Contents

• The Global Campaign to Counter the Islamic State
• Military Aspects of the Coalition
• Recent Significant Changes to the Counter-IS Coalition
• France
• Canada
• Russia
• Turkey
• Possible Enhanced NATO Involvement?
• Challenges to Coalition Coherence

The Global Campaign to Counter the Islamic State¹

On September 10, 2014, President Obama announced the formation of a global coalition to "degrade and ultimately defeat" the Islamic State (IS, aka the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, ISIL/ISIS or the Arabic acronym DaeshDa'esh).² Subsequently, someover 60 nations and partner organizations agreedagreed to participate, contributing either military forces or resources (or both) to the campaign.³ In Brussels in December 2014, these 6060 of these partners agreed to organize themselves along five "lines of effort,"⁴3 (by contrast, the United States strategy involves nine lines of effort), with at least two countries in the lead for each:⁵

• 4supporting military operations, capacity building, and training (led by the United States and Iraq);
• stopping the flow of foreign terrorist fighters (led by The Netherlands and Turkey);
• cutting off IS access to financing and funding (led by Italy, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the United States);
• addressing associated humanitarian relief and crises (led by Germany and the United Arab Emirates); and
• exposing IS's true nature (led by the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States).

According to the U.S. State Department, there are currently 66 participants in the coalition include, including Afghanistan, Albania, the Arab League, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, the European Union, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kosovo, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malaysia, Moldova, Montenegro, Morocco, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States.⁶5

Each country is contributing to the coalition in a manner commensurate with its national interests and comparative advantage. Contributions include both military and non-military assistance, although reporting on non-military contributions tends to be sporadic. Some, as many countries donate humanitarian assistance directly to local governments or non-governmental organizations operating on the ground. Still, some illustrative examples of the kinds of bilateral counter-IS assistance countries provided as the coalition was being formed in September 2014 include: Switzerland's donation of $9 million in aid to Iraq, Belgium's contribution of 13 tons of aid to Iraq generally, Italy's contribution of $2.5 million worth of weaponry (including machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, and 1 million rounds of ammunition), and Japan's granting of $6 million in emergency aid to specifically help displaced people in Northern Iraq.⁷

Military Aspects of the Coalition

Operation Inherent Resolve, the military component of the global coalition to defeat the Islamic State, began on August 8, 2014. Subsequently, according to United States Central Command and open source reporting, some 22 nations have joined the military coalition. The military campaign has two primary elements—airstrikes and training and equipping of local forces—both of which are designed to empower Iraqis and Syrians to take on the Islamic State while minimizing the number of U.S. and coalition "boots on the ground." According to the Department of Defense, the coalition has conducted upwards of 8,125 airstrikes⁸ and destroyed 16,075 targets as of November 13, 2015; as of October 31, 2015, the United States spent $5 billion on counter-IS military operations.⁹

6 Counter-IS Coalition Mandate

In terms of the legal basis for the coalition, several United Nations Security Council Resolutions—in particular, 2170, 2178, and 2199—call on U.N.UN member states to take a variety of steps (to include coalition activities such as countering terrorist financing, assisting with humanitarian relief, countering IS messaging, and assisting with stabilization support), although these fall short of explicitly authorizing the use of military force against the Islamic State. Some coalition participants have cited the Iraqi Government's letter to the United Nations Security Council requesting defense assistance and stating that Iraq faces threats from IS safe havens in Syria as a further legal basis for participating in the military coalition. With respect to the U.S. contribution to the military campaign, some observers have argued that a new authorization for the use of military force (AUMF) is required;¹⁰7 the Obama Administration maintains that it already has the necessary legal basis to prosecute the campaign through the 2001 AUMF (P.L. 107-40), and the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (2002 AUMF; P.L. 107-243).¹¹8 Even so, U.S. Administration officials underscore that the military campaign is only one part of the overall effort to counter the Islamic State, asserting that success depends upon the ability to make progress in non-military areas.¹²

