.

    Oleg Sukhov, "Constitutional Court Cancels Most of Zelensky's Judicial Reform," Kyiv Post, March 12, 2020.

    59.

    Olena Halushka and Halyna Chyzhyk, "Is Ukraine's New Judicial Reform a Step Forward?" Atlantic Council, October 24, 2019. Also see Iryna Budz, "What Prevents Ukrainian Judiciary From Becoming Truly Effective and Independent?, Vox Ukraine, July 24, 2019; and Maria Popova and Daniel J. Beers, "No Revolution of Dignity for Ukraine's Judges: Judicial Reform After the Euromaidan," Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, vol. 28, no. 1 (Winter 2020), pp. 113-142.

    60.

    Oleg Sukhov, "Zelensky's Obstacles on the Way to Rule of Law," Kyiv Post, September 6, 2019.

    61.

    Oleg Sukhov, "Experts Claim Zelensky's Judicial Reform on Brink of Collapse," Kyiv Post, January 6, 2020.

    62.

    The newly established Orthodox Church of Ukraine incorporated the former Kyiv Patriarchate and a smaller self-declared Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. Ecumenical Patriarchate, "Patriarchal and Synodol Tomos for the Bestowal of the Ecclesiastical Status of Autocephaly to the Orthodox Church in Ukraine," January 14, 2019.

    63.

    RFE/RL, "One-Third Of Ukrainians Say They Belong to Church Independent of Moscow," RFE/RL, February 4, 2020.

    64.

    Bohdan Ben, "New Independent Church and Moscow Patriarchate Vie for Parishes in Ukraine," Euromaidan Press, January 30, 2019; RFE/RL, "Epifaniy: About 600 Parishes of Moscow-Aligned Church Convert to New Ukrainian Orthodox Church," January 6, 2020.

    65.

    Peter Dickinson, "Nation-Building Ukraine Marks a Year of Orthodox Independence," Atlantic Council, February 13, 2020.

    66.

    Gabby Deutch, "Ukraine's Spiritual Split from Russia Could Trigger a Global Schism," Atlantic, October 11, 2018; Robert Person and Aaron Brantly, "The Ukrainian Orthodox Church Is Trying to Withdraw from Moscow's Control. The Kremlin Is Not Happy," Washington Post, October 31, 2018; Christine Borovkova and Andreas Umland, "How Russia's Orthodox Church Rejects Ukrainian Autocephaly," Vox Ukraine, August 6, 2019.

    67.

    U.S. Department of State, "Declaration of Ukrainian Autocephaly," January 10, 2019.

    68.

    @SecPompeo, Twitter, January 31, 2020.

    69.

    Associated Press, "Putin: Russians, Ukrainians Are 'One People,'" July 20, 2019.

    70.

    Studies of the conflict in Crimea and eastern Ukraine include Richard Sakwa, Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands (I.B. Tauris, 2016); Michael Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine (RAND Corporation, 2017); Samuel Charap and Timothy J. Colton, Everyone Loses: The Ukraine Crisis and the Ruinous Contest for Post-Soviet Eurasia (Routledge/IISS, 2017); Lawrence Freedman, Ukraine and the Art of Strategy (Oxford University Press, 2019); and Sabine Fischer, The Donbas Conflict: Opposing Interests and Narratives, Difficult Peace Process, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), 2019.

    71.

    Patrick Tucker, "U.S. Intelligence Officials and Satellite Photos Detail Russian Military Buildup on Crimea," Defense One, June 12, 2019; Ukrinform, "Already 31,500 Russian Troops Deployed in Occupied Crimea," November 7, 2019.

    72.

    Crimean Tatars made up about 10%-15% of Crimea's population before the occupation. OHCHR, "Situation of Human Rights in the Temporarily Occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol (Ukraine)," September 25, 2017.

    73.

    These assurances were provided in connection with Ukraine's assent to the removal of nuclear weapons from its territory. The official title of the Budapest Memorandum is the Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine's Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. United Nations General Assembly/Security Council (A/49/765, S/1994/1399), December 19, 1994, at https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/169471?ln=en. For details, see Steven Pifer, The Trilateral Process: The United States, Ukraine, Russia and Nuclear Weapons, Brookings, May 2011.

    74.

    U.N. General Assembly Resolutions A/RES/68/262, March 27, 2014; A/RES/71/205, December 19, 2016; A/RES/72/190, December 19, 2017; A/RES/73/194, December 17, 2018; A/RES/73/263, December 22, 2018; A/RES/74/17, December 9, 2019; and A/RES/74/168, December 18, 2019.

    75.

    UAWire, "Paris Court Upholds Decision To Collect Ukrainian Bank's Crimea-Related Losses from Russia," October 25, 2019.

    76.

    Ukrinform, "Permanent Court of Arbitration: Russia Illegally Seizes Assets of Naftogaz in Crimea," March 1, 2019; Ukrinform, "Naftogaz Continues To Sue Russia for Lost Crimean Assets," February 10, 2020.

    77.

    Roman Olearchyk, "Ukraine Hits Russia with Another Legal Claim," Financial Times, September 14, 2016; Ukrinform, "Ukraine v. Russia: Permanent Court of Arbitration Publishes Positions of Parties," June 11, 2019; UNIAN Information Agency, "Ukraine's MFA on Arbitral Tribunal Award: Russia to Face Legal Scrutiny for Kerch Bridge Construction," February 21, 2020.

    78.

    Will Englund, "International Court Clears Way to Hear Cases Against Russia on Crimea and Eastern Ukraine," Washington Post, November 8, 2019.

    79.

    Maj. Michael Cohen, "Ukraine's Battle at Ilovaisk, August 2014: The Tyranny of Means," Military Review, June 10, 2016; Maj. Amos C. Fox, "Cyborgs at Little Stalingrad": A Brief History of the Battles of the Donetsk Airport, Institute of Land Warfare, May 2019; and Maj. Amos C. Fox, "Battle of Debal'tseve: The Conventional Line of Effort in Russia's Hybrid War in Ukraine," Armor (Winter 2017), pp. 45-52.

    80.

    Yuriy Vyshnevskyy, "Demography of ORDLO (Separate Districts of Donetsk and Luhansk Regions)," Delovaya Stolitsa (Ukraine), n.d., at https://www.dsnews.ua/static/longread/donbas-eng/demography-of-ordlo.html.

