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For nearly two decades, Congress has shapedhelped shape the U.S. approach to Afghanistan and the ongoing conflict there. This product provides a summary of legislative proposals considered in the 115th Congressand 116th Congresses that relate to U.S. policy in Afghanistan. These address a number of issues, including the following.
While Pakistan is a key player in the Afghan conflict, the measures described in this report do not include anydoes not discuss measures primarily related to Pakistan, though many such proposals reference the war in Afghanistan. This report also does not include legislative proposals related to special immigrant visas for Afghan nationals who work for or on behalf of the U.S. government in Afghanistan. For more on that program, see CRS Report R43725, Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Programs, by Andorra Bruno.
For more information on U.S. policy in Afghanistan, see CRS Report R45818, Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy and CRS Report R45122, Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy In Brief, by Clayton Thomas.
Afghanistan has been a central U.S. foreign policy concern since American forces, in the wake of the attacks on September 11, 2001, attacks, helped lead a military campaign against Al Qaeda and the Taliban government that harbored it. Since then, the United States, along with NATO and other international partners, has deployed tenshundreds of thousands of troops and provided tens of billions of dollars in developmentforeign assistance to Afghanistan. The overarching goal of this effort isthese efforts has been to support the elected Afghan government and bolster its security forces against a resilient insurgency by the Taliban and others, including (since 2014) an active affiliate of the Islamic State (IS-Khorasan Province, also known as ISKP or ISIS-K).
After a coalition of armed opposition groups, also known as ISIS, ISIL, or the Arabic acronym Da'esh).
After an Afghan opposition coalition known as the Northern Alliance drove the Taliban government out of Kabulthe capital, Kabul, with the help of American airpower and a small number of U.S. special forces, the U.N. convened Afghan leaders in Bonn, Germany in December 2011 to lay out a roadmap for the creation of a democratic government in Afghanistan. Taliban representatives were not invited to participate in the meetings in Bonn. That conference established an interim administration headed by Hamid Karzai, and called for a June 2002 emergency loya jirga (a traditional Afghan consultative assembly) that confirmed Karzai as President of the Afghan Transitional Administration. Another loya jirga was convened in late 2003 to endorse a new constitution, which was ratified in January 2004. Afghanistan held its first presidential election in October 2004, and Karzai was elected electing Karzai with 55% of the vote. The first parliamentary elections followed in September 2005.
Sporadic Taliban attacks continued during this time, with U.S. intelligence collecting evidence of an "organized Taliban revival" by early 2004.1 Under intense U.S. military pressure, most Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters had fled into Pakistan, where they helped to inspire an Islamist insurgency that would later drive the Pakistani state into full-scale crisis. At the same time asAs they battled Al Qaeda and other Islamist militants at home, Pakistan's security institutions aided the Afghan Taliban, including by providing safe haven to much of its leadership, a legacy of Pakistan's formal recognition of the group from 1996 to 2001. By 2007, despite nascent democratic development and improvements in most Afghans' quality of life, the American effort in Afghanistan, once described as "the good war," appeared "off course," with security deteriorating, narcotics production increasing, and levels of Taliban violence steadily rising.2
In response, President Barack Obama increased the number of American forces (from approximately 36,000 in February 2009 to a high of 2009 to about 100,000 in 2011) as part of an effort to combat the Taliban insurgency and increase the capacity of the Afghan government and security forces. Most security metrics improved during the "surge," but uncertainty rose as Afghan forces took the lead for security nationwide (in mid-2013) amidst a steady drawdown of U.S. and international forces as part of a planned withdrawal. That uncertainty was compounded by theAfghanistan's 2014 presidential election, which was marred by widespread allegations of fraud and was only resolved with the creation of a fragile unity government formed after months of U.S. mediation. Still, the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF, 2003-2014) mission was replaced by Resolute Support Mission (RSM, 2015-present) —a NATO-led campaign to train, advise, and assist Afghan forces—at the end of 2014 as scheduled.
The killing of Taliban leader Mullah Mansour (successor to original Taliban leader Mullah Omar, who died of natural causes in 2013) in a May 2016 U.S. airstrike in Pakistan demonstrated continued Taliban vulnerabilities to U.S. military and intelligence capabilities. At the same timeMeanwhile, the Taliban expanded their control and influence in rural areas while pressuring urban centers (as evidenced by their brief seizure of the provincial capital of Kunduz in 2015).
President Donald Trump expressed few policy positions on Afghanistan during the 2016 presidential campaign, though he had previously conveyed skepticism about the American effort there. After months of debate within the Administration, President Trump announced a new strategy for Afghanistan and South Asia in a nationwide address on August 21, 2017. The strategy features a tougher line against Pakistan and a larger role for India; no set timetables for policy adjustments or personnel withdrawals; expanded targeting authorities for U.S. forces; and around 3,000 additional troops, bringing the total number of U.S. forces in the country to approximately 14,000-15,000 (about 8,500 of which are part of RSM).3
President Trump, who criticized his predecessor's use of "arbitrary timetables," did not specify In part due to the President's reported frustration with the military situation, the Administration authorized U.S. officials to seek out direct talks with the Taliban in July 2018.7 Those talks, ongoing since October 2018 under Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad, represent a reversal of U.S. policy, which had previously encouraged negotiations between Kabul and Taliban representatives. The Taliban have long refused to negotiate with representatives of the Afghan government, which they characterize as a corrupt and illegitimate puppet of foreign powers.8 To date, Kabul has not been directly involved in the ongoing U.S.-Taliban negotiations. In a January 2019 televised address, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani warned that any agreement to withdraw U.S. forces that did not include Kabul's participation could lead to "catastrophe," pointing to the 1990s-era civil strife following the fall of the Soviet-backed government that led to the rise of the Taliban.9 Some have called for the United States to suspend talks until the Taliban agree to a ceasefire or talks with the Afghan government.10 Nevertheless, in March 2019, Khalilzad announced that an agreement "in draft" had been reached on unspecified counterterrorism assurances and U.S. troop withdrawal. Reports in late August 2019 indicate that negotiators are "close" to concluding an agreement on those issues.11 Critics have expressed concerns that the United States will prioritize a military withdrawal over a complex political settlement that preserves some of the social, political, and humanitarian gains made since 2001. Some U.S. analysts argue that the President's publicly stated desire for a U.S. withdrawal undermines negotiations, with one observer asking, "Why would the Taliban give up anything in exchange for something the president has already said he wants to do?"12 In July 2019, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that his "directive" from President Trump was to bring about the reduction of U.S. troops before the 2020 U.S. presidential election; he later stated that "there is no deadline" for the U.S. military mission.13 Afghans opposed to the Taliban doubt the group's trustworthiness, and express concern that the group will have little incentive to comply with the terms of an agreement in the absence of U.S. troops.14 At the same time, U.S. military operations in support of the Afghan government continue apace as Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS), which comprises two "complementary missions." 15 Of the approximately 14,000 U.S. troops serving in Afghanistan, some 8,500 are part of RSM's train, advise, and assist efforts. The remaining U.S. forces conduct and support counterterrorism operations. In 2018, Afghanistan became U.S. Central Command's "main effort" as U.S. operations in Iraq and Syria wound down.16 Since at least early 2017, U.S. military officials have publicly stated that the conflict is "largely stalemated."17 Arguably complicating that assessment, the extent of territory controlled or contested by the Taliban has steadily grown in recent years by U.S. measures. In its January 2019 report to Congress, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) relayed data indicating that the share of districts under government control or influence had fallen to 53.8% as of October 2018, the lowest level recorded by SIGAR since tracking began in November 2015. 12% of districts were classified as under insurgent control or influence, with the remaining 34% contested. According to SIGAR's April 2019 quarterly report, the U.S. military is no longer tracking that metric because it "was of limited decision-making value to the [U.S.] Commander."18 Beyond the Taliban, a significant share of U.S. operations are aimed at IS-Khorasan Province. ISKP and Taliban forces have sometimes fought over control of territory or because of political or other differences.19 U.S. officials are reportedly tracking attempts by IS fighters fleeing Iraq and Syria to enter Afghanistan, which may represent a more permissive operating environment.20 ISKP has claimed responsibility for a number of large-scale attacks in Afghanistan, many targeting the country's Shia minority. Some raise the prospect of defections of Taliban hardliners to ISKP in the event that Taliban leaders agree to a political settlement or to a continued U.S. counterterrorism presence.21 The U.N. reports that Al Qaeda views Afghanistan as a "continuing safe haven for its leadership, relying on its long-standing and strong relationship with the Taliban leadership."22 For years, Members have introduced legislation to condition, limit, or end the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan. While no such measure has ever passed either chamber, support for such proposals in the House of Representatives generally grew from 2009 to 2014, the period in which most such measures were introduced; for example: Sporadic legislative efforts to curtail or terminate U.S. operations in Afghanistan have continued. Introduced in the 115th Congress, H.R. 1666 would have prohibited funding for U.S. activities in Afghanistan (other than U.S. Embassy operations or intelligence gathering) one year after enactment, with a waiver available under certain conditions. In the 116th Congress, S.J.Res. 12, the "AFGHAN Service Act," was introduced in March 2019 and would, among other provisions, require the removal of all U.S. forces from Afghanistan within a year of enactment. At the same time, some legislative efforts in the 116th Congress have shown support for continued U.S. presence: Some Members have proposed measures to repeal the 2001 AUMF or to replace it with a new authorization that would alter the legal basis for U.S. military engagement in Afghanistan.26 At least seven such replacements were introduced in the 115th Congress, all of which would have authorized the use of military force against groups in Afghanistan, specifically including the Taliban (which was not named in the 2001 AUMF).27 In the 116th Congress, several bills have been introduced that would repeal the 2001 AUMF without replacement. On June 19, 2019, the House passed H.R. 2740, an omnibus appropriations measure that includes the FY2020 Defense Appropriations Act. Section 9025 of that act would repeal the 2001 AUMF without replacement within 240 days of enactment. Congress has mandated a number of executive branch reports on Afghanistan, which remain among the most detailed sources of information on U.S. efforts in the country. One of the most significant congressional oversight actions was the 2008 establishment of a Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), modeled in part on a similar office overseeing reconstruction in Iraq.28 Congress directed that SIGAR publish quarterly reports detailing the obligation and expenditure of funds appropriated for Afghan reconstruction. Congress also required periodic audits and investigations of specific projects and funds. The FY2008 NDAA added more reporting requirements. Section 1230 of the Act directed the President, through the Department of Defense, to submit a biannual report on "Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan." The first report was submitted under that title in June 2009. In Section 1225 of the FY2015 NDAA, Congress required a report on "Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan," among other reporting requirements, and biannual reports have been submitted under that title since June 2015 (most recently on July 12, 2019). Sections 1231 and 1531 of the FY2016 NDAA and FY2017 NDAA, respectively, mandated additional categories of information to be included in these reports (often referred to as "Section 1225 reports"). Congress also has regularly mandated the submission of one-time reports on specific issues in appropriations and defense authorization bills. Individual report directives proposed and included in legislation can be found below.whatwhich conditions on the ground might necessitate or allow for alterations to the strategy going forward.4 Some have characterized the Trump strategy as "short on details" and serving "only to perpetuate a dangerous status quo."5 Others welcomed the strategy, contrasting it favorably with proposed alternatives such as a full withdrawal of U.S. forces, —which President Trump described as his "original instinct," "—or a strategy that reliesrelied heavily on contractors.6 The strategy evidently did not change security dynamics in the country over the following months, as U.S. officials continued to describe the war as a stalemate.