On September 16, 2015, General Lloyd Austin, Commander of United States Central Command, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee, noting that U.S. and coalition efforts to train and equip Syrian soldiers to counter the Islamic State had produced only a handful of troops active on the battlefield.¹³ Subsequently, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter decided to cancel the Syrian train and equip program as it was configured.¹⁴ Instead, the United States is currently focusing on arming already existing anti-IS militias in Syria through, among other things, airdropping ammunition and equipment,¹⁵ authorizing the deployment of Special Operations Forces to assist with logistics and planning, and coordinating U.S. operations with those of opposition militia groups.¹⁶ In late October, the Administration reportedly began considering a number of different options for training and equipping local counter-IS forces.¹⁷ Administration officials have described their intended overall approach to the redesigned program as "transactional" and performance-based, with Syrian beneficiaries receiving U.S. support as opportunities present themselves and relative to their effectiveness on the battlefield and the alignment of their actions with U.S. interests.¹⁸

The failures of the initial DOD Syria train and equip program, combined with the November 13 attacks on Paris, have led observers to question the overall efficacy of the overall U.S. strategic approach. While some analysts maintain that defeating the Islamic State will require, among other things, the injection of significant numbers of U.S. and coalition ground troops,¹⁹ the Obama Administration maintains that doing so would be counter-productive.²⁰

Recent Significant Changes to the Counter-IS Coalition

Coalition participation tends to be fluid, with each country contributing capabilities that are commensurate with their own national interests and comparative advantage. Since August 2015, several coalition participants have changed the roles, missions, and capabilities of the military forces they are applying to counter the Islamic State. Russia also initiated military operations in Syria, but it did not begin robustly targeting Islamic State forces until Russian authorities concluded in mid-November that a bomb had brought down a Russian airliner in Egypt in October 2015. Indeed, Russia's military operations in Syria to support the Asad regime appear to be independent of the global counter-IS coalition's activities.

France

France has conducted military operations alongside the United States to counter the Islamic State for over a year. From February 23 to April 18, 2015, it deployed the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle to the U.S. 5^th Fleet's area of operations, from which French Super Etendard and Rafale fighter aircraft conducted airstrikes in Iraq.²¹ It also used fighter aircraft forward deployed in the U.A.E. and Jordan to conduct strikes.²² However, during this period, France limited its operations to Iraq, citing two primary constraints: the lack of a formal international legal mandate to pursue operations in Syria, and a desire not to inadvertently support the Asad regime.

French leaders changed their position in fall 2015. Responding to the refugee crisis²³ as well as to increased concerns that further attacks against France were being planned from IS strongholds, in early September 2015 France initiated reconnaissance missions in Syria.²⁴ In late September, citing France's legitimate right to self-defense, French military forces conducted airstrikes against targets in Syria,²⁵ focusing on training camps. In order to strike at an Islamic State source of income, it also targeted an oil and gas depot.²⁶

In the wake of the November 13 attacks in Paris, President Hollande announced that France would intensify its military campaign against the Islamic State. On November 15, French fighter jets conducted their most aggressive airstrikes of the campaign thus far, striking a command center and training camp in the Islamic State's headquarters, Raqqa.²⁷ The airstrikes were coordinated with the United States and facilitated by the provision of U.S. intelligence and targeting information.²⁸ France will also triple the number of fighter jets conducting airstrikes against the Islamic State by redeploying the Charles de Gaulle into theater, although the decision to do so was finalized at a defense council meeting on November 5, 2015, before the attacks.²⁹

Canada

Since his Liberal Party won a parliamentary majority on October 19, Canada's new Prime Minister, Justin Trudeau, has reiterated his intention to augment the outgoing Conservative government's commitment to countering the Islamic State. On October 20, Trudeau announced to the United States that Canada intended to withdraw its combat aircraft from the coalition, but that it would seek to accommodate some 25,000 Syrian refugees.³⁰ The Trudeau government has not indicated it will be reversing its decision in the wake of the Paris attacks. The timing of the withdrawal of combat aircraft is currently unclear. On November 17, Trudeau announced that Canada's training mission will be expanded, surpassing the current contingent of 69 soldiers based in northern Iraq. The details of that expanded mission are currently being coordinated with the United States.³¹

