Democracy and Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy: Tools and Considerations for Congress

January 4, 2024 R47890

Democracy and Human Rights in U.S. Foreign
January 4, 2024
Policy: Tools and Considerations for Congress
Michael A. Weber
U.S. law declares the promotion and protection of democracy, human rights, and
Analyst in Foreign Affairs
fundamental freedoms to be “principal” and “fundamental” goals of U.S. foreign policy.

Congress has debated matters of democracy and human rights in the conduct of U.S.
foreign policy, often as a source of pressure on the executive branch to place greater and

more consistent emphasis on these issues. Beginning in the 1970s in particular, Congress
initiated and led a gradual process through which issues of democracy and human rights gained greater
prominence in the U.S. foreign policy agenda. At the same time, U.S. policymakers have often pursued efforts to
defend and promote democracy and human rights overseas selectively and in some tension with competing
foreign policy priorities.
Some democracy experts view the mid-1970s as the starting point of a global expansion of democracy (some of
them calling it democracy’s “third wave”) that further accelerated with the disintegration and ultimate collapse of
the Soviet Union in 1991. Optimism among some U.S. policymakers in the early post-Cold War period over the
capacity of the United States to engender more humane and democratic governance overseas has since eroded to
some degree, however. This erosion has occurred in the face of competing strategic imperatives, difficulties the
U.S. government has faced in its attempts to foster rights-respecting and democratic political systems following
U.S. military invasions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and expanding challenges to democracy and human rights around
the globe. Among these challenges are those related to some governments’ restrictions on civil society and media,
incremental forms of “democratic backsliding,” technological developments, and the international influence of
authoritarian governments.
Congressional action has resulted in a growing and evolving array of statutory provisions and associated policy
tools that the U.S. government can use to address matters related to democracy and human rights in foreign
contexts. These tools include, among others, democracy assistance programs; executive branch reporting
requirements; U.S. engagement through international institutions and initiatives; statutory provisions restricting
foreign assistance and arms sales; authorities for targeted sanctions; and import restrictions and export controls,
among others. As Congress conducts oversight, appropriates resources, and considers additional authorities for
promoting democracy or human rights globally, it may consider the following issues:
• U.S Interests and Tensions with Other Objectives. Proponents of efforts by the United States to
promote democracy and human rights overseas argue that such efforts serve long-term U.S.
interests. These efforts may at times be in tension with other U.S. foreign policy goals, however.
In the current period of intensified competition with the governments of China and Russia, a U.S.
emphasis on democracy and human rights may support the pursuit of some U.S. objectives while
also contributing to the complexity of other policy questions facing U.S. policymakers.
• Impact and Effectiveness. Evaluating the impact of U.S. democracy and human rights efforts is
difficult, and these efforts may face more challenges in the current period than in the early post-
Cold war years. In general, experts view governance-related developments as protracted,
uncertain, and nonlinear processes, with often considerable constraints on the ability of the
United States (or other foreign actors) to influence them.
• Criticisms and Questions About U.S. Credibility. Some critics assert that U.S. democracy and
human rights promotion constitutes an imposition of American values on other societies and
“interference” in foreign governments’ internal affairs. Other criticisms include, for example, that
the U.S. government holds the governments of strategic partners to different democracy and
human rights standards than it does adversarial governments, and that the United States lacks
credibility given its own domestic democracy and human rights challenges and its actions abroad
that have negatively affected democracy and human rights.
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Democracy and Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy

Introduction
U.S. law states that the promotion and protection of democracy and human rights are “principal”
and “fundamental” goals of U.S. foreign policy.1 Congress, having enacted such goals, has shaped
the manner and degree to which U.S. government policy strives to achieve these goals in practice.
Since the 1970s in particular, congressional action has resulted in a growing and evolving array of
statutory provisions and associated policy tools to address matters related to democracy and
human rights in foreign contexts. Congress authorizes, appropriates resources for, and oversees,
the use of these tools.
This report summarizes the origins and evolution of U.S. policy in this area, with a focus on the
role of Congress. It also describes key policy tools; highlights selected global challenges that may
affect current U.S. efforts; and analyzes selected policy matters Congress may consider. In
addition, the report highlights CRS resources on topics addressed in this report.
Scope of This Report: The Relationship Between Democracy and
Human Rights
This report focuses on U.S. foreign policy developments and policy tools that relate to democracy
and human rights.2 The report’s grouping together of democracy and human rights reflects that
Congress often approaches these issues in tandem. Democracy and human rights are distinct yet
interrelated, overlapping concepts. Among the human rights articulated in the United Nations
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for instance, is Article 21, which provides that “the will
of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in
periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by
secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.”3 At the same time, many conceptions of
democracy include not only basic elements of electoral political competition and participation,
but also protections for individual rights and freedoms, such as freedoms of expression, assembly,
and association.4

1 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Section 502B(a)(1) (22 U.S.C. §2304(a)(1)); Advance Democratic Values, Address
Nondemocratic Countries, and Enhance [ADVANCE] Democracy Act of 2007, Section 2103 (22 U.S.C. §8202).
2 U.S. foreign policy efforts have emphasized issues such as combating gross violations of the integrity of the person
(e.g., extrajudicial killings and torture) and fostering respect for civil and political rights, as reflected in the United
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and international human rights treaties. Former Representative Donald
Fraser, reflecting on passage of foundational human rights legislation in the 1970s, stated that “it seemed clear that we
could not force the executive branch to support human rights all over the world irrespective of what rights were
involved; there are simply too many rights enumerated in these various documents. There is not a single country in the
world that is not violating some human rights standard. In many countries, many standards are being violated. We
thought emphasis should be placed on those standards which have the widest acceptances, or put conversely, where the
violations of these standards would evoke widespread condemnation—human rights violations such as torture and
summary execution.” Donald M. Fraser, “Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy: Some Basic Questions Regarding
Principles and Practice,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 23, no. 2 (June 1979), pp. 174-185.
3 U.N. General Assembly Resolution 217 A, “Universal Declaration U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Human Rights,” December 10, 1948.
4 In foreign policy matters, U.S. law generally implicitly aligns with broad conceptions of democracy. See, for
example, 22 U.S.C. §8203.
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Origins of U.S. Policy
For over a century, some U.S. policymakers have maintained that the defense of fundamental
freedoms around the world should be a goal of U.S. foreign policy. Supporters of this view have
asserted a moral obligation on the part of the United States, and some also have justified their
arguments on the basis of national security.5 From the national security perspective, an
overarching theme has been a perceived relationship between peace and world order and the
existence of partnerships among rights-respecting democracies. In one of the early articulations of
this sentiment in U.S. political rhetoric, President Woodrow Wilson in 1917 advocated for U.S.
entry into World War I in part by arguing that “a steadfast concert for peace can never be
maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic government could be
trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants.”6
It was not until the aftermath of the atrocities of World War II, however, that national
governments came to more formally accept democracy- and human rights-related matters as
issues of international concern. The 1945 United Nations (U.N.) Charter—while expressly not
authorizing the United Nations “to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state”—declared that the organization would promote “universal respect for,
and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race,
sex, language, or religion.”7 Further, the U.N. Charter pledged its members to take “joint and
separate action” in cooperation with the United Nations for the achievement of such purpose.8
Three years later, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the nonbinding Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR), the preamble of which declares that “recognition of the inherent dignity
and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of
freedom, justice and peace in the world.”9 The UDHR, which articulates a range of human
rights—including civil and political rights, economic, social and cultural rights, and rights against
certain forms of ill-treatment—was followed by an array of binding international human rights
treaties.10

5 See, for example, remarks by Senator Claude Swanson, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, and others in Senate Debate,
Congressional Record, vol. 55, part 1 (April 4, 1917), pp. 186-251. Some scholars have argued that an inclination
within U.S. foreign policy for “values promotion” derives from fundamental aspects of American political culture. See
Walter Russell Mead, “The Paradox of American Democracy Promotion,” The American Interest, April 9, 2015. Mead
wrote, “If one really believes that all people are created equal, and are endowed by their Creator with inalienable rights,
it becomes very hard to believe that by ‘all people’ we mean merely ‘all citizens of the United States of America.’
There is a sense in which the legitimacy of American domestic institutions rests on a set of assumptions about what
world society should be like, how all human beings should live.”
6 According to President Wilson, the United States would fight “for democracy, for the right of those who submit to
authority to have a voice in their own Governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal
dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world
itself at last free.” Wilson also famously stated in the same address that “the world must be made safe for democracy.”
National Archives, “President Wilson’s Declaration of War Message to Congress,” April 2, 1917.
7 Article 2 and Article 55 of the United Nations Charter, accessible at https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-
text. The United Nations Charter is the founding document of the United Nations and is an international treaty ratified
by the United States.
8 Article 56 of the United Nations Charter.
9 U.N. General Assembly Resolution 217 A, “Universal Declaration U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Human Rights,” December 10, 1948.
10 See also CRS In Focus IF10861, Global Human Rights: Multilateral Bodies & U.S. Participation. According to
Eleanor Roosevelt, who chaired the multi-nation drafting committee for the UDHR, it was “most important that the
Declaration be accepted by all member nations, not because they will immediately live up to all of its provisions, but
(continued...)
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Efforts of the United States and its allies to construct a postwar international order were “based,
in part, on the assumption that no order would be sustainable if not built on a foundation of
democracies with shared values.”11 However, the U.S. commitment to defend human rights and
democratic governance overseas was not an institutionalized feature of U.S. foreign policy, and
was pursued by some policymakers selectively and in some tension with competing foreign
policy priorities. This included the U.S. government’s overriding priority during the Cold War
(1947-1991) to combat the influence of the Soviet Union and the spread of communism. In some
cases, the United States robustly supported democratization, such as in post-war Germany and
Japan. In others, U.S. policy actively buttressed strategically important but repressive
authoritarian allies, or in some instances sought the subversion or overthrow of elected
governments that some U.S. officials deemed to be antithetical to U.S. interests, including in
Guatemala, Iran, the Republic of the Congo, and Chile.12 In part for these reasons, U.S.
democracy promotion was viewed with suspicion by people in many parts of the world.13
Congressional Action Beginning in the 1970s. Over the years, Congress debated matters of
democracy and human rights in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy, often as a source of pressure
on the executive branch to place greater and more consistent emphasis on these issues. Beginning
in the 1970s in particular, Congress initiated and led efforts through which democracy and human
rights gradually gained greater prominence in the U.S. foreign policy agenda.14 Historical
accounts note that congressional action was preceded by, or occurred against the backdrop of, a
variety of potentially salient factors, such as the U.S. civil rights movement; perceptions of global
democratic decline accompanied by numerous military coups around the world; increasing
transnational information flows and nongovernmental activism; Cold War politics and ideological
divisions; public concern over issues such as the United States’ involvement in Vietnam and U.S.
support for authoritarian governments; and broader conflicts between Congress and the executive
branch.15
A series of 1973 House Foreign Affairs Committee subcommittee hearings on human rights
examined efforts by international and nongovernmental organizations to protect human rights;
U.S. policy toward rights-violating governments; and human rights conditions in foreign

because they ought to support the standards toward which the nations must henceforward aim. Since the objectives
have been clearly stated, men of good will everywhere will strive to attain them with more energy and, I trust, with
better hope of success.” Eleanor Roosevelt, “The Promise of Human Rights,” Foreign Affairs, April 1948.
11 Michael J. Mazarr et al., Understanding the Current International Order, RAND Corporation, October 2016.
12 Some U.S. efforts were undertaken covertly and subsequently investigated by Congress. Most notably, see relevant
reports of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities
(Church Committee) at https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/resources/intelligence-related-commissions.
13 See, for example, Thomas Carothers, “Does Democracy Promotion Have a Future?” in Democracy and
Development, ed. Bernard Berendsen (Amsterdam: KIT Publishers, 2008).
14 Some scholars have emphasized the 1970s in particular as a foundational period for modern human rights. See, for
example, Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010),
and critiques such as Philip Alston, “Book Review: Does the Past Matter? On the Origins of Human Rights,” Harvard
Law Review, vol. 126, no. 7 (May 2013), pp. 2043-2081; Sarita Cargas, “Questioning Samuel Moyn’s Revisionist
History of Human Rights,” Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 38, no. 2 (May 2016), pp. 411-425.
15 See Sarah B. Snyder, “‘A Call for U.S. Leadership’: Congressional Activism on Human Rights,” Diplomatic History,
vol. 37, no. 2 (April 2013), pp. 372-397; Barbara Keys, “Congress, Kissinger, and the Origins of Human Rights
Diplomacy,” Diplomatic History, vol. 34, no. 5 (November 2010), pp. 823-851; Joe Renouard, Human Rights in
American Foreign Policy: From the 1960s to the Soviet Collapse (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
2015); Sarah B. Snyder, From Selma to Moscow: How Human Rights Activists Transformed U.S. Foreign Policy (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2018).
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countries, including Bangladesh, Chile, and Northern Ireland, among other topics.16 A subsequent
March 1974 report by the subcommittee contended that neglect of human rights in U.S. foreign
policy had “led the United States into embracing governments which practice torture and
unabashedly violate almost every human rights guarantee pronounced by the world
community.”17 According to the report:
[H]uman rights should not be the only factor, or even always the major factor, in foreign
policy decision-making. But a higher priority is urgently needed…. Respect for human
rights in other countries is a rightful concern of Americans not because of any assumed
mission on our part to impose our own standards on others; rather, it is that not only have
many other countries used our Bill of Rights as a model for their constitutions, but
international standards have been established by the U.N. Charter and other treaties which
obligate governments to uphold most of the same rights which are basic in our own system.
Furthermore, an increasingly interdependent world means that disregard for human rights
in one country can have repercussions in others…. Thus, consideration for human rights in
foreign policy is both morally imperative and practically necessary.18
The subcommittee made numerous policy recommendations, including the creation of dedicated
offices in the State Department tasked with focusing on these issues.19 A few months later, the
State Department’s Policy Planning Staff examined what, if anything, the U.S. government
should be doing about human rights violations overseas, as well as how the United States should
deal with authoritarian governments.20 The State Department began to take some action,
including appointing new human rights personnel. However, some historical accounts contend
that resistance by some senior officials in the executive branch to placing greater emphasis on
human rights in foreign policy—and to a greater congressional role in foreign policy generally—
spurred Congress to take more, and stronger, legislative action.21