Authorization for Use of Military Force
U.S. military forces deployed to Afghanistan under the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF, P.L. 107-40), which allows the President "to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided" the September 11, 2001, attacks as well as any entities that harbored them. While the Taliban regime collapsed after about two months of major combat operations, U.S. operations in Afghanistan against a resilient Taliban insurgency, residual Al Qaeda elements, and the local Islamic State affiliate (which U.S. officials characterize as a legally permissible target under the 2001 AUMF) continue under that resolution.
heavily on contractors.6
More than a year after President Trump's speech, it remains unclear to what extent the new strategy has changed dynamics on the ground in Afghanistan. While U.S. officials continue to publicly express optimism,7 the extent of territory controlled or contested by the Taliban has steadily grown in recent years by most measures. In its July 30, 2018, report, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) reported that the share of districts under government control or influence remains at 56%, tied for the lowest level recorded in the two years SIGAR has tracked that metric, with 14% under insurgent control or influence, and the remaining 30% contested.8 While most Taliban gains have been in sparsely populated rural or mountainous areas, the group has also been able to contest urban centers; militants have briefly overrun two provincial capitals in 2018 thus far (Farah in May, Ghazni in August).9 Additionally, the Taliban have demonstrated an ability to conduct operations in different parts of the country simultaneously and inflict significant casualties on Afghan forces, though the U.S. military classified those figures and various other metrics related to ANDSF performance in 2017.10
Reflecting the Trump Administration's reported frustration with the 17-year-old U.S. war effort, 2018 has seen a flurry of diplomatic activity that may portend progress toward peace talks.11 Most importantly, the Trump Administration is reportedly considering direct talks with the Taliban in what would represent a significant change in American policy.12 Other reports, which U.S. officials have not denied, indicate that at least some preliminary discussions between U.S. and Taliban officials have already taken place.13 However, the Afghan government, or some of its members, may be opposed to any negotiation with the Taliban in which they are not the lead interlocutor,14 and the Taliban's own stance on negotiations is unclear.15 Ongoing disputes between Afghan leaders may worsen in advance of long-delayed and already controversial parliamentary elections, set for October 2018, and the presidential election slated for April 2019.
In the decade before the September 11, 2001, terror attacks, Afghanistan was not a major focus of congressional attention.16 Since then, Congress has taken an active role in shaping U.S. policy toward Afghanistan. Major initiatives and areas of congressional interest are described below.
U.S. military forces deployed into Afghanistan under the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF, P.L. 107-40), which allows the president "to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided" the September 11, 2001, attacks as well as any entities that harbored them. The Taliban regime collapsed after about two months of major combat operations. U.S. operations in Afghanistan against the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and the local Islamic State affiliate continue under that resolution, though Members have proposed a range of measures to replace the 2001 AUMF with a new authorization that could alter U.S. military engagement in Afghanistan, as outlined in the chart below.17
After the fall of the Taliban, U.S. efforts shifted quickly to providing humanitarian support to the Afghan people, stabilizing the country, and building up a democratic Afghan government. One of the most important congressional measures in this regard was the 2002 Afghanistan Freedom Support Act (AFSA, P.L. 107-327), which authorized a total of $3.8 billion in humanitarian, developmental, counter-narcotics, and security assistance over four years.18 The act contains a number of provisions directing U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and establishing congressional oversight thereof; many of these provisions anticipate additional congressional directives enacted in subsequent years. Such provisions include the authorization of funds for specific purposes (including the creation of positions within executive branch agencies; see below); regular notification and reporting requirements; and subjecting aid to Afghanistan to the same conditions as assistance provided under other pieces of legislation, like the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Arms Export and Control Act of 1976.
The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003 largely overshadowed the war in Afghanistan, and much of the legislative attention to Afghanistan in the subsequent several years came in bills and legislative provisions that treated the two wars together. As conditions in Afghanistan deteriorated, however, congressional attention returned to Afghanistan and some Members sought to scrutinize the U.S.-led international project there more closely. Congress mandated a number of reports, which remain among the most important sources for information on U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. One of the most significant congressional oversight actions was the 2008 establishment of a Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), modeled in part on a similar office overseeing Iraq.19 Congress directed that SIGAR publish quarterly reports detailing the obligation and expenditure of funds appropriated for Afghan reconstruction. Congress also required periodic audits and investigations of specific projects and funds.
The FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) added more reporting requirements. Section 1230 of the Act directed the President, through the Department of Defense, to submit a biannual report on "Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan." The first report was submitted under that title in June 2009. In the FY2015 NDAA (P.L. 113-291), Congress required a report on "Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan," among other reporting requirements, and biannual reports have been submitted under that title since June 2015 (most recently on July 3, 2018). In addition to these ongoing reports, Congress has regularly mandated the submission of one-time reports on specific issues in appropriations and defense authorization bills. Individual report directives proposed to and included in legislation in the 115th Congress can be found below.
Congress has appropriated $126.3 billion for relief and reconstruction in Afghanistan since FY2002, according to SIGAR's July 30, 2017 quarterly report.20 During the Karzai administration, the United States and other international donors "increasingly sought to condition assistance funds for Afghanistan…as a result of inadequate reforms."29"21 A 2014 report by majority staff by majority staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee also Committee also recommended that "a higher proportion of U.S. assistance should be conditioned based on specific reforms by the Afghan government."2230
Accordingly, Congress has imposed a number of directives and conditions on the use of both security and development assistance to Afghanistan (e.g., , Economic Support Fund, ESF, and International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement, INCLE) for a number of years. Most of those statutory conditions have been enacted through appropriations measures. Echoing provisions from prior years, the FY2019 omnibus appropriations bill (H.J.Res 31) prohibitsmeasures. As outlined below, FY2019 appropriations bills would prohibit the use of funds for activities that involve individuals suspected of involvementparticipating in corruption, narcotics trafficking, or human rights violations. Additionally, they would require the Secretary of State to certify that the Afghan government . The House Appropriations Committee-passed FY2019 State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations bill (H.R. 6385) would have required the Secretary of State to certify that the Afghan government is governing democratically, protecting, protecting women's rights, and publicly reporting its national budget (among other conditions) before obligating funds. There are a number of additional ; that provision was not included in the final FY2019 Consolidated Appropriations Act.