    81.

    Then-U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley said, "militants in eastern Ukraine report directly to the Russian military, which arms them, trains them, leads them and fights alongside them." U.S. Department of State, "Press Briefing with Kurt Volker, Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations," November 8, 2018; Remarks at the U.N. Security Council (S/PV.8270, 16), May 29, 2018, at https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.8270.

    82.

    Reuters, "Some 12,000 Russian Soldiers in Ukraine Supporting Rebels: U.S. Commander," March 3, 2015.

    83.

    Remarks at the U.N. Security Council (S/PV.8461, 23), February 12, 2019, at https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.8461.

    84.

    UNIAN Information Agency, "Ukraine's Defense Minister: Over 25,000 Russian Troops in Occupied Donbas Now," February 19, 2020.

    85.

    U.S. Department of State, "Latest Developments on Ukraine Negotiations," April 13, 2018.

    86.

    This includes an estimated 110 Ukrainian combatant deaths, 27 civilian deaths, and (according to Ukrainian estimates) more than 600 deaths among Russia-led forces in 2019. OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine: 16 November 2019 to 15 February 2020, pp. 7-8; Olena Goncharova, "Russia's War Kills 110 Soldiers in 2019, 10 Soldiers in 2020 Already," Kyiv Post, January 24, 2020; UNIAN Information Agency, "JFO HQ Reveals Enemy Death Toll in Donbas Over 2019," January 2, 2020.

    87.

    Zeke J. Miller, "U.S. Officials Say They Tracked 'Specific' Missile That Downed Malaysian Plane," Time, July 22, 2014; Aric Toler, "British Intelligence Report Confirms Russian Military Origin of MH17 Murder Weapon," Bellingcat, December 20, 2017; Netherlands Police, "Update in Criminal Investigation [of the] MH17 Disaster," press release, May 24, 2018. Also see Bellingcat, The Open Source Investigation: Three Years Later, July 17, 2017.

    88.

    Among MH17's passengers were 193 Dutch citizens and 18 citizens of other EU countries. Government of the Netherlands, "Suspects to Be Prosecuted for the Downing of Flight MH17," press release, June 19, 2019; Claire Parker, "Here's What We Know About the Four Suspects Charged with Downing Flight MH17," Washington Post, June 19, 2019.

    89.

    Nataliya Vasilyeva, "Russia Offers Ukrainians in Conflict Zones Quick Citizenship," AP, April 24, 2019; RFE/RL, "Putin Widens Citizenship Offer to All Residents of Ukraine's Donetsk, Luhansk Regions," July 18, 2019.

    90.

    Russia has provided citizenship to residents in regions of other countries it has militarily occupied (including Georgia's Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions and Moldova's Transnistria region). Observers note that Russia justified its invasion of Georgia in 2008 in part by asserting a need to defend Russian citizens in Georgia's South Ossetia region. UNIAN, "About 200,000 Donbas Residents Obtain Russian Citizenship in 2019 – Russian Media," January 2, 2020; Yuri Zoria, "Is Russia's Passport Scheme in Donbas a Harbinger of Full-Scale Invasion Like in 2008 Georgia?" Euromaidan Press, May 14, 2019.

    91.

    Ukrinform, "Social Policy Ministry: Over 1,000 IDPs Registered in Ukraine Over Past Week," March 10, 2020.

    92.

    Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, at http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/ukraine; Krzystof Nieczypor, "In the Shadow of War: Ukraine's Policy Towards Internally Displaced Persons," OSW Centre for Eastern Studies (Warsaw), January 16, 2019.

    93.

    U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), "Supreme Court of Ukraine Takes Landmark Decision to Protect Pension Rights of IDPs," September 7, 2018; Human Rights Watch, "Ukraine: Pension Issues, Crossing Conditions," July 10, 2019.

    94.

    UNHCR, "Checkpoints Monthly Crossings – Online Dashboard," at https://www.unhcr.org/ua/en/resources.

    95.

    UNHCR/Right to Protection, "Eastern Ukraine Checkpoint Monitoring – Online Dashboard – 2019," at https://www.unhcr.org/ua/en/resources.

    96.

    Human Rights Watch, "Ukraine: Barriers to Free Movement for Older People," November 29, 2018; Olga Malchevska, "The Killer Queues of Ukraine," BBC World Service, May 28, 2019; RFE/RL, "In Symbolic Move, Ukraine's Zelenskiy Opens Rebuilt Bridge In War-Torn East," November 21, 2019.

    97.

    UNHCR, Freedom of Movement Across the Line of Contact in Eastern Ukraine, July 2018, pp. 1, 4; Ukrainian Ministry of Temporarily Occupied Territories and Internally Displaced Persons, "A New Order for Crossing the Contact Line in the East Approved," July 18, 2019.

    98.

    Human Rights Watch, "Ukraine: Dozens Stranded in a War Zone," April 2, 2020.

    99.

    Nataliya Vasilyeva, "Ukraine's Richest Man Plays Both Sides of War's Frontline," Associated Press, September 22, 2015; Fred Weir, "In Ukraine, Blockade Threatens to Force Issue at Heart of Civil War," Christian Science Monitor, February 28, 2017; RFE/RL, "Ukraine Announces Suspension of Cargo Traffic with Separatist-Held Areas," March 15, 2017.

    100.

    "Protocol on the Outcome of Consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group on Joint Steps Aimed at the Implementation of the Peace Plan of the President of Ukraine, P. Poroshenko, and the Initiatives of the President of the Russian Federation, V. Putin," September 5, 2014, at https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/UA_140905_MinskCeasfire_en.pdf; and "Memorandum on the Implementation of the Provisions of the Protocol […]," September 19, 2014, at https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/UA_140919_MemoImplementationPeacePlan_en.pdf.

    101.

    "Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements," February 12, 2015, at https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/UA_150212_MinskAgreement_en.pdf.

    102.

    U.N. Security Council Resolution 2202 (2015), at https://undocs.org/S/RES/2202(2015).

    103.

    U.N. Security Council, "Condemning Continuous Ceasefire Violations in Eastern Ukraine, Security Council Presidential Statement Expresses Grave Concern About Severe Impact on Civilians," SC/13367, June 6, 2018.

    104.

