Order Code RS21762
Updated March 24, 2004
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator Budget
Request and Plan, FY2005-FY2009
Jonathan Medalia
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
The FY2005 budget document for the National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA) shows funding for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) increasing
sharply after FY2005 as the weapon proceeds beyond the study phase. NNSA states that
these developments are shown for budgeting purposes and do not represent an actual
plan. It further states that the out-year figures are already out of date, but that no new
figures are available. A feasibility and cost study of RNEP currently under way was
projected to cost $45 million between FY2003 and FY2005, but is now projected to cost
$71 million between FY2003 and FY2006. This report explains the budget request and
provides details on the plan. It will be updated as needed. CRS Report RL32130,
Nuclear Weapon Initiatives: Low-Yield R&D, Advanced Concepts, Earth Penetrators,
Test Readiness, by Jonathan Medalia, provides technical background and history.
Background
Nuclear earth penetrator weapons burrow into the ground some tens of feet before
detonating, greatly increasing their ability to destroy hardened underground targets.
RNEP is at present a study, begun in May 2003, of modifications to convert existing B61
or B83 nuclear bombs to an earth penetrator configuration. While the Air Force is leading
the study, NNSA – a semiautonomous agency in the Department of Energy (DOE)
responsible for nuclear warheads – is in charge of studying modifications of specific
warheads.
RNEP is controversial. Supporters argue that it is needed to attack hard and deeply
buried targets (such as leadership bunkers or WMD production facilities) in countries of
concern, thereby deterring or defeating such nations; critics reply that RNEP would lower
the threshold for use of nuclear weapons and prompt other nations to develop nuclear
weapons to deter U.S. attack. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said in May 2003
Congressional Research Service ˜
The Library of Congress
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that RNEP “is a study. It is nothing more and nothing less.”1 The plan was that the
RNEP study would cost $15 million a year for FY2003-FY2005. While Congress
appropriated the FY2003 request of $15.0 million, the FY2004 request met much
criticism. The House rejected an amendment by Representative Tauscher to transfer
funds from RNEP to conventional means of attacking buried targets. The Senate tabled
an amendment by Senator Dorgan and another by Senator Feinstein to bar funds for
RNEP, and adopted an amendment by Senator Nelson (FL), and a similar amendment by
Senator Reed, to require congressional authorization to start development engineering
(discussed below) or later phases of RNEP. (The Nelson amendment became Section
3117 of P.L. 108-136, the FY2004 National Defense Authorization Act.) The
appropriation was cut to $7.5 million.
In response to this reduction, NNSA plans to spend almost all of the $7.5 million to
study the B83 as an RNEP candidate, and little on the B61 study. The B83 study is being
conducted by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, in Livermore, CA, and Sandia
National Laboratories’ Livermore branch; the B61 study is the responsibility of Los
Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM, and Sandia National Laboratories’
headquarters facility in Albuquerque, NM.
The RNEP Budget and Plan, and NNSA’s Explanation
The FY2005 budget cycle is the first in which NNSA presented a detailed four-year
projection along with the current request. For RNEP, the figures are: FY2005, $27.6
million; FY2006, $95.0 million; FY2007, $145.4 million; FY2008, $128.4 million; and
FY2009, $88.4 million, for a five-year total of $484.7 million.2 The FY2005 request also
presented a plan for RNEP. By way of background, the Departments of Defense and
Energy agreed years ago to a formal set of phases by which modified nuclear weapons
move through research, development, production, deployment, and retirement, often
called the Phase 6.X process. The key phases for RNEP are: Phase 6.2, feasibility study
and option down select; Phase 6.2A, design definition and cost study; Phase 6.3,
development engineering, in which the nuclear weapons laboratories produce a completed
warhead design; and Phase 6.4, production engineering, in which the design is adapted
for production and a system to manufacture the weapon is created. NNSA stated the
performance targets for RNEP are as follows:
! FY2005: “Complete 56% of scheduled RNEP Phase 6.2/6.2A activity.”
