Taliban Government in Afghanistan: Background and Issues for Congress

November 2, 2021 R46955

Taliban Government in Afghanistan:
November 2, 2021
Background and Issues for Congress
Clayton Thomas
On September 7, 2021, the Taliban announced a “caretaker government” to rule Afghanistan.
Analyst in Middle Eastern
The announcement came weeks after the Taliban, a Sunni Islamist extremist movement that ruled
Affairs
most of Afghanistan from 1996 until 2001, retook effective control of the country with the

collapse of the U.S.-backed former Afghan government and its security forces amid the U.S.
military departure.

The Taliban’s return to power comes almost 20 years after a U.S.-led military campaign deposed the group in response to its
harboring of the international Islamist terrorist group Al Qaeda, which carried out the September 11, 2001, attacks . The
Taliban regrouped and began an insurgency that by 2005 was challenging U.S. and international military forces, along with
the new Afghan government and its nascent security forces, in parts of the country. After a 2009-2011 “surge,” U.S. force
levels decreased as Afghan forces took responsibility for security nationwide. Deep and abiding divisions among Afghan
political elites, along with widespread corruption, undermined the government’s authority and strengthened the Taliban,
which continued to make battlefield gains. In the February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement, signed in Doha, Qatar, the Taliban
agreed to take unspecified action to prevent other groups (including Al Qaeda) from using Afghan soil to threaten the United
States and its allies, in return for the full withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan by May 2021. In 2021,
President Joseph Biden postponed the U.S. withdrawal date by several months; two weeks before that withdrawal was to
conclude, the Taliban entered Kabul on August 15, 2021, the culmination of a rapid nationwide military advance that
shocked many in the United States and Afghanistan. Other than an Islamic State affiliate, no viable Afghan armed opposition
to the Taliban appears to exist as of November 2021, though some anti-Taliban Afghan leaders have sought U.S. support.
Afghanistan is different in many ways from the country the Taliban last ruled in 2001. Women have been active participants
in many parts of Afghan society; protections for them, and ethnic and religious minorities, were enshrined in the country’s
2004 constitution. The Taliban are likely to reverse that progress, though their early actions suggest at least some moderation
from their extremely repressive 1996-2001 rule. The Taliban takeover is also likely to affect terrorist groups in Afghanistan
differently. The local Islamic State affiliate, a Taliban adversary, has escalated its attacks since the Taliban takeover,
challenging the group’s legitimacy, but Al Qaeda, a longtime Taliban partner, may be empowered. The Taliban takeover has
reshaped regional dynamics, presenting challenges and opportunities for U.S. adversaries and competitors.
As the Biden Administration and the 117th Congress consider the new situation in Afghanistan, a range of U.S. policy tools is
potentially available. The prospect of U.S. recognition of, and establishment of diplomatic relations with, the Taliban
government could provide some leverage over a Taliban that claims to want international legitimacy . Only the President may
extend formal recognition to another government, but Congress can restrain, condition, or otherwise influence the
implementation of recognition decisions. There appears to be broad support in Congress for maintaining terrorism-related
sanctions on the Taliban while allowing for the provision of humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan. It is unclear how the
Taliban might respond to additional U.S. sanctions, or what such sanctions might be intended to accomplish, were the
Administration (potentially with congressional input) to make a decision to impose them. Congress might also seek to
provide foreign assistance, both within Afghanistan and to the country’s neighbors, for various purposes. In the aftermath of
the Taliban takeover, international financial institutions blocked Afghanistan’s access to funds; similarly, in August 2021, the
Biden Administration placed a hold on U.S.-based Afghan central bank assets. Congress may exert influence over U.S.
decisionmaking on both of those issues.
Possible overall U.S. approaches to the Taliban include direct or indirect attempts to undermine the group’s rule, as well as
tacit or explicit acceptance of the group’s position. A U.S. policy response that rejects and seeks to weaken the Taliban may
have broad domestic support, given the history of conflict and Taliban policies that undermine U.S. interests. It is unclear t o
what extent, if at all, the Taliban might change their behavior in response to U.S. actions, but the group appears to be
prioritizing internal cohesion over compromises that might appeal to foreign actors. A less oppositional U.S. approach toward
the Taliban could allow for greater U.S. access to, and perhaps influence over, the group and events in Afghanistan.
Engagement with a Taliban government that acts in support of some U.S. interests and against others could compel U.S.
policymakers to weigh and prioritize those interests, posing a difficult challenge.

Congressional Research Service

Taliban Government in Afghanistan: Background and Issues for Congress

Background: The Taliban, 1994-2021
The Taliban, now in their third decade of existence, began as an armed group that emerged in the
1990s out of Afghanistan’s civil war. By 1996, they had come to rule most of the country. In
2001, U.S., international, and Afghan forces deposed them, and the group soon began what would
become a nearly twenty-year insurgency. In 2021, they again control Afghanistan, arguably to a
greater extent than they did in the 1990s. The Taliban’s background may be instructive for
understanding the group’s renewed rule in 2021.
Origins, Rise to Power, and Rule: 1994-2001
In 1993-1994, Afghan Sunni Muslim clerics and students, mostly of rural, Pashtun origin, formed
the Taliban movement. Many were former anti-Soviet fighters known as mujahideen. After the
1989 Soviet withdrawal and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet-supported Afghan government
in 1992, a civil war among mujahideen parties broke out. Those former fighters who had become
disil usioned with the civil war formed the backbone of the Taliban. Many members of the
movement had studied in seminaries in neighboring Pakistan and chose the name Taliban (plural
of talib, a student, in this case, of Islam) to distance themselves from the mujahideen.1 According
to the 9/11 Commission Report, Pakistan supported the Taliban because of the group’s potential
to “bring order in chaotic Afghanistan and make it a cooperative al y,” thus giving Pakistan
“greater security on one of the several borders where Pakistani military officers hoped for what
they cal ed ‘strategic depth.’”2 Taliban beliefs and practices were consonant with, and derived in
part from, the conservative tribal traditions of Pashtuns, who represent a plurality (though not a
majority) of Afghanistan’s complex ethnic makeup and who have traditional y ruled
Afghanistan.3
The Taliban viewed the post-Soviet occupation government of President Burhanuddin Rabbani as
weak, corrupt, and anti-Pashtun. The four years of civil war between the mujahideen groups
(1992-1996) resulted in popular support for the Taliban as they were seen as less corrupt and
more able to deliver stability; as Zalmay Khalilzad, later U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan and
Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation, wrote in his 2016 memoir, “I, like many,
was optimistic about the Taliban” at the outset.4 The Taliban took control of the southern city of
Kandahar in November 1994 and launched a series of armed campaigns throughout the country
that culminated in the capture of Kabul on September 27, 1996. The Taliban reportedly received
significant direct military support from Pakistan in their offensives.5
The Taliban quickly lost international and domestic support as the group imposed strict adherence
to its interpretation of Islam in areas it controlled and employed harsh punishments, including
public executions, to enforce its decrees, including bans on television, Western music, and
dancing. It prohibited women from attending school or general y working outside the home and

1 See Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (Yale University Press, 2000).
2 National Commission on T errorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the
National Com m ission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, (2004) p. 64.
3 Like T aliban founder Mullah Omar, most of the senior figures in the T aliban regime were Ghilzai Pashtuns, one of the
major Pashtun tribal confederations; most modern Afghan rulers have been from the Durrani Pashtun tribal
confederation.
4 Zalmay Khalilzad, The Envoy: From Kabul to the White House, My Journey Through a Turbulent World (St. Martin’s
Press, 2016), p. 84.
5 Crisis of Impunity: The Role of Pakistan, Russia, and Iran in Fueling the Civil War, Human Rights Watch, July 2001.
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Taliban Government in Afghanistan: Background and Issues for Congress

publicly executed women for al eged adultery. In March 2001, the Taliban drew international
condemnation by destroying monumental sixth-century Buddha statues carved into hil s above
the city of Bamiyan, which the Taliban considered idolatrous and contrary to Islamic norms.
The Taliban’s sheltering of Al Qaeda (AQ) leader Osama Bin Laden eventual y became the
central issue affecting international views of and relations with the Taliban. In 1996, Bin Laden
moved from Sudan to Afghanistan, where he had previously spent most of the 1980s as a high-
profile financier and organizer of efforts to aid the mujahideen.6 Bin Laden established an al iance
with the Taliban whereby he provided mil ions in financial aid to the group (and military support
for Taliban efforts to complete their conquest of the country) and the Taliban provided safe haven
for AQ recruits and training camps. Over 10,000 AQ fighters may have trained at AQ camps in
Afghanistan.7 U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Bil Richardson visited Kabul in April
1998, the highest-ranking U.S. official to do so in decades. In response to Richardson’s request
that the Taliban expel Bin Laden, the group “answered that they did not know his whereabouts. In
any case, the Taliban said, [Bin Laden] was not a threat to the United States.”8
In response to the August 1998 AQ bombings of U.S. embassies in Africa, the United States
launched cruise missile attacks on AQ targets in Afghanistan. They were unsuccessful in either
kil ing Bin Laden or persuading the Taliban to expel him. U.S. pressure on Saudi Arabia and
Pakistan (which, along with the United Arab Emirates, formal y recognized the Taliban
government) to use their influence to convince the Taliban to expel the AQ leader proved equal y
unsuccessful. The United States and United Nations imposed sanctions on the Taliban as wel (see
“Sanctions,” below). Taliban leadership was unmoved; their relationship with Bin Laden was
“sometimes tense” but “the foundation was deep and personal.”9
Fall and Beginnings of Insurgency: 2001-2014
On September 11, 2001, AQ operatives conducted a series of terrorist attacks in the United States
that kil ed nearly 3,000 people. In a nationwide address before a joint session of Congress on
September 20, 2001, President George W. Bush demanded that the Taliban hand over AQ leaders,
permanently close terrorist training camps, and give the United States access to such camps,
adding that the Taliban “must hand over the terrorists, or they wil share in their fate.”10 Taliban
leaders refused, citing Bin Laden’s status as their guest and what they characterized as a lack of
evidence of his involvement in the attacks.11
Pursuant to an authorization for the use of military force (AUMF) against the perpetrators of the
attack as wel as those who aided or harbored them (P.L. 107-40), U.S. military action in
Afghanistan began on October 7, 2001, with airstrikes on Taliban targets throughout the country
and close air support to anti-Taliban Afghan forces (known as the Northern Al iance). Limited
numbers of U.S. Army Special Forces, Central Intel igence Agency (CIA) paramilitary forces,