Russia³²

On September 30, 2015, Russia officially entered the conflict in Syria, conducting airstrikes. It had previously deployed some 600 marines to guard its air base in Lattakia, an Asad regime stronghold.³³ Further, a press report citing an unnamed U.S. official said that recent Russian shipments include tanks and artillery to protect the expanded Russian facilities, as well as armored personnel carriers, hundreds of naval infantry personnel, modular housing units to house about 1,500 people, and air traffic control equipment.³⁴ The entry of Russian military forces, and in particular close air support and combat aviation capabilities, into theater led the Obama Administration to conclude a detailed agreement on de-conflicting airspace between the two countries.³⁵

Because9 Military Aspects of the Coalition

Operation Inherent Resolve, the military component of the global coalition to defeat the Islamic State, began on August 8, 2014. Subsequently, according to United States Central Command and open source reporting, some 22 nations have joined the military component of the coalition. The current objectives of the coalition campaign are "destroying ISIL's parent tumor in Iraq and Syria, combating its worldwide spread, and protecting all homelands."¹⁰ Accordingly, the campaign currently has three primary military components: coordinated air strikes, training and equipping local security forces, and targeted special operations, some based out of Northern Iraq while others apparently dedicated to operations in Syria.¹¹ The philosophy underpinning the campaign appears to be that fighting the Islamic State requires a long-term campaign for which Iraqis and their neighbors should take the lead; thus, in its view, U.S. and coalition forces should therefore focus on supporting Iraqis, Syrians, and others rather than taking on significant ground combat roles themselves.

According to the Department of Defense (DOD), as of March 15, 2016, the coalition conducted 10,962 airstrikes; 7,336 of those in Iraq and the balance (3,626) in Syria.¹² By March 17, 2016, 22,779 targets were destroyed.¹³ The United States has spent $6.4 billion on counter-IS military operations since August 8, 2014, with an average daily cost of $11.5 million.¹⁴ Figure 1 illustrates the average daily cost of operations, by month, since August 2015:

Figure 1. Operation Inherent Resolve: Average U.S. Daily Costs, by Month

Source: U.S. Department of Defense.

Note: In millions of dollars.

Towards the end of 2015, the campaign to counter the Islamic State experienced several notable setbacks. First, despite the expenditure of upwards of $500 million, the Department of Defense proved unable to field more than a "handful" of anti-IS troops in the Syrian battle space. Second, the Islamic State demonstrated a degree of strategic-level reach by inspiring (and in some cases coordinating) attacks in Western cities, notably Paris, Brussels, and San Bernardino, and expanding to other countries, including Libya.¹⁵ As a result of these and other developments, the Obama Administration determined it should alter its military campaign plan,¹⁶ shifting away from its "Iraq First" approach to sequencing the campaign and targeting the Islamic State more directly while "accelerating"¹⁷ its overall anti-IS operations.

Reflecting this decision, Secretary Carter announced that the U.S. would send an Expeditionary Targeting Force (ETF) of around 200 soldiers to the Iraqi theater. While the precise tasks of the ETF are classified, it is generally believed that it conducts raids and other operations, and collects intelligence.¹⁸ Carter also announced a 50% increase in DOD's budget request for operations and capabilities associated with countering the Islamic State, for a total of $7.5 billion. The request includes $1.8 billion to purchase 45,000 GPS-guided smart bombs and laser-guided rockets, as well as an investment in maintaining 4^th generation fighter and attack jets, including the A-10.

