Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami: Humanitarian Assistance and Relief Operations

On December 26, 2004, a magnitude 9.0 undersea earthquake off the west coast of northern Sumatra, Indonesia, unleashed a tsunami that affected more than 12 countries throughout south and southeast Asia and stretched as far as the northeastern African coast. Current official estimates indicate that more than 250,000 people are dead or missing and millions of others are affected, including those injured or displaced, making this the deadliest tsunami on record. Sections of Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, and Thailand have suffered the worst devastation. In response, the United Nations, the United States, and other donor nations have organized what some have called the world's largest relief and recovery operation to date. President Bush pledged $350 million in aid early on and mobilized the U.S. military to provide logistical and other assistance. The Administration has increased this amount by seeking $600 million in its request for $950 million for tsunami relief in the FY2005 emergency supplemental. Of this total, $346 million would replenish USAID emergency aid accounts that had been drawn down in support of the U.S. government response and reimburse Defense Department accounts that were used in the relief effort. On March 16, the House passed H.R. 1268 , funding all items proposed under the Tsunami Recovery and Reconstruction Fund, except for the $45 million proposed for debt reduction. The large-scale U.S. response to the tsunami is unlikely to reverse the decline in the U.S. image abroad since the September 11 attacks, because this decline primarily is due to American policies in the Middle East. However, the scale and scope of U.S. assistance could provide a positive example of U.S. leadership and military capabilities. Additionally, the disaster relief cooperation between the U.S. and Indonesian militaries is likely to be mentioned during the annual congressional deliberations over renewing restrictions on U.S.-Indonesian military-to-military relations, which the Bush Administration has sought to restore since the September 11, 2001 attacks. This report summarizes the extent of the disaster and relief effort and includes descriptions of the U.S. and international assistance efforts. It also examines protection mechanisms for children and separated orphans. A section is devoted to the situation in each of the affected countries followed by an analysis of selected issues for Congress. The report will be updated further as events warrant.

Order Code RL32715 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami: Humanitarian Assistance and Relief Operations Updated March 21, 2005 -name redacted-, Coordinator Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division -name redacted-, -name redacted-, -name redacted-, -name redacted-, -name redacted-, -name redacted-, and -name redactedForeign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division -name redactedKnowledge Services Group Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami: Humanitarian Assistance and Relief Operations Summary On December 26, 2004, a magnitude 9.0 undersea earthquake off the west coast of northern Sumatra, Indonesia, unleashed a tsunami that affected more than 12 countries throughout south and southeast Asia and stretched as far as the northeastern African coast. Current official estimates indicate that more than 250,000 people are dead or missing and millions of others are affected, including those injured or displaced, making this the deadliest tsunami on record. Sections of Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, and Thailand have suffered the worst devastation. In response, the United Nations, the United States, and other donor nations have organized what some have called the world’s largest relief and recovery operation to date. President Bush pledged $350 million in aid early on and mobilized the U.S. military to provide logistical and other assistance. The Administration has increased this amount by seeking $600 million in its request for $950 million for tsunami relief in the FY2005 emergency supplemental. Of this total, $346 million would replenish USAID emergency aid accounts that had been drawn down in support of the U.S. government response and reimburse Defense Department accounts that were used in the relief effort. On March 16, the House passed H.R. 1268, funding all items proposed under the Tsunami Recovery and Reconstruction Fund, except for the $45 million proposed for debt reduction. The large-scale U.S. response to the tsunami is unlikely to reverse the decline in the U.S. image abroad since the September 11 attacks, because this decline primarily is due to American policies in the Middle East. However, the scale and scope of U.S. assistance could provide a positive example of U.S. leadership and military capabilities. Additionally, the disaster relief cooperation between the U.S. and Indonesian militaries is likely to be mentioned during the annual congressional deliberations over renewing restrictions on U.S.-Indonesian military-to-military relations, which the Bush Administration has sought to restore since the September 11, 2001 attacks. This report summarizes the extent of the disaster and relief effort and includes descriptions of the U.S. and international assistance efforts. It also examines protection mechanisms for children and separated orphans. A section is devoted to the situation in each of the affected countries followed by an analysis of selected issues for Congress. The report will be updated further as events warrant. Contributing Authors and Subject Areas Name (name redacted) (name redacted) (name redacted) Mark Manyin (name redacted) Telephone 7-.... Subject Thailand 7-.... 7-.... 7-.... 7-.... African Affairs Asian Affairs Asian Affairs Humanitarian Assistance Child Protection Wayne Morrissey 7-.... Early Warning Systems Larry Niksch 7-.... Burma Indonesia (name redacted) 7-.... Budget and Policy Issues (name redacted) 7-.... Indonesia Sri Lanka Contents Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Comparisons to Past Disasters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Current Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Relief Operations and Aid Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Health . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Protection for Children and Separated Orphans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Tsunami Orphans: The Tsunami Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Humanitarian Response: U.S. and International Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 U.S. Emergency Assistance to the Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 The U.S. Emergency Response Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 FY2005 Emergency Supplemental . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 International Emergency Assistance to the Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 International Donor Conferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Early Warning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Situation Report on Countries Affected by the Tsunami . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Indonesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Sri Lanka . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Thailand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Burma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 The Maldives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Diego Garcia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Malaysia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Bangladesh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Kenya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Tanzania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Seychelles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Madagascar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Mauritius . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Reunion (French Territory) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 South Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Tsunami Aid and Reconstruction Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Burdensharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Competing Aid and Budget Priorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Transparency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Debt Relief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Implications for Other U.S. Foreign Policy Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 The War on Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Countering Negative Images of the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Early Warning Systems: International Scientific, Technological and Other Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Aid to Indonesia and the Leahy Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Appendix 1. U.S. Assistance to Selected Countries Affected by the Indian Ocean Tsunami . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 List of Aid-Related Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 Appendix 2. Child Protection Issues in Tsunami-Affected Countries . . . . . . . . 48 Indonesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 Thailand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 Sri Lanka . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 Malaysia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 UNICEF’S Child Protection Response to the Indian Ocean Emergency . . . . . . . 50 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 Key Achievements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 Future Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 List of Figures Figure 1. Map of the 2004 Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami . . . . . . . . . . 2 Figure 2. Countries Affected by the Tsunami . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Figure 3. Regional Assistance and Food Aid Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 List of Tables Table 1. Deadliest Natural Disasters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Table 2. U.S. Governmental Assistance after Hurricane Mitch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Table 3. Estimated Number of Persons Affected by the Earthquake and Tsunamis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Table 4. Governmental, Inter-Governmental, and Private Tsunami Relief and Reconstruction Pledges and Contributions as of March 9, 2005 . . . . . 18 Table 5. U.S. Assistance to Indonesia, 2001-2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Table 6. U.S. Assistance to Sri Lanka, 2001-2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Table 7. U.S. Assistance to India, FY2001-FY2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 Table 8. U.S. Assistance to Thailand, FY2002-FY2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 Table 9. U.S. Assistance to Malaysia, 2001-2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 Table 10. U.S. Assistance to Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami: Humanitarian Assistance and Relief Operations Background1 Introduction On December 26, 2004, a magnitude 9.0 undersea earthquake off the west coast of northern Sumatra, Indonesia, unleashed a tsunami that affected more than 12 countries throughout south and southeast Asia and stretched as far as the northeastern African coast. Within six hours the deadly waves traveled more than 3,000 miles and carved a trail of death and destruction as they arrived on land. Current official estimates indicate that more than 250,000 people are dead or missing, and millions of others are affected, including the injured or displaced.2 The World Health Organization (WHO) indicates that an estimated three to five million people lack the basic necessities for survival; between one and two million people may be displaced. In many places the physical environment is badly damaged or destroyed, including entire communities, homes, businesses, tourist areas, and infrastructure (roads, bridges, power and telephone systems, and public buildings). For many their means of livelihood and way of life has been wiped out. In the hardest hit areas, social services are severely compromised or nonexistent. Experts have said this is the most powerful earthquake in 40 years and the fourth (and perhaps the second) most deadly in the last century. Estimates of the dead make it the worst tsunami disaster on record. A massive, global relief and recovery operation is underway. According to the United Nations, the relief operation is the largest ever undertaken. Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, and Thailand have suffered some of the worst devastation. Within a day, all were declared a disaster by their respective U.S. ambassador, which allowed U.S. aid to be immediately released through the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). For information on current conditions and latest developments, view the reports of governments, private voluntary agencies, and U.N. agencies on the web at [] 1 2 Prepared by (name redacted), Foreign Affairs Analyst. Early estimates of deaths from natural disasters are difficult to calculate and usually quite different from the final count. In this disaster the final number likely will never be known with any accuracy given the number of countries involved, the long, populous coastlines that were struck by the tsunamis, and the number of villages completely destroyed. Numbers fluctuate. See Donald G. McNeil, Jr., “Experts Say Accurate Toll is Hard to Calculate,” New York Times, December 29, 2004. CRS-2 Figure 1. Map of the 2004 Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami Comparisons to Past Disasters3 In terms of estimated fatalities, the Indian Ocean tsunami ranks among the world’s worst natural disasters, though it falls below other events. (See Table 1.) The unique feature of this tsunami is the extent of the damage and the number of countries affected. Unlike the damage caused by other disasters, which tended to be highly localized, the Indian Ocean tsunami struck thousands of miles of populous coastline in nearly a dozen countries, affecting millions of people. The devastation was particularly acute in several island areas, where at times, entire land masses were flooded. The very nature of the tidal waves, combined with the lack of warning, made women, children, the elderly and others unable to swim particularly vulnerable. Also, the potential deaths of thousands of tourists from the industrialized world vacationing in southern Thailand and Sri Lanka — mostly Europeans but also many Americans and Japanese — has given the Indian Ocean tsunami a higher profile than previous disasters. 3 Prepared by Mark Manyin, Specialist in Asian Affairs. CRS-3 Table 1. Deadliest Natural Disasters Year Location Event Estimated Death Toll 1931 Huang He River, China flood 3.7 million 1970 Bangladesh cyclone 300,000 1976 Tangshan, China earthquake (magnitude 7.5) 255,000* 1920 Ningxia-Kansu, China earthquake (8.6) 200,000 1927 Tsinghai, China earthquake (7.9) 200,000 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake (9.0) and tsunami 150,000+ 1923 Kanto region, Japan earthquake (7.9) 143,000 1991 Bangladesh cyclone 139,000 1948 Turkmenistan, USSR earthquake (7.3) 110,000 1908 Messina, Italy earthquake (7.2) 70,000-100,000 Sources: Washington Post, December 30, 2004; U.S. Geological Survey. * Official death toll. Unofficial estimates range as high as 655,000. No natural disasters in recent memory compare with the magnitude and scope of this earthquake and tsunami. Table 2 provides context, detailing the large-scale U.S. assistance that followed after a previous natural disaster, the October 1998 Hurricane Mitch, which inflicted severe destruction upon several countries in central America. Table 2. U.S. Governmental Assistance after Hurricane Mitch (millions of U.S. dollars) Country Assisted (Estimated Death Toll) Existing U.S. Resources and Debt Relief at Time of Disaster Supplemental Appropriation Total Honduras (14,000) 238.3 324.9 563.2 Nicaragua (3,500) 57.4 113.0 170.4 Guatemala (440) 42.5 35.9 78.4 El Salvador (370) 19.4 35.1 54.5 Costa Rica (6) - 9.0 9.0 Central America Regional - 27.3 27.3 357.6 545.2 902.8 Total CRS-4 Even as the emergency response gained momentum in January, discussion of the medium and long-term reconstruction of the area had already begun and continues at international meetings and within the U.S. government. Ongoing damage assessments related to reconstruction are underway in the affected countries. Experts had already estimated the total damage to the region in the billions of dollars. In Indonesia, a joint report issued by the government of Indonesia and the international donor community estimates that the total cost of damages and losses is $4.45 billion.4 Secretary- General Kofi Annan said it could take ten years to bring parts of the region back to full capacity. The reconstruction effort will likely attempt to reduce the vulnerability of these countries to similar disasters in the future. Although countries in the Pacific region have a warning system for tsunamis (which are a relatively frequent occurrence), the countries in the Indian Ocean lack such a coordinated response. In an effort to improve disaster preparedness a review of the response to the earthquake and tsunami may include an examination of the dissemination of information by national governments to other governments and to their populace, communication between regional governments about the course and damage of the storm, and local governmental disaster response plans and procedures. See the section on early warning systems later in this report. 