Ten Years in U.S.-China Policy; Interest Groups and Their Influence, 1989-2000

Ten Years in U.S.-China Policy; Interest Groups and Their Influence, 1989-2000

Order Code RL30768
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Ten Years in U.S.-China Policy; Interest Groups
and Their Influence, 1989-2000
December 12, 2000
Kerry Dumbaugh
Specialist in Asian Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Ten Years in U.S.-China Policy; Interest Groups and Their
Influence, 1989-2000
Summary
Through much of the 1980s, the U.S. policy community had consensus on
decisions involving China, and organized groups with interests outside the parameters
of that consensus remained at the margins of the policy process. With the breakdown
of this consensus in 1989-1990, organized interests began to voice their opinions
more vigorously, especially in areas of policy differences. Initially, these policy
differences were played out through the vehicle of legislation to oppose renewal of
China’s most-favored-nation (MFN) trade status. Later, as MFN legislation appeared
less viable, legislative alternatives and interest group activity on China proliferated.
Since 1992, Congress has considered, and in many cases has passed, legislation
targeting China in other areas, including abortion, human rights, prison labor, Chinese
students, nuclear and missile non-proliferation, international broadcasting, Tibet,
Taiwan, Hong Kong, espionage, religious freedom, and military relations. Each of
these issues was accompanied by an assortment of interest groups arguing for or
against. In addition, the explosive growth of the Internet in recent years has expanded
the reach and potential influence of even the smallest of groups. Organized interests
with a skeletal staff and a website can now command greater attention than before.
Chinese student organizations and dissident groups, highly influential in the
months following the Tiananmen Square crackdown of 1989, seem to have lost this
visibility and influence. And groups focusing on religious or moral values, such as the
Christian Coalition and the Family Research Council, after having increased their
influence through the 1990s, have taken a noticeably lower profile after their peak
activity in 1997-98. Many other interest groups appear to have become increasingly
influential in the U.S. decision making processes on China. Tibetan activist groups,
human rights organizations, democracy advocacy groups, the Taiwan lobby, non-
proliferation groups, the American business community, and public policy research
groups have all remained active and influential in policy decisions on China.
Absent demonstrable changes in China’s policies, in the character of U.S.-China
relations, or in the current nature of political discourse in the United States,
organized interest groups can be expected to continue to exploit policy differences in
ways likely to further affect U.S. policy decisions on China.

Contents
Overview of Trends in U.S.-China Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
NGOs and U.S. Policy Toward China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Some General Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Chinese Dissident and Student Groups in the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Independent Federation of Chinese Students and Scholars (IFCSS),
and Human Rights in China (HRIC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Rupture, November 21, 1989 - January 4, 1990 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
The “Tibet Lobby” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
International Campaign for Tibet (ICT) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
The Committee of 100 for Tibet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
The Tibet Information Network (TIN) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Human Rights, Religious, and Other “Values” Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
“Think Tanks” and Other Public Policy/Research Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
National Committee on U.S.-China Relations (NCUSCR) . . . . . . . . 21
U.S.-China Policy Foundation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
The American Enterprise Institute (AEI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
The Heritage Foundation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) . . . . . . . . 24
The Brookings Institution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
The U.S.-China Business Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
The Business Coalition for U.S.-China Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
The International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Non-Proliferation Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
The “Taiwan Lobby” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Concluding Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Appendix: NGOs Involved in Aspects of U.S. Policy Toward China,
1989-1999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Appendix Addendum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
List of Tables
Pertinent NGO Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Ten Years in U.S.-China Policy; Interest Groups
and Their Influence, 1989-2000
Introduction
In recent years, successive U.S. Republican and Democrat Administrations have
had great difficulty in fielding a comprehensive and coordinated policy toward China
that not only clearly defines and promotes U.S. national interests, but also attracts
widespread domestic support. To a great extent, the stage for current U.S. policy
difficulties was set by the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown, from which China has
never recovered in the eyes of most Americans. Several factors and policy trends in
the past decade have opened the way for non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
and other organized interest groups to play a more active role in the U.S. China
policymaking process.
First, it is hard to overstate the significance of the Tiananmen Square crackdown
of June 4, 1989 as the defining moment for the decade that came after it in U.S. policy
toward China. The collapse of the Soviet Union — and with it, China’s strategic
importance as a counterweight to Soviet power — may well have resulted in an
eventual reassessment of U.S. China policy in any case during the 1990's. But it is
Tiananmen that ultimately ruptured the American policy consensus on China and
suggested that the political liberalization accompanying China’s program of economic
reform had abruptly ended. The demise of the consensus, in effect, ended
congressional support for Administration initiatives on China that had characterized
the U.S. policy process through much of the 1980s.
Since Tiananmen, Congress and the executive branch have clashed repeatedly
over U.S. policy toward China. Both the Bush and Clinton Administrations generally
stressed policies of “engagement” toward China, while their congressional critics have
tended to push for a firmer, more sanction-oriented approach. Beginning in 1990,
Congress brought this pressure to bear largely through the vehicle of annual renewal
of China’s most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment – now known as normal trade
relations, or NTR – either by voting to withdraw China’s MFN trade status or by
placing further conditions on it. This issue came to a head in debate leading to the
106th Congress passing legislation (H.R. 4444) to give permanent normal trade
relations (PNTR) to China. President Clinton signed the bill into law on October 10,
2000 (P.L. 106-286). Meanwhile, during the 1990s, Congress has placed increasing
emphasis on diverse and separate initiatives that have had implications for U.S.-China
relations, including measures on human rights, non-proliferation, trade, Taiwan,
religious freedom, national security, and other issues. At each stage of the process,
NGOs and organized interest groups have promoted their own points of view among
growing policy differences, attempting to maximize their influence over decisions.

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This fluid and uncertain atmosphere in the American political scene has proven
fertile ground for a range of interest groups and individuals competing for influence
over U.S. policy decisions involving China. In reviewing some of the key issues on
which these groups have had the most effect, it is difficult to tell whether the groups
themselves have contributed to the policy divergences over China in the past decade,
or whether they merely exploited differences that have occurred for other reasons.
The apparent individual effectiveness these groups have had in influencing policy
decisions has waxed and waned, depending on the issues involved, the strength of the
group or individual, and the overall atmosphere in U.S.-China relations at the time.
Their collective effectiveness, however, appears to have grown in the past decade.
In general, the most successful have either spent significant time developing
relationships with Members of Congress, or have been able to mobilize a broad
spectrum of American public opinion in support of their interests.
This paper makes generalized observations about the role of non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and other organized interest groups in U.S. policy toward
China over the last decade and provides information about selected NGOs. In order
to set the context for this discussion, the paper first presents a broad overview of
issue trends in U.S. China policy during the Bush and Clinton Administrations, and
discusses the role of interest groups generally on major issues and policies relating to
China during this period, drawing overall conclusions based on these observations.
Finally, the paper provides pertinent information about selected groups.
Overview of Trends in U.S.-China Policy
After the rocky road to U.S.-China normalization of relations ended with the
signing of the communique on arms sales to Taiwan in 1982, a consensus prevailed
in U.S. policymaking on China until 1989 during which Congress generally supported
White House initiatives. Potentially troublesome issues arose during this brief period
– Tibet, human rights, the “spiritual pollution” campaign and other Chinese
government crackdowns – but overall, China was seen to be proceeding inexorably
in the “right direction” with its implementation of dramatic economic reforms and
incremental political change. The United States, for its part, was preoccupied with
domestic economic issues, and much time in U.S. government debate was given over
to battles over the federal budget. This situation had changed dramatically by the end
of the first year of the Bush Administration in 1989, and U.S. policy consensus on
China has been illusive in the decade since then. Interest groups and NGOs have
been able to work well within, and in some cases have contributed to, this dynamic.
In addition to the significant changes in American policy factors – the
recalculation of China’s potential role as a U.S. strategic asset and the reassessment
that China was moving in the “right” reform direction – other trends in the past
decade have facilitated the growth of organized interest groups in the U.S. policy
process. One trend has been simply the growing number of issues on the U.S.-China
agenda. In 1990, early in the breakdown of the U.S. policy consensus on China, U.S.-
China policy differences were aired through the vehicle of the annual debate over
China’s most-favored-nation (MFN) status. While essentially an irrelevant issue in
the 1980s, the question of China’s MFN status took on increasing importance

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beginning in 1990, and peaked in 1992, when Congress came closest to revoking or
placing further conditions on China’s MFN status. After this high-water mark, the
annual MFN debate faded markedly in importance, although it still served as a focal
point for interest group activity on other issues until 2000, when Congress passed
legislation to give China this trade status permanently.
President Clinton’s 1993 decision to link China’s MFN status to human rights
progress appears to have been a pivotal catalyst in MFN’s declining importance.
Confronted with the real possibility that the President, in 1994, might sign a bill
withdrawing China’s MFN status, Congress appeared less vigorous in pushing to
revoke or condition China’s MFN status. Instead, beginning in 1994, Members
broadened their search for more specific, more targeted legislative alternatives. Each
year, the possible alternatives grew, and the search for appropriate policy approaches
opened the door for NGOs and other interest groups to become more influential in
advancing ideas and alternatives.
Along with the increasing complexity of the legislative agenda on China, a
second trend since 1989 has been the blurring of traditional party line alliances within
the Congress. The 1990s saw the shifting and regrouping of unusual congressional
coalitions – on the specific question of China’s MFN status and on the broader issues
surrounding U.S. China policy. To cite but one example in the 105th Congress, in
addition to conservative Republicans and religious organizations from the right of the
political spectrum, opponents of extending MFN trade status to China included liberal
Democrats, labor interests, and human rights organizations more often associated with
the left of the political spectrum. MFN proponents included party centrists, pro-
business conservatives, liberal free traders, and others in the religious community.1
The issue of free trade versus the desire to penalize China for various human
rights infractions and contain its military power proved pivotal. Differences were
particularly sharp between so-called social and economic conservatives in the
Republican Party. Some senior Republicans, for instance, stated that “America’s best
strategy for promoting lasting democratic change in this repressive society [China] is
through the free exchange of goods and services in the context of an open MFN trade
relationship.”2 Others concluded, however, that:
...multinational corporations have too much influence in the China debate. There
has been an unholy alliance between big business, the Clinton administration, and
certain Republicans who have adopted the trade-at-any-price approach.3
In a related trend, China has increasingly come to be viewed as a potential security
threat to various U.S. interests by some in the Pentagon and U.S. intelligence
1 The week prior to House floor debate, on June 20, 1997, Representative David Dreier
included in the Congressional Record the text of a letter he had received from the Rev. Billy
Graham in support of MFN for China. Congressional Record, June 20, 1997, p. H 4123.
2 Text is from a June 3, 1998 letter to President Clinton by Speaker of the House Newt
Gingrich and Representatives Bill Archer and Phil Crane.
3 Senator Tim Hutchinson, quoted in The Congressional Quarterly, June 6, 1998, p. 1519.

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communities and by a growing group in Congress. (But some who share this view,
such as the Heritage Foundation, also championed PNTR for China.)
A further complication to the legislative agenda has involved the attitude of key
congressional committees. Those that are important in consideration of punitive
measures – such as the House Banking Committee, the House Ways and Means
Committee, and the Senate Finance Committee – have traditionally had majorities
who favor insulating U.S. trade and economic policy decisions from other U.S. policy
goals. These committees are subject to their own constituencies – including business,
economic, and agricultural interests – and they can act as a potent obstacle in
blocking proposed enforcement mechanisms that other organized interests seek to put
in place. These committees have often blocked more punitive measures or moderated
them.
Arguably, a third factor leading to the rise of organized interest group activity
on China in the past decade has been the notable animosity and partisanship that
developed between the Republican, more conservative Congresses elected since 1994
and the Clinton White House. In an environment that included presidential
impeachment proceedings, policy accord – even on relatively benign issues – has been
difficult. In addition, in the early Clinton years, many in the foreign policy community
considered the new Administration to be so focused on domestic economic issues that
it lacked an international leadership strategy or agenda. On questions involving
China, with which U.S. relations have been tense and troublesome throughout the
decade, and with which the United States appears to have growing substantive
differences, this perceived leadership deficit may have contributed to policy
differences.
NGOs and U.S. Policy Toward China
“Groups need Congress, and Congress needs groups.”4
Before examining the role of NGOs and other organized interest groups in the
past decade of U.S. policymaking on China, it would be useful to consider some
general principles that may govern these groups and their interaction with U.S. policy
processes.
Some General Observations
Throughout American history, organized interest groups have been a feature of
the political landscape. From the very birth of the republic, groups were formed to
oppose taxation, abolish slavery, advocate rebellion, advance ideas, elect candidates,
and affect policy. By their very nature, groups form in response to a perceived need.
This perceived need may be overarching – to educate the uninformed, to respond to
4 Ornstein, Norman, and Elder, Shirley, Interest Groups, Lobbying and Policymaking,
Congressional Quarterly, Washington, D.C., 1978, , p. 224. Cited in Oleszek, Walter, and
Davidson, Roger, Congress and Its Members, Congressional Quarterly, Washington, D.C.,
2000, p. 337.

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a physical or moral crisis or to remedy a serious national leadership weakness. Often,
the perceived need is more parochial – to get a better tax break, to build support for
a certain view, or in some other way to further the group’s vested interests.
Regardless, the perceived need is there. Also, a group can form not only to further
its own interests, but to prevent some other group from furthering its interests at the
first group’s expense. Thus, groups tend to breed other groups. Or, as one specialist
puts it, “Each move to protect a [group’s] interests is likely to prompt a
countermove.”5 Nor are groups static things. Groups with seemingly divergent
interests and opposing ideologies can still form an alliance in pursuit of a shared goal.
Once these coalitions have achieved the objective, the marriage quickly can be
dissolved.
The last decade of American decision making on China appears to be an
encapsulation of this group dynamic. Through much of the 1980s, there was U.S.
policy consensus on China, and groups that had interests outside the parameters of
that consensus remained at the margins of the policy process. With the breakdown
of consensus in 1989-1990, organized interests were able to begin to exploit areas of
policy differences. Throughout his presidency from 1989-1992, President Bush’s
defense of executive prerogative over legislative action created an atmosphere that
effectively empowered more organized groups – groups that were able to combine
forces and work through an increasingly receptive Congress to pursue alternate
objectives to those set by the President.
Initially, these policy differences were played out through the vehicle of
legislation to oppose renewal of China’s MFN trade status. Later, as legislation to
restrict China’s MFN status appeared less viable, legislative alternatives and interest
group activity on China proliferated into other areas. Since 1992, when China’s trade
status was most in jeopardy,6 Congress has considered, and in many cases passed,
legislation targeting China in such areas as abortion, human rights, prison labor,
Chinese students, nuclear and missile non-proliferation, international broadcasting,
Tibet, Taiwan, Hong Kong, espionage, religious freedom, and military relations. Each
of these issues was accompanied by an assortment of NGO interests arguing for or
against. With the election of a Republican Congress in 1994 (the first Republican
House in 40 years), ideological and in some cases partisan differences fueled the
China debate further.
Added to this, the explosive growth of the Internet – and with it, the possibilities
for electronic outreach and lobbying – has expanded the reach and potential influence
of even the smallest groups. Few groups, no matter how tiny, are now without their
own electronic home pages. Organized interests with a skeletal staff and a website
can now appear muscular, commanding dramatically greater attention than would
have been the case just a few years ago. Groups new to the China business (such as
the Family Research Council), or with minimal staff (such as the U.S. China Policy
Foundation) have web sites devoted to issues involving China. In some cases, these
5 Oleszek, p. 349.
6 In 1991 and 1992, both houses passed legislation to place further conditions on China’s
eligibility for MFN status. In both cases, H.R. 2212 (1991) and H.R. 5318 (1992) were
vetoed by President Bush; in both cases, the House overrode the veto, but the Senate did not.

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come with easy-to-use electronic form letters for contacting Members of Congress
or other parts of the U.S. government in support of a particular position.
This complicated dynamic may help explain the fact that organized interest
groups appear to have become increasingly involved in decisions on China. The
discussion below provides information about how some of the key groups active at
one time or another over the past decade have affected U.S. policy decisions.
Chinese Dissident and Student Groups in the United States
Although organizations representing students and scholars from China had
existed in the United States since the early 1980's, the number of these organizations
increased dramatically in the year following the Tiananmen Square demonstrations
and crackdown. Of 17 Chinese student and scholar organizations surveyed in
October 1990, 13 of them had been formed since March 1989.7 In the immediate
aftermath of the Tiananmen Square crackdown, members of the Chinese dissident
community became visible and articulate advocates in the American policy process,
arguing persuasively for initiatives in support of human rights and political freedoms
in China. They were particularly influential in and involved with efforts to protect
Chinese students studying in the United States at the time of the Tiananmen
crackdown.
As one of his actions in response to the crackdown, President Bush in June 1989
directed that a “sympathetic review” be given to any Chinese student studying in the
United States who requested a visa extension. Initially, Congress gave broad support
to the President’s actions.8 But sentiments to take further steps were encouraged by
the continuing harsh actions of Chinese leaders. On June 9, 1989, for instance, Deng
Xiaoping and much of the rest of China’s top leadership appeared in public to
congratulate troops involved in the crackdown. The Chinese government also began
issuing arrest warrants for student leaders and Chinese dissidents involved in the
demonstrations. In the ensuing weeks, the American press gave widespread attention
to these actions, and to the plight of Chinese in the United States who would have to
return to China when their visas ran out. International human rights organizations and
groups of Chinese students streamed to Capitol Hill to testify on the newly repressive
atmosphere in China, making their case directly to American legislators and
government officials.
In the ensuing months, many Members of Congress came to believe that the
President’s actions on behalf of Chinese students were not sufficient and that students
may be jeopardized by having to request a visa extension, thus implying to Beijing that
they feared to return. Consequently, several legislative measures were considered to
expand upon the President’s action and offer greater protection to the students.
7 See Dumbaugh, Kerry, “Chinese Student and Scholar Organizations in the United States,”
Congressional Research Service Report 90-558 F, October 15, 1990.
8 The Speaker of the House, Representative Tom Foley (D-WA), demonstrated the continuing
accord between Congress and the White House during these early days: “I do not favor actions
that aren’t taken in consultation with the Administration.” See Congressional Quarterly, June
24, 1989, p. 1564.