There are a number of additional conditions on U.S. assistance applicable but not specific to Afghanistan, such as the Leahy Laws (10 USC 362) prohibiting security assistance to foreign security forces that have perpetratedcommitted a gross violation of human rights. Some have suggested that31 According to media accounts, as well as a 2017 SIGAR report, some Afghan forces Afghan forces may have committed such violations.23
Congress has also played an important role in shaping the bureaucratic structures within the executive branch that are responsible for U.S. policy on Afghanistan. In the 2002 AFSA, Congress authorized the creation of a "coordinator" for Afghanistan and U.S. assistance there, to serve at the rank of ambassador. In 2007, the House passed a bill that would have authorized a Senate-confirmed special envoy to promote cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The George W. Bush Administration described the section authorizing the special envoy as "significantly objectionable," and the Senate did not take up the bill."24 In 2009, however, the Obama Administration created a similar position under State Department general authorities by appointing Richard Holbrooke as the first Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP). Various congressional proposals in recent years would have statutorily authorized, altered the mission of, required reporting on, or otherwise addressed the office, which the Trump Administration closed in September 2017.25
Other congressional measures have sought to condition, limit, or end the U.S. military effort in Afghanistan. While no measure limiting or terminating the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan has ever passed either chamber, support for such proposals in the House of Representatives generally seems to have grown from 2009 to 2014, the period when most of these measures were introduced.26 House bills calling for a "responsible end to the war in Afghanistan," for example, attracted 33 cosponsors in 2010 and 72 cosponsors in 2011; NDAA amendments that would have cut off funding for U.S. operations (other than the withdrawal of U.S. forces) attracted 113 and 153 votes in 2012 and 2014, respectively.27
Since the Trump Administration's announcement of the South Asia strategy in August 2017, congressional interest in Afghanistan seems to have increased, with some Members assessing the new strategy, events on the ground, and broader U.S. foreign and domestic policy interests as they relate to Afghanistan. The table below provides summaries and information on the status of proposed and enacted Afghanistan-related legislation in the 115th Congress.
Table 1. Proposed Legislation on Afghanistan
Bills, Resolutions, and Amendments offered in the 115th Congress
Bill Number |
Sponsor |
Summary |
Status |
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Resolutions and Stand–alone Legislation |
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Rep. Jones (R-NC) 15 cosponsors (as of 8/22/18) |
To Prohibit the Availability of Funds for Activities in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and for Other Purposes – Would prohibit funding for U.S. activities in Afghanistan (other than U.S. Embassy operations or intelligence gathering) one year after enactment, unless the President submits a national security certification waiver and Congress, within 30 days of receipt of that waiver, enacts a joint resolution authorizing the use of funds for purposes described in the certification (under expedited procedures). |
Introduced on 3/22/18 in the House. Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs on the same day. Sponsor introductory remarks were given on 4/27/18. |
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Rep. Lee (D-CA) |
No More Ghost Money Act – Would prohibit payments from U.S. employees to foreign officials for the purposes of bribery or coercion; would also require within 180 days after enactment the submission of a report from the Director of the CIA on all monetary payments made by the CIA to Afghan officials since September 11, 2001. |
Introduced on 1/5/17 in the House and referred to the Committee on Intelligence on the same day. |
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Sen. Cardin (D-MD) |
Promoting Peace and Justice for the People of Afghanistan Act of 2017 – Would require the President to submit within 60 days after enactment the U.S. strategy for engagement in Afghanistan; authorizes the creation of the Afghanistan Peace and Justice Initiative for FY2018 and FY2019; requires two reports within 180 days after enactment and annually thereafter on (1) U.S. diplomatic engagement to bring about a negotiated settlement and (2) Afghan and U.S. efforts to address corruption and abuses by Afghan civilian security forces. |
Introduced in the Senate on 9/28/17 and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. |
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Authorizations for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) |
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Rep. Banks (R-IN) |
AUMF Against al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria – Would authorize the use of force against al-Qaeda and the Taliban (in addition to ISIL), as well as "successor organizations, and associated forces;" would mandate a report every 60 days on actions taken pursuant to the authorities granted in the joint resolution. |
Introduced on 3/15/17 in the House and referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on the same day. |
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Rep. Schiff (D-CA) |
Consolidated AUMF Resolution of 2017 – Would authorize for three years the use of force against al-Qaeda and "the Afghan Taliban" (in addition to ISIL), as well as associated groups engaged in hostilities against the United States. |
Introduced in the House on 4/27/17 and referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs on the same day. |
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Rep. Perry (R-PA) |
AUMF Against Islamic Extremism – Would authorize the use of force against al-Qaeda, the Haqqani Network, and the Taliban (among other groups), as well as "any substantial supporters, associated forces, or closely related successor entities." |
Introduced in the House on 7/20/17 and referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on the same day. |
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Rep. Coffman (R-CO) |
AUMF Against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria – Would authorize for five years the use of force against al-Qaeda and the Taliban (in addition to ISIL), as well as "any person…that is a part of, or substantially supports" those groups. |
Introduced in the House on 10/21/17 and referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on the same day. |
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Sen. Young (R-IN) |
U.S. spending, both in general as well as on specific projects, has also been the subject of multiple congressional hearings. For information on the Trump Administration's budget requests and congressional action on U.S. funding levels in Afghanistan, see Table 3. In both legislation and public statements, some Members have expressed concern over the decline in the types and amount of information provided by the executive branch, including once-publicly available information related to Afghan military performance. John Sopko, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, said in an April 2019 interview, "What we are finding is now almost every indicia, metric for success or failure is now classified or nonexistent. Over time it's been classified or it's no longer being collected" and that "the classification in some areas is needless."33 This trend is not new. In October 2017, SIGAR reported that "in a significant development," U.S. officials "classified or otherwise restricted information" SIGAR had previously reported. That information includes metrics such as casualty rates, personnel strength, and attrition of Afghan forces. Administration officials cited a request from the Afghan government as justification for the 2017 decision.34 A May 2018 amendment to the FY2019 NDAA would have required the Secretary of Defense to make public all previously released data related to Afghan military performance; the amendment was not made in order. The accompanying report (H.Rept. 115-874) states that ...the conferees are disappointed by recent public decisions regarding a lack of transparency on basic information such as kinetic strike data, ANDSF [Afghan National Defense and Security Forces] development, retention, and casualty rates… The restriction of information in this manner undermines public confidence, hinders necessary congressional oversight, and raises legitimate questions about the efficacy of current U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. U.S. troop levels are another area of congressional interest, particularly since the Trump Administration decision to withhold information about troop deployments in Afghanistan and other conflict zones starting in December 2017. President Trump had previously declared, "we will not talk about numbers of troops or our plans for further military activities."35 Some Members of Congress have since engaged with Administration officials at hearings, written letters to Administration officials, and introduced legislative measures to require the Secretary of Defense to rescind the decision to withhold troop numbers, but as of August 2019 the Defense Manpower Data Center quarterly reports still lack data for Afghanistan (as well as Syria and Iraq).36 Concern among some Members regarding executive branch transparency extends beyond war-related data. In a March 2019 hearing, some Members pressed Secretary of State Pompeo to confirm that Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Khalilzad would brief the committee on U.S.-Taliban negotiations, as requested by House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Eliot Engel and Ranking Member Michael McCaul in February. Pompeo refused to commit, citing the sensitivity of ongoing talks and the need "to make sure that the contents of those negotiations remain in a very small circle."37 Some Members of the Committee then wrote a letter to Secretary Pompeo in April, describing Pompeo's refusal to commit to a briefing from Khalilzad as "unacceptable" and "perplexing in light of the fact that [Khalilzad] has engaged in a number of on-the-record interactions that outline the parameters of these negotiations."38 The plight of women and girls in Afghanistan has attracted significant congressional attention, particularly in light of ongoing U.S.