Ten Years in U.S.-China Policy; Interest Groups and Their Influence, 1989-2000

Order Code RL30768 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Ten Years in U.S.-China Policy; Interest Groups and Their Influence, 1989-2000 December 12, 2000 Kerry Dumbaugh Specialist in Asian Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress Ten Years in U.S.-China Policy; Interest Groups and Their Influence, 1989-2000 Summary Through much of the 1980s, the U.S. policy community had consensus on decisions involving China, and organized groups with interests outside the parameters of that consensus remained at the margins of the policy process. With the breakdown of this consensus in 1989-1990, organized interests began to voice their opinions more vigorously, especially in areas of policy differences. Initially, these policy differences were played out through the vehicle of legislation to oppose renewal of China’s most-favored-nation (MFN) trade status. Later, as MFN legislation appeared less viable, legislative alternatives and interest group activity on China proliferated. Since 1992, Congress has considered, and in many cases has passed, legislation targeting China in other areas, including abortion, human rights, prison labor, Chinese students, nuclear and missile non-proliferation, international broadcasting, Tibet, Taiwan, Hong Kong, espionage, religious freedom, and military relations. Each of these issues was accompanied by an assortment of interest groups arguing for or against. In addition, the explosive growth of the Internet in recent years has expanded the reach and potential influence of even the smallest of groups. Organized interests with a skeletal staff and a website can now command greater attention than before. Chinese student organizations and dissident groups, highly influential in the months following the Tiananmen Square crackdown of 1989, seem to have lost this visibility and influence. And groups focusing on religious or moral values, such as the Christian Coalition and the Family Research Council, after having increased their influence through the 1990s, have taken a noticeably lower profile after their peak activity in 1997-98. Many other interest groups appear to have become increasingly influential in the U.S. decision making processes on China. Tibetan activist groups, human rights organizations, democracy advocacy groups, the Taiwan lobby, nonproliferation groups, the American business community, and public policy research groups have all remained active and influential in policy decisions on China. Absent demonstrable changes in China’s policies, in the character of U.S.-China relations, or in the current nature of political discourse in the United States, organized interest groups can be expected to continue to exploit policy differences in ways likely to further affect U.S. policy decisions on China. Contents Overview of Trends in U.S.-China Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 NGOs and U.S. Policy Toward China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Some General Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Chinese Dissident and Student Groups in the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Independent Federation of Chinese Students and Scholars (IFCSS), and Human Rights in China (HRIC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Rupture, November 21, 1989 - January 4, 1990 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 The “Tibet Lobby” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 International Campaign for Tibet (ICT) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 The Committee of 100 for Tibet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 The Tibet Information Network (TIN) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Human Rights, Religious, and Other “Values” Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 “Think Tanks” and Other Public Policy/Research Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 National Committee on U.S.-China Relations (NCUSCR) . . . . . . . . 21 U.S.-China Policy Foundation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 The American Enterprise Institute (AEI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 The Heritage Foundation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) . . . . . . . . 24 The Brookings Institution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 The U.S.-China Business Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 The Business Coalition for U.S.-China Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 The International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Non-Proliferation Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 The “Taiwan Lobby” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Concluding Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Appendix: NGOs Involved in Aspects of U.S. Policy Toward China, 1989-1999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Appendix Addendum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 List of Tables Pertinent NGO Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 Ten Years in U.S.-China Policy; Interest Groups and Their Influence, 1989-2000 Introduction In recent years, successive U.S. Republican and Democrat Administrations have had great difficulty in fielding a comprehensive and coordinated policy toward China that not only clearly defines and promotes U.S. national interests, but also attracts widespread domestic support. To a great extent, the stage for current U.S. policy difficulties was set by the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown, from which China has never recovered in the eyes of most Americans. Several factors and policy trends in the past decade have opened the way for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other organized interest groups to play a more active role in the U.S. China policymaking process. First, it is hard to overstate the significance of the Tiananmen Square crackdown of June 4, 1989 as the defining moment for the decade that came after it in U.S. policy toward China. The collapse of the Soviet Union — and with it, China’s strategic importance as a counterweight to Soviet power — may well have resulted in an eventual reassessment of U.S. China policy in any case during the 1990's. But it is Tiananmen that ultimately ruptured the American policy consensus on China and suggested that the political liberalization accompanying China’s program of economic reform had abruptly ended. The demise of the consensus, in effect, ended congressional support for Administration initiatives on China that had characterized the U.S. policy process through much of the 1980s. Since Tiananmen, Congress and the executive branch have clashed repeatedly over U.S. policy toward China. Both the Bush and Clinton Administrations generally stressed policies of “engagement” toward China, while their congressional critics have tended to push for a firmer, more sanction-oriented approach. Beginning in 1990, Congress brought this pressure to bear largely through the vehicle of annual renewal of China’s most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment – now known as normal trade relations, or NTR – either by voting to withdraw China’s MFN trade status or by placing further conditions on it. This issue came to a head in debate leading to the 106th Congress passing legislation (H.R. 4444) to give permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) to China. President Clinton signed the bill into law on October 10, 2000 (P.L. 106-286). Meanwhile, during the 1990s, Congress has placed increasing emphasis on diverse and separate initiatives that have had implications for U.S.-China relations, including measures on human rights, non-proliferation, trade, Taiwan, religious freedom, national security, and other issues. At each stage of the process, NGOs and organized interest groups have promoted their own points of view among growing policy differences, attempting to maximize their influence over decisions. CRS-2 This fluid and uncertain atmosphere in the American political scene has proven fertile ground for a range of interest groups and individuals competing for influence over U.S. policy decisions involving China. In reviewing some of the key issues on which these groups have had the most effect, it is difficult to tell whether the groups themselves have contributed to the policy divergences over China in the past decade, or whether they merely exploited differences that have occurred for other reasons. The apparent individual effectiveness these groups have had in influencing policy decisions has waxed and waned, depending on the issues involved, the strength of the group or individual, and the overall atmosphere in U.S.-China relations at the time. Their collective effectiveness, however, appears to have grown in the past decade. In general, the most successful have either spent significant time developing relationships with Members of Congress, or have been able to mobilize a broad spectrum of American public opinion in support of their interests. This paper makes generalized observations about the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other organized interest groups in U.S. policy toward China over the last decade and provides information about selected NGOs. In order to set the context for this discussion, the paper first presents a broad overview of issue trends in U.S. China policy during the Bush and Clinton Administrations, and discusses the role of interest groups generally on major issues and policies relating to China during this period, drawing overall conclusions based on these observations. Finally, the paper provides pertinent information about selected groups. Overview of Trends in U.S.-China Policy After the rocky road to U.S.-China normalization of relations ended with the signing of the communique on arms sales to Taiwan in 1982, a consensus prevailed in U.S. policymaking on China until 1989 during which Congress generally supported White House initiatives. Potentially troublesome issues arose during this brief period – Tibet, human rights, the “spiritual pollution” campaign and other Chinese government crackdowns – but overall, China was seen to be proceeding inexorably in the “right direction” with its implementation of dramatic economic reforms and incremental political change. The United States, for its part, was preoccupied with domestic economic issues, and much time in U.S. government debate was given over to battles over the federal budget. This situation had changed dramatically by the end of the first year of the Bush Administration in 1989, and U.S. policy consensus on China has been illusive in the decade since then. Interest groups and NGOs have been able to work well within, and in some cases have contributed to, this dynamic. In addition to the significant changes in American policy factors – the recalculation of China’s potential role as a U.S. strategic asset and the reassessment that China was moving in the “right” reform direction – other trends in the past decade have facilitated the growth of organized interest groups in the U.S. policy process. One trend has been simply the growing number of issues on the U.S.-China agenda. In 1990, early in the breakdown of the U.S. policy consensus on China, U.S.China policy differences were aired through the vehicle of the annual debate over China’s most-favored-nation (MFN) status. While essentially an irrelevant issue in the 1980s, the question of China’s MFN status took on increasing importance CRS-3 beginning in 1990, and peaked in 1992, when Congress came closest to revoking or placing further conditions on China’s MFN status. After this high-water mark, the annual MFN debate faded markedly in importance, although it still served as a focal point for interest group activity on other issues until 2000, when Congress passed legislation to give China this trade status permanently. President Clinton’s 1993 decision to link China’s MFN status to human rights progress appears to have been a pivotal catalyst in MFN’s declining importance. Confronted with the real possibility that the President, in 1994, might sign a bill withdrawing China’s MFN status, Congress appeared less vigorous in pushing to revoke or condition China’s MFN status. Instead, beginning in 1994, Members broadened their search for more specific, more targeted legislative alternatives. Each year, the possible alternatives grew, and the search for appropriate policy approaches opened the door for NGOs and other interest groups to become more influential in advancing ideas and alternatives. Along with the increasing complexity of the legislative agenda on China, a second trend since 1989 has been the blurring of traditional party line alliances within the Congress. The 1990s saw the shifting and regrouping of unusual congressional coalitions – on the specific question of China’s MFN status and on the broader issues surrounding U.S. China policy. To cite but one example in the 105th Congress, in addition to conservative Republicans and religious organizations from the right of the political spectrum, opponents of extending MFN trade status to China included liberal Democrats, labor interests, and human rights organizations more often associated with the left of the political spectrum. MFN proponents included party centrists, probusiness conservatives, liberal free traders, and others in the religious community.1 The issue of free trade versus the desire to penalize China for various human rights infractions and contain its military power proved pivotal. Differences were particularly sharp between so-called social and economic conservatives in the Republican Party. Some senior Republicans, for instance, stated that “America’s best strategy for promoting lasting democratic change in this repressive society [China] is through the free exchange of goods and services in the context of an open MFN trade relationship.”2 Others concluded, however, that: ...multinational corporations have too much influence in the China debate. There has been an unholy alliance between big business, the Clinton administration, and certain Republicans who have adopted the trade-at-any-price approach.3 In a related trend, China has increasingly come to be viewed as a potential security threat to various U.S. interests by some in the Pentagon and U.S. intelligence 1 The week prior to House floor debate, on June 20, 1997, Representative David Dreier included in the Congressional Record the text of a letter he had received from the Rev. Billy Graham in support of MFN for China. Congressional Record, June 20, 1997, p. H 4123. 2 Text is from a June 3, 1998 letter to President Clinton by Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich and Representatives Bill Archer and Phil Crane. 3 Senator Tim Hutchinson, quoted in The Congressional Quarterly, June 6, 1998, p. 1519. CRS-4 communities and by a growing group in Congress. (But some who share this view, such as the Heritage Foundation, also championed PNTR for China.) A further complication to the legislative agenda has involved the attitude of key congressional committees. Those that are important in consideration of punitive measures – such as the House Banking Committee, the House Ways and Means Committee, and the Senate Finance Committee – have traditionally had majorities who favor insulating U.S. trade and economic policy decisions from other U.S. policy goals. These committees are subject to their own constituencies – including business, economic, and agricultural interests – and they can act as a potent obstacle in blocking proposed enforcement mechanisms that other organized interests seek to put in place. These committees have often blocked more punitive measures or moderated them. Arguably, a third factor leading to the rise of organized interest group activity on China in the past decade has been the notable animosity and partisanship that developed between the Republican, more conservative Congresses elected since 1994 and the Clinton White House. In an environment that included presidential impeachment proceedings, policy accord – even on relatively benign issues – has been difficult. In addition, in the early Clinton years, many in the foreign policy community considered the new Administration to be so focused on domestic economic issues that it lacked an international leadership strategy or agenda. On questions involving China, with which U.S. relations have been tense and troublesome throughout the decade, and with which the United States appears to have growing substantive differences, this perceived leadership deficit may have contributed to policy differences. NGOs and U.S. Policy Toward China “Groups need Congress, and Congress needs groups.”4 Before examining the role of NGOs and other organized interest groups in the past decade of U.S. policymaking on China, it would be useful to consider some general principles that may govern these groups and their interaction with U.S. policy processes. Some General Observations Throughout American history, organized interest groups have been a feature of the political landscape. From the very birth of the republic, groups were formed to oppose taxation, abolish slavery, advocate rebellion, advance ideas, elect candidates, and affect policy. By their very nature, groups form in response to a perceived need. This perceived need may be overarching – to educate the uninformed, to respond to 4 Ornstein, Norman, and Elder, Shirley, Interest Groups, Lobbying and Policymaking, Congressional Quarterly, Washington, D.C., 1978, , p. 224. Cited in Oleszek, Walter, and Davidson, Roger, Congress and Its Members, Congressional Quarterly, Washington, D.C., 2000, p. 337. CRS-5 a physical or moral crisis or to remedy a serious national leadership weakness. Often, the perceived need is more parochial – to get a better tax break, to build support for a certain view, or in some other way to further the group’s vested interests. Regardless, the perceived need is there. Also, a group can form not only to further its own interests, but to prevent some other group from furthering its interests at the first group’s expense. Thus, groups tend to breed other groups. Or, as one specialist puts it, “Each move to protect a [group’s] interests is likely to prompt a countermove.”5 Nor are groups static things. Groups with seemingly divergent interests and opposing ideologies can still form an alliance in pursuit of a shared goal. Once these coalitions have achieved the objective, the marriage quickly can be dissolved. The last decade of American decision making on China appears to be an encapsulation of this group dynamic. Through much of the 1980s, there was U.S. policy consensus on China, and groups that had interests outside the parameters of that consensus remained at the margins of the policy process. With the breakdown of consensus in 1989-1990, organized interests were able to begin to exploit areas of policy differences. Throughout his presidency from 1989-1992, President Bush’s defense of executive prerogative over legislative action created an atmosphere that effectively empowered more organized groups – groups that were able to combine forces and work through an increasingly receptive Congress to pursue alternate objectives to those set by the President. Initially, these policy differences were played out through the vehicle of legislation to oppose renewal of China’s MFN trade status. Later, as legislation to restrict China’s MFN status appeared less viable, legislative alternatives and interest group activity on China proliferated into other areas. Since 1992, when China’s trade status was most in jeopardy, 6 Congress has considered, and in many cases passed, legislation targeting China in such areas as abortion, human rights, prison labor, Chinese students, nuclear and missile non-proliferation, international broadcasting, Tibet, Taiwan, Hong Kong, espionage, religious freedom, and military relations. Each of these issues was accompanied by an assortment of NGO interests arguing for or against. With the election of a Republican Congress in 1994 (the first Republican House in 40 years), ideological and in some cases partisan differences fueled the China debate further. Added to this, the explosive growth of the Internet – and with it, the possibilities for electronic outreach and lobbying – has expanded the reach and potential influence of even the smallest groups. Few groups, no matter how tiny, are now without their own electronic home pages. Organized interests with a skeletal staff and a website can now appear muscular, commanding dramatically greater attention than would have been the case just a few years ago. Groups new to the China business (such as the Family Research Council), or with minimal staff (such as the U.S. China Policy Foundation) have web sites devoted to issues involving China. In some cases, these 5 6 Oleszek, p. 349. In 1991 and 1992, both houses passed legislation to place further conditions on China’s eligibility for MFN status. In both cases, H.R. 2212 (1991) and H.R. 5318 (1992) were vetoed by President Bush; in both cases, the House overrode the veto, but the Senate did not. CRS-6 come with easy-to-use electronic form letters for contacting Members of Congress or other parts of the U.S. government in support of a particular position. This complicated dynamic may help explain the fact that organized interest groups appear to have become increasingly involved in decisions on China. The discussion below provides information about how some of the key groups active at one time or another over the past decade have affected U.S. policy decisions. Chinese Dissident and Student Groups in the United States Although organizations representing students and scholars from China had existed in the United States since the early 1980's, the number of these organizations increased dramatically in the year following the Tiananmen Square demonstrations and crackdown. Of 17 Chinese student and scholar organizations surveyed in October 1990, 13 of them had been formed since March 1989.7 In the immediate aftermath of the Tiananmen Square crackdown, members of the Chinese dissident community became visible and articulate advocates in the American policy process, arguing persuasively for initiatives in support of human rights and political freedoms in China. They were particularly influential in and involved with efforts to protect Chinese students studying in the United States at the time of the Tiananmen crackdown. As one of his actions in response to the crackdown, President Bush in June 1989 directed that a “sympathetic review” be given to any Chinese student studying in the United States who requested a visa extension. Initially, Congress gave broad support to the President’s actions.8 But sentiments to take further steps were encouraged by the continuing harsh actions of Chinese leaders. On June 9, 1989, for instance, Deng Xiaoping and much of the rest of China’s top leadership appeared in public to congratulate troops involved in the crackdown. The Chinese government also began issuing arrest warrants for student leaders and Chinese dissidents involved in the demonstrations. In the ensuing weeks, the American press gave widespread attention to these actions, and to the plight of Chinese in the United States who would have to return to China when their visas ran out. International human rights organizations and groups of Chinese students streamed to Capitol Hill to testify on the newly repressive atmosphere in China, making their case directly to American legislators and government officials. In the ensuing months, many Members of Congress came to believe that the President’s actions on behalf of Chinese students were not sufficient and that students may be jeopardized by having to request a visa extension, thus implying to Beijing that they feared to return. Consequently, several legislative measures were considered to expand upon the President’s action and offer greater protection to the students. 