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These efforts received strong bipartisan support. On July 11, 1989, the Senate
Majority and Minority Leaders (Senators George Mitchell and Robert Dole) jointly
sponsored an amendment to a pending immigration bill (S. 358) which in effect would
have automatically extended Chinese student visas without their having to register a
request with the U.S. government.9 The House passed similar legislation on July 31
(H.R. 2712, introduced by Rep. Pelosi). When it passed the House, H.R. 2712 had
259 cosponsors. The final Conference Report on the Emergency Chinese Adjustment
of Status Facilitation Act of 1989 was adopted easily in both Houses.10
Chinese activist groups mounted an effective and well-organized lobbying effort
to gain congressional support for this legislation. When Representative Pelosi first
introduced the bill in the House, members of Chinese activist groups met with
congressional staff and deployed to help seek cosponsors for the bill. As the
legislative process unfolded, these groups provided relevant documentation, prepared
letters, contacted voters, gave public presentations, and wrote articles for publication
in local town newspapers urging support for the bill. According to a Pelosi staff
member, these groups did a “complete and thorough job, covered all their bases.”11
Independent Federation of Chinese Students and Scholars (IFCSS), and
Human Rights in China (HRIC). Two Chinese activist organizations that were
highly active during this time were the Independent Federation of Chinese Students
and Scholars (IFCSS), and Human Rights in China (HRIC), both formed in 1989.
IFCSS was founded in July 1989 as a direct response to the Tiananmen Square
crackdown. According to its representatives at the time, IFCSS was established to
serve as a coordinating organization for Chinese student and scholar associations on
U.S. campuses. According to the IFCSS constitution, adopted at the organization’s
First Congress (the Chicago Conference) on July 28-30, 1989, all members were to
be formally registered at a U.S. university, academic institution, or research
organization. At the time, the IFCSS claimed a membership of 40,000 Chinese
students.12 HRIC, formed by Chinese scientists and scholars in March 1989,
appeared to focus on a somewhat different agenda – the task of educating Chinese in
China and abroad about human rights principles, and monitoring human rights
activities in China. Along with IFCSS, HRIC provided input to organizers of
congressional hearings in 1989 on the Tiananmen Square crackdown.
Of the two organizations, IFCSS was the more visible in pushing for legislation
to help Chinese students, who made up the bulk of IFCSS membership. To help
achieve this goal, IFCSS established a loose organizational structure, including a
series of working committees and affiliated groups. One of these, the National
9 The amendment passed by a vote of 97-0.
10 The House adopted the Conference Report unanimously on November 19 (403-0); the
Senate adopted it by voice vote on November 20.
11 Telephone conversation with a Legislative Assistant in Representative Pelosi’s office,
February 7, 1990.
12 This figure may simply be the organization’s assumption that it effectively represented all
Chinese students in the United States, since 40,000 is the total number of Chinese students
generally estimated to have been studying in the United States at that time.

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Committee of Chinese Student Affairs, was formed specifically to spearhead the a
group’s representational efforts with the U.S. government. In addition, in the fall of
1989, the IFCSS established a government affairs office, to serve as a liaison office
with the U.S. government. Members of these two IFCSS offices met with U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service and U.S. State Department officials to discuss
implementation of policies to benefit Chinese students in the United States.
Throughout this period, tensions on China policy between the President and the
Congress were growing. Administration officials opposed any congressional effort
going beyond President Bush’s stated sanctions, saying that such efforts would
interfere with the President’s flexibility on foreign policy. In the face of growing
reports of abuses in China, presidential rhetoric on China remained mild, and
Administration officials were seen by their critics as increasingly tempering their
negative comments about Beijing’s actions with positive references about China’s
continuing importance to U.S. interests.
Rupture, November 21, 1989 - January 4, 1990. On November 21, 1989, the
consensus on U.S.-China policy quickly began to unravel when, after Congress
adjourned for the year, President Bush vetoed several key pieces of legislation
concerning China.13 Among those bills was H.R. 2712, the Emergency Chinese
Adjustment of Status Facilitation Act — the most broadly supported and benign bill
on China that had passed during the year — which President Bush pocket-vetoed on
November 30, 1989.
In his veto message concerning the measure, the President announced that he
thought the bill was “wholly unnecessary,” since he already had sufficient authority
as President to provide the protections called for in the legislation. Moreover, the
President stated that even as he was vetoing the bill, he was directing the Attorney
General to act administratively to implement the bill’s provisions. In a later statement
about the veto, the President was quoted as saying, “I want to keep control of
managing the foreign policy of this country as much as I can. And I didn’t think that
legislation was necessary.”14
In addition to the two vetoed bills, throughout December 1989, in Congress’
absence, the President continued to waive, or elected not to impose, sanctions and
other measures that large bipartisan majorities in Congress had enacted. By the time
Congress returned in January 1990, the U.S. consensus on China policy was
13 H.R. 1487, the FY90 State Department Authorization bill containing Congress’ major
China sanctions package. The veto came because of a provision stemming from the Iran-
Contra affair, and Members expected it; on the same day, the House quickly approved a new
version of the bill, H.R. 3792, without the offending language. But Senator Ernest Hollings’
jurisdictional objection to the bill in the Senate raised a new hurdle that could not be cleared
before Congress adjourned the following day. The net effect was that the 101st Congress
adjourned for the year without having formally enacted the major sanctions package to protest
the Tiananmen Square crackdown.
14 The President’s remarks, made on December 11, were reported in the Congressional
Quarterly, December 16, 1989, p. 3435. He later issued Executive Order #12711,
implementing the Act’s provisions.

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effectively over, and the stage had been set for continued grappling over China policy
between the White House and Congress throughout the rest of the Bush
Administration.
When Congress in 1990 attempted (unsuccessfully) to override the President’s
veto of the Emergency Chinese Adjustment of Status Facilitation Act, Republican
Representative Jim Leach offered this interpretation of the new executive-legislative
atmosphere: “The President, by Executive Order, implemented the policy but vetoed
the legislation. In one sense, the veto was gratuitous; in another sense, the override
effort is equally gratuitous.”15 Chinese activist groups lobbied Congress heavily on
this issue on behalf of the viewpoint that ultimately prevailed.
Since 1989, the congressional activities of the IFCSS have waned considerably,
along with its influence in the policy process. Its nature as a student organization has
meant that many of its original student leaders have moved on.16 A non-profit
organization, the group has received small grants from the National Endowment for
Democracy to help meet its objectives, which primarily concentrate on providing a
broad range of services, information, and other assistance to its principal
constituency, the continuing Chinese student population in the United States. Still,
IFCSS surfaces occasionally to make its views known in key debates on China. In
floor debate on June 24, 1997, for instance, Representative Bunning inserted into the
Congressional Record a letter from IFCSS asking that Congress make human rights
improvements a condition of China’s eligibility for MFN treatment.17
Human Rights in China, however, perhaps because it started with broader
objectives, appears quietly to have increased its visibility and stature, both in the U.S.
policy community and internationally. Founded originally by Fu Xin-yuan,18 HRIC
has been under the executive directorship of Xiao Qiang throughout the 1990s. The
group continues to pursue its core objectives: educating Chinese people about their
own rights and about international human rights standards; monitoring individual
cases of human rights abuse in China; documenting and publicizing human rights
violations; and facilitating the provision of financial and legal support to former
prisoners and their families in China. HRIC continues to contact U.S. policymakers,
providing them with information, setting up meetings, and in some cases testifying
before congressional committees. In addition to its growing U.S. work, HRIC has
become an active advocate in international fora, working with the World Bank, the
U.N. Commission on Human Rights, and other international groups. According to
15 From floor debate, Congressional Record, January 24, 1990, p. H49.
16 A deputy director of IFCSS, Xiao Qiang, who in 1989 interrupted his doctoral studies in
astrophysics at the University of Notre Dame, left IFCSS in 1991 to become Executive
Director of Human Rights in China.
17 Floor debate, Congressional Record, June 24, 1997, p. H4236.
18 According to a recent article by Dr. Fu, he founded HRIC while a postdoctoral fellow
working doing research on “molecular mechanisms of signal transduction of interferon, an
antiviral and anti-cancer protein.” “Searching for Answers: My Path Towards Becoming a
Concerned Scientist,” in China Rights Forum, June 1999. He is now Associate Professor in
the Department of Pathology, Yale University School of Medicine.

CRS-10
recent information supplied by HRIC, its board of directors includes Fang Lizhi, Perry
Link, Liu Binyan, Andrew Nathan, Orville Schell, and Anne Thurston.
The “Tibet Lobby”
The Dalai Lama himself has been the most charismatic and renowned advocate
for the Tibetan people over the past decade, and in this effort he has had strong
supporters in the U.S. Congress.19 His and his exiled community’s initiative to gain
international support for Tibet’s cause appeared to begin in 1986-1987, when a series
of meetings between Tibetan and Western supporters in New York, Washington, and
London launched what has become known as Tibet’s “international campaign.”20 The
goal of this campaign was to garner Western and principally U.S. support for Tibet’s
situation, and ultimately to bring this international pressure to bear on Beijing to make
satisfactory political concessions. As a result of this new strategy, Congress in 1987
began to put pressure on the White House to protect Tibetan culture and accord Tibet
greater status in U.S. law, despite Beijing’s strong objections.
Two events of particular importance occurred in 1987. First, on September 21,
the Dalai Lama made his first political speech in the United States, at the invitation
of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus. In that speech, the Dalai Lama made a
five-point proposal for resolving the Tibet question that was well-received in the
United States and had significant consequences on congressional attitudes toward
Tibet. Second, non-binding measures were put into place that year declaring that the
United States should make Tibet’s situation a higher policy priority and should urge
China to establish a constructive dialogue with the Dalai Lama.21
This language, not the first that Congress had passed regarding Tibet,22
nevertheless, marked the beginning of a significant increase in congressional activity
on Tibet’s status.23 From this point on, congressional supporters sought to mention
Tibet separately whenever possible in legislation relating to China. In 1990, in
19 These have included Representatives Charlie Rose, Ben Gilman, and Tom Lantos, and the
late Senator Claiborne Pell.
20 These three cities are all still centers for Tibet-related offices and information networks.
According to Dr. Melvyn Goldstein, professor of anthropology at Case Western Reserve
University, the details of how the “international campaign” strategy was formed have not yet
been documented. Goldstein, Melvyn, The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet, and the
Dalai Lama, University of California Press, 1997. pp. 76 and 138.
21 President Reagan signed into law H.R. 1777, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of
FY88-89, on December 22, 1987 (Public Law 100-204); section 1243 contains language on
Tibet. In 1985, 91 Members of Congress reportedly had also sent a letter to China’s
President, Li Xiannian, expressing support for continued talks with the Dalai Lama.
22 Congress considered a number of non-binding measures in the 1980s concerning Tibet. In
1986, Congress listed “Tibet” as an independent country in H.R. 5548, legislation dealing the
Export-Import Bank. This bill was approved on October 15, and became P.L. 99-472.
23 According to a legislative database, in the four years prior to 1987, only 6 measures had
been introduced in Congress concerning Tibet, whereas the 1987 legislation was only one of
14 measures introduced in 1987-1988. [http://www.loc.thomas]

CRS-11
considering foreign relations authorization legislation that contained the so-called
“Tiananmen sanctions,” Congress singled out Tibet for special mention in sense-of-
Congress language that closely resembled the “5 points” the Dalai Lama had
mentioned two years earlier and, in the same legislation, mandated the Voice of
America to begin broadcasts in the Tibetan language.24 In 1994, Congress enacted
a number of Tibetan-related provisions in the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of
FY94-95, including:
! a provision mandating that Tibet be listed separately in the State
Department’s annual report, “Country Reports on Human Rights”
! a provision mandating the State Department to issue a report on the
“state of relations between U.S. and those recognized by Congress
as the true representatives of the Tibetan people; the Dalai Lama, his
representatives, and the Tibetan Government in exile, and on
conditions in Tibet.”25
Views espoused by Tibetan activists also can be seen in the debate during recent
years over establishing the position of U.S. Special Envoy for Tibet, with
ambassadorial rank. Congress began considering measures to establish this position
early in the Clinton Administration. In introducing such a measure in 1994, Senator
Claiborne Pell stated he believed it was necessary to further focus Administration
attention on issues involving Tibet:
I recall how difficult it was to engage previous administrations in serious,
knowledgeable discussions on Tibet...A Special Envoy for Tibet would ensure that
this important element of United States-China relations was continually reflected
in policy discussions on a senior level.26
While legislation to create a Special Envoy for Tibet has never been enacted,
similar provisions to those in the 1994 legislation were also introduced as sections of
authorization bills in the 104th and the 105th Congresses.27 In each case, the provision
24 This bill, H.R. 3792, was enacted as P.L. 101-246, and contains the “Tiananmen sanctions”
on China that are still largely in effect. Its provisions on Tibet stated that U.S. policy toward
China should be explicitly linked with the situation in Tibet, specifically to include; lifting of
martial law in Lhasa and other parts of Tibet; opening Tibet to foreigners, including the press
and international human rights organizations; release of political prisoners; and conduct of
negotiations between representatives of the Dalai Lama and the Chinese government.
25 Established pursuant to Section 536 of the Foreign Relations Authorizations Act, H.R.
2333, enacted as P.L. 103-236.
26 Statement by Senator Pell, Congressional Record, October 7, 1994, p. S14878. Senator
Pell’s bill, S. 2554, was not enacted; nor was H.R. 5254, a similar bill introduced in the
House on October 7, 1994, by Representative Howard Berman.
27 In the 104th Congress, that legislation was the American Overseas Interests Act of 1995
(H.R. 1561-Gilman, and S. 908-Helms). President Clinton vetoed this legislation on April 12,
1996; the House override vote on April 30,1996 failed to achieve the two-thirds necessary for
passage (234-188). Similar legislation in the 105th Congress, H.R. 1486, was replaced by
three separate bills after consideration by the House Rules Committee on June 3, 1997: H.R.
(continued...)

CRS-12
called for the Special Envoy to have ambassadorial rank and to actively promote
negotiations between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese government. U.S.
Administration officials opposed these provisions, primarily because of concerns
about the creation of an ambassadorial rank position for an entity (Tibet) that the
United States recognizes as part of China rather than as an independent country in its
own right.
On October 31, 1997, in a move seen as a compromise to appeal to proponents
of the “Special Envoy” position, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright designated a
Special Coordinator for Tibetan issues within the State Department and named
Gregory Craig to serve in the position concurrently with his job as Director of Policy
Planning. Although the new Special Coordinator position did not come with
ambassadorial rank, its creation nevertheless suggested there would be a higher level
of official attention on issues involving Tibet. Consequently, the 105th Congress
dropped the Special Envoy provision from subsequent legislation. On January 20,
1999, the position of Special Coordinator for Tibet was assumed by Julia Taft, U.S.
Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees, and Migration. Assistant
Secretary Taft has met with the Dalai Lama on several occasions, including in April
1999 in Frankfurt and in August 1999 in New York.
Congressional efforts to raise the profile of Tibet over the last ten years or more
have been resisted or mitigated by successive U.S. Administrations, but generally in
a low profile, non-confrontational manner. As early as 1986, when Congress passed
legislation authorizing Export-Import Bank funding which listed Tibet as a separate
country, President Reagan signed the legislation into law.28 In his remarks, however,
the President said:
I note that Tibet is listed as a country in section 8. The United States recognizes
Tibet as part of the People’s Republic of China. I interpret Tibet’s inclusion as
a separate country to be a technical oversight.29
In other respects, however, the consistent pressure of interest groups, often
working through legislative vehicles, has contributed to U.S. Administrations being
forced to acknowledge, however subtly, the Tibetan activist position. Thus,
President George Bush in 1991 became the first U.S. President to meet with the Dalai
Lama, while President Bill Clinton met with the Dalai Lama several times. Although
these meetings were deliberately kept low-key and informal, they nevertheless
offended Chinese leaders, as did the Clinton Administration’s decision, after having
27 (...continued)
1757, authorizing appropriations for the State Department for FY1998-1999 (and containing
the Tibet Special Envoy provision); H.R. 1758, the European Security Act (NATO
enlargement); and H.R. 1759, a foreign aid authorization and reform bill. The Special Envoy
provision was dropped from this separate legislation before final passage.
28 H.R. 5548 was approved on October 15, and became P.L. 99-472.
29 “Statement on Signing the Export-Import Bank Act Amendments of 1986,” October 15,
1986, in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, Book II, June
28 to December 31, 1986, pp. 1390-1391.