In February of 2016, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter expressed his frustration that military coalition partners were not doing enough to shoulder the military burden of countering the Islamic State.¹⁹ Shortly thereafter, Secretary Carter met with his counterparts from a number of the coalition contributing nations at NATO Headquarters in Brussels to generate additional contributions to the campaign and brief other nations on the United States' updated concept of operations for OIR. The latter was unanimously agreed upon. In terms of force generation, Secretary Carter noted, "[i]n sum, nearly 90 percent of the countries participating in the coalition's military campaign have stepped up to do more in the last months and days."²⁰ According to public sources, contributions from coalition participants included extending air operations to Syria, training police, stabilizing, assisting in recovery, and providing more trainers, critical logistic support and materiel to local partners on the ground.²¹

On April 6, 2016, Pentagon officials stated that the coalition has "degraded the enemy's ability to move freely on the battlefield while regaining significant amounts of territory and degrading [IS] leadership and resources."²²

Russia²³

Russian President Vladimir Putin announced on March 14, 2016, that Russia would begin withdrawing the "main part" of its forces in Syria.²⁴ Observers subsequently noted that this did not indicate a full withdrawal from Syria. As some observers note, "what is happening on the ground is a drawdown of forces that were surged to Syria in the aftermath of the shootdown of a Russian Su-24 by Turkey in November 2015 and the intensified fighting over the winter."²⁵ Russia has retained a number of its aircraft in Syria, its naval basing at Tartous, as well as its S-400 air defense system in Latakia. Russia initially built up its military presence at Latakia in September 2015 and launched an air campaign on September 30.

In part because of Moscow's long history and relationship with the Asad regime, Russia's strategic priorities in Syria appear to fundamentally differ from those of the U.S.-led counter-IS coalition, which has generally argued that Asad could not remain in power as a result of any settlement arrangements. These strategic differences have been manifestmanifested in Russia's military targeting priorities to date. Through mid-November, Russia had largely struck what it referred to as "terrorist" elements opposed to the Asad regime, including— – but not limited to— – the Islamic State.³⁶ As the Secretary General of NATO stated on November 17, "But what we have seen so far is that most of [Russian] military actions have been targeted at targets not in ISIL-controlled areas."³⁷ This targeting disposition may change; on November 17, Alexander Bortnikov, head of the Russian FSB, stated that "we can unequivocally say" that the bombing of an Airbus A321 that carried Russian holidaymakers from Sharm el Sheikh to St. Petersberg "was a terrorist act." An Islamic State-affiliated group claimed responsibility.³⁸ The next day, Russian long-range bombers and sea-based cruise missiles attacked Raqqa.³⁹

Turkey⁴⁰

In26 A cessation of hostilities agreement had largely frozen fighting between pro-Asad forces and select opposition forces as of early April, but reports suggested that Russian-supported Syrian military operations against Islamic State targets were ongoing. Turkey²⁷ Before the initial publication of this report, in July 2015, Turkey expanded its participation in the coalition by taking direct military action in Syria and allowing other coalition planes to utilize Turkish airspace and bases to conduct strikes on the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Shortly after Turkey commenced military strikes against the Islamic State in Syria in late July, Turkey resumed hostilities with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), ending a cease- fire that had been in place since March 2013. As Prime Minister Davutoglu said in September 2015, "by mounting operations against [ISthe Islamic State] and the PKK at the same time, we also prevented the PKK from legitimizing itself." Turkey is reportedly worried about recent gains by the Syria-Based People's Protection Units (Kurdish acronym YPG), and about increased YPG closeness with the United States because of the YPG's emergence as arguably the most capable anti-IS ground force in Syria. Some observers speculate that Turkey is more concerned about containing Kurdish political aspirations (with their potential cross-border implications) than countering Islamist extremism at and within its borders.⁴¹

Possible Enhanced NATO Involvement?

On July 31, 2015, at the request of the Iraqi government, NATO agreed to launch a military assistance program for Iraq, which will be based out of Jordan and Turkey, and "includes measures of support in seven priority areas: advice on security sector reform; countering improvised explosive devices, explosive ordnance disposal and de-mining; civil military planning; cyber defense; military medicine and medical assistance; military training; and civil emergency planning."⁴² Teams are presently being sent to assess Iraqi needs.⁴³ NATO also deployed six Patriot missile defense systems to Turkey,⁴⁴ although they are scheduled to be withdrawn in December of this year unless NATO authorizes their continued presence.