16 Sarah B. Snyder, “‘A Call for U.S. Leadership’: Congressional Activism on Human Rights,” Diplomatic History,
vol. 37, no. 2 (April 2013), pp. 372-397.
17 U.S. Congress, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements,
Human Rights in the World Community: A Call for U.S. Leadership, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., March 27, 1974
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1974).
18 Ibid. Representative Lawrence H. Fountain registered opposing views on a number of grounds and criticized the
report for “presum[ing] to have the answer for the prevention of nearly every form of human rights violation in the
world today.”
19 According to one historical account, “At the time, the State Department considered human rights at best a marginal
concern, particularly in bilateral diplomacy…. the State Department had only one person assigned full time to human
rights issues” and, other than that officer and an officer in the Office of Legal Affairs, “no one else was charged with
monitoring or implementing human rights concerns.” Barbara Keys, “Congress, Kissinger, and the Origins of Human
Rights Diplomacy,” Diplomatic History, vol. 34, no. 5 (November 2010), pp. 823-851.
20 These questions, according to a summary of the study, had become more acute at that time for a number of reasons,
including events in four countries with which the U.S. government had been “popularly identified”: “the abrogation of
parliamentary institutions and restrictions of civil liberties in Chile and the Philippines, the tightening of authoritarian
rule in Korea and the course of events in the last seven years in Greece [following an April 1967 military coup].”
Further, the study noted that “the charge that the U.S. Government is insensitive to human rights issues ... almost surely
hinders development of a domestic ‘consensus’ on some aspects of foreign policy,” with developments having caused
Congress in particular to support “a stronger US official posture on human rights.” The study suggested “a more
systematic way of thinking, planning and speaking about human rights issues” and offered four broad options “ranging
from a passive policy to a major new initiative.” U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian, “Summary of Paper
on Policies on Human Rights and Authoritarian Regimes,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume
E-3, October 1974.
21 Barbara Keys, “Congress, Kissinger, and the Origins of Human Rights Diplomacy,” Diplomatic History, vol. 34, no.
5 (November 2010), pp. 823-851; Sarah B. Snyder, “‘A Call for U.S. Leadership’: Congressional Activism on Human
Rights,” Diplomatic History, vol. 37, no. 2 (April 2013), pp. 372-397; Joe Renouard, Human Rights in American
Foreign Policy: From the 1960s to the Soviet Collapse (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015).
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By the end of the 1970s, Congress had taken a series of legislative actions to institutionalize
human rights as a U.S. foreign policy concern.22 This included enactment of Section 116 and,
separately, Section 502B, of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195, as amended). These
provisions aimed to deny development and security assistance to foreign governments responsible
for “gross violations of internationally recognized human rights,” and required what became the
State Department’s annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.23 Section 502B, as
amended, declares that
The United States shall, in accordance with its international obligations as set forth in the
Charter of the United Nations and in keeping with the constitutional heritage and traditions
of the United States, promote and encourage increased respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms throughout the world without distinction as to race, sex, language,
or religion. Accordingly, a principal goal of the foreign policy of the United States shall be
to promote the increased observance of internationally recognized human rights by all
countries.24
Legislation in the 1970s also solidified human rights within the State Department’s bureaucracy
by authorizing a senior official to lead a dedicated human rights bureau—the precursor to the
Department’s current Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL).25 Additionally, in
response to restrictive emigration policies in the Soviet Union, Congress enacted Section 402
(popularly cited as the Jackson-Vanik amendment) of the Trade Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-618, as
amended), denying permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status to any nonmarket economy
of a government that denies its citizens freedom to emigrate.26 Congress also passed legislation
aimed at addressing human rights situations in numerous specific countries in Asia, Africa,
Europe, and Latin America, including limiting or restricting foreign assistance on the basis of
human rights concerns.27 Related to human rights in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe,
Congress took strong interest in the August 1975 Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-
Operation in Europe (commonly referred to as the Helsinki Final Act or the Helsinki Accords),
including by establishing the independent Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe to
monitor compliance with the agreement’s provisions, particularly those regarding humanitarian-
and human rights-related matters.28
In the executive branch, the Administration of Jimmy Carter (1977-1981) emphasized human
rights—broadly conceived to include rights to integrity of the person, civil and political rights,
and some economic rights—as a major foreign policy concern, although the United States

22 Sarah B. Snyder, “‘A Call for U.S. Leadership’: Congressional Activism on Human Rights,” Diplomatic History,
vol. 37, no. 2 (April 2013), pp. 372-397.
23 See 22 U.S.C. §2151n and 22 U.S.C. §2304, respectively. See also “Reporting Requirements.”
24 22 U.S.C. §2304(a).
25 See Section 1(c)(2) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. §2651a(c)(2)). The DRL
Assistant Secretary position originated in the State Department as the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs (1975) and
evolved in title, rank, and responsibilities/scope as a result of subsequent legislation—see P.L. 94-329 (1976) and P.L.
95-105 (1977). In 1994, what had been the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs
was renamed the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (P.L. 103-236).
26 See 19 U.S.C. §2432.
27 U.S. Congress, House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on International Organizations, CRS
report on Human Rights in the International Community and in U.S. Foreign Policy, 1945-76, 95th Cong., 1st sess., July
24, 1977; U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, CRS report on Human Rights and U.S. Foreign
Assistance: Experiences and Issues in Policy Implementation (1977-1978), 96th Cong., 1st sess., November 1979.
28 P.L. 94-304, as amended; 22 U.S.C. §§3001 et seq. The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe is also
commonly known as the U.S. Helsinki Commission. See also https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/helsinki;
https://www.csce.gov/.
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continued to support certain authoritarian governments viewed as strategically important.29 The
successor Ronald Reagan Administration (1981-1989) focused on promoting democracy and
political freedoms, particularly in Communist states.30 In the 1980s, Congress and the Reagan
Administration established foundational elements of modern democracy assistance.31 A key
element was the creation of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), a private entity that
was specifically authorized by Congress in 1983 to receive federal funds to support democracy
overseas.32 NED’s creation represented a novel approach of providing grants to local civil society
organizations to support bottom-up democracy and human rights movements abroad.33
Post-Cold War Era. Some democracy experts view the mid-1970s as the starting point of a new
global expansion of democracy (referred to by some experts as democracy’s “third wave”) that
further accelerated with the disintegration and ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.34
The end of the Soviet Union left the United States without a major strategic or ideological
competitor, bringing forth new optimism among some U.S. policymakers about the capacity of
the United States to shape global developments and engender more humane and democratic
governance overseas. With the overriding strategic logic of the Cold War receding, democracy
and human rights issues began to assume a more central place on the U.S. foreign policy agenda.
U.S. democracy and human rights efforts broadened and became more universal in geographic
focus in this period. Some U.S. policymakers initially devoted particular attention to supporting
democratic transitions in Eastern Europe and the emerging states of the former Soviet Union.
Congress enacted legislation that in part authorized, and laid out the broader policy framework
for, assistance to these countries through the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act
of 1989 (P.L. 101-179, concerning Poland and Hungary) and the Freedom for Russia and
Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets (FREEDOM) Support Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-
511).35 U.S. presidential strategic documents, beginning with the Bill Clinton Administration’s
national security strategies (NSS),36 featured democracy promotion as an overarching strategic

29 John Dumbrell, “Jimmy Carter,” in US Foreign Policy and Democracy Promotion. In his inaugural address,
President Carter argued that “because we are free we can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere. Our
moral sense dictates a clearcut preference for these societies which share with us an abiding respect for individual
human rights.” Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, “Inaugural Address of President Jimmy Carter,” January 20, 1977.
30 Henry R. Nau, “Ronald Reagan,” in US Foreign Policy and Democracy Promotion.
31 In a 1982 address before the parliament of the United Kingdom, President Reagan called for fostering “the
infrastructure of democracy—the system of a free press, unions, political parties, universities—which allows a people
to choose their own way, to develop their own culture, to reconcile their own differences through peaceful means.”
National Endowment for Democracy, “Text of President Ronald Reagan’s Westminster Address,”
https://www.ned.org/promoting-democracy-and-peace/.
32 Title V of P.L. 98-164; 22 U.S.C. §§4411 et seq.
33 Unlike covert Cold War efforts to support foreign groups undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency that became
publicly known in the 1960s, NED’s support was overt and did not involve military aid. David Lowe, “Idea to Reality:
NED at 30,” National Endowment for Democracy, https://www.ned.org/about/history/.
34 See Samuel P. Huntington, “Democracy’s Third Wave,” Journal of Democracy, vol. 2, no. 2 (Spring 1991), pp. 12-
34; Larry Diamond, “Democracy’s Third Wave Today,” Current History, vol. 110, issue 739 (November 2011), pp.
299-307.
35 See also the FRIENDSHIP Act (P.L. 103-199), the purpose of which was “to amend or repeal numerous statutory
provisions that restrict or otherwise impede normal relations between the United States and the Russian Federation,
Ukraine, and the other independent states of the former Soviet Union.” (Section 101; 22 U.S.C. §5801 note).
36 According to the 1994 NSS, “the more that democracy and political and economic liberalization take hold in the
world, particularly in countries of geostrategic importance to us, the safer our nation is likely to be and the more our
people are likely to prosper…. All of America’s strategic interests—from promoting prosperity at home to checking
global threats abroad before they threaten our territory—are served by enlarging the community of democratic and free-
market nations.” The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, July 1994.
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priority, and the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
began to more robustly and systematically pursue democracy assistance efforts.37 Beyond efforts
in Europe and Eurasia, U.S. efforts in these years sought to support democratic transitions in a
number of countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. U.S. policymakers also sought in some
instances to use the aforementioned Trade Act of 1974 to link trade matters with human rights
conditions, including notably with regard to the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China).38
In the years that followed, Congress further institutionalized and refined issues of human rights
and democracy in U.S. foreign policy and fostered the development of an array of policy tools
(see “Selected Policy Tools and the Congressional Role”). This included laws that
• imposed additional and more targeted restrictions on assistance on the basis of
human rights (e.g., the “Leahy Laws” restricting assistance to foreign security
force units on the basis of human rights);39
• appropriated funding for democracy assistance programs administered by
USAID, the State Department, and NED;40
• created new foreign assistance, reporting, bureaucratic structures, and authorities
related to issues of concern (e.g., through the International Religious Freedom
Act of 1998, the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, and the ADVANCE
Democracy Act of 2007);41
• established the Millennium Challenge Corporation to provide economic
assistance based on performance indicators, including those related to democracy
and human rights;42
• created new commissions and other oversight mechanisms (e.g., the
Congressional-Executive Commission on China and the U.S. Commission on
International Religious Freedom);
• authorized targeted sanctions against individuals and entities on the basis of
human rights violations or corruption.43

37 Michael McFaul, Advancing Democracy Abroad: Why We Should and How We Can (Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2010). According to one expert, “it came to a point by the end of the 1990s that if you travelled to a country
attempting a democratic transition, every single sector in that country’s political or public life was in some way touched
by democracy assistance. You could not visit the judiciary, the legislature, the local governments, the civil society
organizations, media and so forth, without tripping over people from the other countries, trying to promote democracy.”
Thomas Carothers, “Does Democracy Promotion Have a Future?” in Democracy and Development.
38 In the early 1990s, U.S. policymakers sought to leverage China’s desire for “most favored nation” (MFN) trade
status by linking its annual renewal to improvements in human rights conditions in China. In May 1993, consistent with
some legislative proposals, President Bill Clinton formally linked China’s MFN renewal with a number of human
rights-related criteria. A year later, while acknowledging the continuance of serious human rights abuses in China, the
Clinton Administration abandoned this linkage in favor of a general policy of engagement with China that it hoped
would contribute to improved respect for human rights in the PRC and greater political freedoms for the Chinese
people. China’s MFN renewal process nonetheless continued to trigger annual debate in Congress over human rights
conditions in China (among other issues) until Congress granted China Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) in
2000. See Executive Order 12850, “Conditions for Renewal of Most-Favored-Nation Status for the People’s Republic
of China in 1994,” 58 Federal Register 31327, May 28, 1993; John M. Broder and Jim Mann, “Clinton Reverses His
Policy, Renews China Trade Status,” Los Angeles Times, May 27, 1994.
39 See “Restrictions on Individual Security Force Units (The “Leahy Laws”).
40 See “Democracy Assistance.”
41 See “Reporting Requirements” and “Human Trafficking, Child Soldiers, and Religious Freedom-Related
Restrictions.”
42 See CRS Report RL32427, Millennium Challenge Corporation: Overview and Issues.
43 See “Sanctions Targeting Individuals and Entities.”
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9/11 and Contemporary Challenges. In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks,
democracy and human rights promotion efforts became intertwined to some degree with an
overriding policy focus on combating terrorism.44 Most notably, the United States launched
ambitious projects that aimed to foster democracy in Afghanistan and Iraq following U.S. military
invasions. The United States also increased funding for democracy promotion assistance activities
globally during these years.45 Even so, short-term strategic considerations at times reportedly
clashed with longer term democracy-building efforts, as the United States sought closer relations
with some authoritarian governments to enhance cooperation to combat terrorism.46 In
Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. government largely failed to achieve stated objectives around
fostering stable, rights-respecting and democratic political systems.47 Additionally, although
democracy promotion was not the primary stated impetus for the U.S. invasions of these
countries, the U.S. government’s military overthrow of existing regimes, and its subsequent
rhetorical and policy emphasis on fostering democratic governments in their place, prompted
some foreign governments and observers to associate the concept of U.S. democracy promotion
with military intervention. Some democracy promotion experts and critics of U.S. policy pointed
to this, along with certain U.S. practices undertaken in the context of counterterrorism (e.g.,
renditions and abuses of prisoners and detainees), as doing lasting damage to perceptions of U.S.
values promotion efforts in foreign countries.48
These developments contributed to eroding optimism more broadly among some policymakers
and experts over the prospects for the continued expansion of democracy and respect for human
rights around the world, and over the capacity of the United States to facilitate such expansion.
By around the mid- to late-2000s, some experts argued that a wave of global democratic
expansion that began in the 1970s had begun to stall, with democracy entering what they
described as its most challenging period since the end of the Cold War. New widespread
challenges emerged, such as increasing restrictions on civil society groups in many countries (see
“Selected Factors Affecting U.S. Efforts”). Several prominent research organizations that produce
global measures of democracy concluded that, as of 2022, democratic governance in the
aggregate had not advanced for well over a decade, and in some respects had declined.49