-Taliban negotiations, which some observers warn could lead to a political arrangement in which women's rights could be compromised. The treatment of women under the Taliban, who effectively "forced Afghan women to disappear entirely from public view" during their rule, attracted nearly universal condemnation from the international community; one prominent scholar attributes the turnaround in U.S. policy toward the Taliban in the late 1990s to domestic backlash over the issue.39 Improving conditions for Afghan women was an integral objective of U.S. development efforts from the outset, as evidenced by the 2001 Afghan Women and Children Relief Act (P.L. 107-81), which authorized education and health assistance for Afghan women and required biannual reporting on those activities. Various congressional subcommittees have held hearings related to Afghan women.40 Some Members appear to have become more engaged on Afghan women's rights since 2018, as U.S. negotiations with the Taliban, who have reportedly given contradictory signs about their current stance, proceed.41 After three Senators sent letters on the issue to Secretary of State Pompeo in February 2019, 77 Representatives wrote to Pompeo in June 2019 to urge him to ensure that women are included in peace talks and that any potential settlement protects their rights.42 In July 2019, several of the signatories of that House letter introduced the Afghan Women's Inclusion in Negotiations Act (H.R. 4097), which would, among other provisions, require the submission of regular reports on the participation of women in peace talks and of an executive branch strategy to protect women's rights after an agreement is reached. Some Members express skepticism about the Administration's commitment to securing protections for Afghan women. In May 2019, Senator Bob Menendez expressed alarm at Secretary Pompeo's statement that he hoped Afghan women "will make their voices heard," remarking "As if that's all it takes. As if the women of Afghanistan hadn't thought of that before…We are not bystanders here…The United States needs to be present and play a role in defending these rights."43 Some Members have also focused on the role of women in the ANDSF, regularly setting aside a portion of the Department of Defense-administered Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) for the recruitment and retention of women in the force. Bill Number Sponsor Summary Status Resolutions and Stand–alone Legislation Rep. Lee (D-CA) No More Ghost Money Act – would prohibit payments from U.S. employees to foreign officials for the purposes of bribery or coercion; would also require within 180 days of enactment the submission of a report from the Director of the CIA on all monetary payments made by the CIA to Afghan officials since September 11, 2001. Introduced in the House on 1/8/19 and referred to the Committee on Intelligence (Permanent Select) S.Amdt. 65 to S. 1 Sen. McConnell (R-KY) Sense of the Senate on Withdrawals of United States Forces from Syria and Afghanistan – found that, among other findings, Iran has supported the Taliban; warned against "a precipitous withdrawal" of U.S. forces; acknowledged Special Representative Khalilzad's efforts; and called upon the Administration to "certify that conditions have been met for the enduring defeat of Al Qaeda and ISIS" before withdrawing U.S. forces from Afghanistan. Introduced in the Senate 1/29/19; amendment, as amended, agreed to in Senate by 70-26 vote on 2/4/19; S. 1 passed by Senate 77-23 on 2/5/19. Sen. Paul (R-KY) AFGHAN Service Act – would require the Secretary of Defense to formulate, within 45 days of enactment, a plan for military withdrawal from Afghanistan; require the removal of all U.S. armed forces from Afghanistan within a year of enactment; award all military personnel deployed in support of the "Global War on Terror" with a $2,500 bonus; and repeal the 2001 AUMF (P.L. 107-40). Introduced in the Senate on 3/4/2019 and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations Rep. Banks (R-IN) Ensuring a Secure Afghanistan Act – would require the Secretary of State to provide monthly briefings on the status of U.S.-Taliban talks to the foreign affairs, armed services, and intelligence committees of both chambers; would also prohibit the use of funds to reduce U.S. forces in Afghanistan below 10,000 unless the Director of National Intelligence certifies that the Taliban have met a number of conditions, including severing all ties with Al Qaeda, recognizing the Afghan constitution, and committing to uphold women's rights. Introduced in the House on 4/3/19 and referred to the Committee on Armed Services Rep. Keating (D-MA) Afghan Women's Inclusion in Negotiations Act – would express the sense of Congress that representatives of Afghan women should be part of U.S.-Taliban negotiations; require the Secretary of State to submit a report within 30 days of the conclusion of each round of Afghan peace negotiations including information on the participation of Afghan women in those talks; and require the Secretary of State to submit within 120 days of a final settlement agreement a strategy for post-conflict U.S. support for Afghan women. Introduced in the House on July 30, 2019. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 House NDAA: H.R. 2500 Rep. Smith (D-WA) Sec. 1211 – would extend, for one year, authority to provide Coalition Support Funds for U.S. military operations and increase the amount authorized by $100 million, to $450 million. Sec 1213 – would extend authority to transfer defense articles and provide defense services to Afghan forces. Sec 1214 – would extend authority to acquire products produced in countries along Afghan supply routes and add a requirement to report on the use of that authority by March 1, 2020. Sec 1215 – would authorize $5 million for ex gratia payments for Afghanistan and other theaters. Sec 1216 – would extend a semiannual DOD reporting requirement. Sec 1521 – would direct that up to $45 million (and at least $10 million) of ASFF be used for recruitment and retention of women in the Afghan security forces; mandate a DOD assessment of Afghan progress toward security objectives and efforts to manage and sustain equipment by June 2020; and direct the Secretary of Defense to withhold $480 million in assistance to the government of Afghanistan if the Department determines that it has made insufficient progress (subject to national security waiver authority). Reported by the House Armed Services Committee, 6/19/19 Rep Lynch (D-MA) House Rules Committee Amendment 429 – would require DOD to make public data related to Afghanistan, including ANDSF casualty figures. Not made in order by the Rules Committee. Rep. Keating (D-MA) House Rules Committee Amendment 471 – would direct the Secretary of Defense to guarantee the meaningful participation of Afghan women in the peace process. Made in order. Incorporated into the bill as Sec. 1218 Rep. Welch (D-VT) House Rules Committee Amendment 583 – would add to the semiannual DOD report on Afghanistan a requirement to include information on monitoring and evaluation measures related to ASFF. Made in order. Incorporated into the bill as Sec. 1216(2). Rep. Welch (D-VT) House Rules Committee Amendment 584 – would require the Administration to submit with its FY2021 budget request the amount of government-to-government funding provided for the ANDSF in FY2019 and FY2020, and to explain any difference between the two. Made in order. Incorporated into the bill as Sec. 1521(e) Rep. Davidson (R-OH) House Rules Committee Amendment 587 – would cut ASFF by half ($2.25 billion) and cut FY2020 Overseas Contingency Operations funding for Operation Freedom's Sentinel by half. Not made in order by the Rules Committee. Rep. Smith (D-WA) Sec. 1211 – would extend, for one year, authority to provide Coalition Support Funds for U.S. military operations and increase amount authorized by $100 million to $450 million. Sec. 1213 – would extend, for two years, authority to transfer defense articles and provide defense services to Afghan forces. Sec. 1214 – would extend authority to acquire products produced in countries along Afghan supply routes and adds requirement to report on the use of that authority by March 1, 2020. Sec. 1215 – would authorize $5 million for ex gratia payments for Afghanistan and other theaters. Sec. 1216 – would extend semiannual DOD reporting requirement, and expand categories of information to be included. Sec. 1218 – would direct the Secretary of Defense to guarantee the meaningful participation of Afghan women in the peace process. Sec. 1521 – would direct that up to $45 million (and minimum of $10 million) of ASFF be used for recruitment and retention of women in the Afghan security forces; would mandate a DOD assessment by June 1, 2020 of Afghan progress toward security objectives and efforts to manage and sustain equipment; would direct the Secretary of Defense to withhold $480 million if the Department determines the Afghan government has made insufficient progress (with national security waiver authority); and would require the Administration to submit with its FY2021 budget request the amount of government-to-government funding provided for the ANDSF in FY2019, FY2020, and the reason for any difference between the two. Passed by the House 220-197 on 7/12/19 Rep. Smith (D-WA) Briefing on Afghanistan Reconciliation – directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the House Armed Services Committee by October 1, 2019 on the status of U.S.-Taliban talks. As reported by the House Armed Services Committee on 6/19/19 Senate NDAA: S. 1790 Sec. 804 – would extend, for two years, authority to acquire products produced in countries along Afghan supply routes. Sec. 1211 – would extend, for one year, authority to transfer defense articles and provide defense services to Afghan forces. Sec. 1212 – would direct that up to $45 million (and at least $10 million) of ASFF be used for recruitment and retention of women in the Afghan security forces; would mandate a DOD assessment within 90 days of Afghan progress. Sec.1213 – would reauthorize the Commander's Emergence Response Program (CERP). Sec. 1214 – would extend, for one year, authority to provide Coalition Support Funds to Afghanistan operations. Sec.1215 – would authorize $15 million to be provided for persons or entities within Afghanistan (or Pakistan if notified) for reconciliation support activities led by the Afghan government As reported to the Senate by the Senate Armed Services Committee on 6/11/19 Sen. Shaheen (D-NH) Senate Amendment 267 – would direct the Secretary of State to ensure the meaningful participation of women in the Afghan peace process. Submitted on 6/12/19. Sen. Bennett (D-CO) Senate Amendment 403 – would add reporting requirements to semiannual DOD reports. Submitted on 6/13/19. Sen. Shaheen (D-NH) Senate Amendment 646 – alteration of S.Amdt. 267 (above) Submitted on 6/18/19; included as Sec. 6215 as passed by the Senate. Sen. Bennett (D-CO) Senate Amendment 673 – alteration of S.Amdt. 403 (above) Submitted on 6/18/19; included as Sec. 6217 as passed by Senate. Sen. Paul (R-KY) Senate Amendment 720 – would withdraw U.S. forces from Afghanistan (same as Afghan SERVICE Act, S.J.Res. 12, above). Submitted 6/18/19. Sen. Inhofe (R-OK) Sec. 804 – would extend, for two years, authority to acquire products produced in countries along Afghan supply routes. Sec. 1211 – would extend, for one year, authority to transfer defense articles and provide defense services to Afghan forces. Sec. 1212 – would direct that up to $25 million (and minimum of $10 million) of ASFF be used for recruitment and retention of women in the Afghan security forces; would mandate a DOD assessment within 90 days of Afghan progress. Sec.1213 – would reauthorize the Commander's Emergence Response Program. Sec. 1214 – would extend, for one year, authority to provide Coalition Support Funds to Afghanistan