4 “Indonesia: Preliminary Damage and Loss Assessment: The December 26, 2004 Natural Disaster,” The Consultative Group on Indonesia, Government of Indonesia (State Minister for National Planning Development Agency/BAPPENAS) and World Bank (for the international donor community), January 19-20, 2005. CRS-5 Current Situation5 Table 3. Estimated Number of Persons Affected by the Earthquake and Tsunamis Death toll (estimated) Missing (estimated) Displaced (estimated) Indonesia 122,232 113,937 406,156 Sri Lanka 30,974 4,698 553,287 India 10,776 5,640 112,558 Thailand 5,395 3,062 Burma (Myanmar) 60-80 Country The Maldives 82 26 11,568 Malaysia 68 6 8,000 Tanzania 10 Bangladesh 2 Somalia 150 Kenya 1 Seychelles 3 5,000 displaced 54,000 affected 40 households displaced Sources: Statistical data provided by USAID Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunamis Fact Sheet #36, February 22, 2005. As the disaster unfolded, the dilemma involved in prioritizing resource allocations began to take shape: on the one hand, to try to save as many lives as possible and on the other, to identify and dispose of bodies as death tolls continued to rise. Multiple challenges have arisen because of the large number of countries affected across a wide geographic area. Moreover, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Somalia have been in conflicts that are as yet unresolved and present potential difficulties in the distribution of aid. And there are millions of people displaced, separated from their families and left with nothing. Critical problems vary by country, including the condition of the infrastructure and response system, the scope of destruction, and degree of access. The situation in each country is discussed later in the report. Initial assessments indicated that the most urgent priorities in the affected areas were for potable water, sanitation (and waste disposal), food, and shelter. As the transition to recovery continues, water and sanitation activities, providing shelter to affected communities, and monitoring health remain clear priorities. 5 Prepared by (name redacted), Foreign Affairs Analyst. CRS-6 Relief Operations and Aid Delivery Experts break relief operations into several phases: search and rescue; treatment and survival; relocation and rehabilitation; and long-term reconstruction.6 As with any massive undertaking that has many moving parts, it can take days to get a relief effort underway. Delays in transportation and congestion, lack of transportation infrastructure, bureaucratic problems, lack of access, all can cause bottlenecks at key points in the system. While timing is critical to save lives, to enable a network of this size to function efficiently requires the coordination of assessments and appropriate responses with local governments, communities, and the international community. In general, the relief effort has been viewed positively and the convening authority of the United Nations has been well received. The sheer scale of this relief effort has brought together tremendous capacity and willingness to help, but experts generally caution that an ongoing effort and strategic planning at the regional and country levels is required at each phase to work out coordination and logistics issues. The relief effort is now focused primarily on recovery and rehabilitation.7 More detailed interagency assessments are underway, the information from which will be critical for planning recovery and reconstruction initiatives, developing strategies for the use of funding, and determining whether personnel are in place with adequate resources. In certain areas, particularly in Indonesia, access and logistics problems continue. There are logistical bottlenecks, and the lack of transportation and adequate infrastructure remain a challenge. Concerns about disease and the need for sanitation and medical capacity are still critical. Impediments to aid in Indonesia appear to be particularly challenging for several reasons. There are the obvious logistical difficulties. The destruction of transportation infrastructure has made it difficult to extend assistance to all of the affected areas.8 The coordination of national and local level government with the military and relief groups presents problems. The conflict between secessionists and the government has also complicated the relief effort. The Indonesian military feels it has to look to both relief and counter-insurgency operations. There is also the issue of national pride. Indonesia was, like India, a leading member of the non-aligned movement. This may be, in part, a reason for Indonesia’s decision to ask providers of foreign military assistance to leave the country by March. The Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami created a natural disaster of historic proportion. The massive relief and reconstruction effort underway also departs from previous emergency operations in its scope and scale. The initial objectives of the relief operation involving search and rescue, treatment and survival are thought to 6 “Relief: Massive Effort, Massive Need,” Christian Science Monitor, January 3, 2005. 7 See maps in Figures 2 and 3 at the end of this report for a regional overview of affected countries and assistance requirements. 8 For example, according to USAID, a road north of Meulaboh, Indonesia is open to trucks and passable for 67 kilometres, but the journey now takes 12 hours instead of the 2 it used to take prior to the tsunami. CRS-7 have been met: in the immediate post-tsunami period, basic needs were addressed and further deaths were prevented. Although it is early to determine “lessons learned,” the assessment of the response to the tsunami disaster so far has been positive on many levels — from meeting basic humanitarian needs, to civil-military coordination, information sharing, and working with national governments and indigenous organizations. The operation has not been without its challenges, such as bottlenecks in aid delivery, but all things considered, it is currently viewed by many as largely successful. In addition to working closely with the national governments of the countries affected by the disaster, The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) has been the lead agency working with actors on the ground, coordinating with the military, and enlisting donor support. As the immediate humanitarian requirements of the operation have been fulfilled, a transition to recovery and reconstruction is now taking place and the operation is shifting from using military to civilian capacity for delivery of assistance. For the foreseeable future, UNOCHA will continue as the lead agency. The transition phase of the post-tsunami period will be challenging. While emergency assistance and the need to guard against the outbreak of disease will continue for some time, there is a new emphasis on conducting assessments and planning for long-term reconstruction, and with that, priorities and funding are beginning to shift.9 Initial assessments focused mainly on basic assistance needs; now long-term challenges, such as creating jobs and housing, are become more pressing. Host governments are also taking more of a lead in determining the outcome of this next phase. And with this transition, there are other issues to consider such as security and political tensions, access for aid workers, and the return of displaced populations. Within the relief operation, transparency and accountability at the United Nations, but also with any organization receiving funds, remains a point of focus. Coordinating the assessments, projects, and capabilities of numerous actors with host governments will become more difficult as the complicated task of reconstruction takes hold. Health The World Health Organization (WHO), which is the lead agency for the coordination of international public health response to disasters such as the tsunami, and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), along with international organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), are all working to meet the public health needs of the affected region. In the first week after the disaster, WHO warned that the death toll could double if clean water, sanitation, medical treatment, and relief supplies were not provided to the affected areas.10 9 See USAID, “Indian Ocean — Earthquake and Tsunamis,” Fact Sheet #32, February 8, 2005. 10 “Response to Enormity,” The Washington Post, December 29, 2004. CRS-8 WHO continues to stress the need to guard against the risk of disease and further deaths through surveillance and early warning systems. WHO remains particularly concerned about disease outbreaks among the many vulnerable populations from contaminated water sources and crowded, unsanitary living conditions, including cholera, dysentery, malaria, and dengue fever. The numbers of injured are estimated to be twice or three times the death toll. So far there do not appear to be any signs of epidemics. WHO has also identified the need to address mental health issues and rebuild the capacity of health systems as critical to recovery.11 Protection for Children and Separated Orphans12 Background. Trafficking in children goes on worldwide and may even be increasing. Statistics on child trafficking, however, are very unreliable and official estimates may reflect only a part of its actual extent. The Department of State’s 2004 Trafficking in Persons Report says that of the 600,000 - 800,000 persons trafficked across international borders each year, 70% are female and 50% are children. In addition, according to that report, many more people (probably millions) are trafficked within countries. The International Labor Organization (ILO) puts the number of children trafficked both internally and across borders annually at 1.2 million. All these numbers are estimates and no country is immune from trafficking, including the United States.13 According to the United Nations, human trafficking is a highly lucrative global industry controlled by powerful criminal organizations from which they derive many billions in revenues annually. This places human trafficking just behind drug and arms trafficking in terms of illicit revenues. Global experience in addressing child trafficking, and distinct focus on the problem separate from the overall human trafficking issue, is relatively new. The problem is huge in scope, multifaceted and sensitive, both culturally and politically. Both boys and girls are trafficked, as are children of all ages — some very young children and some nearly adults. Trafficking in children is directly linked to their subsequent exploitation. The forms of exploitation vary including commercial sexual exploitation (for prostitution or pornography), use as domestic servants, as bonded laborers, as beggars, in other illicit activities from drug running to burglaries, as well as child soldiers. In addition, babies may be trafficked for adoption, and older teens for marriage. In all cases constraints are put on the movement of the children involved who are virtually enslaved. Girls are the chief victims of trafficking for 11 See “Questions and Answers: South Asia Earthquake and Tsunami,” World Health Organization, January 14, 2005. 12 13 Prepared by (name redacted), Foreign Affairs Analyst. “Anywhere between 20,000 and 50,000 people are trafficked into the United States each year, depending on the source. In addition, there are around 200,000 young people in America who may be victims of trafficking within the United States.” Remarks of Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs, Paula Dobriansky, in Helsinki, Finland on June 3, 2003 at [] For background see also CRS Report RL30545 Trafficking in Persons: The U.S. and International Response by (name redacted). CRS-9 sexual exploitation, domestic work and marriage. Boys and girls, however, are subjected to trafficking and most forms of exploitation.14 The root causes of sale and trafficking of children are complex, and include conditions of conflict and population movements, poverty, lack of employment opportunities, low social status of the girl child, impunity from prosecution, and a general lack of education and awareness. Children from minority groups, or those who are undocumented, are particularly vulnerable to being trafficked.15 Situations of massive dislocation due to natural disasters, like the recent tsunami in the Indian Ocean, provide opportunities for syndicates to take advantage of the chaos and breakdown of protection mechanisms that leave orphans and children separated from their parents particularly vulnerable. Tsunami Orphans: The Tsunami Generation. UNICEF, and other organizations focused on the fate of children orphaned or separated from their families amid the chaos of a disaster, acknowledge it is a multifaceted problem that will take time to resolve. The scope of the problem in the tsunami-affected countries is not fully known, and although there are only estimates of the number of children orphaned or separated from their parents, UNICEF now states that the numbers of unaccompanied and separated children are much lower than initially expected. UNICEF refers to these children as the Tsunami Generation. Early on after the tsunami struck, the United Nations, international organizations and NGOs issued warnings of the risks to children left unprotected in the aftermath of the tsunami. They are working on high-alert prevention mechanisms, including raising awareness at camps, providing guidelines to officials and volunteers, urging governments in affected countries to act, and identifying police and community officials to be of assistance. International adoptions are considered very premature and are not considered the best option for the child. Governments of affected countries are working with UNICEF to prevent illegal adoptions and trafficking. UNICEF has developed five key steps to protect children from exploitation, including identification and registration; provision of immediate, safe care; tracing and reunification with extended family members; alerting police and community authorities; and working with governments of the affected countries to monitor the problem. UNICEF is also encouraging children to go back to school as soon as possible as a way of creating a more normal environment and beginning to deal with the mental trauma of the disaster. See Appendix 2 for an overview of UNICEF’s activities. 14 Trafficking in Children for Sexual Purposes: an Analytical Review, p. 17 at [ pers/ThemepaperTrafficking] in Children.pdf 15 A Child-Rights Approach on International Migration and Child Trafficking: a UNICEF Perspective U.N. document: UN/POP/MIG/2004/9, October 18, 2004. CRS-10 Humanitarian Response: U.S. and International Assistance16 U.S. Emergency Assistance to the Region Offers of assistance have greatly increased since December 26, 2004, as the international community has come to realize the growing scale of the disaster. In the case of the United States, American Ambassadors responsible for Sri Lanka, the Maldives, India, and Indonesia provided $400,000 in immediate assistance in the wake of the Indian Ocean tsunami. The United States Government then provided $4 million in additional assistance to the Red Cross. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID)’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) immediately sent Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs) to the region to assess needs in the areas of sanitation, health, and other kinds of relief supplies. On December 28, $10 million was allocated for the relief effort for a total estimated initial contribution by the United States of around $15 million.17 As reports of the growing scale of the disaster came in, the United States raised its pledge to $35 million.18 By December 31, this number had increased to $350 million. Of this amount, as of February 22, 2005, USAID reports that more than $120 million has been committed.19 For the latest breakdown of U.S. government assistance to the region, see []. Military assistance to the region, in coordination with international organizations and NGOs, includes flights with relief aid, medical supplies, personnel, and equipment to affected areas.20 Initially, the U.S. Navy dispatched P-3 patrol aircraft and an aircraft carrier to assist with relief operations. Helicopters were used to deliver relief supplies and evacuate the injured. In addition, surface ships, landing crafts and inflatable boats were positioned to provide relief supplies, including the capacity to produce potable water, transport vehicles, generators and other equipment. Military forensic teams deployed to Thailand and preventive medicine units conducted assessments in Indonesia. By mid-January, more than 11,600 military personnel were involved in the relief operation with 17 ships and 75 aircraft. The cost of total military spending to date as outlined in the supplemental request is $226 million. As of February 14, 2005, Combined Support Force 536 ended its operations in the tsunami-affected region. 16 Prepared by (name redacted), Foreign Affairs Analyst. 17 Secretary Colin Powell, Briefing with Assistant Administrator for United States Agency for International Development Ed Fox,” U.S. Department of State, December 27, 2004. 18 John Harris and Robin Wright, “Aid Grows Amid Remarks About President’s Absence,” The Washington Post, December 29, 2004. 19 Also see CRS Report RS22027 Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunamis: Food Aid Needs and the U.S. Response by Charles Hanrahan. 20 Additional information is available on a U.S. Pacific Command Fact Sheet at []. CRS-11 On December 29, 1004, President Bush announced the formation of a donor group consisting of the United States, Australia, India, and Japan to coordinate relief and military capabilities in the region in the first weeks of the crisis. On January 6, the Core Group joined the efforts of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) as the lead agency on the relief effort. Two interagency task forces were established — one to coordinate U.S. government relief efforts and the other to assist in tracking missing Americans. Eighteen Americans are confirmed dead, with another sixteen presumed dead. Private sector assistance has already been substantial and is expected to continue to grow.21 On January 3, President Bush announced that former Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton would lead a fundraising effort in the U.S. private sector in support of the tsunami crisis. They traveled to the region to assess the damage from February 18-21. Cash donations are being encouraged. It is too soon to estimate the value of private relief supplies, which will be transported by DOD under the Denton program.22 U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, Florida Governor Jeb Bush, and USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios visited the affected region in early January 2005 to assess the situation and whether the response is sufficient to meet the needs on the ground. Several U.S. Congressional delegations have also traveled to the region over the past few months. The U.S. Emergency Response Mechanism The United States is generally a leader and major contributor to relief efforts in humanitarian disasters.23 In 2004 the United States contributed more than 2.4 billion to disaster relief worldwide. In the case of the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami, it is clear that the response will require a major long-term effort beyond the relief and recovery operation currently underway.24 21 See also CRS Report RL32738 Charitable Contributions for Tsunami Relief: P.L. 109-1 by Pamela L. Jackson. 