44 For additional discussion of the history of U.S. democracy promotion, see also “A History of U.S. Democracy
Assistance” in CRS Report R44858, Democracy Promotion: An Objective of U.S. Foreign Assistance.
45 Michael McFaul, Advancing Democracy Abroad: Why We Should and How We Can, pp. 21-22.
46 Thomas Carothers, “Does Democracy Promotion Have a Future?” in Democracy and Development; Special
Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), Corruption in Conflict: Lessons from the U.S. Experience
in Afghanistan, September 2016.
47 See Freedom House, “Afghanistan” and “Iraq” in Freedom in the World 2023, March 2023; SIGAR, Why the
Afghan Government Collapsed, November 2022; SIGAR, Corruption in Conflict: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in
Afghanistan, September 2016; CRS Report R45122, Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy; CRS In Focus
IF10404, Iraq.
48 See, for example, Thomas Carothers, “Does Democracy Promotion Have a Future?” in Democracy and
Development; Mark P. Lagon, “The Whys and Hows of Promoting Democracy,” Council on Foreign Relations,
February 11, 2011; Sarah Bush, “Democracy Promotion After the Iraq War,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, March
30, 2023.
49 For example, see Varieties of Democracy Institute (V-Dem), Democracy Report 2023: Defiance in the Face of
Autocratization, March 2023; Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2023: Marking 50 Years in the Struggle for
Democracy, March 2023. At the same time, disagreements exist over how to define and measure democracy and the
extent and nature of democratic backsliding globally. See, for example, Andrew Little and Anne Meng, “Measuring
Democratic Backsliding,” July 18, 2023; Carl Henrik Knutsen et al., “Conceptual and Measurement Issues in Assessing
Democratic Backsliding,” V-Dem working paper, May 2023; Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, “Democracy’s
Surprising Resilience,” Journal of Democracy, vol. 34, no. 4 (October 2023), pp. 5-20.
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The present authoritarian character of the governments of Russia and China, and the threat that
many observers claim they pose to human rights, democracy, and international norms and
institutions upholding these values—has reinvigorated emphasis on democracy and human rights
as a component of, and a rationale for, political and strategic competition with these countries—
on the part of the United States and among some U.S. allied and partner governments.50 At the
same time, policy orientation around such competition echoes some prior policy questions for
Congress about the extent to which the United States should promote democracy and human
rights overseas given competing U.S. priorities and uncertainty over the effectiveness of U.S.
efforts. In general, Congress may consider whether to accept, reject, or seek to modify the
executive branch’s approach to human rights and democracy promotion; how to use available
tools to those ends; and whether or not to create new tools.
Selected Policy Tools and the Congressional Role
The United States employs numerous foreign policy tools intended to promote or defend
democracy and human rights. Congress authorizes, appropriates resources for, and conducts
oversight of the use of these tools, a selection of which are briefly discussed below. CRS products
that discuss these foreign policy tools in greater depth appear in text boxes at the end of the
sections below.
Democracy Assistance
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 emphasizes civil, political, and economic rights, anti-
corruption and transparency, and the fostering of democratic institutions as priorities of U.S.
foreign assistance.51 Congress, in annual State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
(SFOPS) appropriations bills, funds “democracy programs,” including programs that support
good governance, credible elections, human rights and fundamental freedoms, independent
media, and other efforts. This amount has averaged around $2.5 billion annually over the last
several years, with USAID and the Department of State serving as the primary managers of these
resources. Aside from SFOPS, Congress has also at times appropriated resources through
supplemental appropriations bills related to acute issues or crises.52 Congress may direct that
certain funds be managed by particular U.S. government offices, be used for specific purposes
(e.g., for internet freedom or efforts to protect civil society activists and journalists), or support
programs in particular countries.53

50 According to the Biden Administration’s October 2022 National Security Strategy, “the most pressing strategic
challenge” to the U.S. vision of a “free, open, prosperous, and secure world” is “from powers that layer authoritarian
governance with a revisionist foreign policy.” The NSS declares that “Americans will support universal human rights
and stand in solidarity with those beyond our shores who seek freedom and dignity…. We will work to strengthen
democracy around the world because democratic governance consistently outperforms authoritarianism in protecting
human dignity, leads to more prosperous and resilient societies, creates stronger and more reliable economic and
security partners for the United States, and encourages a peaceful world order.” The White House, National Security
Strategy, October 2022.
51 See pertinent language in Section 101 (22 U.S.C. §2151), 102 (22 U.S.C. §2151-1), and 116 (22 U.S.C. §2151n) of
the FAA. Congress has added various additional provisions to the FAA that authorize relevant specific activities,
including with regard to particular regions. The ADVANCE Democracy Act of 2007 (Title XXI of P.L. 110-53; 22
U.S.C. §§8201 et seq.) also guides some State Department activities.
52 See, for example, CRS Report R47275, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS)
Supplemental Funding for Ukraine: In Brief.
53 In the area of internet freedom, in addition to relevant efforts funded by the State Department and USAID, Congress
also separately appropriates within SFOPS resources to the U.S. Agency for Global Media.
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Congress, through SFOPS, also appropriates funds to the National Endowment for Democracy
(NED), a private nonprofit organization established in 1983 to promote democracy globally.
Although expressly not an agency or establishment of the U.S. government, NED is funded
chiefly through annual appropriations authorized by the National Endowment for Democracy Act
(Title V of P.L. 98-164; 22 U.S.C. §§4411 et seq.). NED awards grants to organizations involved
in democracy promotion; a portion of these grants are provided to four affiliated “core institute”
U.S. nonprofit organizations, while the rest are provided as direct grants to local civil society
organizations working in target countries.54 NED’s private status allows it to operate relatively
independently of U.S. government foreign policy direction, and this status as well as NED’s
funding model may facilitate work in closed societies.
Appropriations acts generally specify that democracy programs, including those funded by NED,
may be implemented “notwithstanding” other provisions of law, thereby generally allowing for
funding programs in countries where foreign assistance is otherwise prohibited. At the same time,
some provisions of permanent law impose restrictions on democracy assistance. For instance,
Section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), which authorizes certain assistance for
purposes of promoting civil and political rights, states that “none of these funds may be used,
directly or indirectly, to influence the outcome of any election in any country.”55 In authoritarian
contexts, democracy assistance programs may primarily or exclusively entail training or other
support to foreign civil society actors rather than government actors.
Democracy Assistance in Hostile Contexts: Technical vs. Political Approaches
A number of democracy assistance approaches and methods originated in the early post-Cold War years, when
many governments were in a period of transition and seeking assistance for their own democratization goals.
Today, U.S. efforts often grapple with entrenched authoritarian governments that are actively seeking to combat
threats to continuing their authoritarian rule. The United States has thus had to adjust its democracy assistance
activities to more hostile environments.56
Democracy assistance programming has faced criticism as it has evolved. Some analysts argue that the United
States and other funders have continued to support some programs that feature technical approaches in contexts
where the obstacles to democracy are more political in nature.57 According to these critics, programs that focus
on building the technical skil s of new members of parliament, for example, are of questionable usefulness in non-
democracies in which the parliament does not exercise genuine political power. Relatedly, some programs whose
stated purpose is to promote democracy may focus more narrowly on goals such as good governance; some
experts have questioned the assumption that improving governance is necessarily supportive of democratization,
noting that doing so in authoritarian or semi-authoritarian contexts may enhance the domestic legitimacy of the
ruling government.58 Some critics contend that technical approaches may allow authoritarian leaders to support
limited reforms that enhance their perceived democratic legitimacy (such as gender quotas in parliaments) among
international observers, while resisting more far-reaching reforms that could threaten these leaders’ rule.59 Other

54 The four “core institutes” are the International Republican Institute (IRI), the National Democratic Institute (NDI),
the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), and the American Center for International Labor Solidarity
(Solidarity Center).
55 22 U.S.C. §2151n(e).
56 Nicolas Bouchet, Ken Godfrey, and Richard Youngs, “Rising Hostility to Democracy Support: Can it Be
Countered?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 1, 2022.
57 Lincoln A. Mitchell, The Democracy Promotion Paradox (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2016); Nic
Cheeseman and Marie-Eve Desrosiers, “How Not To Engage with Authoritarian States,” Westminster Foundation for
Democracy, February 2023.
58 Sarah Sunn Bush, “Three Lessons for Democracy Assistance Effectiveness,” in Does Democracy Matter? The
United States and Global Democracy Support, pp. 51-64; Francis Fukuyama, “States and Democracy,”
Democratization, vol. 21, no. 7 (December 2014), pp. 1326-1340.
59 Nic Cheeseman and Marie-Eve Desrosiers, “How Not To Engage with Authoritarian States,” Westminster
(continued...)
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democracy promotion experts have noted strengths and weaknesses of both more political and more technical
(or “developmental”) democracy assistance approaches, arguing that “neither approach is necessarily better than
the other; the efficacy of each depends greatly on the specific country context.”60
U.S. agencies have acknowledged the importance of political factors as possible obstacles to democratic
development. In non-democracies, the United States has engaged with and supported civil society and media
organizations in addition to—or rather than—government actors. This approach can entail challenges and
limitations. Politically-oriented activities in authoritarian or semi-authoritarian contexts may be more difficult to
put into practice, face limitations on in-country activities, engender risks and push back from foreign governments,
and have greater potential to negatively affect bilateral relations.61
Reporting Requirements
Through legislation, Congress requires the executive branch to report on democracy- and human
rights-related issues overseas. Congressionally mandated reports may serve a variety of functions,
including scrutinizing abuses by foreign governments both to bring them to light and to
incentivize improved practices; informing U.S. policy decisions, including congressional
consideration of foreign assistance budget requests; helping to ensure continued diplomatic
attention on issues of human rights within the U.S. State Department and at overseas posts; and
equipping nongovernmental actors with information that they may use to advocate for improved
conditions. At the same time, the executive branch often contends that reporting requirements
impose burdens on scarce resources, and may adversely affect bilateral relations with foreign
governments.
Congress has mandated a number of high-profile reports that are global in scope and produced on
an annual basis, most notably the following:
• the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, which describe human rights
conditions in foreign countries around the world and are mandated by Congress
through Section 116 (22 U.S.C. §2151n) and Section 502B (22 U.S.C. §2304) of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA, P.L. 87-195, as amended);
• the International Religious Freedom Report (IRF Report), which describes
religious freedom conditions in foreign countries around the world and is
mandated through Section 102 (22 U.S.C. §6412) of the International Religious
Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA, P.L. 105-292, as amended); and
• the Trafficking in Persons Report (TIP Report), which assesses the efforts of
governments around the world (including the United States) to combat human
trafficking and is mandated through Section 110 (22 U.S.C. §7107) of the

Foundation for Democracy, February 2023; Elin Bjarnegård and Pär Zetterberg, “How Autocrats Weaponize Women’s
Rights,” Journal of Democracy, vol. 33, no. 2 (April 2022), pp. 60-75. Citing data for example that about two-thirds of
the 75 countries that have adopted gender-based quota laws for parliamentary representation are non-democracies,
Bjarnegård and Zetterberg contend that authoritarian governments take advantage of “excessive eagerness to equate
even superficial gender-equality reforms with democracy,” allowing increases in women’s representation in political
institutions to be viewed as democratic progress even if these institutions possess little power and/or the women taking
legislative seats are loyal supporters of the authoritarian government.
60 Thomas Carothers, “Democracy Assistance: Political vs. Developmental?” Journal of Democracy, vol. 20, no. 1
(January 2009), pp. 5-19.
61 Nic Cheeseman and Marie-Eve Desrosiers, “How Not To Engage with Authoritarian States,” Westminster
Foundation for Democracy, February 2023; Lincoln A. Mitchell, The Democracy Promotion Paradox (Washington,
DC: The Brookings Institution, 2016); Nicolas Bouchet, Ken Godfrey, and Richard Youngs, “Rising Hostility to
Democracy Support: Can it Be Countered?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 1, 2022.
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Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA, Division A of P.L. 106-386, as
amended).
Among these reports, IRFA requires the President to publicly designate countries with
governments determined to have engaged in or tolerated particularly severe religious freedom
violations. The TVPA similarly requires the Administration to publicly rank countries based on
their efforts to combat human trafficking. Foreign governments can face possible U.S. sanctions
or other restrictive actions based on these reports, though the President may make exceptions or
waive the restrictions, including on the basis of U.S. national interest (see “Issue-Specific
Restrictions” below). Congress has modified the scope of the reports and changed the country
designation categories or methodologies from time to time.
Through the Advance Democratic Values, Address Nondemocratic Countries, and Enhance
(ADVANCE) Democracy Act of 2007 (Title XXI of P.L. 110-53), Congress separately mandates
annual reporting on U.S. efforts to promote democracy and protect human rights in non-
democratic and democratic transition countries.62 Congress has frequently required additional
reports on specific issues or countries/regions of concern, either as part of standalone legislation
or through reporting requirements contained in broader bills such as annual SFOPS Acts.
See also:
•
CRS In Focus IF10795, Global Human Rights: The Department of State’s Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices;
•
CRS In Focus IF10803, Global Human Rights: International Religious Freedom Policy;
•
CRS In Focus IF10587, Human Trafficking and U.S. Foreign Policy: An Introduction; and
•
CRS Report R44953, The State Department’s Trafficking in Persons Report: Scope, Aid
Restrictions, and Methodology.
International Institutions and Initiatives
The United States works through multilateral institutions and other international groupings to
promote democracy and human rights. Beginning in the aftermath of World War II, the United
States and other leading democracies sought to embed democratic norms within multilateral
institutions, including the Bretton Woods system governing international financial institutions
(1944), the United Nations (U.N., 1945), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO, 1949),
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, 1975), and the European Union
(EU, 1993), among others.63 To some extent the originators of these institutions built democracy
and human rights norms into the operating systems of the international order, linking these norms
with security and economic benefits in order to incentivize countries to meet democratic
standards. Specialized international organizations have also developed over time that use
monitoring and public reporting, technical assistance, and other means to support and advance
human rights and democratic governance. These include U.N. and regional human rights bodies;
international tribunals such as the International Criminal Court; the Community of Democracies;