Further, “In FY2005, subsystem tests and a full system test of the proposed
design will be completed.”
! FY2006: “Complete 100% of scheduled RNEP Phase 6.2/6.2A activity.”
1 U.S. Department of Defense. “DoD News Briefing – Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers.”
May 20, 2003. At [http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030520-secdef0207.html].
2 U.S. Department of Energy. Office of Management, Budget, and Administration/CFO.
FY
2005 Congressional Budget Request. volume 1, National Nuclear Security Administration.
DOE/ME-0032, February 2004, p. 63. The RNEP budget is available under “Directed Stockpile
Work” at [http://www.mbe.doe.gov/budget/05budget/index.htm].
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! FY2007: “Report results of RNEP Phase 6.2/6.2A to Nuclear Weapons
Council [a joint Department of Defense (DOD)-DOE agency that coordinates
nuclear weapon programs] Obtain, if applicable, RNEP Phase 6.3 appropriate
authorization. Complete initial 25% of scheduled RNEP Phase 6.3 activity (if
authorized).”
! FY2008: “Complete 65% of RNEP Phase 6.3 activity (if appropriately
authorized).”
! FY2009: “Complete 100% of scheduled RNEP Phase 6.3 activity (if
authorized). Complete 15% of scheduled RNEP Phase 6.4 activity (if
appropriately authorized).”3
The FY2005 request document therefore seems to cast serious doubt on assertions
that RNEP is only a study. However, NNSA Administrator Linton Brooks stated:
We included funds in our out-year budget projections to comply with legislative
requirements for five-year budget projections. The out-year projections are
placeholders in the event the President decides to proceed with development and
Congress approves. No decision will be made until the study is completed. The law
is clear that beginning 6.3 engineering development requires Congressional approval.4
An NNSA manager responsible for the program stated that, if out-year funds were
not included in the FY2005 budget, NNSA would face two choices that it deems
unsatisfactory: (1) By the time the budget for one fiscal year is submitted, the budget for
the next fiscal year is largely fixed; without the placeholder, a decision to proceed with
RNEP could not be implemented until the second fiscal year. (2) Alternatively, without
the placeholder, a decision to proceed with RNEP could be implemented promptly only
by taking the needed funds out of other programs. The budget projection reflects costs
that might be expected if RNEP proceeds to Phases 6.3 and 6.4. The official emphasized
that no decision has been made on whether or not to proceed with those phases pending
completion of the Phase 6.2/6.2A study.5
The RNEP study was initially projected to cost $45 million – $15 million a year for
FY2003-FY2005. The numbers, however, have changed for each year. For FY2003,
delay in submission of a DOD study required by the FY2003 National Defense
Authorization Act (P.L. 107-314, Sec. 3146) delayed the start of NNSA’s RNEP study;
as a result, $6.1 million was spent of the $15.0 million appropriated. For FY2004,
Congress cut the RNEP appropriation to $7.5 million. For FY2005, the request is $27.6
million, vs. the $15.0 million originally planned. Finally, FY2006, not FY2005, will be
the last year of the RNEP study; NNSA estimates the FY2006 request at $30 million. The
four-year total is about $71 million.
3 Department of Energy,
FY 2005 Congressional Budget Request, volume 1, p. 69, 70, 76.
4 Letter from Linton F. Brooks, Administrator, NNSA, to Honorable Ellen O. Tauscher, March
17, 2004. Regarding the requirements for a 5-year budget projection, see National Defense
Authorization Acts for FY1997 (P.L. 104-201, sec. 3155), FY2000 (P.L. 106-65, sec. 3253), and
FY2001 (P.L. 106-398, sec. 3154 and 3155). The legislation requiring congressional approval
to begin Phase 6.3 for RNEP is discussed in “Criticisms, Questions, and Responses,” below.