The Paris terrorist attacks have raised the question as to whether the Alliance's "Article V" collective defense provision—which states that an attack on one NATO ally is an attack on all—should be invoked.⁴⁵ At present, this appears unlikely, especially given other NATO priorities, including combating Russian aggression in Central and Eastern Europe. Further, as one unnamed official observed, if France intended to request Article V support, it would have already done so.⁴⁶ According to the NATO Secretary General, while NATO allies are working to counter the Islamic State, much of that work falls outside NATO's purview:

There has been no request for invoking Article 5. But many NATO Allies have offered France support and help. And we are doing so in many different ways, not least by sharing intelligence, working more closely with France in their efforts to fight ISIL.⁴⁷

28

Challenges to Coalition Coherence

Organizing and prosecuting a coalition campaign presents a variety of challenges in addition to the military task of defeating an opponent. In the first instance, without a single authority responsible for prioritizing and adjudicating between different multinational civilian and military lines of effort, differentvarious actors often work at cross-purposes without intending to do so. These coalition coordination challenges were demonstrated in recent military campaigns (particularly in Afghanistan). Exacerbating matters, other actors in the region—some of whom are coalition partners—have different, and often conflicting, longer-term regional geopolitical interests from those of the United States or other coalition members. This, in turn, may lead nations participating in the coalition to advance their goals and objectives in ways that might contradict each other. Finally, different participants in the coalition have different tolerances for risk, and therefore will determine "rules of engagement" (ROE), or "caveats" that can constrain the ability of military commanders from employing military force as they see fit. While navigable, all these factors can make it considerably more difficult to consolidate gains and achieve campaign success.

This brief report offers twoseveral figures. The first is a chartmap of the training and capacity building bases across Iraq, and key nations operating out of those bases as reported by United States Central Command and supplemented with open source reporting. The second is a table depicting participants in the military campaign, and what specifically each country is contributing in terms of military forces, according to open source data compiled by CRS and information provided by United States Central Command at the time of writing. The second maps the training and capacity building bases across Iraq, and key nations operating out of those bases as reported by United States Central Command and supplemented with open source reporting.

This report update reflects significant changes regarding the coalition's composition since August 3, 2015.

increased during December 2015-February 2016, when the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle, together with France's carrier battle group (Groupe Aéronaval or GAN) arrived in theater and took command of U.S. Naval Forces Central Command's Task Force 50. h. Ministère de la Défense (France), "Operation Chammal 2016," at http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/irak-syrie/cartes/cartes. Accessed March 29, 2016. i. German Bundeswehr, "Syrien: Kampf gegen den IS" and "Irak: Ausbildung für den Kampf gegen den IS," at http://www.bundeswehr.de/. Accessed March 10, 2016. j. Italian Ministry of Defense, "Prima Parthica: Contributo nazionale," at http://www.difesa.it/OperazioniMilitari/. Accessed March 11, 2016. k. Open sources indicate that up to 20 Jordanian F-16 aircraft participated in airstrikes against ISIL carried out in in early 2015, but do not indicate approximate numbers of F-16s that may participate in regular Jordanian airstrikes against ISIL. l. NATO, "Secretary General in Baghdad: NATO stands with Iraq in the fight against extremism," at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_128720.htm. Accessed March 11, 2016. m. Open sources do not indicate if all of these aircraft are flown in combat sorties against ISIL or if they provide force protection for Dutch ground forces. n. In early 2015, the Swedish Parliament approved 35 trainers to be sent to Iraq, with an additional 85 personnel available if necessary for reinforcement or evacuation operations. o. On or around December 3, 2015, Turkey deployed "hundreds" of personnel to northern Iraq as part of a "routine rotation" of its train-and-assist mission. The Iraqi Government disputed the legality of the deployment. While Turkey maintains that this action was undertaken with the "full knowledge" of the counter-ISIL coalition, this deployment appears to be a bilateral move independent of the U.S.-led military campaign. Open source reports from February 2016 indicate that Turkish personnel may still be conducting operations in the region. p. Based on a recent agreement struck between the United States and Turkey on July 23, 2015. q. Estimated number of F-16s derived from press photos of the UAE squadron deployed in Jordan. r. The United Kingdom House of Commons voted on December 2, 2015 to authorize airstrikes against IS targets in Syria—Royal Air Force airstrikes against IS targets in Iraq have been ongoing since October 2014. s. The United States has pledged 400 to 700 troops to train Syrian forces. It is unclear how many forces are currently in place. The U.S. is also deploying 50 Special Operations Forces plus an "expeditionary targeting force" of approximately 100 soldiers to Northern Iraq, who may conduct operations in Syria if operational circumstances dictate. t. Transcript, "Department of Defense Press Briefing by Secretary Carter and Gen. Dunford in the Pentagon Briefing Room," February 29, 2016.