22 The Denton program, named after former Member of Congress Jeremiah Denton, authorizes shipment of privately donated humanitarian goods on U.S. military aircraft on a space-available basis. The donated goods must be certified as appropriate for the disaster by USAID’s OFDA and can be bumped from the transport if other U.S. government aid must be transported. 23 For background information see CRS Report RL32714, International Disasters and Humanitarian Assistance: U.S. Governmental Response, by (name redacted). 24 There are a number of variables that make reading the United States government numbers and drawing accurate conclusions problematic. Questions about authority, definitions and categories of services make up part of the reason it is a challenge to grasp the concept and (continued...) CRS-12 The President has broad authority to provide emergency assistance for foreign disasters and the United States government provides disaster assistance through several U.S. agencies. The very nature of humanitarian disasters — the need to respond quickly in order to save lives and provide relief — has resulted in an unrestricted definition of what this type of assistance consists of on both a policy and operational level. While humanitarian assistance is assumed to provide for urgent food, shelter, and medical needs, the agencies within the U.S. government providing this support expand or contract the definition in response to circumstances. Funds may be used for U.S. agencies to deliver the services required or to provide grants to international organizations (IOs), international governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and private or religious voluntary organizations (PVOs). USAID is the U.S. agency charged with coordinating U.S. government and private sector assistance.25 It also coordinates with international organizations, the governments of countries suffering disasters, and other governments. OFDA in USAID’s Bureau of Humanitarian Response can respond immediately with relief materials and personnel including personnel and materiel already located in various countries around the world.26 It is responsible for the provision of non-food humanitarian assistance and has disaster response teams (DARTS) which can be assembled quickly to conduct assessments of the situation. OFDA has wide authority to borrow funds, equipment, and personnel from other parts of USAID and other federal agencies. USAID has two other offices that administer U.S. humanitarian aid: Food For Peace (FFP) and the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI). USAID administers Title II of the FFP under P.L. 480 and provides relief and development food aid that does not have to be repaid. OTI provides post-disaster transition assistance, which includes mainly short-term peace and democratization projects with some attention to humanitarian elements but not emergency relief. The Department of Defense (DOD) Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) appropriation funds three DOD humanitarian programs: the Humanitarian Assistance Program (HAP), the Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA) Program, and Foreign Disaster Relief and Emergency Response (FDR/ER). The office provides humanitarian support to stabilize emergency situations and deals with a range of tasks including the provision of food, shelter and supplies, and medical evacuations. In addition the President has the authority to draw down defense equipment and direct military personnel to respond to disasters. The President may 24 (...continued) function of humanitarian assistance. Another factor has to do with how the numbers are generated in budgets within the U.S. government. Each agency has its own budget, with its own criteria, accounting detail and regional specificity. The fact that an urgent response to humanitarian crises is often required only compounds the problem. Budgets may reflect regional support, a certain area, specific countries, or a combination thereof over time and with changing events. Particularly in comparing assistance levels with other countries, financial sources may be compared against other forms of assistance (blankets, etc.) or they may reflect commitments of support rather than overall obligations. 25 Private donations may be made to the private agencies working the area which are listed on the internet at [] 26 Authorized in Sec. 491-493 of P.L. 87-195, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. CRS-13 also use the Denton program to provide space available transportation on military aircraft and ships to private donors who wish to transport humanitarian goods and equipment in response to a disaster. Generally, OFDA provides emergency aid which lasts 30-90 days. The same is true for Department of Defense humanitarian assistance. After the initial emergency is over, assistance is provided through other channels, such as the regular country development programs of USAID. The State Department also administers programs for humanitarian relief with a focus on refugees and the displaced. Emergency Refugee and Migration Account (ERMA) is a fund available until spent27 and provides wide latitude to the President in responding to refugee emergencies. Emergencies lasting more than a year come out of the regular Migration and Refugee Account (MRA) through the Population, Migration and Refugees (PRM) bureau. PRM28 covers refugees worldwide, conflict victims, and populations of concern to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), often extended to Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). Humanitarian assistance includes a range of services from basic needs to community services. Legislation29 Several bills pertaining to the Indian Ocean tsunamis and their after-effects have been introduced in the 109th Congress.30 One of these bills, H.R. 241 (Thomas), entitled To Accelerate the Income Tax Benefits for Charitable Cash Contributions for the Relief of Victims of the Indian Ocean Tsunami, was the first legislative measure passed by the 109th Congress to be signed into law; it became P.L. 109-1. As of March 20, 2005, other pending bills included the following: ! H.Res. 12 (Hyde). Introduced and passed by the House on January 4, 2005; entitled Expressing condolences and support for assistance to the victims of the earthquake and tsunamis that occurred on December 26, 2004, in South and Southeast Asia. ! H.Res 120 (Blumenauer). Introduced and referred to the House International Relations Committee and House Armed Services Committee on February 17, 2005. Committee consideration and mark-up session held on March 9, 2005; entitled Commending the 27 Governed by P.L. 103-326, the maximum amount is $100 million. Authorized in sections 2 and 3 or P.L. 87-510 of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962. 28 When there is functional or programmatic overlap between USAID and PRM, they coordinate with each other and define partners. Traditionally PRM is a funder of UNHCR and other multilateral actors; USAID creates bilateral arrangements with NGOs. There is now a shift in partnering due to funding and resources required. 29 30 Prepared by (name redacted) , African Affairs Specialist. To assist the reader, this section repeats some legislation mentioned in the January 21, 2005 version of this report. CRS-14 outstanding efforts by members of the Armed Forces and civilian employees of the Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development in response to the earthquake and tsunami of December 26, 2004. ! H.R. 60 (Jackson-Lee). Introduced and referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary on January 4, 2005. Referred to the House Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims on March 2, 2005; entitled To designate Sri Lanka, India, Indonesia, Thailand, Somalia, Myanmar, Malaysia, Maldives, Tanzania, Seychelles, Bangladesh, and Kenya under section 244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act in order to render nationals of such foreign states eligible for temporary protected status under such section. ! H.R. 397 (Menendez). Introduced and referred to the House Committee on International Relations on January 26, 2005; entitled To amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to provide assistance to children who are orphaned or unaccompanied as a result of the tsunamis that occurred on December 26, 2004, in the Indian Ocean. ! H.R. 465 (Faleomavaega). Introduced and referred to the House Committee on Resources on February 1, 2005. Referred to the House Subcommittee on Fisheries and Oceans on February 10, 2005; entitled To provide for the establishment of a tsunami hazard mitigation program for all United States insular areas. ! H.R. 499 (Shays). Introduced and referred to the Committee on International Relations, and in addition to the Committee on Resources on February 1, 2005. Referred to the House Subcommittee on Fisheries and Oceans on February 9, 2005; entitled To provide for the development of a global tsunami detection and warning system, to improve existing communication of tsunami warnings to all potentially affected nations, and for other purposes. ! H.R. 882 (Boehlert). Introduced and referred to the House Science Committee on February 17, 2005; referred to the Subcommittee on Environment, Technology, and Standards on March 3, 2005; entitled To require the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, through the National Weather Service, to establish a tsunami hazard mitigation program for all United States coastal States and insular areas. ! H.R. 890 (Pallone). Introduced and referred to the House International Relations Committee, the House Resources Committee and the House Science Committee; referred to the Subcommittee on Environment, Technology, and Standards on March 3, 2005; entitled To provide for the establishment of national and global tsunami warning systems and to provide assistance for the relief and CRS-15 rehabilitation of victims of the Indian Ocean tsunami and for the reconstruction of tsunami-affected countries. ! H.R. 950 (Maloney). Introduced and referred to the House Committee on International Relations on February 17, 2005; entitled To authorize assistance to support programs to protect children who are homeless or orphaned as a result of the tsunamis that occurred on December 26, 2004, in the Indian Ocean from becoming victims of trafficking. ! H.R. 1011 (Maloney). Introduced and referred to the House Committee on International Relations on March 1, 2005; entitled To provide financial assistance to the United Nations Population Fund to provide urgent medical and health care to tsunami victims in Indonesia, the Maldives, and Sri Lanka. ! S.Res. 4 (Frist). Introduced and passed in the Senate on January 4, 2005; entitled A resolution expressing the sympathy and pledging the support of the United States Senate and the people of the United States for the victims of the powerful earthquake and devastating tsunami that struck Bangladesh, Burma, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, the Maldives, the Seychelles, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, and other areas of South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Africa, on December 26, 2004. ! S. 34 (Lieberman). Introduced and referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on January 24, 2005; entitled A bill to provide for the development of a global tsunami detection and warning system, to improve existing communication of tsunami warnings to all potentially affected nations, and for other purposes. ! S. 50 (Inouye). Introduced on January 24, 2005; ordered to be reported an original measure by the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on February 2, 2005; ordered to be reported with an amendment in the nature of a substitute favorably on March 10, 2005; entitled A bill to authorize and strengthen the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s tsunami detection, forecast, warning, and mitigation program, and for other purposes. ! S. 361 (Snowe). Introduced and referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on February 10, 2005; ordered to be reported without amendment favorably on March 10, 2005; entitled A bill to develop and maintain an integrated system of ocean and coastal observations for the Nation’s coasts, oceans and Great Lakes, improve warnings of tsunamis and other natural hazards, enhance homeland security, support maritime operations, and for other purposes. CRS-16 ! S. 452 (Corzine). Introduced and referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on February 17, 2005; entitled A bill to provide for the establishment of national and global tsunami warning systems and to provide assistance for the relief and rehabilitation of victims fo the Indian Ocean tsunami and for the reconstruction of tsunami-affected countries. FY2005 Emergency Supplemental.31 On February 14, 2005, the Administration submitted a supplemental request for Appropriations for Iraq and Afghanistan, Tsunami Relief, and Other Activities which included $950 million to support the countries affected by the tsunami. The United States made an early pledge of $350 million for immediate relief efforts, but the Administration has increased this amount by seeking $600 million in its request for a $950 million FY2005 supplemental. Of this total, $346 million would be used to replenish USAID emergency aid accounts that had been drawn in support of the initial American government response ($120 million) and to reimburse DOD accounts ($226 million) that were used in the immediate aftermath of the tsunami. The largest portion of the Tsunami Recovery and Reconstruction supplemental account ($581 million) would be used for small transition and longer term large infrastructure activities. Of this amount, up to $45 million could be used to provide debt relief to the affected countries if their governments request such debt reduction. An additional $22.6 million would support creation of tsunami warning systems in the region and other related activities. Out of the total $950 million request, $701 million falls under international affairs budget accounts managed by USAID and the State Department. Congressional Action. On March 16, 2005, the House passed H.R. 1268, providing funds for all items proposed under the Tsunami Recovery and Reconstruction Fund, except for the $45 million proposed for debt reduction. In approving the tsunami relief money, the House Appropriations Committee noted its support for education and women and children programs, and recommended that $10 million be used for training and equipment for women-led NGOs in tsunami-affected countries. The Senate Appropriations Committee plans to mark up a companion bill when Congress returns from its recess in early April. International Emergency Assistance to the Region International recovery efforts are typically complex because they require coordination among numerous different actors. Those responding to humanitarian crises include U.N. agencies, international organizations, NGOs, PVOs, and bilateral and multilateral donors. A great deal of assistance is provided by other governments and international agencies. The U.N. OCHA tracks worldwide contributions to 31 This section draws on CRS Report RlL32783 FY2005 Supplemental Appropriations for Iraq and Afghanistan, Tsunami Relief, and Other Activities by (name redacted) and (name redacted). See the section on Tsunami Recovery and Reconstruction for more detailed information on this legislation and congressional action. CRS-17 disasters.32 According to the United Nations, as of March 9, 2005, pledges from the international community for the Indian Ocean tsunami stand at over $12 billion. Initially, the European Union pledged $40.5 million dollars. Australia pledged $7.6 million dollars while France, Germany, Russia, Britain, Pakistan, and Italy initially reacted by sending plane loads of assistance supplies. The International Red Cross and the Red Crescent Societies were focused on an initial appeal of $6.6 million.33 Since then, donations have increased enormously (see Table 4). Australia and Japan have stated that they will help build a tidal wave warning system which is thought will cost tens of millions of dollars to establish.34 The U.N. agencies are also conducting damage assessments and reconstruction estimates which will likely be used at donor conferences and planning for the future. The United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Jan Egeland, has stated that “the cost of the devastation will be in the billions of dollars. It would probably be in the many billions of dollars,” making it one of the largest humanitarian relief efforts in history.35 On January 6, the United Nations and its partners launched a flash appeal for $977 million. It is well known that in previous disasters, pledges made by governments have not always resulted in actual contributions. Billions of dollars have been pledged to help the victims of the tsunami disaster. Reconstruction will be costly and take time. Maintaining enough pressure on donors to honor their pledges while securing funds needed for other disaster areas requires a delicate balance, particularly if donor fatigue is to be avoided.36 The table below reflects the most recent data available on relief and reconstruction pledges and contributions. 