CRS-13
opposed the Special Envoy position for 4 years, to compromise by establishing the
position of Special Coordinator for Tibetan Affairs.
International Campaign for Tibet (ICT). Apart from the Dalai Lama, a
number of interest groups established both in the United States and abroad since the
mid-1980s have worked to bring the Tibetan cause to the attention of the
Administration, the international community, and Members of Congress. These
groups remain important forces of influence on the political scene in 2000. Among
the most visible advocates for the Tibetan cause is the U.S.-based International
Campaign for Tibet (ICT), formed in 1988. Although the ICT pursues broader human
rights issues involving Tibet, its primary goals concern Tibet’s political and
international status — specifically, to help Tibet regain independence from China,
which the ITC regards as an illegal occupying power. Through its work, the ITC
hopes to create sufficient international support for Tibet to force China to begin
serious talks with the Dalai Lama about Tibet’s future status. The ITC has offices in
Washington and Amsterdam. Although it occasionally receives small grants (for
instance, from the National Endowment for Democracy), the ITC is largely dependent
on donations from private individuals.
The Committee of 100 for Tibet. In a similar vein, the Committee of 100 for
Tibet, formed in 1992, seeks to put Tibet on the international agenda, and to
encourage international support for a free, independent Tibet. According to its self-
description, the Committee maintains “uncompromising support of the Tibetan
peaceful struggle for independence,” and it “cooperates with and complements the
work of other organizations working for Tibet and the Tibetan people.”30 The
Committee tries to disseminate news about Tibet through the World Tibet Network
News (WTN) and the Tibet News Digest. Its membership (of approximately 100) is
an international one, and draws heavily from the traditionally liberal actor/artist
community (including Richard Gere, Joan Baez, John Cleese, Marvin Hamlisch, and
Catherine Ingram); the Nobel Laureate community (13 Nobel prize winners, including
Desmond Tutu and Elie Wiesel); and current and former U.S. officials (House
International Relations Committee Chairman Ben Gilman, Representative Charlie
Rose, former Attorney General Ramsey Clark, and former U.S. Ambassador to the
United Nations Jean Kirkpatrick). Membership also includes officials associated with
other Tibetan activist organizations, including Lodi Gyari, president of the
International Campaign for Tibet; Rinchen Dharlo, representative of the Dalai Lama
to North America; and Tsewang Phuntso, president of the Tibetan Youth Congress.
The Tibet Information Network (TIN). A third group, the Tibet Information
Network (TIN – formed in October 1987) describes its goal as providing “accurate
information free from political bias” (a claim supported by a spokesperson from the
office of the U.S. Special Coordinator for Tibetan Affairs).31 Contrary to other
advocacy/support groups on Tibet, TIN is an independent news organization. Based
in London, with a U.S. office in Jackson, Wyoming, TIN maintains it is not associated
30 Taken from the group’s website, which also includes a complete list of the group’s
membership. [http://www.tibet.org/Tibet100/]
31 Quote taken from the TIN website: [http://www.tibetinfo.net/admin/whattin.htm]

CRS-14
with any government organizations or other Tibet-related organizations. Since its
inception, TIN has been providing reports on social, economic, and political
developments in Tibet, based on both official Chinese and Tibetan sources, and on
independent observations from foreign visitors. In addition to its website, TIN offers
its “News subscribers” about 35 faxed or e-mailed news reports annually, plus
periodic book length studies, and moderate length briefing papers. Subscribers to its
TIN Publications Service receive mailed copies of more in-depth reports a minimum
of four times a year.
Human Rights, Religious, and Other “Values” Groups
Scarcely a factor in U.S. relations with China prior to the 1989 Tiananmen
Square crackdown, human rights and other issues involving American ideals and
values have increased markedly since then as components of the U.S. policy debate.
Early in the Bush Administration, these issues were expressed as vague though deeply
felt general concepts – that the Chinese government needed to improve its record on
human rights, for example, or needed to release political prisoners arrested during the
Tiananmen demonstrations. But throughout the Bush and Clinton Administrations,
the American concept of human rights in China acquired a more complex character,
partly through the efforts of relevant interest groups. In the last decade, issues
considered under the “human rights” umbrella have multiplied to include
demographics and family planning issues, sentencing and treatment of prisoners,
crackdowns on nascent political and social movements, aspects of religious worship,
environmental and other quality of life issues, rule of law and democracy-building
initiatives, and a host of others.
Human Rights. To a great extent, a wide variety of organized interest groups
have human rights issues as a component of their political platforms. In the strictest
sense, however two important groups – Amnesty International and Human Rights
Watch – may be said to be “human rights groups” in that it is their entire mission to
focus international attention on a broad range of human rights abuses, both in China
and elsewhere. Although they well pre-date Tiananmen Square, these two
international organizations often share common goals with other groups mentioned
elsewhere in this paper that represent issues that arose later in the policy debate –
religious groups, the Tibet Lobby, and democracy advocacy groups being only a few.
With their extensive networks, however, Amnesty International and Human Rights
Watch have the broadest and deepest reach in making human rights in China a key
U.S. policy focus.
Amnesty International. Amnesty International (hereafter referred to as
“Amnesty”) is for many the standard by which other human rights organizations
generally are measured. Founded in 1961 after a one-year campaign called “Appeal
for Amnesty 1961" attracted broad international support, Amnesty today has more
than 1 million members and donors in more than 160 countries and territories.
Amnesty regularly reports on, writes about, and testifies concerning a broad range of
human rights abuses in China.32 Focusing solely on individuals, Amnesty maintains
32 According to Amnesty officials, some Members of Congress have “adopted” Chinese
(continued...)

CRS-15
that it takes no position on often political questions such as the status of territory.
This enables it often to work effectively with officials of the U.S. and other
governments, because its mission insulates it from many divisive political issues. In
one of its recent campaigns involving China, Amnesty USA pushed for American
businesses to adopt a set of voluntary principles for the human rights of Chinese
workers under their employ.
Human Rights Watch (HRW). A newer group, Human Rights Watch (HRW)
was founded in 1978. While also pursuing a mission of protecting international
human rights, HRW considers itself different from Amnesty in that it focuses less on
individuals and more on governments. HRW claims to “investigate and expose human
rights violations and hold abusers accountable,” and to “challenge governments and
those who hold power to end abusive practices...”33 HRW is more involved in the
U.S. policy process than Amnesty, through meetings with State Department officials,
and also with officials at the National Security Council, Commerce Department, and
U.S. Trade Representative’s office, as well as with Members of Congress. HRW’s
Washington D.C. office essentially wears two hats in the U.S. policy process –
participating in information exchanges with U.S. government offices, and sometimes
adopting an adversarial position on policy issues. A spokesman from the organization
described this interactive relationship with U.S. policymakers as “schizophrenic but
functional.”34 HRW enjoys a wide audience for its views. The group’s representatives
readily volunteer instances where they cannot confirm human rights abuse allegations
in China that other, less well-known groups claim are true.
Democracy, Rule-of-Law. The demise of the Soviet Union left U.S.
policymakers searching for a new framework for pursuing foreign policy objectives.
By the early 1980s, officials in the Reagan Administration, Members of Congress
from both parties, and others had come to believe that the United States needed to
make a more concerted effort to promote democratic ideals abroad.35 Consequently,
in 1983, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) was established (with the
passage of the State Department Authorization Act, FY84-85)36 as a private,
nonprofit corporation charged with the mission of encouraging the development and
expansion of democratic institutions in other countries by providing grants to NGOs
for that purpose.
National Endowment for Democracy(NED)/International Republican
Institute (IRI). Although controversy surrounds its status as a private NGO funded
32 (...continued)
citizens that Amnesty believes to be political prisoners, regularly making appeals and inquiries
about these prisoners.
33 [http://www.hrw.org/about/about/html]
34 Interview with Mike Jendrzejczyk, Washington Director of HRW’s Asia Division.
35 See Epstein, Susan, “National Endowment for Democracy: Policy and Funding Issues,”
CRS Report 96-222 F.
36 The National Endowment for Democracy Act became Title V of that comprehensive
legislation, which was signed into law by President Reagan on November 22, 1983. (P.L. 98-
164)

CRS-16
solely by the U.S. government, NED’s contention has been that this dual identity is
what allows the organization to field programs in China and other countries where
official U.S. government involvement would be either unwelcome or too risky. NED
meets its objectives largely by providing grants to four specified core groups, a policy
that has been criticized by some in Congress as insufficiently open to competition.
The International Republican Institute (IRI), one of the four groups funded by NED,
maintains an active and growing program involving China.37 As with the other NED
core groups, the International Republican Institute receives its funding from the
federal government while maintaining its NGO status and identity. The Institute’s
board of directors draws heavily from sitting Members of Congress and former U.S.
government officials.38
Like officials and representatives of almost every other NGO, IRI officials have
testified before Congress about their programs and insights involving China. It is
difficult to tell, however, whether IRI has influenced congressional decision-making
on China, or whether congressional imperatives and ideals have influenced IRI’s
program direction. IRI’s China efforts generally have been received well in Congress
in as much as they involve programs that are consistent with traditional congressional
interests. In this sense, IRI’s initiatives appear to perform a balancing role in the
congressional China debate by offering vehicles capable of attracting broad support
within the Administration and Congress during times of tension in U.S.-China
relations.
At the same time, IRI is particularly noteworthy for its appeal to internationalists
in government and elsewhere who, regardless of their party affiliation, ideological
leanings, or views about China, believe that forces of the global marketplace and
ongoing open dialogue are the appropriate agents for change in and interaction with
China. In the months after its China program began, for instance, IRI was the subject
of complimentary comments by Republican Senator Richard Lugar39 and Democratic
Representative Lee Hamilton40 – both former chairmen of international affairs
37 The other three core groups are the National Democratic Institute of International Affairs
(NDI), representing the Democratic Party, the American Center for International Labor
Solidarity, affiliated with the AFL-CIO; and the Center for International Private Enterprise,
affiliated with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.
38 IRI’s Board includes Senators John McCain (Board Chairman) and Chuck Hagel;
Representatives David Dreier and Jim Kolbe; and former U.S. Government officials Brent
Scowcroft, Jeane Kirkpatrick, and Lawrence Eagleburger, among others.
39 Speaking about NED and its four core groups, Senator Lugar, a member of NED’s Board
of Directors commented on the NED’s “strong bipartisan support,” saying “Democrats and
Republicans, liberals and conservatives, academicians, practitioners...openly and knowingly
praise the work of NED and...its four core institutes....” Congressional Record, July 27,
1993, p. S9568.
40 On IRI’s sponsorship of a seminar in Beijing on the legislative process: “I would like to
commend the International Republic Institute and particularly its Asian regional director, Ms.
Lorraine Spiess...Sessions like these are a fine example of the ways in which the United
States, as part of a strategy of engagement, can make a significant and positive contribution
to discussion in China on that country’s political system.” Statement submitted by
(continued...)

CRS-17
committees in their respective bodies. IRI’s focus on helping to build democratic
institutions in China will continue to be viewed with interest by Congress, and the
Institute’s work in China is likely to continue to be a credible force for moderation
and engagement in U.S. China policy.
Religious Groups. Throughout the Bush and Clinton Administrations, political
activism by conservative Christian groups has been a continuing feature of the
American political scene. Such groups appear to have become more outspoken in
recent years on matters where moral values are seen to be at stake. U.S. China policy
is one of these areas. Two key influential groups in this movement have been the
Christian Coalition and the Family Research Council.
The Christian Coalition. The Christian Coalition, founded in 1989 by Pat
Robertson, was still relatively unknown as a political actor early in the Bush
Administration. By 1993-94, however, under the executive directorship of Ralph
Reed, the Christian Coalition had become a visible and controversial presence on the
American political scene. Putting particular emphasis on grass-roots activism, “voters
guides,” and candidate questionnaires, the Coalition specialized in helping to elect
candidates who were sympathetic to the group’s values and ideology.
The Family Research Council (FRC). The Family Research Council (FRC) was
part of the group “Focus on the Family” from 1988-1992, until the two parted
company in October 1992. Under president Gary Bauer, who served in the Reagan
Administration for eight years, The Family Research Council after 1992 became a
more formidable presence on the political scene. While emphasizing similar “values”
issues as the Christian Coalition, the FRC also seems to have had more involvement
in foreign policy matters, including those involving China.
Throughout much of the 1990s, the primary China focus of the conservative
Christians appeared involved in working to keep restrictions in place on U.S. funding
for international family planning programs. China had been a particular target of these
efforts since 1984, when the Reagan Administration, at the 2nd U.N. International
Conference on Population in Mexico City, established the requirement that the U.N.
Population Fund (UNFPA) provide “concrete assurances that [it] is not engaged in,
or does not provide funding for, abortion or coercive family planning programs.”
Concern at the time was highest over China because of allegations that had recently
surfaced about its coercive family planning practices.41 During the Bush
Administration, a slight majority in Congress tried to resume funding for UNFPA
40 (...continued)
Representative Lee Hamilton, Congressional Record, November 30, 1994, p. E2361.
41 Subsequently, in the FY85 Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 99-88), Congress
enacted even more restrictive language, prohibiting appropriated funds from going to any
organization or program which the President determined to be supporting or participating
in a coercive family planning program. Largely as a result of the conservative Christian
Right, and through the efforts of congressional pro-life supporters, most subsequent foreign
aid appropriations acts have included provisions prohibiting U.S. family planning assistance
to UNFPA unless the President certifies that that organization is not involved in family
planning activities in China.

CRS-18
through foreign aid authorization and appropriations bills. In 1989, Congress
specified that population assistance funds should go to UNFPA in the FY90 Foreign
Operations Appropriations bill; President Bush vetoed the measure in part because of
this inclusion, and the provision was removed.
In 1997, during the 105th Congress, the FRC, Christian Coalition, and other
conservative Christian groups became significantly more involved in the American
China debate than during the previous decade. Keeping to tradition, they remained
active on anti-abortion issues as these related to legislation involving China. In
addition, these groups became particularly active on two other issues: religious
persecution, and China’s MFN status.42 Partially as a result of this involvement by
conservative Christian groups, the congressional debate on China beginning in 1997
drew on attitudes involving morality and values, and these attitudes have persisted to
an extent into 2000. The Clinton Administration was singled out for particular
criticism for its policies.
In tandem with the more direct involvement of conservative Christian elements
in the policy process, beginning in 1997, congressional efforts expanded upon
measures targeting China for its coercive family planning practices. Representative
Tillie Fowler introduced H.R. 2570, a bill that would have required the United States
to deny visas to any Chinese national or Chinese government official who credibly
could be determined to have been involved in either establishing or enforcing
population policies resulting in forced sterilization or forced abortion. A similar
measure was introduced in the Senate by Senator Abraham.43 Ultimately, neither
measure was enacted, although both bodies held hearings and the House passed an
amended version of H.R. 2570.
The debate on international religious persecution highlighted important
differences in the American religious community between many mainstream religious
groups, on the one hand, and the FRC, Christian Coalition, and other conservative
religious organizations, on the other. Many members of religious-affiliated groups,
such as the National Council of Churches and the National Association of
Evangelicals, were supportive of concerns about religious persecution, but worked
to moderate pending legislation and in some cases actively opposed pending bills.44
These moderating sentiments were not shared by the Coalition, the FRC, or other
similarly inclined conservative Christian groups.
Partly as a result of increased activity by these groups, Congress in 1997-1998
considered several measures relating to international religious persecution, and
42 At a press conference in August of 1997, the Christian Coalition’s new president, Don
Hodel, announced that combating international religious persecution would be the Coalition’s
top legislative priority, and he suggested that the Coalition would try to influence foreign
policy – specifically, try to revoke China’s MFN status – in its effort to pursue this goal.
[http://www.pfaw.org/issues/right/bg_cc.shtml]
43 Section 101(5) of S. 1164, the China Policy Act of 1997, introduced on Sept. 11, 1997.
44 Among the groups opposing or working to moderate pending legislation on religious
persecution were the United Church of Christ; the National Council of Churches; the World
Alliance of Reformed Churches; and the Billy Graham Evangelistic Association.