u. Information on the Hungarian contribution to the counter-IS coalition was obtained through the Defense Attaché Office of Hungary, Washington, DC.

Figure 1. Country Participation at Training and Capacity Building Bases in Iraq

Source: United States Central Command and Open Source Reporting.

Author Contact Information

Footnotes

Michael Kofman, "The Russian Intervention in Syria: Policy Options and Exit Strategies" War on the Rocks, October 21, 2015. .

1.	For more information on the status of efforts to defeat ISthe Islamic State, see CRS Report R43612, The "Islamic State" and U.S. Policy, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].
2.	Testimony from Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, House Armed Services Committee, June 17, 2015.
3.	Precise figures on participating states are difficult to determine, as different governments report different figuresFor example, the United Kingdom reports that 63 nations participate (https://www.gov.uk/government/topical-events/isil-uk-government-response—3) while the United States maintains 65 countries are currently participating (http://www.state.gov/s/seci/index.htm). The variation in numbers may be due to the fact that coalition participation tends to change over time.
4.	Subsequent to the Brussels meeting, other nations joined the coalition. U.S. Department of State, "Joint statement issued by partners at the Counter-ISIL Coalition Meeting," December 3, 2014. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/12/234627.htm.
54.	Remarks by General John Allen, then Special PresidentalPresidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter-ISIL, Doha, Qatar, June 3, 2015. http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2015/06/01-2015-us-islamic-world-forum/060315brookingsdoha.pdf.
65.	U.S. Department of State, then Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL webpage, http://www.state.gov/s/seci/.
76.	Sebastian Payne, "What the 60-plus members of the anti-Islamic State coalition are doing," The Washington Post, September 25, 2014.
8.	Jim Garamone, "Wormuth Stresses Whole-of-Government Approach to ISIL," DoD News, July 13, 2015.
9.	U.S. Department of Defense, "Operation Inherent Resolve: Targeted Operations against ISIL Terrorists," Available at http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0814_Inherent-Resolve. Accessed November 16, 2015.
107.	See, for example, Richard Fontaine & Vance Serchuk, "Can We Finally Get An AUMF Right? As Congress debates the war authorization against Islamic State, it should learn from past mistakes" Politico, February 15, 2015; Paul Kane, "Congress Split Over Ways to Face the Islamic State," The Washington Post, February 22, 2015.
118.	For more information, see CRS Report R43760, A New Authorization for Use of Military Force Against the Islamic State: Issues and Current Proposals in Brief, by [author name scrubbed].
129.	Jim Garamone, "Wormuth Stresses Whole-of-Government Approach to ISIL," DoD News, July 13, 2015.
1310.	Terri Moon Cronk, "Carter: Counter-ISIL Defense Ministers Unanimously Support Objectives," DOD News, February 11, 2016, http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/655155/carter-counter-isil-defense-ministers-unanimously-support-objectives.
11.	Barbara Starr, Army's Delta Force Begins to Target ISIS in Iraq, CNN.com, February 29, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2016/02/29/politics/pentagon-army-target-isis-iraq/.
12.	U.S. Department of Defense, "Operation Inherent Resolve: Targeted Operations against ISIL Terrorists," http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0814_Inherent-Resolve, accessed March 18, 2016.
13.	Ibid.
14.	Ibid.
15.	Eric Schmitt, "Obama Is Pressed To Open Military Front Against ISIS In Libya," The New York Times, February 4, 2016.
16.	Andrew Tilghman, "This Is The Pentagon's New Strategy To Fight ISIS," Military Times, January 14, 2016.