6 T he 9/11 Commission Report, p. 64.
7 Ibid,, pp. 66-67.
8 Ibid., p. 111.
9 Ibid., p. 125.
10 “T ext: President Bush Addresses the Nation,” Washington Post, September 20, 2001.
11 Steve Coll, Directorate S: The CIA and America’s Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Penguin Press, 2018),
pp. 69.
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and conventional ground forces began deploying in Afghanistan less than two weeks later.12 By
November 13, the Taliban evacuated Kabul, which U.S.-backed Afghan forces soon retook.
In late November 2001, the United Nations (U.N.) convened Afghan opposition leaders in Bonn,
Germany, to form a transitional government, even as Taliban forces were still fighting in their
final redoubt, Kandahar. The Taliban were not included in those talks, at which Afghan
opposition leaders selected Hamid Karzai as the interim leader of the country. Taliban leader
Mullah Mohammad Omar and others reportedly offered to recognize Karzai and surrender their
arms and Kandahar to Afghan opposition forces in December 2001, in exchange for being
allowed to return to their homes.13 At a December 6, 2001, press conference, Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld said an arrangement where Omar could live “in dignity” would not be
acceptable, and he cast doubt on the prospects for a negotiated settlement.14 Some Taliban leaders
were arrested and detained; others, like Omar, escaped to Pakistan, where many AQ leaders also
fled. Some observers assert that U.S. forces, lacking AQ targets to combat, focused on low -level
Taliban fighters “because they [were] there,” sometimes becoming involved in local disputes that
were unrelated to terrorism and contributing to the growth of the insurgency.15
U.S. officials declared an end to major combat operations in Afghanistan on May 1, 2003, though
Rumsfeld said that “pockets of resistance in certain parts of the country remain.”16 By 2005,
scattered Taliban forces had begun to regroup in southern and eastern Afghanistan, as well as in
Pakistan, where many observers suspected they were being tolerated by, if not receiving active
support from, Pakistan’s security and intel igence services.17 By 2006, Taliban forces were
reported to be clashing “daily” with U.S. and coalition forces and administering areas of southern
Afghanistan under their control.18 To combat the growing insurgency, U.S. troop levels in
Afghanistan were increased after 2006, supplemented by a comprehensive nation building effort.
By 2009, the Taliban had expanded their presence in the north, reaching areas far from the south
and east.19 While U.S. observers judged that the Taliban did not have significant popular support,
a combination of factors, including widespread Afghan government corruption and the Taliban’s
provision of some basic services (including justice) al owed it to make inroads in local
communities; it also extended its influence through intimidation.20 The group also adjusted its
tactics, focusing on coordinated assaults against remote outposts of U.S. and coalition forces, as
wel as use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs).21 In response, the United States increased its
counterinsurgency efforts, with President Obama announcing in 2009 an additional increase in

12 For more on the first year of U.S. operations in Afghanistan, see Walter L. Perry and David Kassing, “T oppling the
T aliban: Air-Ground Operations in Afghanistan, October 2001 -June 2002,” RAND Corporation, 2015.
13 “T aliban Agrees to Surrender Kandahar,” ABC News, December 6, 2001; Anand Gopal, No Good Men Among the
Living: Am erica, the Taliban, and the War Through Afghan Eyes (Metropolitan Books, 2014), p. 60.
14 Defense Department Briefing, C-SPAN, December 6, 2001.
15 Gopal, op. cit., 119-123; Steve Coll, Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America’s Secret Wars in Afghanistan and
Pakistan (Penguin Press, 2018), pp. 143-144.
16 “Rumsfeld: Major combat over in Afghanistan,” CNN, May 1, 2003.
17 See, for example, Matt Waldman, “T he Sun in the Sky: the Relationship between Pakistan’s ISI and Afghan
Insurgents,” Crisis States Discussion Papers, June 2010.
18 Carlotta Gall, “T aliban Surges as U.S. Shifts Some T asks to NAT O,” New York Times, June 11, 2006.
19 Carlotta Gall, “T aliban Open Nort hern Front in Afghanistan,” New York Times, November 26, 2009; “Stopping the
T aliban’s Momentum?” Carnegie Middle East Center, September 23, 2010.
20 Michael O’Hanlon, “Staying Power: T he U.S. Mission in Afghanistan Beyond 2011,” Brookings Institution, August
25, 2010.
21 Rob Evans, “Afghanistan war logs: How the IED became T aliban’s weapon of choice,” Guardian, July 25, 2010.
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U.S. military and development personnel and funding for Afghanistan, a “surge” of resources that
peaked with the deployment of nearly 100,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan in 2010 along with
other international forces.
The surge of international forces reduced Taliban control in the south and east, but did not
eliminate it.22 Afghan forces began assuming security responsibilities from international forces as
scheduled in mid-2011. These forces were weakened by high casualty and attrition rates and a
corrupt chain of command, and remained largely dependent on the United States for logistical and
tactical support. In contrast, the Taliban possessed a large and effective intel igence network, its
fighters remained highly motivated, and the group adopted a flexible range of tactical and
strategic approaches to expand their influence and combat U.S. and Afghan forces (such as
infiltrator or “green on blue” attacks).23 Successful Taliban operations often both sapped the
Afghan government’s own capabilities and undermined the Afghan public’s confidence in the
government and its security forces. As the surge of U.S. forces ended in September 2012, U.S.
officials expressed confidence that it “broke the Taliban’s momentum” as they continued to
transfer responsibility for security to Afghan forces.24
The Obama Administration came to assess that the conflict had no military solution and began
low-level negotiations with the Taliban as early as late 2010.25 The talks centered largely on
confidence-building measures, including the opening of a short-lived Taliban political office in
Doha, Qatar. The refusal of the Taliban to engage with the Afghan government, and the Afghan
government’s opposition to U.S. negotiations with the Taliban at which the government was not
represented, constrained and eventual y led to the dissolution of talks in 2014.
Road to Return: 2015-2021
Afghan forces official y assumed full responsibility for security nationwide at the beginning of
2015, though they were stil reliant on U.S. air power, training and logistical support to sustain
their operations.26 The year 2015 was a time of transition for the Taliban as wel : the group
admitted its founder Mullah Mohammad Omar had died in 2013 and announced Mullah Akhtar
Mansour as the group’s new leader, amid reports of contention among Taliban’s leaders about the
succession.27 Reported internal dissent did not have an apparent effect on the Taliban’s military
capabilities, with the group capturing the northern provincial capital of Kunduz for two weeks in
September-October 2015, their first seizure of a major urban area since 2001.
Mansour was kil ed in a U.S. drone strike in Pakistan in May 2016, and succeeded by Haibatullah
Akhundzada, a religious scholar seen by some analysts as “low-key” and “a potential unifier.”28

22 Seth Jones, “Beating Back the T aliban,” Foreign Policy, March 15, 2011.
23 Ben Brandt, “T he T aliban’s Conduct of Intelligence and Counterintelligence,” CTC Sentinel, June 2011; Alissa J.
Rubi, “T aliban Using Modern Means to Add to Sway,” New York Times, October 4, 2011; Rajiv Chandrasekaran,
“T aliban’s new strategy focuses more on high-profile assaults, less on territory,” Washington Post, September 18,
2012; Rod Nordland and Alissa Rubin, “T aliban Captives Dispute U.S. View on Afghanistan War,” New York Times,
February 1, 2012; “Afghanistan: Green on Blue Attacks Are Only a Small Part of the Problem,” CSIS, September 4,
2012.
24 “T ranscript: Obama’s Remarks On War In Afghanistan,” NPR, May 1, 2012.
25 Evan MacAskill et al., “White House shifts Afghanistan strategy towards talks with T aliban,” Guardian, July 19,
2010.
26 Statement by the President on Afghanistan, White House (Archives), May 27, 2014.
27 Barnett Rubin, “T urmoil in the T aliban,” New Yorker, July 31, 2015.
28 Mujib Mashal and T aimoor Shah, “T aliban’s New Leader, More Scholar T han Fighter, Is Slow to Impose Himself,”
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The Taliban again briefly seized Kunduz in 2016 as the group made gradual gains nationwide, as
reported in successive Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR)
quarterly reports to Congress. In July 2016, President Obama announced that he would maintain
8,400 U.S. forces in the country through the end of his Administration, a higher level than
planned, saying “Afghan forces are stil not as strong as they need to be.”29
Taliban Organizational Structure and Finances, pre-2021
The Taliban’s post-2001 insurgency was sustained in large part by a cohesive organizational structure and
continuous access to financial resources.
Since 2016, the Taliban has been led by Haibatul ah Akhundzada, who is referred to as emir of the group’s Islamic
Emirate and was supported by three deputies: Sirajuddin Haqqani (son of Haqqani Network founder Jalaluddin
Haqqani), Mohammad Yaqoob (son of Taliban founder Mul ah Omar), and Abdul Ghani Baradar. Al three have
prominent positions in the 2021 Taliban government. Yaqoob previously headed the group’s powerful Military
Commission, which appointed shadow governors and other officials for Afghanistan’s 34 provinces.30 Abdul Ghani
Baradar headed the Political Commission, based in Doha, Qatar, and led the Taliban’s talks with the United States
and regional diplomacy. Along with the Military and Political Commissions, the Taliban had 14 additional
commissions, including those for the judiciary, the media, health, agriculture, and antiquities.31
The emir, his deputies, and around 20 other individuals comprised a Leadership Council or Rahbari Shura, also
described as the Quetta Shura after the Pakistani city where some members and their families lived (the United
Nations described the Quetta Shura as “not a geographical term, but an analytical concept describing the most
senior group of Taliban leaders”).32 The Quetta Shura reportedly control ed Taliban forces and activities in
southern and western provinces; another group, known as the Peshawar Shura, was responsible for other
provinces, mostly in the east. The Miram Shah Shura was headed by and comprised almost entirely of Haqqani
Network fighters.
Since at least 2012, U.N. sanctions monitors assessed that the Taliban col ected over $100 mil ion a year in
revenues. Estimates of the Taliban’s revenues in the year before their August 2021 takeover vary widely, with
U.N. sanctions monitors citing a range of $300 mil ion to $1.6 bil ion in annual income, mostly from il egal mining,
opium poppy cultivation, taxation, and extortion. One expert disputes these figures, arguing that the vast majority
of Taliban revenues came from taxes on the trade of fuel and goods (79%) as opposed to il egal drugs (9%).33
The Taliban published an open letter addressed to President Trump in August 2017, urging him to
withdraw U.S. forces from Afghanistan, citing what it characterized as the weakness and
ineptitude of the Afghan government.34 Later that month, President Trump authorized an increase
in U.S. targeting authorities and force levels, though he conceded that a full withdrawal was his
“original instinct.”35 Within a year, President Trump was reportedly frustrated with the lack of
military progress against the Taliban, and he ordered formal and direct U.S.-Taliban talks without
Afghan government participation for the first time.36

New York Tim es, July 11, 2016.
29 T he White House, Statement by the President on Afghanistan, July 6, 2016.
30 Yaqoob was appointed to head the Military Commission in May 2021, displacing Ibrahim Sadr. Sadr has been seen
as close to Iran, and his absence in the original T aliban cabinet announced on September 7, 2021, reportedly
“unnerved” T ehran; he was later appointed acting deputy interior minister. Antonio Giustozzi, “Russia and Iran:
Disappointed Friends of the T aliban?” RUSI, September 30, 2021.
31 UN Report 2020/415.
32 UN Report 2021/486.
33 David Mansfield, “A T axing Narrative: Miscalculating Revenues and Misunderstanding the Conflict in
Afghanist an,” Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, October 2021.
34 Justin Rowlatt, “T aliban open letter to Trump urges Afghan withdrawal,” BBC, August 15, 2017.
35 Philip Rucker and Robert Costa, “'It’s a hard problem’: Inside T rump’s decision to send more troops to
Afghanistan,” Washington Post, August 21, 2017.
36 Mujib Mashal and Eric Schmitt, “White House Orders Direct T aliban T alks to Jump -Start Afghan Negotiations,”
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Those talks culminated in the February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement, in which the two sides
agreed to two “interconnected” commitments: the withdrawal of al U.S. and international forces
by May 2021, and unspecified Taliban action to prevent other groups (including Al Qaeda) from
using Afghan soil to threaten the United States and its al ies. The U.S. withdrawal commitment
was not explicitly conditioned on the Taliban reducing violence against the Afghan government,
making concessions in prospective intra-Afghan talks, or taking other actions.
The United States also committed to facilitating a prisoner exchange between the Taliban and the
Afghan government, whose mutual releases of 1,000 and 5,000 prisoners, respectively, began in
May 2020. France and Australia reportedly opposed the release of some specific Taliban prisoners
accused of attacks that kil ed French and Australian nationals.37 Before the prisoner release
concluded, some media reports indicated that released Taliban fighters were returning or intended
to return to the battlefield, with one June 2020 report citing a Taliban commander as saying that
released fighters would be redeployed.38 Some Taliban prisoners released in 2020 reportedly
played roles in the military offensives that led to the Taliban’s August 2021 takeover.39 The
Afghan government concluded its controversial and sometimes contentious release of 5,000
Taliban prisoners in September 2020, after which the first direct talks between the Taliban and
Afghan government began.40 Those negotiations were halting and did not make evident progress.
In the months after the agreement, Secretary of Defense Mark Esper asserted that the Taliban
were not fulfil ing their commitments under the accord, especial y with regard to Al Qaeda.41 U.S.
officials also described increased Taliban violence as “not consistent” with the agreement.42
Although no provisions in the publicly available agreement address Taliban attacks on U.S. or
Afghan forces, the Taliban, in non-public annexes accompanying the accord, reportedly
committed not to attack U.S. forces.43 No U.S. forces were reportedly kil ed in Afghanistan by
Taliban forces after February 2020. Casualties among Afghan military forces and civilians
remained high as the Taliban continued a “two-track strategy” of fighting while remaining at the
negotiating table.44
The United States had been withdrawing forces before the February 2020 agreement and
continued to do so afterwards, reaching a low of 2,500 by the time President Trump left office in
January 2021.45 After an Administration review of U.S. policy in Afghanistan, President Biden
announced on April 14, 2021, that while the U.S.-Taliban agreement was “perhaps not what I
would have negotiated myself,” the United States would keep to it by beginning a “final
withdrawal” on May 1, to be completed by September 11, 2021.46 He later said the U.S. military