CRS-19
enacted one – H.R. 2431, the Freedom From Religious Persecution Act of 1998 (P.L.
105-292), introduced by Representative Wolf. Originally introduced as H.R. 1685 on
May 20, 1997, Representative Wolf’s bill would have established the U.S. Office of
Religious Persecution Monitoring, and would have imposed sanctions against
countries engaged in religious persecution. But the bill faced key objections from
some Members because of its trade-related sanctions – notably, from Members of the
House Ways and Means Committee, which has jurisdiction over trade issues. As a
result, the bill’s proponents elected to compromise, and the bill was reintroduced on
September 8, 1997, with minor changes, including the deletion of a provision linking
a country’s religious tolerance with U.S. support for its WTO membership.
On March 25, 1998, the House International Relations committee marked up the
bill, adopting an amendment by Chairman Gilman. The Gilman amendment added
language about the Xinjiang Autonomous Region in China, formerly East Turkestan,
which is the home of large numbers of Muslim Uighurs; established definitions and
separate remedies for “Category 1" persecution (officially sanctioned or conducted
by the government), and “Category 2" persecution (not officially sanctioned); and
softened the presidential waiver authority restrictions. Both houses ultimately passed
the legislation, and it was signed into law on October 27, 1998.45
Conservative Christian groups also became involved in the debate over renewing
China’s MFN status in 1997. As a result, the annual trade debate became heavily
laden with moral values arguments. Tangible evidence of this involvement came in
the form of a letter made available during the most-favored-nation (MFN) renewal
debate in 1997, which specifically linked religious persecution of Chinese Christians
with renewal of China’s MFN status. The letter, signed by key leaders of
conservative Christian organizations, including the Christian Coalition and the Family
Research Council, made clear the differences of opinion these groups had with
Christian missionary groups in China.46 Other Members echoed these beliefs during
the MFN debate. During floor debate, Representative Richard Gephardt stated that
the debate was about “principle and value and belief.”47 Representative Frank Wolf
criticized Administration policy toward China as a policy that had “fundamentally
failed. It is not true to American values...It is amoral, and I personally believe it is
45 The House passed an amended version of the bill it on May 14, 1998, by a vote of 375-41.
On July 6, 1998, the bill was placed on the Senate legislative calendar for the first time. On
July 7, 1998, the bill was placed on the Senate legislative calendar for the second time, under
General Orders. The Senate passed the bill, amended, on October 9, 1998, by a vote of 98-0.
The following day, on October 10, 1998, the House acceded to the Senate amendment.
46 “Open Letter on China’s Persecution of Christians,” printed in the Congressional Record
during House floor debate on MFN renewal, June 24, 1997, pp. H4240-4241. Signors
included Gary Bauer (president, Family Research council), Ralph Reed (executive director,
Christian Coalition), and Rev. Richard John Neuhaus (president, Institute for Religious and
Public Life). The letter referred to the group’s deep respect and support for missionaries
around the world, but indicated they did not agree with their stand which urged Members “not
to vote to revoke China’s Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) trade status.” (P. H4240) The letter
supported the U.S. Catholic Conference in opposing MFN for China.
47 Floor debate, Congressional Record, June 24, 1997, p. H4273.

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immoral.”48 Representative Dana Rohrabacher described MFN for China as a
taxpayer subsidy for elite American corporations, and “an abomination.”49
Of the two groups, the FRC has appeared more proactive than the Christian
Coalition on foreign affairs issues, particularly in the China debate. Both groups
maintain extensive web sites, each of which illustrates the particular focal issues of its
host. The Coalition’s website contains an “Issue Positions” section, but appears to
concentrate on more traditional values-based issues, such as education and school
prayer. The FRC, on the other hand, moves beyond these traditional subjects, and in
addition to religious persecution, includes foreign affairs and military readiness as
among the “Issues in Depth” on which it is active. Issues involving China are cross-
referenced to all three of these areas in the group’s web site, and hotlinks to other,
related web sites are provided on issues involving the debate over China’s trade
status. Written products advertised in these sites include materials on China’s
“Laogai” (prison system), religious persecution in China, China as a security threat
to the United States, and Chinese espionage in the United States. The FRC website
also contains extensive information on contacting Congress.
Empirical evidence suggests that the influence of the religious right in the U.S.
China debate reached a zenith in 1997-98. Although still active, these groups have
adopted a lower profile in American policy debates in 1999-2000. Both the Christian
Coalition and the Family Research Council have had key leadership changes within
the past two years, with the departure of Ralph Reed from the Coalition in 1997 and
Gary Bauer (who went on extended leave of absence during his exploration for a
presidential bid) from the FRC in January 1999. The new president of the Coalition,
Kenneth L. Connor, and the new executive vice president, Charles A. Donovan
(serving in their current positions since September 2000) both have good conservative
credentials, but it is unclear whether they can muster the kind of political clout and
visibility for the Coalition that Reed enjoyed.
“Think Tanks” and Other Public Policy/Research Groups
Independent research and educational groups – so-called “think tanks” – have
been an important source of influence and information on U.S. policy toward China
since before normalization of relations in 1979. These groups are distinctive from
academic research institutions (many of which also influence American decisions and
actions involving China) in the extent of their focus on public policy research, which
makes them particularly relevant to many U.S. policymakers. These groups generally
seek to bring together in conferences and working group sessions researchers and
specialists in the academic community, members of the business community, and U.S.
and foreign government policy makers to confer about current issues and problems.
Often, the end-result is a published work – a pamphlet, book, or journal – analyzing
the results of the discussions and setting forth a list of policy recommendations.
48 Ibid, p. H4271. In other criticisms of White House policy toward China, Representative
Gerald Solomon termed it “appeasement,” and said it was “a policy out of touch with reality.”
(p. H4244); Representative Duncan Hunter referred to the utterings of a Tickle-Me-Elmo doll
as “more coherent than the trade policy of the Clinton Administration.” (p. H4250).
49 Ibid, p. H4247.

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Funding is a constant preoccupation of public policy think tanks. Money comes from
various sources: in some cases, from U.S. government contracts (as with RAND and
similar federal contract research centers), but more generally from corporate or
private contributions, foundation grants, and to a lesser extent, sale of the
organization’s publications.
While many of the interest groups discussed elsewhere in this paper are advocacy
groups, seeking to influence congressional decision making on China on a specific
issue, or on behalf of a deeply-held conviction or a category of people, public policy
research groups generally seek broader roles in the policy process. Although all these
organizations describe themselves as “private, non-profit, non-partisan” institutions
(emphasis added), each tends to be associated with a particular political point of view,
and sometimes with a particular political party. These institutional inclinations
become clearer on examination of their boards of directors and advisors, the chairs
of their working groups, the participants in their conferences, and their sources of
funding. Given these ideological predispositions, a think tank’s influence in the policy
process may be cyclical – rising and falling depending on whether its values are shared
by the current Administration or Congress.
National Committee on U.S.-China Relations (NCUSCR). Some public
policy research groups start from the premise that further Sino-American contacts will
improve mutual understanding. They seek to foster exchange and dialogue, both
among policymakers and among those outside the governmental community, and they
provide a forum for debate, discussion, and research on related issues. One of the
most well-known and influential of these groups is the New York-based National
Committee on U.S.-China relations (hereafter referred to as the National Committee).
Another, significantly smaller and newer than the National Committee, is the
Washington-based U.S. China Policy Foundation (the Foundation).
Founded by a group of scholars and leaders in the business, civic, and religious
communities, the National Committee came into being in 1966, long before U.S.-
China normalization in 1979, at a time when Americans knew little about China and
there was no official and little unofficial contact between Americans and Chinese.
National Committee officials state that the human and written resources they provided
in those early years were among the few available on China.
As the U.S.-China relationship changed, so did the National Committee’s role.
In the 1960s, the Committee provided information and encouraged public discourse
about China. In the 1970s, by its account, it “handled all subsequent [to 1972]
exchanges between the United States and China prior to normalization of relations in
1979.”50 Beginning in the 1980s, the Committee initiated projects involving multiple
cities, organizations, and countries. Throughout its existence, the National
Committee has sponsored American delegation visits to China and Chinese delegation
visits to the United States.
In Chinese culture, where personal contacts and their longevity count for much,
the National Committee enjoys considerable access. This is undoubtedly facilitated
50 Quote from National Committee materials, [http://www.neuser.org/history.htm]

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by the relevant experience and caliber of its board of directors. Chaired by Barber
Conable, a former Member of Congress, the board is replete with current and former
U.S. government officials who gained experience working with China during their
government tenures; eminent scholars specializing in China and Asia; and prominent
business leaders.51 As the Committee points out, its membership includes:
...over 700 people who represent many points of view, but share the belief that
increased public knowledge of China and U.S.-China relations enhances
international understanding and contributes to the effective conduct of foreign
policy.52
The nature of the organization and the people associated with it means that,
unlike with some of the other NGOs, it can be difficult to point to an issue or an
instance where the Committee’s input had a decisive influence on a particular policy
decision. Rather, the Committee’s focus is directed more toward the overall policy
process than can be demonstrated by debate on any single issue. National Committee
Board members, officers, and members routinely testify at congressional hearings on
China, participate in briefings for U.S. government officials, and prepare briefing
materials for delegations visiting China.53 National Committee publications, such as
its China Policy Series, are well-known among policymakers. In recent years, the
National Committee has been primarily involved in what has come to be called the
“track 2" dialogue, an attempt to supplement faltering official U.S.-China talks with
unofficial but high-level visits by former U.S. government officials and others with
influence in the policy process.54 The National Committee continues to be involved
with congressional delegation trips to China, providing access, information, and
funding.
Critics have sometimes cited the National Committee as being excessively pro-
engagement and unwilling to endorse broad punitive sanctions or to give sufficient
recognition to China as a potential long-term security threat. In 1997, for instance,
when allegations surfaced about illegal campaign contributions by Chinese
government sources, the National Committee received negative public scrutiny and
criticism for having paid for congressional trips to China after having received money
from the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs.55 In 2000, Senator Jesse
51 A partial list of board members in 1998 included Gerald Ford, Nancy Kassebaum Baker,
David Boren, Barbara Franklin, Sam Gibbons, Arthur Hummel, James Schlesinger, Brent
Scowcroft, Richard Solomon, Robert McNamara, and Ezra Vogel.
52 National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, 1998 Annual Report, p. 1.
53 Representative Lee Hamilton, for instance, referred to the National Committee as having
prepared extensive briefing materials for a delegation of former Members of Congress visiting
China. Congressional Record, June 18, 1997, p. E1245.
54 According to some, an additional benefit of the “track 2" dialogue is that unofficial groups
can raise issues in China without first having to explain their mission or its purpose to
Congress. John Pomfret, “U.S. Seeks China-Taiwan Dialogue; Delegation Attempts to
Facilitate Back Channel of Communication,” Washington Post, February 21, 1998, p. A16.
55 Sara Fritz and Janet Hook, China Hosted Several Lawmakers, Records Show...”, Los
(continued...)

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Helms sought to hold up a federal grant for the National Committee, criticizing the
organization for its views of China and for what he implied were the national security
implications of the Committee’s hosting of visiting Chinese scholars.56
U.S.-China Policy Foundation.
With a similar philosophy as that of the
National Committee, the U.S.-China Policy Foundation was founded in 1995 by a
small group of current and retired U.S. government officials and a U.S. businessman.57
According to the Foundation’s own account, the group was founded to counteract
what its founders saw as a series of misunderstandings and other deteriorating factors
in U.S.-China relations in the mid-1990s. According to the group’s literature and
website, those associated with the group in various advisory positions are Senators
Max Baucus and Dianne Feinstein, former U.S. Ambassador to China James Sasser,
and former Secretary of State Al Haig, among others.58
The U.S.-China Policy Foundation’s location a few blocks from Capitol Hill
facilitates lunch seminars for congressional staff on issues involving China. But the
Foundation is a significantly smaller group than the National Committee, with far less
funding; none of its founders or advisors hold paid positions. Still, the Foundation has
close contacts with the National Committee (several of its founders and advisors are
on the National Committee’s Board), and was one of the hosting organizations for a
dinner for Premier Zhu Rongji during his April 1999 Washington visit. The
Foundation has a monthly newsletter, U.S.-China Policy Review, and twice yearly
publishes the Washington Journal of Modern China. Recently, the Foundation has
been begun to explore sponsoring regular congressional staff delegation visits to
China. The indications are that the Foundation is interested in expanding its presence
and programs in the coming years.
The American Enterprise Institute (AEI). The American Enterprise Institute
(AEI) is a center-right scholarly organization founded in 1943. AEI lists its revenues
in 1998 at $19.6 million, which its annual report says is a 19 percent increase over the
previous year.59 AEI does public policy work on a broad range of subjects, including
the world economy, U.S. foreign policy, and political and social issues. According
to its own mission statement, AEI is dedicated to the concepts of “limited
government, competitive private enterprise, vital cultural and political institutions, and
55 (...continued)
Angeles Times, June 14, 1997, p. A16.
56 Senator Helms’s objection was to the State Department’s plan to give a $355,000 for
FY2000 to the National Committee to support its cultural and educational programs.
Mufson, Steven, “Abroad at Home: The State Department; China Relations Group Feels
Helms’s Pull,” Washington Post, October 19, 2000, p. A29.
57 The Foundation founders are: Dr. Wang Chi, and former Assistant Secretary of Defense
Chas Freeman (cochairs); former Ambassador John Holdridge; former Ambassador Arthur
Hummel; Dr. Leo Orleans; and Mr. Gary Shaw. According to Dr. Wang, this group functions
like an executive committee for the Foundation.
58 See the Foundation’s website: [http://users.erols.com/uscpf/advisors.html]
59 See “Finances” section of AEI Annual Report for 1999, the text of which can be found on
AEI’s website.

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vigilant defense.”60 Its Asian Studies Program is directed by Arthur Waldron (titled
Visiting Scholar), and addresses “Asian security, trade, economic development, and
democratization and human rights issues...”61 Others associated with AEI’s Asia
work are: former U.S. Ambassador to China James Lilley, Lawrence B. Lindsey, John
Makin, and Nick Eberstadt. AEI scholars have testified on a wide range of issues
before Congress, including on China.
The Heritage Foundation. According to its mission statement, the Heritage
Foundation, founded in 1973, seeks to “formulate and promote conservative public
policies” on a range of issues.62 Its board of trustees includes Edwin J. Feulner,
Richard M. Scaife, Holland Coors, and J. William Middendorf II. In the two-year
fund-raising campaign of 1998-1999, Heritage reportedly raised $104.8 million. The
organization appeared to take a moderate position on U.S.-China policy during the
Bush Administration, but it has been sharply critical of the Clinton Administration’s
policies, accusing it of “continued lack of clarity.” At the same time, as further
indication of the complexity of the U.S. China policy environment, Heritage generally
has been both in favor of free trade and consistently supportive of giving China PNTR
status.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). The Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) identifies itself as centrist. Originally
affiliated with Georgetown University, it became independent in the 1980s. Its budget
in 1999 was approximately $17 million. According to its mission statement, CSIS’
goal is “to inform and shape selected policy decisions in government and the private
sector by providing long-range, anticipatory, and integrated policy thinking...”63 On
its board of trustees, chaired by Sam Nunn, are: David Abshire, Anne Armstrong,
Harold Brown, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Henry Kissinger, Carla Hills, Brent Scowcroft,
and James Schlesinger, among others. In addition to working with U.S. government
officials and Members of Congress on key policy issues, CSIS places a high priority
on serving its primary source of funding – corporate members – and, upon request,
provides personal briefings, consultations, and special written policy assessments for
senior corporate officers on policy issues. CSIS corporate supporters are often
invited to attend meetings with or join distinguished groups of current and former
U.S. government officials.
The Brookings Institution. Founded in 1916, the moderate-to-liberal
Brookings Institution is the oldest public policy institute in the United States.
Consistent with other public policy think tanks, it strives to be a “bridge between
scholarship and public policy,” and says that it is committed to publishing its
findings.64 Nearly one-third of Brookings’ annual revenue comes from its sizeable
endowment, with another 38 percent from gifts and grants. Brookings is able to
60 See “Mission Statement,” Ibid.
61 [www.aei.org/research/description/html]
62 [http://www.heritage.org/annual_report/mission.html]
63 [http://www.csis.org/html/csismiss.html]
64 [http://www.brook.edu/about/aboutbi.htm]

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devote much of these established financial resources to carrying out its own research
and educational activities. Work on China is carried out through the auspices of the
Institution’s Foreign Policy Studies Program, under the direction of vice-president
Richard N. Haass. Through this program, specialists analyze global events and make
policy recommendations designed to defend and promote U.S. interests in the global
environment. Brookings scholars regularly testify before Congress and brief Executive
Branch officials on important policy issues. Scholars working on China include: Bates
Gill, Nicholas R. Lardy, David Shambaugh, and Michael E. O’Hanlon. The
Institution’s active trustrees include James Johnson (chairman and CEO), Michael H.
Armacost (president), Zoe Baird, former Rep. Lee Hamilton, and Warren Rudman.
The “Business Lobby”
The so-called “China business lobby”is a broad assortment of business groups
with economic interests in China, who generally support engagement policies as
pursued by recent U.S. Administrations. They include: agribusiness interests and
farmers; importers of toys, clothing and textiles, electronic products, shoes, and other
consumer goods manufactured in China; high-tech, telecommunications, energy, and
manufacturing industries concerned with increasing exports; the entertainment
industry; and the financial and services sectors, among others.
The economic pull of a potentially vast “China market” has prompted business
community involvement in U.S. China policy since the formative days of the
relationship. (The U.S.-China Business Council, for instance, a prominent group
influencing U.S.-China policy, was formed in 1973, following the Nixon/Kissinger
opening to China.) But China’s crackdown in Tiananmen Square during the first year
of the Bush Administration drove many investors away from the China market, eroded
business confidence in China’s economic potential, and made it difficult for business
groups to defend U.S. relations with China. Given the negative domestic and
international view of China in the aftermath of Tiananmen Square, “no one [in the
business community] wanted to be an apologist” for Chinese leaders’ actions, in the
words of one business representative.65 In the first years after Tiananmen Square,
then, the business community tended to keep a low profile, leaving President Bush to
defend U.S.-China relations and, ultimately, protect American business interests. By
1991, partly in response to efforts in Congress to withdraw or place further conditions
on China’s MFN trade status, business groups became more active in trying to protect
China’s trade status. By the mid-1990s, the investment climate in China also had
improved noticeably – a circumstance which traditionally has spurred heightened
business community activity on China issues.66
The U.S.-China Business Council. One of the most prominent business
organizations seeking to influence U.S. China policy is the U.S.-China Business
Council (“the Council”), formed in 1973 as the National Council for U.S.-China
65 Remarks attributed to R.D. Folsom, member of the Business Coalition for U.S.-China
Trade, by Tricia Cortez in “Cash, Clash, and Compromise,” a senior thesis for Princeton
University, cited in a report for the Congressional Research Service (97-48 F) by Robert
Sutter, China: Interest Groups and Recent U.S. Policy, December 30, 1996, p. 32.
66 Interview with Karen Sutter, of the U.S.-China Business Council, June 7, 2000.