7 See Dumbaugh, Kerry, “Chinese Student and Scholar Organizations in the United States,” Congressional Research Service Report 90-558 F, October 15, 1990. 8 The Speaker of the House, Representative Tom Foley (D-WA), demonstrated the continuing accord between Congress and the White House during these early days: “I do not favor actions that aren’t taken in consultation with the Administration.” See Congressional Quarterly, June 24, 1989, p. 1564. CRS-7 These efforts received strong bipartisan support. On July 11, 1989, the Senate Majority and Minority Leaders (Senators George Mitchell and Robert Dole) jointly sponsored an amendment to a pending immigration bill (S. 358) which in effect would have automatically extended Chinese student visas without their having to register a request with the U.S. government.9 The House passed similar legislation on July 31 (H.R. 2712, introduced by Rep. Pelosi). When it passed the House, H.R. 2712 had 259 cosponsors. The final Conference Report on the Emergency Chinese Adjustment of Status Facilitation Act of 1989 was adopted easily in both Houses.10 Chinese activist groups mounted an effective and well-organized lobbying effort to gain congressional support for this legislation. When Representative Pelosi first introduced the bill in the House, members of Chinese activist groups met with congressional staff and deployed to help seek cosponsors for the bill. As the legislative process unfolded, these groups provided relevant documentation, prepared letters, contacted voters, gave public presentations, and wrote articles for publication in local town newspapers urging support for the bill. According to a Pelosi staff member, these groups did a “complete and thorough job, covered all their bases.”11 Independent Federation of Chinese Students and Scholars (IFCSS), and Human Rights in China (HRIC). Two Chinese activist organizations that were highly active during this time were the Independent Federation of Chinese Students and Scholars (IFCSS), and Human Rights in China (HRIC), both formed in 1989. IFCSS was founded in July 1989 as a direct response to the Tiananmen Square crackdown. According to its representatives at the time, IFCSS was established to serve as a coordinating organization for Chinese student and scholar associations on U.S. campuses. According to the IFCSS constitution, adopted at the organization’s First Congress (the Chicago Conference) on July 28-30, 1989, all members were to be formally registered at a U.S. university, academic institution, or research organization. At the time, the IFCSS claimed a membership of 40,000 Chinese students.12 HRIC, formed by Chinese scientists and scholars in March 1989, appeared to focus on a somewhat different agenda – the task of educating Chinese in China and abroad about human rights principles, and monitoring human rights activities in China. Along with IFCSS, HRIC provided input to organizers of congressional hearings in 1989 on the Tiananmen Square crackdown. Of the two organizations, IFCSS was the more visible in pushing for legislation to help Chinese students, who made up the bulk of IFCSS membership. To help achieve this goal, IFCSS established a loose organizational structure, including a series of working committees and affiliated groups. One of these, the National 9 The amendment passed by a vote of 97-0. 10 The House adopted the Conference Report unanimously on November 19 (403-0); the Senate adopted it by voice vote on November 20. 11 Telephone conversation with a Legislative Assistant in Representative Pelosi’s office, February 7, 1990. 12 This figure may simply be the organization’s assumption that it effectively represented all Chinese students in the United States, since 40,000 is the total number of Chinese students generally estimated to have been studying in the United States at that time. CRS-8 Committee of Chinese Student Affairs, was formed specifically to spearhead the a group’s representational efforts with the U.S. government. In addition, in the fall of 1989, the IFCSS established a government affairs office, to serve as a liaison office with the U.S. government. Members of these two IFCSS offices met with U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service and U.S. State Department officials to discuss implementation of policies to benefit Chinese students in the United States. Throughout this period, tensions on China policy between the President and the Congress were growing. Administration officials opposed any congressional effort going beyond President Bush’s stated sanctions, saying that such efforts would interfere with the President’s flexibility on foreign policy. In the face of growing reports of abuses in China, presidential rhetoric on China remained mild, and Administration officials were seen by their critics as increasingly tempering their negative comments about Beijing’s actions with positive references about China’s continuing importance to U.S. interests. Rupture, November 21, 1989 - January 4, 1990. On November 21, 1989, the consensus on U.S.-China policy quickly began to unravel when, after Congress adjourned for the year, President Bush vetoed several key pieces of legislation concerning China.13 Among those bills was H.R. 2712, the Emergency Chinese Adjustment of Status Facilitation Act — the most broadly supported and benign bill on China that had passed during the year — which President Bush pocket-vetoed on November 30, 1989. In his veto message concerning the measure, the President announced that he thought the bill was “wholly unnecessary,” since he already had sufficient authority as President to provide the protections called for in the legislation. Moreover, the President stated that even as he was vetoing the bill, he was directing the Attorney General to act administratively to implement the bill’s provisions. In a later statement about the veto, the President was quoted as saying, “I want to keep control of managing the foreign policy of this country as much as I can. And I didn’t think that legislation was necessary.”14 In addition to the two vetoed bills, throughout December 1989, in Congress’ absence, the President continued to waive, or elected not to impose, sanctions and other measures that large bipartisan majorities in Congress had enacted. By the time Congress returned in January 1990, the U.S. consensus on China policy was 13 H.R. 1487, the FY90 State Department Authorization bill containing Congress’ major China sanctions package. The veto came because of a provision stemming from the IranContra affair, and Members expected it; on the same day, the House quickly approved a new version of the bill, H.R. 3792, without the offending language. But Senator Ernest Hollings’ jurisdictional objection to the bill in the Senate raised a new hurdle that could not be cleared before Congress adjourned the following day. The net effect was that the 101st Congress adjourned for the year without having formally enacted the major sanctions package to protest the Tiananmen Square crackdown. 14 The President’s remarks, made on December 11, were reported in the Congressional Quarterly, December 16, 1989, p. 3435. He later issued Executive Order #12711, implementing the Act’s provisions. CRS-9 effectively over, and the stage had been set for continued grappling over China policy between the White House and Congress throughout the rest of the Bush Administration. When Congress in 1990 attempted (unsuccessfully) to override the President’s veto of the Emergency Chinese Adjustment of Status Facilitation Act, Republican Representative Jim Leach offered this interpretation of the new executive-legislative atmosphere: “The President, by Executive Order, implemented the policy but vetoed the legislation. In one sense, the veto was gratuitous; in another sense, the override effort is equally gratuitous.”15 Chinese activist groups lobbied Congress heavily on this issue on behalf of the viewpoint that ultimately prevailed. Since 1989, the congressional activities of the IFCSS have waned considerably, along with its influence in the policy process. Its nature as a student organization has meant that many of its original student leaders have moved on. 16 A non-profit organization, the group has received small grants from the National Endowment for Democracy to help meet its objectives, which primarily concentrate on providing a broad range of services, information, and other assistance to its principal constituency, the continuing Chinese student population in the United States. Still, IFCSS surfaces occasionally to make its views known in key debates on China. In floor debate on June 24, 1997, for instance, Representative Bunning inserted into the Congressional Record a letter from IFCSS asking that Congress make human rights improvements a condition of China’s eligibility for MFN treatment.17 Human Rights in China, however, perhaps because it started with broader objectives, appears quietly to have increased its visibility and stature, both in the U.S. policy community and internationally. Founded originally by Fu Xin-yuan,18 HRIC has been under the executive directorship of Xiao Qiang throughout the 1990s. The group continues to pursue its core objectives: educating Chinese people about their own rights and about international human rights standards; monitoring individual cases of human rights abuse in China; documenting and publicizing human rights violations; and facilitating the provision of financial and legal support to former prisoners and their families in China. HRIC continues to contact U.S. policymakers, providing them with information, setting up meetings, and in some cases testifying before congressional committees. In addition to its growing U.S. work, HRIC has become an active advocate in international fora, working with the World Bank, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, and other international groups. According to 15 From floor debate, Congressional Record, January 24, 1990, p. H49. 16 A deputy director of IFCSS, Xiao Qiang, who in 1989 interrupted his doctoral studies in astrophysics at the University of Notre Dame, left IFCSS in 1991 to become Executive Director of Human Rights in China. 17 18 Floor debate, Congressional Record, June 24, 1997, p. H4236. According to a recent article by Dr. Fu, he founded HRIC while a postdoctoral fellow working doing research on “molecular mechanisms of signal transduction of interferon, an antiviral and anti-cancer protein.” “Searching for Answers: My Path Towards Becoming a Concerned Scientist,” in China Rights Forum, June 1999. He is now Associate Professor in the Department of Pathology, Yale University School of Medicine. CRS-10 recent information supplied by HRIC, its board of directors includes Fang Lizhi, Perry Link, Liu Binyan, Andrew Nathan, Orville Schell, and Anne Thurston. The “Tibet Lobby” The Dalai Lama himself has been the most charismatic and renowned advocate for the Tibetan people over the past decade, and in this effort he has had strong supporters in the U.S. Congress.19 His and his exiled community’s initiative to gain international support for Tibet’s cause appeared to begin in 1986-1987, when a series of meetings between Tibetan and Western supporters in New York, Washington, and London launched what has become known as Tibet’s “international campaign.”20 The goal of this campaign was to garner Western and principally U.S. support for Tibet’s situation, and ultimately to bring this international pressure to bear on Beijing to make satisfactory political concessions. As a result of this new strategy, Congress in 1987 began to put pressure on the White House to protect Tibetan culture and accord Tibet greater status in U.S. law, despite Beijing’s strong objections. Two events of particular importance occurred in 1987. First, on September 21, the Dalai Lama made his first political speech in the United States, at the invitation of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus. In that speech, the Dalai Lama made a five-point proposal for resolving the Tibet question that was well-received in the United States and had significant consequences on congressional attitudes toward Tibet. Second, non-binding measures were put into place that year declaring that the United States should make Tibet’s situation a higher policy priority and should urge China to establish a constructive dialogue with the Dalai Lama.21 This language, not the first that Congress had passed regarding Tibet,22 nevertheless, marked the beginning of a significant increase in congressional activity on Tibet’s status.23 From this point on, congressional supporters sought to mention Tibet separately whenever possible in legislation relating to China. In 1990, in 19 These have included Representatives Charlie Rose, Ben Gilman, and Tom Lantos, and the late Senator Claiborne Pell. 20 These three cities are all still centers for Tibet-related offices and information networks. According to Dr. Melvyn Goldstein, professor of anthropology at Case Western Reserve University, the details of how the “international campaign” strategy was formed have not yet been documented. Goldstein, Melvyn, The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama, University of California Press, 1997. pp. 76 and 138. 21 President Reagan signed into law H.R. 1777, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of FY88-89, on December 22, 1987 (Public Law 100-204); section 1243 contains language on Tibet. In 1985, 91 Members of Congress reportedly had also sent a letter to China’s President, Li Xiannian, expressing support for continued talks with the Dalai Lama. 22 Congress considered a number of non-binding measures in the 1980s concerning Tibet. In 1986, Congress listed “Tibet” as an independent country in H.R. 5548, legislation dealing the Export-Import Bank. This bill was approved on October 15, and became P.L. 99-472. 23 According to a legislative database, in the four years prior to 1987, only 6 measures had been introduced in Congress concerning Tibet, whereas the 1987 legislation was only one of 14 measures introduced in 1987-1988. [http://www.loc.thomas] CRS-11 considering foreign relations authorization legislation that contained the so-called “Tiananmen sanctions,” Congress singled out Tibet for special mention in sense-ofCongress language that closely resembled the “5 points” the Dalai Lama had mentioned two years earlier and, in the same legislation, mandated the Voice of America to begin broadcasts in the Tibetan language.24 In 1994, Congress enacted a number of Tibetan-related provisions in the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of FY94-95, including: ! ! a provision mandating that Tibet be listed separately in the State Department’s annual report, “Country Reports on Human Rights” a provision mandating the State Department to issue a report on the “state of relations between U.S. and those recognized by Congress as the true representatives of the Tibetan people; the Dalai Lama, his representatives, and the Tibetan Government in exile, and on conditions in Tibet.”25 Views espoused by Tibetan activists also can be seen in the debate during recent years over establishing the position of U.S. Special Envoy for Tibet, with ambassadorial rank. Congress began considering measures to establish this position early in the Clinton Administration. In introducing such a measure in 1994, Senator Claiborne Pell stated he believed it was necessary to further focus Administration attention on issues involving Tibet: I recall how difficult it was to engage previous administrations in serious, knowledgeable discussions on Tibet...A Special Envoy for Tibet would ensure that this important element of United States-China relations was continually reflected in policy discussions on a senior level.26 While legislation to create a Special Envoy for Tibet has never been enacted, similar provisions to those in the 1994 legislation were also introduced as sections of authorization bills in the 104th and the 105th Congresses.27 In each case, the provision 24 This bill, H.R. 3792, was enacted as P.L. 101-246, and contains the “Tiananmen sanctions” on China that are still largely in effect. Its provisions on Tibet stated that U.S. policy toward China should be explicitly linked with the situation in Tibet, specifically to include; lifting of martial law in Lhasa and other parts of Tibet; opening Tibet to foreigners, including the press and international human rights organizations; release of political prisoners; and conduct of negotiations between representatives of the Dalai Lama and the Chinese government. 25 Established pursuant to Section 536 of the Foreign Relations Authorizations Act, H.R. 2333, enacted as P.L. 103-236. 26 Statement by Senator Pell, Congressional Record, October 7, 1994, p. S14878. Senator Pell’s bill, S. 2554, was not enacted; nor was H.R. 5254, a similar bill introduced in the House on October 7, 1994, by Representative Howard Berman. 