62 See https://www.state.gov/advancing-freedom-and-democracy/. The ADVANCE Democracy Act of 2007 in part
amended an earlier reporting requirement under Section 665(c) of P.L. 107-228 (22 U.S.C. §2151n note).
63 See, for example, Robert Kagan, “The Weight of Geopolitics,” Journal of Democracy, vol. 26, no. 1 (January 2015),
pp. 21-31. The importance of democratic values to some of the aforementioned international institutions, however, has
not been uniform across institutions or across time. For example, analysts note that NATO was established foremost on
the basis of shared opposition to the Soviet Union and increasingly emphasized democratic values over time. See
Nikolas K. Gvosdev, “Realist Counsel on Democracy Promotion,” in Does Democracy Matter? The United States and
Global Democracy Support, pp. 7-31.
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the Open Government Partnership; the Media Freedom Coalition; and the Freedom Online
Coalition, among others.
Congress may shape U.S. participation in international institutions and initiatives by
appropriating funding and enacting conditions or restrictions. For instance, Section 701 (22
U.S.C. §262d) of the International Financial Institutions Act (P.L. 95-118, as amended), declares
that U.S. government policy is to use its voice and vote in international financial institutions to
“advance the cause of human rights, including by seeking to channel assistance toward countries
other than those whose governments engage in ... a pattern of gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights.” Another example is a recurring SFOPS provision that restricts U.S.
funding to the U.N. Human Rights Council absent the Secretary of State determining that the
Council “is taking significant steps to remove Israel as a permanent agenda item and ensure
integrity in the election of members to such Council.”64 In addition to U.S. assessed contributions
to international organizations, Congress through appropriations may also direct voluntary
contributions to institutions involved in democracy or human rights assistance activities, such as
the U.N. Democracy Fund, the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the
Organization of American States. Views of the effectiveness of bilateral versus multilateral
approaches to promoting democracy and human rights vary, as do positions on U.S. participation
in relevant institutions such as the U.N. Human Rights Council.
Human Rights Treaties and U.S. Ratification. Of the treaties adopted by the U.N. General
Assembly and entered into force, the United Nations considers nine to be core international
human rights treaties (alongside nine related Optional Protocols). The scope of these agreements
includes civil and political rights; economic, social and cultural rights; the rights of particular
vulnerable groups; and rights against certain forms of ill-treatment (e.g., torture). These treaties
establish committees of independent experts charged with monitoring treaty implementation by
States Parties.65 Other international treaties also relate to human rights issues, including, for
example, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and the
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children.66
The United States, despite protections for human rights in U.S. domestic law and practice, has
refrained from ratifying six of the nine core international human rights treaties. Of these treaties,
the United States has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ratified in
1992), the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(1994), and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (1994).67 Proponents of U.S. ratification of human rights treaties contend that
ratification enhances U.S. leadership in promoting human rights. Not ratifying, they argue,
undermines the credibility of the United States when it advocates for foreign governments to
adhere to international human rights obligations. Opponents of U.S. ratification generally argue
that ratification may infringe on U.S. sovereignty or inhibit the ability of the United States to act

64 See, most recently, Section 7048(c) of P.L. 117-328.
65 See, for example, https://www.ohchr.org/en/treaty-bodies/ccpr.
66 The United States has signed and ratified both treaties. The latter is a supplement to the U.N. Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime.
67 The United States has signed but not ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(signed in 1977), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1980), the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (1995), and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2009).
The United States has neither signed nor ratified the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families and the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons
from Enforced Disappearance.
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in service of its interests. Ratification opponents also question the overall effectiveness of the
treaties in addressing human rights issues, arguing that many countries with poor human rights
records have ratified such treaties without taking meaningful action to improve human rights
conditions.
See also:
•
CRS In Focus IF10861, Global Human Rights: Multilateral Bodies & U.S. Participation;
•
CRS Report RL33608, The United Nations Human Rights Council: Background and Policy Issues;
•
CRS In Focus IF11457, United Nations Issues: U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights; and
•
CRS Report R47715, The United Nations System: Frequently Asked Questions.
Restrictions on Foreign Assistance and Arms Sales
A number of statutes condition certain U.S. foreign assistance and arms exports on the basis of
democracy- and human rights-related standards, while generally authorizing the President to
waive restrictions or providing other forms of flexibility to the executive branch in implementing
these requirements.
Broad Restrictions on Security and Other Assistance
Security Assistance (Including Arms Sales) and Development Assistance. Pioneering
provisions for restricting assistance on the basis of human rights are Section 502B and Section
116 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA; P.L. 87-195, as amended), enacted in the 1970s.
Section 502B (22 U.S.C. §2304) declares that a principal goal of U.S. foreign policy is “to
promote the increased observance of internationally recognized human rights by all countries.”68
These provisions restrict assistance in relation to “gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights,” defined as including “torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment, prolonged detention without charges and trial, causing the disappearance of persons
by the abduction and clandestine detention of those persons, and other flagrant denial of the right
to life, liberty, or the security of person.”69 (See footnote concerning a slight difference in
language between the two provisions.)
Section 502B, which restricts security assistance, including arms sales, directs the President:
to formulate and conduct international security assistance programs of the United States in
a manner which will promote and advance human rights and avoid identification of the
United States, through such programs, with governments which deny to their people
internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, in violation of
international law or in contravention of the policy of the United States as expressed in this
section or otherwise.70
Accordingly, Section 502B stipulates that “no security assistance may be provided to any country
the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights.”71 This section also restricts licenses for the export of crime control and

68 22 U.S.C. §2304(a)(1).
69 22 U.S.C. §2304(d)(1); 22 U.S.C. §2151n(a). Differing from Section 502B, the language in Section 116 (see 22
U.S.C. §2151n(a)) omits the phrase “and trial.”
70 22 U.S.C. §2304(a)(3).
71 22 U.S.C. §2304(a)(2).
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detection instruments and equipment to such countries.72 Certain exceptions can apply, including
if the President certifies to Congress that “extraordinary circumstances” warrant the provision of
assistance.
Section 502B defines the restricted “security assistance” to include certain categories of
assistance authorized under the FAA,73 as well as “sales of defense articles or services, extensions
of credits (including participations in credits), and guaranties of loans” under the Arms Export
Control Act (AECA; P.L. 90-629; 22 U.S.C. §§2751 et seq.). Also restricted are “any licenses in
effect with respect to the export to or for the armed forces, police, intelligence, or other internal
security forces” of the foreign country of (1) defense articles or defense services under Section 38
of the AECA (22 U.S.C. §2778), or (2) items listed under the 600 series of the Commerce Control
List, which contains dual-use items controlled for export.74
Section 502B(c) establishes a mechanism whereby the House or Senate, or the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations or House Committee on Foreign Affairs, can request a statement from the
Secretary of State regarding human rights in a country.75 After receiving that statement, Congress
may then consider legislation to terminate, restrict, or continue security assistance to the
country.76
Section 116 (22 U.S.C. §2151n) prohibits FAA-authorized development assistance, or support
from the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, from being provided “to the
government of any country which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights ... unless such assistance will directly benefit the needy
people in such country.”77 Such assistance is also prohibited from being provided “to any
government failing to take appropriate and adequate measures, within their means, to protect
children from exploitation, abuse or forced conscription into military or paramilitary services.”78

72 The section restricts licenses issued under the Export Administration Act of 1979 (P.L. 96-72). This law, which later
expired but was continued in effect through the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, was largely repealed
and replaced in 2018 by the Export Control Reform Act (Title XVII, Subtitle B of P.L. 115-232).
73 Assistance provided pursuant to part II of the FAA for military assistance (chapter 2), the economic support fund
(chapter 4), military education and training (chapter 5), peacekeeping operations (chapter 6), or anti-terrorism
assistance (chapter 8).
74 22 U.S.C. §2304(d)(2).
75 Congress has rarely formally used Section 502B(c). In 1976, the House International Relations Committee requested
and received responsive statements from the State Department pertaining to Argentina, Haiti, Indonesia, Iran, Peru, and
the Philippines. See U.S. Congress, House Committee on International Relations, Human Rights and U.S. Policy:
Argentina, Haiti, Indonesia, Iran, Peru, and the Philippines, committee print, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., December 31, 1976.
In some Congresses, Members have introduced resolutions that would request statements from the State Department
pursuant to Section 502B(c); to date, no such resolution has passed.
76 In the event that a requested statement is not transmitted within 30 days, Section 502B(c)(3) (22 U.S.C. 2304(c)(3))
states that “no security assistance shall be delivered to such country” absent specific subsequent congressional
authorization “unless and until such statement is transmitted.” In a 1989 signing statement, President George H.W.
Bush objected to Section 502B(c) on constitutional grounds, writing that the 30-day cut-off would “have the effect of
allowing a single House of Congress (or even a single committee) to halt the provision of assistance. This section
violates the constitutional principle, recognized by the Supreme Court in INS v. Chadha, that every legislative act of
the Congress must be presented to the President in accordance with the requirements of Article I, section 7 of the
Constitution.” George Bush, “Statement on Signing the International Narcotics Control Act of 1989,” December 13,
1989.
77 22 U.S.C. §2151n(a).
78 22 U.S.C. §2151n(b). Section 116 of the FAA has two subsections designated as subsec. (b). This language is stated
in the second subsec. (b), added to the FAA by Section 599D of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1990 (P.L. 101-513).
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The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 does not require to be made public a list of governments that
are or have been subject to restriction pursuant to these FAA provisions.79 While the provisions
together also mandate annual reports on human rights conditions in foreign countries that the
State Department fulfills through its Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, these reports
do not state which governments have engaged in “a consistent pattern of gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights.”80 Successive administrations reportedly have
interpreted language such as “consistent pattern” narrowly;81 some critics argue that this practice
has allowed the executive branch to avoid assessing that governments have met the law’s standard
for restricting assistance.82
See also:
•
CRS In Focus IF11197, U.S. Arms Sales and Human Rights: Legislative Basis and Frequently Asked
Questions.

79 The joint explanatory statement accompanying Division K of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-
103) directed that the Secretary of State report to Congress “detailing each instance when section 502B of the FAA was
applied in the past ten years to prevent the provision of security assistance or the issuance of an export license under the
Export Administration Act of 1979, and each instance when the President certified in writing that extraordinary
circumstances existed to warrant the provision of assistance or issuance of such an export license.” The report was also
required to “specify the criteria used to determine if the government of a country has engaged in a consistent pattern of
gross violations of human rights and include a current list of such governments.” This report was reportedly submitted
to the appropriate congressional committees in October 2022, but was not required to be made publicly available.
80 In a 1978 conference report accompanying legislation amending Section 502B, Congress stated that it did not intend
“to require the executive branch to publicly identify those countries which it considers to be consistent violators of
human rights. Rather it is the intent of the committee of conference to place renewed emphasis on human rights as a
major factor that must, as a matter of law, be taken into account in making security assistance decisions.” U.S.
Congress, H.Rept. 95-1546, 95th Cong., 2nd sess., accessed via Congressional Record, daily edition, September 7, 1978.
81 A similar provision pertaining to international financial institution assistance was amended in 1983 to refer merely to
governments engaging in a “pattern” of gross human rights violations, rather than “consistent pattern.” In September
1983, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs held a subcommittee hearing to consider whether to similarly amend
the Foreign Assistance Act. According to testimony by the then-Chairperson of the House Committee on Banking,
Finance and Urban Affairs, Subcommittee on International Development Institutions and Finance, Representative Jerry
Patterson, “this was done because of observations my subcommittee made during the long series of hearings during
1981 and 1982 about U.S. support for loans to such countries as Argentina, Chile, Guatemala, Paraguay, South Korea,
and Uruguay… In making this change, we were attempting especially to deal with the argument that improvements in
human rights records entitled countries to be exempted from the requirements of the law. The law does not refer to
‘improvement’ and a change of the kind and scope of violations is not enough to change the requirement that the
United States oppose loans to particular countries if a pattern of gross violations continues.” U.S. Congress, House
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations, Review of U.S.
Human Rights Policy, hearings, 98th Cong., 1st sess., March 3, June 28, and September 21, 1983.
82 For example, according to September 1983 testimony by former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Human
Rights Stephen B. Cohen, “a reading of the legislative history shows that Congress intended in section 502B that
governments practicing torture, arbitrary detention, or summary execution on significant scale were to be denied U.S.
security assistance. I believe the intent has been distorted by the way in which the executive has interpreted the word
‘consistent.’ It is claimed that even though gross violations of human rights are significant in number and recurrent, the
pattern is not consistent if there is some decline in the overall number of abuses. To illustrate, suppose that country A
tortures and executes 400 political prisoners a year. It would be considered to engage in a consistent pattern of gross
violation, and therefore ineligible for security assistance. But if the number of executions falls by 25 percent, to 300 a
year, under the administration’s interpretation of the law, the reduction is considered a positive step and the pattern is
considered no longer consistent.” U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Human
Rights and International Organizations, Review of U.S. Human Rights Policy, hearings, 98th Cong., 1st sess., March 3,
June 28, and September 21, 1983. See also Stephen B. Cohen, “Conditioning U.S. Security Assistance on Human
Rights Practices,” The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 76, No. 2 (April 1982), pp. 246-279; Human
Rights First, Walking the Talk: 2021 Blueprints for a Human Rights-Centered U.S. Foreign Policy, chapter 8,
“Overhauling U.S. Security Sector Assistance,” October 2020.
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Other provisions of law similarly restrict certain types of assistance on the basis of gross
violations of internationally recognized human rights:
• International Financial Institutions. Section 701 (22 U.S.C. §262d) of the
International Financial Institutions Act (P.L. 95-118, as amended), originally
enacted in 1977, declares that U.S. government policy is to use its voice and vote
in international financial institutions (IFIs) to “advance the cause of human
rights, including by seeking to channel assistance toward countries other than
those whose governments engage in ... a pattern of gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights.”83 This provision instructs U.S.
executive directors of IFIs to oppose “any loan, any extension of financial
assistance, or any technical assistance” to such countries “unless such assistance
is directed specifically to programs which serve the basic human needs of the
citizens of such country.”84
• International Food Aid. Section 403(j) (7 U.S.C. §1733(j)) of the Food for
Peace Act (P.L. 83-480, as amended), added in 1990, restricts U.S. international
food assistance “to the government of any country determined by the President to
engage in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights,” unless the assistance “is targeted to the most needy people in such
country and is made available in such country through channels other than the
government.”
Restrictions on Individual Security Force Units (The “Leahy Laws”)
The “Leahy Laws,” the origins of which date back to appropriations provisions sponsored by
Senator Patrick Leahy in the 1990s, prohibit U.S. assistance to foreign security force units when
there is credible information that the unit has committed a “gross violation of human rights”
(GVHR). Pursuant to the laws, before providing assistance, the U.S. government vets potential
recipients for information about GVHR involvement.85
The Leahy Laws constitute two separate provisions that generally restrict security assistance
otherwise funded by the Departments of State and Defense. Congress made the law applicable to
State Department assistance (authorized by the FAA or the AECA) permanent in 2007 through
amendment to the FAA (Section 620M [formerly 620J]; 22 U.S.C. §2378d). The law applicable to
assistance furnished by the Department of Defense (DOD), made permanent in 2014, is stated at
10 U.S.C. §362.86