32 The information is only as complete as the various governments’ willingness to report the information. It does not include non-cash contributions in services or in kind (such as trucks and aircraft, crews, and emergency and medical personnel). 33 “World Scrambles to Help Asia Tidal Victims,” Agence France Presse, December 27, 2004. 34 “Officials in Asia Concede That They Failed to Issue Warnings,” Associated Press, December 27, 2004. 35 Colum Lynch, “Billions in Aid Needed for Devastated Areas, U.N. Official Says,” The Washington Post, December 28, 2004. 36 Information for this section was drawn from interviews, the USAID fact sheets, reports by various U.N. agencies, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations available at []. CRS-18 Table 4. Governmental, Inter-Governmental, and Private Tsunami Relief and Reconstruction Pledges and Contributions as of March 9, 2005 (millions of U.S. dollars; governments ranked by paid contributions as of March 9, 2005) Country/Agency Donor Govt Unpaid Govt Paid Pledges* Contributionsa Govt Totals, Paid and Unpaida Privateb Japan 493.68 6.87 500.55 NA United States 125.00 227.25 352.25 1,025.62 Germany 105.81 576.98 682.79 619.8 United Kingdom 100.79 18.91 119.70 375 Norway 77.86 96.35 174.21 61 China 50.25 14.00 64.25 1.8 Canada 38.84 311.82 350.67 122 Denmark 38.20 40.36 78.56 35 Netherlands 37.54 230.42 267.97 150 c 33.30 397.84 431.14 177 Russian Federation 32.20 0.00 32.20 NA New Zealand 31.80 15.10 46.90 7 France 29.59 413.23 442.82 90 Greece 26.53 0.00 26.53 22.5 Italy 26.02 86.84 112.86 20 Sweden 23.08 53.80 76.88 75 India 23.00 0.00 23.00 NA Qatar 22.00 3.00 25.00 NA Switzerland 20.04 0.00 20.04 110 Belgium 19.93 20.35 40.28 40 Finland 18.07 51.13 69.20 28 Portugal 16.21 0.00 16.21 5 Taiwan NA NA 50.00 -NA- Other Private by Country NA NA NA 225.05 Other Governments NA NA 514.30 1,389.73 2,564.27 4,518.30 Australia Totals 3,189.77 CRS-19 International Financial Institutions (IFIs) Commitments and Pledges Asian Development Bank (initial support) NA NA 775.00 — European Investment Bank (prospective pledge) NA NA 1,275.94 — International Monetary Fund (prospective pledge) NA NA 1,000.00 — World Bank (first phase support) NA NA 672.00 — 3,722.94 — IFI Totals Intergovernmental Organization Pledges and Contributions Commitments and Pledges ECHO (European Commission) 34.09 132.27 166.36 — European Commission 19.00 474.90 493.89 — U.N. organizations and affiliates NA NA 292.63 — Arab Gulf Fund NA NA 0.10 — Intergovernmental Totals 952.98 — Total Pledges and Commitments by Category 9,194.22 3,189.77 Total Pledges and Commitments 12,383.99 Source: Table compiled by (name redacted), African Affa irs Specialist, Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division. Note: Some pledges are conditional or prospective, and data on both pledges and commitments is currently subject to change on a daily basis. In addition to the pledges noted above, numerous countries, including the United States, have made in-kind and other contributions for which no value is specified in available reporting data. The value of the resources that affected countries are devoting to their own tsunami relief and reconstruction are not included above. a. Data sources: U.N. OCHA, Indian Ocean Earthquake-Tsunami 2005, Financial Tracking Tables, March 9, 2005, []; international organization data; and supplementary national government information. Totals shown may differ from the sum of individual entries, due to rounding. A Reuters news report (Reuters, “Nations Pledge Aid after Tsunami Disaster,” Jan. 28, 2005) indicates that some countries may have pledged different amounts than those reported by UN OCHA, the source of the national data reported above. CRS-20 b. Except as noted, the source for all private donation figures is Reuters, “Nations Pledge Aid...,” Jan. 28, 2005. Source for U.S. entry is InterAction, “Disaster Response Relief Barometer,” Mar. 4, 2005, [], which is currently being updated weekly. Source of entries for Italy, Sweden, France, China, and South Korea is BBC News, “Tsunami aid: Who’s giving what,” Jan. 27, 2005; source for Germany is Reuters, “German Private Tsunami Aid Exceeds 475 Mln Euros,” Jan. 25, 2005; and source for Mexico is Nick Cumming-Bruce, “Tsunami aid arriving with rare speed,” International Herald Tribune, March 1, 2005. c. Australia has pledged a larger aid package than the data reported by OCHA suggest. See AusAID, documents under “Indian Ocean Disaster,” notably “Australia’s Response,” and “$1 billion aid package to Indonesia,” on the webpage []. International Donor Conferences On January 6, 2005, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) held an emergency meeting to discuss coordination of international relief efforts and managing logistical obstacles that have delayed the delivery of aid in certain areas.37 A meeting of summit leaders took place in Jakarta on January 6 and focused on increasing donor contributions and coordination of the relief effort.38 A large international donors conference took place on January 11 in Geneva. Early Warning International science ministers finalized plans for a global observing system in Brussels, Belgium, February 15, 2004. That system would be the backbone on which a regional tsunami early warning system for the Indian Ocean would be built. The United States is not expected to provide details of its commitment to the internationally sponsored global tsunami early warning network prior to the convening of the G-8 summit in July 2005. Experts from Indian Ocean countries affected by the December 26, 2004 tsunami and other countries met at the U.N. Interagency Oceanographic Commission (IOC) in Paris, France, March 1-3, 2005, to plan a coordinated tsunami early warning system for the Indian Ocean and to review countries’ financial commitments. The Director of the U.N. International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) chaired the meeting. Situation Report on Countries Affected by the Tsunami The current situation, as of March 18, 2005, in each affected country is described below with brief background descriptions, reports of the damage, and highlights of the emergency response. 37 ASEAN is comprised of Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. 38 “Special ASEAN Meeting Thursday to Coordinate Tsunami Response,” Agence FrancePresse, January 3, 2005. CRS-21 Indonesia39 The northern part of the Indonesian island of Sumatra, especially the northernmost province of Aceh, was closest to the epicenter of the Indian Ocean earthquake. Successive tidal waves of 30 to 50 feet high slammed into Aceh’s west coast of nearly 200 miles. As of the end of February 2005, the Indonesian government estimated over 127,000 killed and over 116,000 missing. Aerial surveys of Aceh’s west coast from Banda Aceh, the provincial capital, southward for about 150 miles revealed near total destruction of towns and villages with many of them underwater. The coastal area was isolated with no aid getting through until January 1, 2005. The same is true of a number of small islands off Sumatra’s west coast. Initial international aid is coming through the reopened Banda Aceh airport and the airport at Medan, a major city south of Aceh. The United States, Australia, and Singapore were supplying the bulk of aid, and non-government humanitarian groups were also active. The initial input of aid brought forth partial recovery in Banda Aceh: the reopening of markets, the restoration of power and water to 40% of the city, and shipments of fuel supplies into the city. Indonesian government efforts to remove massive debris and bury thousands of dead people were making progress, although much remained to be done. Beginning on January 1, U.S. SH-60 Bravo helicopters flying off the U.S. aircraft carrier, Abraham Lincoln, were delivering food and water to the isolated towns and villages down Aceh’s west coast from Banda Aceh. On January 2, U.S. navy helicopters, numbering about 25, flew 27 missions and delivered 80,000 pounds of supplies. Indonesian navy helicopters also were delivering supplies to these towns and villages, but the Indonesian military only has few helicopters in Sumatra. Providing adequate water to the thousands of Acehnese stranded along the west coast has been difficult. Medical treatment of numerous injuries also has been difficult. Many of the injured have to be transported by helicopter to medical facilities at Banda Aceh, which strains the helicopter fleet available. The Indonesian military (TNI) controls the relief supplies at the Banda Aceh and Medan airports. Until January 1, the TNI initially refused to allow foreign relief airplanes to land at Banda Aceh. Indonesian President Susilio Yudhoyono apparently overrode military opposition to foreign relief deliveries. Since then, several TNI commanders have cooperated with American, Australian, and Singaporean military units, and they have praised the U.S. military relief effort. Nevertheless, on January 11 and 12, the Indonesian military and government officials announced restrictions on future foreign relief operations in Aceh. The main restrictions are termination of all foreign military relief operations by March 26; restrictions on plans by U.S. Marines to move significant quantities of aid and manpower into the west coast of Aceh; the establishment of TNI operational control over all foreign relief operations; a requirement that a TNI officer be on board any foreign aircraft engaged in relief; confinement of foreign aid workers to the towns of 39 Prepared by Larry Niksch, Specialist in Asian Affairs, and (name redacted), Analyst in Asian Affairs. CRS-22 Banda Aceh and Meulaboh unless they receive TNI permission to operate elsewhere; and a requirement that aid workers operating outside Banda Aceh and Meulaboh must be accompanied by TNI personnel. U.S. and other foreign militaries began to withdraw in February 2005, and a complete withdrawal likely will occur by the March 26 deadline. The Indonesian government also announced that it would issue a master plan on March 26 to shift the aid effort in Aceh from humanitarian assistance to reconstruction. As part of this, the government disclosed that it was reviewing the presence of foreign non-government groups (NGOs) in Aceh and that it would order some of these to depart on or around March 26. Foreign aid donor countries pledged $1.7 billion in reconstruction aid for Aceh in 2005, and they offered to reschedule Indonesian foreign debt repayments of up to $2 billion. This is on top of $3.4 billion in development aid to Indonesia. Indonesia’s plans to establish relocation centers to initially house 30,000 Acehnese tsunami refugees, then an additional 60,000, remains controversial. The military will have a role in operating the centers. In the past, the military has practiced forced relocation of Acehnese as a counter-insurgency tool. Foreign NGOs are reluctant to be involved in this program. There are an estimated 380,000 refugees in Aceh. The military has admitted that it has continued to carry out operations against Free Aceh insurgents, despite the military’s self-proclaimed cease-fire after December 26. TNI attitudes are governed by an insurgency in the province that has gone on since 1976. Anti-Indonesia forces (the Free Aceh Movement — GAM) seek independence for the province and cite decades of repressive Indonesian rule as justification for their uprising. The Indonesian military (TNI) long has been accused of committing atrocities and other human rights abuses in Aceh and being involved in corrupt practices there. In May 2003, the Indonesian government, under pressure from the TNI, ended a six-month-long cease-fire with the insurgents and declared martial law. The TNI suppressed separatist political activity and reported resumed severe human rights violations. The TNI also banned foreigners from Aceh, including aid workers. The government lifted the ban on foreign aid workers on December 27, 2004; but the restrictions announced on January 11 and 12, 2005, appear motivated, at least in part, by a desire of the TNI to restore Aceh as much as possible to the pre-tsunami situation of closure to foreigners. TNI commanders justify the restrictions as needed to protect aid workers from the GAM and prevent relief supplies from falling into the hands of GAM. However, GAM has declared a cease-fire and asserts that it welcomes the foreign presence. The TNI reportedly has pressed for a reduction of the foreign NGO presence in Aceh after March 26, 2005. The government and the GAM renewed peace talks in February 2005 in Helsinki, Finland. The GAM dropped its demand for independence and proposed “self-rule.” It continued to reject the Indonesian government “special autonomy” plan for Aceh, contending that the plan actually provided for continued centralized rule from Jakarta. Indonesian delegates said they would take the GAM’s proposals to Jakarta and that the Indonesian government would reply at the next round of talks. CRS-23 The TNI also has facilitated the entrance into Aceh of Islamic militant groups, allegedly for relief operations. The TNI provided air transport, provisions, and housing to these groups. One of these groups, the Mujahideen Council of Indonesia (MMI) is viewed by U.S. terrorism experts, such as Zachary Abuza (currently with the U.S. Institute of Peace) as a political front for Jemaah Islamiya, Al Qaeda’s regional terrorist arm in Southeast Asia.40 The TNI’s support of MMI’s entrance into Aceh raises questions regarding the TNI’s relations with and policies toward Islamic terrorist groups. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice certified in February 2005 that Indonesia is cooperating in investigating the killings and wounding of an American teacher in Papua in August 2002. This will end the congressional restriction on Indonesian participation in the IMET program. The Bush Administration has viewed militaryto-military cooperation in tsunami relief as an opportunity to restore full military-tomilitary relations with Indonesia. Sri Lanka41 The Indian Ocean tsunami hit Sri Lanka particularly hard, killing over 31,000. An estimated 40% of those killed in Sri Lanka were children. Between 441,410 and 504,440 were homeless as of mid-January 2005. Of these, an estimated 186,000 are thought to have been taken in by friends and family while some 250,000 were placed in welfare centers and makeshift camps. As of mid-March 2005 over 4,700 people were still missing.42 Tsunami related damages have been estimated at $1.8 billion. Sri Lanka has requested some debt forgiveness and a two-year hold on its $8.82 billion debt.43 In the immediate wake of the disaster, President Bush expressed his condolences to the victims over the “terrible loss of life and suffering.”44 In the aftermath of the tsunami, the State Department issued a travel advisory warning Americans to avoid Sri Lanka.45 The Sri Lankan Ambassador to the United States, Devinda Subasinghe, stated that up to 70% of the Sri Lankan coast was damaged. This differs from Indonesia where only a small percentage of the coast was affected. By January 18 the situation in Sri Lanka had improved significantly and widespread disease had not emerged. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz reportedly observed during 40 Interview with Zachary Abuza, January 13, 2005. Abuza, Jachary. Militant Islam in Southeast Asia. Boulder and London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003. p. 140-158. 41 Prepared by (name redacted), Analyst in Asian Affairs. 42 “The Tsunami Toll,” The Irish Times, March 14, 2005. 43 “State of Play in Tsunami-hit Countries,” Reuters, January 14, 2005. 44 Brian Knowlton, “Officials Gather in Jakarta,” International Herald Tribune, January 6, 2005. 45 Deb Riechman, “Bush Sends Condolences to Asia, Offers Aid,” Associated Press, December 27, 2004. CRS-24 his visit to Sri Lanka that the nation was moving from the relief and rescue stage of operations to the reconstruction and rehabilitation stage.46 The United States Bonhomme Richard Expeditionary Strike Group, which had been in Guam, was ordered to the Bay of Bengal to provide assistance to affected countries. The seven ships in the strike group have 25 helicopters, 2,100 marines and 1,400 sailors which provided assistance. The head of the Pacific Command, Admiral Thomas Fargo, also ordered two ships out of the squadron based in Diego Garcia to provide assistance as well as five pre-positioned ships located in Guam. Each prepositioned ship can store 90,000 gallons of fresh water and produce 36,000 gallons per day.47 The U.S. government has provided $62 million in “emergency food assistance, relief supplies, shelter, water and sanitation, health, livelihoods recovery, psychological and social support, protection and anti-trafficking, logistics and coordination, and cleanup and rehabilitation activities” in Sri Lanka.48 In mid-March, the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers began surveys for signature projects such as the bridge over Arugam Bay, replacing vocational technical schools, and reconstruction of fishing harbors. U.S. assistance in Sri Lanka has also sought to revive the post tsunami economy through micro-finance programs that seek to reach some 30,000 families involved in tourism, textile, fishing, and handicraft industries in tsunami affected areas.49 Of the 33 Americans thought killed by the tsunami, 9 are thought to have died in Sri Lanka.50 Sri Lanka apparently mobilized its limited resources to deal with the disaster in a more effective way than was originally thought likely. In the initial post disaster phase Andrew Natsios, Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development, stated that “I think the Sri Lankans basically are telling us this is so massive, they are being overwhelmed by it.”51 It was estimated on December 30 that some 10,000 to 12,000 Sri Lankans were injured. Sri Lanka’s transportation links to the affected areas collapsed. Rail connections to the south had closed. In the immediate post tsunami period truckers refuse to travel south for fear of another tsunami. Some of the estimated one million land mines set during ongoing Sri Lanka’s civil war — between the government and ethnic Tamil rebels in the north and east — were reportedly unearthed and shifted during the flood. The Tamil rebel group, the 46 “US Official Wolfowitz Visits Tsunami Hit Area in Sri Lanka,” BBC News, January 17, 2005. 