New York Tim es, July 15, 2018.
37 “Australia, France Object to Afghan Release of Some T aliban Detainees,” Radio Azadi, August 17, 2020.
38 “Freed T aliban prisoners eye return to the battlefield,” France24, June 10, 2020.
39 Alan Cullison and Saeed Shah, “T aliban Commander Who Led Attack on Afghan City Was Released From Prison
Last Year, Officials Say,” Wall Street Journal, August 3, 2021.
40 Mujib Mashal and Fatima Faizi, “Afghanistan to Release Last T aliban Prisoners, Removing Last Hurdle to T alks,”
New York Tim es, September 3, 2020.
41 “T aliban not living up to its commitments, U.S. Defense Secretary says,” Reuters, May 5, 2020.
42 “Violence ‘Not Consistent’ with US-T aliban Deal: US Envoy,” TOLOnews, October 13, 2020.
43 “Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on the Defense Budget Posture,” CQ, March 4, 2020.
44 Marvin Weinbaum, “T he T aliban’s two-track strategy,” Middle East Institute, June 8, 2020.
45 T homas Gibbons-Neff et al., “U.S. Is Quietly Reducing Its T roop Force in Afghanistan,” New York Times, October
21, 2019.
46 White House, “Remarks by President Biden on the Way Forward in Afghanistan,” April 14, 2021.
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mission would conclude on August 31. The Taliban accused the United States of breaching the
agreement with the extension, but continued to refrain from attacking U.S. forces.47
Summer 2021 Taliban Takeover
Throughout 2021, Afghan officials sought to downplay the potential detrimental impact of the
U.S. troop withdrawal while emphasizing the need for continued U.S. financial assistance to
Afghan forces.48 In a May 2021 press conference, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General
Mark Mil ey said “bad outcomes” were not “inevitable,” given what he characterized as the
strengths of the Afghan government and military.49 In its 2021 annual threat assessment, the
Office of the Director of National Intel igence reported that “the Afghan Government wil
struggle to hold the Taliban at bay if the Coalition withdraws support.”50
An external assessment published in January 2021 concluded that the Taliban enjoyed a strong
advantage over the Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) in cohesion and
a slight advantage in force employment and that the two forces essential y split on material
resources and external support.51 The one ANDSF advantage—force size—was assessed as much
narrower than often assumed. The author concluded in his net assessment that the Taliban enjoyed
a narrow advantage over the government. The Taliban had also come to control significant
territory: in October 2018, the last time the U.S. government made such data publicly available,
the group controlled or contested as much as 40% of Afghanistan and the group continued to
make gradual gains in subsequent years.
In early May 2021, the Taliban began a sweeping advance that captured wide swaths of the
country’s rural areas, solidifying the group’s hold on some areas in which it already had a
significant presence. The Taliban’s seizure of other districts was more surprising: some northern
areas had militarily resisted the Taliban when the group was in power in the 1990s, making their
2021 fal to the Taliban particularly significant. One source estimated that the Taliban took
control of over 100 of Afghanistan’s 400 districts in May and June 2021.52 The speed of the
Taliban’s advance reportedly surprised some within the group, with one commander saying that
his forces were intentional y avoiding capturing provincial capitals before the departure of U.S.
forces.53 In July, the Taliban began seizing border crossings with Tajikistan, Iran, and Pakistan.
On July 21, 2021, General Mil ey estimated that the Taliban controlled over 200 districts, but
emphasized that the Taliban had not seized any provincial capitals, where Afghan forces had been
consolidated.54

47 “Statement of Islamic Emirate regarding recent announcement by US President Joe Biden,” Voice of Jihad, April 15,
2021.
48 Zahra Rahimi, “ANDSF Showcases Air Force as Country Braces for US Pullout,” TOLOnews, April 26, 2021.
49 T ranscript: Secretary of Defense Austin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Milley Press Briefing,
Department of Defense, May 6, 2021.
50 Annual T hreat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, Office of the Directo r of National Intelligence, April
19, 2021.
51 Jonathan Schroden, “Afghanistan Security Forces Versus the T aliban: A Net Assessment,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 14,
Issue 1, January 2021.
52 Kate Clark and Obaid Ali, “A Quarter of Afghanistan’s Districts Fall to th e T aleban amid Calls for a ‘Second
Resistance,’” Afghanistan Analysts Network, July 2, 2021.
53 Dan De Luce, Mushtaq Yusufzai, and Saphora Smith, “Even the T aliban are surprised at how fast they’re advancing
in Afghanistan,” NBC News, June 25, 2021.
54 Secretary of Defense Austin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Milley Press Briefing, U.S. Department
of Defense, July 21, 2021.
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On August 6, 2021, the Taliban captured the provincial capital of Zaranj. The Taliban’s capture of
half of Afghanistan’s provincial capitals in the following week shocked many observers and,
reportedly, U.S. officials.55 By August 13, U.S. officials were reportedly concerned that the
Taliban could move on Kabul within days. With the fal of Jalalabad in the east and Mazar-e-
Sharif in the north, the Taliban captured the last major cities and eliminated the final outposts of
organized Afghan government resistance. On the morning of August 15, 2021, the Taliban began
entering Kabul, completing their effective takeover of the country. The central province of
Panjshir, where some former Afghan leaders attempted to establish an armed resistance to the
Taliban (see more below), was reportedly captured by Taliban forces in September 2021.56
While the Taliban faced stiff, if ultimately unsuccessful, resistance from government forces in
some areas, some provincial capitals and other areas were taken with minimal fighting.57 In many
of these areas, the Taliban reportedly secured the departure of government forces (and the
handover of their weapons) through payments or through the mediation of local elders seeking to
avoid bloodshed.58
Seizure of U.S.-supplied Military Materiel
In taking over Afghanistan, the Taliban came into possession of a large amount of equipment
supplied by the United States to the former Afghan government. The value of such equipment in
both financial and strategic terms is a matter of some dispute among observers and
policymakers.59 Stil , newly acquired equipment (see below) provides the Taliban with some
additional capabilities, as wel as material for propaganda.
The Taliban had reportedly captured smal er amounts of U.S.-supplied equipment from Afghan
forces long before August 2021; one 2018 media report, citing military statistics, stated that U.S.
airstrikes had destroyed “about 40” U.S.-supplied Humvees captured by the Taliban “so as not to
al ow the enemy an advantage,” in the words of a military spokesperson.60 The Taliban reportedly
have for years been able to buy some types of equipment from Afghan forces. Special Inspector
General for Afghanistan Reconstruction John Sopko said in a January 2017 speech that, “There is
also evidence that the Taliban have instructed their field commanders to simply purchase U.S.
supplied weapons, fuel, and ammunition from Afghan soldiers because to do so is both easier and
less expensive for the insurgents.”61
Determining the total amount of U.S.-supplied equipment captured by the Taliban in August 2021
is difficult. First, a comprehensive public reporting of al equipment transferred to Afghan forces
does not exist. Some U.S. government entities have published data on equipment transferred to
Afghan forces, but that data is time-limited and incomplete. For example, in a 2017 report
requested in the FY2017 House National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the Government

55 Zeke Miller et al., “Biden team surprised by rapid T aliban gains in Afghanistan,” Associated Press, August 15, 2021.
56 “Afghanistan crisis: T aliban kill civilians in resistance stronghold,” BBC, September 13, 2021.
57 “Afghanistan: T aliban continue attacks on three major cities,” BBC, August 1, 2021.
58 Susannah George, “Afghanistan’s military collapse: Illicit deals and mass desertions,” Washington Post, August 15,
2021.
59 Glenn Kessler, “No, the T aliban did not seize $85 billion of U.S. weapons,” Washington Post, August 31, 2021.
60 Jim Michaels, “U.S. gives Humvees to Afghan army, then blows them up when they fall into T aliban hands,” USA
Today, June 6, 2018. See also, for example, Richard Engel et al., “ T aliban parade new weapons seized from Afghan
military as U.S. withdraws,” NBC News, July 6, 2021.
61 Prepared Remarks of John F. Sopko, “Afghanistan Reconstruction: Enduring Challenges for the New Administration
and Congress,” SIGAR, January 11, 2017.
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Accountability Office (GAO) estimated that through FY2016 the United States had funded the
transfer to Afghan forces of:
 over 75,000 vehicles (including 22,000 Humvees and nearly 200 armored
personnel carriers);
 nearly 600,000 weapons (including 485,000 rifles and pistols; 64,000 machine
guns; and 25,000 grenade launchers);
 over 16,000 night vision devices; and
 208 aircraft (including 110 helicopters, 60 transport/cargo airplanes, and 20 light
attack airplanes).
However, that report “did not assess the extent to which key equipment has been distributed to the
ANDSF or is in use.”62 SIGAR has in recent years published lists of the ten highest-cost items of
equipment delivered to the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police by quarter, which
likely accounts for much, but not al , of the value of U.S. equipment transferred to the ANDSF
during those periods. At least some equipment provided over the past twenty years was destroyed
in combat or otherwise rendered inoperable. Such calculations are further complicated by some
Afghan forces’ removal of their equipment out of the country in August 2021. For instance,
Afghan pilots reportedly flew 46 aircraft to Uzbekistan on August 15; others to Tajikistan.63
Additional Afghan forces fled to Iran in their U.S.-supplied vehicles.64
Former President Trump said in an August 30, 2021, statement that the United States should
demand the return of al materiel supplied to the former Afghan government, which he asserted
totaled $85 bil ion.65 The origin of that figure is unclear; it may be derived from the total amount
of U.S. reconstruction funding to support security ($88.6 bil ion, per the July 2021 SIGAR
quarterly report to Congress) or the cumulative amount of appropriations for the Afghanistan
Security Forces Fund or ASFF ($82.9 bil ion). Those funding categories supported a number of
purchases and activities, including contracted support, training, salaries, ammunition, and fuel for
Afghan forces. According to SIGAR, just under 25% of the nearly $75 bil ion in total ASFF
disbursements were for equipment and transportation.66
While smal arms and some vehicles are readily usable by Taliban forces (and already have been
used), it is unclear to what extent the group can utilize larger platforms, such as aircraft.
Sustainment of such platforms is a known chal enge. Afghan forces relied on contracted logistics
support for maintenance on al air platforms (for some platforms, such as the C-130 and UH-60A
Blackhawk, contractors performed 100% of maintenance).67 The Taliban may seek similar
logistical support from non-U.S. sources.68 Some argue Taliban forces have used captured U.S.-
supplied equipment to project authority since their 2021 takeover.69 In September 2021, the