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Trade. Primarily, the Council serves the interests of its member corporations,
providing market information and advice about investing in or trading with China;
publishing a bimonthly magazine and a monthly newsletter on developments in
China’s trade and investment climate; and maintaining a U.S.-China Legal
Cooperation Fund supported by contributions from some of its member corporations.
In addition, according to a self-description, the Council is “a private, non-profit, non-
partisan” organization that carries out “activities in support of [U.S.] government
policies conducive to expanded U.S.-China commercial and economic ties....”67 The
Council works regularly and primarily with U.S. Administration officials on problems
and issues involving its constituency, and holds a number of annual conferences and
regular meetings to discuss policy issues.
The Council was strongly affected by the business community’s disillusionment
with China’s potential after the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown. During the
succeeding two years, the Council lost two-thirds of its members, and it only began
to recover with China’s renewed economic prospects in 1993-94. By the year 2000,
the Council had regained its membership, and it now has about 260 member
corporations. Council representatives maintain that only two of the approximately 30
staff are involved in public advocacy with congressional offices on issues involving
China and that most representations to Congress are carried out by member
corporations. Nevertheless, in recent years, the Council has played an active role in
the debate over MFN and PNTR trade status for China; Council president Robert
Kapp has testified in support of China’s trade status before congressional committees
on numerous occasions in recent years.68
The Business Coalition for U.S.-China Trade. The Business Coalition for
U.S.-China Trade (“the Coalition”) is a relative newcomer to the U.S. China policy
scene. It was established in 1991, the first year that China’s MFN trade status
appeared to be in jeopardy. A 1991 article describes the original founding members
of the Coalition to be 75 major trade groups and corporations whose goal was to help
bolster President Bush in his efforts to maintain China’s trade status.69 According to
a Coalition spokesman, the primary founder of the group was the Emergency
Committee for American Trade (ECAT), which was founded in 1967 to lobby against
import quotas, but in recent years, has been active in efforts to protect China’s MFN
trade status.70 Four core organizations remain at the center of the Coalition: ECAT,
the U.S.-China Business Council, the Business Roundtable, and the American
Chamber of Commerce.
The Coalition stands out for its primary focus on protecting China’s trade status.
For the past nine years, this has meant promoting annual renewal of China’s MFN
67 From “An Introduction to the U.S.-China Business Council,” which can be found on the
group’s website at: [http://www.uschina.org/more/html]
68 The texts of Mr. Kapp’s testimonies can be found on the Council’s website at:
[http://www.uschina.org/public/testimony/testimony10.html]
69 Stone, Peter, “Big Business Favors China Trade,” The Legal Times, May 27, 1991, p. 5.
70 Conversation with Chris Padilla, Communications Director for the Business Coalition for
U.S.-China Trade, June 7, 2000.

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status, and in the past year, lobbying for Congress to grant China PNTR. According
to the Coalition’s Communications Director, now that the PNTR goal has been
achieved, the Coalition will go out of existence.71 Decisions about how to organize
and prioritize the Coalition’s efforts on PNTR have been made by a Corporate
Executive Committee formed in January 2000, co-chaired by executives from Boeing
and New York Life. The Coalition has maintained a website and extensive grassroots
outreach through its member corporations, but otherwise has little permanent
infrastructure.
The International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA). The International
Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA), formed in 1984, is an umbrella organization for
seven trade associations involved in U.S. copyright-based industries.72 Like the U.S.-
China Business Council, IIPA works primarily with U.S. and other government
agencies to ensure that governments establish a legal and enforcement regime for
copyrighted materials that protects intellectual property, deters piracy, and
encourages a beneficial investment and employment climate. IIPA works closely with
the U.S. Trade Representative on “Special 301" reviews concerning intellectual
property protection, and its website contains the texts of its recommendations on
these cases for China and the other approximately 80 countries in which the
organization is involved. IIPA work with Congress generally involves efforts to
amend U.S. trade laws to provide for better IP protection.73
Non-Proliferation Groups
One of the longest-running issues in U.S.-China relations concerns allegations
involving transfers of weapons of mass destruction and medium-range ballistic
missiles, primarily to Pakistan and to countries in the Middle East. Iran is reported
to have been a steady customer of Chinese weapons, having purchased small numbers
of SA-2 surface-to-air missiles, F-7 combat aircraft, fast-attack patrol boats, and C-
802 anti-ship cruise missiles. In May 1998, in response to earlier nuclear weapons
tests by India (on May 11 and 28, 1998), Pakistan tested its own nuclear weapons,
dramatically announcing its new status as a nuclear power. These tests have been
cited by some Members as positive proof that China has violated its agreements and
has assisted Pakistan in its nuclear weapons program.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Continuing concerns about
China’s weapons sales and nuclear weapons programs have given arms control and
non-proliferation groups a natural congressional audience. For the most part, these
groups have served as sources of information on technical and scientific aspects of
71 Ibid.
72 The seven are: The Association of American Publishers; The Interactive Digital Software
Association; the American Filmmakers Association; the Motion Picture Association of
America; the Business Software Alliance; the National Music Publishers’ Association; and
the Recording Industry Association of America. Together, these seven associations represent
hundreds of corporate members involved in various sectors of the entertainment, publishing,
and software industries.
73 IIPA’s website is at [http://www.iipa.com/]

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weapons systems and comparative studies of China’s force structure with that of other
countries. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (the Endowment) is
perhaps the oldest and best known of these groups. Founded in 1910 with a gift from
Andrew Carnegie, the Endowment works on a broad range of policy issues, of which
non-proliferation is only one. The Endowment is governed by a distinguished Board
of Trustees of varying backgrounds, including William Donaldson (Chair), former
Secretary of Defense William Perry, former Senator Bill Bradley, and Leslie Gelb.
While the Endowment does not generally take institutional positions, its non-
proliferation experts, programs, and publications have been routinely cited by
Members of Congress in floor statements that describe details of China’s nuclear
weapons program, missile development, and weapons sales.74
U.S. Administration officials have tended to argue that China is reassessing its
weapons sales and assistance policies and that its overall record has been steadily
improving. Administration officials cite a series of decisions by China in support of
this argument: accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); in 1992, to
abide by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR); in 1993, to sign the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CSC); in 1996, to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty; and in 1997, to join the Zangger Committee of NPT exporters.75
Congressional critics, however, bolstered by independent information from non-
proliferation groups, have charged that the Administration’s confidence in China’s
non-proliferation policies is misplaced. In 1991, congressional concerns about
China’s international weapons sales prompted Members to begin to include adherence
to non-proliferation regimes as one of the additional conditions China should meet
before having its MFN trade status renewed. In 1992, for instance, Senator Joe Biden
expressed his concern in the annual debate over China’s MFN status, saying “...if
China continues to behave as a rogue elephant on weapons proliferation, we should
be prepared to retaliate with a clear and unequivocal message...denying China most-
favored-nation trade status.”76 In succeeding years, measures targeting China’s
weapons proliferation activities have been introduced either as components of MFN-
related bills, or as separate, free-standing measures.77 In September 1999, Congress
74 In addition to its widely read journal, Foreign Policy, which contains regular articles on
China, in April 1999, the Endowment published a book devoted to China – China’s
Changing Nuclear Posture.
75 On January 12, 1998, President Clinton signed the required certifications to implement a
nuclear cooperation agreement with China, citing that there had been “clear assurances” from
China on nuclear non-proliferation issues. The actual U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation
agreement was signed in 1985, but no cooperation had occurred under the agreement,
primarily because of concerns over China’s proliferation activities.
76 Congressional Record, July 23, 1991, p. S10640.
77 One example is H.Res. 188, a measure introduced by Representative Gilman, which found
the delivery of Chinese C-802 cruise missiles to Iran to be destabilizing and therefore a
violation of the Iran-Iraq Non-Proliferation Act of 1992. During floor consideration, the
House adopted amendments which, among other things, recommended that the United States
not issue any visa to Chinese nationals involved in weapons proliferation (Reps.
Porter/Dreier/Matsui). The House passed the amended H.Res. 188 on November 6, 1997, by
(continued...)

CRS-29
enacted S. 1059, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2000 (P.L. 106-65),
which included sense-of-Congress language that China should not be allowed to join
the MTRC without meeting certain conditions, and requiring the Administration to
submit a report by January 31, 2000, on China’s adherence to the MTCR.
The “Taiwan Lobby”
No discussion of the role that interest groups play in influencing U.S. China
policy would be complete without mention of this group. The loosely defined
“Taiwan lobby” is the group of activists considered by many observers to have the
most consistent and in-depth influence in the U.S. China policy process. Consisting
of Taiwan government officials, members of the business community, groups of
American citizens of either Taiwanese or Chinese ancestry, and U.S.-based groups
advocating independence for Taiwan, the amorphous pro-Taiwan group appears
deeply committed to representing various interests, (not necessarily mutually
reinforcing) involving Taiwan at every relevant point in the American policy process.
The Taiwan lobby was a critical factor in 1995, for instance, when Congress passed
a resolution urging the President to invite Taiwan’s President, Lee Teng-hui, to the
United States.78 This invitation reportedly contributed in large part to the 1996
Taiwan Strait missile crisis, the most confrontational crisis in U.S.-China relations
since normalization of relations in 1979, involving live-fire missile exercises by China
and the corresponding American dispatch of two carrier battle groups to the area.
In the 105th Congress (1997-1998), Taiwan interests promoted the passage of
a resolution urging Taiwan’s unconditional admittance to the World Trade
Organization (WTO), a bill requiring the United States to develop plans for a theater
missile defense (TMD) system for Taiwan 79, and several resolutions reaffirming and
clarifying U.S. support for Taiwan in conjunction with President Clinton’s “Three
Noes” statements in Shanghai, which some interpreted as a change in U.S. policy
toward Taiwan.80 In the 106th Congress, Taiwan interests were reflected in the
Taiwan Security Enhancement Act (H.R. 1838/S. 693), a bill designed to enhance
U.S.-Taiwan military communication and cooperation, and strengthen Taiwan’s
security.
77 (...continued)
a vote of 414-8.
78 The resolution was H.Con.Res. 53, introduced by Congressman Tom Lantos, which the
House passed by a vote of 396-0 on May 2, 1995, and which the Senate passed by a vote of
97-1 on May 9, 1995.
79 The WTO legislation, H.Res. 190; TMD system, H.R. 2386.
80 The President made his “three noes” statement in responding to a question at a Shanghai
press conference on June 30, 1998. According to a White House transcript of his remarks,
the President said: “ I had a chance to reiterate our Taiwan policy, which is that we don’t
support independence for Taiwan, or two China’s, or one Taiwan-one China. And we don’t
believe that Taiwan should be a member in any organization for which statehood is a
requirement. So I think we have a consistent policy.” Among the resolutions introduced as
a result were: H.Con.Res. 270 (Rep. Solomon); S.Con.Res. 107 (Sen. Lott); H.Con.Res. 301
(Reps. Delay, Solomon, Snowbarger).

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Concluding Observations
Several observations can be made after examining U.S. China policy over the
past decade and the activities of organized interest groups in the policy process. First,
the changes that the U.S. policy debate has undergone in recent years suggest that
U.S.-China relations are not likely to improve or become less controversial over the
near term. While essentially a policy of consensus in the 1980s, questions about the
direction of U.S. policy over China became controversial and divisive within a few
months of the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989 and have generally remained that
way since. Long-standing issues involving non-proliferation, national security, and
human rights have only grown in importance within the U.S. policy debate over the
past decade. So-called “sovereignty issues” – Tibet, Xinjiang, and most importantly,
Taiwan – continue to be divisive and potentially destabilizing issues in the
relationship. From this perspective, it would appear that political circumstances will
continue to provide opportunities for organized groups who have vested interests in
these issues to seek to influence U.S. China policy.
Another observation on interest group activity over the past decade has to do
with personnel and perception. The perception is that the expansion of interest
groups focusing on China in recent years (approximately 50% of the groups listed in
this report’s appendix were formed since 1980) represents an ever-widening circle of
disenchantment with or vested interest in the current direction of U.S. China policy.
In fact, this perception may be somewhat skewed, since some groups have
overlapping memberships and advisory boards. In some cases, a new group has been
formed by members of other groups representing similar interests, as in the case of the
Business Coalition on U.S.-China Trade, in order to focus more attention on a given
issue. Although several groups with duplicate memberships working the same issue
from different angles can create more of an impression on the policy process than if
only one group were working those issues, it does not necessarily follow that
dissatisfaction with the policy process is growing – only that the number of interest
groups is growing, and that they are becoming more sophisticated in their activities.
A second set of observations relates to three points raised initially in this report
as being among the reasons for rising interest group activity. The first of these is
particularly important: the shift of the debate over the past decade from the single
issue of extending China’s MFN status to a growing proliferation of issues unrelated
to MFN. Although decisions approving extensions of China’s MFN status became
more or less routine beginning in 1993, they did serve as catalysts for consideration
of various “alternative” U.S. government proposals on measures involving China
policy. But the 106th Congress’ passage of legislation to grant China permanent
normal trade relations status may change the dynamic of interest group activity.
Business and labor groups heretofore involved heavily in the China MFN/PNTR
debate may find both their influence and their solidarity wane with the disappearance
of their chief issue. Other interest groups, usually able to count on leveraging the
annual trade debate for their own particular goals, could find it much more difficult
to initiate new policy measures absent this regular legislative vehicle. In a sense, the
annual China trade debate served both as a unifying element and as a kind of “force
multiplier” for divergent interest groups; having disappeared as an issue, the

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implication for interest groups might be increasing fractionalization among groups
with divergent interests competing for policy influence.
Two other reasons cited for rising interest group activity over the past decade
are also subject to possible change over the near term: the blurring of traditional party
and ideological lines; and the animosity and partisanship that comes with a divided
U.S. government – between a Democratic Congress and the Bush White House, and
particularly between a conservative Republican Congress and the Clinton White
House. These systemic, sometimes sharp policy differences make it difficult to tell
whether the views and actions of interest groups were a contributing factor to policy
division, or whether groups were merely exploiting policy differences that already
existed. In any event, this policy dynamic also may change dramatically after the
American elections in November 2000, with subsequent implications for interest
group activity and influence.
These issues are important for making future judgements about the role and
effectiveness of non-governmental organized interest groups. Absent demonstrable
changes in China’s policies or in the nature of the American political process, there
are few forces apparent on the horizon that seem capable of making U.S. policy
debates on China over the near term significantly smoother than they have been over
the past decade. The result will be that these issues will continue being problematic
for U.S.-China relations, for American policymakers and the political process, and,
indirectly, for internal Chinese policies.

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Appendix: NGOs Involved in Aspects of U.S. Policy
Toward China, 1989-199981
The following list is not comprehensive. It is intended to be a guide to some of
the organized interest groups that have been active in U.S.-China policy over the past
decade. For further or more detailed information, consult the group’s websites. In
addition, non-profit organizations must now file financial disclosure forms with the
Internal Revenue Service about their sources of funding and expenses. Information
from these disclosures, including a reproduction of the forms themselves, can be
found online at [http://www.guidestar.org/search/]. Quotes in the mission
descriptions of the groups below come directly from the literature of the organizations
themselves.
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (AEI)
[http://www.aei.org/]
1150 17th St. N.W.
Washington D.C. 20036
Ph: 202-862-5800
Fax: 202-862-7178
Year Founded: 1943
Budget: $19.6 million in revenue in 1998
Funding: Private, corporate, and foundation donations, plus money from conferences and sales.
Philosophy: Conservative, non-partisan, non-profit
China Focus: Conducted under the Asian Studies section of Foreign and Defense Policy Studies
Primary Overall Mission: According to its mission statement, AEI “sponsors original research on
the world economy, U.S. foreign policy, and political and social issues. AEI is dedicated to
preserving and strengthening the foundations of a free society—limited government, competitive
private enterprise, vital cultural and political institutions, and vigilant defense—through rigorous
inquiry, debate, and writing. The Institute is home to some of America’s most renowned
economists, legal scholars, political scientists, and foreign policy specialists. AEI is an independent,
nonpartisan organization financed by tax-deductible contributions from corporations, foundations,
and individuals.” According to its description of its Asian Studies Program, AEI “sponsors
conferences and publications on Asian security, trade, economic development, democratization, and
human rights issues. Current research focuses on the growing offensive capabilities of the People’s
Liberation Army, the democratization of Taiwan and PRC-Taiwan relations, the North Korean
military threat and prospects for Korean reunification, economic and political reform in the PRC,
and the prospects for ‘democratic peace’ throughout the region.” AEIs Asian Studies scholars
include: Arthur Waldron (director), John Bolton, Claude Barfield, Nicholas Eberstadt, James R.
Lilley, Lawrence B. Lindsey,
and John H. Makin.
81 This section draws heavily from CRS Report 97-48, by Robert Sutter, “China: Interest
Groups and Recent U.S. Policy – An Introduction,” December 30, 1996, and from the annual
reports and websites of the organizations listed.