27 In the 104th Congress, that legislation was the American Overseas Interests Act of 1995 (H.R. 1561-Gilman, and S. 908-Helms). President Clinton vetoed this legislation on April 12, 1996; the House override vote on April 30,1996 failed to achieve the two-thirds necessary for passage (234-188). Similar legislation in the 105th Congress, H.R. 1486, was replaced by three separate bills after consideration by the House Rules Committee on June 3, 1997: H.R. (continued...) CRS-12 called for the Special Envoy to have ambassadorial rank and to actively promote negotiations between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese government. U.S. Administration officials opposed these provisions, primarily because of concerns about the creation of an ambassadorial rank position for an entity (Tibet) that the United States recognizes as part of China rather than as an independent country in its own right. On October 31, 1997, in a move seen as a compromise to appeal to proponents of the “Special Envoy” position, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright designated a Special Coordinator for Tibetan issues within the State Department and named Gregory Craig to serve in the position concurrently with his job as Director of Policy Planning. Although the new Special Coordinator position did not come with ambassadorial rank, its creation nevertheless suggested there would be a higher level of official attention on issues involving Tibet. Consequently, the 105th Congress dropped the Special Envoy provision from subsequent legislation. On January 20, 1999, the position of Special Coordinator for Tibet was assumed by Julia Taft, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees, and Migration. Assistant Secretary Taft has met with the Dalai Lama on several occasions, including in April 1999 in Frankfurt and in August 1999 in New York. Congressional efforts to raise the profile of Tibet over the last ten years or more have been resisted or mitigated by successive U.S. Administrations, but generally in a low profile, non-confrontational manner. As early as 1986, when Congress passed legislation authorizing Export-Import Bank funding which listed Tibet as a separate country, President Reagan signed the legislation into law.28 In his remarks, however, the President said: I note that Tibet is listed as a country in section 8. The United States recognizes Tibet as part of the People’s Republic of China. I interpret Tibet’s inclusion as a separate country to be a technical oversight.29 In other respects, however, the consistent pressure of interest groups, often working through legislative vehicles, has contributed to U.S. Administrations being forced to acknowledge, however subtly, the Tibetan activist position. Thus, President George Bush in 1991 became the first U.S. President to meet with the Dalai Lama, while President Bill Clinton met with the Dalai Lama several times. Although these meetings were deliberately kept low-key and informal, they nevertheless offended Chinese leaders, as did the Clinton Administration’s decision, after having 27 (...continued) 1757, authorizing appropriations for the State Department for FY1998-1999 (and containing the Tibet Special Envoy provision); H.R. 1758, the European Security Act (NATO enlargement); and H.R. 1759, a foreign aid authorization and reform bill. The Special Envoy provision was dropped from this separate legislation before final passage. 28 29 H.R. 5548 was approved on October 15, and became P.L. 99-472. “Statement on Signing the Export-Import Bank Act Amendments of 1986,” October 15, 1986, in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, Book II, June 28 to December 31, 1986, pp. 1390-1391. CRS-13 opposed the Special Envoy position for 4 years, to compromise by establishing the position of Special Coordinator for Tibetan Affairs. International Campaign for Tibet (ICT). Apart from the Dalai Lama, a number of interest groups established both in the United States and abroad since the mid-1980s have worked to bring the Tibetan cause to the attention of the Administration, the international community, and Members of Congress. These groups remain important forces of influence on the political scene in 2000. Among the most visible advocates for the Tibetan cause is the U.S.-based International Campaign for Tibet (ICT), formed in 1988. Although the ICT pursues broader human rights issues involving Tibet, its primary goals concern Tibet’s political and international status — specifically, to help Tibet regain independence from China, which the ITC regards as an illegal occupying power. Through its work, the ITC hopes to create sufficient international support for Tibet to force China to begin serious talks with the Dalai Lama about Tibet’s future status. The ITC has offices in Washington and Amsterdam. Although it occasionally receives small grants (for instance, from the National Endowment for Democracy), the ITC is largely dependent on donations from private individuals. The Committee of 100 for Tibet. In a similar vein, the Committee of 100 for Tibet, formed in 1992, seeks to put Tibet on the international agenda, and to encourage international support for a free, independent Tibet. According to its selfdescription, the Committee maintains “uncompromising support of the Tibetan peaceful struggle for independence,” and it “cooperates with and complements the work of other organizations working for Tibet and the Tibetan people.”30 The Committee tries to disseminate news about Tibet through the World Tibet Network News (WTN) and the Tibet News Digest. Its membership (of approximately 100) is an international one, and draws heavily from the traditionally liberal actor/artist community (including Richard Gere, Joan Baez, John Cleese, Marvin Hamlisch, and Catherine Ingram); the Nobel Laureate community (13 Nobel prize winners, including Desmond Tutu and Elie Wiesel); and current and former U.S. officials (House International Relations Committee Chairman Ben Gilman, Representative Charlie Rose, former Attorney General Ramsey Clark, and former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Jean Kirkpatrick). Membership also includes officials associated with other Tibetan activist organizations, including Lodi Gyari, president of the International Campaign for Tibet; Rinchen Dharlo, representative of the Dalai Lama to North America; and Tsewang Phuntso, president of the Tibetan Youth Congress. The Tibet Information Network (TIN). A third group, the Tibet Information Network (TIN – formed in October 1987) describes its goal as providing “accurate information free from political bias” (a claim supported by a spokesperson from the office of the U.S. Special Coordinator for Tibetan Affairs).31 Contrary to other advocacy/support groups on Tibet, TIN is an independent news organization. Based in London, with a U.S. office in Jackson, Wyoming, TIN maintains it is not associated 30 Taken from the group’s website, which also includes a complete list of the group’s membership. [http://www.tibet.org/Tibet100/] 31 Quote taken from the TIN website: [http://www.tibetinfo.net/admin/whattin.htm] CRS-14 with any government organizations or other Tibet-related organizations. Since its inception, TIN has been providing reports on social, economic, and political developments in Tibet, based on both official Chinese and Tibetan sources, and on independent observations from foreign visitors. In addition to its website, TIN offers its “News subscribers” about 35 faxed or e-mailed news reports annually, plus periodic book length studies, and moderate length briefing papers. Subscribers to its TIN Publications Service receive mailed copies of more in-depth reports a minimum of four times a year. Human Rights, Religious, and Other “Values” Groups Scarcely a factor in U.S. relations with China prior to the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown, human rights and other issues involving American ideals and values have increased markedly since then as components of the U.S. policy debate. Early in the Bush Administration, these issues were expressed as vague though deeply felt general concepts – that the Chinese government needed to improve its record on human rights, for example, or needed to release political prisoners arrested during the Tiananmen demonstrations. But throughout the Bush and Clinton Administrations, the American concept of human rights in China acquired a more complex character, partly through the efforts of relevant interest groups. In the last decade, issues considered under the “human rights” umbrella have multiplied to include demographics and family planning issues, sentencing and treatment of prisoners, crackdowns on nascent political and social movements, aspects of religious worship, environmental and other quality of life issues, rule of law and democracy-building initiatives, and a host of others. Human Rights. To a great extent, a wide variety of organized interest groups have human rights issues as a component of their political platforms. In the strictest sense, however two important groups – Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch – may be said to be “human rights groups” in that it is their entire mission to focus international attention on a broad range of human rights abuses, both in China and elsewhere. Although they well pre-date Tiananmen Square, these two international organizations often share common goals with other groups mentioned elsewhere in this paper that represent issues that arose later in the policy debate – religious groups, the Tibet Lobby, and democracy advocacy groups being only a few. With their extensive networks, however, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have the broadest and deepest reach in making human rights in China a key U.S. policy focus. Amnesty International. Amnesty International (hereafter referred to as “Amnesty”) is for many the standard by which other human rights organizations generally are measured. Founded in 1961 after a one-year campaign called “Appeal for Amnesty 1961" attracted broad international support, Amnesty today has more than 1 million members and donors in more than 160 countries and territories. Amnesty regularly reports on, writes about, and testifies concerning a broad range of human rights abuses in China.32 Focusing solely on individuals, Amnesty maintains 32 According to Amnesty officials, some Members of Congress have “adopted” Chinese (continued...) CRS-15 that it takes no position on often political questions such as the status of territory. This enables it often to work effectively with officials of the U.S. and other governments, because its mission insulates it from many divisive political issues. In one of its recent campaigns involving China, Amnesty USA pushed for American businesses to adopt a set of voluntary principles for the human rights of Chinese workers under their employ. Human Rights Watch (HRW). A newer group, Human Rights Watch (HRW) was founded in 1978. While also pursuing a mission of protecting international human rights, HRW considers itself different from Amnesty in that it focuses less on individuals and more on governments. HRW claims to “investigate and expose human rights violations and hold abusers accountable,” and to “challenge governments and those who hold power to end abusive practices...”33 HRW is more involved in the U.S. policy process than Amnesty, through meetings with State Department officials, and also with officials at the National Security Council, Commerce Department, and U.S. Trade Representative’s office, as well as with Members of Congress. HRW’s Washington D.C. office essentially wears two hats in the U.S. policy process – participating in information exchanges with U.S. government offices, and sometimes adopting an adversarial position on policy issues. A spokesman from the organization described this interactive relationship with U.S. policymakers as “schizophrenic but functional.”34 HRW enjoys a wide audience for its views. The group’s representatives readily volunteer instances where they cannot confirm human rights abuse allegations in China that other, less well-known groups claim are true. Democracy, Rule-of-Law. The demise of the Soviet Union left U.S. policymakers searching for a new framework for pursuing foreign policy objectives. By the early 1980s, officials in the Reagan Administration, Members of Congress from both parties, and others had come to believe that the United States needed to make a more concerted effort to promote democratic ideals abroad.35 Consequently, in 1983, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) was established (with the passage of the State Department Authorization Act, FY84-85)36 as a private, nonprofit corporation charged with the mission of encouraging the development and expansion of democratic institutions in other countries by providing grants to NGOs for that purpose. National Endowment for Democracy(NED)/International Republican Institute (IRI). Although controversy surrounds its status as a private NGO funded 32 (...continued) citizens that Amnesty believes to be political prisoners, regularly making appeals and inquiries about these prisoners. 33 [http://www.hrw.org/about/about/html] 34 Interview with Mike Jendrzejczyk, Washington Director of HRW’s Asia Division. 35 See Epstein, Susan, “National Endowment for Democracy: Policy and Funding Issues,” CRS Report 96-222 F. 36 The National Endowment for Democracy Act became Title V of that comprehensive legislation, which was signed into law by President Reagan on November 22, 1983. (P.L. 98164) CRS-16 solely by the U.S. government, NED’s contention has been that this dual identity is what allows the organization to field programs in China and other countries where official U.S. government involvement would be either unwelcome or too risky. NED meets its objectives largely by providing grants to four specified core groups, a policy that has been criticized by some in Congress as insufficiently open to competition. The International Republican Institute (IRI), one of the four groups funded by NED, maintains an active and growing program involving China.37 As with the other NED core groups, the International Republican Institute receives its funding from the federal government while maintaining its NGO status and identity. The Institute’s board of directors draws heavily from sitting Members of Congress and former U.S. government officials.38 Like officials and representatives of almost every other NGO, IRI officials have testified before Congress about their programs and insights involving China. It is difficult to tell, however, whether IRI has influenced congressional decision-making on China, or whether congressional imperatives and ideals have influenced IRI’s program direction. IRI’s China efforts generally have been received well in Congress in as much as they involve programs that are consistent with traditional congressional interests. In this sense, IRI’s initiatives appear to perform a balancing role in the congressional China debate by offering vehicles capable of attracting broad support within the Administration and Congress during times of tension in U.S.-China relations. At the same time, IRI is particularly noteworthy for its appeal to internationalists in government and elsewhere who, regardless of their party affiliation, ideological leanings, or views about China, believe that forces of the global marketplace and ongoing open dialogue are the appropriate agents for change in and interaction with China. In the months after its China program began, for instance, IRI was the subject of complimentary comments by Republican Senator Richard Lugar39 and Democratic Representative Lee Hamilton40 – both former chairmen of international affairs 37 The other three core groups are the National Democratic Institute of International Affairs (NDI), representing the Democratic Party, the American Center for International Labor Solidarity, affiliated with the AFL-CIO; and the Center for International Private Enterprise, affiliated with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. 38 IRI’s Board includes Senators John McCain (Board Chairman) and Chuck Hagel; Representatives David Dreier and Jim Kolbe; and former U.S. Government officials Brent Scowcroft, Jeane Kirkpatrick, and Lawrence Eagleburger, among others. 39 Speaking about NED and its four core groups, Senator Lugar, a member of NED’s Board of Directors commented on the NED’s “strong bipartisan support,” saying “Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives, academicians, practitioners...openly and knowingly praise the work of NED and...its four core institutes....” Congressional Record, July 27, 1993, p. S9568. 40 On IRI’s sponsorship of a seminar in Beijing on the legislative process: “I would like to commend the International Republic Institute and particularly its Asian regional director, Ms. Lorraine Spiess...Sessions like these are a fine example of the ways in which the United States, as part of a strategy of engagement, can make a significant and positive contribution to discussion in China on that country’s political system.” Statement submitted by (continued...) CRS-17 committees in their respective bodies. IRI’s focus on helping to build democratic institutions in China will continue to be viewed with interest by Congress, and the Institute’s work in China is likely to continue to be a credible force for moderation and engagement in U.S. China policy. Religious Groups. Throughout the Bush and Clinton Administrations, political activism by conservative Christian groups has been a continuing feature of the American political scene. Such groups appear to have become more outspoken in recent years on matters where moral values are seen to be at stake. U.S. China policy is one of these areas. Two key influential groups in this movement have been the Christian Coalition and the Family Research Council. The Christian Coalition. The Christian Coalition, founded in 1989 by Pat Robertson, was still relatively unknown as a political actor early in the Bush Administration. By 1993-94, however, under the executive directorship of Ralph Reed, the Christian Coalition had become a visible and controversial presence on the American political scene. Putting particular emphasis on grass-roots activism, “voters guides,” and candidate questionnaires, the Coalition specialized in helping to elect candidates who were sympathetic to the group’s values and ideology. The Family Research Council (FRC). The Family Research Council (FRC) was part of the group “Focus on the Family” from 1988-1992, until the two parted company in October 1992. Under president Gary Bauer, who served in the Reagan Administration for eight years, The Family Research Council after 1992 became a more formidable presence on the political scene. While emphasizing similar “values” issues as the Christian Coalition, the FRC also seems to have had more involvement in foreign policy matters, including those involving China. Throughout much of the 1990s, the primary China focus of the conservative Christians appeared involved in working to keep restrictions in place on U.S. funding for international family planning programs. China had been a particular target of these efforts since 1984, when the Reagan Administration, at the 2nd U.N. International Conference on Population in Mexico City, established the requirement that the U.N. Population Fund (UNFPA) provide “concrete assurances that [it] is not engaged in, or does not provide funding for, abortion or coercive family planning programs.” Concern at the time was highest over China because of allegations that had recently surfaced about its coercive family planning practices. 41 During the Bush Administration, a slight majority in Congress tried to resume funding for UNFPA 40 (...continued) Representative Lee Hamilton, Congressional Record, November 30, 1994, p. E2361. 41 Subsequently, in the FY85 Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 99-88), Congress enacted even more restrictive language, prohibiting appropriated funds from going to any organization or program which the President determined to be supporting or participating in a coercive family planning program. Largely as a result of the conservative Christian Right, and through the efforts of congressional pro-life supporters, most subsequent foreign aid appropriations acts have included provisions prohibiting U.S. family planning assistance to UNFPA unless the President certifies that that organization is not involved in family planning activities in China. CRS-18 through foreign aid authorization and appropriations bills. In 1989, Congress specified that population assistance funds should go to UNFPA in the FY90 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill; President Bush vetoed the measure in part because of this inclusion, and the provision was removed. In 1997, during the 105th Congress, the FRC, Christian Coalition, and other conservative Christian groups became significantly more involved in the American China debate than during the previous decade. Keeping to tradition, they remained active on anti-abortion issues as these related to legislation involving China. In addition, these groups became particularly active on two other issues: religious persecution, and China’s MFN status.42 Partially as a result of this involvement by conservative Christian groups, the congressional debate on China beginning in 1997 drew on attitudes involving morality and values, and these attitudes have persisted to an extent into 2000. The Clinton Administration was singled out for particular criticism for its policies. In tandem with the more direct involvement of conservative Christian elements in the policy process, beginning in 1997, congressional efforts expanded upon measures targeting China for its coercive family planning practices. Representative Tillie Fowler introduced H.R. 2570, a bill that would have required the United States to deny visas to any Chinese national or Chinese government official who credibly could be determined to have been involved in either establishing or enforcing population policies resulting in forced sterilization or forced abortion. A similar measure was introduced in the Senate by Senator Abraham. 