5 Telephone interview, February 10, 2004.
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Owing to the uncertainties of the program, NNSA could not, as of early March 2004,
project an RNEP budget for FY2007-FY2009. Indeed, a purpose of the 6.2/6.2A study
is to provide a firm estimate of the cost of the project in Phase 6.3 and beyond. Thus no
firm estimate is likely for some time. There is likely to be a schedule disconnect between
submission of the FY2007 request, which in the normal course of the budget process
would occur in early February 2006, and completion of the Phase 6.2/6.2A study, which
will probably occur several months later, late in FY2006. It is unclear how NNSA would
propose to handle a possible FY2007 request for 6.3 funds for RNEP.
According to NNSA, the study’s cost has grown for several reasons. The $45 million
did not take into account participation in the study by Y-12 Plant, which would make
components of RNEP, or of Pantex Plant, which would convert existing weapons into
RNEPs; their participation adds some $2 million. DOE has imposed additional project
management requirements that add $2 million. The rest of the increase comes from a
better definition of the requirements of the study, refinement of cost estimates, and an
increase in surety (safety, security, and use control) of the proposed weapon. On the latter
point, DOE requires that any modifications of a nuclear weapon includes looking for ways
to increase its surety.6 According to an NNSA source, “NNSA and the Air Force are
committed to exploring ways to increase RNEP surety in a cost effective manner,
consistent with DOE and military requirements.”7
Criticisms, Questions, and Responses
Critics have reacted to the RNEP budget projection and plan. Representative
Tauscher, in a letter to NNSA Administrator Linton Brooks, stated that “This is the first
notice that we have received of a significantly ramped up activity,” and that “the planning
and budgeting for further steps in the 6.X process in the next five years speaks to a clear
intent to develop these modified nuclear weapons at a time when the feasibility study has
not been completed and the Department of Defense has not submitted a request for this
weapon.”8 Steven Aftergood of the Federation of American Scientists argued that there
are not five-year budgets for every research program that might lead to development. He
reportedly said, “If they had placeholders for every funding scenario, they’d have to
request an infinite amount of money .... This is an expression of intent to move ahead with
an expanded program.”9 Another critic, Jay Coghlan, director of Nuclear Watch of New
Mexico, was quoted as saying, “The present administration is definitely seeking to expand
U.S. nuclear capabilities – while at the same time it denounces any kind of effort by
others to do the same.”10
6 U.S. Department of Energy. Order DOE O 452.1B, “Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety
Program,” approved August 6, 2001, Section 4(f).
7 Information provided March 22, 2004.
8 Letter from Representative Ellen Tauscher to Linton Brooks, Administrator, National Nuclear
Security Administration, March 8, 2004, available at [http://www.house.gov/tauscher/03-08-
04.htm].
9 Paul Richter, “Questions Raised about Bomb Plan,”
Los Angeles Times, March 11, 2004: 12.
10 Jeff Tollefson, Santa Fe New Mexican.com, March 11, 2004.
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The following paragraphs present questions from Representative Tauscher’s letter,
responses from Administrator Brooks,11 and additional information based on discussions
with staff from NNSA, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory. Representative Tauscher wrote:
For FY 2005 the budget request describes the RNEP activities as including
“subsystems tests and full system test of the proposed design.” Such activities appear
to go beyond research activities and may be interpreted to fall into 6.3 activities. In
your view, why are such activities consistent with legislation passed by Congress last
year? What specific activities would be associated with the initial year of 6.3 work
on the RNEP in FY 2007?
Administrator Brooks responded:
The “subsystem and full system tests of the proposed design” refer to impact tests to
be performed on surrogate penetrator bodies at Sandia National Laboratories’ sled
track facility. These tests are consistent with the definition and requirements for a
Phase 6.2 feasibility study. We need to understand whether the penetrator bodies are
survivable to ground penetration in the required geologies before feasibility can be
assessed.
