Order Code RS21762
March 8, 2004
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator Budget
Request and Plan, FY2005-FY2009
Jonathan Medalia
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
The FY2005 budget document for the National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA) shows funding for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) increasing
sharply after FY2005 as the weapon proceeds beyond the study phase. NNSA states that
these developments are shown for budgeting purposes and do not represent an actual
plan. It further states that the out-year figures are already out of date, but that no new
figures are available. A feasibility and cost study of RNEP currently under way was
projected to cost $45 million between FY2003 and FY2005, but is now projected to cost
$71 million between FY2003 and FY2006. This report explains the budget request and
plan, and will be updated as needed. CRS Report RL32130, Nuclear Weapon
Initiatives: Low-Yield R&D, Advanced Concepts, Earth Penetrators, Test Readiness, by
Jonathan Medalia, has further information.
Background
Nuclear earth penetrator weapons burrow into the ground some tens of feet before
detonating, greatly increasing their ability to destroy hardened underground targets.
RNEP is at present a study, begun in May 2003, of modifications to convert existing B61
or B83 nuclear bombs to an earth penetrator configuration. While the Air Force is leading
the study, NNSA – a semiautonomous agency in the Department of Energy responsible
for nuclear warheads – is in charge of studying modifications of specific warheads.
RNEP is controversial. Supporters argue that it is needed to attack hard and deeply
buried targets (such as leadership bunkers or WMD production facilities) in countries of
concern, thereby deterring or defeating such nations; critics reply that RNEP would lower
the threshold for use of nuclear weapons and prompt other nations to develop nuclear
weapons to deter U.S. attack. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said in May 2003
that RNEP “is a study. It is nothing more and nothing less.”1 The plan was that the
1 U.S. Department of Defense. “DoD News Briefing – Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers.”
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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RNEP study would cost $15 million a year for FY2003-FY2005. While Congress
appropriated the FY2003 request of $15.0 million, the FY2004 request met much
criticism. The House rejected an amendment by Representative Tauscher to transfer
funds from RNEP to conventional means of attacking buried targets. The Senate tabled
an amendment by Senator Dorgan and another by Senator Feinstein to bar funds for
RNEP, and adopted an amendment by Senator Nelson (FL), and a similar amendment by
Senator Reed, to require congressional authorization to start development engineering
(discussed below) or later phases of RNEP. (The Nelson amendment became Section
3117 of P.L. 108-136, the FY2004 National Defense Authorization Act.) The
appropriation was cut to $7.5 million.
The RNEP Budget and Plan, and NNSA’s Explanation
Beginning with the FY2005 budget cycle, NNSA presented a detailed four-year
projection along with the current request; for RNEP, the figures are: FY2005, $27.6
million; FY2006, $95.0 million; FY2007, $145.4 million; FY2008, $128.4 million; and
FY2009, $88.4 million, for a five-year total of $484.7 million.2
The FY2005 request document seems to cast serious doubt on assertions that RNEP
is only a study. The Departments of Defense and Energy agreed years ago to a formal set
of phases by which new and modified nuclear weapons move through research,
development, production, deployment, and retirement. The key phases for RNEP are:
Phase 6.2, feasibility study and option down select; Phase 6.2A, design definition and cost
study; Phase 6.3, development engineering, in which the nuclear weapons laboratories
produce a completed warhead design; and Phase 6.4, production engineering, in which
the design is adapted for production and a system to manufacture the weapon is created.
NNSA states the performance targets for RNEP are as follows:
! FY2005: “Complete 56% of scheduled RNEP Phase 6.2/6.2A activity.”
Further, “In FY2005, subsystem tests and a full system test of the proposed
design will be completed.”
! FY2006: “Complete 100% of scheduled RNEP Phase 6.2/6.2A activity.”
! FY2007: “Report results of RNEP Phase 6.2/6.2A to Nuclear Weapons
Council [a joint DOD-DOE agency that coordinates nuclear weapon
requirements, production schedules, etc.] Obtain, if applicable, RNEP Phase
6.3 appropriate authorization. Complete initial 25% of scheduled RNEP Phase
6.3 activity (if authorized).”
! FY2008: “Complete 65% of RNEP Phase 6.3 activity (if appropriately
authorized).”
1 (...continued)
May 20, 2003. At [http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030520-secdef0207.html].
2 U.S. Department of Energy. Office of Management, Budget, and Administration/CFO. FY
2005 Congressional Budget Request. volume 1, National Nuclear Security Administration.
DOE/ME-0032, February 2004, p. 63. The RNEP budget is available under “Directed Stockpile
Work” at [http://www.mbe.doe.gov/budget/05budget/index.htm].

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! FY2009: “Complete 100% of scheduled RNEP Phase 6.3 activity (if
authorized). Complete 15% of scheduled RNEP Phase 6.4 activity (if
appropriately authorized).”3
An NNSA manager responsible for the program maintained that the budget increase
beyond FY2005 is an artifact of the budget process. He stated that the money was
inserted in the out years as a “placeholder” to protect the option of proceeding with
RNEP. Were this not done, it is argued that NNSA would face two choices that it deems
unsatisfactory: (1) By the time the budget for one fiscal year is submitted, the budget for
the next fiscal year is largely fixed; without the placeholder, a decision to proceed with
RNEP could not be implemented until the second fiscal year. (2) Alternatively, without
the placeholder, a decision to proceed with RNEP could be implemented promptly only
by taking the needed funds out of other programs. Similarly, the move to Phases 6.3 and
6.4 reflects how the program might be expected to advance if it proceeds. The official,
however, indicated that no decision has been made on whether or not to proceed with
RNEP pending completion of the study.4
The RNEP study was initially projected to cost $45 million – $15 million a year for
FY2003-FY2005. The numbers, however, have changed for each year. For FY2003,
delay in submission of a DOD study required by the FY2003 National Defense
Authorization Act (P.L. 107-314, Sec. 3146) delayed the start of NNSA’s RNEP study;
as a result, $6.0 million was spent of the $15.0 million appropriated. For FY2004,
Congress cut the RNEP appropriation to $7.5 million. For FY2005, the request is $27.6
million, vs. the $15.0 million originally planned. Finally, FY2006, not FY2005, will be
the last year of the RNEP study; NNSA estimates the FY2006 request at $30 million. The
four-year total is about $71 million. Owing to the uncertainties of the program, NNSA
could not, as of early March 2004, project an RNEP budget for FY2007-FY2009.
According to NNSA, the study’s cost has grown for a number of reasons. The $45
million did not take into account participation in the study by Y-12 Plant, which would
make components of RNEP, or of Pantex Plant, which would convert existing weapons
into RNEPs; their participation adds some $2 million. DOE has imposed additional
project management requirements that add $2 million. The rest of the increase comes
from a better definition of the requirements of the study, refinement of cost estimates, and
an increase in surety (safety, security, and use control) of the proposed weapon. On the
latter point, DOE requires that any modifications of a nuclear weapon look for ways to
increase its surety.5 NNSA says it has found ways to increase RNEP surety, and plans to
do so.
3 Department of Energy, FY 2005 Congressional Budget Request, volume 1, p. 69, 70, 76.
4 Telephone interview, February 10, 2004.
5 U.S. Department of Energy. Order DOE O 452.1B, “Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety
Program,” approved August 6, 2001, Section 4(f).

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