83 Section 37 (22 U.S.C §283z-9) of the Inter-American Development Bank Act (P.L. 86-147, as amended), added in
1992, which authorized a U.S. contribution to the Inter-American Development Bank’s Multilateral Investment Fund,
similarly specified that “such funds shall only be disbursed from the Fund to countries that have governments that are
democratically elected ... and that do not engage in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights.”
84 Annual appropriations bills have also contained recurring human rights-related provisions pertaining to IFI loans and
financing.
85 The Leahy Laws do not define GVHR. Drawing instead on the term “gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights,” as defined and articulated under Section 116 and 502B of the FAA, the U.S. government primarily vets
foreign security forces for credible information indicating (1) torture, (2) extrajudicial killing, (3) enforced
disappearance, or (4) rape under color of law (in which a perpetrator abuses their official position to commit rape).
Other acts may also be assessed as to whether they constitute GVHRs.
86 In addition to the Leahy Laws, Congress has enacted certain provisions that seek to prohibit U.S. security assistance
to individual units due to human rights-related issues. These include provisions in annual SFOPS appropriations acts
related to sexual exploitation or abuse and, separately, excessive force to repress peaceful expression or assembly.
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Rather than contemplating broad restrictions as under Section 502B of the FAA (discussed
above), the Leahy Laws entail the targeted withholding of assistance from specific foreign
security force units (or, in some cases, individual security force members). Further, in contrast to
how Section 502B of the FAA defines “security assistance” for the purposes of that section, the
Leahy Laws are not applied to foreign military sales (FMS) or direct commercial sales (DCS)
because the executive branch has interpreted “assistance” under the Leahy Laws as that provided
with U.S-appropriated funds.87
Proponents of the Leahy Laws tout the laws as a tool to disassociate the United States from
objectionable security forces, while also incentivizing adherence to human rights standards by
governments wishing to access and benefit from U.S. security assistance.88 At the same time,
some policymakers have debated whether the Leahy Laws constrain the United States’ capacity to
pursue other U.S. national security interests and foreign policy priorities. Congress continues to
assess and modify these laws.
See also:
•
CRS In Focus IF10575, Global Human Rights: Security Forces Vetting (“Leahy Laws”).
Coup-Related Restrictions
A recurring provision in annual SFOPS legislation restricts certain U.S. foreign assistance
following a coup d’état. For FY2023, the provision provides that
[n]one of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available pursuant to titles III through
VI [encompassing bilateral economic assistance, security assistance, multilateral
assistance, and export and investment assistance] of this Act shall be obligated or expended
to finance directly any assistance to the government of any country whose duly elected
head of government is deposed by military coup d’état or decree or, after the date of
enactment of this Act, a coup d’état or decree in which the military plays a decisive role.89
These restrictions explicitly do not apply to “assistance to promote democratic elections or public
participation in democratic processes, or to support a democratic transition.”90 Assistance may
resume if the Secretary of State certifies to Congress “that subsequent to the termination of
assistance a democratically elected government has taken office.” The Secretary of State may also
waive restrictions “on a program-by-program basis” by certifying that such waiver is in the U.S.
national security interest.91 Congress has modified this recurring provision over time, and
executive branch interpretations and application of the provision have varied.
See also:
•
CRS In Focus IF11267, Coup-Related Restrictions in U.S. Foreign Aid Appropriations.

87 This interpretation may in part reflect a continuance of historical practice, as the first iterations of the Leahy Laws
were recurring provisions in annual foreign operations appropriations and DOD appropriations bills that applied only to
the funds appropriated by each of those bills.
88 For example, see Amnesty International, “Deconstructing the Leahy Law: Fact vs Fiction,”
https://www.amnestyusa.org/updates/deconstructing-the-leahy-law-fact-vs-fiction/.
89 See Section 7008 of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2023
(Division K of P.L. 117-328).
90 More generally, annual SFOPS appropriations have consistently provided that funds for democracy programs may be
made available “notwithstanding any other provision of law.”
91 This waiver authority was included for the first time in FY2023.
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Human Trafficking, Child Soldiers, and Religious Freedom-Related
Restrictions
Congress has enacted laws that authorize the executive branch to restrict assistance to countries
designated in relation to issue-specific annual reports (see also discussion and links to related
CRS products in “Reporting Requirements” above).
Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA). The TVPA (Division A of P.L. 106-386; 22 U.S.C.
§§7101 et seq.) restricts certain foreign assistance to the governments of countries that the
Secretary of State determines do not fully comply with TVPA standards for combating human
trafficking and are not making significant efforts to become compliant. Specifically,
nonhumanitarian, nontrade-related foreign assistance authorized by the FAA or the AECA may be
withheld from such countries.92 Additionally, the President may instruct U.S. executive directors
of the multilateral development banks and of the International Monetary Fund to vote against and
otherwise attempt to deny loans or other uses of funds to such countries. The President may
waive these restrictions, in whole or in part, to promote the purposes of the TVPA or if the
President determines it is in the national interest of the United States to do so.
Child Soldiers Prevention Act (CSPA). The CSPA (Title IV of P.L. 110-457, as amended; 22
U.S.C. §§2370c et seq.) requires that the Secretary of State publish annually a list of countries
within which “governmental armed forces, police, or other security forces” or “government-
supported armed groups, including paramilitaries, militias, or civil defense forces,” recruited or
used child soldiers during the previous year. Pursuant to the CSPA, the State Department, since
2010, has published a list of such countries within the annual Trafficking in Persons Report. The
CSPA prohibits the provision of certain types of security assistance to the governments of such
countries. The CSPA articulates exceptions to these restrictions, however, and the President may
waive the restrictions, in whole or in part, if the President determines that to do so is in the
national interest and certifies that the foreign government is taking steps to address the problem
of child soldiers.
International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA). IRFA (P.L. 105-292, as amended; 22 U.S.C.
§§6401 et seq.) mandates that the President, using information from the International Religious
Freedom Report and other sources, annually designate as “countries of particular concern”
(CPCs) those countries whose governments have engaged in or tolerated particularly severe
religious freedom violations. For CPCs, the IRFA requires the executive branch to implement one
or more sanctions stated in the law. These include restrictions on development assistance in
accordance with Section 116 of the FAA, restrictions on security assistance in accordance with
Section 502B of the FAA, and efforts to deny loans to or other uses of funds to the country from
international financial institutions, among other possible actions. At the same time, the law
provides the executive branch significant discretion in determining which, if any, punitive actions
to take. Administrations can take “commensurate action” in lieu of IRFA’s suggested measures
against CPCs, exempt a CPC from new sanctions by referring to already existing human rights-
related sanctions against that country, or waive sanctions by citing U.S. national interest.
See also:
•
CRS In Focus IF10901, Child Soldiers Prevention Act: Security Assistance Restrictions;
•
CRS In Focus IF10803, Global Human Rights: International Religious Freedom Policy;

92 For countries that do not receive such assistance, the TVPA authorizes the President to withhold funding for
participation by officials or employees of designated countries in educational and cultural exchange programs.
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•
CRS In Focus IF10587, Human Trafficking and U.S. Foreign Policy: An Introduction; and
•
CRS Report R44953, The State Department’s Trafficking in Persons Report: Scope, Aid
Restrictions, and Methodology.
Country-Specific Foreign Aid Restrictions
From time to time, Congress has enacted legislation to restrict foreign assistance to a specific
country due to democracy- or human rights-related concerns. These provisions have varied in a
number of ways, including in terms of the types of assistance restricted, whether assistance is
withheld writ large or from specific foreign government institutions, and whether assistance is
prohibited or is conditioned on progress in certain areas. Annual SFOPS appropriations are a
vehicle for country-specific restrictions, with such restrictions typically being limited to the fiscal
year funds appropriated by the given appropriations bill. Many such provisions restrict assistance
unless the Secretary of State certifies that the government in question has taken certain steps to
improve human rights or democracy conditions, as specifically articulated in the law. Congress
has also at times enacted enduring country-specific restrictions that remain in place until the
President determines and certifies that conditions have changed.93 More informally, congressional
committees and Members at times have placed “holds” on specific proposed assistance or arms
sales to foreign governments, citing human rights concerns.94
Members of Congress have weighed the benefits and drawbacks of enacting country-specific
restrictions relative to general, global standards, such as those found in other legislation discussed
above. The former method represents a more direct means by which Congress may shape the
provision of foreign assistance on the basis of human rights concerns, including when Members
assess that the executive branch has failed to take sufficient action on its own pursuant to existing
authorities. On the other hand, singling out a foreign government for restriction based on
sometimes bespoke criteria may invite criticisms of unfair selectivity or bias.95

93 Section 570(a) of P.L. 104-208, for example, restricted nearly all forms of bilateral assistance to Burma’s
government, and directed that U.S. executive directors of international financial institutions vote against loans or other
uses of funds to Burma, “until such time as the President determines and certifies to Congress that Burma has made
measurable and substantial progress in improving human rights practices and implementing democratic government.”
These restrictions, enacted in September 1996, remained in place until December 2016, when President Obama
provided such a determination and certification to Congress. The White House, “Presidential Determination Pursuant to
Section 570(a) of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997,” 81
Federal Register 94211, December 2, 2016. See also CRS Report R44570, U.S. Restrictions on Relations with Burma.
94 Upon receiving notification from the executive branch concerning a planned sale or obligation of funds, Members of
Congress may raise concerns and place a “hold” on the action. This is an informal practice not prescribed in law. In
many cases, little information concerning holds is publicly available. See, for example, Doyinsola Oladipo and Mike
Stone, “Proposed U.S. Arms Sales to Nigeria on ‘Hold’ Over Human Rights Concerns – Sources,” Reuters, July 30,
2021; Chao Deng, “Sen. Patrick Leahy Blocks $75 Million in Funding to Egypt, Citing Human Rights,” The Wall
Street Journal, October 18, 2022; CQ News, “Cardin Puts Hold on Defense Aid to Egypt Over Human Rights Record,”
October 4, 2023.
95 For example, former Representative Donald Fraser argued in 1979 regarding country-specific prohibitions that “the
conservatives and liberals have gone after each other’s favorite violators. The conservative members cut aid to leftist
countries, such as Tanzania, Mozambique, Angola, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos. The liberal members cut aid to
rightist countries such as the Philippines, Argentina, Chile, and Brazil. I do not favor this method. I think it is better for
Congress to write the general standards and oversee their implementation by the executive branch; but I have voted for
a number of these cuts when the administration did not seem to be taking action.” Donald M. Fraser, “Human Rights
and U.S. Foreign Policy: Some Basic Questions Regarding Principles and Practice,” International Studies Quarterly,
vol. 23, no. 2 (June 1979), pp. 174-185.
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Sanctions Targeting Individuals and Entities
Congress has contributed to the development of an array of targeted sanctions programs that
allow the United States to impose economic sanctions or travel restrictions on a foreign person or
entity in connection with democracy- and human rights-related concerns. These include
authorities that can be applied globally, as well as those focused on activities within, or in relation
to, specific countries.96
Global Authorities
Global Magnitsky Act. The Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Global
Magnitsky Act, Title XII, Subtitle F of P.L. 114-328, as amended; 22 U.S.C. §§10101 et seq.)
authorizes the President to impose economic sanctions on, and deny entry into the United States
to, foreign individuals or entities identified as engaging in human rights violations or corruption.97
The executive branch implements the Global Magnitsky Act pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.)
13818 of December 20, 2017.98 Drawing on the National Emergencies Act (NEA), International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), and Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), E.O.
13818 expands the scope of sanctionable targets, including broader networks of individuals and
entities associated with perpetrators of serious human rights abuse or corruption.99
The Global Magnitsky Act provides the executive branch with authority to impose sanctions
against persons around the world without requiring the United States to create a country-specific
sanctions program (discussed below), which can be diplomatically or politically challenging. On
the other hand, country-specific programs allow the United States to tailor sanctionable criteria to
context-specific behaviors and categories of persons.
See also:
•
CRS Report R46981, The Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act: Scope,
Implementation, and Considerations for Congress.
SFOPS Visa Restrictions. A recurring provision in annual SFOPS bills (currently located at
Section 7031(c)) requires the Secretary of State to deny visas to enter the United States to a
foreign official credibly implicated in significant corruption or a gross violation of human rights.
This restriction extends to immediate family members of the foreign official. For FY2023, the
provision applies to any foreign official “about whom the Secretary of State has credible
information have been involved, directly or indirectly, in significant corruption, including
corruption related to the extraction of natural resources, or a gross violation of human rights,
including the wrongful detention of locally employed staff of a United States diplomatic mission

96 For a general overview of how the United States uses sanctions to advance foreign policy and national security
objectives, see CRS Report R47829, Sanctions Primer: How the United States Uses Restrictive Mechanisms to
Advance Foreign Policy or National Security Objectives.
97 The law has its origins in the Russia-focused Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012 (Title IV of
P.L. 112-208). See “Origins” in CRS Report R46981, The Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act: Scope,
Implementation, and Considerations for Congress.
98 Executive Order (E.O.) 13818, “Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or
Corruption,” 82 Federal Register 60839, December 20, 2017.
99 National Emergencies Act (NEA; P.L. 94-412; 50 U.S.C. §§1601 et seq.); International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (IEEPA; Title II of P.L. 95-223; 50 U.S.C. §§1701 et seq.); Immigration and Nationality Act (INA; P.L.
82-414; 8 U.S.C. §§1101 et seq.).
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or a United States citizen or national.”100 This requirement is subject to certain exceptions, and
may be waived by the Secretary of State if the Secretary determines that such waiver “would
serve a compelling national interest” or “the circumstances which caused the individual to be
ineligible have changed sufficiently.” Unlike Global Magnitsky sanctions, an SFOPS Section
7031(c) designation does not entail economic sanctions, and the designation may be made public
or kept confidential.
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) Entry Denials. Section 212 of the INA (8 U.S.C.
§1182) provides the Secretary of State with broad authority to deny entry into the United States to
any prospective traveler based on the avoidance of adverse impacts on U.S. foreign policy. It also
includes specific activities as grounds for denial of entry, including participation in genocide,
commission of acts of torture or extrajudicial killings, responsibility for particularly severe
violations of religious freedom while serving as a foreign government official, and conviction of
a crime involving moral turpitude, among others. Drawing on INA authority, the executive branch
has broadly suspended the entry of foreign public officials engaged in corruption (through
Presidential Proclamation 7750 of January 12, 2004),101 and of non-U.S. nationals (“aliens”)
implicated in human rights and humanitarian law violations (through Presidential Proclamation
8697 of August 4, 2011).102 Pursuant to Section 222(f) of the INA, relevant records are generally
confidential.
Country-Specific Sanctions Programs
Congress has enacted laws that provide authority to impose sanctions related to democracy or
human rights situations in specific contexts. The President has also used authorities set out in the
NEA, IEEPA, and INA to establish country-specific sanctions regimes, citing, in part, human
rights abuses, corruption, and/or the undermining of democracy as the national security rationale
for the restrictions. Many of the more than 30 economic sanctions regimes currently maintained
by the United States include sanctionable criteria related to such issues.103 Examples include the
following:
• The Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012 (Title IV of P.L.
112-208; 22 U.S.C. §5811 note), a 2012 Russia-focused precursor to the Global
Magnitsky Act, which requires the President to impose sanctions against persons
determined to have been involved in the “criminal conspiracy” uncovered by
Russian lawyer and auditor Sergei Magnitsky or Magnitsky’s subsequent
detention, abuse, and death, or involved more generally in certain gross human
rights violations against individuals in Russia.