    U.S. Department of State, "Secretary Tillerson Appoints Ambassador Kurt Volker Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations," July 7, 2017.

    105.

    See, for example, "What Are the Minsk Agreements?" Economist, September 14, 2016; U.S. Department of State, "U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations Kurt Volker," November 3, 2017; Tim B. Peters and Anastasiia Shapkina, The Grand Stalemate of the Minsk Agreements, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, February 2019; and Anna Hess Sargsyan, Unpacking Complexity in the Ukraine Peace Process, Center for Security Studies (ETH Zurich), April 2019.

    106.

    See, for example, remarks by Halit Çevik, Chief Monitor, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, in the U.N. Security Council, February 18, 2020 (S/PV.8726, 5/24), at https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.8726.

    107.

    Disengagement areas are provided for in a September 2016 Framework Decision on Disengagement of Forces and Hardware. See OSCE, "Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine Sajdik Welcomes Framework Decision on Disengagement of Forces and Hardware," September 21, 2016; Hromadske International, "Ukraine's War-Torn Stanytsia Luhanska Sees Historic Separation of Forces," June 27, 2019; Hromadske International, "Why Some Zolote Residents Oppose Disengagement of Forces," October 14, 2019; Ukrinform, "Ukraine's Armed Forces Preparing for Disengagement of Forces in Petrivske on November 8," November 7, 2019.

    108.

    OSCE SMM to Ukraine, "Status Report as of 9 March 2020," March 16, 2020, at https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/448507.

    109.

    In addition to the SMM, the OSCE operates an Observer Mission at the Russian Checkpoints Gukovo and Donetsk (both within Russia) to monitor border crossings to and from eastern Ukraine. See the OSCE Observer Mission webpage at https://www.osce.org/observer-mission-at-russian-checkpoints-gukovo-and-donetsk.

    110.

    See, for example, Ukrinform, "UN Sends Over 157 Tonnes of Humanitarian Aid to Occupied Donbas," November 22, 2019; Ukrinform, "Red Cross Sends 137 Tonnes of Humanitarian Aid to Occupied Donbas," March 12, 2020.

    111.

    Anna Arutunyan, "Getting Aid to Separatist-Held Ukraine," International Crisis Group, May 13, 2019.

    112.

    Inna Varenytsia, "Ukrainian Authorities and Separatist Rebels Swap Prisoners," Associated Press, December 27, 2017.

    113.

    Oksana Grytsenko, "What We Know About 35 Ukrainian Political Prisoners Released from Russia," Kyiv Post, September 7, 2019; Hromadske International, "The Great Exchange: Whom Did Ukraine Send to Russia?," September 7, 2019.

    114.

    Oksana Grytsenko, "Ukraine, Russian-Backed Militants Exchange 200 Prisoners amid Controversy," Kyiv Post, December 29, 2019; Hromadske International, "The Cost of Freedom: Who Was Exchanged in Occupied Donbas Prisoner Swap?," December 30, 2019.

    115.

    llia Ponomarenko and Matthew Kupfer, "In Prisoner Swap, Ukraine Releases Alleged Killers, Terrorists with Ties to Russia," December 31, 2019.

    116.

    Bermet Talant, "Ombudswoman: We Will Bring All Ukrainian Political Prisoners Home," Kyiv Post, March 12, 2020; RFE/RL, "Abductions, Torture, 'Hybrid Deportation': Crimean Tatar Activist Describes Six Years Under Russian Rule," March 17, 2020.

    117.

    RFE/RL, "Ukraine, Russia-Backed Separatists Hold Another Prisoner Swap," April 16, 2020.

    118.

    See, for example, European Council, "Declaration by the High Representative on Behalf of the EU on the 'Elections' Planned in the So-Called 'Luhansk People's Republic' and 'Donetsk People's Republic' for 11 November 2018," November 10, 2018; and U.S. Department of State, "Condemning Sham 'Elections' in Russia-Controlled Eastern Ukraine," November 12, 2018.

    119.

    Ukraine's parliament passed a resolution in 2015 listing the cities, towns, and other settlements to which the law on local self-government applies. Law of Ukraine No. 1680-VII, as amended, at https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/en/1680-18; Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine No. 252-VIII, at https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/252-viii.

    120.

    U.S. Department of State, "Detainee Exchange Between Ukraine and Russia-Led Forces," December 28, 2017; U.S. Department of State, "Latest Developments on Ukraine Negotiations," April 13, 2018; UNIAN Information Agency, "Ukraine To Ask UN To Deploy Peacekeepers Throughout Occupied Donbas," February 18, 2020.

    121.

    In 2017, Russian President Putin proposed a peacekeeping mission, but only along the line of contact to protect OSCE monitors and help separate the conflicting sides. Tony Wesolowsky, "Explainer: Does Putin's Peacekeeper Proposal for Ukraine Have Any Merit?" RFE/RL, September 6, 2017.

    122.

    Elysee, "Paris 'Normandie' Summit," December 9, 2019, at https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2019/12/09/paris-normandie-summit.en; David M. Herszenhorn and Rym Momtaz, "Normandy Talks Land in Paris but Fail to Deliver Peace in Ukraine," Politico, December 10, 2019.

    123.

    Christopher Miller, "Explainer: What Is the Steinmeier Formula—and Did Zelenskiy Just Capitulate To Moscow?" RFE/RL, October 2, 2019; UNIAN Information Agency, "'Steinmeier Formula,' Explained," December 10, 2019.

    124.

    Maria Zolkina, "What Are Ukrainians Willing to Compromise for Peace," UkraineAlert, Atlantic Council, October 30, 2019; Maryna Vorotnyuk, "Ukrainian Protests Against the Steinmeier Formula—A View from the Ground," Eurasia Daily Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, October 21, 2019.

    125.

    UNIAN Information Agency, "Ukraine To Insist On Revision of Minsk Agreements," January 23, 2020.

    126.

    Ukrinform, "Lavrov Says He Heard Nothing About Normandy Format Meeting Scheduled for March, February 27, 2020; UNIAN Information Agency, "Presidential Chief of Staff Yermak Puts Forth Main Condition for New Normandy Summit," March 31, 2020.

    127.

    Andrew E. Kramer, "To Make A Diplomatic Point, Ukraine Rebels Open Fire," New York Times, February 18, 2020.

    128.