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American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO)
[http://www.aflcio.org/home.htm]
815 16th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006
Ph: 202-637-5000
Fax: 202-637-5058
Year Founded: 1955
Budget: NA
Funding: Member dues
Philosophy: Pro-labor
China Focus: Pertaining largely to trade and labor issues
Primary Overall Mission: “The mission of the AFL-CIO is to improve the lives of working
families—to bring economic justice to the workplace and social justice to our nation....We will speak
for working people in the global economy, in the industries in which we are employed, in the firms
where we work, and on the job everyday.” With respect to China, the AFL-CIO has urged its
members to “let Congress know China does not deserve permanent free trade status from the United
States until it improves trade and human rights practices.” In describing congressional action on
PNTR for China, organization literature said: “ A $12 million corporate campaign won the U.S.
House vote on permanent Normal Trade Relations for China without annual review of that country’s
human rights practices. Union leaders and other supporters of working families decried the vote as
a blank check for China to continue its oppression of Chinese citizens, which opens the door to
corporate exploitation and lowered living and working standards for workers everywhere. They
vowed, however, to undertake massive education and mobilization toward enacting a Working
Families Agenda and electing candidates this fall who support it, and continuing to push for global
fairness.”
Amnesty International (AI)
[http://www.amnesty-usa.org/]
322 8th Ave., 10th fl

New York, NY 10001
Ph: 212-807-8400
Fax: 212-627-1451
Year Founded: 1961
Budget: $33 million in revenues for 1998
Funding: Individual contributions and donated services.
Philosophy:
China Focus: Included in Amnesty’s global focus.
Primary Overall Mission: Amnesty International has an International Executive Committee of
seven, elected every two years. (Amnesty USA has a Board of Directors of 18.) According to the
group’s literature, AI bases its four-fold mandate on the 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration
of Human Rights: “to free all prisoners of conscience detained anywhere for their beliefs or because
of their ethnic origin, sex, colour or language -- who have not used or advocated violence ; ensure
prompt and fair trials for political prisoners; abolish the death penalty, torture, and other cruel or
inhuman treatment of prisoners; and end extrajudicial executions and ‘disappearances.’” In its 1999
Annual Report, AI said about China, “Hundreds, possibly thousands, of activists and suspected
opponents of the government were detained during the year. Thousands of political prisoners jailed
in previous years remained imprisoned, many of them prisoners of conscience. Some had been
sentenced after unfair trials, others were still held without charge or trial. Political trials continued
to fall short of international fair trial standards. Torture and ill-treatment remained endemic, in some
cases resulting in death. The death penalty continued to be used extensively.”

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Asia Society
[http://www.asiasociety.com/]
502 Park Ave. (temporary offices)
New York, NY 1002223
Ph: 212-288-6400
Fax: 212-517-8315
(The group’s permanent headquarters, at 725 Park Ave. New York, NY 10021, is under
renovation until 2001.)
Year Founded: 1956, by John D. Rockefeller 3rd
Budget: $17,000,000 (1999-2000)
Funding: Foundation and corporate grants, individual contributions, membership and program
service fees, special events, contributed services, and endowments.
Philosophy: Non-profit, non-political
China Focus: Since inception
Primary Overall Mission: “The Asia Society is ... dedicated to fostering understanding of Asia and
communication between Americans and the peoples of Asia and the Pacific. A national nonprofit,
nonpartisan educational organization, the Society provides a forum for building awareness of the
more than thirty countries broadly defined as the Asia-Pacific region - the area from Japan to Iran,
and from Central Asia to New Zealand, Australia and the Pacific Islands. Through art exhibitions
and performances, films, lectures, seminars and conferences, publications and assistance to the
media, and materials and programs for students and teachers, the Asia Society presents the
uniqueness and diversity of Asia to the American people.”
Atlantic Council
[http://www.acus.org/]
910 17th St. N.W. Suite 1000
Washington, D.C. 20006
Ph: 202-463-7226
Fax: 202-463-7241
Year Founded: 1961
Budget: $3.1 million operating budget in 1999
Funding: foundations, corporations, individual donors, and a limited number of U.S. Government
contracts
China Focus: China work is included in the program on Atlantic-Pacific Interrelationships.
Primary Overall Mission: “The Atlantic Council is a non partisan network of leaders who are
convinced of the pivotal importance of effective U.S. foreign policy and the cohesion of U.S.
international relationships. The Council promotes constructive U.S. leadership and engagement in
international affairs based on the central role of the Atlantic community in the contemporary world
situation. It does this principally by:
–
stimulating dialogue and discussion about critical international policy issues, with
the intention of enriching public debate and promoting consensus in the
administration, the Congress, the corporate and nonprofit sectors and the media
in the United States, and among leaders in Europe, Asia and the Americas;
–
promoting educational and other programs for successor generations of U.S. leaders
who will value U.S. international engagement and have the formation necessary to
develop effective policies, building on U.S. leadership in the Atlantic community.”

CRS-35
The Brookings Institution
[http://www.brook.edu]
1775 Massachusetts Ave. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Ph: 202-797-6000
Fax: 202-797-6004
Year Founded: 1916
Budget: $53 million in income for 1998
Funding: Brookings is financed largely by endowment and by the support of philanthropic
foundations, corporations, and private individuals.
Philosophy: Private, non-profit organization, politically left of center.
China Focus: Included in the institution’s Foreign Policy Studies program.
Primary Overall Mission: “In its research, The Brookings Institution functions as an independent
analyst and critic, committed to publishing its findings for the information of the public. In its
conferences and activities, it serves as a bridge between scholarship and public policy, bringing new
knowledge to the attention of decision makers and affording scholars a better insight into public
policy issues. Its funds are devoted to carrying out its own research and educational activities. It also
undertakes some unclassified government contract studies, reserving the right to publish its
findings.” The Brookings Institution’s scholars doing work on China include: Bates Gill, Nicholas
R. Lardy, Michael O’Hanlon, James Reilly, and David Shambaugh.
The Business Coalition for U.S.-China Trade
[[http://www.business4chinatrade.org/]
601 13th St. N.W., Suite 1100 North
Washington, D.C. 20005
Ph: 202-879-5810
Fax: 202-347-1750

Year Founded: 1991
Budget: NA
Funding: Contributions from the Coalition’s corporate members
China Focus: Entire existence
Primary Overall Mission: To ensure that China is granted Permanent Normal Trade Relations
status (PNTR). According to a spokesman from the Coalition’s office, there currently is no plan to
continue the Coalition after PNTR for China is achieved.
The Cato Institute
[http://www.cato.org/]
1000 Massachusetts Ave. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001
Ph: 202-842-0200
Fax: 202-842-3490
Year Founded: 1977
Budget: $13 million in 1999
Funding: Foundations, corporations, individual donors
Philosophy: non-partisan, conservative
China Focus: part of a U.S. foreign policy program
Primary Overall Mission: “...the Cato Institute is a nonpartisan public policy research foundation
headquartered in Washington, D.C. The Institute is named for Cato’s Letters, libertarian pamphlets
that helped lay the philosophical foundation for the American Revolution. The Cato Institute seeks
to broaden the parameters of public policy debate to allow consideration of more options that are
consistent with the traditional American principles of limited government, individual liberty, and

CRS-36
peace. Toward that goal, the Institute strives to achieve greater involvement of the intelligent,
concerned lay public in questions of policy and the proper role of government.
The Cato Institute undertakes an extensive publications program dealing with the complete
spectrum of policy issues. Books, monographs, and shorter studies are commissioned to examine the
federal budget, Social Security, monetary policy, natural resource policy, military spending,
regulation, NATO, international trade, and myriad other issues. Major policy conferences are held
throughout the year, from which papers are published thrice yearly in the Cato Journal. The Institute
also publishes the quarterly magazine Regulation and a bimonthly newsletter, Cato Policy Report.
It has approximately 75 employees, 55 adjunct scholars, and 14 fellows, many of whom are among
the country’s leading advocates of free markets and limited government.”
Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs
[http://www.cceia.org/]
Merrill House
170 East 64th Street
New York, NY 10021
Ph: 212-838-4120
Fax: 212-752-2432
Year Founded: 1914, by Andrew Carnegie
Budget: NA
Funding: Corporate, individual, and trustee contributions; membership fees; investment income
China Focus: Included as part of the overall international work of the Council
Primary Overall Mission: The Council is “an independent, nonpartisan, nonprofit organization
dedicated to research and education in the field of ethics and international affairs. The Carnegie
Council exists to provide leadership, guidance, education, and a home for those seeking to relate
insights and resources of the world’s moral traditions to the most urgent issues of our time.” The
Council’s “programs and publications provoke thinking and dialogue about the urgent and complex
ethical dilemmas involved in international decision making. The Council’s resources are drawn upon
to explore the connections between moral commitments and political reality and to put their
understanding into practice in their public lives.”
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
[http://ceip.org/index.html]
1779 Massachusetts Ave. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Ph: 202-483-7600
Fax: 202-483-1840
Year Founded: 1910
Budget: $16.7 million in total operating expenses in 1998 (according to financial disclosure Form
990 PF, filed with the IRS)
Funding: It supports its activities principally from its own resources, supplemented by non-
governmental, philanthropic grants.
Philosophy: The Endowment normally does not take institutional positions on public policy issues.
China Focus: One of a range of international policy topics the Endowment pursues.
Primary Overall Mission: “As a tax-exempt nonprofit organization, the Endowment conducts
programs of research, discussion, publication, and education in international affairs and U.S. foreign
policy. The Endowment publishes the quarterly magazine, Foreign Policy. Carnegie’s
Associates—whose backgrounds include government, journalism, law, academia, and public
affairs—bring to their work substantial first-hand experience in foreign policy. Through writing,
public and media appearances, study groups, and conferences, Carnegie associates seek to invigorate
and extend both expert and public discussion on a wide range of international issues. These include
worldwide migration, nuclear non-proliferation, economic reform and inequality, regional conflicts,

CRS-37
multilateralism, democracy-building, and the use of force. The Endowment also engages in and
encourages projects designed to foster innovative contributions in international affairs.”
Center for Strategic and International Studies
[http://www.csis.org/]
1800 K St. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
Ph: 202-887-0200
Fax: 202-775-3199
Year Founded: 1962
Budget: $16.4 million in total revenues and support, 1999
Funding: largely from foundation grants and corporate and individual donations, with a small
percentage from U.S. Government contracts, publication sales, and conference fees
Philosophy: nonpartisan and nonproprietary research
China Focus: China and Hong Kong are a major focus of the Center’s Asian Studies Program
Primary Overall Mission: “The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is a public
policy research institution dedicated to analysis and policy impact. CSIS is the only institution of its
kind that maintains resident experts on all the world’s major geographical regions. It also covers key
functional areas, such as international finance, U.S. trade and economic policy, national and
international security issues, energy, and telecommunications. CSIS is a private, tax-exempt
institution. Sam Nunn chairs its Board of Trustees. The Center’s staff of 90 policy experts, 80
support staff, and 70 interns, is committed to generating strategic analysis, exploring contingencies,
analyzing policy options, exploring contingencies, and making policy recommendations.”
Center for Taiwan International Relations (CTIR)
[http://www.taiwandc.org/ctir/]
110 Maryland Ave. N.E., Suite 206
Washington, D.C. 20002
Ph: 202-543-6287
Fax: 202-543-2364
Year Founded: 1988
Budget: NA
Funding: private donations
Philosophy: Pro self-determination for Taiwan
China Focus: Entire Existence
Primary Overall Mission: “The Center for Taiwan International Relations (CTIR) is a private,
non-profit, non-partisan research organization established in Washington, D.C. in 1988. CTIR has
always maintained that the sovereignty of Taiwan (including the Pescadores) belongs to 21 million
people of Taiwan, and to no one else. Thus, it supports the right of those people to decide the
ultimate resolution of the ‘Taiwan Question.’ No government constituted without the consent of
Taiwan’s people has any valid claim to sovereignty over the island or any right to characterize
Taiwan’s future as its ‘internal affairs.’ To this end, CTIR works with the international community
to uphold the right of Taiwan’s people to decide their future for themselves and to ensure that this
decision is made freely without threat, coercion, or false information.”
China Information and Culture Center
[http://www.taipei.org/]
1230 Avenue of the Americas, 2nd floor
New York, NY 10020
Ph: 212-273-1800
Fax: 212-373-1866

CRS-38
Year Founded: NA
Budget: NA
Funding: The government of Taiwan and private donations.
Philosophy: Showcasing Chinese culture
China Focus: Entire existence, but focused around the Republic of China on Taiwan
Primary Overall Mission: The Chinese Information and Culture Center focuses on Chinese culture
and contemporary life on Taiwan. Encompassing a theater, art gallery, library, and culture center,
the CICC seeks to promote, educate, and inform researchers and the general public on Chinese
issues. Books, videos, films, and documents may be loaned out, and the Center sponsors many
cultural events on the premises.
Christian Coalition of America
[http://www.cc.org/]
499 S. Capitol Street, S.W., Suite 615
Washington, DC 20003
Ph: 202-479-6900
Fax: 202-479-4260
Year Founded: 1989, by Pat Robertson
Budget: NA
Funding: NA
Philosophy: Conservative
China Focus: Particular on “values” related issues such as religious freedom and coercive abortion.
Primary Overall Mission: “The Christian Coalition was founded in 1989 by Pat Robertson to give
Christians a voice in government. We represent a growing group of over 2 million members and
supporters who believe it’s time for people of faith to have a voice in the conversation we call
democracy. We are driven by the belief that people of faith have a right and a responsibility to be
involved in the world around them. That involvement includes community, social and political
action.”
“Christian Coalition will essentially split into two new organizations; Christian Coalition
International, a not for-profit, taxable corporation and Christian Coalition of America, a 501(c)(4),
tax exempt organization. This new corporate structure will allow Christian Coalition International
to form Christian Coalition chapters in countries all over the world. In addition, Christian Coalition
International will have the ability to form a political action committee which can raise and distribute
funds directly to candidates. Our tax-exempt arm-Christian Coalition of America-will continue to
conduct non-partisan, get-out-the-vote efforts and distribute voter education material...
It is clear in the wake of our new reorganization that Christian Coalition’s mission statement
remains intact. We will continue to recruit and train pro-life, pro-family activists, draw people to the
polls in record numbers and educate voters about the issues that impact families. In fact, this new
corporate structure has expanded Christian Coalition’s ability to impact the public policy debate as
we move boldly forward as the nation’s number one pro-family organization in America.”
Committee of 100 for Tibet
[http://www.tibet.org/Tibet100/]
P.O. Box 60612
Palo Alto, CA 94306-0612
Ph: NA
Fax: NA
Year Founded: 1992
Budget: NA (annual income is less than $25,000)
Funding: individual contributions
Philosophy: supporting the Tibetan people’s independence aspirations

CRS-39
China Focus: Entire existence
Primary Overall Mission: “The Committee of 100 for Tibet was formed in 1992. The Committee
is dedicated to placing Tibet on the international agenda, and to encouraging peoples and
governments to recognize that Tibet is currently illegally occupied and colonized by China. The
Committee of 100 for Tibet is a unique organization in its composition, strategy and
uncompromising support of the Tibetan peaceful struggle for independence. The Committee
cooperates with and complements the work of other organizations working for Tibet and the Tibetan
people. There are national committees in Belgium, France, India, Ireland, and Switzerland. The
Committee of 100 for Tibet is a non-profit 501(c)(3) California corporation. Contributions are tax
deductible, seriously needed and greatly appreciated. The Committee is an all volunteer organization.
All donations go directly to our public awareness efforts.”
Council on Foreign Relations
[http://www.cfr.org/p/]
The Harold Pratt House
58 East 68th Street
New York, NY 10021
Ph: 212-434-9400
Fax: 212-434-9800
Year Founded: 1921
Budget: $38 million in revenue, $19.9 million in expenses for 1998
Funding: Private and corporate membership dues, donations, grants, book publications, investments,
fellowships, and publications of Foreign Affairs magazine.
China Focus: Included in a broad range of foreign relations issues.
Primary Mission: “Founded in 1921, the Council on Foreign Relations is a nonpartisan membership
organization, research center, and publisher. It is dedicated to strengthening America’s role in and
understanding of the world by better comprehending global trends and contributing ideas to U.S.
foreign policy. The Council does this through cutting-edge studies; serious, civil discussions; and
rigorous analyses. The Council does not take institutional positions; however, Council Fellows and
independent task forces do advocate certain policies as a result of their work. The Council’s highly
diverse membership of over 3,800 American citizens includes the country’s leaders in business,
academia, the media, civil society, and government....The Council’s Studies Department is now one
of the largest foreign policy ‘think tanks’ in the nation. It consists of experts on every region of the
world as well as on particular subjects such as international economics, security, science and
technology, and culture. Its more than 100 Fellows and research associates produce research-based,
policy-oriented books and articles. The Fellows also are often called upon for congressional
testimony, newspaper op-eds, and TV and radio commentary.”
East-West Center
[http://www.ewc.hawaii.edu/]
1601 East-West Road
Honolulu, HI 96848
Ph: 808-944-7111
Fax: 808-944-7376
Year Founded: 1960
Budget: NA
Funding: Allocated by U.S. Congress, donations from private corporations, and contributions from
a number of Asian and Pacific governments.
China Focus: Entire existence.
Primary Overall Mission: “The East-West Center was established by the United States Congress...
to promote better relations and understanding between the United States and the nations of Asia and
the Pacific, through cooperative study, training, and research. The Center helps promote the

CRS-40
establishment of a stable, peaceful and prosperous Asia Pacific community in which the United
States is a natural, valued and leading partner. As mandated by the Congress, the Center carries out
its mission through programs of cooperative study, training and research. Professionals and students
from the United States, Asia and the Pacific study and work together at the East-West Center to
better understand issues of common and critical concern and explore mutually beneficial ways of
addressing them.”
Emergency Committee for American Trade
[http://ecat.policy.net/]
1211 Connecticut Ave. N.W., Suite 801
Washington, D.C. 20001
Ph: 202-659-5147
Fax: 202-659-1347
Year Founded: 1967
Budget: NA
Funding: Contributions from its member corporations
Philosophy: Focused on expansion of trade and
China Focus: Recent years.
Primary Overall Mission: “The Emergency Committee for American Trade (ECAT) is comprised
of leading American companies with global operations that support the to expansion of international
trade and investment...ECAT members are active supporters of legislative and other measures that
facilitate U.S. trade and investment. They additionally are opposed to changes in U.S. taxation of
foreign source income that unfairly penalize their competitiveness in world markets. They have
called for a new multilateral trade round to expand markets around the world for farmers,
manufacturers, and service providers, and to improve compliance with agreements to protect
intellectual property rights. They have encouraged business people overseas to support policies that
assure fairer treatment of American goods in foreign markets and to oppose restrictions on
American-owned companies.”
“To reap the benefits of China’s WTO market-opening, the United States must approve PNTR -- the
same non-discriminatory tariff treatment that we provide to 136 other WTO Members. Unless
Congress and the Administration join together to secure PNTR and end the divisive annual reviews
of China’s trade status, China would be legally entitled to withhold key WTO market-access
concessions from U.S. goods, services, and farm products.”
Family Research Council
[http://www.frc.org/]
801 G St. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001
Ph: 202-393-2100
Fax: 202-393-2134
Year Founded: 1983
Budget: Revenue of $14.6 million, expenditures of $14.5 million in 1998
Funding: Individual donations and grants. The FRC has 501(c)3 tax-exempt status.
Philosophy: Conservative
China Focus: Recent years.
Primary Overall Mission: “The Family Research Council is a nonprofit, nonpartisan educational
organization operating under the provision of Section 501C-3 of the Internal Revenue Code. The
Council is supported by voluntary donations and grants. The Family Research Council exists to
reaffirm and promote nationally, and particularly in Washington, DC, the traditional family unit and
the Judeo-Christian value system upon which it is built.”