To elaborate, the basis for this question is that the FY2004 National Defense
Authorization Act, P.L. 108-136, section 3117, requires specific congressional
authorization before starting Phase 6.3 or subsequent phases of RNEP. NNSA indicated
that one type of physical test (as distinct from a computer simulation) is planned as part
of the 6.2/6.2A study: a series of “sled track tests” at Sandia National Laboratories.
Some would be done as full system tests, in which the various components of an RNEP
would be assembled in a penetrator body (a strong, heavy, pointed metal case) without a
guidance system or fissile materials.12 This assembly would be mounted on a sled that is
sent down a track at high speed and slammed into a large concrete block to test how well
the components withstand the deceleration required of an earth penetrator weapon. This
type of test is included in the 6.2/6.2A study because it is essential to assess feasibility.
In turn, a successful demonstration of feasibility is a necessary condition for the weapon
to proceed to Phase 6.3. In preparation for the full system tests, a number of subsystem
sled tests will be conducted, in which candidate RNEP components are slammed into a
water target. These tests are scheduled to start in the third quarter of FY2005, and will
be held at Sandia’s sled track, located at Kirtland Air Force Base in Albuquerque, NM.
More advanced tests would be conducted in Phase 6.3. In one type, “vibration
flyaround tests,” a mock-up of the weapon would be mounted on an aircraft and flown to
validate that the weapon would not be damaged by the vibration of the aircraft and to
determine the weapon’s aerodynamic stability. In this test, the device would not be
released. Another type of test, which would occur later in the development process once
the guidance system is developed, would involve dropping a mock-up of the weapon from
an aircraft. Both types of test would use surrogate material (a heavy metal) instead of
11 Letter from Linton F. Brooks, Administrator, NNSA, to Honorable Ellen O. Tauscher, March
17, 2004.
12 Information provided March 11 and 12, 2004.
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fissile materials. Other tests would probably be conducted as well, but it is too early in
the process to say which tests would be conducted when.
Representative Tauscher also asked:
With regard to the Annual Performance Results and Targets, what technical, military,
and other criteria would the NNSA consider and what decisions would be made before
it requests legislative authorization to begin 6.3 work? Who is involved in the
determination to begin 6.3 work and why does the budget indicate that this might
happen in FY 2007? Similarly, what criteria would the NNSA use to base its decision
to go from phase 6.3 to 6.4 in FY 2009?
Administrator Brooks replied:
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) does not make the decision
to proceed to Phase 6.3 or subsequent phases. If NNSA and the Air Force agree that
the Phase 6.2/6.2A study results support proceeding to Phase 6.3 engineering
development, the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) could consider whether to
proceed further. If the NWC recommends going forward, NNSA would move beyond
the study stage only if the President approves and funds are authorized and
appropriated by the Congress.
He further stated that the criteria NWC would use in this decision include “the feasibility
and military utility of the design definition, and the projected cost and schedule
established in the Phase 6.2/6.2A Study,” and that “If RNEP does proceed to 6.3, the
President and Congress will make a separate decision on whether to proceed to Phase 6.4,
Production Engineering.”
To support a decision to move RNEP to Phase 6.3, NNSA would address cost,
schedule, and feasibility, while the Air Force would address military requirements. As
a hypothetical example, NNSA might say that an RNEP would have a specified cost,
could be ready by a certain date, and would have certain characteristics (weight, accuracy,
depth of penetration, etc.) The Air Force might decide not to proceed if the penetration
ability was too low or if a nonnuclear alternative existed, or it might recommend
proceeding if the proposed RNEP was the only way to accomplish a critical military
mission. The decision to request congressional approval would be worked through the
Nuclear Weapons Council and ultimately be made by the President. These steps would
occur before a request was submitted to Congress. The decision on whether or not to
proceed with Phase 6.3 is projected to occur in FY2007 because the Phase 6.2/6.2A study
is expected to conclude late in FY2006.