100 See Section 7031(c) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act,
2023 (Division K of P.L. 117-328).
101 Presidential Proclamation 7750 of January 12, 2004, “To Suspend Entry as Immigrants or Nonimmigrants of
Persons Engaged In or Benefiting From Corruption,” 3 C.F.R. 2004 Comp., p. 2.
102 Presidential Proclamation 8697 of August 4, 2011, “Suspension of Entry as Immigrants and Nonimmigrants of
Persons Who Participate in Serious Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Violations and Other Abuses,” 3 C.F.R.
2011 Comp., p. 94. More generally, the executive branch has drawn on INA authority to deny entry into the United
States to aliens subject to U.S. financial sanctions. See Presidential Proclamation 8693 of July 24, 2011, “Suspension of
Entry of Aliens Subject to United Nations Security Council Travel Bans and International Emergency Economic
Powers Act Sanctions,” 3 C.F.R. 2011 Comp., p. 86, and executive orders establishing sanctions programs.
103 See U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), “Sanctions Programs and Country
Information,” at https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/sanctions-programs-and-country-
information.
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• E.O. 13692 of March 8, 2015, which draws on the Venezuela Defense of Human
Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-278), as well as NEA, IEEPA, and
INA authorities, to in part provide for sanctions against persons involved, in
relation to Venezuela, in actions or policies that undermine democratic processes
or institutions, the commission of serious human rights violations or abuses,
actions that restrict freedom of expression or peaceful assembly, or high-level
public corruption.104
• E.O. 14014 of February 10, 2021, which draws on IEEPA, NEA, and INA
authorities to provide for Burma-focused sanctions in part against foreign persons
involved in serious human rights abuse, actions or policies that undermine
democratic processes or institutions, or actions or policies that restrict freedom of
expression or peaceful assembly or that limit access to media.105
Some country-focused programs contain transnational elements. For instance, E.O. 14024 of
April 15, 2021, which targets “harmful foreign activities” by the Russian government, includes
sanctionable criteria related to the undermining of democratic processes or institutions in the
United States or abroad, the assassination or other unlawful killing or bodily harm against U.S.
persons or U.S. ally or partner nationals, and involvement in transnational corruption, among
other criteria.106
See also:
•
CRS In Focus IF12390, U.S. Sanctions: Overview for the 118th Congress;
•
CRS Report R41438, North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions;
•
CRS In Focus IF12452, U.S. Sanctions on Iran;
•
CRS Report R45415, U.S. Sanctions on Russia;
•
CRS In Focus IF10715, Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions; and
•
CRS Report R45618, The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and
Use.
Import Restrictions and Export Controls
Forced Labor Import Ban. Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 prohibits the importation of
products “mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part” by forced labor, convict labor,
and/or indentured labor under penal sanctions.107 Section 910 of the Trade Facilitation and Trade
Enforcement Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-125) eliminated a prior longstanding “consumptive demand”
exception to this prohibition. In subsequent years, Congress has further enacted country-specific
legislation that subjects products mined, produced, or manufactured by North Korean nationals
(Section 302A of P.L. 114-122, as amended by Section 321 of P.L. 115-44; 22 U.S.C. §9241a), or

104 E.O. 13692, “Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in
Venezuela,” 80 Federal Register 12747, March 8, 2015.
105 E.O. 14014, “Blocking Property With Respect to the Situation in Burma,” 86 Federal Register 9429, February 10,
2021.
106 E.O. 14024, “Blocking Property With Respect To Specified Harmful Foreign Activities of the Government of the
Russian Federation, 86 Federal Register 20249, April 15, 2021.
107 19 U.S.C. §1307.
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in China’s Xinjiang region or by certain Xinjiang-related entities (Section 3 of P.L. 117-78), to a
rebuttable presumption that they are prohibited from importation pursuant to Section 307.108
See also:
•
CRS In Focus IF11360, Section 307 and Imports Produced by Forced Labor; and
•
CRS Report R46631, Section 307 and U.S. Imports of Products of Forced Labor: Overview and
Issues for Congress.
Restrictions on Exports. The Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (Title XVII, Subtitle B of P.L.
115-232; 50 U.S.C. §§4801 et seq.), which authorizes export controls on dual-use goods, includes
a statement of policy that export controls are to be used in part to “carry out the foreign policy of
the United States, including the protection of human rights and the promotion of democracy.”109
The executive branch implements a number of relevant export controls, including list-based, end-
user, and end-use controls, as well as licensing policies that allow review of transactions for
human rights and democracy concerns.110 These controls include, for example, adding certain
foreign entities implicated in human rights abuses, or the undermining of democracy, to the
Commerce Department’s “Entity List,” which generally entails a presumption of license denial
for the export of controlled items to such entities. The Commerce Department has explicitly cited
human rights or democracy concerns as the U.S. national security and foreign policy rationale for
imposing export controls in response to some country-specific situations, including human rights
violations in China’s Xinjiang region and the February 2021 military coup in Burma, among
others.
See also:
•
CRS Report R46814, The U.S. Export Control System and the Export Control Reform Act of
2018.
Other Areas of Congressional Engagement
Congress engages in a variety of other areas to influence U.S. foreign policy related to democracy
and human rights, including but not limited to the following (see associated footnotes for relevant
CRS products):
• conducting oversight of U.S. bilateral and multilateral diplomacy;
• engaging in congressional diplomacy through public statements or travel
overseas;
• mandating the creation of offices or positions within U.S. federal agencies (e.g.,
congressional authorization of the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy,
Human Rights, and Labor, codified at 22 U.S.C. §2651a(c)(2));
• creating congressional or independent commissions (e.g., the Tom Lantos Human
Rights Commission, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe,

108 See also Customs and Border Protection, “Forced Labor,” at https://www.cbp.gov/trade/forced-labor; “Uyghur
Forced Labor Prevention Act,” at https://www.cbp.gov/trade/forced-labor/UFLPA.
109 50 U.S.C. §4811(2)(D).
110 Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), “Promoting Human Rights and Democracy,” at
https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/promoting-human-rights-and-democracy; BIS, “Amendment to
Licensing Policy for Items Controlled for Crime Control Reasons,” 85 Federal Register 63007, October 6, 2020.
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Congressional-Executive Commission on China, and U.S. Commission on
International Religious Freedom);
• imposing broad conditions on U.S. trade with foreign countries (e.g., human
rights-related eligibility criteria for preferential trade treatment under the African
Growth and Opportunity Act; Title I of P.L. 106-200);111
• supporting national or international efforts to pursue criminal accountability for
atrocities;
• authorizing and appropriating resources for U.S. international broadcasting
efforts;112 and
• authorizing and appropriating resources to combat foreign disinformation (e.g.,
the State Department’s Global Engagement Center).
Selected Factors Affecting U.S. Efforts
Numerous general factors, a selection of which are discussed below, may make U.S. efforts to
promote democracy and human rights more complex and challenging now than in earlier post-
Cold War years. Some analysts caution against overstating or misinterpreting the importance of
these factors relative to local dynamics in particular countries.
Restrictions on Civil Society and Media
After the end of the Cold War, the United States and other international donors substantially
increased democracy assistance funding, including for civil society groups operating in relatively
closed societies. This, along with other factors and events (e.g., the role of civil society activism
in “color revolutions” in certain post-Soviet countries and the later Arab Spring movements),
appears to have motivated some non-democratic governments to increase restrictions on the work
of civil society and media organizations.113 Even in relatively freer contexts, some governments
have used measures that purport to combat issues of public concern (such as terrorism,
defamation, or mis/disinformation) but that also unduly restrict, or in some cases effectively
criminalize, freedoms of assembly, association, or expression.114 In the context of the COVID-19
pandemic, some governments used a stated need to combat health-related misinformation to
justify imposing restrictions on civil society, the media, and the internet.115

111 See CRS In Focus IF10149, African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). See also CRS In Focus IF10046, Worker
Rights Provisions in Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), and CRS Report R46842, Worker Rights Provisions and U.S.
Trade Policy.
112 See CRS Report R46968, U.S. Agency for Global Media: Background, Governance, and Issues for Congress.
113 See, for example, Saskia Brechenmacher and Thomas Carothers, “Defending Civic Space: Is the International
Community Stuck?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 22, 2019.
114 See also CRS In Focus IF12137, Global Trends in Democracy and Authoritarianism: Challenges to Press Freedom.
115 For example, in Uganda, according to Amnesty International, “the Uganda Communications Commission issued a
statement [in March 2020] saying that anyone spreading false information would be subject to arrest and prosecution”
under existing laws. This legal framework was “used during the COVID-19 pandemic to criminalize freedom of
expression and to penalize journalists and writers, such as Kakwenza Rukirabashaija, an author known for a book
criticizing President Museveni and his family who was arrested in April 2020 on trumped-up charges of defamation
and cyber related crimes.” See Amnesty International, Silenced and Misinformed: Freedom of Expression in Danger
During COVID-19, October 2021. See also United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
“COVID-19 pandemic exposes repression of free expression and right to information worldwide, UN expert says,” July
10, 2020; V-Dem, “Pandemic Backsliding: A Year of Violations and Advances in Response to COVID-19,” policy
brief, July 2021.
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Restrictions have taken a variety of forms, including restrictive legal or regulatory tools (e.g.,
stringent and onerous registration requirements for nongovernmental organizations) and the
selective or arbitrary enforcement of such tools. Notably, some governments have imposed
restrictions on the ability of domestic civil society groups to receive funding, including from
foreign sources, thereby making it more difficult in some cases for the United States and other
international democracy assistance funders to support democracy and human rights advocates.116
Democratic Backsliding
Breakdowns of democracy may occur in a variety of ways, including sudden shock events such as
coups as well as incremental erosions in democratic institutions and norms. Some research
indicates that the proportion of such breakdowns arising from the latter phenomenon—which
some analysts refer to as “democratic backsliding” or “authoritarianization”—has increased since
the end of the Cold War.117 In some cases, political leaders who have taken power through
democratic means have subsequently worked to gradually erode checks on their power, such as
by undermining the independence of the judiciary, civil society, and the media. At times, leaders
later have worked to directly undermine the integrity or fairness of elections.118
Some analysts note that a number of contemporary cases of democratic backsliding have been
top-down processes driven by political leaders.119 Although such processes have occurred in a
variety of contexts, would-be authoritarian actors may seek to leverage or exacerbate potentially
conducive structural factors present in some countries, such as high levels of political polarization
and public dissatisfaction with government performance. Newer democracies with lower levels of
state capacity or where the rule of law is not well-established may be particularly susceptible.120
As a matter of foreign policy, some observers have noted that the United States has tended to
respond more swiftly and forcefully to sudden events such as coups than to gradual erosions in
democracy or respect for human rights.121 The latter are more difficult to discern in real time, and
crafting effective policy responses to them may be more challenging.122