CRS-41
Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA)
[http://www.fapa.org/]
552 7th St. S.E.
Washington, D.C. 20003
Ph: 202-547-3686
Fax: 202-543-7891
Year Founded: 1982
Budget: $400,000 in 1999
Funding: Private donations from Taiwan-American families, and contributions from individuals in
Taiwan.
Philosophy: Self-determination for Taiwan
China Focus: Entire existence.
Primary Overall Mission: “The Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA) is a world-wide,
Washington headquartered, non-profit organization whose goals include: Promotion of international
support for the right of the people of Taiwan (1) to establish an independent and democratic country,
and (2) to join the international community ; and Promotion of peace and security for Taiwan.
FAPA’s mission is educational. The organization provides US policy makers, the media, scholars
and the general public with information, books, pamphlets and papers on issues related to Taiwan.
FAPA also informs and updates Members of Congress and their staffers on Taiwanese issues. FAPA
seeks to articulate the point of view of the people of Taiwan in the intensifying Taiwan debate.”
Heritage Foundation
[http://www.heritage.org/]
214 Massachusetts Ave. N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20002
Ph: 202-608-6081
Fax: 202-675-1779
Year Founded: 1973
Budget: Income of approximately $46,000,000 in 1998
Funding: Individual and corporate donations, investment income, foundation grants, and publication
sales. Heritage accepts no government funds and performs no contract work.
Philosophy: Conservative.
China Focus: Since 1983, as part of its Asian Studies Center.
Primary Overall Mission: “The Heritage Foundation is a research and educational institute - a
think tank - whose mission is to formulate and promote conservative public policies based on the
principles of free enterprise, limited government, individual freedom, traditional American values,
and a strong national defense. Heritage’s staff pursues this mission by performing timely, accurate
research on key policy issues and effectively marketing these findings to our primary audiences:
members of Congress, key congressional staff members, policymakers in the executive branch, the
nation’s news media, and the academic and policy communities. Heritage’s products include
publications, articles, lectures, conferences, and meetings.”
Hoover Institution
[http://www-hoover.stanford.edu/]
434 Galvez Mall
Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305
Ph: 650-723-1754
Fax: 650-723-1687
Year Founded: 1919
Budget: Approximately $25 million, according to the Institution’s website

CRS-42
Funding: Donations from individuals and their related foundations and corporations (approximately
40 percent); payout from endowment funds, the market value of which exceeds $250 million
(approximately 45 percent); and contributions from Stanford University dedicated to the library and
archives (approximately 15 percent).
China Focus: Began in 1945
Primary Overall Mission: “The Institution’s overarching purposes are to: Collect the requisite
sources of knowledge pertaining to economic, political, and social changes in societies at home and
abroad, as well as to understand their causes and consequences; analyze the effects of government
actions relating to public policy; generate, publish, and disseminate ideas that encourage positive
policy formation using reasoned arguments and intellectual rigor, converting conceptual insights
into practical initiatives judged to be beneficial to society; convey to the public, the media,
lawmakers, and others an understanding of important public policy issues and promote vigorous
dialogue.”
Human Rights in China
[http://www.hrichina.org/]
350 Fifth Ave., Suite 3309
New York, NY 10118
Ph: 212-239-4495
Fax: 212-239-2561
Year Founded: 1989
Budget: $368,431 in 1997
Funding: Private donations.
China Focus: Entire existence.
Primary Overall Mission: “To support firmly those who openly and directly advocate the message
of human rights, democracy and rule of law within Chinese society, and to provide assistance to
those persecuted and imprisoned for the non-violent exercise of their fundamental rights and
freedoms; To educate the Chinese people about human rights principles and activities through
Chinese broadcasting services, overseas Chinese media, the Internet, and publications distributed
inside China and internationally; To promote ongoing scrutiny of the Chinese government’s human
rights practice, urge China to ratify international human rights covenants, and systematically
monitor their implementation; To recognize, encourage, and facilitate the work of progressive forces
inside China and exert constructive external pressure to aid them in developing an effective agenda
for social, legal, and political change respectful of human rights.”
Human Rights Watch (HRW)
[http://www.hrw.org/]
350 Fifth Ave., 34th Floor
New York, NY 10118
Ph: 212-290-4700
Fax: 212-736-1300
1630 Connecticut Ave. N.W., Suite 500
Washington, D.C. 20009
Ph: 202-612-4321
Fax: 202-371-0124
Year Founded: 1978
Budget: $12.5 million in operating revenues, 1997-98
Funding: Private donations and foundation grants. HRW accepts no government funds, either
directly or indirectly.
China Focus: Since 1985

CRS-43
Primary Overall Mission: “Human Rights Watch is dedicated to protecting the human rights of
people around the world. We stand with victims and activists to prevent discrimination, to uphold
political freedom, to protect people from inhumane conduct in wartime, and to bring offenders to
justice. We investigate and expose human rights violations and hold abusers accountable. We
challenge governments and those who hold power to end abusive practices and respect international
human rights law. We enlist the public and the international community to support the cause of
human rights for all.”
The group has numerous directors and advisors; in addition to a Board of Directors and an
Emeritus Board, HRW has separate and well-populated advisory committees on: the Middle East,
Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe and Central Asia, Children’s Rights, Women’s Rights, and
Arms. The group has also tapped into the Hollywood connection with its “Human Rights Watch
California” committee, co-chaired by Mike Farrell and Vicki Riskin.
Institute for the Study of Diplomacy (ISD)
[http://data.georgetown.edu/]
3700 O St., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20057
Ph: 202-687-6279
Fax: 202-687-8312
Year Founded: 1978
Budget: NA
Funding: Part of Georgetown University annual budget. NA
China Focus: As part of its international relations research, entire existence.
Primary Overall Mission: “The Institute for the Study of Diplomacy is part of the Edmund A.
Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. The Institute focuses on the
implementation of foreign policy. It seeks to answer the question how announced policy objectives
can best be pursued. It does so by drawing on the concrete experiences of practitioners and the
conceptual, comparative, and historical work of academics.”
International Campaign for Tibet (ICT)
[http://www.savetibet.org/]
1825 K St. N.W., Suite 520
Washington, D.C. 20006
Ph: 202-785-1515
Fax: 202-785-4343
Year Founded: 1988
Budget: approximately $1.5 million in 1997
Funding: Reliance on private donations.
China Focus: Entire existence.
Primary Overall Mission: “The International Campaign for Tibet (ICT) is a non-partisan, public
interest group dedicated to promoting human rights and democratic freedoms for the people of Tibet.
ICT was founded in 1988 and is a non-profit, tax-exempt organization incorporated in Washington,
D.C. ICT believes that governments and people around the world need accurate information on
current conditions in Tibet; that Tibetans are a “people” under international law and have the right
to self-determination; that Tibet is an occupied country which has a distinct language, culture and
religion; and, that dialogue between Tibetans and Chinese is integral towards finding a solution to
the situation in Tibet.”

CRS-44
International Committee of Lawyers for Tibet (ICLT)
[http://www.TibetICLT.org/]
2288 Fulton St., Suite 312
Berkeley, CA 94704
Ph: 510-486-0588
Fax: 510-548-3785
Year Founded: 1989
Budget: NA
Funding: Reliance on support from attorneys, other concerned individuals, and organizations.
China Focus: Entire existence.
Primary Overall Mission: “The International Committee of Lawyers for Tibet (ICLT) was created
in 1989 at the request of representatives of the Tibetan people. We are the only international
organization devoted solely to legal advocacy for Tibet. ICLT (1) monitors China’s compliance with
human rights law and its own law in Tibet; (2) documents China’s violations of these laws; (3)
publicizes these violations as widely as possible; (4) demands, in appropriate forums, that China
cease these violations and negotiate the status of Tibet with Tibetan representatives; (5) assists the
development of Tibetan democratic institutions; and (6) provides immigration and refugee rights
assistance to Tibetan refugees in the US and abroad.”
Independent Federation of Chinese Students and Scholars (IFCSS)
[http://www.ifcss.org/]
733 15th St. N.W., Suite 700
Washington, D.C. 20005
Ph: 202-347-0017
Fax: 202-347-0018
Year Founded: July 1989
Budget: NA
Funding: NA
China Focus: Entire existence
Primary Overall Mission: As originally formed, the IFCSS aimed to serve as a coordinating
organization for Chinese student and scholar associations on U.S. college campuses. One of the
goals listed in the group’s 1989 Manifesto was to “Defeat tyranny and dictatorship by peaceful,
rational, and nonviolent means.” As of this writing, the group’s website was “Under Construction.”
International Republican Institute (IRI)
[http://www.iri.org/]
1212 New York Ave. N.W.. Suite 900
Washington, D.C. 20005
Ph: 202-408-9450
Fax: 202-408-9462
Year Founded: 1984
Budget: $ 12,266,607 in income in 1997
Funding: From U.S. government sources, such as the National Endowment for Democracy and the
U.S. Agency for International Development, and from private and corporate donations.
China Focus: China program began in 1993
Primary Overall Mission: Since 1993, IRI has launched the following efforts in China, which are
ongoing today:
Legislative: 1993 – providing technical assistance on laws being drafted by
the National People’s Congress, such as the securities law and contract law,
as well as assistance to strengthen NPC ability to research and draft laws

CRS-45
independently; 1998 – policy implementation program to strengthen
province level legislative institutions
Electoral: 1994 – observing local village elections and sponsoring election
workshops to emphasize the importance of multiple candidates,
transparency, secret ballots; 1997 – working at provincial level to train
elected village committee leaders
Judicial: 1996 – a judicial training program, including training on contract and
guaranty law and SOE reform; 1997 – legal aid reform program (suspended after the
mistaken Belgrade Embassy bombing)
National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR)
[http://www.nbr.org/]
4518 University Way NE, Suite 300
Seattle, WA 98015
Ph: 206-632-7370
Fax: 206-632-7487
Year Founded: 1989
Budget: $1,858,433 in 1998
Funding: Foundations, government grants, and private donations.
China Focus: As part of an overall Asia program
Primary Overall Mission: “The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) is a nonprofit,
nonpartisan institution that conducts advanced research on policy-relevant issues in Asia. It also
serves as the global clearinghouse for Asia research conducted by specialists and institutions
worldwide. Through these activities NBR is uniquely positioned to promote informed and effective
U.S. policy toward the region. NBR sponsors projects that examine the economic, political, and
strategic questions affecting U.S. relations with East, Central, and South Asia, as well as Russia.
NBR efficiently draws upon the world’s premier specialists to develop and carry out its research
agenda. Through its advisory board, programs, and print and electronic publications, NBR
integrates its research into the policymaking communities of the United States and Asia.”
National Committee on U.S.-China Relations
[http://www.ncuscr.org/]
71 West 23rd St., Suite 1901
New York, NY 10010
Ph: 212-645-9677
Fax: 212-645-1695
Year Founded: 1966, by a broad coalition of scholars and civic, religious, and business leaders
Budget: $1,880,708 in income in 1998
Funding: A combination of grants from the U.S. Information Agency, U.S. Department of
Education, foundations, private donations, and the Committee’s members and other interested
citizens. The committee is classified by the I.R.S. as a tax-exempt 501(c)(3) organization.
Philosophy: Engagement with China.
China Focus: Entire existence.
Primary Overall Mission: “The National Committee on United States-China Relations is a
nonprofit educational organization that encourages understanding of China and the United States
between citizens of both countries. The Committee’s continuity of experience and depth of
associations with senior officials and distinguished citizens of China and the United States make it
a unique national resource. The Committee was founded in the belief that vigorous debate of China
policy among Americans was essential and that balanced public education could clarify U.S. interests
and strengthen our foreign policy. Similarly, the founders believed that over time dialogue with
Chinese citizens would enhance mutual understanding, a basic requirement for stable and productive
relations.”

CRS-46
“The Committee’s exchange, educational, and policy programs are carried out primarily in the fields
of international relations, economic development and management, governance and the rule of law,
environmental and other global concerns, mass communication, and education administration –
addressing these issues with respect to the People’s Republic, Hong Kong SAR and Taiwan. The
membership of the organization includes some 700 distinguished Americans from all parts of the
country who represent many points of view but who share the belief that increased public knowledge
of China and U.S.-China relations strengthens the Sino-American relationship.”
National Endowment for Democracy (NED)
[http://www.ned.org/]
1101 15th St. N.W., Suite 700
Washington, D.C. 20005
Ph: 202-293-9072
Fax: 202-223-6042
Year Founded: 1983
Budget: $33,000,000 in income for 1998
Funding: Annual appropriations from the U.S. Congress
China Focus:
Primary Overall Mission: “The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) is a private,
nonprofit, bipartisan, organization created to help strengthen democratic institutions around the
world through non-governmental efforts. The Endowment’s grants program assists organizations
abroad working for democratic goals. It makes hundreds of grants each year to support pro-
democracy groups throughout the world, including Asia. The Endowment’s programs encourage
democratic political development primarily in three major functional areas – pluralism; democratic
governance; and education, culture, and communications. Democracy involves the right of the
people freely to determine their own destiny. The exercise of this right requires a system that
guarantees freedom of expression, belief and association, free and competitive elections, respect for
the inalienable rights of individuals and minorities, free communications media, and the rule of law.
(From NED’s founding “Statement of Principles and Objectives,” 1984).
Non-Proliferation Policy Education Center
[http://www.wizard.net/~npec/]
1718 M St. N.W., Suite 244
Washington D.C. 20036
Ph: 202-466-4406
Fax: 202-659-5429
Year Founded: 1994
Budget: NA
Funding: NA
China Focus: Specifically with respect to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Primary Overall Mission: “The Non-Proliferation Policy Education Center’s (NPEC) aim is to
address questions involving deficiencies in current non-proliferation policies and programs and to
explain why US non-proliferation policy will need to change... NPEC will bring together
Congressional staff, administration officials, and the press to discuss pressing proliferation policy
issues with NPEC’s monograph authors and other academic specialists at a series of non-
proliferation policy forums. Given the breadth of support any significant change in US non-
proliferation policy will require, NPEC takes care to avoid partisanship. All of NPEC’s activities
involve key administration officials, members of Congress, national security experts, government
contractors, legislative staff and academics known for their work in the proliferation field.”