    Tony Wesolowsky, "Donbas Development: Will 'Advisory Council' Unlock Door to Direct Talks Between Kyiv and Russia-Backed Separatists?" RFE/RL, March 30, 2020.

    129.

    In addition to delaying passage of ships through the Kerch Strait, Russian forces detained and inspected dozens of ships on the open sea in 2018. Such interceptions reportedly ceased as of October 2018. Oksana Grytsenko and Kostyantyn Chernichkin, "Dangerous Waters: As Russia Monopolizes Azov Sea, Mariupol Feels Heightened Danger," Kyiv Post, August 3, 2018; Andrii Klymenko, Tetyana Guchakova, and Olga Korbut, "Russia's Economic War Against Ukraine in the Sea of Azov as of February 1, 2020," Black Sea News, February 13, 2020.

    130.

    Joshua Kucera, "Russia Transfers Five Warships Out of Caspian Sea," Eurasianet, June 25, 2018.

    131.

    After the Russian vessels rammed the tugboat and blockaded all three boats for hours, the Ukrainian vessels were fired upon as they sought to leave the area, injuring six sailors. Dmitry Gorenburg and Michael Kofman, "Russia and Ukraine Had a Short Naval Battle. Here's What You Need to Know," Washington Post, November 28, 2018; Andrzej Wilk, "The Russian Attack on Ukrainian Ships in the Black Sea: The Military Aspects," Centre for Eastern Studies (Warsaw), November 28, 2018; RFE/RL, "Ukrainian Envoy Says Russian Helicopter Fired On Navy Vessel In Black Sea In 2018," February 13, 2020.

    132.

    A 2003 bilateral agreement between Ukraine and Russia affirms freedom of navigation through the strait for both countries. Some argue that customary international law as reflected in the United Nations Charter on the Law of the Sea, or UNCLOS, also does that. See http://www.fao.org/fishery/shared/faolextrans.jsp?xp_FAOLEX=LEX-FAOC045795, and https://www.iucn.org/theme/marine-and-polar/our-work/international-ocean-governance/unclos.

    133.

    OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine: 16 November 2018 to 15 February 2019, p. 3.

    134.

    International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, "Tribunal Prescribes Provisional Measures Ordering the Russian Federation to Release Three Ukrainian Naval Vessels and Their 24 Servicemen," press release, May 25, 2019.

    135.

    Anders Aslund, Ukraine: What Went Wrong and How to Fix It (Washington, DC: PIIE Press, 2015), p. 5.

    136.

    IMF World Economic Outlook Database, April 2020.

    137.

    IMF, "Ukraine: Financial Position in the Fund as of March 31, 2020," at https://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/tad/exfin2.aspx?memberkey1=993&date1Key=2020-03-31.

    138.

    Olha Hordienko, "Ukraine's Economic Outlook for 2020: Modest Growth, Low Inflation, and Possible Devaluation Return," UNIAN Information Agency, December 31, 2019; Anders Aslund, "Ukraine's Underrated Economy Is Poised for A Strong 2020," Atlantic Council, January 6, 2020.

    139.

    Anders Aslund, "Ukraine Urgently Needs A New IMF Agreement," Atlantic Council, March 22, 2020; National Bank of Ukraine, "Ukraine Had USD 24.9 Billion in International Reserves as of 1 April 2020," April 7, 2020.

    140.

    IMF World Economic Outlook Database, April 2020.

    141.

    World Bank, Ukraine Economic Update, November 19, 2019, at http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/100071574084094307/Ukraine-economic-update-Fall-2019-en.pdf.

    142.

    State Statistics Service of Ukraine, at http://ukrstat.gov.ua/.

    143.

    World Bank, Migration and Remittances Data, at http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migration-remittances-data; National Bank of Ukraine, at https://bank.gov.ua/; Shaun Walker, "'A Whole Generation Has Gone': Ukrainians Seek a Better Life in Poland," Guardian, April 18, 2019; RFE/RL, "Remittances to Ukraine: Where Do They Come From?" August 23, 2019.

    144.

    The total value of Ukraine's merchandise imports declined by 51% from 2013 to 2015, with the value of merchandise imports from Russia declining by 78% from 2013 to 2016. Trade data are from the State Customs Committee of Ukraine, as presented by Global Trade Atlas.

    145.

    Ukraine is also the world's largest exporter of sunflower oil. Ben Aris, "Ukraine On Course to Smash Its 2019 Grain Harvest Record, Remain World's Biggest Grain Exporter," bne Intellinews, November 13, 2019.

    146.

    State Statistics Service of Ukraine.

    147.

    National Bank of Ukraine; State Statistics Service of Ukraine.

    148.

    See, for example, Anders Aslund, Securing Ukraine's Energy Sector, Atlantic Council, April 2016.

    149.

    It also included 11% oil and 3% hydroelectric and renewables. BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2019.

    150.

    OECD, Snapshot of Ukraine's Energy Sector: Institutions, Governance, and Policy Framework, 2019; BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2019.

    151.

    Cedigaz, a subscription service statistical database, at http://www.cedigaz.org.

    152.

    In particular, Russia briefly reduced gas exports to Ukraine in 2006 after gas contract negotiations failed and, in 2009, briefly cut them, leading to temporary dips in supplies to some EU countries. For more, see Jonathan Stern, The Russian-Ukrainian Gas Crisis of January 2006, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, January 16, 2006, and Simon Pirani, Jonathan Stern, and Katja Yafimava, The Russo-Ukrainian Gas Dispute of January 2009: A Comprehensive Assessment, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, February 2009.

    153.

    Natural gas usage in Ukraine had declined before Russia's invasion in 2012-2013 (by about 8% a year), but it declined more markedly in 2014 and 2015 (by 16% and 20%, respectively). In 2013, 92% of Ukraine's natural gas imports came directly from Russia (51% of Ukraine's total gas usage). By 2015, 37% of Ukraine's natural gas imports came from Russia (18% of usage). Data come from Naftogaz annual reports for 2014-2016.

    154.

    Council of the EU, "Joint Press Statement following the 6th Association Council Meeting between the EU and Ukraine," press release, January 28, 2020; Todd Prince, "After Years of Stalling, Can Ukraine Finally Become Energy Self-Sufficient?" RFE/RL, September 15, 2019; Ihor Orel, "Ukraine's Plans to Get Off Energy Dependence Needle," UNIAN Information Agency, January 22, 2020. Also see Sagatom Saha and Ilya Zaslavskiy, Advancing Natural Gas Reform in Ukraine, Council on Foreign Relations, December 2018, and OECD, Snapshot of Ukraine's Energy Sector: Institutions, Governance, and Policy Framework, 2019.