43 Ultimately, neither measure was enacted, although both bodies held hearings and the House passed an amended version of H.R. 2570. The debate on international religious persecution highlighted important differences in the American religious community between many mainstream religious groups, on the one hand, and the FRC, Christian Coalition, and other conservative religious organizations, on the other. Many members of religious-affiliated groups, such as the National Council of Churches and the National Association of Evangelicals, were supportive of concerns about religious persecution, but worked to moderate pending legislation and in some cases actively opposed pending bills.44 These moderating sentiments were not shared by the Coalition, the FRC, or other similarly inclined conservative Christian groups. Partly as a result of increased activity by these groups, Congress in 1997-1998 considered several measures relating to international religious persecution, and 42 At a press conference in August of 1997, the Christian Coalition’s new president, Don Hodel, announced that combating international religious persecution would be the Coalition’s top legislative priority, and he suggested that the Coalition would try to influence foreign policy – specifically, try to revoke China’s MFN status – in its effort to pursue this goal. [http://www.pfaw.org/issues/right/bg_cc.shtml] 43 44 Section 101(5) of S. 1164, the China Policy Act of 1997, introduced on Sept. 11, 1997. Among the groups opposing or working to moderate pending legislation on religious persecution were the United Church of Christ; the National Council of Churches; the World Alliance of Reformed Churches; and the Billy Graham Evangelistic Association. CRS-19 enacted one – H.R. 2431, the Freedom From Religious Persecution Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-292), introduced by Representative Wolf. Originally introduced as H.R. 1685 on May 20, 1997, Representative Wolf’s bill would have established the U.S. Office of Religious Persecution Monitoring, and would have imposed sanctions against countries engaged in religious persecution. But the bill faced key objections from some Members because of its trade-related sanctions – notably, from Members of the House Ways and Means Committee, which has jurisdiction over trade issues. As a result, the bill’s proponents elected to compromise, and the bill was reintroduced on September 8, 1997, with minor changes, including the deletion of a provision linking a country’s religious tolerance with U.S. support for its WTO membership. On March 25, 1998, the House International Relations committee marked up the bill, adopting an amendment by Chairman Gilman. The Gilman amendment added language about the Xinjiang Autonomous Region in China, formerly East Turkestan, which is the home of large numbers of Muslim Uighurs; established definitions and separate remedies for “Category 1" persecution (officially sanctioned or conducted by the government), and “Category 2" persecution (not officially sanctioned); and softened the presidential waiver authority restrictions. Both houses ultimately passed the legislation, and it was signed into law on October 27, 1998.45 Conservative Christian groups also became involved in the debate over renewing China’s MFN status in 1997. As a result, the annual trade debate became heavily laden with moral values arguments. Tangible evidence of this involvement came in the form of a letter made available during the most-favored-nation (MFN) renewal debate in 1997, which specifically linked religious persecution of Chinese Christians with renewal of China’s MFN status. The letter, signed by key leaders of conservative Christian organizations, including the Christian Coalition and the Family Research Council, made clear the differences of opinion these groups had with Christian missionary groups in China.46 Other Members echoed these beliefs during the MFN debate. During floor debate, Representative Richard Gephardt stated that the debate was about “principle and value and belief.”47 Representative Frank Wolf criticized Administration policy toward China as a policy that had “fundamentally failed. It is not true to American values...It is amoral, and I personally believe it is 45 The House passed an amended version of the bill it on May 14, 1998, by a vote of 375-41. On July 6, 1998, the bill was placed on the Senate legislative calendar for the first time. On July 7, 1998, the bill was placed on the Senate legislative calendar for the second time, under General Orders. The Senate passed the bill, amended, on October 9, 1998, by a vote of 98-0. The following day, on October 10, 1998, the House acceded to the Senate amendment. 46 “Open Letter on China’s Persecution of Christians,” printed in the Congressional Record during House floor debate on MFN renewal, June 24, 1997, pp. H4240-4241. Signors included Gary Bauer (president, Family Research council), Ralph Reed (executive director, Christian Coalition), and Rev. Richard John Neuhaus (president, Institute for Religious and Public Life). The letter referred to the group’s deep respect and support for missionaries around the world, but indicated they did not agree with their stand which urged Members “not to vote to revoke China’s Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) trade status.” (P. H4240) The letter supported the U.S. Catholic Conference in opposing MFN for China. 47 Floor debate, Congressional Record, June 24, 1997, p. H4273. CRS-20 immoral.”48 Representative Dana Rohrabacher described MFN for China as a taxpayer subsidy for elite American corporations, and “an abomination.”49 Of the two groups, the FRC has appeared more proactive than the Christian Coalition on foreign affairs issues, particularly in the China debate. Both groups maintain extensive web sites, each of which illustrates the particular focal issues of its host. The Coalition’s website contains an “Issue Positions” section, but appears to concentrate on more traditional values-based issues, such as education and school prayer. The FRC, on the other hand, moves beyond these traditional subjects, and in addition to religious persecution, includes foreign affairs and military readiness as among the “Issues in Depth” on which it is active. Issues involving China are crossreferenced to all three of these areas in the group’s web site, and hotlinks to other, related web sites are provided on issues involving the debate over China’s trade status. Written products advertised in these sites include materials on China’s “Laogai” (prison system), religious persecution in China, China as a security threat to the United States, and Chinese espionage in the United States. The FRC website also contains extensive information on contacting Congress. Empirical evidence suggests that the influence of the religious right in the U.S. China debate reached a zenith in 1997-98. Although still active, these groups have adopted a lower profile in American policy debates in 1999-2000. Both the Christian Coalition and the Family Research Council have had key leadership changes within the past two years, with the departure of Ralph Reed from the Coalition in 1997 and Gary Bauer (who went on extended leave of absence during his exploration for a presidential bid) from the FRC in January 1999. The new president of the Coalition, Kenneth L. Connor, and the new executive vice president, Charles A. Donovan (serving in their current positions since September 2000) both have good conservative credentials, but it is unclear whether they can muster the kind of political clout and visibility for the Coalition that Reed enjoyed. “Think Tanks” and Other Public Policy/Research Groups Independent research and educational groups – so-called “think tanks” – have been an important source of influence and information on U.S. policy toward China since before normalization of relations in 1979. These groups are distinctive from academic research institutions (many of which also influence American decisions and actions involving China) in the extent of their focus on public policy research, which makes them particularly relevant to many U.S. policymakers. These groups generally seek to bring together in conferences and working group sessions researchers and specialists in the academic community, members of the business community, and U.S. and foreign government policy makers to confer about current issues and problems. Often, the end-result is a published work – a pamphlet, book, or journal – analyzing the results of the discussions and setting forth a list of policy recommendations. 48 Ibid, p. H4271. In other criticisms of White House policy toward China, Representative Gerald Solomon termed it “appeasement,” and said it was “a policy out of touch with reality.” (p. H4244); Representative Duncan Hunter referred to the utterings of a Tickle-Me-Elmo doll as “more coherent than the trade policy of the Clinton Administration.” (p. H4250). 49 Ibid, p. H4247. CRS-21 Funding is a constant preoccupation of public policy think tanks. Money comes from various sources: in some cases, from U.S. government contracts (as with RAND and similar federal contract research centers), but more generally from corporate or private contributions, foundation grants, and to a lesser extent, sale of the organization’s publications. While many of the interest groups discussed elsewhere in this paper are advocacy groups, seeking to influence congressional decision making on China on a specific issue, or on behalf of a deeply-held conviction or a category of people, public policy research groups generally seek broader roles in the policy process. Although all these organizations describe themselves as “private, non-profit, non-partisan” institutions (emphasis added), each tends to be associated with a particular political point of view, and sometimes with a particular political party. These institutional inclinations become clearer on examination of their boards of directors and advisors, the chairs of their working groups, the participants in their conferences, and their sources of funding. Given these ideological predispositions, a think tank’s influence in the policy process may be cyclical – rising and falling depending on whether its values are shared by the current Administration or Congress. National Committee on U.S.-China Relations (NCUSCR). Some public policy research groups start from the premise that further Sino-American contacts will improve mutual understanding. They seek to foster exchange and dialogue, both among policymakers and among those outside the governmental community, and they provide a forum for debate, discussion, and research on related issues. One of the most well-known and influential of these groups is the New York-based National Committee on U.S.-China relations (hereafter referred to as the National Committee). Another, significantly smaller and newer than the National Committee, is the Washington-based U.S. China Policy Foundation (the Foundation). Founded by a group of scholars and leaders in the business, civic, and religious communities, the National Committee came into being in 1966, long before U.S.China normalization in 1979, at a time when Americans knew little about China and there was no official and little unofficial contact between Americans and Chinese. National Committee officials state that the human and written resources they provided in those early years were among the few available on China. As the U.S.-China relationship changed, so did the National Committee’s role. In the 1960s, the Committee provided information and encouraged public discourse about China. In the 1970s, by its account, it “handled all subsequent [to 1972] exchanges between the United States and China prior to normalization of relations in 1979.”50 Beginning in the 1980s, the Committee initiated projects involving multiple cities, organizations, and countries. Throughout its existence, the National Committee has sponsored American delegation visits to China and Chinese delegation visits to the United States. In Chinese culture, where personal contacts and their longevity count for much, the National Committee enjoys considerable access. This is undoubtedly facilitated 50 Quote from National Committee materials, [http://www.neuser.org/history.htm] CRS-22 by the relevant experience and caliber of its board of directors. Chaired by Barber Conable, a former Member of Congress, the board is replete with current and former U.S. government officials who gained experience working with China during their government tenures; eminent scholars specializing in China and Asia; and prominent business leaders.51 As the Committee points out, its membership includes: ...over 700 people who represent many points of view, but share the belief that increased public knowledge of China and U.S.-China relations enhances international understanding and contributes to the effective conduct of foreign policy.52 The nature of the organization and the people associated with it means that, unlike with some of the other NGOs, it can be difficult to point to an issue or an instance where the Committee’s input had a decisive influence on a particular policy decision. Rather, the Committee’s focus is directed more toward the overall policy process than can be demonstrated by debate on any single issue. National Committee Board members, officers, and members routinely testify at congressional hearings on China, participate in briefings for U.S. government officials, and prepare briefing materials for delegations visiting China.53 National Committee publications, such as its China Policy Series, are well-known among policymakers. In recent years, the National Committee has been primarily involved in what has come to be called the “track 2" dialogue, an attempt to supplement faltering official U.S.-China talks with unofficial but high-level visits by former U.S. government officials and others with influence in the policy process.54 The National Committee continues to be involved with congressional delegation trips to China, providing access, information, and funding. Critics have sometimes cited the National Committee as being excessively proengagement and unwilling to endorse broad punitive sanctions or to give sufficient recognition to China as a potential long-term security threat. In 1997, for instance, when allegations surfaced about illegal campaign contributions by Chinese government sources, the National Committee received negative public scrutiny and criticism for having paid for congressional trips to China after having received money from the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs. 55 In 2000, Senator Jesse 51 A partial list of board members in 1998 included Gerald Ford, Nancy Kassebaum Baker, David Boren, Barbara Franklin, Sam Gibbons, Arthur Hummel, James Schlesinger, Brent Scowcroft, Richard Solomon, Robert McNamara, and Ezra Vogel. 52 National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, 1998 Annual Report, p. 1. 53 Representative Lee Hamilton, for instance, referred to the National Committee as having prepared extensive briefing materials for a delegation of former Members of Congress visiting China. Congressional Record, June 18, 1997, p. E1245. 54 According to some, an additional benefit of the “track 2" dialogue is that unofficial groups can raise issues in China without first having to explain their mission or its purpose to Congress. John Pomfret, “U.S. Seeks China-Taiwan Dialogue; Delegation Attempts to Facilitate Back Channel of Communication,” Washington Post, February 21, 1998, p. A16. 55 Sara Fritz and Janet Hook, China Hosted Several Lawmakers, Records Show...”, Los (continued...) CRS-23 Helms sought to hold up a federal grant for the National Committee, criticizing the organization for its views of China and for what he implied were the national security implications of the Committee’s hosting of visiting Chinese scholars.56 U.S.-China Policy Foundation. With a similar philosophy as that of the National Committee, the U.S.-China Policy Foundation was founded in 1995 by a small group of current and retired U.S. government officials and a U.S. businessman.57 According to the Foundation’s own account, the group was founded to counteract what its founders saw as a series of misunderstandings and other deteriorating factors in U.S.-China relations in the mid-1990s. According to the group’s literature and website, those associated with the group in various advisory positions are Senators Max Baucus and Dianne Feinstein, former U.S. Ambassador to China James Sasser, and former Secretary of State Al Haig, among others.58 The U.S.-China Policy Foundation’s location a few blocks from Capitol Hill facilitates lunch seminars for congressional staff on issues involving China. But the Foundation is a significantly smaller group than the National Committee, with far less funding; none of its founders or advisors hold paid positions. Still, the Foundation has close contacts with the National Committee (several of its founders and advisors are on the National Committee’s Board), and was one of the hosting organizations for a dinner for Premier Zhu Rongji during his April 1999 Washington visit. The Foundation has a monthly newsletter, U.S.-China Policy Review, and twice yearly publishes the Washington Journal of Modern China. Recently, the Foundation has been begun to explore sponsoring regular congressional staff delegation visits to China. The indications are that the Foundation is interested in expanding its presence and programs in the coming years. The American Enterprise Institute (AEI). The American Enterprise Institute (AEI) is a center-right scholarly organization founded in 1943. AEI lists its revenues in 1998 at $19.6 million, which its annual report says is a 19 percent increase over the previous year.59 AEI does public policy work on a broad range of subjects, including the world economy, U.S. foreign policy, and political and social issues. According to its own mission statement, AEI is dedicated to the concepts of “limited government, competitive private enterprise, vital cultural and political institutions, and 55 (...continued) Angeles Times, June 14, 1997, p. A16. 56 Senator Helms’s objection was to the State Department’s plan to give a $355,000 for FY2000 to the National Committee to support its cultural and educational programs. Mufson, Steven, “Abroad at Home: The State Department; China Relations Group Feels Helms’s Pull,” Washington Post, October 19, 2000, p. A29. 57 The Foundation founders are: Dr. Wang Chi, and former Assistant Secretary of Defense Chas Freeman (cochairs); former Ambassador John Holdridge; former Ambassador Arthur Hummel; Dr. Leo Orleans; and Mr. Gary Shaw. According to Dr. Wang, this group functions like an executive committee for the Foundation. 58 59 See the Foundation’s website: [http://users.erols.com/uscpf/advisors.html] See “Finances” section of AEI Annual Report for 1999, the text of which can be found on AEI’s website. CRS-24 vigilant defense.”60 Its Asian Studies Program is directed by Arthur Waldron (titled Visiting Scholar), and addresses “Asian security, trade, economic development, and democratization and human rights issues...”61 Others associated with AEI’s Asia work are: former U.S. Ambassador to China James Lilley, Lawrence B. Lindsey, John Makin, and Nick Eberstadt. AEI scholars have testified on a wide range of issues before Congress, including on China. The Heritage Foundation. According to its mission statement, the Heritage Foundation, founded in 1973, seeks to “formulate and promote conservative public policies” on a range of issues.62 Its board of trustees includes Edwin J. Feulner, Richard M. Scaife, Holland Coors, and J. William Middendorf II. In the two-year fund-raising campaign of 1998-1999, Heritage reportedly raised $104.8 million. The organization appeared to take a moderate position on U.S.-China policy during the Bush Administration, but it has been sharply critical of the Clinton Administration’s policies, accusing it of “continued lack of clarity.” At the same time, as further indication of the complexity of the U.S. China policy environment, Heritage generally has been both in favor of free trade and consistently supportive of giving China PNTR status. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) identifies itself as centrist. Originally affiliated with Georgetown University, it became independent in the 1980s. Its budget in 1999 was approximately $17 million. According to its mission statement, CSIS’ goal is “to inform and shape selected policy decisions in government and the private sector by providing long-range, anticipatory, and integrated policy thinking...”63 On its board of trustees, chaired by Sam Nunn, are: David Abshire, Anne Armstrong, Harold Brown, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Henry Kissinger, Carla Hills, Brent Scowcroft, and James Schlesinger, among others. In addition to working with U.S. government officials and Members of Congress on key policy issues, CSIS places a high priority on serving its primary source of funding – corporate members – and, upon request, provides personal briefings, consultations, and special written policy assessments for senior corporate officers on policy issues. CSIS corporate supporters are often invited to attend meetings with or join distinguished groups of current and former U.S. government officials. The Brookings Institution. Founded in 1916, the moderate-to-liberal Brookings Institution is the oldest public policy institute in the United States. Consistent with other public policy think tanks, it strives to be a “bridge between scholarship and public policy,” and says that it is committed to publishing its findings.64 Nearly one-third of Brookings’ annual revenue comes from its sizeable endowment, with another 38 percent from gifts and grants. Brookings is able to 60 See “Mission Statement,” Ibid. 61 [www.aei.org/research/description/html] 62 [http://www.heritage.org/annual_report/mission.html] 63 [http://www.csis.org/html/csismiss.html] 64 [http://www.brook.edu/about/aboutbi.htm] CRS-25 devote much of these established financial resources to carrying out its own research and educational activities. Work on China is carried out through the auspices of the Institution’s Foreign Policy Studies Program, under the direction of vice-president Richard N. Haass. Through this program, specialists analyze global events and make policy recommendations designed to defend and promote U.S. interests in the global environment. Brookings scholars regularly testify before Congress and brief Executive Branch officials on important policy issues. Scholars working on China include: Bates Gill, Nicholas R. Lardy, David Shambaugh, and Michael E. O’Hanlon. The Institution’s active trustrees include James Johnson (chairman and CEO), Michael H. Armacost (president), Zoe Baird, former Rep. Lee Hamilton, and Warren Rudman. The “Business Lobby” The so-called “China business lobby”is a broad assortment of business groups with economic interests in China, who generally support engagement policies as pursued by recent U.S. Administrations. They include: agribusiness interests and farmers; importers of toys, clothing and textiles, electronic products, shoes, and other consumer goods manufactured in China; high-tech, telecommunications, energy, and manufacturing industries concerned with increasing exports; the entertainment industry; and the financial and services sectors, among others. The economic pull of a potentially vast “China market” has prompted business community involvement in U.S. China policy since the formative days of the relationship. (The U.S.-China Business Council, for instance, a prominent group influencing U.S.-China policy, was formed in 1973, following the Nixon/Kissinger opening to China.) But China’s crackdown in Tiananmen Square during the first year of the Bush Administration drove many investors away from the China market, eroded business confidence in China’s economic potential, and made it difficult for business groups to defend U.S. relations with China. Given the negative domestic and international view of China in the aftermath of Tiananmen Square, “no one [in the business community] wanted to be an apologist” for Chinese leaders’ actions, in the words of one business representative.65 In the first years after Tiananmen Square, then, the business community tended to keep a low profile, leaving President Bush to defend U.S.-China relations and, ultimately, protect American business interests. By 1991, partly in response to efforts in Congress to withdraw or place further conditions on China’s MFN trade status, business groups became more active in trying to protect China’s trade status. By the mid-1990s, the investment climate in China also had improved noticeably – a circumstance which traditionally has spurred heightened business community activity on China issues.66 The U.S.-China Business Council. One of the most prominent business organizations seeking to influence U.S. China policy is the U.S.-China Business Council (“the Council”), formed in 1973 as the National Council for U.S.-China 65 Remarks attributed to R.D. Folsom, member of the Business Coalition for U.S.-China Trade, by Tricia Cortez in “Cash, Clash, and Compromise,” a senior thesis for Princeton University, cited in a report for the Congressional Research Service (97-48 F) by Robert Sutter, China: Interest Groups and Recent U.S. Policy, December 30, 1996, p. 32. 66 Interview with Karen Sutter, of the U.S.-China Business Council, June 7, 2000. CRS-26 Trade. Primarily, the Council serves the interests of its member corporations, providing market information and advice about investing in or trading with China; publishing a bimonthly magazine and a monthly newsletter on developments in China’s trade and investment climate; and maintaining a U.S.-China Legal Cooperation Fund supported by contributions from some of its member corporations. In addition, according to a self-description, the Council is “a private, non-profit, nonpartisan” organization that carries out “activities in support of [U.S.] government policies conducive to expanded U.S.-China commercial and economic ties....”67 The Council works regularly and primarily with U.S. Administration officials on problems and issues involving its constituency, and holds a number of annual conferences and regular meetings to discuss policy issues. The Council was strongly affected by the business community’s disillusionment with China’s potential after the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown. During the succeeding two years, the Council lost two-thirds of its members, and it only began to recover with China’s renewed economic prospects in 1993-94. By the year 2000, the Council had regained its membership, and it now has about 260 member corporations. Council representatives maintain that only two of the approximately 30 staff are involved in public advocacy with congressional offices on issues involving China and that most representations to Congress are carried out by member corporations. Nevertheless, in recent years, the Council has played an active role in the debate over MFN and PNTR trade status for China; Council president Robert Kapp has testified in support of China’s trade status before congressional committees on numerous occasions in recent years.68 The Business Coalition for U.S.-China Trade. The Business Coalition for U.S.-China Trade (“the Coalition”) is a relative newcomer to the U.S. China policy scene. It was established in 1991, the first year that China’s MFN trade status appeared to be in jeopardy. A 1991 article describes the original founding members of the Coalition to be 75 major trade groups and corporations whose goal was to help bolster President Bush in his efforts to maintain China’s trade status.69 According to a Coalition spokesman, the primary founder of the group was the Emergency Committee for American Trade (ECAT), which was founded in 1967 to lobby against import quotas, but in recent years, has been active in efforts to protect China’s MFN trade status.70 Four core organizations remain at the center of the Coalition: ECAT, the U.S.-China Business Council, the Business Roundtable, and the American Chamber of Commerce. The Coalition stands out for its primary focus on protecting China’s trade status. For the past nine years, this has meant promoting annual renewal of China’s MFN 67 From “An Introduction to the U.S.-China Business Council,” which can be found on the group’s website at: [http://www.uschina.org/more/html] 68 The texts of Mr. Kapp’s testimonies can be found on the Council’s website at: [http://www.uschina.org/public/testimony/testimony10.html] 69 70 Stone, Peter, “Big Business Favors China Trade,” The Legal Times, May 27, 1991, p. 5. Conversation with Chris Padilla, Communications Director for the Business Coalition for U.S.-China Trade, June 7, 2000. CRS-27 status, and in the past year, lobbying for Congress to grant China PNTR. According to the Coalition’s Communications Director, now that the PNTR goal has been achieved, the Coalition will go out of existence.71 Decisions about how to organize and prioritize the Coalition’s efforts on PNTR have been made by a Corporate Executive Committee formed in January 2000, co-chaired by executives from Boeing and New York Life. The Coalition has maintained a website and extensive grassroots outreach through its member corporations, but otherwise has little permanent infrastructure. The International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA). The International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA), formed in 1984, is an umbrella organization for seven trade associations involved in U.S. copyright-based industries.72 Like the U.S.China Business Council, IIPA works primarily with U.S. and other government agencies to ensure that governments establish a legal and enforcement regime for copyrighted materials that protects intellectual property, deters piracy, and encourages a beneficial investment and employment climate. IIPA works closely with the U.S. Trade Representative on “Special 301" reviews concerning intellectual property protection, and its website contains the texts of its recommendations on these cases for China and the other approximately 80 countries in which the organization is involved. IIPA work with Congress generally involves efforts to amend U.S. trade laws to provide for better IP protection.73 Non-Proliferation Groups One of the longest-running issues in U.S.-China relations concerns allegations involving transfers of weapons of mass destruction and medium-range ballistic missiles, primarily to Pakistan and to countries in the Middle East. Iran is reported to have been a steady customer of Chinese weapons, having purchased small numbers of SA-2 surface-to-air missiles, F-7 combat aircraft, fast-attack patrol boats, and C802 anti-ship cruise missiles. In May 1998, in response to earlier nuclear weapons tests by India (on May 11 and 28, 1998), Pakistan tested its own nuclear weapons, dramatically announcing its new status as a nuclear power. These tests have been cited by some Members as positive proof that China has violated its agreements and has assisted Pakistan in its nuclear weapons program. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Continuing concerns about China’s weapons sales and nuclear weapons programs have given arms control and non-proliferation groups a natural congressional audience. For the most part, these groups have served as sources of information on technical and scientific aspects of 71 Ibid. 72 The seven are: The Association of American Publishers; The Interactive Digital Software Association; the American Filmmakers Association; the Motion Picture Association of America; the Business Software Alliance; the National Music Publishers’ Association; and the Recording Industry Association of America. Together, these seven associations represent hundreds of corporate members involved in various sectors of the entertainment, publishing, and software industries. 73 IIPA’s website is at [http://www.iipa.com/] CRS-28 weapons systems and comparative studies of China’s force structure with that of other countries. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (the Endowment) is perhaps the oldest and best known of these groups. Founded in 1910 with a gift from Andrew Carnegie, the Endowment works on a broad range of policy issues, of which non-proliferation is only one. The Endowment is governed by a distinguished Board of Trustees of varying backgrounds, including William Donaldson (Chair), former Secretary of Defense William Perry, former Senator Bill Bradley, and Leslie Gelb. While the Endowment does not generally take institutional positions, its nonproliferation experts, programs, and publications have been routinely cited by Members of Congress in floor statements that describe details of China’s nuclear weapons program, missile development, and weapons sales.74 U.S. Administration officials have tended to argue that China is reassessing its weapons sales and assistance policies and that its overall record has been steadily improving. Administration officials cite a series of decisions by China in support of this argument: accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); in 1992, to abide by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR); in 1993, to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention (CSC); in 1996, to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; and in 1997, to join the Zangger Committee of NPT exporters.75 Congressional critics, however, bolstered by independent information from nonproliferation groups, have charged that the Administration’s confidence in China’s non-proliferation policies is misplaced. In 1991, congressional concerns about China’s international weapons sales prompted Members to begin to include adherence to non-proliferation regimes as one of the additional conditions China should meet before having its MFN trade status renewed. In 1992, for instance, Senator Joe Biden expressed his concern in the annual debate over China’s MFN status, saying “...if China continues to behave as a rogue elephant on weapons proliferation, we should be prepared to retaliate with a clear and unequivocal message...denying China mostfavored-nation trade status.”76 In succeeding years, measures targeting China’s weapons proliferation activities have been introduced either as components of MFNrelated bills, or as separate, free-standing measures.77 In September 1999, Congress 74 In addition to its widely read journal, Foreign Policy, which contains regular articles on China, in April 1999, the Endowment published a book devoted to China – China’s Changing Nuclear Posture. 75 On January 12, 1998, President Clinton signed the required certifications to implement a nuclear cooperation agreement with China, citing that there had been “clear assurances” from China on nuclear non-proliferation issues. The actual U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation agreement was signed in 1985, but no cooperation had occurred under the agreement, primarily because of concerns over China’s proliferation activities. 76 77 Congressional Record, July 23, 1991, p. S10640. One example is H.Res. 188, a measure introduced by Representative Gilman, which found the delivery of Chinese C-802 cruise missiles to Iran to be destabilizing and therefore a violation of the Iran-Iraq Non-Proliferation Act of 1992. During floor consideration, the House adopted amendments which, among other things, recommended that the United States not issue any visa to Chinese nationals involved in weapons proliferation (Reps. Porter/Dreier/Matsui). The House passed the amended H.Res. 188 on November 6, 1997, by (continued...) CRS-29 enacted S. 1059, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2000 (P.L. 106-65), which included sense-of-Congress language that China should not be allowed to join the MTRC without meeting certain conditions, and requiring the Administration to submit a report by January 31, 2000, on China’s adherence to the MTCR. The “Taiwan Lobby” No discussion of the role that interest groups play in influencing U.S. China policy would be complete without mention of this group. The loosely defined “Taiwan lobby” is the group of activists considered by many observers to have the most consistent and in-depth influence in the U.S. China policy process. Consisting of Taiwan government officials, members of the business community, groups of American citizens of either Taiwanese or Chinese ancestry, and U.S.-based groups advocating independence for Taiwan, the amorphous pro-Taiwan group appears deeply committed to representing various interests, (not necessarily mutually reinforcing) involving Taiwan at every relevant point in the American policy process. The Taiwan lobby was a critical factor in 1995, for instance, when Congress passed a resolution urging the President to invite Taiwan’s President, Lee Teng-hui, to the United States.78 This invitation reportedly contributed in large part to the 1996 Taiwan Strait missile crisis, the most confrontational crisis in U.S.-China relations since normalization of relations in 1979, involving live-fire missile exercises by China and the corresponding American dispatch of two carrier battle groups to the area. In the 105th Congress (1997-1998), Taiwan interests promoted the passage of a resolution urging Taiwan’s unconditional admittance to the World Trade Organization (WTO), a bill requiring the United States to develop plans for a theater missile defense (TMD) system for Taiwan 79, and several resolutions reaffirming and clarifying U.S. support for Taiwan in conjunction with President Clinton’s “Three Noes” statements in Shanghai, which some interpreted as a change in U.S. policy toward Taiwan.80 In the 106th Congress, Taiwan interests were reflected in the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act (H.R. 1838/S. 693), a bill designed to enhance U.S.-Taiwan military communication and cooperation, and strengthen Taiwan’s security. 77 (...continued) a vote of 414-8. 78 The resolution was H.Con.Res. 53, introduced by Congressman Tom Lantos, which the House passed by a vote of 396-0 on May 2, 1995, and which the Senate passed by a vote of 97-1 on May 9, 1995. 79 80 The WTO legislation, H.Res. 190; TMD system, H.R. 2386. The President made his “three noes” statement in responding to a question at a Shanghai press conference on June 30, 1998. According to a White House transcript of his remarks, the President said: “ I had a chance to reiterate our Taiwan policy, which is that we don’t support independence for Taiwan, or two China’s, or one Taiwan-one China. And we don’t believe that Taiwan should be a member in any organization for which statehood is a requirement. So I think we have a consistent policy.” Among the resolutions introduced as a result were: H.Con.Res. 270 (Rep. Solomon); S.Con.Res. 107 (Sen. Lott); H.Con.Res. 301 (Reps. Delay, Solomon, Snowbarger). CRS-30 Concluding Observations Several observations can be made after examining U.S. China policy over the past decade and the activities of organized interest groups in the policy process. First, the changes that the U.S. policy debate has undergone in recent years suggest that U.S.-China relations are not likely to improve or become less controversial over the near term. While essentially a policy of consensus in the 1980s, questions about the direction of U.S. policy over China became controversial and divisive within a few months of the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989 and have generally remained that way since. Long-standing issues involving non-proliferation, national security, and human rights have only grown in importance within the U.S. policy debate over the past decade. So-called “sovereignty issues” – Tibet, Xinjiang, and most importantly, Taiwan – continue to be divisive and potentially destabilizing issues in the relationship. From this perspective, it would appear that political circumstances will continue to provide opportunities for organized groups who have vested interests in these issues to seek to influence U.S. China policy. Another observation on interest group activity over the past decade has to do with personnel and perception. The perception is that the expansion of interest groups focusing on China in recent years (approximately 50% of the groups listed in this report’s appendix were formed since 1980) represents an ever-widening circle of disenchantment with or vested interest in the current direction of U.S. China policy. In fact, this perception may be somewhat skewed, since some groups have overlapping memberships and advisory boards. In some cases, a new group has been formed by members of other groups representing similar interests, as in the case of the Business Coalition on U.S.-China Trade, in order to focus more attention on a given issue. Although several groups with duplicate memberships working the same issue from different angles can create more of an impression on the policy process than if only one group were working those issues, it does not necessarily follow that dissatisfaction with the policy process is growing – only that the number of interest groups is growing, and that they are becoming more sophisticated in their activities. A second set of observations relates to three points raised initially in this report as being among the reasons for rising interest group activity. The first of these is particularly important: the shift of the debate over the past decade from the single issue of extending China’s MFN status to a growing proliferation of issues unrelated to MFN. Although decisions approving extensions of China’s MFN status became more or less routine beginning in 1993, they did serve as catalysts for consideration of various “alternative” U.S. government proposals on measures involving China policy. But the 106th Congress’ passage of legislation to grant China permanent normal trade relations status may change the dynamic of interest group activity. Business and labor groups heretofore involved heavily in the China MFN/PNTR debate may find both their influence and their solidarity wane with the disappearance of their chief issue. Other interest groups, usually able to count on leveraging the annual trade debate for their own particular goals, could find it much more difficult to initiate new policy measures absent this regular legislative vehicle. In a sense, the annual China trade debate served both as a unifying element and as a kind of “force multiplier” for divergent interest groups; having disappeared as an issue, the CRS-31 implication for interest groups might be increasing fractionalization among groups with divergent interests competing for policy influence. Two other reasons cited for rising interest group activity over the past decade are also subject to possible change over the near term: the blurring of traditional party and ideological lines; and the animosity and partisanship that comes with a divided U.S. government – between a Democratic Congress and the Bush White House, and particularly between a conservative Republican Congress and the Clinton White House. These systemic, sometimes sharp policy differences make it difficult to tell whether the views and actions of interest groups were a contributing factor to policy division, or whether groups were merely exploiting policy differences that already existed. In any event, this policy dynamic also may change dramatically after the American elections in November 2000, with subsequent implications for interest group activity and influence. These issues are important for making future judgements about the role and effectiveness of non-governmental organized interest groups. Absent demonstrable changes in China’s policies or in the nature of the American political process, there are few forces apparent on the horizon that seem capable of making U.S. policy debates on China over the near term significantly smoother than they have been over the past decade. The result will be that these issues will continue being problematic for U.S.