116 Nicolas Bouchet, Ken Godfrey, and Richard Youngs, “Rising Hostility to Democracy Support: Can it Be
Countered?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 1, 2022.
117 Nancy Bermeo, “On Democratic Backsliding,” Journal of Democracy, vol. 27, no. 1 (January 2016), pp. 5-16; Erica
Frantz, Authoritarianism: What Everyone Needs to Know (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018); Erica Frantz,
“Contemporary Challenges to Global Democracy,” Brown Journal of World Affairs, vol. 26, no. 2 (May 2021); V-
Dem, Democracy Report 2021: Autocratization Turns Viral, March 2021.
118 Ibid.
119 Thomas Carothers and Benjamin Press, “Understanding and Responding to Global Democratic Backsliding,”
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 20, 2022.
120 Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, “The Anatomy of Democratic Backsliding,” Journal of Democracy vol. 32,
no. 4 (October 2021), pp. 27-41; Roberto Stefan Foa, “Why Strongmen Win in Weak States,” Journal of Democracy,
vol. 32, no. 1 (January 2021), pp. 52-65; Richard Wike and Janell Fetterolf, “Global Public Opinion in an Era of
Democratic Anxiety,” Pew Research Center, December 7, 2021.
121 Thomas Carothers and Benjamin Press, “Understanding and Responding to Global Democratic Backsliding,”
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 20, 2022. According to the authors, “it is striking that in
multiple cases of leader-driven democratic backsliding, Western democracies were slow to realize what was happening
and to take steps to oppose it firmly. For example, the U.S. government was still lauding Erdoğan’s Turkey as a beacon
of democracy in a Muslim-majority country well after the signs of serious democratic deterioration were apparent.
Only twelve years after Orbán began dismantling Hungarian democracy has the European Union started to take
potentially serious measures to oppose his autocratic project. And since Tunisian President Kais Saied carried out a
presidential self-coup in July 2021, U.S. policymakers have been slow to come to terms with the full extent of his
antidemocratic intentions.”
122 Some analysts have called on pro-democracy governments to develop methodology to better identify gradual forms
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Technological Developments
Emerging technologies have the potential to affect democracy and human rights in both positive
and negative ways. New technologies may improve citizens’ access to information or ability to
organize. Early optimism over the democratizing power of the internet and social media,
however, has been tempered over time. Some authoritarian governments have shown an ability to
mitigate politically threatening aspects of new technologies, in some cases leveraging them to
further social and political control. Governments increasingly possess an array of tools—
including artificial intelligence (AI)-enhanced surveillance, censorship, website blocking, paid
commentators, automated bots, and targeted internet shutdowns or slowdowns—to monitor their
citizens and shape their information environments. Some governments and citizens have
criticized social media platforms for the role they may play in social and political polarization, the
propagation of hate speech, and offline human rights abuses in democracies and nondemocracies
alike.
Technological tools may reduce some of the pitfalls that some authoritarian governments have
faced from more traditional and visible forms of political repression, such as risks of public
backlash, high resource costs, and “principal-agent” dilemmas associated with empowering large
numbers of individuals to implement repressive policies.123 Some research indicates that the use
of modern technology by authoritarian regimes has increased their durability.124 According to a
February 2023 assessment by the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC), “various technologies now
constitute an important component of many governments’ repressive toolkits, extending states’
power to stifle dissent beyond traditional means.”125 The PRC’s model of technology-enhanced
authoritarianism, in particular, increasingly appears to have global implications, although
evaluating China’s diffuse impact in this area is challenging.126 Some research indicates, for
instance, that PRC firms are driving the proliferation of AI surveillance technology around the
world to a greater degree than companies from any other country, although firms in democracies
are also contributing to the spread of technology that can be misused for purposes of
repression.127 Some U.S. policymakers have sought ways to respond to democracy- and human
rights-related technology challenges, such as by supporting the development and proliferation of

of democratic backsliding and to respond as early in the process as possible (e.g., through diplomatic and economic
disincentives and/or efforts to strengthen countervailing institutions such as independent judiciaries, the media, and
civil society). See ibid.; Nic Cheeseman and Marie-Eve Desrosiers, “How Not To Engage with Authoritarian States,”
Westminster Foundation for Democracy, February 2023.
123 Steven Feldstein, The Rise of Digital Repression: How Technology is Reshaping Power, Politics, and Resistance
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2021).
124 Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Erica Frantz, and Joseph Wright, “The Digital Dictators: How Technology Strengthens
Autocracy,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2020.
125 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,”
February 6, 2023. See also National Intelligence Council, “Digital Repression Growing Globally, Threatening
Freedoms,” October 31, 2022 (declassified April 24, 2023).
126 The PRC may serve as an aspirational example for other authoritarian governments that perceive technology as a
key component of the Communist Party’s apparent success in perpetuating its political control while still maintaining
economic growth. At the same time, domestic factors in other countries—including political regime type and technical
and bureaucratic capacity—may play important roles as to whether governments aspire to, or are capable of, adopting
practices similar to the PRC’s.
127 Steven Feldstein, The Global Expansion of AI Surveillance, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
September 2019; Martin Beraja et al., “Exporting the Surveillance State via Trade in AI,” Brookings Institution
working paper, January 2023; Dana Priest, Craig Timberg, and Souad Mekhennet, “Private Israeli spyware used to
hack cellphones of journalists, activists worldwide,” Washington Post, July 18, 2021; Ronald J. Deibert, “The Autocrat
in Your iPhone,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2023.
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internet freedom technologies (e.g., tools to circumvent government censorship) and
strengthening export controls.
Authoritarian Actors
The growing power and international influence of certain authoritarian countries appears to be
contributing to a less hospitable global environment for democracy and human rights.128 Although
the precise objectives of authoritarian governments may be complex and varied, many focus on
protecting against threats to domestic regime security, potentially driving them to seek to contain
or roll back the spread of democracy abroad in addition to at home. Some analysts view China
and Russia, in particular, as working to move the international order in a direction that is more
hospitable to authoritarianism, and as cooperating with each other to some extent toward that
goal. A February 2022 joint Russia-PRC statement asserted that “it is only up to the people
of the country to decide whether their State is a democratic one,” argued for the international
community “to respect cultural and civilizational diversity,” and pledged to increase cooperation
to oppose “color revolutions” and “interference in the internal affairs of sovereign countries.”129
Some analysts contend that Russia’s aggressive actions in Eastern Europe, including its February
2022 expanded invasion of Ukraine, have been driven in part by Russian leaders’ fears for regime
security associated with democratic expansion in nearby countries.130
Authoritarian governments may undermine democracy and human rights internationally in
various ways, including, for example, by: (1) providing aid or other support to foreign
governments, including other authoritarian governments, that undermines democracy or the
prospects for democratization in recipient countries;131 (2) actively or indirectly supporting the
diffusion of techniques or tools that are used to violate human rights and repress political dissent;
(3) subverting institutions or norms within democracies, such as through election interference;
and (4) working through international bodies to undermine, distort, or erode support for human
rights- and democracy-related international norms. In the past several years, analysts have
devoted greater attention to the problem of authoritarian government-sponsored disinformation
and influence activities in other countries, claiming that governments pursuing these activities
aim to distort public discourse and undermine free expression or fair political competition.132
Some authoritarian government-sponsored activities may constitute a form of “transnational
repression,” a longstanding but purportedly growing problem that the nongovernmental
organization Freedom House describes as “governments reach[ing] across national borders to
silence opposition among diaspora and exile communities.”133
The international influence of authoritarian governments may be a complicating factor for U.S.
efforts to promote democracy and human rights across a range of areas. For instance, bilateral
U.S. democracy assistance programs focused on combating domestic challenges to democracy

128 According to one measure, non-democracies accounted for 46% of global GDP in 2022, compared with 24% in
1992. V-Dem, Democracy Report 2023: Defiance in the Face of Autocratization, March 2023.
129 Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations
Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development, February 4, 2022.
130 See, for example, Robert Person and Michael McFaul, “What Putin Fears Most,” Journal of Democracy, February
22, 2022.
131 For instance, Russia’s government has provided or promised more than 1 billion dollars in loans, as well as other
support, to Belarus in the wake of a political crisis involving widespread protests against electoral fraud in Belarus’s
2020 presidential election. See CRS In Focus IF10814, Belarus: An Overview, by Cory Welt and Shelby B. Senger.
132 Some such tactics have been described under the umbrella concept of “sharp power.” See, for example, Christopher
Walker and Jessica Ludwig, “The Meaning of Sharp Power,” Foreign Affairs, November 16, 2017.
133 Freedom House, Defending Democracy in Exile: Policy Responses to Transnational Repression, June 2022.
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and human rights in particular countries may increasingly also need to confront negative
transnational influences posed by third countries.134 At the same time, some experts caution
against overstating the transnational role that China and Russia may play in third countries while
understating the role that local political dynamics may play. These experts suggest that, to date,
Russia and China’s influence on global democracy and human rights may have helped entrench
existing authoritarian regimes more than it has caused democratic backsliding elsewhere.135
Selected Policy Considerations
U.S. Interests and Tensions with Other Objectives
Proponents of U.S. democracy and human rights promotion argue for these efforts not only on
moral grounds, but also on the basis of long-term U.S. interests. Such proponents contend, for
example, that rights-respecting democracies are more reliable U.S. partners; that democracies are
considerably less likely to go to war with one another (referred to by some experts as “democratic
peace theory,” although the validity of this theory has itself been a topic of debate); and that,
conversely, threats to U.S. security—such as instability, terrorism, transnational crime, and
migration crises—tend to be associated with or emanate from authoritarian governance.136 Some
research also finds that “personalist” authoritarian regimes—in which power is concentrated in
the hands of a single leader—are prone to unpredictable and aggressive foreign policies (as some
experts argue Russia’s invasion of Ukraine illustrates).137 In light of these assessments, some
analysts argue that issues of human rights, democracy, and countering authoritarianism have
myriad implications for other U.S. objectives and should be prioritized as overarching foreign
policy foci.138 Other analysts question the extent to which foreign government regime types and
human rights situations are vital to U.S. interests, or express doubts about the U.S. capacity to
help improve overseas human rights and democracy situations, even if doing so would support
U.S. interests (see “Impact and Effectiveness of U.S. Efforts”).139
Efforts to promote democracy and human rights may at times conflict with other policy goals.
The odds of succeeding in achieving U.S. goals in, for example, deterring terrorism or weapons
proliferation, improve with mutual trust among governments. U.S. emphasis on democracy and
human rights may increase tension between the United States and nondemocratic governments,

134 Thomas Carothers, “Rejuvenating Democracy Assistance,” Journal of Democracy, vol. 31, no. 1 (January 2020),
pp. 114-123.
135 Thomas Carothers and Benjamin Press, “Understanding and Responding to Global Democratic Backsliding,”
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 20, 2022. Some analysts have argued that authoritarian
governments actively work to inflate foreign perceptions of their power and influence. See Péter Krekó, “How
Authoritarians Inflate Their Image,” Journal of Democracy, vol. 32, no. 3 (July 2021), pp. 109-123.
136 For additional information and sources, see also CRS Report R45344, Global Trends in Democracy: Background,
U.S. Policy, and Issues for Congress, by Michael A. Weber.
137 Erica Frantz and Andrea Kendall-Taylor, “The Evolution of Autocracy: Why Authoritarianism Is Becoming More
Formidable,” Survival, vol. 59, no. 5 (September 2017), 57-68; Adam E. Casey and Seva Gunitsky, “The Bully in the
Bubble: Putin and the Perils of Information Isolation,” Foreign Affairs, February 4, 2022; Erica Frantz and Joseph
Wright, “It’s Not Just a Putin Problem. ‘Personalists’ Like Him are Behind Much of the World’s Bad Behavior,”
Washington Post, March 2, 2022.
138 See, for example, Task Force on US Strategy to Support Democracy and Counter Authoritarianism, Reversing the
Tide: Towards a New US Strategy to Support Democracy and Counter Authoritarianism, Freedom House, April 2021.
139 See, for example, Stephen M. Walt, “Why is America so Bad at Promoting Democracy in Other Countries?”
Foreign Policy, April 25, 2016; Walter Russell Mead, “The Paradox of American Democracy Promotion,” The
American Interest, April 9, 2015.
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and that tension may hamper cooperation toward these or other objectives.140 At times, U.S.
efforts to promote democracy and human rights over the long-term may collide with efforts to
respond to crises or other shorter-term policy imperatives.
Values Promotion and “Strategic Competition.” Given the current focus on geopolitical
competition between the United States government and the governments of China and Russia, a
U.S. rhetorical and policy emphasis on democracy and human rights has the potential to support
the pursuit of some U.S. objectives, while potentially complicating others. As contrasted with the
repressive political systems of China and Russia, shared democratic values may be a powerful
and deep-rooted source of cohesion between the United States and its democratic allies. Indeed,
preserving an international order that is conducive to values of democracy and human rights is the
raison d'être for such competition to begin with, according to some analysts: “Chinese and
Russian leaders are challenging the liberal international order in part because they view the
principles of that order as an existential threat to their regimes and believe they would be safer in
a more illiberal world. As a result, both Beijing and Moscow are working to roll back the global
influence of democratic norms and weaken the democratic countries opposing their revisionist
designs.”141 On the other hand, some analysts question the importance of competing ideologies
(i.e., between democracy and authoritarianism) in this geopolitical competition and argue that a
U.S. emphasis on values introduces risks, such as of intensifying rivalry with authoritarian
governments and narrowing the scope for cooperation with these governments when it is in the
U.S. interest.142
Some third countries that U.S. policymakers may view as strategically important to the United
States have authoritarian governments (e.g., Vietnam) or may be experiencing human rights
abuses and democratic backsliding (e.g., India).143 The governments of such countries may be less
inclined to maintain or deepen their partnerships with the United States if the U.S. government
forcefully presses them on democracy and human rights.144 In some instances, U.S. policymakers
may face somewhat paradoxical trade-offs. On the one hand, some forms of U.S. engagement
with strategically important countries could lend legitimacy to problematic governments or their
repressive practices.145 U.S. neglect of democracy and human rights issues could also undercut
long-term U.S. interests by failing to push back against developments that can destabilize these
countries over time and erode their capacity to be effective partners of the United States.146 On