    155.

    Alexander Query, "Ukraine's Naftogaz Announces Completion of Gas System Unbundling," Kyiv Post, January 2, 2020. For more on EU energy policy, see CRS Report R42405, European Energy Security: Options for EU Natural Gas Diversification, coordinated by Michael Ratner.

    156.

    International Energy Agency, "Facts in Brief: Ukraine, Europe, Oil & Gas," March 4, 2014; Naftogaz Group, Annual Report 2018, p. 82; and Gazpromexport, "Gas Supplies to Europe."

    157.

    Naftogaz Group, Annual Report 2018, p. 82.

    158.

    For more, see CRS In Focus IF11138, Russia's Nord Stream 2 Pipeline: Will Sanctions Stop It?, by Paul Belkin, Michael Ratner, and Cory Welt.

    159.

    For details, see Simon Pirani and Jack Sharples, "The Russia-Ukraine Gas Transit Deal: Opening A New Chapter," Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, February 2020.

    160.

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, "President Signed Amendments to the Constitution on the Strategic Course of Ukraine for Membership in the EU and NATO," February 19, 2019.

    161.

    RFE/RL, "Ukraine's President Promises NATO Referendum as Part of Path to West," June 5, 2019.

    162.

    Parts of the agreement were applied provisionally from September 2014, and the free-trade agreement was applied provisionally in January 2016. The full agreement entered into force in September 2017. The text of the Association Agreement and the 2019 Association Implementation Report are available at https://eeas.europa.eu/node/10420_en. For a summary, see Quick Guide to the Association Agreement, at https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/071215_eu-ukraine_association_agreement.pdf.

    163.

    European Commission and European External Action Service (EEAS), Joint Staff Working Document: Association Implementation Report on Ukraine, December 12, 2019, p. 16. Also see Tony Barber, "Ukraine Reaps Benefits of Trade Deal with EU," Financial Times, September 11, 2018.

    164.
    165.

    European Commission, "The EU's Response to the Coronavirus Pandemic in the Eastern Partnership," April 2020; European Commission, "Coronavirus: Commission Proposes €3 Billion Macro-financial Assistance Package to Support Ten Neighbouring Countries," press release, April 22, 2020.

    166.

    European Commission, "EU-Ukraine Summit: EU Steps Up Its Support to the Sea of Azov Region," July 8, 2019.

    167.

    Steven Pifer, "Ukraine Overturns Its Non-Bloc Status: What Next with NATO?" Kyiv Post, December 26, 2014; RFE/RL, "Ukrainian Parliament Makes NATO Integration a Priority," June 8, 2017.

    168.

    NATO's Enhanced Opportunity Partners are Australia, Finland, Georgia, Jordan, and Sweden. Illia Ponomarenko, "Defense Minister: Ukraine Can Join NATO's Enhancement Opportunity Program by October," Kyiv Post, February 13, 2020; NATO, "Partnership Interoperability Initiative," last updated March 24, 2020, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132726.htm. On NATO-Ukraine relations, see NATO, "Relations with Ukraine," updated November 4, 2019, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_37750.htm.

    169.

    NATO, "Warsaw Summit Communique Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8-9 July 2016," July 9, 2016; White House, "Fact Sheet: U.S. and NATO Efforts in Support of NATO Partners, Including Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova," July 9, 2016.

    170.

    The trust funds address the following areas: Command, Control, Communications and Computers; Cyber Defense; Explosive Ordnance Disposal and Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices; Logistics and Standardization; Medical Rehabilitation; and Military Career Transition.

    171.

    UNIAN Information Agency, "Some 64% of Ukrainians Support Accession to EU – Poll," January 21, 2020.

    172.

    In the Bucharest Summit Declaration of April 2008, heads of state and government of NATO member countries declared that "NATO welcomes Ukraine's and Georgia's Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO." NATO, "Bucharest Summit Declaration," April 3, 2008, at https://www.nato.int/cps/us/natohq/official_texts_8443.htm.

    173.

    Steven Pifer, "NATO's Ukraine Challenge: Ukrainians Want Membership, But Obstacles Abound," Brookings, June 6, 2019; UNIAN Information Agency, "Poll: 51% of Ukrainians Stand for Ukraine Joining NATO," January 21, 2020; Gerard Toal, John O'Loughlin, and Kristin M. Bakke, "Is Ukraine Caught between Europe and Russia? We Asked Ukrainians This Important Question," Washington Post, February 26, 2020.

    174.

    Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Premature Partnership," Foreign Affairs 73, no. 2 (March/April 1994), p. 80. Hereinafter Brzezinski, "Premature Partnership."

    175.

    Brzezinski, "Premature Partnership."

    176.

    Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, "Pelosi Remarks Announcing Impeachment Inquiry," press release, September 24, 2019. On October 31, 2019, the House agreed to H.Res. 660, which directed certain committees to continue ongoing investigations as part of an impeachment inquiry.

    177.
    178.

    See, for example, White House, Trial Memorandum of President Donald J. Trump, January 20, 2020.

    179.

    U.S. Department of State, "Acting Secretary Sullivan's Meeting with Ukrainian Foreign Minister Klimkin," April 21, 2018; U.S. Department of State, "Crimea Is Ukraine," February 27, 2019; U.S. Department of State, "U.S. Support for Ukrainian Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity," November 27, 2019.

    180.

    U.S. Department of State, "Remarks at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Diplomatic Academy," February 21, 2018.

    181.

    U.S. Department of State, "Crimea Declaration," July 25, 2018.

    182.

    U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, "Press Release Issued by the Department of State on July 23, 1940," at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1940v01/d412. Also see U.S. Department of State, "Seventy-Fifth Anniversary of the Welles Declaration," July 22, 2015, at https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2015/07/245160.htm.

    183.

    Title II of P.L. 115-44, Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). The Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (CRIEEA) also states that the United States "does not recognize territorial changes effected by force, including the illegal invasions and occupations" of Crimea and eastern Ukraine, as well as of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (in Georgia) and Transnistria (in Moldova) (§253).