-China relations, for American policymakers and the political process, and, indirectly, for internal Chinese policies. CRS-32 Appendix: NGOs Involved in Aspects of U.S. Policy Toward China, 1989-199981 The following list is not comprehensive. It is intended to be a guide to some of the organized interest groups that have been active in U.S.-China policy over the past decade. For further or more detailed information, consult the group’s websites. In addition, non-profit organizations must now file financial disclosure forms with the Internal Revenue Service about their sources of funding and expenses. Information from these disclosures, including a reproduction of the forms themselves, can be found online at [http://www.guidestar.org/search/]. Quotes in the mission descriptions of the groups below come directly from the literature of the organizations themselves. American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (AEI) [http://www.aei.org/] 1150 17th St. N.W. Washington D.C. 20036 Ph: 202-862-5800 Fax: 202-862-7178 Year Founded: 1943 Budget: $19.6 million in revenue in 1998 Funding: Private, corporate, and foundation donations, plus money from conferences and sales. Philosophy: Conservative, non-partisan, non-profit China Focus: Conducted under the Asian Studies section of Foreign and Defense Policy Studies Primary Overall Mission: According to its mission statement, AEI “sponsors original research on the world economy, U.S. foreign policy, and political and social issues. AEI is dedicated to preserving and strengthening the foundations of a free society—limited government, competitive private enterprise, vital cultural and political institutions, and vigilant defense—through rigorous inquiry, debate, and writing. The Institute is home to some of America’s most renowned economists, legal scholars, political scientists, and foreign policy specialists. AEI is an independent, nonpartisan organization financed by tax-deductible contributions from corporations, foundations, and individuals.” According to its description of its Asian Studies Program, AEI “sponsors conferences and publications on Asian security, trade, economic development, democratization, and human rights issues. Current research focuses on the growing offensive capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army, the democratization of Taiwan and PRC-Taiwan relations, the North Korean military threat and prospects for Korean reunification, economic and political reform in the PRC, and the prospects for ‘democratic peace’ throughout the region.” AEIs Asian Studies scholars include: Arthur Waldron (director), John Bolton, Claude Barfield, Nicholas Eberstadt, James R. Lilley, Lawrence B. Lindsey, and John H. Makin. 81 This section draws heavily from CRS Report 97-48, by Robert Sutter, “China: Interest Groups and Recent U.S. Policy – An Introduction,” December 30, 1996, and from the annual reports and websites of the organizations listed. CRS-33 American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) [http://www.aflcio.org/home.htm] 815 16th Street, NW Washington, DC 20006 Ph: 202-637-5000 Fax: 202-637-5058 Year Founded: 1955 Budget: NA Funding: Member dues Philosophy: Pro-labor China Focus: Pertaining largely to trade and labor issues Primary Overall Mission: “The mission of the AFL-CIO is to improve the lives of working families—to bring economic justice to the workplace and social justice to our nation....We will speak for working people in the global economy, in the industries in which we are employed, in the firms where we work, and on the job everyday.” With respect to China, the AFL-CIO has urged its members to “let Congress know China does not deserve permanent free trade status from the United States until it improves trade and human rights practices.” In describing congressional action on PNTR for China, organization literature said: “ A $12 million corporate campaign won the U.S. House vote on permanent Normal Trade Relations for China without annual review of that country’s human rights practices. Union leaders and other supporters of working families decried the vote as a blank check for China to continue its oppression of Chinese citizens, which opens the door to corporate exploitation and lowered living and working standards for workers everywhere. They vowed, however, to undertake massive education and mobilization toward enacting a Working Families Agenda and electing candidates this fall who support it, and continuing to push for global fairness.” Amnesty International (AI) [http://www.amnesty-usa.org/] 322 8th Ave., 10th fl New York, NY 10001 Ph: 212-807-8400 Fax: 212-627-1451 Year Founded: 1961 Budget: $33 million in revenues for 1998 Funding: Individual contributions and donated services. Philosophy: China Focus: Included in Amnesty’s global focus. Primary Overall Mission: Amnesty International has an International Executive Committee of seven, elected every two years. (Amnesty USA has a Board of Directors of 18.) According to the group’s literature, AI bases its four-fold mandate on the 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “to free all prisoners of conscience detained anywhere for their beliefs or because of their ethnic origin, sex, colour or language -- who have not used or advocated violence ; ensure prompt and fair trials for political prisoners; abolish the death penalty, torture, and other cruel or inhuman treatment of prisoners; and end extrajudicial executions and ‘disappearances.’” In its 1999 Annual Report, AI said about China, “Hundreds, possibly thousands, of activists and suspected opponents of the government were detained during the year. Thousands of political prisoners jailed in previous years remained imprisoned, many of them prisoners of conscience. Some had been sentenced after unfair trials, others were still held without charge or trial. Political trials continued to fall short of international fair trial standards. Torture and ill-treatment remained endemic, in some cases resulting in death. The death penalty continued to be used extensively.” CRS-34 Asia Society [http://www.asiasociety.com/] 502 Park Ave. (temporary offices) New York, NY 1002223 Ph: 212-288-6400 Fax: 212-517-8315 (The group’s permanent headquarters, at 725 Park Ave. New York, NY 10021, is under renovation until 2001.) Year Founded: 1956, by John D. Rockefeller 3rd Budget: $17,000,000 (1999-2000) Funding: Foundation and corporate grants, individual contributions, membership and program service fees, special events, contributed services, and endowments. Philosophy: Non-profit, non-political China Focus: Since inception Primary Overall Mission: “The Asia Society is ... dedicated to fostering understanding of Asia and communication between Americans and the peoples of Asia and the Pacific. A national nonprofit, nonpartisan educational organization, the Society provides a forum for building awareness of the more than thirty countries broadly defined as the Asia-Pacific region - the area from Japan to Iran, and from Central Asia to New Zealand, Australia and the Pacific Islands. Through art exhibitions and performances, films, lectures, seminars and conferences, publications and assistance to the media, and materials and programs for students and teachers, the Asia Society presents the uniqueness and diversity of Asia to the American people.” Atlantic Council [http://www.acus.org/] 910 17th St. N.W. Suite 1000 Washington, D.C. 20006 Ph: 202-463-7226 Fax: 202-463-7241 Year Founded: 1961 Budget: $3.1 million operating budget in 1999 Funding: foundations, corporations, individual donors, and a limited number of U.S. Government contracts China Focus: China work is included in the program on Atlantic-Pacific Interrelationships. Primary Overall Mission: “The Atlantic Council is a non partisan network of leaders who are convinced of the pivotal importance of effective U.S. foreign policy and the cohesion of U.S. international relationships. The Council promotes constructive U.S. leadership and engagement in international affairs based on the central role of the Atlantic community in the contemporary world situation. It does this principally by: – stimulating dialogue and discussion about critical international policy issues, with the intention of enriching public debate and promoting consensus in the administration, the Congress, the corporate and nonprofit sectors and the media in the United States, and among leaders in Europe, Asia and the Americas; – promoting educational and other programs for successor generations of U.S. leaders who will value U.S. international engagement and have the formation necessary to develop effective policies, building on U.S. leadership in the Atlantic community.” CRS-35 The Brookings Institution [http://www.brook.edu] 1775 Massachusetts Ave. N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 Ph: 202-797-6000 Fax: 202-797-6004 Year Founded: 1916 Budget: $53 million in income for 1998 Funding: Brookings is financed largely by endowment and by the support of philanthropic foundations, corporations, and private individuals. Philosophy: Private, non-profit organization, politically left of center. China Focus: Included in the institution’s Foreign Policy Studies program. Primary Overall Mission: “In its research, The Brookings Institution functions as an independent analyst and critic, committed to publishing its findings for the information of the public. In its conferences and activities, it serves as a bridge between scholarship and public policy, bringing new knowledge to the attention of decision makers and affording scholars a better insight into public policy issues. Its funds are devoted to carrying out its own research and educational activities. It also undertakes some unclassified government contract studies, reserving the right to publish its findings.” The Brookings Institution’s scholars doing work on China include: Bates Gill, Nicholas R. Lardy, Michael O’Hanlon, James Reilly, and David Shambaugh. The Business Coalition for U.S.-China Trade [[http://www.business4chinatrade.org/] 601 13th St. N.W., Suite 1100 North Washington, D.C. 20005 Ph: 202-879-5810 Fax: 202-347-1750 Year Founded: 1991 Budget: NA Funding: Contributions from the Coalition’s corporate members China Focus: Entire existence Primary Overall Mission: To ensure that China is granted Permanent Normal Trade Relations status (PNTR). According to a spokesman from the Coalition’s office, there currently is no plan to continue the Coalition after PNTR for China is achieved. The Cato Institute [http://www.cato.org/] 1000 Massachusetts Ave. N.W. Washington, D.C. 20001 Ph: 202-842-0200 Fax: 202-842-3490 Year Founded: 1977 Budget: $13 million in 1999 Funding: Foundations, corporations, individual donors Philosophy: non-partisan, conservative China Focus: part of a U.S. foreign policy program Primary Overall Mission: “...the Cato Institute is a nonpartisan public policy research foundation headquartered in Washington, D.C. The Institute is named for Cato’s Letters, libertarian pamphlets that helped lay the philosophical foundation for the American Revolution. The Cato Institute seeks to broaden the parameters of public policy debate to allow consideration of more options that are consistent with the traditional American principles of limited government, individual liberty, and CRS-36 peace. Toward that goal, the Institute strives to achieve greater involvement of the intelligent, concerned lay public in questions of policy and the proper role of government. The Cato Institute undertakes an extensive publications program dealing with the complete spectrum of policy issues. Books, monographs, and shorter studies are commissioned to examine the federal budget, Social Security, monetary policy, natural resource policy, military spending, regulation, NATO, international trade, and myriad other issues. Major policy conferences are held throughout the year, from which papers are published thrice yearly in the Cato Journal. The Institute also publishes the quarterly magazine Regulation and a bimonthly newsletter, Cato Policy Report. It has approximately 75 employees, 55 adjunct scholars, and 14 fellows, many of whom are among the country’s leading advocates of free markets and limited government.” Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs [http://www.cceia.org/] Merrill House 170 East 64th Street New York, NY 10021 Ph: 212-838-4120 Fax: 212-752-2432 Year Founded: 1914, by Andrew Carnegie Budget: NA Funding: Corporate, individual, and trustee contributions; membership fees; investment income China Focus: Included as part of the overall international work of the Council Primary Overall Mission: The Council is “an independent, nonpartisan, nonprofit organization dedicated to research and education in the field of ethics and international affairs. The Carnegie Council exists to provide leadership, guidance, education, and a home for those seeking to relate insights and resources of the world’s moral traditions to the most urgent issues of our time.” The Council’s “programs and publications provoke thinking and dialogue about the urgent and complex ethical dilemmas involved in international decision making. The Council’s resources are drawn upon to explore the connections between moral commitments and political reality and to put their understanding into practice in their public lives.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace [http://ceip.org/index.html] 1779 Massachusetts Ave. N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 Ph: 202-483-7600 Fax: 202-483-1840 Year Founded: 1910 Budget: $16.7 million in total operating expenses in 1998 (according to financial disclosure Form 990 PF, filed with the IRS) Funding: It supports its activities principally from its own resources, supplemented by nongovernmental, philanthropic grants. Philosophy: The Endowment normally does not take institutional positions on public policy issues. China Focus: One of a range of international policy topics the Endowment pursues. Primary Overall Mission: “As a tax-exempt nonprofit organization, the Endowment conducts programs of research, discussion, publication, and education in international affairs and U.S. foreign policy. The Endowment publishes the quarterly magazine, Foreign Policy. Carnegie’s Associates—whose backgrounds include government, journalism, law, academia, and public affairs—bring to their work substantial first-hand experience in foreign policy. Through writing, public and media appearances, study groups, and conferences, Carnegie associates seek to invigorate and extend both expert and public discussion on a wide range of international issues. These include worldwide migration, nuclear non-proliferation, economic reform and inequality, regional conflicts, CRS-37 multilateralism, democracy-building, and the use of force. The Endowment also engages in and encourages projects designed to foster innovative contributions in international affairs.” Center for Strategic and International Studies [http://www.csis.org/] 1800 K St. N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006 Ph: 202-887-0200 Fax: 202-775-3199 Year Founded: 1962 Budget: $16.4 million in total revenues and support, 1999 Funding: largely from foundation grants and corporate and individual donations, with a small percentage from U.S. Government contracts, publication sales, and conference fees Philosophy: nonpartisan and nonproprietary research China Focus: China and Hong Kong are a major focus of the Center’s Asian Studies Program Primary Overall Mission: “The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is a public policy research institution dedicated to analysis and policy impact. CSIS is the only institution of its kind that maintains resident experts on all the world’s major geographical regions. It also covers key functional areas, such as international finance, U.S. trade and economic policy, national and international security issues, energy, and telecommunications. CSIS is a private, tax-exempt institution. Sam Nunn chairs its Board of Trustees. The Center’s staff of 90 policy experts, 80 support staff, and 70 interns, is committed to generating strategic analysis, exploring contingencies, analyzing policy options, exploring contingencies, and making policy recommendations.” Center for Taiwan International Relations (CTIR) [http://www.taiwandc.org/ctir/] 110 Maryland Ave. N.E., Suite 206 Washington, D.C. 20002 Ph: 202-543-6287 Fax: 202-543-2364 Year Founded: 1988 Budget: NA Funding: private donations Philosophy: Pro self-determination for Taiwan China Focus: Entire Existence Primary Overall Mission: “The Center for Taiwan International Relations (CTIR) is a private, non-profit, non-partisan research organization established in Washington, D.C. in 1988. CTIR has always maintained that the sovereignty of Taiwan (including the Pescadores) belongs to 21 million people of Taiwan, and to no one else. Thus, it supports the right of those people to decide the ultimate resolution of the ‘Taiwan Question.’ No government constituted without the consent of Taiwan’s people has any valid claim to sovereignty over the island or any right to characterize Taiwan’s future as its ‘internal affairs.’ To this end, CTIR works with the international community to uphold the right of Taiwan’s people to decide their future for themselves and to ensure that this decision is made freely without threat, coercion, or false information.” China Information and Culture Center [http://www.taipei.org/] 1230 Avenue of the Americas, 2nd floor New York, NY 10020 Ph: 212-273-1800 Fax: 212-373-1866 CRS-38 Year Founded: NA Budget: NA Funding: The government of Taiwan and private donations. Philosophy: Showcasing Chinese culture China Focus: Entire existence, but focused around the Republic of China on Taiwan Primary Overall Mission: The Chinese Information and Culture Center focuses on Chinese culture and contemporary life on Taiwan. Encompassing a theater, art gallery, library, and culture center, the CICC seeks to promote, educate, and inform researchers and the general public on Chinese issues. Books, videos, films, and documents may be loaned out, and the Center sponsors many cultural events on the premises. Christian Coalition of America [http://www.cc.org/] 499 S. Capitol Street, S.W., Suite 615 Washington, DC 20003 Ph: 202-479-6900 Fax: 202-479-4260 Year Founded: 1989, by Pat Robertson Budget: NA Funding: NA Philosophy: Conservative China Focus: Particular on “values” related issues such as religious freedom and coercive abortion. Primary Overall Mission: “The Christian Coalition was founded in 1989 by Pat Robertson to give Christians a voice in government. We represent a growing group of over 2 million members and supporters who believe it’s time for people of faith to have a voice in the conversation we call democracy. We are driven by the belief that people of faith have a right and a responsibility to be involved in the world around them. That involvement includes community, social and political action.” “Christian Coalition will essentially split into two new organizations; Christian Coalition International, a not for-profit, taxable corporation and Christian Coalition of America, a 501(c)(4), tax exempt organization. This new corporate structure will allow Christian Coalition International to form Christian Coalition chapters in countries all over the world. In addition, Christian Coalition International will have the ability to form a political action committee which can raise and distribute funds directly to candidates. Our tax-exempt arm-Christian Coalition of America-will continue to conduct non-partisan, get-out-the-vote efforts and distribute voter education material... It is clear in the wake of our new reorganization that Christian Coalition’s mission statement remains intact. We will continue to recruit and train pro-life, pro-family activists, draw people to the polls in record numbers and educate voters about the issues that impact families. In fact, this new corporate structure has expanded Christian Coalition’s ability to impact the public policy debate as we move boldly forward as the nation’s number one pro-family organization in America.” Committee of 100 for Tibet [http://www.tibet.org/Tibet100/] P.O. Box 60612 Palo Alto, CA 94306-0612 Ph: NA Fax: NA Year Founded: 1992 Budget: NA (annual income is less than $25,000) Funding: individual contributions Philosophy: supporting the Tibetan people’s independence aspirations CRS-39 China Focus: Entire existence Primary Overall Mission: “The Committee of 100 for Tibet was formed in 1992. The Committee is dedicated to placing Tibet on the international agenda, and to encouraging peoples and governments to recognize that Tibet is currently illegally occupied and colonized by China. The Committee of 100 for Tibet is a unique organization in its composition, strategy and uncompromising support of the Tibetan peaceful struggle for independence. The Committee cooperates with and complements the work of other organizations working for Tibet and the Tibetan people. There are national committees in Belgium, France, India, Ireland, and Switzerland. The Committee of 100 for Tibet is a non-profit 501(c)(3) California corporation. Contributions are tax deductible, seriously needed and greatly appreciated. The Committee is an all volunteer organization. All donations go directly to our public awareness efforts.” Council on Foreign Relations [http://www.cfr.org/p/] The Harold Pratt House 58 East 68th Street New York, NY 10021 Ph: 212-434-9400 Fax: 212-434-9800 Year Founded: 1921 Budget: $38 million in revenue, $19.9 million in expenses for 1998 Funding: Private and corporate membership dues, donations, grants, book publications, investments, fellowships, and publications of Foreign Affairs magazine. China Focus: Included in a broad range of foreign relations issues. Primary Mission: “Founded in 1921, the Council on Foreign Relations is a nonpartisan membership organization, research center, and publisher. It is dedicated to strengthening America’s role in and understanding of the world by better comprehending global trends and contributing ideas to U.S. foreign policy. The Council does this through cutting-edge studies; serious, civil discussions; and rigorous analyses. The Council does not take institutional positions; however, Council Fellows and independent task forces do advocate certain policies as a result of their work. The Council’s highly diverse membership of over 3,800 American citizens includes the country’s leaders in business, academia, the media, civil society, and government....The Council’s Studies Department is now one of the largest foreign policy ‘think tanks’ in the nation. It consists of experts on every region of the world as well as on particular subjects such as international economics, security, science and technology, and culture. Its more than 100 Fellows and research associates produce research-based, policy-oriented books and articles. The Fellows also are often called upon for congressional testimony, newspaper op-eds, and TV and radio commentary.” East-West Center [http://www.ewc.hawaii.edu/] 1601 East-West Road Honolulu, HI 96848 Ph: 808-944-7111 Fax: 808-944-7376 Year Founded: 1960 Budget: NA Funding: Allocated by U.S. Congress, donations from private corporations, and contributions from a number of Asian and Pacific governments. China Focus: Entire existence. Primary Overall Mission: “The East-West Center was established by the United States Congress... to promote better relations and understanding between the United States and the nations of Asia and the Pacific, through cooperative study, training, and research. The Center helps promote the CRS-40 establishment of a stable, peaceful and prosperous Asia Pacific community in which the United States is a natural, valued and leading partner. As mandated by the Congress, the Center carries out its mission through programs of cooperative study, training and research. Professionals and students from the United States, Asia and the Pacific study and work together at the East-West Center to better understand issues of common and critical concern and explore mutually beneficial ways of addressing them.” Emergency Committee for American Trade [http://ecat.policy.net/] 1211 Connecticut Ave. N.W., Suite 801 Washington, D.C. 20001 Ph: 202-659-5147 Fax: 202-659-1347 Year Founded: 1967 Budget: NA Funding: Contributions from its member corporations Philosophy: Focused on expansion of trade and China Focus: Recent years. Primary Overall Mission: “The Emergency Committee for American Trade (ECAT) is comprised of leading American companies with global operations that support the to expansion of international trade and investment...ECAT members are active supporters of legislative and other measures that facilitate U.S. trade and investment. They additionally are opposed to changes in U.S. taxation of foreign source income that unfairly penalize their competitiveness in world markets. They have called for a new multilateral trade round to expand markets around the world for farmers, manufacturers, and service providers, and to improve compliance with agreements to protect intellectual property rights. They have encouraged business people overseas to support policies that assure fairer treatment of American goods in foreign markets and to oppose restrictions on American-owned companies.” “To reap the benefits of China’s WTO market-opening, the United States must approve PNTR -- the same non-discriminatory tariff treatment that we provide to 136 other WTO Members. Unless Congress and the Administration join together to secure PNTR and end the divisive annual reviews of China’s trade status, China would be legally entitled to withhold key WTO market-access concessions from U.S. goods, services, and farm products.” Family Research Council [http://www.frc.org/] 801 G St. N.W. Washington, D.C. 20001 Ph: 202-393-2100 Fax: 202-393-2134 Year Founded: 1983 Budget: Revenue of $14.6 million, expenditures of $14.5 million in 1998 Funding: Individual donations and grants. The FRC has 501(c)3 tax-exempt status. Philosophy: Conservative China Focus: Recent years. Primary Overall Mission: “The Family Research Council is a nonprofit, nonpartisan educational organization operating under the provision of Section 501C-3 of the Internal Revenue Code. The Council is supported by voluntary donations and grants. The Family Research Council exists to reaffirm and promote nationally, and particularly in Washington, DC, the traditional family unit and the Judeo-Christian value system upon which it is built.” CRS-41 Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA) [http://www.fapa.org/] 552 7th St. S.E. Washington, D.C. 20003 Ph: 202-547-3686 Fax: 202-543-7891 Year Founded: 1982 Budget: $400,000 in 1999 Funding: Private donations from Taiwan-American families, and contributions from individuals in Taiwan. Philosophy: Self-determination for Taiwan China Focus: Entire existence. Primary Overall Mission: “The Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA) is a world-wide, Washington headquartered, non-profit organization whose goals include: Promotion of international support for the right of the people of Taiwan (1) to establish an independent and democratic country, and (2) to join the international community ; and Promotion of peace and security for Taiwan. FAPA’s mission is educational. The organization provides US policy makers, the media, scholars and the general public with information, books, pamphlets and papers on issues related to Taiwan. FAPA also informs and updates Members of Congress and their staffers on Taiwanese issues. FAPA seeks to articulate the point of view of the people of Taiwan in the intensifying Taiwan debate.” Heritage Foundation [http://www.heritage.org/] 214 Massachusetts Ave. N.E. Washington, D.C. 20002 Ph: 202-608-6081 Fax: 202-675-1779 Year Founded: 1973 Budget: Income of approximately $46,000,000 in 1998 Funding: Individual and corporate donations, investment income, foundation grants, and publication sales. Heritage accepts no government funds and performs no contract work. Philosophy: Conservative. China Focus: Since 1983, as part of its Asian Studies Center. Primary Overall Mission: “The Heritage Foundation is a research and educational institute - a think tank - whose mission is to formulate and promote conservative public policies based on the principles of free enterprise, limited government, individual freedom, traditional American values, and a strong national defense. Heritage’s staff pursues this mission by performing timely, accurate research on key policy issues and effectively marketing these findings to our primary audiences: members of Congress, key congressional staff members, policymakers in the executive branch, the nation’s news media, and the academic and policy communities. Heritage’s products include publications, articles, lectures, conferences, and meetings.” Hoover Institution [http://www-hoover.stanford.edu/] 434 Galvez Mall Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305 Ph: 650-723-1754 Fax: 650-723-1687 Year Founded: 1919 Budget: Approximately $25 million, according to the Institution’s website CRS-42 Funding: Donations from individuals and their related foundations and corporations (approximately 40 percent); payout from endowment funds, the market value of which exceeds $250 million (approximately 45 percent); and contributions from Stanford University dedicated to the library and archives (approximately 15 percent). China Focus: Began in 1945 Primary Overall Mission: “The Institution’s overarching purposes are to: Collect the requisite sources of knowledge pertaining to economic, political, and social changes in societies at home and abroad, as well as to understand their causes and consequences; analyze the effects of government actions relating to public policy; generate, publish, and disseminate ideas that encourage positive policy formation using reasoned arguments and intellectual rigor, converting conceptual insights into practical initiatives judged to be beneficial to society; convey to the public, the media, lawmakers, and others an understanding of important public policy issues and promote vigorous dialogue.” Human Rights in China [http://www.hrichina.org/] 350 Fifth Ave., Suite 3309 New York, NY 10118 Ph: 212-239-4495 Fax: 212-239-2561 Year Founded: 1989 Budget: $368,431 in 1997 Funding: Private donations. China Focus: Entire existence. Primary Overall Mission: “To support firmly those who openly and directly advocate the message of human rights, democracy and rule of law within Chinese society, and to provide assistance to those persecuted and imprisoned for the non-violent exercise of their fundamental rights and freedoms; To educate the Chinese people about human rights principles and activities through Chinese broadcasting services, overseas Chinese media, the Internet, and publications distributed inside China and internationally; To promote ongoing scrutiny of the Chinese government’s human rights practice, urge China to ratify international human rights covenants, and systematically monitor their implementation; To recognize, encourage, and facilitate the work of progressive forces inside China and exert constructive external pressure to aid them in developing an effective agenda for social, legal, and political change respectful of human rights.” Human Rights Watch (HRW) [http://www.hrw.org/] 350 Fifth Ave., 34th Floor New York, NY 10118 Ph: 212-290-4700 Fax: 212-736-1300 1630 Connecticut Ave. N.W., Suite 500 Washington, D.C. 20009 Ph: 202-612-4321 Fax: 202-371-0124 Year Founded: 1978 Budget: $12.5 million in operating revenues, 1997-98 Funding: Private donations and foundation grants. HRW accepts no government funds, either directly or indirectly. China Focus: Since 1985 CRS-43 Primary Overall Mission: “Human Rights Watch is dedicated to protecting the human rights of people around the world. We stand with victims and activists to prevent discrimination, to uphold political freedom, to protect people from inhumane conduct in wartime, and to bring offenders to justice. We investigate and expose human rights violations and hold abusers accountable. We challenge governments and those who hold power to end abusive practices and respect international human rights law. We enlist the public and the international community to support the cause of human rights for all.” The group has numerous directors and advisors; in addition to a Board of Directors and an Emeritus Board, HRW has separate and well-populated advisory committees on: the Middle East, Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe and Central Asia, Children’s Rights, Women’s Rights, and Arms. The group has also tapped into the Hollywood connection with its “Human Rights Watch California” committee, co-chaired by Mike Farrell and Vicki Riskin. Institute for the Study of Diplomacy (ISD) [http://data.georgetown.edu/] 3700 O St., N.W. Washington, D.C. 20057 Ph: 202-687-6279 Fax: 202-687-8312 Year Founded: 1978 Budget: NA Funding: Part of Georgetown University annual budget. NA China Focus: As part of its international relations research, entire existence. Primary Overall Mission: “The Institute for the Study of Diplomacy is part of the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. The Institute focuses on the implementation of foreign policy. It seeks to answer the question how announced policy objectives can best be pursued. It does so by drawing on the concrete experiences of practitioners and the conceptual, comparative, and historical work of academics.” International Campaign for Tibet (ICT) [http://www.savetibet.org/] 1825 K St. N.W., Suite 520 Washington, D.C. 20006 Ph: 202-785-1515 Fax: 202-785-4343 Year Founded: 1988 Budget: approximately $1.5 million in 1997 Funding: Reliance on private donations. China Focus: Entire existence. Primary Overall Mission: “The International Campaign for Tibet (ICT) is a non-partisan, public interest group dedicated to promoting human rights and democratic freedoms for the people of Tibet. ICT was founded in 1988 and is a non-profit, tax-exempt organization incorporated in Washington, D.C. ICT believes that governments and people around the world need accurate information on current conditions in Tibet; that Tibetans are a “people” under international law and have the right to self-determination; that Tibet is an occupied country which has a distinct language, culture and religion; and, that dialogue between Tibetans and Chinese is integral towards finding a solution to the situation in Tibet.” CRS-44 International Committee of Lawyers for Tibet (ICLT) [http://www.TibetICLT.org/] 2288 Fulton St., Suite 312 Berkeley, CA 94704 Ph: 510-486-0588 Fax: 510-548-3785 Year Founded: 1989 Budget: NA Funding: Reliance on support from attorneys, other concerned individuals, and organizations. China Focus: Entire existence. Primary Overall Mission: “The International Committee of Lawyers for Tibet (ICLT) was created in 1989 at the request of representatives of the Tibetan people. We are the only international organization devoted solely to legal advocacy for Tibet. ICLT (1) monitors China’s compliance with human rights law and its own law in Tibet; (2) documents China’s violations of these laws; (3) publicizes these violations as widely as possible; (4) demands, in appropriate forums, that China cease these violations and negotiate the status of Tibet with Tibetan representatives; (5) assists the development of Tibetan democratic institutions; and (6) provides immigration and refugee rights assistance to Tibetan refugees in the US and abroad.” Independent Federation of Chinese Students and Scholars (IFCSS) [http://www.ifcss.org/] 733 15th St. N.W., Suite 700 Washington, D.C. 20005 Ph: 202-347-0017 Fax: 202-347-0018 Year Founded: July 1989 Budget: NA Funding: NA China Focus: Entire existence Primary Overall Mission: As originally formed, the IFCSS aimed to serve as a coordinating organization for Chinese student and scholar associations on U.S. college campuses. One of the goals listed in the group’s 1989 Manifesto was to “Defeat tyranny and dictatorship by peaceful, rational, and nonviolent means.” As of this writing, the group’s website was “Under Construction.” International Republican Institute (IRI) [http://www.iri.org/] 1212 New York Ave. N.W.. Suite 900 Washington, D.C. 20005 Ph: 202-408-9450 Fax: 202-408-9462 Year Founded: 1984 Budget: $ 12,266,607 in income in 1997 Funding: From U.S. government sources, such as the National Endowment for Democracy and the U.S. Agency for International Development, and from private and corporate donations. China Focus: China program began in 1993 Primary Overall Mission: Since 1993, IRI has launched the following efforts in China, which are ongoing today: Legislative: 1993 – providing technical assistance on laws being drafted by the National People’s Congress, such as the securities law and contract law, as well as assistance to strengthen NPC ability to research and draft laws CRS-45 independently; 1998 – policy implementation program to strengthen province level legislative institutions Electoral: 1994 – observing local village elections and sponsoring election workshops to emphasize the importance of multiple candidates, transparency, secret ballots; 1997 – working at provincial level to train elected village committee leaders Judicial: 1996 – a judicial training program, including training on contract and guaranty law and SOE reform; 1997 – legal aid reform program (suspended after the mistaken Belgrade Embassy bombing) National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) [http://www.nbr.org/] 4518 University Way NE, Suite 300 Seattle, WA 98015 Ph: 206-632-7370 Fax: 206-632-7487 Year Founded: 1989 Budget: $1,858,433 in 1998 Funding: Foundations, government grants, and private donations. China Focus: As part of an overall Asia program Primary Overall Mission: “The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan institution that conducts advanced research on policy-relevant issues in Asia. It also serves as the global clearinghouse for Asia research conducted by specialists and institutions worldwide. Through these activities NBR is uniquely positioned to promote informed and effective U.S. policy toward the region. NBR sponsors projects that examine the economic, political, and strategic questions affecting U.S. relations with East, Central, and South Asia, as well as Russia. NBR efficiently draws upon the world’s premier specialists to develop and carry out its research agenda. Through its advisory board, programs, and print and electronic publications, NBR integrates its research into the policymaking communities of the United States and Asia.” National Committee on U.S.-China Relations [http://www.ncuscr.org/] 71 West 23rd St., Suite 1901 New York, NY 10010 Ph: 212-645-9677 Fax: 212-645-1695 Year Founded: 1966, by a broad coalition of scholars and civic, religious, and business leaders Budget: $1,880,708 in income in 1998 Funding: A combination of grants from the U.S. Information Agency, U.S. Department of Education, foundations, private donations, and the Committee’s members and other interested citizens. The committee is classified by the I.R.S. as a tax-exempt 501(c)(3) organization. Philosophy: Engagement with China. China Focus: Entire existence. Primary Overall Mission: “The National Committee on United States-China Relations is a nonprofit educational organization that encourages understanding of China and the United States between citizens of both countries. The Committee’s continuity of experience and depth of associations with senior officials and distinguished citizens of China and the United States make it a unique national resource. The Committee was founded in the belief that vigorous debate of China policy among Americans was essential and that balanced public education could clarify U.S. interests and strengthen our foreign policy. Similarly, the founders believed that over time dialogue with Chinese citizens would enhance mutual understanding, a basic requirement for stable and productive relations.” CRS-46 “The Committee’s exchange, educational, and policy programs are carried out primarily in the fields of international relations, economic development and management, governance and the rule of law, environmental and other global concerns, mass communication, and education administration – addressing these issues with respect to the People’s Republic, Hong Kong SAR and Taiwan. The membership of the organization includes some 700 distinguished Americans from all parts of the country who represent many points of view but who share the belief that increased public knowledge of China and U.S.