17.	Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, "Remarks Previewing the FY 17 Defense Budget At The Economic Club of Washington," February 2, 2016.
18.	Dan Lamothe, "The Fight Against The Islamic State Just Entered a New Phase – And It Could Grow Soon," Washington Post, January 20, 2016.
19.	Aaron Mehta, "Carter Again Slams Anti-ISIS Partners on Lack of Assistance," Defense News, February 2, 2016, http://www.defensenews.com/story/war-in-syria/2016/02/02/carter-slams-isis-coaltion-isil-syria-iraq-fight/79698804/.
20.	Terri Moon Cronk, "Carter: Counter-ISIL Defense Ministers Unanmously Support Objectives," DOD News, February 11, 2016, http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/655155/carter-counter-isil-defense-ministers-unanimously-support-objectives.
21.	Ibid.
22.	Terri Moon Cronk, "Counter-ISIL Campaign Shows Strong Progress, Admiral Says," DOD News, April 6, 2016, http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/714995/counter-isil-campaign-shows-strong-progress-admiral-says.
23.	For more information, see CRS Insight IN10360, Russian Deployments in Syria Complicate U.S. Policy, by [author name scrubbed] et al.
24.	Denis Dyomkin and Suleiman Al-Khalidi, "Putin Says Russians To Start Withdrawing From Syria, As Peace Talks Resume," Reuters, March 15, 2016.
25.	Ibid.
26.
27.	For more information, see CRS Report R41368, Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations, by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report R44000, Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief, by [author name scrubbed].
28.	Orhan Coskun and Dasha Afanasieva, "Turkey stages first air strikes on Islamic State in Syria," Reuters, July 24, 2015.
General Lloyd Austin, "Testimony Before the Senate Armed Services Committee: U.S. Strategy Against ISIS," September 16, 2015.
14.	Michael D. Shear, Helene Cooper and Eric Schmitt, "Obama Administration Ends Effort to Train Syrians to Combat ISIS," The New York Times, October 9, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/10/world/middleeast/pentagon-program-islamic-state-syria.html?_r=0.
15.	Department of Defense Press Briefing by Secretary Carter and Press Secretary Cook in the Pentagon Briefing Room, October 19, 2015.
16.	Barbara Starr and Jeremy Diamond, "Syria: Obama Authorizes Boots on Ground to Fight ISIS," CNN, October 30, 2015. http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/30/politics/syria-troops-special-operations-forces/.
17.	Christina Wong, "Pentagon Weighing Deeper U.S. Involvement in Iraq," The Hill, October 26, 2015.
18.	See CRS Report R43612, The "Islamic State" and U.S. Policy, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]
19.	Susan Heavey, "Bush, Other Republicans Back More Troops to Fight Islamic State," Reuters, November 16, 2015.
20.	The White House Office of the Press Secretary, "Press Conference by President Obama –Antalya, Turkey" November 16, 2015. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/16/press-conference-president-obama-antalya-turkey.
21.	United States Central Command, "French, U.S. Navies Integrate Under Operation Inherent Resolve," April 10, 2015. http://www.centcom.mil/en/news/articles/french-us-navies-integrate-under-operation-inherent-resolve.
22.	Frédéric Lert, "France to Deploy Charles de Gaulle Again for Anti-IS Strikes," IHS Janes 360, November 12, 2015, http://www.janes.com/article/55939/france-to-deploy-charles-de-gaulle-again-for-anti-is-strikes.
23.	CRS In Focus IF10259, Europe's Migration and Refugee Crisis, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]
24.	"France Could Launch Air Strikes on ISIS in Syria: Hollande" Reuters, September 7, 2015. http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/france-could-launch-air-strikes-isis-hollande-n422871.
25.	Elaine Ganley, "France Carries Out Airstrikes In Syria Against Islamic State," Associated Press International, September 27. 2015.