62 “Afghanistan Security: U.S.-Funded Equipment for the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces,” U.S.
Government Accountability Office, August 10, 2017.
63 Abraham Mahshie, “25% of Afghan Air Force Fled, Remainder in Disarray, Sources Say,” Air Force Magazine,
August 19, 2021.
64 “Video: Afghan military flee near Iran border prior to T aliban push,” Al Arabiya News, August 14, 2021.
65 Joseph Coi, “T rump: US should take military action if T aliban don’t return billions in equipment,” The Hill, August
30, 2021.
66 Letter available at https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/spotlight/2021-09-10-CBM-SFL-Comer-Grothman-to-Sopko-SIGAR-
re-Follow-up-Reports.pdf.
67 1225 Report.
68 Jonathan Schroden, “Five Myths About the T aliban’s New Arsenal,” Lawfare, September 1, 2021.
69 Alex Horton, “T aliban show off U.S.-made weapons and gear in a bid to intimidate, project authority,” Washington
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Chairwoman and Ranking Member of the Committee on Oversight and Reform wrote to SIGAR
requesting examination of, among other topics, the “extent to which the Taliban have access
to...U.S.-funded equipment and defense articles previously provided to the government of
Afghanistan and the ANDSF, and any mechanisms the U.S. government is using to recoup,
recapture, or secure this funding and equipment.”70
Taliban Government
On September 7, 2021, longtime Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid made his first official
appearance in public. He announced the names of 33 individuals who were described as “acting”
ministers that fil a “caretaker cabinet” to administer the country. The Taliban refer to this
government, as they have for decades referred to themselves, as the Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan. It is unclear by whom and why these individuals might be replaced going forward or
in what sense these “caretaker” positions differ from permanent positions. The Taliban’s
government in the 1990s reportedly was also “nominal y interim.”71 The Taliban reportedly intend
to “implement” the 1964 constitution of the former Afghan monarchy “without any content that
contradicts Islamic law and the principles of the Islamic Emirate,” leaving unanswered larger
questions about how the group intends to deal with the 2004 constitution, Afghanistan’s
parliament, and other elements of the post-2001 political system.72
Taliban leader Haibatullah Akhundzada (of whom one verified photograph exists and who has
never made an official public appearance) is to hold supreme power as the group’s emir.
Mohammad Hassan Akhund, who served as governor of Kandahar and foreign minister in the
1990s Taliban government, is the Acting Prime Minister. One analyst describes Akhund as
“relatively weak,” an “uncontroversial” figure whose selection forestal s competition among
more powerful figures and factions within the Taliban.73 Abdul Ghani Baradar, who led
negotiations with the United States, is the Acting Deputy Prime Minister. Baradar released an
audio recording on September 13, 2021, denying rumors of his death or injury in a brawl with
other Taliban figures; the BBC reported on September 15, 2021, that Baradar had gone to
Kandahar after a heated disagreement with Haqqani figures (see below) over whether the
Taliban’s political or military wings deserve credit for the group’s takeover.74
Nearly al members of the “caretaker cabinet” are former Taliban officials or longtime loyalists.
Al are male, and the vast majority are ethnic Pashtuns, mostly from southern Afghanistan. Over
half were, and remain, designated for U.S. and/or U.N. sanctions, including the Acting Interior
Minister, Sirajuddin Haqqani. The U.S. Department of State has for years offered a reward of up
to $10 mil ion for information leading to the arrest of Haqqani, who is the head of the Haqqani
Network, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). Some argue the role of

Post, August 25, 2021.
70 Letter available at https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/2021 -09-
10.CBM%20SFL%20Comer%20Grothman%20to%20Sopko-SIGAR%20re%20Follow-up%20Reports.pdf.
71 “Who Will Run the T aliban Government?” International Crisis Group, September 9, 2021.
72 S. K. Khan, “T aliban to implement monarch-era Constitution in Afghanistan,” Anadolu Ajansi, September 28, 2021;
Ziar Khan Yaad, “Fate of Afghanistan’s National Assembly Unclear,” TOLOnews, September 14, 2021.
73 Martine van Bijlert, “T he Focus of the T aleban’s New Government: Internal cohesion, external dominance,”
Afghanistan Analysts Network, September 12, 2021.
74 Khudai Noor Nasar, “Afghanistan: T aliban leaders in bust-up at presidential palace, sources say,” BBC, September
15, 2021.
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Haqqani Network-associated figures in the Taliban caretaker government is a reflection of their
outsized military import, and could make U.S. cooperation with the Taliban more difficult.75
Figure 1. Selected Taliban Cabinet Members

Source: Created by CRS. Photographs and information from media sources; Office of Foreign Assets Control
(OFAC) and U.N. sanctions (1988 Committee) databases.
Some had speculated that the Taliban might reach out to former Afghan government officials
(such as former President Hamid Karzai, who held some meetings with senior Taliban figures
after the August 2021 takeover) or to others from outside the movement as part of their promise
to establish an “inclusive government.” Additional lists of acting deputy ministers and other

75 Stephanie Findlay, “Haqqani network’s clever game culminates with Afghan government roles,” Financial Times,
September 10, 2021.
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officials announced by the Taliban on September 21 and October 4 include some members of
some minorities (including one Hazara) but are predominantly Pashtun.76
The makeup of the Taliban’s government indicates that the group has prioritized internal cohesion
over reaching out to other parts of Afghan society.77 This approach may secure Taliban rule in the
short term. Reports indicate continued dissension in the Taliban ranks, largely between the
group’s political wing (which advocates for greater inclusion of diverse elements from within
Afghan society, with an eye toward international recognition) and its military wing (which
opposes such compromises).78 Others express skepticism that the group is at risk of fracturing.79
Even if the Taliban succeed in preventing factional infighting, their exclusive approach to
governing may carry its own risks of inspiring opposition or insurgency against its rule.
Current and Potential Opposition
While the Taliban’s August 2021 takeover was swift, it happened not because the Taliban had
massive popular support but because the former government evidently had so little.80 The
Afghanistan that the Taliban wil govern in 2021 is different in economic, political, and social
terms from the country the group ruled two decades ago. Some elements of Afghan society,
particularly in urban areas, view the Taliban with skepticism, fear, or hostility. One initial attempt
to form an armed resistance to the Taliban was short-lived and evidently collapsed. Nonviolent
protests against the group’s rule, and the Taliban’s uncompromising response to them, indicate a
potential for future unrest.
On August 17, 2021, two days after the Taliban entered Kabul, former First Vice President
Amrullah Saleh claimed on Twitter to be the “legitimate care taker [sic] President” and to be
“reaching out to al leaders to secure their support & consensus.”81 Saleh had previously vowed to
never submit to Taliban rule and cal ed on Afghans to join him in resisting the group. He
relocated to the central province of Panjshir, whose strategic location and historic legacy (it was
never occupied by the Soviets in the 1980s or the Taliban in the 1990s) give it outsized import.
He was joined by Ahmad Massoud, the son of the late Northern Al iance commander Ahmad
Shah Massoud. They stated that they formed an armed resistance to the Taliban and appealed for
U.S. and international support.82
The Taliban claim to have taken control of the province as of early September, amid reports of
continued sporadic fighting and Taliban kil ings of civilians.83 Competing claims of control are

76 For the full list of 88 individuals, see Martine van Bijlert, “T he T aleban’s caretaker Cabinet and other senior
appointments,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, October 7, 2021.
77 “Who Will Run the T aliban Government?” op. cit.
78 Ali Latifi, “How deep are divisions among the T aliban?” Al Jazeera, September 23, 2021.
79 Michael Kugelman, “Opinion: How real is the threat of T aliban infighting?” Deutsche Welle, September 21, 2021.
80 “How the T aliban engineered ‘political collapse’ of Afghanistan,” Reuters, August 17, 2021; Shadi Hamid,
“Americans never understood Afghanistan like the T aliban did,” Brookings Institution, August 23, 2021.
81 Amrullah Saleh, T witter, August 17, 2021, 9:59AM, https://twitter.com/AmrullahSaleh2/status/
1427631191545589772. Section 60 of the Afghan constitution provides that the first Vice President “ shall act in
accordance with the provisions of this Constitution” in the event of the president’s “absence, resignation or death.”
Section 67 of the Afghan constitution provides that the first Vice President shall assume the responsibilities of
president in the case of the president’s resignation, impeachment, or death; the president is to “personally tender” his
resignation to the National Assembly.
82 Ahmad Massoud, “Opinion: T he mujahideen resistance to the T aliban begins now. But we need help,” Washington
Post, August 18, 2021.
83 Natasha T urak, “Fighting continues in Afghanistan’s Panjshir Valley as anti-T aliban resistance vows to hold out,”
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difficult to assess,84 but in a September 14, 2021, visit to Panjshir, New York Times reporters
found few indications of active resistance or recent heavy combat.85 Some reports indicate that
Saleh and Massoud have relocated to Tajikistan.86 Saleh and Massoud are ethnic Tajiks
(Afghanistan’s second largest ethnic group after Pashtuns), and Tajikistan has taken a notably
hard stance against the Taliban.87 On September 22, 2021, Representative Mike Waltz and Senator
Lindsey Graham stated they had spoken with Massoud, who expressed “his continued
commitment to resisting” the Taliban, and they cal ed on the Biden Administration not to
recognize the Taliban as Afghanistan’s government.88
With the taking of Panjshir, the Taliban appear to effectively control the entire country, unlike in
the 1990s when the former Northern Al iance represented significant armed opposition and held
around 10% of the country’s territory. The Taliban also have stronger ties with regional powers,
including some that once supported the Northern Al iance against the Taliban. Stil , the existence
of resistance factions, in Panjshir or elsewhere, could serve as a ral ying point or galvanize
Taliban opponents nationwide, who might then make additional appeals for U.S. or other
international assistance. It is not clear how likely this prospect is.
Some Afghans in other parts of the country have demonstrated nonviolently to advocate for their
rights and express opposition to the Taliban. Protests by hundreds of women in Kabul gained
significant international attention, but some Afghans demonstrated in Jalalabad, Kandahar, and
other cities as wel to protest Taliban actions.89 The Taliban carefully monitored most protests,
and violently dispersed some. The Taliban-led Interior Ministry issued a decree on September 8,
2021, banning unapproved demonstrations and few appear to have taken place since. U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights Michel e Bachelet said on September 13 that Taliban forces had
used “increasing violence against protesters and journalists.”90 The Taliban have publicized
demonstrations in favor of Taliban rule in which some women were reportedly coerced to
participate.91 As noted above, the Taliban’s exclusive rule and heavy-handed approach to dissent
could create greater opposition throughout the country. At the same time, this approach could also
solidify their position, at least in the short term, by suppressing active expressions of resistance.
Impacts of the Taliban’s Return to Power
The Taliban’s August 2021 takeover has implications for a number of U.S. policy interests. It may
create opportunities and chal enges for the various terrorist groups that have a presence in
Afghanistan, and complicates (if not renders obsolete) U.S. plans to partner with Afghan