47 Marc Grossman, “News Briefing on Indian Ocean Disaster Relief,” Federal Document Clearing House, December 29, 2004 and Ralph Cossa, “U.S. Provides Backbone for Relief Operation,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 4, 2005. 48 “Indian Ocean-Earthquake and Tsunamis,” Agency for International Development, February 8, 2005. 49 “USAID Tsunami /asia_near_east/tsunami/] 50 51 Reconstruction,” [ “US Estimates Tsunami Killed 33 Americans,” Washington Post, February 9, 2005. Marc Grossman, “News Briefing on Indian Ocean Disaster Relief,” Federal Document Clearing House, December 29, 2004. CRS-25 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), complained that aid is not getting through to Tamil areas.52 The Sri Lankan army has a fleet of only 12 helicopters.53 By January 18, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz traveled to Sri Lanka and observed Sri Lanka’s recovery efforts and reportedly stated that Sri Lanka may now be at the point where it no longer needs U.S. military assistance. U.S. helicopters conducted 1,500 disaster relief missions across the region. In connection with secessionist strife in Sri Lanka and Indonesia, Wolfowitz also remarked that “... hopefully they realize the stakes for which they’re fighting are trivial in comparison.”54 U.S. military assistance has reportedly stayed away from Tamil areas of Sri Lanka in an effort to avoid the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. India has reportedly been providing assistance to Tamil areas of Sri Lanka.55 As the relief effort evolves, it has moved to address issues of protection of survivors and to providing assistance for psychological social program elements. A protest in Trincomalee in March 2005 attested to discontent amongst some Sri Lankans with the lack of coordination and slow distribution of disaster relief assistance.56 The LTTE has complained that aid has not been getting through to areas under their control.57 Sri Lanka has reportedly been pledged over one billion dollars in disaster relief but only a small amount of that money had been delivered by March 2005.58 By mid-March 2005, the LTTE had reportedly agreed in principle to a deal brokered by the Norwegians that would establish a joint mechanism for distribution of aid. The government’s coalition partner, the JVP, reportedly greeted the proposal with the threat that they could withdraw their support from the government if the LTTE are given any say in how relief assistance is distributed.59 The two sectors of the Sri Lankan economy most affected are tourism and fisheries. Hundreds of hotels are damaged or destroyed. In one poll, 30% of tourists said that they were deterred from visiting tsunami affected areas.60 Tourism accounts for 11% of the Sri Lankan economy. It is expected that there will be a 8% drop in tourism this year there.61 Sri Lanka’s fishing fleet in the affected areas has been badly damaged. Sri Lanka harvests a reported 300,000 tons of fish annually for 52 “After the Tsunami the Rising Cost,” The Age, December 30, 2004. 53 Paddy Murphy, “Call for Choppers,” The Australian, December 30, 2004. 54 Joss White, “Wolfowitz Cites Sri Lanka’s Progress on Reconstruction,” The Washington Post, 1/18/05. 55 “State of Play in Tsunami-hit Countries,” Reuters, January 14, 2005. 56 “Sri Lankan Tsunami Victims Stage Demonstrations,” Xinhua News Agency, March 14, 2005. 57 “Rebels Accept Draft Agreement,” Radio Australia, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, March 14, 2005. 58 “Strike Grips Northeastern Sri Lankan Town,” Agence France Presse, March 14, 2005. 59 “Lanka Aid,” Organization of Asia-Pacific News, March 13, 2005. 60 “Tsunami Effect Lingers on,” The Hindustan Times, March 11, 2005. 61 “Survey Names Countries Likely Hurt by Tsunami,” Thai News Service, March 14, 2005. CRS-26 domestic consumption. Much of this is caught by subsistence fishermen.62 Sri Lanka announced that it is postponing the South Asian games that it had planned to host in August 2005 in order that it may focus on reconstruction efforts. The government has announced a rural entrepreneurship program to help the economy recovery.63 One challenge facing farmers in affected areas is the salination of their fields due to salt water innundation. It is not clear whether the fresh water resources are sufficient to address this problem.64 The Sri Lankan rupee began to strengthen in mid-March 2005 on reports that tsunami aid pledges were beginning to reach Sri Lanka.65 The Sri Lankan government has issued guidelines for construction near the coast. Residential and commercial construction must be at least 100 meters from the coast in the western and southern coastal zones. In the north and east it must be 200 meters from the coast. The LTTE have established a buffer of between 300 and 500 meters in areas under their control. This has created problems because the government reportedly does not have sufficient land to offer to those displaced from this coastal zone.66 Sri Lanka is a constitutional democracy with relatively high educational and social standards.67 The country’s political, social, and economic development has been seriously constrained by two decades of ethnic conflict between the majority Sinhalese and minority Tamil ethnic groups. Since 1983, a separatist war costing some 64,000 lives has been waged against government forces by the LTTE, which has been seeking to establish a separate state in the Tamil-dominated areas of the north and east. Though Sri Lanka lost fewer people than Indonesia, it lost them out of a smaller population. Sri Lanka lost over 30,000 out of a total population of approximately 20 million while Indonesia’s losses are out of a population of over 220 million. Further, Sri Lanka suffered destruction on approximately 70% of its coast while the area affected in Indonesia was much more localized. India68 As of January 18, 2004, India is believed to have suffered up to 16,000 deaths and $2.2 billion in financial losses as a result of the Indian Ocean tsunami.69 Waves 62 Amy Waldman and James Brooke, Disaster’s Damage to Economies may be Minor,” The New York Times, January 3, 2005. 63 “Sri Lanka Economy Will Be Revamped,” Xinhua News, March 13, 2005. 64 Gracia Sarmiento, “Salt Water Hurting Tsunami Affected Farms,” Dow Jones, March 13, 2005. 65 “Sri Lankan Rupee Firms,” Reuters, March 14, 2005. 66 “How Aid Efforts are Helping Townspeople to Rebuild,” National Public Radio, February 20, 2005. 67 For additional information see CRS Report RL31707, Sri Lanka: Background and U.S. Relations, by (name redacted). 68 69 Prepared by (name redact ed), Analyst in Asian Affairs. “India Tsunami Costs ‘Hit $1.6 Billion,’” BBC News, January 7, 2005. On January 13, (continued...) CRS-27 12-14 feet high struck India’s eastern coast approximately three hours after the first tremor. Many or most of those killed in the populous southeastern state of Tamil Nadu reportedly were women and children.70 The city of Nagapattinam, a fishing community some 150 miles south of Madras (Chennai), was devastated by the ocean surge which advanced the shoreline up to 100 meters inland along the Tamil Nadu coast. (USAID officials reported tsunami-related destruction in Tamil Nadu more than one kilometer inland.) Nagapattinam alone eventually may account for up to 20,000 deaths, and more than 650,000 Tamil Nadu residents are said to have been displaced or otherwise affected by the tsunami.71 The southernmost of India’s Andaman and Nicobar Islands sit only 80 miles from the earthquake epicenter in the Bay of Bengal. Some 30,000 residents of the archipelago lived on the nearly flat island of Car Nicobar, where an Indian air force base was completely submerged. Car Nicobar alone may account for up to one-third of deaths in the remote archipelago; one report claims that 12 of the island’s 15 villages were “obliterated” by the tsunami.72 Severe flooding in all affected regions has contaminated water systems and, combined with the existence of many corpses floating in coastal areas, raised concerns that lethal waterborne diseases such as cholera and diarrhea may become epidemic.73 The Tamil Nadu economy is heavily reliant on marine product exports and is expected to suffer major losses with the destruction of tens of thousands of fishing boats and nets. Shipping came to a virtual standstill at the Madras port (south India’s largest), and the region’s tourist industry has been devastated by physical damage and booking cancellations. Madras’s 8-mile beach, said to be the world’s second-longest, has been nearly deserted since December 26.74 India was considered by many to have had a well established disaster management system. The United States has been engaged with Indian in disaster training and technical assistance through USAID for some years.75 However, numerous critics of the Indian relief effort have spoken out in 2005. At least one United Nations expert called the recent disaster a “wake-up call”for Indian planners 69 (...continued) the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs was reporting 10,672 Indians confirmed dead and another 5,711 missing. 70 T.S. Subramanian, “Killer Waves,” Frontline (Madras), January 14, 2005. 71 S. Anand, “The Big Churn,” Outlook India (Delhi), December 30, 2004; USAID Fact Sheet #7, FY2005, January 2, 2005. 72 Pankaj Sekhsaria, “Andaman’s Agony,” Frontline (Madras), January 14, 2005; Janaki Kremmer, “No easy Access For Remote Islands,” Christian Science Monitor, January 4, 2005. 73 “India Turns Down Foreign Relief Aid,” ANSA English Media Service, December 29, 2004; “Tsunami-Hit India Struggles to Channel Flood of Aid to Needy,” Agence France Presse, January 2, 2005. 74 S. Anand, “The Big Churn,” Outlook India (Delhi), December 30, 2004; “Tsunami Washes Away Tourism,” Times of India (Delhi), December 27, 2004; Chris Tomlinson, “World’s Second-Longest Beach, Center of Madras Life, Abandoned After Tsunami,” Associated Press Newswires, January 5, 2004. 75 Marc Grossman, “News Briefing on Indian Ocean Disaster Relief,” Federal Document Clearing House, December 29, 2004. CRS-28 who allegedly failed to learn from past experience, and Indian Red Cross officials spoke of “chaotic” relief management and the “hijacking”of aid supplies by government workers in Port Blair, the Andaman and Nicobar capital. A Hong Kongbased human rights group described India’s relief efforts as “pathetic,” specifying lack of interagency coordination and caste discrimination as key problems. New York-based Human Rights Watch itself highlighted inequitable aid distribution and urged the Indian government to do more to ensure that the Dalit (so-called untouchable) community was not discriminated against in disaster-stricken areas.76 Following the tsunami, the Indian government immediately released $115 million for the National Contingency Relief Fund. For some days after the disaster, New Delhi did not request international assistance and turned down emergency aid offers from the United States, Russia, Japan, and Israel, saying that indigenous capabilities are sufficient. Later, the Indian government did request long-term rehabilitation aid from both the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. As of January 15, 2005, USAID’s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance had committed just above $3.1 million for emergency relief activities in India.77 More than 5,000 Indian navy personnel used 27 ships, 19 helicopters, and six naval aircraft to deliver many hundreds of tons of relief supplies. The Indian prime minister has promised a payment of approximately $2,300 to the next of kin of each of those killed. India also has pledged $22 million in disaster aid to Sri Lanka and $2 million for Maldives and dispatched several naval ships to Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Indonesia. 78 According to the external affairs minister, New Delhi had disbursed $250 million on relief and rehabilitation efforts in India through January 4.79 76 Rajesh Moudgil, “‘A Wake-Up Call for India,” Hindustan Times (Delhi), January 2, 2005; “Tsunami-Hit India Struggles to Channel Flood of Aid to Needy,” Agence France Presse, January 2, 2005; “Aid to Indian Islands ‘Hijacked,’” BBC News, January 13, 2005; “Rights Body Says India’s Tsunami Relief Efforts ‘Pathetic,’” Agence France Presse, January 10, 2005; “India: End Caste Bias in Tsunami Relief,” Human Rights Watch Press Release, January 14, 2005. See also K.P.S. Gill, “Combined Muddled Group,” Outlook India (Delhi), January 14, 2005. 77 World Bank Press Release, January 11, 2005; USAID Fact Sheet #20, FY2005, January 15, 2005. Some observers believe that New Delhi’s reliance on indigenous capabilities and sizeable aid contributions to neighboring states grow at least partly from a desire to have India seen as a major and self-sufficient power. India’s rejection of external aid brought criticism from some quarters and reportedly has caused skepticism about motives among some diplomats. At least one report suggested that a U.S. military presence in Sri Lanka was being viewed by New Delhi as a symbolic intrusion into India’s sphere of influence (“Post-Tsunami India’s Image Rises Globally,” Hindustan Times (Delhi), January 5, 2005; Edward Luce, “India Aims to Be Part of the Solution,” Financial Times (London), January 6, 2005; “US-India Struggle For Control in Disaster Zone,” Telegraph (Calcutta), January 4, 2005). 78 “Earthquake and Tsunamis Wreak Devastation in Indian Ocean Region,” Embassy of India Press Release; “The Indian Relief Effort,” Embassy of India Press Release. 79 “Statement by External Affairs Minister Shri K. Natwar Singh at the Special Meeting of Leaders Convened by ASEAN in the Aftermath of the Earthquake and Tsunami,” Embassy of India Press Release, January 6, 2005. CRS-29 In early January, the Tamil Nadu government was reporting that 412 relief camps had been established and held more than 300,000 people (at least 500,000 of the state’s citizens had been evacuated). That government also will provide special relief packages to families suffering loss of homes. By January 17, 41 relief camps were still hosting about 44,000 citizens.80 Much of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands are off-limits to foreigners due to the presence of military facilities and to protect the region’s aboriginal tribes. International aid agencies have requested access to the islands, where relief efforts are hampered by the destruction of most of the islands’ jetties. Emergency crews there focused on burying the dead to prevent epidemics (it is Hindu custom to cremate the dead).81 India is the world’s second most populous country with nearly 1.1 billion residents. The U.N. Development Program’s 2004 Human Development Report assigns India a ranking of 127 out of 177 world countries, a status comparable to that of Morocco or Cambodia. Despite the existence of widespread and serious poverty, many observers believe that India’s long-term economic potential is tremendous, and the current growth rate of the Indian economy (8.2% for the year ending July 2004) is amongst the highest in the world. The estimated gross domestic product in 2004 was just above $3 trillion, or $2,900 per capita (both figures in purchasing power parity terms).82 India was allocated about $177 million in U.S. assistance for FY2004 and FY2005 combined, along with another $65 million in food aid. India has recently dealt with a major disaster, an earthquake that struck the western Gujarat state in January 2001, killing some 20,000 persons, injuring another 200,000, and leaving nearly one million homeless. New Delhi reportedly intends to purchase a $29 million tsunami warning system to be functional in 2007. Some observers believe that such a purchase would be unwise, given the rarity of tsunamis in the region.83 Indian administrators continue to receive harsh criticism for perceived interference with relief efforts in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, interference that allegedly has caused considerable and unnecessary suffering for tsunami victims there.84 80 Government of Tamil Nadu, “Rescue and Relief Operations” at []. 81 “Foreign NGOs Seek Andamans Access,” BBC News, January 3, 2005. 82 C.I.A. World Factbook 2004; UNDP Human Development Report 2004. 83 “India to Install Tsunami System,” Asia Pulse (Sydney), January 4, 2005; T.V.R. Shenoy, “How Not to Respond to a Tsunami,” Indian Express (Delhi), January 13, 2005. 84 Colin Gonsalves, “The Deadly Bureaucracy in the Andamans,” Indian Express (Bombay), January 26, 2005. CRS-30 Thailand85 Six provinces on the western coast of southern Thailand, particularly the Phang Nga province and the resort islands of Phuket and Phi Phi, were badly hit by sea surges stemming from the underwater quake. Over 5,300 dead have been identified and over 3,000 remain missing, most of whom are presumed dead.86 Officials said that about half of the dead were foreign vacationers, many from Europe. Many oceanfront properties, particularly hotels, were destroyed in the wave. Compared to other affected nations, however, the infrastructure in Thailand was left relatively unscathed: the regional electricity grid and telecommunication network continued to function, and the transportation system and water supply in Phuket were largely unaffected. The emergency response in Thailand was praised by the international community. United Nations and Australian relief agency officials described effective and rapid coordination of grass roots relief teams to distribute supplies and provide first aid. Some credited Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s strong political authority to command the military and police forces and his hands-on leadership. Thaksin has also come out strongly in favor of establishing a tsunami alert system in cooperation with other regional governments. Scattered press reports initially accused government officials of declining to evacuate the island despite receiving a warning, based partially on fears of hurting the tourism industry.87 Such criticism has largely subsided, however, and Thaksin’s popularity ratings have increased based on his leadership in the wake of the disaster. On February 7, 2005, Thaksin was elected to a second term. The diplomatic and logistical challenge of the disaster in Thailand was different from the other affected countries. Because at least 36 nationalities were represented among the victims, many consulates were directly involved in the tasks of identifying the dead. Sweden was the hardest hit, with up to 1,900 missing initially. Other high missing national tolls, counted one week after the disaster, were Germany (730), Austria (500), the United Kingdom (over 400) and Italy (330).88 The Thai police took charge of a massive effort to identify all the victims using DNA samples, with the cooperation of several international teams of forensic specialists, including Chinese labs and an American company responsible for caring for those remains that needed to be repatriated. Over 4,000 bodies were exhumed from their original burial in order to ensure that all bodies would be identified using the standard set by 85 Prepared by (name redacted), Analyst in Asian Affairs and (name redacted), Specialist in Asian Affairs. 