operations. Sec.1215 – would authorize $15 million for reconciliation support activities led by the Afghan government to designated persons or entities within Afghanistan, or Pakistan if notified, with rule of construction to not violate 8 USC 2339, 2339A, or 2339B (providing support to terrorism). Sec. 6215 – would direct the Secretary of Defense to ensure the meaningful participation of Afghan women in the ongoing peace process, and would require report within 180 days on steps taken to fulfill that directive. Sec. 6217 – would add to semiannual DOD reporting requirements information on counterterrorism and DOD support for reconciliation efforts Passed by the Senate 86-8 on 6/27/19. FY2020 Defense Appropriations Introduced as H.R. 2968; passed as Division C of H.R. 2740 H.R. 2968 Rep. Visclosky (D-IN) Sec. 9005 – would appropriate up to $5 million for CERP. Sec. 9006 – would allow DOD funds to provide supplies and support to allied forces participating in operations in Afghanistan. Sec. 9007 – would prohibit the use of funds for the purpose of providing for the permanent stationing of U.S. troops in Afghanistan (as well as Iraq). Sec. 9009 – would prohibit the obligation of ASFF funds prior to the approval of a financial and activity plan by the Afghanistan Resources Oversight Council at DOD. Sec. 9020 – would prohibit the transfer of C-130s to Afghanistan until DOD reports on Afghan airlift requirements. Sec. 9021 – would allow the use of ASFF funds for Afghan forces that would otherwise be prohibited by 10 USC 362 ("Leahy Law") if the Secretary certifies that doing so is in U.S. national security interests. Sec. 9022 – would prohibit the use of funds to pay Taliban expenses to participate in meetings that do not include Afghan government representatives or that restrict women's participation. Approved by Defense Subcommittee on 5/15/19 H.R. 2968 Rep. Lee (D-CA) Amendment to Defense Appropriations Bill – would repeal the 2001 AUMF (PL 107-40) 240 days after enactment. Approved in full Committee 30-22 (Roll Call 2), 5/21/19 Incorporated into the bill as Section 9025. H.R. 2740 Rep. DeLauro (D-CT) Sec. 9005 – would appropriate up to $5 million for CERP. Sec. 9006 – would allow DOD funds to provide supplies and support to allied forces participating in operations in Afghanistan. Sec. 9007 – would prohibit the use of funds for the purpose of providing for the permanent stationing of U.S. troops in Afghanistan (as well as Iraq). Sec. 9009 – would prohibit the obligation of ASFF funds prior to the approval of a financial and activity plan by the Afghanistan Resources Oversight Council at the Department of Defense. Sec. 9020 – would prohibit the transfer of C-130s to Afghanistan until DOD reports on Afghan airlift requirements. Sec. 9021 – would allow the use of ASFF funds for Afghan forces that would otherwise be prohibited by 10 USC 362 ("Leahy Law") if the Secretary certifies that doing so is in U.S. national security interests. Sec. 9022 – would prohibit the use of funds to pay Taliban expenses to participate in meetings that do not include Afghan government representatives or that restrict women's participation. Sec. 9025 – would repeal the 2001 AUMF (PL 107-40) within 240 days of enactment. Passed by the House 226-203 on 6/19/19 FY2020 State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Introduced as H.R. 2839; passed as Division D of H.R. 2740 H.R. 2839 Rep. Lowey (D-NY) Sec. 7044 – would make funds available for reconciliation and reintegration activities and for an endowment to empower Afghan women and girls; and would prohibit the use of funds to enter into permanent basing agreement with the Afghan government. Reported to the House by the House Appropriations Committee 5/20/19 H. Rept 116-78 SIGAR drawdown -- the Committee recommendation includes funding to begin reductions to the SIGAR operations in fiscal year 2020 and directs SIGAR to submit, within 180 days, a plan for a "complete drawdown" by the end of FY2021. Reported to the House by the House Appropriations Committee 5/20/19 H.R. 2740 Rep. Davidson (R-OH) House Rules Committee Amendment 5 – would reduce OCO funding for Afghanistan to a maximum of $9.3 billion. Not made in order. H.R. 2740 Rep. Davidson (R-OH) House Rules Committee Amendment 6 – would reduce ASFF by half ($2.25 billion). Not made in order. H.R. 2740 Rep. DeLauro (D-CT) Sec. 7044 – would make funds available for reconciliation and reintegration activities and for an endowment to empower Afghan women and girls; and would prohibit the use of funds to enter into permanent basing agreement with Afghan government. Passed by the House 226-203 on 6/19/19 Note: Congress also passed the FY2019 State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations in the 116th Congress (see below) Source: Congressional Research Service Bill Number Sponsor Summary Status Resolutions and Stand–alone Legislation Rep. Jones (R-NC) To Prohibit the Availability of Funds for Activities in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and for Other Purposes – would prohibit funding for U.S. activities in Afghanistan (other than U.S. Embassy operations or intelligence gathering) one year after enactment, unless the President submits a national security certification waiver and Congress, within 30 days of receipt of that waiver, enacts a joint resolution authorizing the use of funds for purposes described in the certification (under expedited procedures). Introduced on 3/22/18 and referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs Sponsor introductory remarks were given on 4/27/18. Rep. Lee (D-CA) No More Ghost Money Act – would prohibit payments from U.S. employees to foreign officials for the purposes of bribery or coercion; would also require within 180 days after enactment the submission of a report from the Director of the CIA on all monetary payments made by the CIA to Afghan officials since September 11, 2001. Introduced on 1/5/17 in the House and referred to the Committee on Intelligence Sen. Cardin (D-MD) Promoting Peace and Justice for the People of Afghanistan Act of 2017 – would require the President to submit within 60 days after enactment the U.S. strategy for engagement in Afghanistan; authorize the creation of the Afghanistan Peace and Justice Initiative for FY2018 and FY2019; require two reports within 180 days after enactment and annually thereafter on (1) U.S. diplomatic engagement to bring about a negotiated settlement and (2) Afghan and U.S. efforts to address corruption and abuses by Afghan civilian security forces. Introduced in the Senate on 9/28/17 and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. Authorizations for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) Rep. Banks (R-IN) AUMF Against al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria – would authorize the use of force against Al Qaeda and the Taliban (in addition to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, or ISIL), as well as "successor organizations, and associated forces"; and would mandate a report every 60 days on actions taken pursuant to the authorities granted in the joint resolution. Introduced on 3/15/17 in the House and referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Rep. Schiff (D-CA) Consolidated AUMF Resolution of 2017 – would authorize for three years the use of force against Al Qaeda and "the Afghan Taliban" (in addition to ISIL), as well as associated groups engaged in hostilities against the United States. Introduced in the House on 4/27/17 and referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs. Rep. Perry (R-PA) AUMF Against Islamic Extremism – would authorize the use of force against Al Qaeda, the Haqqani Network, and the Taliban (among other groups), as well as "any substantial supporters, associated forces, or closely related successor entities." Introduced in the House on 7/20/17 and referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on the same day. Rep. Coffman (R-CO) AUMF Against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria – would authorize for five years the use of force against Al Qaeda and the Taliban (in addition to ISIL), as well as "any person…that is a part of, or substantially supports" those groups. Introduced in the House on 10/21/17 and referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on the same day. Sen. Young (R-IN) AUMF Against al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria – would authorize the use of force against Al Qaeda and the Taliban (in addition to ISIL), as well as "successor organizations, and associated forces;" would mandate a report every 60 days on actions taken pursuant to the authorities granted in the joint resolution. Introduced in the Senate on 3/2/17 and referred to Committee on Foreign Relations. |
Introduced in the Senate on 3/2/17 and referred to Committee on Foreign Relations. |
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Sen. Corker (R-TN) |
AUMF of 2018 – |
Introduced in the House on 4/16/18 to the Committee on Foreign Relations. Committees on Foreign Relations and Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs held hearings on 5/16/18 and 6/6/18, respectively. |
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Sen. Merkley (D-OR) |
Constitutional Consideration for Use of Force Resolution – Would authorize the use of force against |
Introduced in the Senate on 5/23/18 and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. |
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National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 |
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House NDAA: H.R. 5515 Rep. Thornberry (R-TX) Sec. 1211 – would extend authority to transfer defense articles and provide services to the ANDSF. Sec. 1213 – would extend (and expand geographic range of) CERP. Sec. 1521 – would extend authorities and reporting requirements regarding the use of ASFF; also directs that at least $10 million of ASFF be used for recruitment and retention of women in the Afghan security forces; also directs the submission of a report on the Afghan government's ability to manage equipment provided through the ASFF and would allow withholding of such assistance in the event that the Afghan government is determined to have made insufficient progress toward maintaining the equipment. As reported in the House by the House Armed Services Committee on 5/15/18 |
Rep. McGovern (D-MA), Rep. Jones (R-NC), Rep. Lee (D-CA), Rep. Garamendi (D-CA), Rep. Kildee (D-MI), Rep. Welch (D-VT) |
House Rules Committee Amendment 173 – Would have required the President to notify Congress of any increase in U.S. force levels in Afghanistan after September 30, 2018, including the number, purpose, and duration of such deployments, and allow for the passage, within 30 days of the presidential determination, of a joint resolution to disapprove of such increases. |
Introduced on 5/15/18. Defeated in Rules Committee Record Vote No. 218, 4-9. |
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Rep. Welch (D-VT), Rep. Jones (R-NC), Rep. Lee (D-CA) |
House Rules Committee Amendment 214 – Would have required the Secretary of Defense to develop sustainment plans for projects funded through the Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund and submit those plans to appropriate congressional committees. |