    184.

    U.S. Department of State, "Crimea Is Ukraine," March 14, 2018.

    185.

    U.S. Department of State, "Ukraine-Russia Prisoner Swap," September 8, 2019.

    186.

    U.S. Department of State, "Ukraine Passes Key Hurdle in Implementation of Minsk Peace Agreements," October 11, 2018; U.S. Department of State, "Condemning Sham 'Elections' in Russia-Controlled Eastern Ukraine," November 12, 2018; U.S. Department of State, "Russia's Decision to Grant Expedited Citizenship to Residents of Russia-Controlled Eastern Ukraine," April 24, 2019.

    187.

    White House, "Remarks by President Trump and President Zelensky of Ukraine Before Bilateral Meeting," September 25, 2019.

    188.

    U.S. Department of State, "The Opening of the Kerch Bridge in Crimea," May 15, 2018. Also see U.S. Department of State, "Russia's Harassment of International Shipping Transiting the Kerch Strait and Sea of Azov," August 30, 2018.

    189.

    See, for example, U.S. Department of State, "Russia's Dangerous Escalation in the Kerch Strait," November 26, 2018.

    190.

    U.S. Department of State, "Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin Statements to the Press," November 16, 2018.

    191.

    For more, see CRS In Focus IF11138, Russia's Nord Stream 2 Pipeline: Will Sanctions Stop It?, by Paul Belkin, Michael Ratner, and Cory Welt.

    192.

    Testimony of Thomas O. Melia, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Implications of the Crisis in Ukraine, hearings, 113th Cong., 2nd sess., January 15, 2014, at http://www.foreign.senate.gov/download/2014/01/15/testimony-1. Also see U.S. Department of State, "Statement of Events in Ukraine," December 10, 2013, and U.S. Department of State, "Situation in Ukraine," February 20, 2014.

    193.

    See, in particular, testimony of Victoria Nuland, in U.S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Policy in Ukraine: Countering Russia and Driving Reform, hearings, 114th Cong., 1st sess., March 10, 2015, at https://www.foreign.senate.gov/download/nuland-testimony-03-10-15; The Economic and Political Future of Ukraine, hearings, 114th Cong., 1st sess., October 8, 2015, at https://www.foreign.senate.gov/download/nuland-testimony-100815; and Ukrainian Reforms Two Years After the Maidan Revolution and the Russian Invasion, hearings, 114th Cong., 2nd sess., March 15, 2016, at https://www.foreign.senate.gov/download/nuland-testimony-031516. Also see White House, "Fact Sheet: U.S. Assistance to Ukraine Since February 2014," June 15, 2016.

    194.

    White House, "Vice President Joe Biden," at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/vp; Brian Bonner, "From the Kyiv Post Archives: Biden's 6 Visits to Ukraine as Vice President," Kyiv Post, October 5, 2019 (originally published on January 15, 2017).

    195.

    Steve Clemons, "The Biden Doctrine," Atlantic, August 22, 2016; Council on Foreign Relations, "Foreign Affairs Issue Launch with Former Vice President Joe Biden," January 23, 2018; Matt Viser and Paul Sonne, "Inside Joe Biden's Brawling Efforts to Reform Ukraine – Which Won Him Successes and Enemies," Washington Post, October 19, 2019.

    196.

    RFE/RL, "U.S. Ambassador Upbraids Ukrainian Prosecutors over Anticorruption Efforts," September 25, 2015; Victoria Nuland, in U.S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, The Economic and Political Future of Ukraine, hearings, 114th Cong., 1st sess., October 8, 2015, at https://www.foreign.senate.gov/download/nuland-testimony-100815; James Risen, "Joe Biden, His Son and the Case Against a Ukrainian Oligarch," New York Times, December 8, 2015; Daniel McLaughlin, "EU Hails Sacking of Ukraine's Prosecutor Viktor Shokin," Irish Times, March 29, 2016.

    197.

    U.S. Department of State, "Remarks to NATO-Ukraine Commission," U.S. Department of State, March 31, 2017.

    198.

    He also commended Ukraine for "bold education, healthcare, and pension reforms" and "deregulating certain business sectors and increasing tax transparency." U.S. Department of State, "Remarks at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Diplomatic Academy," February 21, 2018.

    199.

    U.S. Embassy in Ukraine, "Remarks by Ambassador Yovanovitch on the Occasion of the 5th Anniversary of the Ukraine Crisis Media Center's Founding," March 5, 2019.

    200.

    White House, "Readout of Vice President Mike Pence's Meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy," September 1, 2019; White House, "Readout of Vice President Mike Pence's Phone Call with the President of Ukraine," September 18, 2019.

    201.

    Foreign aid totals from FY1992 to FY2000 include all agencies and accounts. See U.S. Department of State, U.S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities With the New Independent States of the Former Soviet Union (submitted pursuant to Section 104 of the FREEDOM Support Act, P.L. 102-511), FY2000 Annual Report (Appendix), January 2001, at https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/nisasst/index.htm.

    202.

    CRS calculations, based on data available in the U.S. Department of State's annual U.S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with Eurasia reports for FY2001 to FY2009, at https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/c10250.htm.

    203.
    204.

    This total includes all State Department and USAID bilateral assistance, except for Foreign Military Financing and International Military Education and Training.

    205.

    See USAID's end-fiscal year Ukraine - Complex Emergency Fact Sheet for FY2015 to FY2019, at https://www.usaid.gov/crisis/ukraine/ukraine-disaster-response-archive.

    206.

    The subsidy cost of the third loan guarantee ($290 million) was included in the total amount of State Department/USAID assistance for FY2016 but is not included in the calculations in the text. On loan guarantees, see CRS In Focus IF10409, U.S. Foreign Assistance: USAID Loan Guarantees, and USAID, "USAID Announces U.S. Issuance of $1 Billion Loan Guarantee to the Government of Ukraine," press release, September 30, 2016.

    207.

    U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), "5 Things to Know About the U.S.-Ukraine Defense Relationship," November 7, 2019.

    208.