CNBC, September 7, 2021.
84 Michael Kugelman, “Avalanche of Misinformation Follows T aliban T akeover,” Foreign Policy, September 9, 2021.
85 Jim Huylebroek and Victor Blue, “In Panjshir, Few Signs of an Active Resistance, or Any Fight at all,” New York
Tim es, September 17, 2021.
86 T revor Filseth, “After Renegade Province’s Fall, Panjshir Resistance Leaders Surface in T ajikistan,” National
Interest, September 23, 2021.
87 Bruce Pannier, “T ajikistan: T he T aliban’s T oughest Critic,” Gandhara, September 13, 2021.
88 “Waltz, Graham Joint Statement on Call with Afghan Resistance Leader Ahmad Massoud,” Office of Mike Waltz,
September 22, 2021.
89 Susannah George and Ezzatullah Mehrdad, “Space for dissent opened in Afghanistan after the T aliban was ousted 20
years ago. Now the militants are trying to slam it shut,” Washington Post, September 12, 2021; Ali Latifi, “Deadly
protest in Jalalabad against removal of Afghan flag,” Al Jazeera, August 18, 2021; “T housands protest against T aliban
in Kandahar over evictions,” Reuters, September 14, 2021.
90 “Oral update on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan” 48 th Session of the Human Rights Council, September
13, 2021.
91 “Were Afghan women forced to attend the pro-Taliban rally?” TRT World, September 15, 2021.
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authorities to counter terrorist threats “over-the-horizon.” Advancing protection of women’s and
other human rights has been another major U.S. policy goal in Afghanistan since 2001; those
rights appear at risk with the Taliban back in power. Final y, the Taliban’s takeover represents a
shock to regional diplomatic and security dynamics, with neighboring and other countries
responding in a variety of ways to the group’s new position.
Relations with Terrorist Groups
For decades, a variety of Islamist extremist terrorist groups have operated in Afghanistan, and the
Taliban have related to them in differing ways. Al Qaeda and the regional Islamic State affiliate
(Islamic State-Khorasan Province, ISKP, also known as ISIS-K) are two of the most significant of
these terrorist groups, and the Taliban’s takeover is likely to affect them in different ways. The
Taliban’s relationship with Al Qaeda is the subject of strong analytical interest amid concerns of
sustained ties and continued debates about AQ capabilities. In contrast, the Taliban and ISKP are
adversaries; escalating ISKP attacks in 2021 represent a threat to the Taliban’s rule. The Taliban
takeover also has implications for Pakistani groups, most notably the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan
(TTP, or Pakistani Taliban).
Al Qaeda92
Al Qaeda senior (or “core”) leaders reportedly remain in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area,
but estimates of how the Taliban takeover is likely to affect the group’s capabilities differ.
U.S. officials reportedly told some Senators in August 2021 “terror groups like al-Qaida may be
able to grow much faster than expected” in Afghanistan in the wake of the Taliban takeover.93
U.S. intel igence officials also reportedly said in September 2021 that their “current assessment”
is that Al Qaeda could “build some capability to at least threaten the homeland” in one to two
years.94 They additional y said that the United States presently faces greater terrorism threats from
elsewhere, including Somalia, Syria, and Iraq.95 Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Colin
Kahl said in October 2021 testimony that Al Qaeda had the intent, but not the capability, to
conduct external operations, but that it could reconstitute that capability in “a year or two.”96
Some analysts argue Al Qaeda is unlikely to resurge in Afghanistan given two decades of U.S.
counterterrorism pressure, the existence of other safe havens around the world, and potential
Taliban constraints.97
Despite (or perhaps because of) U.S. counterterrorism pressure, AQ ties with the Taliban, which
go back to the 1990s, appear to have remained strong. In June 2021, U.N. sanctions monitors
reported Al Qaeda had “minimized overt communications with Taliban leadership in an effort to

92 See also CRS In Focus IF11854, Al Qaeda: Background, Current Status, and U.S. Policy.
93 Michael Balsamo, et al., “Concerns over US T error T hreat Rising as T aliban hold Grows,” Associated Press, August
15, 2021.
94 Julian Barnes, “Al Qaeda Could Rebuilt in Afghanistan in a Year or T wo, U.S. Officials Say,” New York Times,
September 14, 2021.
95 Barnes, op. cit., Courtney McBride and Warren Strobel, “U.S. Spies See Signs of Al Qaeda Fighters Returning to
Afghanistan,” Wall Street Journal, September 14, 2021.
96 “Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on Afghanistan, South and Central Asia Security,” CQ
Congressional Transcripts, October 26, 2021.
97 Ahmad Siddiqi, “T he West is getting Afghanistan wrong – again,” Al Jazeera, September 12, 2021; Daniel Byman,
“Will Afghanistan Become a T errorist Safe Haven Again?” Foreign Affairs, August 18, 2021.
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‘lay low’ and not jeopardize the Taliban’s diplomatic position.”98 In its report on the final quarter
of 2020, the Department of Defense (DOD) Office of the Inspector General relayed an assessment
from the Defense Intel igence Agency (DIA) that the Taliban maintain ties to Al Qaeda and that
some AQ members were “integrated into the Taliban’s forces and command structure.”99
According to the U.N. sanctions monitors’ report, AQ-Taliban ties have been reinforced by the
groups’ shared struggle in Afghanistan and personal bonds, including marriage links.100
For their part, Taliban spokespeople continue to claim “there was no proof [Bin Laden] was
involved” in the September 11, 2001, attacks.101 One of those spokespeople said in September
2021, “We do not see anyone in Afghanistan who has anything to do with Al Qaeda” and
reiterated the Taliban’s commitment that “from Afghanistan, there wil not be any danger to any
country.”102
One analyst argues that while some parts of the Taliban oppose the group’s ties with Al Qaeda,
citing the costs of the relationship in terms of the Taliban’s international image and U.S. pressure,
shared ideology links the two groups to such an extent that a full breach between them is unlikely.
While the Taliban do not have transnational aims like Al Qaeda does, that analyst argues that Al
Qaeda “sees the Afghan Taliban as an important partner in its stewardship of global jihad,” as
evidenced by the al egiance AQ leaders have pledged to successive Taliban leaders.103 Another
analyst has suggested that the Taliban may “provide space and financial support” for Al Qaeda
“while also restricting the activities of the group to plot and stage attacks.”104 The power dynamic
between Al Qaeda and the Taliban has changed significantly over the past 20 years: AQ financial
and military support was critical in bolstering the Taliban before 2001, but AQ seems to have
played little if any direct role in the Taliban’s 2021 return to power.
The Islamic State
The Islamic State affiliate in Afghanistan (ISKP, also known as ISIS-K), on the other hand, has
opposed the Taliban since its 2015 establishment and the two groups have often clashed. ISKP
(with 1,500-2,200 fighters, per U.N. sanctions monitors) views the Taliban’s Afghanistan-focused
nationalist political project as counter to its own universalist vision of a global caliphate. The
Taliban’s takeover could represent a setback for ISKP; Taliban forces reportedly executed an
imprisoned former ISKP leader after the Taliban captured an Afghan government prison in
Kabul.105
If the Taliban makes compromises on certain issues as the group begins governing, these steps
could prompt hardliners to defect to ISKP; some Taliban fighters have associated themselves with
ISKP in the past. The United States previously launched airstrikes in support of Taliban

98 U.N. Document S/2021/486.
99 Operation Freedom’s Sentinel: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, October 1, 2020 -
Decem ber 31, 2020, released February 17, 2021.
100 U.N. Document S/2021/486.
101 Rachel Pannett, “Taliban Spokesman Says ‘no proof’ Bin Laden was Responsible for 9/11 attacks,” Washington
Post, August 26, 2021.
102 “T aliban say no al Qaeda or ISIS in Afghanistan,” Reuters, September 21, 2021.
103 Asfandyar Mir, “Untying the Gordian Knot: Why the T aliban Is Unlikely to Break T ies with Al-Qaeda,” Modern
War Institute at West Point, August 10, 2021.
104 Cole Bunzel, “Al Qaeda Versus ISIS,” Foreign Affairs, September 14, 2021.
105 Yaroslav T rifimov et al., “T aliban Consolidate Control in Afghanistan’s Capital as T housands Remain Stranded,”
Wall Street Journal, August 17, 2021.
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offensives against ISKP, a rare area of prior U.S.-Taliban cooperation.106 At a September 1, 2021,
press conference, when asked about the possibility of future U.S. coordination with the Taliban
against ISKP, General Mil ey said, “It’s possible.”107 A Taliban spokesperson reportedly rejected
such cooperation in October 2021, saying, “We are able to tackle [ISKP] independently.”108
ISKP was “nearly eradicated” from its main base in eastern Afghanistan in late 2019 by U.S. and
Afghan military offensives and, separately, the Taliban, but the group’s operational capabilities
appear to remain strong.109 On August 26, 2021, ISKP carried out an attack at Kabul International
Airport that left 13 U.S. service members and more than 150 Afghans dead. The group has also
claimed responsibility for numerous attacks against Taliban forces in the eastern city of Jalalabad,
as wel as the October 2021 suicide bombing of a Shia mosque in the northern city of Kunduz that
left approximately one hundred people dead. Continuous ISKP attacks undermine the Taliban’s
effort to demonstrate its ability to govern and secure the country.110 Another October 2021 ISKP
bombing, in this case of the largest Shia mosque in the southern city of Kandahar, where the
Taliban movement was born and where no known ISKP attacks had previously taken place,
represents a particularly brazen chal enge to the Taliban. Experts disagree about the potency of
the ISKP threat and the Taliban’s self-asserted ability to counter the group without external
assistance.111 Some Afghans, including former members of the ANDSF, have reportedly taken up
arms with ISKP, attracted by ISKP cash payments and the group’s status as the sole active armed
opposition to the Taliban.112
TTP (Pakistani Taliban)
The TTP is an umbrel a organization for a number of Pakistan-based extremist groups that came
into conflict with the government of Pakistan after 2007. It began to splinter following the 2013
death of leader Hakimullah Mehsud. In 2014, some TTP members pledged al egiance to the
Islamic State and subsequently relocated to eastern Afghanistan in response to Pakistani army
operations that mostly drove the group from its safe havens in the former Federal y Administered
Tribal Areas (FATA). Continued military pressure (Mehsud’s successor was kil ed by a U.S.
drone strike in Afghanistan’s Kunar province in 2018) greatly reduced the group’s activity in
subsequent years. However, reunification between TTP and some former splinter groups (possibly
facilitated by AQ) since 2020 has swel ed the group's ranks to between 2,500 and 6,000, per U.N.
sanctions monitors.113 The TTP may benefit further from the Taliban takeover and the subsequent
release of TTP prisoners in Afghanistan.
While they share some ideological similarities (indicated by their common name) and have
fought alongside each other in Afghanistan, the TTP and the Taliban are separate organizations:

106 Wesley Morgan, “Our secret T aliban Air Force,” Washington Post, October 22, 2020.
107 Secretary of Defense Austin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Milley Press Briefing on the End of the
U.S. War in Afghanistan, Department of Defense, September 1, 2021.
108 Kathy Gannon, “T aliban say they won’t work with US to contain Islamic State,” Associated Press, October 9, 2021.
109 UN Report 2020/415.
110 Sami Yousafzai and T ucker Reals, “ISIS-K is trying to undermine Afghanistan’s T aliban regime, from inside and
out. T hat’s America’s problem too,” CBS News, October 8, 2021.
111 Samya Kullab, “Islamic State attacks test T aliban’s control in Afghanistan,” Christian Science Monitor, October 13,
2021; Amira Jadoon and Andrew Mines, “T he T aliban can’t take on the Islamic State alone,” War on the Rocks,
October 14, 2021.
112 Yaroslav T rofimov, “Left Behind After U.S. Withdrawal, Some Former Afghan Spies and Soldiers T urn to Islamic
State,” Wall Street Journal, October 31, 2021.
113 U.N. document S/2021/486.
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the TTP has “distinctive anti-Pakistan objectives” and the Taliban is focused on Afghanistan.114
However, both are largely made up of, and derive support from, ethnic Pashtuns, a group that
spans the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. The Taliban’s takeover in Afghanistan could serve
as a model for TTP, which one analyst argues is shifting its focus from transnational jihad to
Pashtun-focused “ethno-separatism.”115 TTP attacks against Pakistani security forces have risen in
2021; Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan said in October 2021 that his government was in
negotiations with components of the TTP, reportedly brokered by the Afghan Taliban.116
“Over-the-horizon” Counterterrorism Strategy and Challenges
From the outset of the U.S. withdrawal, U.S. officials said that the United States would maintain
the ability to combat terrorist threats in Afghanistan without a military presence on the ground
there by utilizing assets based outside of Afghanistan, in what has been described as an “over-the-
horizon” approach. In announcing the “final phase” of the U.S. withdrawal in April 2021,
President Biden said, “We’l reorganize our counterterrorism capabilities and the substantial
assets in the region to prevent the reemergence of [terrorist threats] to our homeland from over
the horizon.”117 In April 2021 testimony, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander
General Kenneth McKenzie said he was “conducting detailed planning” on over-the-horizon
capabilities, which would be “difficult” but “not impossible” to establish:
You will have to base your overhead ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance]
from no longer within Afghanistan, where an MQ-9 [drone] can take off and be over its
target in a matter of minutes to, perhaps, much further away. We will look at all the
countries in the region. Our diplomats will reach out, and we’ll talk about places where we
could base those resources. Some of them may be very far away, and then there would be
a significant bill for those types of resources, because you’d have to cycle a lot of them in
and out.118
When asked for specifics on what “over-the-horizon” capabilities might entail, Acting Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Affairs David Helvey said in a May 2021 hearing that
details “are best left in a classified session” and said broadly that “we are working...to establish
the types of arrangements that give us the access, basing, and overflight necessary to address the
terrorism threats.”119 The United States leased bases in the Kyrgyz Republic, Pakistan, and
Uzbekistan (from 2001-2014, 2001-2011, and 2001-2005, respectively) to support military
operations in Afghanistan. As of November 2021, similar arrangements have not been announced
with Afghanistan’s neighbors, which may be reticent about connections with U.S. operations. For
instance, in May 2021, Pakistan’s foreign minister ruled out any U.S. use of Pakistani bases for
future operations, explaining that his government has adopted a policy that al ows it to become
“only partners in peace.” In June, Pakistan’s prime minister reiterated the refusal, saying it was

114 Ibid.
115 Abdul Basit, “T ehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan’s Discursive Shift From Global Jihadist Rhetoric to Pashtun -Centric
Narratives,” Jamestown Foundation, September 24, 2021.
116 Salman Masood, “Pakistan in T alks With T aliban Militants, Even as Attacks Ramp Up,” New York Times, October
4, 2021; Zia ur Rehman, “Islamabad deeply alarmed by rise in Pakistan T aliban terrorism,” Nikkei Asia, September 28,
2021.
117 Remarks by President Biden on the Way Forward in Afghanistan, White House, April 14, 2021.
118 “House Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on US Military Activities Greater Middle East and Africa,” CQ
Congressional Transcripts, April 20, 2021.
119 “House Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on Afghanistan,” CQ Congressional Transcripts, May 12, 2021.
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based on fear of internal retaliation.120 CNN reported in late October 2021 that the United States
was seeking an agreement with Pakistan to use its airspace for counterterrorism operations in
Afghanistan.121 In October 2021 testimony, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Colin Kahl
said, “We’re seeking to build out a more robust ecosystem for over-the-horizon CT
[counterterrorism], which would include regional players ... we’re in conversation with
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and others.”122
The closest U.S. bases to Afghanistan are in the Persian Gulf region, from which U.S. airstrikes in
Afghanistan have been launched in recent years, though U.S. aircraft must take an indirect route
to avoid Iranian airspace. The deployment of aircraft carriers in the Arabian Sea and operations
from Diego Garcia are other means by which the United States in theory could conduct “over-the-
horizon” operations in Afghanistan.123
With the Taliban in control of Afghanistan, the United States wil likely have to alter any plans
that had been predicated on the continued existence of the former Afghan government and its
security forces. In May 2021 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Acting
Assistant Secretary of Defense Helvey said having “a wil ing and capable partner in Afghanistan
is a critical piece of our CT capabilities. If that goes away, it becomes much harder, greater risk,
and it wil be more costly.”124 Cooperation with Taliban authorities may prove impossible or too
diplomatical y or political y fraught. Collaboration with non-Taliban Afghans via clandestine or
covert action authorities could yield counterterrorism gains but carry risks with regard to broader
U.S.-Taliban relations. Some Members of Congress have argued the Administration has not been
sufficiently forthcoming with regard to future U.S. plans to counter terrorism in Afghanistan.125
An August 29, 2021, U.S. drone strike in Kabul that kil ed civilians may have demonstrated the
chal enges associated with conducting remote counterterrorism strikes. At a September 17, 2021,
press conference, General Kenneth McKenzie said, “I would reject a paral el between this
operation and an over-the-horizon strike...because we wil have an opportunity to further develop
the target and time to look at pattern of life. That time was not available to us because this was an
imminent threat to our forces,” even though “our intel igence was wrong.”126
Human Rights: Women and Ethnic and Religious Minorities
During their former rule, the Taliban had “one of the worst human rights records in the world,”
according to U.S. assessments; one U.S. official stated in November 2001, “The human rights
abuses that the Taliban have imposed on Afghanistan are in a class by themselves. In a number of
categories, they rate in the worst possible sector.”127 While many human rights abuses continued

120 “Pakistan: No More Military Bases for US Afghan Mission,” VOA News, May 11, 2021; Imran Khan, “Pakistan Is
Ready to Be a Partner for Peace in Afghanistan, But We Will Not Host U.S. Bases,” (op -ed), Washington Post, June
21, 2021.
121 Natasha Bertrand et al., “US nearing a formal agreement to use Pakistan’s airspace to carry out military operations
in Afghanistan,” CNN, October 23, 2021.
122 “Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on Afghanistan, South and Central Asia Security,” op. cit.
123 Paul McLeary, “T he U.S. ground war in Afghanistan is over. Now it’s the Navy’s turn,” Politico, September 3,
2021.
124 “Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on T ransition from Afghanistan,” op cit.
125 Jonathan Swan and Zachary Basu, “Red flags for Biden’s ‘over-the-horizon’ Strategy,” Axios, September 12, 2021.
126 Department of Defense, “General Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr. Commander of U.S. Central Command and Pentagon
Press Secretary John F. Kirby Hold a Press Briefing,” September 17, 2021.
127 “Human Rights and the T aliban,” Remarks by Assistant Secretary Lorne W. Craner, U.S. Department of State,
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under the U.S.-backed former Afghan government, conditions general y are seen to have
improved, leading to fears about the Taliban takeover reversing progress on human rights
achieved since 2001. Two of the most prominent, and closely watched, issues in this area are the
rights of Afghan women and girls and the rights of ethnic and religious minorities. In both cases,
the Taliban’s actions since August 2021 suggest that the group’s rule wil restrict many former
rights and protections for Afghan women; the picture with regard to minorities is more mixed.
Afghan Women and Girls
Since taking power in August 2021, Taliban officials have reiterated their commitment to
protecting women’s rights “within the framework of sharia.”128 Some observers question whether
Taliban statements are an attempt to assuage concerns that a rollback of women’s rights is
imminent and to dispel “rumors” about reported actions carried out by the group before its
takeover, such as forced marriages and targeted kil ings of women.129 In the immediate aftermath
of the takeover, Taliban leaders cal ed on women government employees to return to their posts,
as long as they were wearing the hijab (headscarf), and granted “amnesty” to al men and women
who worked with foreign powers.130 Taliban leaders subsequently cal ed for women to stay home
temporarily, citing concerns over new Taliban forces who “have not yet been trained very wel ”
and who may mistreat, harm, or harass women.131
The Taliban are often portrayed as the prime drivers of Afghan women’s oppression. Others have
noted that many people within Afghan society hold restrictive views of women’s rights that often
predate the Taliban movement, particularly in rural areas, where 76% of the population resides.132
For some Afghan women, the Taliban takeover may represent an improvement over high levels of
violence that have characterized recent years, if the group can prevent further violence and
improve security conditions.133 This may be particularly so for those in rural areas more affected
by conflict. Fieldwork conducted in 2019 and 2020 found that “peace is an absolute priority for
some rural women, even a peace deal very much on the Taliban terms.”134
For other women, the Taliban’s takeover has increased fears of sexual violence, retaliation, and
displacement, and has created longer-term concerns over the future of women’s rights under a
Taliban government.135 A number of women have protested in Kabul and other cities to demand

November 6, 2001.
128 “T ranscript of T aliban’s first news conference in Kabul,” Al Jazeera, August 17, 2021. Sharia refers broadly to
concepts and principles of Islamic religious jurispruden ce that vary in their interpretation under different schools of
practice. For more, see Matthew Nelson, “T he T aliban’s (Islamic) Isolation,” Chatham House, October 21, 2020.
129 Lynne O’Donnell, “ As T aliban Expand Control, Concerns About Forced Marriage and Sex Slavery Rise,” Foreign
Policy, July 23, 2021. Other restrictions reportedly imposed in some areas of the country since May 2021 included
ordering women not leave the home without a male guardian, closing girls’ and mixed-gender schools, and banning the
use of television. Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, “Escalation of Violent Confrontations and a
Rise in Violations of Human Rights, June 22 to July 6, 2021,” July 17, 2021.
130 “T aliban urges government staff to return to work,” Ariana News, August 16, 2021.
131 Maggie Astor, Sharif Hassan, and Norimitsu Onishi, “A T aliban spokesman urges women to stay home because
fighters haven’t been trained to respect them,” The New York Times, August 24, 2021.
132 John R. Allen and Vanda Felbab-Brown, “T he fate of women’s rights in Afghanistan,” Brookings Institution,
September 2020.
133 Anand Gopal, “T he Other Afghan Women,” The New Yorker, September 6, 2021.
134 Allen and Brown, “ T he fate of women’s rights in Afghanistan”; International Crisis Group, “ What Will Peace T alks
Bode for Afghan Women?” briefing note, April 6, 2020.
135 “‘I worry my daughters will never know peace’: women flee the T aliban —again,” The Guardian, August 12, 2021;
Farnaz Fassihi et al., “ For Afghan Women, T aliban Stir Fears of Return to a Repressive Past,” The New York Times,
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protection for human rights and inclusion in the Taliban government. Reports indicate some
women have been beaten by Taliban fighters while protesting, and some journalists have been
detained while covering the protests.136 The Taliban have reinstated the Ministry of Propagation
of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, which enforced the Taliban’s interpretation of Islam in the
1990s. The Taliban’s government does not include the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, which was
not present in the prior Taliban government but had been a part of the former Afghan
government.137
On September 18, 2021, the Ministry of Education announced the reopening of public secondary
schools and directed al male teachers and students to attend. The lack of reference to girls led
most to stay home and led some to describe a Taliban “ban” on girls’ education.138 Taliban
spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid said on September 20 that the Taliban was finalizing
arrangements to reopen secondary schools for girls in a “safe learning environment,” which
would happen “as soon as possible.”139
Many women’s rights advocates are skeptical of these claims and fearful that the group never
intends to al ow such education. In the 1990s, the Taliban did not formal y ban secondary or
higher education for girls, but similarly prohibited it on an ostensibly temporary basis due to
unspecified security concerns, a de facto ban that lasted the entirety of the group’s five-year
rule.140
Some signs suggest that the Taliban may permit education for women and girls in at least some
cases. Schooling for girls up to sixth grade reportedly resumed in gender-segregated classrooms.
Women have resumed attending a number of universities, though a Taliban minister said
classrooms would be gender-segregated and Islamic dress would be compulsory for women.141 In
early October 2021, media outlets reported that secondary schooling for girls had resumed (or in
some cases not ever been suspended) in several northern provinces.142 It is unclear to what extent
this development represents a broader change in Taliban policy or if the group is adapting to local
conditions (which would itself constitute a break with how the group governed in the 1990s).143
Foreign ministers from Turkey, Indonesia, and other Muslim-majority countries reportedly plan to
visit Kabul to encourage the Taliban to al ow girls’ education.144