Submitted on 05/15/18. Not made in order by Rules Committee. |
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Rep. Lee (D-CA), Rep. Jones (R-NC) |
House Rules Committee Amendment 231 – Would have required the Secretary of Defense to submit within 90 days of passage, and Joint Explanatory Statement – "The conferees welcome the introduction of the bilateral U.S.-Afghanistan Compact, and the focus on the four pillars of governance, economics, peace and reconciliation, and security. However, the conferees are disappointed by the lack of transparency provided by the Department of Defense and the Department of State on the central tenants of the Compact and associated benchmarks." |
Submitted on 05/16/18. Made in order as Amendment 76 in H.Rept. 115-698. Adopted by voice vote as part of en bloc H.Amdt. 643. Incorporated as Section 1230B and engrossed in the House on 5/24/18. House receded in conference, not incorporated into final bill, but addressed in Joint Explanatory Statement. |
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Rep. Lynch (D-MA), Rep. Cummings (D-MD), Rep. Welch (D-VT) |
House Rules Committee Amendment 255 – Would have required the Secretary of Defense to rescind the decision to redact troop levels for Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria in the quarterly Defense Manpower Data Center report, and to publish troop numbers based on deployment location instead of permanently-assigned unit location. |
Submitted on 05/15/18 Not made in order by Rules Committee. |
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Rep. Lynch (D-MA), Rep. Welch (D-VT) |
House Rules Committee Amendment 256 – Would have required the Secretary of Defense to "facilitate meaningful access and assistance" to Members of the committees of jurisdiction traveling to Afghanistan, Iraq, Kuwait, and Syria as part of congressional oversight efforts. |
Submitted on 05/21/18 Not made in order by Rules Committee. |
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Rep. Lynch (D-MA), Rep. Cummings (D-MD), Rep. Welch (D-VT) |
House Rules Committee Amendment 257 – Would have directed the Secretary of Defense to make public all performance data about the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces that have not been publicly available since October 2017. Joint Explanatory Statement: "The conferees are disappointed by recent public decisions regarding a lack of transparency on basic information such as kinetic strike data, [and] ANDSF development, retention, and casualty rates…The restriction of information in this manner undermines public confidence, hinders necessary congressional oversight, and raises legitimate questions about the efficacy of current U.S. efforts in Afghanistan." |
Submitted on 05/15/18 Not made in order by Rules Committee, but addressed in Joint Explanatory Statement. |
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Rep. Engel (D-NY) |
House Rules Committee Amendment 449 – Would have directed the Secretary of State to establish an office (of at least three full-time employees) for peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan to lead and coordinate U.S. efforts to seek a negotiated settlement to the war. |
Submitted on 05/14/18 Not made in order by Rules Committee. |
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Rep. Boyle (D-PA) |
House Rules Committee Amendment 522 – Would have required the State Department and Department of Defense to report on Russia's support of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Joint Explanatory Statement – |
Submitted 5/21/18. Made in order as Amendment 35 in H.Rept. 115-702. Adopted by voice vote as part of en bloc H.Amdt. 645. Incorporated as Section 1242 and engrossed in the House on 5/24/18. House receded, not incorporated into final bill but Joint Explanatory Statement directs submission of related report. |
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Rep. Thornberry (R-TX) | Section 1211 – Extends authority (first granted in 2013 NDAA) for Secretary of Defense to transfer, without reimbursement, excess U.S. defense articles in Afghanistan as of January 2, 2013 to Afghan security forces. |
Engrossed in the House on 5/24/18. Engrossed in the Senate on 6/18/18 as Section 1213. Incorporated into final bill as Section 1221. |
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Rep. Thornberry (R-TX) |
Senate Amendment 2656 – Would have directed the Secretary of Defense to submit within 180 days a report on U.S. diplomatic, defense and security, and development strategies in Afghanistan. Submitted on 6/11/18. Not considered. Sen. Durbin (D-IL), Sen. Duckworth (D-IL) Senate Amendment 2775 – Would have directed the Secretary of Defense to submit within a year of enactment an assessment of security cooperation programs in Afghanistan (along with nine other countries). Submitted on 6/11/18 Not considered. Sen. Bennet (D-CO) Senate Amendment 2779 – Would have established an eight-member "Long Wars Study Group" to examine U.S. involvement in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; the working group would produce a final report, including lessons learned and recommendations, within two years of enactment. Submitted on 6/11/18 Not considered FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 115-232 Sec. 1221 – extends authority to transfer defense articles and provide services to the ANDSF. |
Engrossed in the House on 5/24/18. Engrossed in the Senate as Section 1211 on 5/24/18. Incorporated into final bill as Section 1223. |
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Sen. Merkley (D-OR) |
Senate Amendment 2656 – Would have directed the Secretary of Defense to submit within 180 days a report on U.S. diplomatic, defense and security, and development strategies in Afghanistan. |
Submitted on 6/11/18. Not considered. |
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Sen. Durbin (D-IL), Sen. Duckworth (D-IL) |
Senate Amendment 2775 – Would have directed the Secretary of Defense to submit within a year of enactment an assessment of security cooperation programs in Afghanistan (along with nine other countries). |
Submitted on 6/11/18 Not considered. |
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Sen. Bennet (D-CO) |
Senate Amendment 2779 – Would have established an 8-member "Long Wars Study Group" to examine U.S. involvement in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; the working group would produce a final report, including lessons learned and recommendations, within two years of enactment. |
Submitted on 6/11/18 Not considered. |
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Fiscal Year 2019 Appropriations |
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Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2019 |
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H.R. 6157 |
Rep. Khanna (D-CA) |
House Rules Amendment 76 – would have prohibited the use of funds to increase the U.S. force presence in Afghanistan above current levels. |
Submitted on 620/18. Not made in order by the Rules Committee. |
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National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 |
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H.R. 2810 (NDAA)/P.L. 115-91 |
Rep. Khanna (D-CA) |
House Rules Committee Amendment 72 – requires the Secretary of Defense to conduct a cost-benefit analysis when entering into a contract for uniforms for Afghan forces. |
Submitted on 7/6/17. Made in order as Amendment 24 in H.Rept. 115-212. Adopted by voice vote as part of en bloc H.Amdt. 173. Incorporated as Section 344 in final bill. |
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H.R. 2810 (NDAA)/P.L. 115-91 |
Rep. Kildee (D-MI) |
House Rules Committee Amendment 153 – would have added projected casualties and costs, as well as objectives, of U.S. deployments to Afghanistan to list of metrics in Section 1212 (requiring a report on U.S. strategy in Afghanistan). Joint Explanatory Statement – "The conferees direct the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, to provide a report on the Afghanistan strategy no later than February 15, 2018. The report should include a description of U.S. security interests and objectives; the current and planned military efforts to support such objectives; the anticipated timeline necessary to achieve such objectives; a description of the projected long-term U.S. military role in Afghanistan; an analysis of the risk to force, including green on blue attacks, and the efforts to mitigate such risks; an accounting of the costs associated with accomplishing the security objectives over the projected timeline; a description of the interests, objectives, and activities of other regional actors in Afghanistan, including Russia, Iran, Pakistan, China, India, and any other country the Secretary believes to be influencing Afghanistan's stability and security." |
Submitted on 7/10/17. Made in order as Amendment 68 in H.Rept. 115-217. Adopted by voice vote as part of en bloc H.Amdt. 193. Incorporated as part of Section 1212. Engrossed in the House on 7/17/17. Struck in conference but incorporated in altered form in Joint Explanatory Statement. |
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H.R. 2810 (NDAA)/P.L. 115-91 |
Rep. McGovern (D-MA), Rep. Jones (R-NC), Rep. Lee (D-CA), Rep. Massie (R-KY), Rep. Garamendi (D-CA), Rep. Welch (D-VT), Rep. Kildee (D-MD) |
House Rules Committee Amendment 165 – would have required the President to notify Congress of any increase in U.S. force levels in Afghanistan after September 30, 2018, including the number, purpose, and duration of such deployments, and allow for the passage, within 30 days of the presidential determination, of a joint resolution to disapprove of such increases. |
Submitted on 07/12/2017. Defeated in Rules Committee Record Vote No. 71 2-8. |
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H.R. 2810 (NDAA)/P.L. 115-91 |
Rep. Gallego (D-AZ) |
House Rules Committee Amendment 271 – would have added a description of foreign support (from Russia, Iran, Pakistan, and others) to the Taliban and other extremist groups to the list of matters included in a report on U.S. strategy in Afghanistan submitted by the Secretary of Defense. Not agreed to in Conference- House recedes, Section 1212 of House bill struck from NDAA but incorporated into Explanatory Statement directive to Secretary of Defense to provide report on Afghanistan strategy by February 15, 2018 (see above). |
Submitted on 07/12/17. Made in order as Amendment 60 in H.Rept. 115-212. Adopted by voice vote as part of en bloc H Amdt 175. Incorporated as part of Section 1212. Struck in conference, but incorporated into Joint Explanatory Statement directive. |
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H.R. 2810 (NDAA)/P.L. 115-91 |
Rep. Connolly (D-VA) |
House Rules Committee Amendment 357 – Requires a review of |
Submitted on 07/12/17. Made in order as Amendment 79 in H.Rept. 115-217. Adopted by voice vote as part of en bloc H Amdt 194. Incorporated as Section 1081 and engrossed in the House on 7/14/17. Incorporated as Section 1098 in final bill. |
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H.R. 2810 (NDAA)/P.L. 115-91 |
Rep. Lee (D-CA), Rep. Jones (R-NC) |
House Rules Committee Amendment 381 – Would have transferred $28 million from ASFF to the Office of Suicide Prevention . |