-China relations strengthens the Sino-American relationship.” National Endowment for Democracy (NED) [http://www.ned.org/] 1101 15th St. N.W., Suite 700 Washington, D.C. 20005 Ph: 202-293-9072 Fax: 202-223-6042 Year Founded: 1983 Budget: $33,000,000 in income for 1998 Funding: Annual appropriations from the U.S. Congress China Focus: Primary Overall Mission: “The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) is a private, nonprofit, bipartisan, organization created to help strengthen democratic institutions around the world through non-governmental efforts. The Endowment’s grants program assists organizations abroad working for democratic goals. It makes hundreds of grants each year to support prodemocracy groups throughout the world, including Asia. The Endowment’s programs encourage democratic political development primarily in three major functional areas – pluralism; democratic governance; and education, culture, and communications. Democracy involves the right of the people freely to determine their own destiny. The exercise of this right requires a system that guarantees freedom of expression, belief and association, free and competitive elections, respect for the inalienable rights of individuals and minorities, free communications media, and the rule of law. (From NED’s founding “Statement of Principles and Objectives,” 1984). Non-Proliferation Policy Education Center [http://www.wizard.net/~npec/] 1718 M St. N.W., Suite 244 Washington D.C. 20036 Ph: 202-466-4406 Fax: 202-659-5429 Year Founded: 1994 Budget: NA Funding: NA China Focus: Specifically with respect to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Primary Overall Mission: “The Non-Proliferation Policy Education Center’s (NPEC) aim is to address questions involving deficiencies in current non-proliferation policies and programs and to explain why US non-proliferation policy will need to change... NPEC will bring together Congressional staff, administration officials, and the press to discuss pressing proliferation policy issues with NPEC’s monograph authors and other academic specialists at a series of nonproliferation policy forums. Given the breadth of support any significant change in US nonproliferation policy will require, NPEC takes care to avoid partisanship. All of NPEC’s activities involve key administration officials, members of Congress, national security experts, government contractors, legislative staff and academics known for their work in the proliferation field.” CRS-47 Pacific Basin Economic Council [http://www.pbec.org] 900 Fort Street, Suite 1080 Honolulu, Hawaii 96813 Ph: 808-521-9044 Fax: 808-521-8530 Year Founded: 1967 Budget: NA Funding: Supported by its corporate members. China Focus: Pacific Basin, including China Primary Overall Mission: “The Pacific Basin Economic Council is an association of senior business leaders from throughout the Pacific Basin Region dedicated to expanding trade and investment through fostering open markets. PBEC’s mission is to achieve a business environment in the region that ensures open trade and investment and encourages competitiveness based on the capabilities of individual companies; provide information, networking fora, and services to members that increase their business opportunities; and support cooperative business efforts to address the economic well-being of citizens in the Pacific region. The Pacific Basin Economic Council will have an impact on the following key business issues in the region (in no particular order), which will promote an improved business climate in the region for all PBEC members: advising governments in order to improve their business environment; generating foreign investment flows to support economic development objectives; reducing administrative barriers to international trade in the region; stimulating the development and accelerating the implementation of new technologies; and balancing economic development with the need for a clean environment.” Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) [http://www.pecc.net/] 4 Nassim Road Singapore 258372 Ph: 65-737-9823 Fax: 65-737-9824 Year Founded: PECC - 1980; U.S. National Committee, 1984 Budget: NA Funding: Provided by member economies Philosophy: non-partisan China Focus: Improving economic relations in the Pacific Rim, including China. Both China and Taiwan are members of the PECC. Primary Overall Mission: “PECC aims to serve as a regional forum for cooperation and policy coordination to promote economic development in the Asia-Pacific region.” PECC is policy oriented, pragmatic and anticipatory. Its work program aims for better cooperation and policy coordination in areas including trade, investment, finance, HRD, and all major industrial sectors. PECC is the only non-governmental official observer of APEC since the APEC’s formation in 1989. PECC has provided information and analytical support to APEC ministerial meetings and working groups. Also it channels and facilitates private sector participation in the formal process.” People for the American Way Foundation [http://www.pfaw.org/] 2000 M Street, NW, Suite 400 Washington, DC 20036 Ph: 202-467-4999 800-326-7329 Fax: 202-293-2672 CRS-48 Year Founded: 1980 Budget: $6,756,232 in 1997 Funding: individual contributors and grants Philosophy: non-partisan advocacy group, left of center, China Focus: minimal and indirect, focused largely on issues involving religious freedom where the “Religious Right” is active Primary Overall Mission: “People For the American Way (PFAW), founded in 1980, is a non-profit, non-partisan advocacy group that organizes and mobilizes Americans to fight for fairness, justice, civil rights and the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. PFAW Foundation is committed to defending democracy and bringing the ideals of community, opportunity, diversity, equality and fairness together to form a strong, united voice. To achieve this, PFAWF conducts research, legal and education work, as well as monitors and researches the Religious Right movement and its political allies. The organization is a premier source of vital information for policymakers, scholars and activists nationwide. In addition, People For the American Way Voters Alliance was formed as a political action committee that will work to hold candidates to account, organize to get voters out to the polls and work to fight the Right.” Taiwan International Alliance (TIA) Year Founded: 1991 Budget: NA Funding: private donations and contributions from members and supporters Philosophy: The TIA holds that Taiwan is not a part of China, but an independent nation China Focus: Entire existence Primary Overall Mission: “The mission of Taiwan International Alliance is to differentiate Taiwan from China, thus overcoming twenty years of international isolation. By educating the world community about the history and accomplishments of Taiwan and its peoples, Taiwan can regain international recognition as a nation state with a seat in the United Nations and all other international forums.” U.S.-ROC Business Council [http://www.usa-roc.org/] 1700 N. Moore Street, Suite 1703 Arlington, VA 22209 Ph: 703-465-2930 Fax: 703-465-2937 Year Founded: 1976 Budget: NA Funding: Membership dues and government grants China Focus: Entire existence Primary Overall Mission: “The US-ROC (Taiwan) Business Council, a private non-profit association, was formed as the only non-governmental organization in the US to foster trade and business relations with the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan. The Council is currently chaired by the Honorable Frank C. Carlucci, Chairman of The Carlyle Group and former Secretary of Defense and National Security Advisor. The Council provides a variety of services to its members: all designed to provide information, advice and counsel on business opportunities with Taiwan.” CRS-49 U.S.-China Business Council [http://www.uschina.org/] 1818 N. St. N.W., Suite 200 Washington, D.C. 20036 Ph: 202-429-0340 Fax: 202-775-2476 Year Founded: 1973, as the National Council for U.S.-China Trade Budget: NA Funding: contributions from its 290 member firms China Focus: Entire existence Primary Overall Mission: “The United States-China Business Council is the principal organization of US companies engaged in trade and investment in the People’s Republic of China. The Council serves more than 250 corporate members through offices in Washington, DC, Beijing, Shanghai, and Hong Kong.” Primarily, the Council provides its member firms with assistance in doing business with China. The Council maintains that it is dedicated to economic pursuits and does not hold political positions on U.S.-China or U.S.-Taiwan relations. Still, the demands of its constituent interests generally place it in the position of advocating “engagement” and closer ties with China – positions that have political implications in the current U.S. policy environment. According to its own literature, “The Council has always played an important role in US policy debates and fought for stable and expanded US-China economic links. Major companies look to the US-China Business Council to be their collective voice on key policy issues and to provide US officials with definitive information on American business interests in China. Among the Council’s many policy-related initiatives are: Position papers that provide US and PRC government officials with responsible, accurate, and persuasive arguments on critical policy concerns; Support for the activities and presence of US businesses in China through congressional testimony, interviews with the media, and participation in other public fora; Sustained efforts to inform Members of Congress and congressional staff of US commercial interests in China.” U.S.-China Policy Foundation [http://users.erols.com/uscpf/] 316 Pennsylvania Ave. S.E. Suite 201 Washington, D.C. 20003 Ph: 202-547-8615 Fax: 202-547-8853 Year Founded: 1995 Budget: NA Funding: NA Philosophy: non-partisan, non-profit, interested in promoting greater understanding between the United States and China China Focus: Entire existence Primary Overall Mission: “The U.S.-China Policy Foundation is a non-partisan, non-profit, non-advocacy organization that promotes a greater understanding between American and Chinese policymakers, researchers, and government officials. USCPF seeks to provide opportunities for students, researchers, and practitioners of foreign policy to interact in more diverse and substantial ways. USCPF also conducts research on U.S.-China policies and relations in the Asia-Pacific region. The Foundation does not advocate any policy or endeavors to influence policy decisions, but instead provides information in order to increase awareness of issues in U.S.-China relations....” Among its list of activities, The Foundation says that it “coordinates research efforts on topics and issues related to U.S.-China policy; organizes exchanges and visits between specialists on U.S.-China relations, policymakers, and officials from both nations; provides free consultative services to American academics and policymakers on various U.S.-China policy issues; promotes the development of China studies in U.S. institutions of higher education; hosts seminars and CRS-50 conferences on issues related to U.S.-China relations; and publishes The U.S.-China Policy Review, and the Washington Journal of Modern China.” U.S. Institute of Peace [http://www.usip.org/] 1200 17th St. N.W., Suite 200 Washington, D.C. 20036 Ph: 202-457-1700 Fax: 202-429-6063 Year Founded: 1984 Budget: NA Funding: Funded by the U.S. Congress as an independent non-profit corporation China Focus: The Institute focuses on a number of regional topics, including China Primary Overall Mission: The Institution’s mandate is to “apply the lessons learned from history and our national experience to the challenge of achieving peace among nations.” The Institute has no political position on China or Taiwan. Washington Center for China Studies, Inc. [NA] 2300 M St. N.W., Suite 800 Washington, D.C. 20037 Ph: 202-973-2844 Fax: 202-296-8072 Year Founded: 1990 Budget: $ 207,100 for 1997 Funding: contributions from foundations, corporations, and individuals China Focus: Entire existence Primary Overall Mission: According to a WCCS official, WCCS goals are to organize, coordinate, and support Chinese scholars conducting studies on issues involving China, and to promote exchanges and better understanding between China and the rest of the world. It conducts research, provides training, does consulting, and conducts information and scholarly exchange programs in the field of social sciences and humanities. CRS-51 Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control [http://www.wisconsinproject.org/] 1701 K Street, NW, Suite 805 Washington, DC 20006 Ph: 202-223-8299 Fax: 202-223-8298 Year Founded: 1986 Budget: Income of $607,098 in 1998 Philosophy: non-profit, non-partisan China Focus: Relating to nuclear arms control Primary Overall Mission: “The Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control carries out research and public education designed to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, chemical/biological weapons, and long-range missiles. It operates in Washington D.C. under the auspices of the University of Wisconsin. The project has been investigating transfers of nuclear-and missile-related technology since 1986 and has identified over 2,000 companies and projects linked to proliferation. By listing suspect buyers in sensitive emerging markets, its database – the Risk Report – helps exporters and governments keep dangerous products out of the wrong hands.” The Risk Report has periodically reported on suspect activities in China. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars [http://wwics.si.edu/] One Woodrow Wilson Plaza 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20004 Ph: 202-691-4000 Fax: 202-691-4001 Year Founded: 1968, by Congress Budget: $7,216,879 in income for 1998 Funding: Primarily an annual appropriation from the U.S. Congress; also from various foundations. China Focus: The Center focuses on a wide range of topics, including China Primary Overall Mission: “Established as an international center for scholars, the Center memorializes Woodrow Wilson -- professor, university president, and twenty-eighth president of the United States -- by supporting scholarship and linking that scholarship to issues of concern to official Washington. It does so by offering fellowships and other support to high-level professors, public officials, journalists, professionals and other leaders, giving them special opportunities for research and writing. Also in support of scholarship, the Center hosts seminars and conferences, and it provides a variety of publications and broadcasting.” World United Formosans for Independence (WUFI) [http://taiwan.wufi.org/initial.htm] P.O. Box 700923 Dallas, TX 75370 Ph: 972- 245-0401 Fax: 972-245-1204 Year Founded: 1970 Budget: NA Funding: Private donations Philosophy: a free and independent Taiwan China Focus: Entire existence Primary Overall Mission: “World United Formosans for Independence (WUFI) is dedicated to the establishment of a free, democratic and independent Republic of Taiwan in accordance with the CRS-52 principle of self-determination of peoples. We are committed to the fundamental freedoms and human rights embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and therefore repudiate all forms of foreign dominance and interventions that run counter to the interests of the 21-million Taiwanese people.” CRS-53 Appendix Addendum Pertinent NGO Data Organization Name and Website Address Phone Fax American Enterprise Institute (AEI) [http://www.aei.org/] 1150 17th St. N.W. Washington, DC 20006 202-862-5800 202-862-7178 AFL-CIO [http://www.aflcio.org/home.htm] 815 16th Street, NW Washington, DC 20006 202-637-5000 202-637-5058 Amnesty International [http://www.amnesty-usa.org/] 322 8th Ave., 10th fl New York, NY 10001 212-807-8400 212-627-1451 Asia Society [http://www.asiasociety.com/] 502 Park Ave. New York, NY 10022 212-288-6400 212-517-8315 Atlantic Council [http://www.acus.org/] 910 17th St. N.W. Suite 1000 Washington, D.C. 20006 202-463-7226 202-463-7241 The Brookings Institution [http://www.brook.edu] 1775 Massachusetts Ave. N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 202-797-6000 202-797-6004 The CATO Institute [http://www.cato.org/] 1000 Massachusetts Ave. N.W. Washington, D.C. 20001 202-842-0200 202-842-3490 Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs [http://www.cceia.org/] Merrill House 170 East 64th Street New York, NY 10021 212-838-4120 212-752-2432 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace [http://ceip.org/index.html] 1779 Massachusetts Ave. N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 202-483-7600 202-483-1840 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) [http://www.csis.org/] 1800 K St. N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006 202-887-0200 202-775-3199 Center for Taiwan International Relations (CTIR) [http://www.taiwandc.org/ctir/] 110 Maryland Ave, NE, Suite 206 Washington, D.C. 20002 202-543-6287 202-543-2364 China Information & Culture Center [http://www.taipei.org/] 1230 Avenue of the Americas, 2nd fl New York, NY 10020 212-373-1800 212-373-1866 The Christian Coalition [http://www.cc.org/] 499 S. Capitol St. Washington, DC 20003 202-479-6900 202-479-4260 Committee of 100 for Tibet [http://www.tibet.org/Tibet100/] P.O. Box 60612 Palo Alto, CA 94306-0612 NA Council on Foreign Relations [http://www.cfr.org/p/] The Harold Pratt House 58 East 68th Street New York, NY 10021 212-434-9400 NA 212-434-9800 CRS-54 Organization Name and Website Address Phone Fax East-West Center [http://www.ewc.hawaii.edu/] 1601 East-West Road Honolulu, HI 96848-1601 808-944-7111 808-944-7376 Emergency Committee for American Trade (ECAT) [http://ecat.policy.net/] 1211 Connecticut Ave. N.W., Suite 801 Washington, D.C. 20036 202-659-5147 202-659-1347 Family Research Council [http://www.frc.org/] 801 G St. N.W. Washington, D.C. 20001 202-393-2100 202-393-2134 Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA) [http://www.fapa.org/] 552 7th St. S.E. Washington, D.C. 20003 202-547-3686 202-543-7891 Heritage Foundation [http://www.heritage.org/] 214 Massachusetts Ave. N.E. Washington, D.C. 20002 202-608-6081 202-675-1779 Hoover Institution [http://www-hoover.stanford.edu/] 434 Galvez Mall Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305 650-723-1754 650-723-1687 Human Rights in China (HRIC) [http://www.hrichina.org/] 350 Fifth Avenue, Suite 3309 New York, NY 10118 212-239-4495 212-239-2561 Human Rights Watch [http://www.hrw.org/] 1630 Connecticut Ave. NW #500 Washington DC 20009 202-612-4321 202-371-0124 Institute for the Study of Diplomacy [http://data.georgetown.edu/] 3700 O St., N.W. Washington, D.C. 20057 202-687-6279 202-687-8312 International Campaign for Tibet [http://www.savetibet.org/] 1825 K St. N.W., Suite 520 Washington, D.C. 20006 202-785-1515 202-785-4343 Independent Federation of Chinese Students and Scholars (IFCSS) [hq@ifcss.org] 733 15th St. N.W., Suite 700 Washington, DC 20005 202-347-0017 202-347-0018 International Republican Institute [http://www.iri.org/] 1212 New York Ave. N.W.. Suite 900 Washington, D.C. 20005 202-408-9450 202-408-9462 National Bureau of Asian Research [http://www.nbr.org/] 4518 University Way NE, Suite 300 Seattle, WA 98015 206-632-7370 206-632-7487 National Committee on U.S.China Relations [http://www.ncuscr.org/] 71 West 23rd St., Suite 1901 New York, NY 10010 212-645-9677 212-645-1695 National Endowment for Democracy (NED) [http://www.ned.org/] 1101 15th St. N.W., Suite 700 Washington, D.C. 20005 202-293-9072 202-223-6042 Non-Proliferation Policy Education Center [http://www.wizard.net/~npec/] 1718 M St. N.W., Suite 244 Washington D.C. 20036 202-466-4406 202-659-5429 CRS-55 Organization Name and Website Address Phone Fax Pacific Basin Economic Council [http://www.pbec.org] 900 Fort Street, Suite 1080 Honolulu, Hawaii 96813 808-521-9044 808-521-8530 Pacific Economic Cooperation Council [http://www.pecc.net/] 4 Nassim Road Singapore 258372 65-737-9823 65-737-9824 People for the American Way [http://www.pfaw.org/] 2000 M Street, NW, Suite 400 Washington, DC 20036 202-467-4999 800-326-7329 202-293-2672 Taiwan International Alliance [NA] 330 East 38th Street, Suite 17B New York, NY 10016 212-983-0480 NA U.S.-ROC Business Council [http://www.usa-roc.org/] 1700 N. Moore Street, Suite 1703 Arlington, VA 22209 703-465-2930 703-465-2937 U.S.-China Business Council [http://www.uschina.org/] 1818 N. St. N.W., Suite 200 Washington, D.C. 20036 202-429-0340 202-775-2476 U.S. China Policy Foundation [http://users.erols.com/uscpf/] 316 Pennsylvania Ave. S.E. Suite 201 Washington, D.C. 20003 202-547-8615 202-547-8853 U.S. Institute of Peace [http://www.usip.org/] 1200 17th St. N.W., Suite 200 Washington, D.C. 20036 202-457-1700 202-429-6063 Washington Center for China Studies [NA] 2300 M St. N.W., Suite 800 Washington, D.C. 20037 202-973-2844 202-973-2845 Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control [http://www.wisconsinproject.org/ ] 1701 K Street, NW Suite 805 Washington, DC 20006 202-223-8299 202-296-8072 Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars [http://wwics.si.edu/] One Woodrow Wilson Plaza 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20004 202-691-4000 202-691-4001 World United Formosans for Independence [http://taiwan.wufi.org/initial.htm] P.O. Box 700923 Dallas, TX 75370 972- 245-0401 972-245-1204