August 17, 2021.
136 Yaroslav T rofimov, “ Afghan Women Protest Hard-Line T aliban Government, Face Violent Crackdown,” Wall
Street Journal, September 8, 2021.
137 Rachel Pannett, “ Who leads Afghanistan’s new government? Here’s what we know about the T aliban’s top
officials,” Washington Post, September 8, 2021.
138 Sune Engel Rasmussen and Jalal Nazari, “Afghanistan’s T aliban Prohibit Girls from Secondary School,” Wall Street
Journal, September 19, 2021.
139 “Girls to return to secondary school ‘soon as possible’: T aliban,” Al Jazeera, September 21, 2021.
140 Margot Buff, “‘Our Futures Will Be Ruined’: Afghan Girls Fear Denial of Education Under T aliban,” Gandhara,
September 21, 2021; Rasmussen and Nazari, op. cit.
141 Ezzatullah Mehrdad, Gerry Shih and Miriam Berger, “T aliban minister says women can attend university, but not
alongside men,” Washington Post, September 12, 2021.
142 “Girls Attend Schools in Kunduz, Balkh, Sar-e-Pol,” TOLOnews, October 9, 2021; “In northern Afghanistan, girls’
schools working despite ban elsewhere,” Reuters, October 12, 2021.
143 Ehsanullah Amiri and Margherita Stancati, “T aliban Allow T eenage Afghan Girls Back in Some Provincial
Schools-But Not in Kabul,” Wall Street Journal, October 12, 2021.
144 Patrick Wintour, “Muslim foreign ministers to make women’s rights plea to T aliban,” Guardian, October 13, 2021.
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Ethnic and Religious Minorities
Taliban rhetoric and action with regard to ethnic and religious minorities has general y been more
favorable than their stance toward Afghan women’s rights. The situation appears mixed and in
flux, particularly in the absence of formal policy directives from senior Taliban leaders.
One of the largest ethnoreligious minorities in Afghanistan is the Hazaras, who are mostly Shia
Muslims and make up around 10-15% of Afghanistan’s population. They are concentrated in their
historic homelands in central Afghanistan (the Hazarajat) as wel as several parts of western
Kabul. Their persecution at the hands of Afghan rulers goes back to the late nineteenth century.
Taliban forces massacred Hazara civilians on several occasions during their 1996-2001 rule.145
This history contributed to many Hazaras expressing fear about the Taliban’s possible return
leading up to 2021.146 The Taliban (who have historical y been mostly ethnic Pashtun Sunni
Muslims) took some actions to “portray themselves as a nationwide movement,” including
appointing a Hazara official in northern Afghanistan in 2020.147 In recent years, Hazaras arguably
faced greater threats from ISKP, which repeatedly targeted Hazara schools, mosques, and other
sites in Kabul on an anti-Shia sectarian basis.
Since their August 2021 takeover, the Taliban have continued to demonstrate a more accepting
official stance toward the Hazaras, particularly in urban areas, even as reports emerge of
massacres and forced displacement in the Hazarajat. Taliban fighters reportedly guarded Shias’
August 2021 commemoration of the holy day of Ashura, which has been marred by violence in
Afghanistan in the past.148 One Hazara was appointed to serve in the Taliban’s cabinet, as an
acting deputy minister of health. These and other evidently supportive actions have taken place
alongside reports that Taliban fighters in central Afghanistan have forcibly evicted hundreds of
Hazara families from their homes.149 Amnesty International has also reported that Taliban fighters
executed Hazara civilians (including former Afghan security forces) in July and August 2021.150
Surveying these mixed messages, one observer speculated in early September 2021 that “the
Taliban political leadership’s more pragmatic approach toward the Hazara is necessary to
maintain its fragile control over al of Afghanistan,” but that persecution could increase in the
absence of international attention.151
Afghanistan has also been home to several other religious minorities, such as Hindus and
Sikhs.152 Afghanistan was once home to tens of thousands of Hindus and Sikhs, but their numbers
decreased precipitously after Afghanistan became engulfed in violence and instability in the

145 “Afghanistan: T he Massacres in Mazar-i Sharif,” Human Rights Watch, November 1998; “Massacres of Hazaras in
Afghanistan,” Human Rights Watch, February 1, 2001.
146 David Zucchino and Fatima Faizi, “T hey Are T hriving After Years of Persecution but Fear a T aliban Deal,” New
York Tim es, March 27, 2019.
147 “T aliban appoints first Shia Hazara as shadow district chief of the group,” Khaama Press, April 28, 2020.
148 Jim Huylebroek, “On the ground: Kabul on edge,” New York Times, August 20, 2021.
149 Shirin Jaafari, “‘Why don’t you have mercy?’: Afghanistan’s Hazara people increasingly face eviction, violence
under T aliban rule,” PRI, October 5, 2021.
150 “Afghanistan: 13 Hazara killed by T aliban fighters in Daykundi province – new investigation,” Amnesty
International, October 5, 2021; “Afghanistan: T aliban responsible for brutal massacre of Hazara men – new
investigation,” Amnesty International, August 19, 2021.
151 T om Mutch, “Afghanistan’s Hazaras Get Mixed Messages From the T aliban,” Foreign Policy, September 4, 2021.
152 Afghanistan’s last Jewish resident reportedly left the country weeks after the T aliban’s August 2021 takeover.
Muhammad Farooq and Joseph Krauss, “ Afghanistan’s last Jew leaves after T aliban takeover,” Associated Press,
September 9, 2021.
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1970s. In 2001, the Taliban reportedly issued an order that non-Muslim minorities wear
distinctive marks on their clothing, perhaps the most public of the group’s oppressive actions
against religious minorities.153 Many of Afghanistan’s remaining Hindus and Sikhs (numbering in
the low hundreds) sought to leave the country after the Taliban’s 2021 takeover; it is unclear how
many remain.154 The Taliban appear to be demonstrating greater tolerance than they showed in the
past. In September 2021, a group of Hindus and Sikhs met with the Taliban-appointed mayor of
Kabul, who reportedly told them that his administration would work on behalf of their
communities, including upkeep of their places of worship.155 Days later, a Sikh place of worship
in Kabul was vandalized, reportedly by Taliban fighters;156 a Taliban spokesperson later wrote on
Twitter that those who had “harassed” the “Hindu minority” had been arrested.157
U.S. Partners and U.S. Citizens Remaining in Afghanistan
Data from the State Department indicate that in the weeks leading up to the final withdrawal of
U.S. forces on August 30, 2021, the United States directly evacuated or facilitated the removal of
124,000 individuals, including 6,000 U.S. citizens.158 Others evacuated included U.S. lawful
permanent residents, citizens from partner nations, and Afghans such as Special Immigrant Visa
(SIV) holders or applicants or others who worked with or for the United States in Afghanistan, as
wel as members of their families.159
According to the State Department, between 100 and 200 U.S. citizens remained in the country as
of mid-October 2021.160 Thousands of Afghans who were employed on behalf of U.S. efforts
remain in the country. Many of these individuals and their families have sought to leave
Afghanistan, fearing retribution from the Taliban.
The Taliban have said that, “Thousands of soldiers who have fought us for 20 years, after the
occupation, al of them have been pardoned,” and proclaimed a general amnesty.161 However,
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Michel e Bachelet said on September 13 that her
office had received “credible al egations of reprisal kil ings of a number of former [Afghan
military] personnel, and reports of civilians who worked for previous administrations and their
family members being arbitrarily detained,” after which some were found dead.162
A joint statement by the United States and dozens of other countries on August 29, 2021, said,
“We have received assurances from the Taliban that al foreign nationals and any Afghan citizens

153 Pamela Constable, “T aliban Singles Out Religious Minorities,” Washington Post, May 23, 2001.
154 Seerat Chabba, “Afghanistan: What does T aliban rule mean for Sikhs and Hindus?” Deutsche Welle, September 8,
2021.
155 “Afghan Hindus, Sikhs meet T aliban-appointed Kabul Mayor, urge for upkeep of gurudwara,” United News of
India, September 30, 2021.
156 “T aliban Vandalizes Gurudwara in Kabul, T akes People In Custody: Report,” NDTV, October 6, 2021.
157 Zabihullah Mujahid (@Zabehulah_M33), T witter, October 9, 2021, at
https://twitter.com/Zabehulah_M33/status/1446767821841698816 .
158 “T he United States Conducts Unprecedented Relocation Effort ,” Department of State, September 6, 2021.
159 For more information, see CRS Report R43725, Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Programs, by Andorra
Bruno.
160 “Department Press Briefing – October 22, 2021,” Department of State, October 22, 2021.
161 “T ranscript of T aliban’s first news conference in Kabul,” Al Jazeera, August 17, 2021.
162 “Oral update on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan” 48 th Session of the Human Rights Council, September
13, 2021.
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with travel authorization from our countries wil be al owed” to leave the country.163 U.S. officials
discussed “safe passage for U.S. citizens, other foreign nationals and our Afghan partners” in a
meeting with Taliban representatives in Doha, Qatar, according to an October 10, 2021, State
Department statement. The United States has continued to facilitate the departure of certain
individuals from Afghanistan since August 31, including 240 U.S. citizens, 157 lawful permanent
residents, and an unknown number of Afghans through unspecified overland routes and charter
flights as of October 22, 2021.164 U.S. government agencies have worked with dozens of private
groups (many representing U.S. military veterans) in this effort. Additional y, on October 18 a
State Department spokesperson indicated that “probably a couple thousand” of individuals had
left Afghanistan “via a variety of means” other than U.S. government assistance.165
While Kabul’s international airport has been partial y operational since late September 2021,
some issues remain, including high prices for commercial flights brought on by insurance
premiums for operating in Afghanistan.166 Some Afghans lack passports or other necessary travel
documents, which impedes international travel. The Taliban have reportedly expedited passport
processing.167 The State Department has said that it is working to provide additional options for
U.S. citizens and Afghan partners to leave Afghanistan. These include facilitating charter flights
on a more routine basis and working with partners such as Qatar to enable the resumption of
normal commercial activity at Kabul International Airport.168
Regional Relations and Dynamics
The Taliban have stated “we do not want to have any problem with the international
community.”169 Stil , their August 2021 takeover has upended regional dynamics, and the
Taliban’s views of, and relations toward, Afghanistan’s neighbors vary and wil likely continue to
evolve as the group begins governing.
Pakistan has long played an active and, by many accounts, disruptive and destabilizing role in
Afghan affairs, including through the provision of active and passive support to the Taliban.170
Many observers see the Taliban’s takeover as a substantive triumph for Pakistan, bolstering its
influence in Afghanistan and advancing its decades-long efforts to limit Indian influence there.171
Stil , Pakistani officials claim that their influence over the Taliban is limited.172
More broadly, despite some implicitly pro-Taliban statements from top Pakistani officials, the
Taliban’s takeover may present chal enges and complications for Pakistan.173 Afghanistan and