Submitted on 07/12/17. Not made in order by Rules Committee. |
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H.R. 2810 (NDAA)/P.L. 115-91 |
Rep. Thornberry (R-TX) |
Agreed to in Conference – House version directed $41 million for recruitment and retention of women in ANDSF (compared to a $25 million "goal" in the Senate bill, Section 1531); final bill language directs at least $10 million, with the goal of $41 million, be directed to that purpose. |
Engrossed in the House on 7/14/17. Agreed to in conference and incorporated in modified form as Section 1531 in final bill. |
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H.R. 2810 (NDAA)/P.L. 115-91 |
Rep. Thornberry (R-TX) |
Joint Explanatory Statement – "the conferees understand the Department of Defense is revaluating the practice of substituting contractor personnel," but directs a briefing on the topic by March 31, 2018. |
Engrossed in the House on 7/14/17. The Senate engrossed amendment contained no similar provision. The House receded in conference, but directive maintained in Joint Explanatory Statement. |
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H.R. 2810 (NDAA)/P.L. 115-91 |
Sen. Sullivan (R-AK), Sen. Peters (D-MI), Sen. Cornyn (R-TX), Sen. Warner (D-VA) |
Senate Amendment 511 – would have directed the Secretary of Defense to work with the Afghan and Indian governments to establish priorities and opportunities for investment in Afghanistan; identify gaps in Afghan military capacity; and improve delivery of humanitarian assistance. |
Submitted on 7/27/17. Not considered. |
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H.R. 2810 (NDAA)/P.L. 115-91 |
Sen. Leahy (D-VT) |
Senate Amendment 529 – authorizes the Secretary of Defense to create |
Submitted on 7/27/17. Engrossed in Senate amendment on 9/18/17 as Section 6203. Incorporated as Section 1216 in final bill. |
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H.R. 2810 (NDAA)/P.L. 115-91 |
Sen. McCain (R-AZ) |
Senate Amendment 609 – would have expressed the sense of Congress that the United States should pursue an "integrated civil-military" strategy in Afghanistan. |
Submitted on 7/27/17. Not considered. |
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H.R. 2810 (NDAA)/P.L. 115-91 |
Sen. McCain (R-AZ) |
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Engrossed in Senate amendment on 9/18/17. House contained no similar provision; House receded in conference and incorporated into final bill as Section 1215. |
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FY2018 Defense Appropriations |
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H.R.3219 – Make America Secure Appropriations Act, 2018 (Defense Appropriations) |
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Rep. Brownley (D-CA) |
House Rules Committee Amendment 21 (version 1) – would have required the Secretary of Defense to submit a report on steps being taken by Afghan forces to end sexual abuse, sex slavery, and rape. |
Introduced on 7/21/17. Not made in order. |
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Rep. Davis (D-CA) |
House Rules Committee Amendment 77 (version 3) – broadens use of funds from "recruitment" of Afghan women in the ANDSF to "recruitment, retention, and training." |
Introduced on 7/26/17. Revised; made in order and incorporated in revised form under "Afghanistan Security Forces Fund." Incorporated into H.R. 1625. |
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Rep. Welch (D-VT), Rep. Lee (D-CA), Rep. Khanna (D-CA), Rep. Jones (R-NC), Rep. Walberg (R-MI) |
House Rules Committee Amendment 111 (version 1) – Would have prohibited the use of ASFF funds to procure uniforms for the Afghan National Army. |
Introduced on 7/21/17. Made in order as Amendment 40 in H.Rept. 115-261. Engrossed in the House on 7/27/17 as Section 10004. Not incorporated into H.R. 1625. |
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Rep. Nolan (D-MN) |
House Rules Committee Amendment 130 (version 2) – Would have decreased ASFF funding by $12 million. |
Introduced on 7/26/17. Made in order as Amendment 53 in H.Rept. 115-261. Engrossed in the House as 7/27/17 under "Afghanistan Security Forces Fund." H.R. 1625 reduced ASFF by more than $12 million below the level in H.R. 3219. |
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Rep. Granger (R-TX) |
Sec. 9006 – would authorize provision of services, transportation, and logistical support to allied and coalition forces supporting U.S. operations in Afghanistan. Sec. 9007 – Prohibits the use of funds for, among other purposes, establishing any base that provides for "permanent stationing" of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Sec. 9009 – Among other purposes, prohibits the obligation of ASFF funds prior to approval of financial and activity plan by the Afghanistan Resources Oversight Council at DOD. Sec. 9019 – prohibits the use of funds to transfer additional C–130 cargo aircraft to Afghan forces until DOD provides a report on Afghan airlift requirements. Sec. 9020 – Rescinds $100 million in 2017/2018 ASFF funds. Sec. 9022 – allows for ASFF funds to be used in training and equipping units for which assistance would otherwise be prohibited by Leahy Laws (10 U.S.C. 362) if the Secretary of State certifies that denial of such assistance would harm U.S. national security, among other conditions. Signed by the President on 3/23/18 as P.L. 115-141 |
Engrossed in the House on 7/27/17. Incorporated into H.R. 1625. |
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Rep. Granger (R-TX) |
Section 9007 – Prohibits the use of funds for, among other purposes, establishing any base that provides for "permanent stationing" of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. |
Engrossed in the House on 7/27/17. Incorporated into H.R. 1625. |
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Rep. Granger (R-TX) |
Section 9009 – Among other purposes, prohibits the obligation of ASFF funds prior to approval of financial and activity plan by the Afghanistan Resources Oversight Council at the Department of Defense. |
Engrossed in the House on 7/27/17. Incorporated into H.R. 1625. |
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Rep. Granger (R-TX) |
Section 9019 – Rescinds $100 million in 2017/2018 ASFF funds. |
Engrossed in the House on 7/27/17. Incorporated into H.R. 1625 as Section 9020. |
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H.R. 3354 (minibus) |
Rep. Rosen (D-NV), Rep. Gallego (D-AZ) |
House Rules Committee Amendment 93 (version 1) – Would have prohibited the use of funds to close or merge the Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. |
Introduced 9/5/17. Not made in order. |
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Consolidated Appropriations FY2018 (Omnibus) |
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In addition to provisions noted above, H.R. 1625 contained the following on Afghanistan: |
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H.R. 1625 (Omnibus)/P.L. 115-141 |
Section 9019 – prohibits the use of funds to transfer additional C–130 cargo aircraft to Afghan forces until the Department of Defense provides a report on Afghan airlift requirements. |
Incorporated into final bill as signed into law on 3/23/18. |
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H.R. 1625 (Omnibus)/P.L. 115-141 |
Section 9022 – allows for ASFF funds to be used in training and equipping units for which assistance would otherwise be prohibited by Leahy Laws (10 U.S.C. 362) if the Secretary of State certifies that denial of such assistance would harm U.S. national security, among other conditions. |
Incorporated into final bill as signed into law on 3/23/18. |
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Division K of H.R. 1625 (Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2018) Rep. Royce (R-CA) Sec. 7044 – (1) prohibits the use of ESF and INCLE funds for projects/activities in which individuals suspected of narcotics production, human rights violations, or corrupt practices are participating or for projects in areas where resource disbursement monitoring cannot be performed (with national security certification waiver); (2) requires the Secretary of State to certify that ESF and INCLE funds are used to advance civil society, women's rights, transparency, and other U.S. goals, among other conditions; (3) requires the Secretary to submit a biannual report on progress toward goals and benchmarks of U.S. assistance; (4) makes funds available for programs to assist women and girls, help the Afghan government develop its financial system, and expand regional linkages, among other purposes; (5) requires the Secretary to certify that U.S. companies and organizations implementing U.S. foreign aid programs are not subjected to taxation by the Afghan government and (6) prohibits the use of any funds to enter into a permanent basing rights agreement between the United States and Afghanistan. Signed by the President on 3/23/18 as P.L. 115-141 Source: Congressional Research ServiceTable 2
Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan
($ in thousands)
FY2018 |
FY2019
|
FY2020 |
|||||||||
President's Budget |
Senatea |
Houseb |
Omnibus |
President's Budget |
Senate |
Houseb |
|
President's Budget
|
Senate House |
||
Economic Support Fund |
650,000 |
500,000 |
- |
|
500,000 |
500,000 |
- |
400,000 |
|||
Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related Programs |
37,000 |
37,000 |
- |
37,000 |
(not requested by country) |
37,000 |
- |
36,600 |
|||
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement |
95,000 |
160,000 |
- |
|
95,000 |
160,000 |
- |
95,000 |
|||
International Military Education and Training |
800 |
800 |
- |
800 |
800 |
800 |
800 |
||||
Operation Freedom's Sentinel (through OCO)c |
47,100,000 |
- |
- |
- |
46,300,000 |
- |
- |
- |
(not broken out) |
||
Afghanistan Security Forces Fund |
4,937,515 |
4,178,815 |
4,937,515 |
4,666,815 |
5,199,450 |
4,666,815 |
5,199,450 |
4,920,000 |
4,803,978 |
4,803,978 |
4,503,978 |
a. Draft FY2018 Defense Appropriations bill and accompanying report published Nov. 21, 2017 by the chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, at https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/news/majority/fy2018-defense-appropriations-bill-released.
b. In reports accompanying its State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations bills for both FY2018 and FY2019, the House Appropriations Committee stated that "The Committee understands that the staffing and programming requirements in [Afghanistan and Pakistan] will remain under continuous review and, for that reason, has not designated specific funding recommendations." Additionally, while Congress authorizes and appropriates ASFF levels, they do not otherwise allocate funding for specific operations, including Operation Freedom's Sentinel.
c. OFS numbers from President's budget requests; Congress does not direct specific breakouts (i.e., by operation) of OCO spending, except for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund.
Source: Congressional Research Service
Author Contact Information
Acknowledgments
Carmelina Palmer contributed significant research assistance to this report during her internship at CRS in summer 2018Sarah Collins provided considerable support in updating this report.