26.	Alissa J. Rubin and Anne Barnard, "France Strikes ISIS Targets in Syria in Retaliation for Attacks" The New York Times, November 15, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/16/world/europe/paris-terror-attack.html?_r=0.
27.	President François Hollande, Speech before a joint session of Parliament, November 16, 2015, http://ambafrance-us.org/spip.php?article7185.
28.	Rubin & Barnard.
29.	Lert.
30.	DeNeen L. Brown, "Canada's New Leader to Pull Planes from Anti-Islamic State Coalition," The Washington Post, October 20, 201. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/meet-canadas-new-prime-minister-justin-trudeau/2015/10/20/41dea584-772a-11e5-bc80-9091021aeb69_story.html.
31.	Bill Curry and Steven Chase, "Canada to send More Military Trainers to Iraq in Battle against IS: Trudeau," The Globe and Mail, November 17th, 2015. http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canada-to-increase-number-of-military-trainers-in-iraq-trudeau/article27291475/.
32.	For more information, see CRS Insight IN10360, Russian Deployments in Syria Complicate U.S. Policy, by [author name scrubbed] et al.
33.	Steven Lee Myers and Eric Schmitt, "Russian Military Uses Syria as Proving Ground, and West Takes Notice," The New York Times, October 14, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/15/world/middleeast/russian-military-uses-syria-as-proving-ground-and-west-takes-notice.html.
34.	Agence France Presse, "Russia Sends Tanks, Artillery to Syria: U.S. Official," September 14, 2015. http://news.yahoo.com/russia-sends-tanks-artillery-syria-us-official-190705106.html.
35.	Helene Cooper, "A Semantic Downgrade for U.S.-Russian Talks about Operations in Syria," The New York Times, October 7, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/08/world/middleeast/a-semantic-downgrade-for-us-russian-talks-about-operations-in-syria.html.
36.	Michael Kofman, "The Russian Intervention in Syria: Policy Options and Exit Strategies" War on the Rocks, October 21, 2015.
37.	"Doorstep Statement by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg Upon His Arrival at the European Council," 17 November, 2015. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_124518.htm.
38.	Andrew Osborn, "Putin Vows Payback After Confirmation of Egypt Plane Bomb," Reuters, November 17, 2015.
39.	Adam Withnall, "Russia Launches Cruise Missiles at ISIS Raqqa Stronghold in Syria," The Independent, November 18, 2015.
40.	For more information, see CRS Report R41368, Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations, by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report R44000, Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief, by [author name scrubbed].
41.	Orhan Coskun and Dasha Afanasieva, "Turkey stages first air strikes on Islamic State in Syria," Reuters, July 24, 2015.
42.	North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "NATO Secretary General Statement on Defense Capacity Building Package for Iraq" July 31, 2015.
43.	Interview with DOD official, 16 November 2015.
44.	North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "NATO Support to Turkey." http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_92140.htm.
45.	Krishnadev Calamur, "Will NATO Respond to the Attacks on Paris? If France invokes Article 5 of the alliance's charter, it will launch a joint response against the Islamic State" The Atlantic, November 15, 2015. Available at http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/11/nato-paris-attack-article-5/416097/ Note: Article V was invoked after the September 11th, 2001 attacks on the United States.
46.	Euractive.com "France 'at war' Inaugurates EU's Mutual Defense Clause," November 17, 2015. http://www.euractiv.com/sections/global-europe/france-war-inaugurates-eus-mutual-defence-clause-319531.
47.	"Doorstep Statement by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg Upon His Arrival at the European Council," 17 November, 2015. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_124518.htm.