86 CNN News. January 13, 2005; U.S. Agency for International Development, Indian Ocean — Earthquake and Tsunamis (Fact Sheet #36, February 22, 2005). 87 “Warning Rejected to Protect Tourism,” The Nation. December 28, 2004. 88 “Hopes Fade on Identifying Missing Foreigners,” Washington Post. January 2, 2005. CRS-31 Interpol.89 The Thai Public Health Ministry expected that all bodies of foreign nationals would be identified and repatriated by July 2005.90 Thailand was the logistics hub for much of the U.S. and international relief effort. U.S. relief operations by air and sea for the entire region were directed out of Thailand’s Utapao air base and Sattahip naval base. Thailand’s government immediately granted full U.S. access to the bases following the disaster. Lt. Gen. Robert R. Blackman, the overall American military commander in Okinawa, headed the mission in Utapao, coordinating with his OFTA counterpart. Representatives from Japan, Singapore, the U.N., the World Food Program, and the World Health Organization also worked out of Utapao. A full DART team was stationed in Bangkok. Initially, the U.S. military provided about 20 cargo planes, tanker aircraft, and search and rescue planes, flown to Thailand from Japan and Guam. P-3 surveillance aircraft conducted survey operations, including search-and-rescue efforts, and cargo planes shuttled supplies to shelter the living and dry ice to preserve the dead from Bangkok to affected areas.91 Bangkok was the first stop by Secretary of State Colin Powell and Florida Governor Jeb Bush on their January 2005 tour of countries hit by the disaster. In February 2005, former Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton visited Thailand and other countries affected by the tsunami. Beyond the immediate concern of dealing with the dead and injured, Thailand faced a blow to its tourism industry. The industry brings in about $8 billion annually, nearly 6% of Thailand’s GDP. Because the tsunami struck at the peak of tourist season in Thailand, millions of visitors cancelled their plans, immediately costing operators about $750 million, analysts estimate.92 Many observers are optimistic, however, that the industry will rebound quickly, as only about 5-10% of Thailand’s hotels were affected and rebuilding is expected to be swift. The Thai government reassured investors that it intended to spend $768 million to repair infrastructure in the area. The resort of Phuket is said to be recuperating quickly.93 Thailand is a long-time military ally with ongoing relevance to U.S. logistical operations in Iraq, a key country in the war against terrorism in Southeast Asia, and a significant trade and economic partner. A proposed U.S.-Thailand Free Trade Agreement (FTA) is currently being negotiated. Despite differences on Burma policy and human rights issues, shared economic and security interests have long provided the basis for U.S.-Thai cooperation. In FY2003 and 2004, Thailand received over $20 million in economic and security assistance from the United States. 89 “MASS EXHUMATIONS: ID Operation Starts Again From Scratch,” The Nation. January 14, 2005. 90 Thai News Service, March 14, 2005. 91 “US Begins Shuttle of Aid to Victims Along Thai Coast,” New York Times. January 1, 2005. 92 93 “Thailand Death Toll Could Reach 2,000,” December 28, 2004. Stuart Wasserman, “Many Tsunami-Ravaged Beaches Making Speedy Recovery,” Miami Herald, March 13, 2005. CRS-32 Burma94 In contrast to other governments affected by the Indian Ocean earthquake and tidal waves, the Burmese government — as of December 29 — had given out little information of the effects on Burma. An official from an international aid agency told the Agence France Presse on December 27, on condition of anonymity, that government officials were confirming 36 dead. The government subsequently issued a figure of 53 dead. On December 28, the Agence France Presse cited at least 90 killed but cited no source. The source apparently was information over the internet websites of anti-government groups. The international aid agency official speculated that the actual death toll is “far greater,” given the trajectory of the tidal waves and the closeness of Burma’s Indian Ocean coastline to the epicenter of the earthquake. The London Sunday Telegraph (reprinted in the Washington Times, January 2, 2005) quoted Burmese fishermen describing a major loss of life on lower Burma’s coastline just north of the hard-hit Thai coast. However, U.N. officials stated on January 6 that the death toll in Burma was relatively small. The Burmese government had not issued an appeal for international aid, as of January 3, 2005. U.N. officials, Doctors Without Borders, and the International Committee for the Red Cross have sought government permission to visit the lower Burma coastline. The issue of aid is complicated by the heavy economic sanctions imposed by the United States and the European Union on Burma because of the politically repressive policies of the military-dominated Burmese government. United Nations officials in Rangoon stated on December 27 that the United Nations was prepared to conduct relief operations. The government likely would accept humanitarian and reconstruction aid from China, Burma’s main international supporter, and from regional countries like Malaysia, Singapore, and India. The government also might accept humanitarian aid from Japan, which has provided low levels of such aid despite sanctions on Japanese developmental aid and investment. However, the government likely would not allow any sizeable presence of foreign aid workers. It is also highly unlikely that the government would ask for or accept aid from the United States. A number of experts on Burma have stated that the views of Burmese military officials toward the United States have become very negative because of the absence of a positive U.S. response to the government’s release from house arrest of opposition leader, Aung Sann Suu-kyi, in 1992 and the U.S. Congress’ enactment of a total ban on Burmese imports to the United States in July 1993 in response to the re-arrest of Aung Sann Suu-kyi. The Maldives95 The tsunami also hit the island-state of The Maldives. Initial reports put the death toll at 32. This was increased to 55 on December 29, to 80 by January 3rd, and to 86 by January 14th, 2005. Some 14,900 were displaced by the disaster. Many outlying islands are only one meter above sea level. 10,000 persons were evacuated off 13 low lying islands. About half of the island of Male was covered in two feet of 94 Prepared by Larry Niksch, Specialist in Asian Affairs. 95 Prepared by (name redacted), Analyst in Asian Affairs. CRS-33 water which closed the airport.96 All of the Maldives is below 8 feet in elevation. Reports indicate that a 10 - 15 foot wave washed over some parts of the Maldives leaving houses smashed, wells contaminated, and power and communications infrastructure inoperable. The Maldives’ outlying coral reefs reportedly protected many of the islands from the tsunami. Nevertheless the government estimates that reconstruction will cost $1 billion or the rough equivalent of two years’ gross domestic product.97 Tourism accounts for 30% of GDP in the Maldives. Parliamentary elections planned for December 31 were postponed.98 It appears that the tsunami has not adversely affected the coral reefs around the Maldives which are a key draw for tourists.99 An American civil/military team was in the Maldives on the 3rd of January 2005 to make an assessment of the damage in preparation for U.S. assistance. An initial estimate called for 1,000 military personnel to be sent to the Sri Lanka/Maldives area to provide disaster assistance.100 On January 17th two military supply ships that had been providing assistance to Sri Lanka were sent to assist the Maldives. Though the Maldives managed to have a relatively low number of fatalities, its reconstruction will be particularly difficult due to its geography. The Republic of the Maldives is a micro state of some 1,200 islands, approximately 200 of which are inhabited by a total population of roughly 310,000. The island state has less than half the land area of Washington DC and is situated in the Indian Ocean off the southwest tip of India. In 1887, the Maldives became a British protectorate. The islands became independent in 1965. The capital, Male, has approximately 70,000 residents. The overall population growth rate is about 3%. The Maldives has a 97% literacy rate. There are four main ethnic groups; Sinhalese, Dravidian, Arab and African and the main religion is Sunni Muslim. The current president of the Maldives, Maumoon Gayoom, assumed office in 1978.101 He was elected to a sixth five-year term in 2003 under a system where the voters vote for or against a single candidate selected by the Maldivian parliament known as the Majlis. The President appoints 8 of the 50 members of the Majlis.102 The Republic of the Maldives is a member of the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) as well as the British Commonwealth.103 96 “Americans Told to Avoid Travel to Sri Lanka and Thailand,” Agence France Presse, December 27, 2004. 97 James Hookway, “Tourism Thrives in the Maldives,” The Wall Street Journal, January 3, 2004. 98 “Quake Prompts Enormous Aid Effort,” BBC News, December 28, 2004. 99 Coral Reefs, Islands Saved Tsunami hit Maldives,” Channel News Asia, March 13, 2005. 100 “Ghost Island of the Maldives,” The Australian, January 4, 2005. 101 “Maldives Leader Names Ministers,” BBC News, September 1, 2004. 102 “Country Profile: The Maldives,” BBC News, August 14, 2004. 103 “The Maldives: Introductory Survey,” in The Europa World Yearbook 2004, (London: Europa Publications, Taylor and Francis Group, 2004). See also “Maldives: Quarterly (continued...) CRS-34 Diego Garcia104 The American military base on Diego Garcia, located south of the Maldives, was one of the few places in the Indian Ocean that did receive warning of the tsunami waves. The base reportedly emerged from the event without major damage. Evidently the configuration of the ocean floor near Diego Garcia played a role in lessening the effect of the tsunami there. The base reportedly received a warning because the Navy is on the contact list of the Pacific Warning Center.105 Malaysia106 Malaysia includes the Malay peninsula in the west and to the east, and Sabah and Sarawak on the north of the island of Borneo. Malaysia has a population of some 23 million. Malaysia was spared the devastation wrecked on Indonesia as it was shielded from the tsunami by Sumatra. Despite this, some 68 were reported killed and 183 injured by the tsunami in Penang and in Kedah, Malaysia.107 A fuel loading facility on the island of Langkawi in north western Malaysia was reportedly damaged in the tsunami.108 Malaysia opened its airspace and airports for international relief efforts. Malaysia also raised 4.7 million rupiah for disaster relief by December 29.109 Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi expressed his condolences and proposed greater regional cooperation to deal with natural disasters.110 Bangladesh111 While Bangladesh has been devastated by past cyclones it was largely spared destruction from the most recent tsunami. The Bangladesh port of Chittagong was hit by large waves which caused flooding in 30 districts and left 2 dead as of December 29.112 Bangladesh lost 300,000 in a cyclone in 1970 and a further 139,000 103 (...continued) Forecast Analysis,” Global Insight, [] 104 Prepared by (name redacted), Analyst in Asian Affairs. 105 M. Kayal and M. Wald, “Tracking Tsunamis: Why was There No Warning?” The New York Times, December 29, 2004. 106 Prepared by (name redacted), Analyst in Asian Affairs. 107 “After the Tsunami the Rising Cost,” The Age, December 30, 2004 and “Malaysia Economic and Corporate News Summary,” AFX, January 3, 2005. 108 “Asian Tsunami Causes Patchy Damage,” WMRC Daily, December29, 2004. 109 “Malaysians Do Care,” New Straits Times, December 29, 2004. 110 “PM Urges Cooperation in Providing Information,” New Straits Times, December 29, 2004. 111 112 Prepared by (name redacted), Analyst in Asian Affairs. “After the Tsunami the Rising Cost,” The Age, December 30, 2004. CRS-35 to another storm in 1991.113 Bangladesh is currently working with other South Asian countries to set a new date for the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation summit which was to be held on January 9-11 in Dhaka. Bangladesh has joined other SAARC countries to provide assistance to Sri Lanka and the Maldives. It is also hoped that the upcoming SAARC summit can provide further assistance for those affected by the disaster.114 Somalia115 Tsunami waves reached Somalia about seven hours after hitting nations in South Asia, about 4,000 miles away. Several Somali coastal towns and roads, notably in northeastern and central coastal zones, were flooded and substantially destroyed by the tsunamis. Thousands of boats and shelters were destroyed, severely damaged, and numerous persons were reported missing. U.N. and news agencies report that between 150 and 298 Somalis died as a result of the tsunamis.116 The northern Hafun peninsula was among the worst-affected areas. The U.N.-affiliated World Food Program (WFP) sent an assessment team to the coast of the northeastern Puntland region, and OCHA led a preliminary air-based December 30 mission to assess coastal zone tsunami damage. U.N. officials estimated that about 54,000 Somalis were directly affected by the tsunamis and that about 18,000 households may require emergency aid. The WFP has sent over 277 tons of food to the affected region, where the World Health Organization deployed three emergency kits with a capacity to serve 30,000 persons’ basic needs for three months. The Kenya-based Somali transitional government has reportedly made unconfirmed, possibly exaggerated claims that over 1,000 Somalis may have died as a result of the tsunamis, and announced plans to send its own assessment team to Somalia. OCHA on January 3, reported that international tsunami-related contributions to Somalia included $50,000 from the United States, to be delivered via UNICEF, and $100,000 from Saudi Arabia, contributed through the Society of the Red Cross. Some existing U.N. drought-related and humanitarian aid was being re-prioritized to meet emerging tsunami-related needs. Somali government officials issued informal appeals for tsunami-related food and medical aid. According to a January 3 news report, a total of 24 countries had pledged to send relief aid to Somalia, but such aid had not arrived, according to a Somali presidential spokesman.117 U.S. officials planned to respond to Somali government requests for tsunami relief aid by reviewing U.N. assessments and, if aid is warranted, to channel any U.S. aid through U.N. agencies. However, if needs prove severe and U.S. officials view the delivery of U.S. bilateral emergency aid as necessary, a U.S. emergency declaration could be 113 “Major Natural Disasters,” US News and World Report, January 10, 2005. 114 “SAARC Urged to Organize Help for Tsunami-battered Countries,” Xinhua News Agency, January 5, 2005. 115 The remainder of the individual country entries were prepared by (name redacted), African Affairs Specialist. 116 117 “Somali Tsunami Victim Toll Rises,” BBC News, January 5, 2005. Rodrique Ngowi, “Somalia still waiting for food, shelter, medical help for victims of the tsunamis,” Associated Press, Jan. 3, 2005. CRS-36 made by the U.S. embassy in Nairobi. German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder has suggested that a moratorium on debt owed by Somalia to creditor nations be discussed at a January 2005 meeting of the Paris Club of official creditors. When questioned about the proposal, U.S. officials, including President Bush, publicly did not reject it, although they did not address it in detail.118 Somalia, a northeastern African country of about 8.3 million, has been wracked by intermittent civil war and armed banditry since the ouster of President Siad Barre in 1991. Since then, it has lacked an effective central government, and remains politically fractious and dangerous due to the activities of diverse armed groups. It is divided into three semi-autonomous regions: Somaliland, in the northwest and Puntland in the north, both self-governed regions; and southern and central Somalia, which is divided into localities dominated by local clans, warlords, and business interests. Somalia is undergoing a process of peace making and state reconstruction. In August 2004, key warlords and politicians formed a new parliament, which appointed President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed in October 2004. U.S., international and Somali government access to southern Somalia is severely limited due to insecurity. U.S. interests are represented by the U.S. mission in Nairobi, Kenya. Conventional, non-tsunami-related U.S. assistance to Somalia focuses on bolstering the capacity of civil society organizations and institutions related to local governance and adherence to the rule of law; enhancing local economic opportunities by backing a variety of projects focused on basic education, infrastructure rehabilitation, and alternative energy use; and support for healthcare delivery. U.S. Economic Support Fund monies, not shown in the aid table in the appendix, have also helped finance lengthy negotiations aimed at forming a central Somali government. The bulk of U.S. aid is delivered in the form of a various emergency, supplemental, and developmental food-related and nutrition programs. H.R. 4818, the foreign operations FY2005 appropriations bill, enacted as P.L. 108-447, did not designate a specific appropriation for Somalia, which is not mentioned in the House report (H.Rept. 108-599) or conference report (H.Rept. 108-792) associated with H.R. 4818. The Senate report (S.Rept. 108-346) that accompanied S. 2812, a Senate foreign operations FY2005 appropriations bill, later amended in relation to the passage of H.R. 4818, stated that “[t]he Committee is concerned that the budget request for assistance for Somalia under the DA account is only $986,000. The Committee requests USAID and the State Department to take a more active role to assist local efforts to promote peace and development in that country and recommends that not less than $5,000,000 in DA be provided to support secular education and strengthen civil society, particularly in Somaliland and Puntland.” 