CRS-47
Pacific Basin Economic Council
[http://www.pbec.org]
900 Fort Street, Suite 1080
Honolulu, Hawaii 96813
Ph: 808-521-9044
Fax: 808-521-8530
Year Founded: 1967
Budget: NA
Funding: Supported by its corporate members.
China Focus: Pacific Basin, including China
Primary Overall Mission: “The Pacific Basin Economic Council is an association of senior business
leaders from throughout the Pacific Basin Region dedicated to expanding trade and investment
through fostering open markets. PBEC’s mission is to achieve a business environment in the region
that ensures open trade and investment and encourages competitiveness based on the capabilities of
individual companies; provide information, networking fora, and services to members that increase
their business opportunities; and support cooperative business efforts to address the economic
well-being of citizens in the Pacific region.
The Pacific Basin Economic Council will have an impact on the following key business issues in
the region (in no particular order), which will promote an improved business climate in the region
for all PBEC members: advising governments in order to improve their business environment;
generating foreign investment flows to support economic development objectives; reducing
administrative barriers to international trade in the region; stimulating the development and
accelerating the implementation of new technologies; and balancing economic development with
the need for a clean environment.”
Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC)
[http://www.pecc.net/]
4 Nassim Road
Singapore 258372
Ph: 65-737-9823
Fax: 65-737-9824
Year Founded: PECC - 1980; U.S. National Committee, 1984
Budget: NA
Funding: Provided by member economies
Philosophy: non-partisan
China Focus: Improving economic relations in the Pacific Rim, including China. Both China and
Taiwan are members of the PECC.
Primary Overall Mission: “PECC aims to serve as a regional forum for cooperation and policy
coordination to promote economic development in the Asia-Pacific region.” PECC is policy
oriented, pragmatic and anticipatory. Its work program aims for better cooperation and policy
coordination in areas including trade, investment, finance, HRD, and all major industrial sectors.
PECC is the only non-governmental official observer of APEC since the APEC’s formation in 1989.
PECC has provided information and analytical support to APEC ministerial meetings and working
groups. Also it channels and facilitates private sector participation in the formal process.”
People for the American Way Foundation
[http://www.pfaw.org/]
2000 M Street, NW, Suite 400
Washington, DC 20036
Ph: 202-467-4999
800-326-7329
Fax: 202-293-2672

CRS-48
Year Founded: 1980
Budget: $6,756,232 in 1997
Funding: individual contributors and grants
Philosophy: non-partisan advocacy group, left of center,
China Focus: minimal and indirect, focused largely on issues involving religious freedom where the
“Religious Right” is active
Primary Overall Mission: “People For the American Way (PFAW), founded in 1980, is a
non-profit, non-partisan advocacy group that organizes and mobilizes Americans to fight for
fairness, justice, civil rights and the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. PFAW Foundation
is committed to defending democracy and bringing the ideals of community, opportunity, diversity,
equality and fairness together to form a strong, united voice. To achieve this, PFAWF conducts
research, legal and education work, as well as monitors and researches the Religious Right
movement and its political allies. The organization is a premier source of vital information for
policymakers, scholars and activists nationwide. In addition, People For the American Way Voters
Alliance was formed as a political action committee that will work to hold candidates to account,
organize to get voters out to the polls and work to fight the Right.”
Taiwan International Alliance (TIA)
Year Founded: 1991
Budget: NA
Funding: private donations and contributions from members and supporters
Philosophy: The TIA holds that Taiwan is not a part of China, but an independent nation
China Focus: Entire existence
Primary Overall Mission: “The mission of Taiwan International Alliance is to differentiate Taiwan
from China, thus overcoming twenty years of international isolation. By educating the world
community about the history and accomplishments of Taiwan and its peoples, Taiwan can regain
international recognition as a nation state with a seat in the United Nations and all other
international forums.”
U.S.-ROC Business Council
[http://www.usa-roc.org/]
1700 N. Moore Street, Suite 1703
Arlington, VA 22209
Ph: 703-465-2930
Fax: 703-465-2937
Year Founded: 1976
Budget: NA
Funding: Membership dues and government grants
China Focus: Entire existence
Primary Overall Mission: “The US-ROC (Taiwan) Business Council, a private non-profit
association, was formed as the only non-governmental organization in the US to foster trade and
business relations with the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan. The Council is currently chaired
by the Honorable Frank C. Carlucci, Chairman of The Carlyle Group and former Secretary of
Defense and National Security Advisor. The Council provides a variety of services to its members:
all designed to provide information, advice and counsel on business opportunities with Taiwan.”

CRS-49
U.S.-China Business Council
[http://www.uschina.org/]
1818 N. St. N.W., Suite 200
Washington, D.C. 20036
Ph: 202-429-0340
Fax: 202-775-2476
Year Founded: 1973, as the National Council for U.S.-China Trade
Budget: NA
Funding: contributions from its 290 member firms
China Focus: Entire existence
Primary Overall Mission: “The United States-China Business Council is the principal organization
of US companies engaged in trade and investment in the People’s Republic of China. The Council
serves more than 250 corporate members through offices in Washington, DC, Beijing, Shanghai, and
Hong Kong.” Primarily, the Council provides its member firms with assistance in doing business
with China.
The Council maintains that it is dedicated to economic pursuits and does not hold political
positions on U.S.-China or U.S.-Taiwan relations. Still, the demands of its constituent interests
generally place it in the position of advocating “engagement” and closer ties with China – positions
that have political implications in the current U.S. policy environment. According to its own
literature, “The Council has always played an important role in US policy debates and fought for
stable and expanded US-China economic links. Major companies look to the US-China Business
Council to be their collective voice on key policy issues and to provide US officials with definitive
information on American business interests in China. Among the Council’s many policy-related
initiatives are: Position papers that provide US and PRC government officials with responsible,
accurate, and persuasive arguments on critical policy concerns; Support for the activities and
presence of US businesses in China through congressional testimony, interviews with the media, and
participation in other public fora; Sustained efforts to inform Members of Congress and
congressional staff of US commercial interests in China.”
U.S.-China Policy Foundation
[http://users.erols.com/uscpf/]
316 Pennsylvania Ave. S.E. Suite 201
Washington, D.C. 20003
Ph: 202-547-8615
Fax: 202-547-8853
Year Founded: 1995
Budget: NA
Funding: NA
Philosophy: non-partisan, non-profit, interested in promoting greater understanding between the
United States and China
China Focus: Entire existence
Primary Overall Mission: “The U.S.-China Policy Foundation is a non-partisan, non-profit,
non-advocacy organization that promotes a greater understanding between American and Chinese
policymakers, researchers, and government officials. USCPF seeks to provide opportunities for
students, researchers, and practitioners of foreign policy to interact in more diverse and substantial
ways. USCPF also conducts research on U.S.-China policies and relations in the Asia-Pacific region.
The Foundation does not advocate any policy or endeavors to influence policy decisions, but instead
provides information in order to increase awareness of issues in U.S.-China relations....” Among
its list of activities, The Foundation says that it “coordinates research efforts on topics and issues
related to U.S.-China policy; organizes exchanges and visits between specialists on U.S.-China
relations, policymakers, and officials from both nations; provides free consultative services to
American academics and policymakers on various U.S.-China policy issues; promotes the
development of China studies in U.S. institutions of higher education; hosts seminars and

CRS-50
conferences on issues related to U.S.-China relations; and publishes The U.S.-China Policy Review,
and the Washington Journal of Modern China.”
U.S. Institute of Peace
[http://www.usip.org/]
1200 17th St. N.W., Suite 200
Washington, D.C. 20036
Ph: 202-457-1700
Fax: 202-429-6063
Year Founded: 1984
Budget: NA
Funding: Funded by the U.S. Congress as an independent non-profit corporation
China Focus: The Institute focuses on a number of regional topics, including China
Primary Overall Mission: The Institution’s mandate is to “apply the lessons learned from history
and our national experience to the challenge of achieving peace among nations.” The Institute has
no political position on China or Taiwan.
Washington Center for China Studies, Inc.
[NA]
2300 M St. N.W., Suite 800
Washington, D.C. 20037
Ph: 202-973-2844
Fax: 202-296-8072
Year Founded: 1990
Budget: $ 207,100 for 1997
Funding: contributions from foundations, corporations, and individuals
China Focus: Entire existence
Primary Overall Mission: According to a WCCS official, WCCS goals are to organize, coordinate,
and support Chinese scholars conducting studies on issues involving China, and to promote
exchanges and better understanding between China and the rest of the world. It conducts research,
provides training, does consulting, and conducts information and scholarly exchange programs in
the field of social sciences and humanities.

CRS-51
Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control
[http://www.wisconsinproject.org/]
1701 K Street, NW, Suite 805
Washington, DC 20006
Ph: 202-223-8299
Fax: 202-223-8298
Year Founded: 1986
Budget: Income of $607,098 in 1998
Philosophy: non-profit, non-partisan
China Focus: Relating to nuclear arms control
Primary Overall Mission: “The Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control carries out research
and public education designed to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, chemical/biological weapons,
and long-range missiles. It operates in Washington D.C. under the auspices of the University of
Wisconsin. The project has been investigating transfers of nuclear-and missile-related technology
since 1986 and has identified over 2,000 companies and projects linked to proliferation. By listing
suspect buyers in sensitive emerging markets, its database – the Risk Report – helps exporters and
governments keep dangerous products out of the wrong hands.” The Risk Report has periodically
reported on suspect activities in China.
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
[http://wwics.si.edu/]
One Woodrow Wilson Plaza
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004
Ph: 202-691-4000
Fax: 202-691-4001
Year Founded: 1968, by Congress
Budget: $7,216,879 in income for 1998
Funding: Primarily an annual appropriation from the U.S. Congress; also from various foundations.
China Focus: The Center focuses on a wide range of topics, including China
Primary Overall Mission: “Established as an international center for scholars, the Center
memorializes Woodrow Wilson -- professor, university president, and twenty-eighth president of the
United States -- by supporting scholarship and linking that scholarship to issues of concern to official
Washington. It does so by offering fellowships and other support to high-level professors, public
officials, journalists, professionals and other leaders, giving them special opportunities for research
and writing. Also in support of scholarship, the Center hosts seminars and conferences, and it
provides a variety of publications and broadcasting.”
World United Formosans for Independence (WUFI)
[http://taiwan.wufi.org/initial.htm]
P.O. Box 700923
Dallas, TX 75370
Ph: 972- 245-0401
Fax: 972-245-1204
Year Founded: 1970
Budget: NA
Funding: Private donations
Philosophy: a free and independent Taiwan
China Focus: Entire existence
Primary Overall Mission: “World United Formosans for Independence (WUFI) is dedicated to the
establishment of a free, democratic and independent Republic of Taiwan in accordance with the

CRS-52
principle of self-determination of peoples. We are committed to the fundamental freedoms and
human rights embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and therefore repudiate all
forms of foreign dominance and interventions that run counter to the interests of the 21-million
Taiwanese people.”

CRS-53
Appendix Addendum
Pertinent NGO Data
Organization Name and
Address
Phone
Fax
Website
American Enterprise Institute
1150 17th St. N.W.
202-862-5800
202-862-7178
(AEI)
Washington, DC 20006
[http://www.aei.org/]
AFL-CIO
815 16th Street, NW
202-637-5000
202-637-5058
[http://www.aflcio.org/home.htm]
Washington, DC 20006
Amnesty International
322 8th Ave., 10th fl
212-807-8400
212-627-1451
[http://www.amnesty-usa.org/]
New York, NY 10001
Asia Society
502 Park Ave.
212-288-6400
212-517-8315
[http://www.asiasociety.com/]
New York, NY 10022
Atlantic Council
910 17th St. N.W. Suite 1000
202-463-7226
202-463-7241
[http://www.acus.org/]
Washington, D.C. 20006
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave. N.W.
202-797-6000
202-797-6004
[http://www.brook.edu]
Washington, D.C. 20036
The CATO Institute
1000 Massachusetts Ave. N.W.
202-842-0200
202-842-3490
[http://www.cato.org/]
Washington, D.C. 20001
Carnegie Council on Ethics and
Merrill House
212-838-4120
212-752-2432
International Affairs
170 East 64th Street
[http://www.cceia.org/]
New York, NY 10021
Carnegie Endowment for
1779 Massachusetts Ave. N.W.
202-483-7600
202-483-1840
International Peace
Washington, D.C. 20036
[http://ceip.org/index.html]
Center for Strategic and
1800 K St. N.W.
202-887-0200
202-775-3199
International Studies (CSIS)
Washington, D.C. 20006
[http://www.csis.org/]
Center for Taiwan International
110 Maryland Ave, NE, Suite 206
202-543-6287
202-543-2364
Relations (CTIR)
Washington, D.C. 20002

[http://www.taiwandc.org/ctir/]
China Information & Culture
1230 Avenue of the Americas, 2nd
212-373-1800
212-373-1866
Center
fl
[http://www.taipei.org/]
New York, NY 10020
The Christian Coalition
499 S. Capitol St.
202-479-6900
202-479-4260
[http://www.cc.org/]
Washington, DC 20003
Committee of 100 for Tibet
P.O. Box 60612
NA
NA
[http://www.tibet.org/Tibet100/]
Palo Alto, CA 94306-0612
Council on Foreign Relations
The Harold Pratt House
212-434-9400
212-434-9800
[http://www.cfr.org/p/]
58 East 68th Street
New York, NY 10021

CRS-54
Organization Name and
Address
Phone
Fax
Website
East-West Center
1601 East-West Road
808-944-7111
808-944-7376
[http://www.ewc.hawaii.edu/]
Honolulu, HI 96848-1601
Emergency Committee for
1211 Connecticut Ave. N.W.,
202-659-5147
202-659-1347
American Trade (ECAT)
Suite 801
[http://ecat.policy.net/]
Washington, D.C. 20036
Family Research Council
801 G St. N.W.
202-393-2100
202-393-2134
[http://www.frc.org/]
Washington, D.C. 20001
Formosan Association for Public
552 7th St. S.E.
202-547-3686
202-543-7891
Affairs (FAPA)
Washington, D.C. 20003
[http://www.fapa.org/]
Heritage Foundation
214 Massachusetts Ave. N.E.
202-608-6081
202-675-1779
[http://www.heritage.org/]
Washington, D.C. 20002
Hoover Institution
434 Galvez Mall
650-723-1754
650-723-1687
[http://www-hoover.stanford.edu/] Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305
Human Rights in China (HRIC)
350 Fifth Avenue, Suite 3309
212-239-4495
212-239-2561
[http://www.hrichina.org/]
New York, NY 10118
Human Rights Watch
1630 Connecticut Ave. NW #500
202-612-4321
202-371-0124
[http://www.hrw.org/]
Washington DC 20009
Institute for the Study of
3700 O St., N.W.
202-687-6279
202-687-8312
Diplomacy
Washington, D.C. 20057
[http://data.georgetown.edu/]
International Campaign for Tibet
1825 K St. N.W., Suite 520
202-785-1515
202-785-4343
[http://www.savetibet.org/]
Washington, D.C. 20006
Independent Federation of
733 15th St. N.W., Suite 700
202-347-0017
202-347-0018
Chinese Students and Scholars
Washington, DC 20005
(IFCSS) [hq@ifcss.org]
International Republican Institute
1212 New York Ave. N.W.. Suite
202-408-9450
202-408-9462
[http://www.iri.org/]
900
Washington, D.C. 20005
National Bureau of Asian
4518 University Way NE, Suite
206-632-7370
206-632-7487
Research
300
[http://www.nbr.org/]
Seattle, WA 98015
National Committee on U.S.-
71 West 23rd St., Suite 1901
212-645-9677
212-645-1695
China Relations
New York, NY 10010
[http://www.ncuscr.org/]
National Endowment for
1101 15th St. N.W., Suite 700
202-293-9072
202-223-6042
Democracy
Washington, D.C. 20005
(NED)
[http://www.ned.org/]
Non-Proliferation Policy
1718 M St. N.W., Suite 244
202-466-4406
202-659-5429
Education Center
Washington D.C. 20036
[http://www.wizard.net/~npec/]

CRS-55
Organization Name and
Address
Phone
Fax
Website
Pacific Basin Economic Council
900 Fort Street, Suite 1080
808-521-9044
808-521-8530
[http://www.pbec.org]
Honolulu, Hawaii 96813
Pacific Economic Cooperation
4 Nassim Road
65-737-9823
65-737-9824
Council
Singapore 258372
[http://www.pecc.net/]
People for the American Way
2000 M Street, NW, Suite 400
202-467-4999
202-293-2672
[http://www.pfaw.org/]
Washington, DC 20036
800-326-7329
Taiwan International Alliance
330 East 38th Street, Suite 17B
212-983-0480
NA
[NA]
New York, NY 10016
U.S.-ROC Business Council
1700 N. Moore Street, Suite 1703
703-465-2930
703-465-2937
[http://www.usa-roc.org/]
Arlington, VA 22209
U.S.-China Business Council
1818 N. St. N.W., Suite 200
202-429-0340
202-775-2476
[http://www.uschina.org/]
Washington, D.C. 20036
U.S. China Policy Foundation
316 Pennsylvania Ave. S.E. Suite
202-547-8615
202-547-8853
[http://users.erols.com/uscpf/]
201
Washington, D.C. 20003
U.S. Institute of Peace
1200 17th St. N.W., Suite 200
202-457-1700
202-429-6063
[http://www.usip.org/]
Washington, D.C. 20036
Washington Center for China
2300 M St. N.W., Suite 800
202-973-2844
202-973-2845
Studies [NA]
Washington, D.C. 20037
Wisconsin Project on Nuclear
1701 K Street, NW Suite 805
202-223-8299
202-296-8072
Arms Control
Washington, DC 20006
[http://www.wisconsinproject.org/
]
Woodrow Wilson International
One Woodrow Wilson Plaza
202-691-4000
202-691-4001
Center for Scholars
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
[http://wwics.si.edu/]
Washington, D.C. 20004
World United Formosans for
P.O. Box 700923
972- 245-0401
972-245-1204
Independence
Dallas, TX 75370
[http://taiwan.wufi.org/initial.htm]