1. |
Steve Coll, Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America's Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Penguin Press, 2018) p. 199. |
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2. |
David Rhode and David E. Sanger, "How a 'Good War' in Afghanistan Went Bad," New York Times, August 12, 2007. |
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3. |
President Trump delegated the authority to set force levels, with increases reportedly limited to around 3,900 additional troops, to former Secretary of Defense James Mattis in June 2017. Jim Garamone, "President Gives Mattis Authority to Set U.S. Troop Strength in Afghanistan," Department of Defense, June 14, 2017. In August 2017 it was reported that due to units rotating in and out of theater, the actual number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan was |
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4. |
The White House, Remarks by President Trump on the Strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia, August 21, 2017. |
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5. |
Rebecca Kheel, "Dems: Trump 'has no strategy |
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6. |
Philip Rucker and Robert Costa, "'It's a hard problem': Inside Trump's decision to send more troops to Afghanistan," Washington Post, August 21, 2017. For more on one such proposal, see Tara Copp, "Here's the blueprint for Erik Prince's $5 billion plan to privatize the Afghanistan war," Military Times, September 5, 2018. |
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7. |
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8. |
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9. |
Samim Faramarz, "7 Provincial Centers Face 'Serious Security Threats,'" Tolo News, May 16, 2018. |
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10. | Hasib Danish Alikozai and Mohammad Habibzada, "Afghans Worry as US Makes Progress in Taliban Talks," Voice of America, January 29, 2019. Ryan Crocker, "I Was Ambassador to Afghanistan. This Deal is a Surrender," Washington Post, January 29, 2019; Husain Haqqani, "The Taliban Smell Blood," Wall Street Journal, July 16, 2019. Shereena Qazi, "US and Taliban 'close' to a peace deal: Afghan group's spokesman," Al Jazeera, August 28, 2019. Wesley Morgan, "How Trump trips up his own Afghan peace efforts," Politico, August 16, 2019. Pamela Constable, "Afghans voice fears that the U.S. is undercutting them in deal with the Taliban," Washington Post, August 17, 2019. |
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12. |
Mashal and Schmitt, op. cit. |
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13. |
Vinay Kaura, "US-Taliban talks a momentous shift in Afghan strategy," Middle East Institute, August 27, 2018. |
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14. |
Sharif Amiri, "Govt Rejects Possibility Of Talks Between US And Taliban," Tolo News, July 17, 2018. |
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15. |
Borhan Osman, "A Negotiated End to the Afghan Conflict," United States Institute of Peace, June 18, 2018. |
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17.
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Ellen Mitchell, "Afghanistan War at a Stalemate, Top General Tells Lawmakers," The Hill, December 4, 2018. 18.
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SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 30, 2019. 19.
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See, for example, Amira Jadoon et al., "Challenging the ISK Brand in Afghanistan-Pakistan: Rivalries and Divided Loyalties," CTC Sentinel, Vol. 11, Issue 4, April 26, 2018. 20.
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"ISIS terrorists heading to Afghanistan from Syria and Iraq to plot attacks," Khaama Press, April 30, 2019. In April 2018, a U.S. air strike killed the ISKP leader (himself a former Taliban commander) in northern Jowzjan province, which NATO described as "the main conduit for external support and foreign fighters from Central Asian states into Afghanistan." NATO Resolute Support Media Center, "Top IS-K Commander Killed in Northern Afghanistan," April 9, 2018 21.
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David Ignatius, "Uncertainty clouds the path forward in Afghanistan." Washington Post, July 22, 2019. 22.
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Twenty-fourth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, S/2019/570, July 15, 2019. |
Traditional levers of congressional influence, such as foreign aid, were limited or nonexistent in Afghanistan under the rule of the Taliban. The United States contributed tens of millions of dollars in humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan before 2001, but without a U.S. diplomatic presence (the U.S. embassy was closed from 1989 to 2002), that aid was administered by the U.N. and non-governmental organizations. "U.S. gives $43 million to Afghanistan," CNN, May 17, 2001. Congressional engagement was mostly limited to resolutions calling for the return of representative government to Afghanistan (e.g., H.Con.Res. 414, S.Con.Res. 150), condemning the Taliban's treatment of women (e.g., S.Res. 68), and expressing concern for the human rights situation in the country (e.g., H.Con.Res. 156). |
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For | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
18. |
Additional congressional action in 2002 included laws establishing Radio Free Afghanistan (P.L. 107-148), appropriating supplemental funds for international disaster assistance (P.L. 107-206), and authorizing educational and health care assistance for Afghan women and children (P.L. 107-81). |
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25.
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Those measures, respectively, are: H.R. 6045, H.R. 780, H.Con.Res. 28, H.Amdt. 1103, and H.Amdt. 928. 26.
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For more, see CRS Report R43983, 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force: Issues Concerning Its Continued Application, by Matthew C. Weed. 27.
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For a list of these resolutions, see CRS Report R45329, Afghanistan: Legislation in the 115th Congress, by Clayton Thomas. |
SIGAR was established by Section 1229 of the FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 110-181). The FY2008 NDAA stipulates that SIGAR will be terminated 180 days after unexpended funds for reconstruction in Afghanistan reach less than $250 million. |
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20. |
Of that amount, $78.2 billion (62%) has been for security. The remainder has been allocated for governance and development ($33 billion, or 26%), humanitarian aid, ($3.4 billion, or 3%), and civilian operations ($11.6 billion, or 9%). John Sopko, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, said in a 2015 speech that there were essentially "no conditions" on security assistance as late as 2013. "No More Free Lunch: Afghan Aid with a Purpose," Prepared Remarks of John F. Sopko, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, For Delivery at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton, NJ, October 6, 2015. |
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21. |
Trent Ruder, "Donor Aid Challenges in Shaping Incentive Programs and Spurring Afghan Reform," United States Institute of Peace, November 2014. |
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22. |
"Afghanistan in Transition: U.S. Civilian Presence and Assistance post-2014," Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, October 27, 2014. Additionally, the July 2015 SIGAR quarterly report contains a lengthy treatment of the benefits, limitations, and challenges of aid conditionality. |
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23. |
Dan Lamothe, "Pentagon and watchdog at odds over efforts to prevent sexual abuse of children by Afghan troops," Washington Post, January 23, 2018. For more on the Leahy Laws, see CRS In Focus IF10575, Human Rights Issues: Security Forces Vetting ("Leahy Laws"), by Liana W. Rosen. |
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24. |
Statement of Administration Policy: H.R. 2446 – Afghanistan Freedom and Security Support Act of 2007, June 5, 2007. Available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=75168. |
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25. |
The once prominent Office of the SRAP was folded into the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs in September 2017 (the SRAP was not itself established by statute, but was dual-hatted as the Coordinator for Afghanistan and Pakistan, as authorized, with reference to Afghanistan, by AFSA). |
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26. |
For example, in 2009, legislation was introduced to require a report from the Department of Defense on the U.S. "exit strategy" from Afghanistan (H.R. 2404); other legislation introduced that year would have prohibited any increase in the number of U.S. military personnel serving in Afghanistan (H.R. 3699). |
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27. | Those measures, respectively, are: H.R. 6045, H.R. 780, H.Amdt. 1103, and H.Amdt. 928.
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Trent Ruder, "Donor Aid Challenges in Shaping Incentive Programs and Spurring Afghan Reform," United States Institute of Peace, November 2014. 30.
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"Afghanistan in Transition: U.S. Civilian Presence and Assistance post-2014," Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, October 27, 2014. The July 2015 SIGAR quarterly report contains a lengthy treatment of the benefits, limitations, and challenges of aid conditionality. 31.
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See CRS In Focus IF10575, Human Rights Issues: Security Forces Vetting ("Leahy Laws"), by Liana W. Rosen. 32.
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Joseph Goldstein, "U.S. Soldiers Told to Ignore Sexual Abuse of Boys by Afghan Allies," New York Times, September 20, 2015; "Child Sexual Assault in Afghanistan: Implementation of the Leahy Laws and Reports of Assault by Afghan Security Forces," SIGAR, June 2017. The SIGAR report was declassified in January 2018. 33.
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Katie Bo Williams, "It's Getting Harder to Track US Progress in Afghanistan." Defense One, April 24, 2019. 34.
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Merrit Kennedy, "U.S. Military Withholds Key Measures Of Afghan War," NPR, October 31, 2017. 35.
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Remarks by President Trump on the Strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia, The White House, August 21, 2017. 36.
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David Welna, "Pentagon Questioned Over Blackout On War Zone Troop Numbers," NPR, July 3, 2018; see also House Rules Committee Amendment 255 to H.R. 5515, submitted May 21, 2018 (not made in order). 37.
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House Foreign Affairs Committee Holds Hearing on U.S. Foreign Policy and the State Department Fiscal 2020 Budget Request, CQ Transcripts, March 27, 2019. 38.
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"House Foreign Affairs Committee Democrats Demand State Department Transparency on Afghanistan," Representative Eliot Engel, April 8, 2019. 39.
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Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 105, 176-182. 40.
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These hearings include House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations hearings in April and October 2013 on protecting Afghan women. 41.
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Ben Farmer, "Taliban say women's rights to be protected under Islam, but must not threaten Afghan values," Telegraph, February 5, 2019; Masuda Sultan, "I Met the Taliban. Women Were the First to Speak," New York Times, June 4, 2019. 42.
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See the text of the letter at https://frankel.house.gov/uploadedfiles/afghan_women_letter_final_6.6.19.pdf. 43.
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Menendez Opening Remarks at Classified Hearing on Afghanistan Peace Talks, May 22, 2019. Available at https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/ranking/release/menendez-opening-remarks-at-classified-hearing-on-afghanistan-peace-talks |