118 Reuters, “Schroeder urges debt relief for Indonesia, Somalia,” December 29, 2004; Agence France Presse, “US ‘open’ to debt relief for tsunami victims,” December 29, 2004; White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “President Discusses Support for Earthquake and Tsunami Victims,” December 29, 2004. CRS-37 Kenya The coast of Kenya, an east African country of about 32.02 million persons, experienced tsunami waves that destroyed boats, damaged coastal properties, and reportedly killed one swimmer, a tourist. More deaths may have been averted because authorities closed coastal beaches and issued public precautions before and after the tsunami waves hit the country. Kenya has not requested tsunami-related aid. The international Committee of the Red Cross plans to ship at least 105 tons of relief supplies to Sri Lanka from Nairobi, where the organization stocks such supplies.119 Tanzania In Dar es Salaam, the commercial capital of Tanzania, an east African country of about 36.59 million persons, ten young swimmers were reported killed as a result of tsunami waves. Additional persons may have died in a capsized boat. A tanker reportedly ruptured an oil pipeline as a result of the tsunamis. Tanzanian officials issued public warnings about possible further tsunami waves. Tanzania has not requested tsunami-related aid.120 Seychelles Seychelles, a group of Indian Ocean islands northeast of Madagascar off the eastern African coast, sustained tsunami-related coastal floods. These destroyed two bridges, some sewer and water systems, and caused extensive damage to a port, power lines, schools, real properties, boats, and vehicles. Total damage in Seychelles is worth an estimated $23.5 million. Three tsunami-related fatalities occurred. Seychelles may formally request tsunami-related international aid, likely from the United States, according to State Department officials.121 Madagascar A tsunami wave flooded a coastal village in southeastern Madagascar, a large Indian Ocean island off the coast of Mozambique, causing about 1,200 people to become homeless. Madagascar, which regularly experiences extensive typhoonrelated natural disasters, has not requested tsunami-related aid.122 119 BBC, “Many missing...”; Voice of America, “Tidal Wave Hits Somalia, Kenya,” Dec. 27, 2004; Kenyan KBC radio, “Kenya sets up “crisis desk” to monitor tidal waves,” BBC Monitoring Newsfile, Dec. 27 2004; Adrian Blomfield, “Evacuation from beaches cut deaths by hundreds in Kenya East Africa,” The Daily Telegraph, Dec. 29 2004; Voice of America, “Government Officials to Travel Around Somalia to Assess Damage,” Dec. 28, 2004. 120 BBC, “Many missing...”; Pflanz, “Waves kill...”; Tom Maliti, “U.N. Struggles to Get Aid to Somali Town,” Associated Press, Dec. 29 2004. 121 BBC, “Many missing...”; Pflanz, “Waves kill...”; The Irish Examiner,” Seychelles Caught in Tsunami’s Path,” Dec. 27, 2004; State Department communications. 122 Mohamed Ali Bile, “Waves kill 38 Somalis, UN fears toll may rise,” Reuters, Dec. 27 2004. CRS-38 Mauritius Damage to property, boats, and a weather station were reported in Mauritius, where tsunami-related coastal evacuation orders were issued. Mauritius has not requested tsunami-related aid.123 Reunion (French Territory) The BBC reports that tsunamis damaged about 15 fishing vessels.124 South Africa South Africa reported unusually high tides, believed to be tsunami-related, in which a man perished.125 Issues for Congress126 Tsunami Aid and Reconstruction Issues Burdensharing. A day after the south Asia crisis, U.N. Under-SecretaryGeneral for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Jan Egeland, commenting on contributions by the wealthy nations to disasters in general in 2004, stated that some developed nations were being “stingy” with aid. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, although the United States is the world’s largest provider of foreign assistance, it often is one of the lowest contributors in per capita terms amongst the world’s most wealthy countries. The United States has been reported as giving 0.14 percent of GNP in international development assistance as compared to Norway’s 0.92 percent contribution.127 USAID Director Andrew Natsios has refuted Egeland’s statement, saying that the aforementioned data was only for development assistance and did not include disaster relief.128 In the first days after the tsunami, the Bush Administration was criticized by some observers for displaying a lack of urgency in its initial response. President 123 Agence France Presse, “Over 100 feared dead in Somalia from killer Asian tidal waves,” Dec. 27, 2004; State Department personal communication. 124 BBC, “Many missing...” 125 Cape Argus, “Somalia asks for UN help,” Dec. 29, 2004. 126 Prepared by (name redacted), Mark Manyin, (name redacted), Larry Niksch, (name redacted), (name redacted), and Wayne Morri ssey, Senior Research Assistant. 127 John Harris and Robin Wright, “Aid Grows Amid Remarks About President’s Absence,” The Washington Post, December 29, 2004. 128 December 29, 2004 Interview on the PBS TV Program, The News Hour. For more information on donor contribution comparisons, see CRS Report RS22032, Foreign Aid: Understanding Data Used to Compare Donors, by (name redacted). CRS-39 Bush came under criticism for waiting three days before publicly speaking about the disaster during his vacation in Crawford, Texas.129 The subsequent increase of U.S. economic and logistical assistance, along with the dispatch of Secretary of State Powell and Florida Governor Bush to the region a week after the tsunami, may help to change this perception. In previous disasters, pledges made by governments have not always resulted in actual contributions, the Bam earthquake of December 2003 is but one example raised by the United Nations. Experts are concerned that while billions of dollars have been pledged to help the victims of the tsunami disaster, there is no guarantee that these pledges will be honored. It also cannot be assumed that the funds represent new money as it may previously have been allocated elsewhere. Some are also concerned about funding priorities and resources for other disaster areas and the very real possibility of international donor fatigue. It will take time for a more complete picture to reveal how the actual costs of the tsunami disaster will be shared among international donors.130 Competing Aid and Budget Priorities.131 Even before the disaster struck, Congress was expected to struggle to find the resources to sustain U.S. aid pledges amid efforts to tackle rising budget deficits by, among other measures, slowing or reducing discretionary spending. During the FY2005 debate, lawmakers reduced the President’s foreign assistance budget request (a subset of the larger foreign policy budget request) by $1.7 billion, or nearly 8%. This was the first time such cuts occurred during the Bush Administration. Some Members of Congress publicly have expressed concern that funding for tsunami relief and reconstruction, which depleted most worldwide disaster contingency accounts, if not fully restored through supplemental appropriations, may jeopardize resources for subsequent international disasters or for other aid priorities from which tsunami emergency aid has been transferred.132 Transparency. Members of Congress have also raised concerns about transparency of donor contributions, allocation of monies, and monitoring of projects by the United Nations. The United Nations has said it will improve its financial tracking and reporting system and Price Waterhouse Coopers is reportedly assisting in that effort. Many contributions are also being made directly to international organizations and non-governmental organizations, which could raise the same questions about transparency requirements. Moreover, while earmarks and time limits may ensure greater accountability, they can also add pressure for organizations to spend contributed funds, sometimes leading to unnecessary spending, waste and 129 David Sanger, “It’s About Aid, and an Image,” New York Times, December 30, 2004. 130 James Darcy, “The Indian Ocean Tsunami Crisis: Humanitarian Dimensions,” Overseas Development Institute, January 11, 2005. 131 132 Prepared by (name redacted), Foreign Affairs Specialist. Elizabeth Becker, “No New Funds Needed For Relief, Bush Aides Say,” New York Times, January 4, 2005. CRS-40 duplicated efforts. Restrictions on funds also often do not allow flexibility to adapt projects to better meet the changing needs on the ground.133 Debt Relief. While there is an on-going need for immediate relief assistance for tsunami-affected countries, longer term aid will also be needed to assist these nations, which face substantial costs associated with rebuilding infrastructure and basic social services. Such extended aid may take the form of official debt relief or repayment moratoriums, which may free resources for reconstruction. Several creditor governments reportedly support an immediate moratorium on debt payments by affected nations while other debt-related policy options are considered.134 While U.S. officials have not firmly committed to any large-scale program of debt cancellation or repayment term rescheduling,135 at least one significant debt-related policy decision — the release of a communique allowing temporary credit forbearance by debtors to the consensus-based Paris Club of creditor governments, of which the United States is a member — has been made to date.136 In addition, the World Bank, IMF, and major bilateral creditor governments, including the United States, have been considering an expansion of the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative. Although none of the tsunami-affected countries are eligible for HIPC debt relief, consideration of debt reduction proposals for these disaster-struck nations could occur during subsequent talks on HIPC enhancement. Due to the size of Indonesia’s debt burden, some have argued in the past that Jakarta should be eligible for some form of HIPC debt-relief terms. If the Paris Club decides to provide debt cancellation or the rescheduling of credit repayment terms to any of the tsunami-affected countries, or if the multilateral financial institutions recommend such relief, Congress may be called upon to consider the nature, extent, and conditions of any credit relief that may be provided by the United States. Implications for Other U.S. Foreign Policy Interests The War on Terrorism. The 9/11 Commission and others have pointed out the U.S. interest in preventing regions of instability from becoming havens or 133 Edward Clay, “Lessons for Life,” The Guardian Review, January 12, 2005. 134 “Debt Freeze for Tsunami Nations Gets Boost at Summit,” Reuters News Service, January 6, 2005; BBC News, “Brown pushes tsunami debt relief,” Jan. 4 2005; Reuters, “Schroeder urges debt relief for Indonesia, Somalia,” December 29, 2004;. 135 Agence France Presse, “US ‘open’ to debt relief for tsunami victims,” December 29, 2004; White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “President Discusses Support for Earthquake and Tsunami Victims,” December 29, 2004. 136 At their January 12, 2005 meeting, Paris Club members “shared the view” that “with immediate effect and consistent with the national laws of the creditor countries, they will not expect debt payments from affected countries that request such forbearance until the World Bank and the IMF [International Monetary Fund] have made a full assessment of their reconstruction and financing needs.” Following such assessments, the Paris Club “will consider what further steps are necessary.” See Paris Club, “Paris Club communique on Tsunami affected countries,” January 12, 2005. For background, see CRS Report RS21482, The Paris Club and International Debt Relief, by (name redacted). CRS-41 recruiting grounds for Islamist terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiya (JI), the Southeast Asia terrorist organization that has close ties to Al Qaeda and is thought to have killed hundreds in four separate attacks since September 11, 2001. While Sumatra, in Indonesia, has not been an active base of operation for Al Qaeda or JI, the Indonesian military’s support of the entrance of the Mujahideen Council of Indonesia (MMI) raises serious questions about the TNI’s policy toward terrorist groups, given the MMI’s relationship with Jemaah Islamiya and Al Qaeda. Moreover, any prolonged economic and political disruption, combined with potential perceptions of Jakarta’s inability to deliver assistance, could open the door for a more active terrorist presence or lead the anti-Indonesian Free Aceh Movement (GAM) to establish ties to JI or Al Qaeda. Additionally, some Indonesian organizations and charities with known ties to JI have dispatched humanitarian relief teams to Aceh. In Southern Thailand, the areas most affected by the tsunami are generally considered ethnically and regionally distinct from the predominantly Muslim provinces on the western coast of peninsular Thailand, which have been the site of sectarian and antigovernment violence by Muslims over the past year. Countering Negative Images of the United States. The large-scale U.S. response to the tsunami is unlikely to reverse the decline in the U.S. image abroad since the September 11 attacks, because this decline primarily is due to American policies in the Middle East. However, the scale and scope of U.S. assistance could provide a positive example of U.S. leadership and military capabilities. The decline in the U.S. image abroad has been particularly acute in the Muslim world, especially in Indonesia, where according to one series of polls, only 15% of those polled in 2003 said they had a favorable opinion of the United States, down from 61% in 2002.137 Additionally, the U.S. tsunami relief effort could help counter the perception among some Southeast Asians that the United States not only has placed too much emphasis on terrorism in its Southeast Asia policy, but also has relied too heavily on “hard” (military) power to combat terrorism. The 9/11 Commission and others have recommended expanding U.S. public diplomacy programs as a way to help win the global battle for “hearts and minds” especially in the Islamic world from which the Muslim terrorists seek to draw recruits and support. The restrictions on foreign relief activities announced by the Indonesian military and government on January 11 and 12, 2005, potentially raise the reverse issue of negative U.S. reactions to Indonesia. Commentary in the U.S. press and on radio talks shows has been very negative toward Indonesia because of the restrictions. Early Warning Systems: International Scientific, Technological and Other Challenges.138 Nations affected by the December 26, 2004 tsunami, assisted by others, are pursuing a multilateral effort through the U.N. Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC) to develop a tsunami detection and early warning network for the Indian Ocean. In early March 2004, scientific experts in affected countries met with international benefactors to coordinate 137 Dan Gardner, “Bush is Losing the War for Hearts and Ninds,” The Ottawa Citizen, March 13, 2004 and Ellen Nakashima, “U.S. Policy Censured in Indonesia,” The Washington Post, October 21, 2003. 138 Prepared by Wayne Morrissey, Information Research Specialist (Science and Technology), Knowledge Services Group. CRS-42 planning efforts and financial commitments. On March 11, 2005, the House approved nearly $23 million for U.S. tsunami detection and warning in FY2005 emergency supplemental appropriations.139 Decisions about whether and how to proceed will likely be complicated for a number of reasons. One reason is because of the number of different potential international parties that would be involved with the need to coordinate data collection and warning dissemination, and a second is the funding needed to establish a tsunami warning system in that region. A third is that nations, including some in the Indian Ocean, might charge for access to critical satellite data that may help in warning potential victims. Some in Congress assert that the costs of acquiring those data could be well worth it, in terms of lives saved; while others counter that access to those proprietary data should be provided free of charge, especially when the United States and other nations provide disaster relief and propose funding tsunami detection and warning activities for the region.140 The greatest challenge is likely to be establishing local or regional emergency management infrastructures for inhabitants in coastal regions bounding the Indian Ocean to receive tsunami alerts in sufficient time to evacuate, and to be notified when to return after the dangers have subsided.141 Many question who would be responsible for building and maintaining such systems. After the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster, some Members of Congress were concerned about the possible vulnerability of U.S. coastal areas to tsunamis, and the adequacy of early warning for coastal areas of the western Atlantic Ocean. Congress has introduced legislation,142 and the Bush Administration has proposed expanding tsunami warning networks in Pacific coastal areas, and adding coverage for the Atlantic seaboard, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Caribbean Sea.143 Additional tsunami detection and warning instrumentation for the United States (and elsewhere) could run into the millions of dollars. To help offset those costs, some experts suggest that existing global weather buoys, regional coastal and ocean 139 House Committee on Appropriations, “Making Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2005, and for Other Purposes,” Report to accompany H.R. 1268 (H.Rept. 109-16, Ch. 5, p. 51, Mar. 11, 2005). 