    Testimony of John Kerry, in U.S. Congress, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Advancing U.S. Interests in a Troubled World: The FY2016 Foreign Affairs Budget, hearings, 114th Cong., 1st sess., February 25, 2015, at http://www.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-4630365; testimony of Victoria Nuland, in U.S. Congress, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Ukraine Under Siege, hearings, 114th Cong., 1st sess., March 4, 2015, at http://www.cq.com/doc/committees-2015030400324140?3; U.S. Department of State, "Remarks on Transatlantic Cooperation and the Crisis in Ukraine," March 5, 2015. Also see Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy, "How Aiding the Ukrainian Military Could Push Putin into a Regional War," Washington Post, February 5, 2015.

    209.

    White House, "Fact Sheet: U.S. Assistance to Ukraine," November 21, 2014. Also see Lolita C. Baldor and Nedra Pickler, "U.S. to Send Ukraine Drones, More Aid, But No Lethal Weapons," Associated Press, March 11, 2015, and Adriane Elliot, "Security Enterprise Builds Partner Nation's Defenses," U.S. Army, July 20, 2016.

    210.

    DOD, "DOD Announces $250M to Ukraine," June 18, 2019.

    211.

    Defense Security Cooperation Agency, "Ukraine – Javelin Missiles and Command Launch Units," Transmittal No. 18-02, March 1, 2018; Senator Rob Portman, "Portman Praises State Department Approval of Anti-Tank Missiles to Ukraine," press release, March 2, 2018.

    212.

    Mike Eckel and Christopher Miller, "Next Up for U.S. Weapons Supplies to Ukraine? Possibly Surface-to-Air Missiles," RFE/RL, June 11, 2019.

    213.

    Defense Security Cooperation Agency, "Ukraine – Javelin Missiles and Command Launch Units," Transmittal No. 19-70, October 3, 2019.

    214.

    John Vandiver, "U.S. Transfers Patrol Boats to Ukraine as Military Aid Takes Center Stage During Impeachment Hearings," Stars and Stripes, November 14, 2019; David Axe, "Ukraine's Getting an American Gunboat. How Long Would It Last Against Russia?," National Interest, March 9, 2020.

    215.

    The Multinational Joint Commission on Defense Reform and Security Cooperation originated in 2014 as a U.S.-Ukraine commission and expanded to include Canada, Lithuania, and the UK and, subsequently, Poland, Denmark, and Sweden. The White House, "Fact Sheet: U.S. and NATO Efforts in Support of NATO Partners, Including Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova," July 9, 2016; Government of Canada, "Operation UNIFIER," December 3, 2018.

    216.

    U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa, "Sixth Fleet Announces Sea Breeze 2019 Participation," press release, June 25, 2019; Ed Adamczyk, "U.S. Navy Prepares for 'Sea Breeze 2019' Naval Exercises in Ukraine," UPI, June 28, 2019.

    217.

    7th Army Training Command, "Rapid Trident," n.d.; Spc. Michael Sword, "Secretary of Army Witnesses Rapid Trident 2011 in Ukraine," U.S. Army, August 5, 2011; Sgt. Kyle Larsen, "Rapid Trident 19 Demonstrates Multinational Proficiency in Ukraine," U.S. Army, September 30, 2019.

    218.

    Kyle Rempfer, "U.S. Air Force's Huge Exercise in Ukraine Fuels Growing Partnership and That Country's NATO Ambitions," Air Force Times, November 13, 2018.

    219.

    ICS-CERT, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure," February 25, 2016; Kim Zetter, "Inside the Cunning, Unprecedented Hack of Ukraine's Power Grid," Wired, March 3, 2016.

    220.

    U.S. Department of State, "The United States and Ukraine Hold Third Cyber Dialogue," March 3, 2020.

    221.

    P.L. 109-205. Before 2006, Ukraine was subject to Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-618; 19 U.S.C. 2101 et seq.), pursuant to which Russia and other post-Soviet states were denied permanent normal trade relations status. The Trade Act had originally imposed restrictions on trade with the Soviet Union, due to its nonmarket economy and prohibitive emigration policies (the latter through Section 402, popularly cited as the Jackson-Vanik amendment). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, these trade restrictions formally continued to apply to Russia and other post-Soviet states, even though they received conditional normal trade relations in 1992.

    222.

    Data in this section are from the State Customs Committee of Ukraine and U.S. Census Bureau, as presented in Global Trade Atlas.

    223.

    Ari Natter, "Ukraine Coal Exports Part of Trump Bid to Counter Russia," Bloomberg News, July 31, 2017; Alessandra Prentice, "How a U.S. Coal Deal Warmed Ukraine's Ties with Trump," Reuters, February 19, 2018.

    224.

    See, for example, H.Con.Res. 120 (1996), S.Res. 205 (2002), and S.Res. 422 (2010).

    225.

    See S.Res. 473 (2004), S.Res. 487 (2004), and H.Con.Res. 16/S.Con.Res. 7 (2005).

    226.

    See H.Res. 440 (1986), H.Con.Res. 167/S.Con.Res. 56 (1996), H.Res. 703 (2006), and S.Res. 153 (2011).

    227.

    Historians attribute the famine, which Ukrainians refer to as the Holodomor, to the coercive policies of Joseph Stalin's regime. The famine killed almost 4 million Ukrainians, according to current estimates. In 1985, Congress established a Commission on the Ukraine Famine (P.L. 99-180), which held hearings with eyewitnesses, published findings, and conducted a related oral history project. In 2006, Congress passed legislation authorizing the government of Ukraine to establish a memorial on federal land to honor the victims of the Ukraine famine (P.L. 109-340). The memorial was established in 2015. Anne Applebaum, Red Famine: Stalin's War on Ukraine (Doubleday, 2017); Commission on the Ukraine Famine, Investigation of the Ukrainian Famine, 1932-1933, April 22, 1988; Askold Krushelnycky, "How Washington Holodomor Monument Won the Race Against Time," Kyiv Post, February 23, 2020.

    228.
    173.

    The Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (Title II of P.L. 115-44, Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act; 22 U.S.C. 9501 et seq.) also states that the United States generally "does not recognize territorial changes effected by force, including the illegal invasions and occupations" of Crimea and eastern Ukraine, as well as of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (in Georgia) and Transnistria (in Moldova) (§253).

    174229.

    From 2014 to 2016, the House and/or Senate repeatedly expressed support for providing lethal defensive weapons to Ukraine at least five more times. See H.Res. 758 (2014), P.L. 113-291 (FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act2015), H.Res. 162 (2015), S.Res. 72 (2015), and H.R. 5094 (2016).