140 In the context of bilateral security partnerships, some democracy promotion advocates argue that U.S. policymakers
tend to underappreciate the linkage between values and interests, overestimate the risks to US. security interests of
raising democracy and human rights issues, and underestimate the gains that can be achieved by doing so. See Thomas
Carothers and Benjamin Press, “When US Security and Democracy Interests Clash,” Just Security, November 18,
2021.
141 Hal Brands and Charles Edel, “A Grand Strategy of Democratic Solidarity,” The Washington Quarterly, vol. 44, no.
1 (March 2021), pp. 29-47.
142 See, for example, Elbridge Colby and Robert D. Kaplan, “The Ideology Delusion,” Foreign Affairs, September 4,
2020; Thomas Pepinsky and Jessica Chen Weiss, “The Clash of Systems?” Foreign Affairs, June 11, 2021; Robert
Manning and Mathew Burrows, “The Problem with Biden’s Democracy Agenda,” War on the Rocks, July 27, 2021.
143 See CRS In Focus IF10209, U.S.-Vietnam Relations; CRS In Focus IF12198, India: Human Rights Assessments.
144 For examples of this critique, see Stephen M. Walt, “Biden’s State Department Needs a Reset,” Foreign Policy,
April 1, 2023; Walter Russell Mead, “The Cost of Biden’s ‘Democracy’ Fixation,” The Wall Street Journal, April 3,
2023.
145 Nic Cheeseman and Marie-Eve Desrosiers, “How Not To Engage with Authoritarian States,” Westminster
Foundation for Democracy, February 2023.
146 Regarding India, for example, one analyst questioned whether democratic backsliding could “get to a point where
you have communal violence, significant violence and unrest, significant crackdowns on Muslim communities … That
could conceivably distract the Indian government from focusing on the strategic and foreign policy issues that allow it
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the other hand, a deterioration in relations or a lessening of U.S. engagement with these
governments could, in some cases, encourage their greater engagement with China or other
authoritarian governments, with its own risks to U.S. interests, including with regard to
democracy and human rights.147 Sometimes, different forms of U.S. engagement with the same
country may have conflicting effects (e.g., security or other assistance to the government on the
one hand, and democracy assistance to civil society groups on the other; see the textbox
below).148
Russia’s expanded invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and some of the resulting U.S. foreign policy
considerations, may illustrate the complexities and competing priorities that can be at play.
Broadly, some policymakers from the United States and other major democracies portray the
defense of Ukraine in part as a defense of democracy against authoritarianism, even as
democracies have, to some extent, sought improved cooperation with certain authoritarian
governments to counter Russia.149 Relatedly, a U.S. policy focus on ensuring continued support
within NATO for assistance to Ukraine may come into tension with policy efforts to push back
against governance and rule of law challenges among certain NATO members (e.g., Hungary and
Turkey). U.S. policy may also grapple with possible tensions between governance-related criteria
for NATO accession and some policymakers’ desire to extend security protections to countries
such as Ukraine that have experienced or are vulnerable to Russian government aggression.150
U.S. Security and Other Assistance to Nondemocracies
U.S. funding for democracy assistance to some countries is less than assistance the United States provides those
countries for other purposes, and some of those latter types of aid may have ambiguous effects on democracy and
human rights.151 Some analysts posit that some assistance to government ministries or security forces—such as for
purposes of combating terrorism—has the potential to strengthen the ability of authoritarian leaders to maintain
political control.152 A USAID-sponsored study published in 2018 found that the effect of U.S. democracy assistance
may decline with increasing amounts of U.S. security assistance in a given country, among other factors.153 More

to work with the [United States],” including to counter China. See comments by Michael Kugelman in Rachel Oswald,
“US Welcome of India’s Modi is Darkened by Rights Record,” CQ, June 15, 2023.
147 Some analysts contend that the leaders of certain authoritarian governments may seek to leverage U.S. fears of
losing ground to China and Russia for their own purposes. See Jon Hoffman, “The Middle East and the Manipulation
of Great Power Competition,” The National Interest, May 9, 2022.
148 Nic Cheeseman and Marie-Eve Desrosiers, “How Not To Engage with Authoritarian States,” Westminster
Foundation for Democracy, February 2023.
149 See, for example, Lucan Ahmad Way, “The Rebirth of the Liberal World Order?” Journal of Democracy, vol. 33,
no. 2 (April 2022), pp. 5-17; Richard Youngs, “Autocracy Versus Democracy After the Ukraine Invasion: Mapping a
Middle Way,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 20, 2022.
150 Regarding Ukraine’s membership aspirations, NATO allies in July 2023 “reaffirmed their commitment that Ukraine
will become a member of NATO,” and, in recognition of “Ukraine’s increased interoperability and substantial progress
with reforms … decided that Ukraine’s path to full Euro-Atlantic integration has moved beyond the need for the
Membership Action Plan.” Allies “will continue to support and review Ukraine’s progress on interoperability as well as
additional democratic and security sector reforms that are required on its path towards future membership.… NATO
will be in a position to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance when Allies agree and conditions are met.”
See NATO, “Relations with Ukraine,” updated July 28, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_37750.htm.
See also CRS Insight IN12192, NATO’s 2023 Vilnius Summit, by Paul Belkin.
151 Nic Cheeseman and Marie-Eve Desrosiers, “How Not To Engage with Authoritarian States,” Westminster
Foundation for Democracy, February 2023.
152 Ibid.
153 Finkel et al., “Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building: Report on Phase III Activities,” August
2018.
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broadly, some research finds that some foreign assistance can exaggerate existing governance trends in a given
country—both positive (democratization) and negative (autocratization).154
Impact and Effectiveness of U.S. Efforts
Perceptions among experts and observers of growing challenges to democracy and human rights
around the world—despite continued policy and programmatic efforts by the United States and
other international actors—may raise questions about the impact and effectiveness of U.S. efforts.
In general, governance-related developments in foreign countries may be protracted, uncertain,
and nonlinear processes, with constraints on the ability of the United States to influence them.
Some analysts question the capacity of the United States to address deep-rooted challenges in
other countries whose societal, historical, and cultural contexts differ markedly from those of the
United States.155 Others contend that the United States in some cases can effectively marshal its
influence to meaningfully support democracy and push back against human rights violations
where they are occurring.156 Some experts point to instances in which they argue that U.S.
diplomatic messaging, sanctions, or other tools have made a positive difference.157 In other cases,
some analysts argue that the U.S. government’s use of these tools has allowed U.S. policymakers
to be seen by observers as standing with democracy and human rights, but with sometimes
unclear impacts.
Evaluating the impact of U.S. democracy and human rights efforts is challenging when
developments are slow-moving and nonlinear, confounding variables are many and complex, and
questions over how to measure progress remain. Additionally, some foreign leaders may find it
politically unpalatable to be seen as acquiescing to U.S. pressure on issues of democracy and
human rights, so the effects of diplomacy in this area may be difficult to discern. U.S. agencies
may attempt to gauge the effectiveness of particular tools and interventions. For instance, a
USAID-sponsored evaluation of USAID democracy assistance provided between 2001 and 2014
found a modest positive relationship between such assistance and a given recipient country’s
democracy rating on a prominent democracy index.158 According to the study, U.S. democracy
assistance can have a greater effect depending on certain factors, including when levels of U.S.

154 Independent Commission for Aid Impact, Review of the UK’s Approach to Democracy and Human Rights:
Literature Review, January 2023. Some U.S. efforts, such as through the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC),
seek to condition foreign assistance in part based on democracy and human rights-related performance indicators. For
more information, see CRS Report RL32427, Millennium Challenge Corporation: Overview and Issues, by Nick M.
Brown.
155 For example, see Walter Russell Mead, “The Paradox of American Democracy Promotion,” The American Interest,
April 9, 2015.
156 Some analysts argue that the United States should lower its aims and seek a middle path, such as by strategically
pursuing opportunities to support improved governance overseas, even if doing so may bolster some authoritarian
governments. See Stephen D. Krasner, “Learning to Live With Despots: The Limits of Democracy Promotion,”
Foreign Affairs, March/April 2020.
157 For instance, one analyst has argued that U.S. diplomacy “helped support a mostly peaceful transfer of power” in
Brazil in 2022 by making clear that “any military-backed attempt to keep then-Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro in
power after his loss in the presidential election would have serious consequences for the U.S.-Brazilian relationship.”
See Thomas Carothers, “How Not to Overcorrect,” in “Should America Still Promote Democracy?” Foreign Affairs,
April 13, 2023.
158 This positive effect was lower than the effect of such aid provided between 1992 and 2000, however. See USAID,
“Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building: Report on Phase III Activities,” August 2018.
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security assistance are low and when the country is not already experiencing democratic
backsliding, among others.159
According to one nongovernmental study published in 2014, “over the last 30 years American
democracy promotion has played a clear—albeit varying—role in supporting democratization in
many countries, although it cannot be seen as the primary cause in any one case.”160 Factors in
U.S. foreign policy that have contributed to success include “long-term commitment, links
between rhetoric and action, consistency with other policies, and creative adaptation of tools.”161
In general, U.S. democracy and human rights efforts may have greater impact when they are
integrated as part of overall foreign policy strategies in specific contexts.162 The executive
branch’s ability to develop and implement effective, context-sensitive strategies may be
constrained by a variety of factors, however, including resource limitations, inadequate
coordination across government agencies, and competing or shifting priorities.
Criticisms and Questions About U.S. Credibility
Sovereignty and “Interference.” Some critics question the appropriateness of U.S. democracy
and human rights promotion, such as by asserting that it imposes American or Western values on
other societies.163 Some leaders of foreign governments, particularly authoritarian governments,
contend that some U.S. and other like-minded governments’ efforts to promote democracy and
human rights constitute “interference” in their countries’ domestic affairs. Supporters of U.S.
efforts generally argue that aspirations for human rights and democracy are universal, and are a
legitimate international concern as reflected in documents such as the U.N. Charter, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and subsequent binding international human rights
treaties.164
Inconsistency. Some observers have described the United States as pressing forcefully on
democracy and human rights in its policies toward competitor states or countries in which the
United States does not have major competing strategic objectives, while at times downplaying the

159 Broader (i.e., not U.S.-specific) studies and literature reviews have similarly found positive, if modest, effects of
democracy assistance. See, for example, Miguel Niño-Zarazúa et al., Effects of Swedish and International Democracy
Aid, Expert Group for Aid Studies, 2020; Rachel M. Gisselquist et al., “Does Aid Support Democracy? A Systematic
Review of the Literature,” United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research, working
paper, January 2021.
160 Nicole Bibbins Sedaca and Nicolas Bouchet, Holding Steady? US Democracy Promotion in a Changing World,
Chatham House, February 2014.
161 Ibid.
162 Some research has found that democracy assistance programs, for example, are more effective when their goals
align with broader U.S. policy and are supported by tools such as sanctions or aid conditionality. See Sarah Sunn Bush,
“Three Lessons for Democracy Assistance Effectiveness,” in Does Democracy Matter? The United States and Global
Democracy Support, pp. 51-64.
163 For example, see Oke Epia, “Imposing Western Values in Africa: Public Diplomacy and the Homosexuality
Debate,” University of Southern California Center on Public Diplomacy blog, February 4, 2014.
164 According to a 1974 State Department policy paper summary, “the unequivocal view of the Office of the Legal
Adviser is that the principle of non-interference is not in itself a legal bar to official US cognizance of human rights
problems in a foreign country. The US Government formally and publicly acknowledged that human rights violations
are matters of international concern when it ratified the U.N. Charter in 1945 and approved the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights in 1948. According to the Office of the Legal Advisor of the Department, ‘there is now ample legal
justification for diplomatic representations to a state concerning its treatment of its own nationals where such treatment
violates minimum standards of international law.’” U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian, “Summary of
Paper on Policies on Human Rights and Authoritarian Regimes,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976,
Volume E-3, October 1974.
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democracy and human rights shortcomings of strategic partners.165 Some argue that such
inconsistency undermines the credibility of U.S. democracy and human rights efforts in the eyes
of foreign governments and publics. Governments of authoritarian competitor states sometimes
make similar points, and promote notions of U.S. hypocrisy.166 On the other hand, some analysts
contend that it is necessary for the United States to pursue opportunities selectively based on
factors including the likelihood of positive impact and the possible effects on other U.S. interests
(see “U.S. Interests and Tensions with Other Objectives”).167
The U.S. Example and U.S. Actions Abroad. Some experts argue that democracy’s appeal
around the world has historically been enhanced by United States’ serving as an attractive (if
flawed) example, and that U.S. domestic challenges may undermine the appeal of democracy
globally as well as the credibility of the United States as a defender of democracy and human
rights. Opinions on the health of democracy in the United States vary. According to the
nongovernmental organization Freedom House, “in recent years [the United States’] democratic
institutions have suffered erosion, as reflected in rising political polarization and extremism,
partisan pressure on the electoral process, bias and dysfunction in the criminal justice system,
harmful policies on immigration and asylum seekers, and growing disparities in wealth, economic
opportunity, and political influence.”168 An Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) election observation mission examining the 2022 U.S. midterm elections stated that
“efforts to undermine voters’ trust in the electoral process by baselessly questioning its integrity
can result in systemic challenges,” and noted other challenges including polarized campaigning,
uncompetitive districts due to partisan redistricting, loopholes in disclosure mechanisms for
campaign finance, and disinformation, among others.169
Some experts and critics of U.S. foreign policy relatedly argue that certain U.S. actions abroad
have undercut U.S. credibility on democracy and human rights. Points of criticism include, for
example, U.S. efforts during the Cold War to overthrow or subvert certain democratically elected
foreign governments, as well as U.S. actions, or the effects of U.S. actions, in the context of post-
9/11 counterterrorism policies, including targeted killings and renditions, abuses of prisoners and
detainees, and civilian deaths associated with U.S. military interventions. The governments of
some authoritarian competitor states actively promote perceptions of human rights abuses and
challenges to democracy both domestically within the United States and in association with U.S.
actions abroad.170
Some observers argue that the United States would be better served by focusing on its own
domestic challenges than on democracy and human rights in other countries. Others argue that the
United States should work to shore up democracy in the United States while simultaneously
confronting pressing challenges to democracy and human rights overseas. Some analysts note that

165 For example, see Nicole Bibbins Sedaca and Nicolas Bouchet, “Holding Steady? US Democracy Promotion in a
Changing World,” Chatham House, February 2014; Lincoln A. Mitchell, The Democracy Promotion Paradox
(Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2016).
166 See, for example, The Economist, “China’s Message to the Global South,” July 6, 2023.
167 Some analysts have accordingly suggested a tempering of U.S. ambition and rhetoric regarding democracy and
human rights. See, for example, Richard Sokolsky and Aaron David Miller, “U.S. Democracy Promotion: Aim Lower,”
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2, 2016.
168 Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2023: United States,” accessed at https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-
states/freedom-world/2023.
169 OSCE International Election Observation Mission’s Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, November
9, 2022.
170 For example, see PRC State Council Information Office, “The Report on Human Rights Violations in the United
States in 2022,” March 2023.
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the United States has long possessed human rights and democracy shortcomings but has
nonetheless sought to project values leadership abroad.171

Author Information

Michael A. Weber

Analyst in Foreign Affairs

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171 See, for example, Hal Brands and Charles Edel, “A Grand Strategy of Democratic Solidarity,” The Washington
Quarterly, vol. 44, no. 1 (March 2021), pp. 29-47. Some analysts argue that, in light of current challenges in
longstanding democracies, democracy promotion efforts should work to facilitate models of mutual learning around
common challenges affecting both new and established democracies alike. See Thomas Carothers and Frances Z.
Brown, “The Chastened Power,” American Purpose, March 10, 2021; Thomas Carothers, “Rejuvenating Democracy
Promotion,” Journal of Democracy, vol. 31, no. 1 (January 2020), pp. 114-123.
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