140 Introductory remarks on S. 34, by Sen. Lieberman, Congressional Record, Jan. 24, 2005, S225-226. 141 U.S. House Committee on Science, Written Testimony, Brigadier General David L. Johnson (U.S. Air Force, Ret.) Assistant Administrator for Weather Services and Director of the National Weather Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration on Tsunamis, Jan. 26, 2005. 142 For more information, including legislation, see CRS Report RL32739 Tsunamis: Monitoring, Detection, and Early Warning Systems, available at []. 143 Executive Office of the President, “U.S. Office of Science and Technology Policy, U.S. Announces Plan for and Improved Tsunami Detection and Warning System,”press release, January 14, 2005 at [], visited March 18, 2005. CRS-43 observation networks, and telecommunications capacity might be shared. Others question the risks of a tsunami hitting the U.S. Atlantic coast.144 Assessing the probability as low, they assert that risk factor should be important when conceptualizing a cooperative early tsunami warning system. Still others have proposed joint European Union, Canada, and United States coverage for the North Atlantic.145 Aid to Indonesia and the Leahy Amendment. U.S. economic aid to Indonesia for fiscal years 2002, 2003, and 2004 totaled $412 million. The Bush Administration budgeted $158 million for FY2005. Much of this aid has gone to programs supporting the development of democratic political institutions in Indonesia with a recent emphasis on Indonesia’s education system. The Administration reportedly will tap this existing bilateral aid program to help fund the U.S. relief effort in Indonesia.146 Congress can be expected to receive new aid requests from the Administration focusing on humanitarian and reconstruction aid, especially directed at Aceh. Such requests undoubtedly would turn the attention of the Administration and Congress to the political situation in Aceh, especially the insurgency and the role of the Indonesian military (TNI). Additionally, the disaster relief cooperation between the U.S. and Indonesian militaries is likely to be mentioned during the annual congressional deliberations over renewing restrictions on U.S.-Indonesian military-to-military relations, which the Bush Administration has sought to restore since the September 11, 2001 attacks. For more than a decade, Congress has restricted the provision of military assistance to Indonesia due to concern about serious human rights violations by the TNI, most notably the massacre of hundreds of people participating in a pro-independence rally in Dili, East Timor, in November 1991. In a press briefing on January 6, 2005, Secretary Powell said that the U.S. is trying to provide the Indonesian government with enough spare parts to repair five Indonesian C-130 Hercules transport aircraft that currently are not operational. This would raise Indonesia’s number of operational C-130s to twelve. As discussed below, current U.S. legislation places strict controls on the provision of military equipment to Indonesia. When pressed on the issue of whether Jakarta in the future might use repaired planes in its conflict with the GAM rebels in Aceh, Secretary Powell said that “the humanitarian need ... trumps, right now, the reservations we have.” He added his “hope” that the Indonesian government’s desire to receive additional military parts in the future would serve as a disincentive for using aircraft against the GAM.147 144 USGS Earthquake Hazards Program, “Off W Coast of Northern Sumatra, Can It Happen in the United States?” [], visited Jan. 5, 2005. 145 CRS Report RL32739 (see footnote 5). 146 Jonathan Weisman, “Funds Ready for Tsunami Aid, but Hill Seeks to Do More,” Washington Post, January 6, 2005. 147 State Department, “Secretary Colin L. Powell Remarks to the Traveling Press in (continued...) CRS-44 Although the language has varied from year to year, in general, the Leahy amendment bans arms sales to Indonesia, U.S. military training with the TNI, and TNI participation in the U.S. International Military Education Training (IMET) program unless the President certifies that the Indonesian government and the TNI are taking actions against the TNI’s reported human rights abuses, including prosecution of abusers. The Leahy amendments for fiscal years 2002 and 2003 specifically mentioned Aceh in this context. About a week after the tsunami hit, the head of the Indonesian military’s relief operations, Major General. Adam Damiri, was replaced, apparently because of concerns that his indictment for war crimes by a U.N.-backed tribunal in East Timor would complicate U.S.-Indonesian military relief cooperation.148 147 (...continued) Indonesia,” Press Filing Center, Jakarta, Indonesia, January 6, 2005. 148 Alan Sipress and Noor Huda Ismail, “Relief Transcends U.S.-Indonesia Divide,” Washington Post, January 4, 2005. CRS-45 Appendix 1. U.S. Assistance to Selected Countries Affected by the Indian Ocean Tsunami (Note: Totals may not add due to rounding) Table 5. U.S. Assistance to Indonesia, 2001-2005 (millions of U.S. dollars) Account FY2001 FY2002 CSH 19.6 35.6 DA 51.5 38.7 ESF 49.9 50.0 IMET 0.0 0.4 NADR 0.0 0.0 INCLE 0.0 0.0 Totals 121.0 124.7 Food Aid (not including freight costs) P.L. 480 Title I 15.0 19.0 USDA Loan P.L. 480 Title 12.2 10.4 II Grant FFP 5.1 10.9 Section 416(b) 0.0 11.2 FY2002 FY2004 FY2005 FY2003 S.A.a estimate estimate — 32.0 34.0 32.3 — 39.0 31.3 32.7 — 59.6 49.7 65.0 — 0.0 0.0 0.6 8.0 1.0 5.8 6.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 12.0 131.6 120.8 146.6 — 0.0 0.0 n/a — 29.5 2.2 23.0 — — 0.0 7.9 5.6 17.7 n/a n/a Sources: U.S. Department of State, USAID, U.S. Department of Agriculture a. Supplemental Appropriations (P.L. 107-206) Table 6. U.S. Assistance to Sri Lanka, 2001-2005 (millions of U.S. dollars) Account FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 estimate FY2005 estimate CSH 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 DA 3.4 5.2 6.2 4.8 6.6 ESF 0.0 3.0 4.0 11.9 10.0 FMF 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.5 IMET 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 NADR 0.0 0.0 2.4 1.9 1.9 PKO 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 Totals 4.0 8.7 13.1 21.3 20.8 Food Aid (not including freight costs) P.L. 480 Title I USDA Loan 7.9 8.0 0.0 0.0 n/a P.L. 480 Title II Grant 0.0 1.3 0.6 2.7 0.0 0.0 2.8 0.0 n/a 0.0 0.0 0.9 n/a FFP Section 416(b) 6.0 Sources: U.S. Department of State, USAID, U.S. Department of Agriculture. CRS-46 Table 7. U.S. Assistance to India, FY2001-FY2005 (millions of U.S. dollars) Program or Account CSH DA ESF IMET FY2001 Actual 24.6 28.8 5.0 0.5 FY2002 Actual 41.7 29.2 7.0 1.0 FY2003 Actual 47.4 34.5 10.5 1.0 FY2004 Estimate 48.3 25.7 14.9 1.3 FY2005 Estimate 43.4 25.4 15.0 1.4 NADR-EXBS 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.7 0.7 Totals $59.8 $79.8 $94.4 $90.9 $85.9 Food Aid (Not including freight costs) P.L.480 Title II* 78.3 93.7 44.8 20.2 44.8 Section 416(b)* -.12.0 -.-.-.Sources: U.S. Departments of State and Agriculture; U.S. Agency for International Development. Table 8. U.S. Assistance to Thailand, FY2002-FY2005 (millions of U.S. dollars) Account CSH DA ESF FMF IMET INCLE NADR Peace Corps Totals FY2001 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 4.1 1.3 1.1 8.4 FY2002 1.0 0.8 0.0 1.3 1.7 4.0 0.7 1.3 10.7 FY2003 1.5 1.3 0.0 2.0 1.8 3.7 0.2 1.8 12.2 FY2004 estimate 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 2.5 2.0 0.4 2.1 7.9 FY2005 estimate 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.5 2.5 2.0 0.8 2.6 10.3 Sources: U.S. Department of State, USAID, U.S. Department of Agriculture. Table 9. U.S. Assistance to Malaysia, 2001-2005 (millions of U.S. dollars) Account FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 estimate FY2005 estimate IMET 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.2 1.1 NADR 0.1 0.2 1.3 0.1 1.0 Totals 0.9 1.0 2.1 1.3 2.1 Sources: U.S. Department of State, USAID, U.S. Department of Agriculture. CRS-47 Table 10. U.S. Assistance to Somalia (millions of U.S. dollars) Account FY2003 Actual FY2004 Est. FY2005 Req.* CSH 0.3 0.1 - DA 3.1 0.9 1.0 NADR-HD 0.5 - - Totals 3.8 1.0 1.0 136.4 89.0 - P.L._480_Title_II Food Aid Source: “Somalia,” Request by Region: Africa, FY2005 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Feb. 10, 2004. *Note: No Somalia-specific appropriations were enacted for FY2005. Data on levels of any U.S. assistance for Somalia will become available after the Administration has notified the appropriate Congressional committees of its functional account allocations, in accordance with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. Overall assistance to sub-Saharan Africa rose slightly over FY2004 levels. List of Aid-Related Abbreviations CSH: Child Survival and Health Programs DA: Development Assistance Programs ESF: Economic Support Fund Programs IMET: International Military Education and Training Programs NADR-EXBS: Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance Programs P.L.480 Title II: Emergency and Private Assistance food aid (grants) Section 416(b): The Agricultural Act of 1949, as amended (surplus agricultural commodity donations) CRS-48 Appendix 2. Child Protection Issues in TsunamiAffected Countries (As of January 9, 2005) Indonesia ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! One confirmed case of four-year-old boy taken out of Banda Aceh by a couple claiming to be his parents. (We cannot confirm the child was trafficked.) There may be other possible cases of child-trafficking: media reports sighting by an “NGO worker” of about 100 infants carried in a speed boat in the middle of the night. The government has imposed a moratorium on adoptions of children from Aceh. Children from Aceh under 16 cannot leave the country at this time. Surveillance will be increased at airports and seaports in North Sumatra and Aceh. The government has placed many Acehnese children in orphanages in Medan and other towns across Sumatra Island. Children being placed with Acehnese families under a temporary foster care scheme. Twenty child-friendly centers for unaccompanied children will soon be opened in major displacement camps in Aceh. Registration of children has begun. When adoptions become possible, Achenese residents will be given priority. Thailand ! ! ! ! The government reports no cases of trafficking or abduction. The government has ruled out adoptions for unaccompanied children at this time. Specific measures being taken to prevent trafficking include registration of children, provision of temporary accommodation for unaccompanied children in government reception homes and family tracing. Child rights volunteers deployed in Ranong and Phuket to conduct community surveillance. UNICEF will work with provincial and district authorities to mobilize NGO partners, communities, and the media to be more vigilant on child protection issues. CRS-49 Sri Lanka ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! No reports of trafficking or abuse of children (in camps) received by UNICEF. UNICEF and partners providing additional support to grandparentheaded families and unaccompanied children. Reports of Sri Lankan citizens wanting to adopt children. Process for adoption takes up to five years. UNICEF is advocating for foster system. (Foster care is not a tradition in Sri Lanka.) UNICEF and partners have mobilized teams to identify and register all unaccompanied and separated children. Police and authorities are not yet present in camps, raising concerns that children will be more vulnerable to sexual and other abuse. UNICEF and the NCPA are conducting an emergency assessment to identify children in displaced camps who are without parents or otherwise vulnerable. UNICEF will support authorities in the investigation of all incidences of abuse of children. Data collection on unaccompanied and separated children is ongoing in all districts. India ! ! ! ! ! No reports of trafficking or abuse of children received by UNICEF. UNICEF is seeking the views of the government of India on the adoption policy announced by the government of Tamil Nadu. UNICEF is providing psychosocial support to traumatized children in 13 districts. Unaccompanied children have been identified in camps in two districts in Tamil Nadu. Special orphanages for unaccompanied children have been opened in Tamil Nadu. Malaysia ! ! The text message offering 300 Acehnese “orphans” for adoption is under investigation. UNICEF working with the government and UNICEF Indonesia as necessary to strengthen the monitoring capacity of immigration controls to prevent trafficking into Malaysia. Source: Reported by UNICEF on January 12, 2005. CRS-50 UNICEF’S Child Protection Response to the Indian Ocean Emergency (As of February 11, 2005) Overview The emergency following the tsunami differs from many others as the numbers of unaccompanied and separated children are relatively low. A large proportion of the dead was children. In all affected countries, extended family and community protection mechanisms function well and almost all separated children are being cared for by relatives and communities. This has a positive effect on both immediate care and protection and on longer term psychosocial well-being. Registration of children and family tracing were of critical importance in the first weeks following the disaster. UNICEF, in collaboration with UN agencies, NGOs and governments, helped in setting up of registration and tracing facilities in order to identify orphans and reunite families. The issue affecting most surviving children, in the long run, is distress at what they have gone through. As a result, there is a high need for psychosocial support not only to children, but also to their families, as well as those working with children such as teachers and social workers. There have been scattered reports of trafficking of children; most could not be confirmed. Particularly in Sri Lanka, cases of military recruitment of children have been increasing. Some have occurred from tsunami camp facilities, but most from local communities. The particular vulnerability of the displaced populations, the deployment of thousands of aid workers, military personnel, and logistics staff, and the uncontrolled access to affected areas by nonlocals and foreigners lead to a higher risk of sexual exploitation and trafficking of children. Key Achievements At the global level, UNICEF coordinates a core group of UN agencies, other international bodies, and NGOs, including World Vision, ICRC, UNHCR, IRC, and Save the Children. Common principles, tools, questionnaires, and registration forms were jointly developed. UNICEF also coordinated the drafting of inter-agency guidelines on psychosocial support and guiding principles on separated children. In addition, UNICEF provided all its offices with reference material on trafficking, child marriage, and HIV/AIDS in emergencies, and also training modules, international standards, and other material including on the Secretary General’s bulletin on sexual exploitation and abuse. At the national level, UNICEF took the lead on child protection issues in many of the affected countries. Child protection officers work in all affected countries in close collaboration with governments and provide support to coordination of registration efforts (including use of standardized forms), foster care arrangements (support to foster families, with use of institutionalized care only as a last resort), and training of police and military on child protection issues. CRS-51 In Indonesia, UNICEF helped set up 20 registration centers for children and a joint database was put in place. UNICEF trained volunteers on identification of separated children and family reunification; police officers and military were trained on child protection issues, including women police officers who act as focal points for women and children within the local government. A coordination group on trafficking was established and UNICEF acts as the focal point in Aceh on the Code of Conduct on sexual exploitation. In Sri Lanka, the registration in camps was completed, a database for registration was set up, and common registration forms are in use. Psychosocial workers were trained, recreation kits for children distributed, and psychosocial support is provided in affected areas. UNICEF is investigating reports about the recruitment of children and allegations of sexual abuse and violence against children. In India, UNICEF is printing a booklet on trafficking, and provides psychosocial support in 13 districts. In Thailand and the Maldives, UNICEF provides information on psychosocial support. Future Concerns ! ! ! ! ! ! Continued risks of child exploitation due to loss of livelihoods. Support to single parent households. Continued monitoring of foster care placement: reliable follow-up to ensure that children in foster care arrangements are properly cared for; institutionalized care used only as a last resort. Awareness raising and programs to address domestic violence. Awareness raising about child marriage which is very common in some parts of the regions. Training of U.N. staff on Code of Conduct on sexual abuse and exploitation. Source: Reported by UNICEF on February 11, 2005. CRS-52 Figure 2. Countries Affected by the Tsunami CRS-53 Figure 3. Regional Assistance and Food Aid Requirements The Congressional Research Service (CRS) is a federal legislative branch agency, housed inside the Library of Congress, charged with providing the United States Congress non-partisan advice on issues that may come before Congress. republishes CRS reports that are available to all Congressional staff. The reports are not classified, and Members of Congress routinely make individual reports available to the public. 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