    230.

    Rep. Ro Khanna, "Rep. Khanna Leads Bipartisan Members in Condemning Anti-Semitism in Europe," April 25, 2018; Rep. Max Rose, "Rose Leads Dozens of House Dems in Asking State Dept: Why Aren't White Supremacist Groups Listed as Foreign Terrorist Organizations?" October 16, 2019.

    231.
    175.

    Rebecca Kheel, "Senators to Trump: Get Tough on Russia over Ukraine," The Hill, December 8, 2016.

    176.

    A related bill was introduced in the Senate (S. 2455).

    177.

    Proposed legislation that responds to Russia's maritime aggression includes S.Res. 27 (reported and placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar) and its companion bill, H.Res. 116, as well as Section 602 of S. 482. Legislation that opposes Nord Stream 2 and other export pipelines includes S.Res. 27 and H.Res. 116, as well as H.R. 2023, H.R. 3206, S. 1441, and S. 1830 (the House bills arewere ordered to be reported; S. 1441 has beenthe Senate bills were reported and placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar).

    232.

    A related bill, S. 2455, was introduced in the Senate.

    233.

    Proposals to treat Ukraine as a major non-NATO ally were previously included in legislation introduced in 2014 (H.R. 5190, S. 2828, H.R. 5782).

    234.

    In addition, S.Res. 27 and H.Res. 116 were introduced in response to Russian maritime aggression against Ukraine.

    235.

    The White House, "Fact Sheet: Ukraine-Related Sanctions," March 17, 2014.

    178.

    The White House, "Fact Sheet: Ukraine-Related Sanctions," March 17, 2014, at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/03/17/fact-sheet-ukraine-related-sanctions.

    179.

    For details, see CRS Report R45415, U.S. Sanctions on Russia, coordinated by Cory Welt.

    180237.

    In his signing statement, President Obama said the Administration did "not intend to impose sanctions under this law, but the Act gives the Administration additional authorities that could be utilized, if circumstances warranted." The White House, "Statement by the President on the Ukraine Freedom Support Act," December 18, 2014, at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/18/statement-president-ukraine-freedom-support-act.

    181238. Vladimir Soldatkin and Andreas Rinke, "Putin: Nord Stream 2 Pipeline Will Be Finished by Year-End or Q1 2021," Reuters, January 11, 2020. Also see Todd Prince, "More Nord Stream 2 Sanctions on Horizon? U.S. Senator and Ukraine's Naftogaz Discuss Ways To Halt Controversial Gas Pipeline," RFE/RL, March 7, 2020, and Benjamin L. Schmitt, "They're Gonna Need a Bigger Boat: The Curious Voyage of the Akademik Cherskiy," Jamestown Foundation, March 31, 2020.

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, "President Signed Amendments to the Constitution on the Strategic Course of Ukraine for Membership in the EU and NATO," February 19, 2019.

    182.

    RFE/RL, "Ukraine's President Promises NATO Referendum as Part of Path to West," June 5, 2019.

    183.

    Parts of the agreement were applied provisionally from September 2014, and the free-trade agreement was applied provisionally in January 2016. The full agreement entered into force in September 2017. The text of the Association Agreement and the 2018 Association Implementation Report are available at https://eeas.europa.eu/node/10420_en. For a summary, see Quick Guide to the Association Agreement, at https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/071215_eu-ukraine_association_agreement.pdf. For more information, see European Council, "EU Relations with Ukraine," at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eastern-partnership/ukraine/.

    184.

    European Commission and European External Action Service (EEAS), Joint Staff Working Document: Association Implementation Report on Ukraine, November 7, 2018, p. 12.

    185.

    EEAS, Joint Staff Working Document (footnote 184); Tony Barber, "Ukraine Reaps Benefits of Trade Deal with EU," Financial Times, September 11, 2018.

    186.

    This assistance includes €3.3 billion (around $3.6 billion) in macro-financial assistance loans and almost €1.2 billion ($1.3 billion) in assistance grants. Assistance also includes €6.5 billion ($7.1 billion) in financing from the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. For more details, see European Union External Action, "EU-Ukraine Relations, Factsheet," updated July 5, 2019, at https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-Homepage/4081/eu-ukraine-relations-factsheet_en.

    187.

    European Commission, "EU-Ukraine Summit: EU Steps Up Its Support to the Sea of Azov Region," July 8, 2019.

    188.

    Steven Pifer, "Ukraine Overturns Its Non-Bloc Status: What Next with NATO?," Kyiv Post, December 26, 2014; RFE/RL, "Ukrainian Parliament Makes NATO Integration a Priority," June 8, 2017. For more on NATO-Ukraine relations, see NATO, "Relations with Ukraine," updated July 1, 2019, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_37750.htm.

    189.

    NATO, "Warsaw Summit Communique Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8-9 July 2016," July 9, 2016; White House, "Fact Sheet: U.S. and NATO Efforts in Support of NATO Partners, Including Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova," July 9, 2016.

    190.

    The trust funds address the following areas: Command, Control, Communications and Computers; Cyber Defense; Explosive Ordnance Disposal and Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices; Logistics and Standardization; Medical Rehabilitation; and Military Career Transition.

    191.

    Olena Makarenko, "68% of Ukrainians Want Pro-European Reforms Even Without EU Membership Prospects," Euromaidan Press, October 22, 2018; Ukrinform, "Poll: 57% of Ukrainians Support Accession to EU," May 16, 2019.

    192.

    In the Bucharest Summit Declaration of April 2008, heads of state and government of NATO member countries declared that "NATO welcomes Ukraine's and Georgia's Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO." NATO, "Bucharest Summit Declaration," April 3, 2008, at https://www.nato.int/cps/us/natohq/official_texts_8443.htm.

    193.

    Sergey Sukhankin, "Ukraine's Thorny Path to NATO Membership: Mission (Im)possible?" International Center for Defense and Security (Estonia), April 22, 2019; Daniel Shapiro, "Ukraine and NATO: Disconnect Between State Policy and Public Opinion Is Less Dangerous Than Russia," Russia Matters, Harvard Kennedy School, May 9, 2019; Steven Pifer, "NATO's Ukraine Challenge: Ukrainians Want Membership, But Obstacles Abound," Brookings, June 6, 2019.