163 “Joint Statement on Afghanistan Evacuation Travel Assurances,” Department of State, August 29, 2021.
164 “Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on Afghanistan, South and Central Asia Securit y,” op. cit.
165 “Department Press Briefing – October 18, 2021,” Department of State, October 18, 2021.
166 “Afghan Civil Aviation Authority warns PIA and Kam Air to drop ticket prices,” Ariana News, October 14, 2021;
Jessica Donati, “U.S. to Resume Evacuation Flights From Afghanistan,” Wall Street Journal, October 14, 2021.
167 “30,000 Passports Issued Since Office Reopened,” TOLOnews, October 13, 2021.
168 “Department Press Briefing – October 7, 2021,” Department of State, October 7, 2021; “Department Press Brief ing
– October 14, 2021,” Department of State, October 14, 2021; “Department Press Briefing – October 18, 2021,”
Department of State, October 18, 2021.
169 “T ranscript of T aliban’s first news conference in Kabul,” Al Jazeera, August 17, 2021.
170 See Waldman, op. cit.
171 Jane Perlez, “T he Real Winner of the Afghan War? It’s Not Who You T hink,” New York Times, August 26, 2021.
172 “Imran Khan Urges a New Pakistan-U.S. Bond” (interview), New York Times, June 25, 2021.
173 Anchal Vohra, “Pakistan Might Soon Regret Its Win in Afghanistan,” Foreign Policy, September 12, 2021.
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Pakistan have long had an ethnical y tinged dispute over their shared 1,600-mile-long border.174
The Taliban (like past Afghan governments) have not accepted this “Durand Line.” Such
differences may exacerbate Pashtun nationalism inside Pakistan, creating a potential flashpoint in
future relations.175 Many commentators, including some from Pakistan, express strong concerns
about the prospect that the Taliban’s takeover could also empower Islamist militant groups that
have continued to operate in Pakistani territory.176 The presence of the TTP or Pakistani Taliban
(see above) within Afghanistan might also test relations between Pakistan and the Taliban. The
two sides have already experienced friction, including the October 2021 suspension of state-run
Pakistan International Airlines charter flights from Kabul due to “inappropriate behavior” by the
Taliban.177
Figure 2. Afghanistan and Its Neighbors

Source: Created by CRS. U.S. Department of State and ESRI.
Pakistan’s foreign minister said in late September 2021 that “I don’t think anybody is in a rush to
recognize” the Taliban, but also cal ed for “innovative” engagement with the group, saying “At
the same time, the international community has to realize: What’s the alternative? What are the
options? This is the reality, and can they turn away from this reality?”178 In an October 2021

174 “Afghans Who Fled the First T aliban Regime Found Precarious Sanctuary in Pakistan,” Time, August 18, 2021.
175 Madiha Afzal, “An Uneasy Limbo for US-Pakistan Relations Amidst the Withdrawal from Afghanistan,” Brookings
Institution, August 6, 2021.
176 See, for example, Madiha Afzal and Michael O’Hanlon, “Why Staying in Afghanistan Is the Least Bad Choice for
Biden” (op-ed), Washington Post, March 8, 2021.
177 Ayaz Gul, “Pakistan Suspends Flights to Kabul Over ‘Inappropriate’ T aliban Behavior,” Voice of America, October
14, 2021.
178 “Quershi says no rush to recognise T aliban govt in Afghanistan,” Dawn, September 21, 2021; Edith Lederer, “T he
AP Interview: Don’t isolate the T aliban, Pakistan urges,” Associated Press, September 23, 2021.
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interview, Prime Minister Khan said that Pakistan was in conversation with Afghanistan’s other
neighbors about “the timing of when to recognize the Taliban regime,” and “soon or later [the
United States] wil have to” recognize the Taliban government.179 This question is likely to
dominate U.S.-Pakistan relations for the foreseeable future: in an October 2021 visit to India,
Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman said that her forthcoming visit to Islamabad would be
“for a very specific and narrow purpose,” namely to discuss the new Taliban government in
Afghanistan.180
China shares a smal , sparsely inhabited border with Afghanistan and has played a relatively
limited role in Afghan affairs in recent years, motivated chiefly by what China perceives as a
threat from Islamist militants in Afghanistan.181 Economical y, Chinese investments (particularly
in the development of Afghan minerals and other resources) have attracted some attention in the
past, but major projects have not come to fruition due to instability, lack of infrastructure, and
other limitations. Afghanistan has not been a significant part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative
or the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, in part because of tensions between Pakistan and the
former Afghan government. Nevertheless, Afghanistan’s potential mineral wealth, combined with
the Taliban’s takeover, could lead to greater Chinese involvement in Afghanistan.
The Chinese government has signaled its support for the Taliban since its takeover of
Afghanistan’s government, and met with the group both before and after the takeover. Although
Chinese officials have emphasized the importance of establishing an “inclusive political
structure” in the country, some analysts have concluded that China’s recognition of the Taliban as
the Afghanistan’s government is “al but inevitable182 China does appear supportive of the
Taliban’s government, despite its previous cal s for the group to establish an “inclusive political
structure.”183 China’s foreign minister said in September 2021 that economic sanctions on
Afghanistan should end and that the country’s foreign exchange reserves belong to the Afghan
people and should not be used to exact political pressure.184 For their part, the Taliban have
indicated they intend to cooperate closely with China, with a Taliban spokesperson reportedly
suggesting in one foreign media interview that China would be the Afghan government’s most
important partner going forward.185 The Taliban’s reported ‘removal’ of Uyghur militants from
the Afghanistan-China border area may reflect and presage closer ties, including security
cooperation, between the two countries.186
Iran’s interests in Afghanistan include preserving its historic influence in western Afghanistan,
protecting Afghanistan’s Shia minority (the Hazaras), and reducing the flow of refugees into Iran
(Iran hosts mil ions of documented and undocumented Afghans). The Iranian government
welcomed the departure of U.S. troops from Afghanistan (which President Ebrahim Raisi

179 “One on One – Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan,” TRT World, October 2, 2021. Available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QKrq2k1WiXs.
180 Shah Meer Baloch and Julian Borger, “Biden administration delivers brusque message to Pakistan,” Guardian,
October 10, 2021.
181 Yun Sun, “China’s Strategic Assessment of Afghanistan,” War on the Rocks, April 8, 2020.
182 Derek Grossman, “Chinese Recognition of the T aliban Is All but Inevitable,” Foreign Policy, August 27, 2021.
183 Ibid.
184 “Chinese FM says economic sanctions on Afghanistan must end,” Reuters, September 23, 2021.
185 Mattia Sorbi, “Afghanistan, il portavoce dei talebani Zabiullah Mujahid: ‘Chiediamo all’Italia di riconosceri. La
Cina ci finanziera,” La Repubblica, September 1, 2021.
186 Reid Standish, “T aliban ‘Removing’ Uyghur Militants from Afghanistan’s Border with China,” RFE/RL, October 5,
2021.
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characterized as a “defeat”) and has cal ed for national unity in the country.187 Some have
speculated that Iran, as it did during the 1990s, might support Afghans in northern, western, and
central Afghanistan against the Taliban, particularly if Hazaras reject and seek to resist a Taliban-
led government.188 Iranian officials condemned the Taliban’s September 2021 takeover of
Panjshir and expressed concern about the makeup of the Taliban government.189 Other analysts
argue Iran is unlikely to oppose the Taliban, to avoid further instability, and wil continue to seek
accommodation with the group.190
Afghanistan’s Central Asian neighbors (Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) have
responded in varying ways to the Taliban’s takeover, including the only regional rejection of the
group’s government. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan appear to be prioritizing economic ties,
including the planned Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) natural gas pipeline, and
have had official engagements with the Taliban (such as the Uzbek foreign minister’s October
2021 visit to Kabul).191 Tajikistan on the other hand has rejected the Taliban’s government and
emerged as the group’s chief regional antagonist, a result both of Tajikistan’s own historical
struggles with Islamist militancy as wel as ethnolinguistic ties with Afghan Tajiks (the country’s
second largest ethnic group) who oppose the Taliban’s rule. Tajikistan has reportedly offered
refuge to prominent anti-Taliban Afghan leaders such as Amrullah Saleh and Ahmad Massoud,
and its officials have criticized the Taliban government, prompting the Taliban to warn Tajikistan
against interfering in Afghan affairs.192
Russia has long expressed concerns about instability in Afghanistan and the potential spread of
radical Islam, drugs, and refugees throughout the neighboring Central Asia region and into
Russia.193 Initial Russian statements suggest the Russian government seeks to continue to build
on its relations with the Taliban (including inviting the group to participate in October 2021
multilateral talks in Moscow), though it has concerns about the effect of the Taliban’s takeover on
traditional Russian concerns.194 Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said at a September 25,
2021, press conference, “The question of international recognition of the Taliban at the present
juncture is not on the table” and that Russia was working with the United States, China, and
Pakistan to ensure the Taliban keep their promises to govern inclusively.195 Russian officials have
also expressed support for Tajikistan, which hosts Russia’s largest external military base.

187 Maziar Motamedi, “US ‘defeat’ in Afghanistan a chance for peace: Iran president,” Al Jazeera, August 16, 2021.
188 “Former Afghan Vice President Karim Khalili Warns T he T aliban Rulers: ‘Afghanistan’s Shi’ite Minority, T he
Hazara Community, Will Resume Armed Confrontation,’” MEMRI, September 24, 2021.
189 Farzin Nadimi, “Iran Sets Its Eyes on Afghanistan,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July 19, 2021; “Iran
condemns T aliban for assault on holdout fighters in Panjshir Valley,” Times of Israel, September 6, 2021; Maziar
Motamedi, “Iran insists on ‘inclusive’ government in Afghanistan,” Al Jazeera, September 9, 2021.
190 Murat Sofuoglu, “After a short honeymoon, are Iran-Taliban relations deteriorating?” TRT World, September 9,
2021.
191 Bruce Pannier, “For the T urkmen and Uzbek leaders, a meeting of minds on Afghanistan,” RFE/RL, October 9,
2021.
192 Catherine Putz, “T ensions Rise Between T ajikistan and the T aliban,” Diplomat, October 5, 2021.
193 Nurlan Aliyev, “How Russia Views Afghanistan T oday,” War on the Rocks, October 19, 2020; T om Balmforth and
Gabrielle T etrault -Farber, “ For Russia, U.S. Afghan Exit Creates Security T hreat on Southern Flank,” Reuters, July 8,
2021; Robyn Dixon, “Why Afghanistan’s Growing Chaos Alarms Leaders from T ajikistan to Russia,” Washington
Post, July 9, 2021; and Kathy Gannon, Vladimir Isachenkov, and Mstyslav Chernov, “ Russia: Afghan Insta bility
Heightens with Hasty U.S. Retreat,” Associated Press, July 16, 2021.
194 “Situation in Afghanistan not easy, terrorists entering from Syria, Iraq, says Putin,” ANI News, October 14, 2021.
195 Edith Lederer, “Russia says it’s in sync with US, China, Pakistan on T aliban,” Associated Press, September 26,
2021.
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U.S. Policy Tools and Possible Issues for Congress
Congress can influence decisions on what U.S. foreign policy tools might be best suited related to
the Taliban. The nature of that influence varies, a reflection of the constitutional delegation of
foreign policy powers across al three branches of government. In some areas, congressional
powers and prerogatives are relatively strong and established. In other areas, the congressional
role is less direct. For instance, only the President can extend recognition to foreign governments,
though Congress can play an important role in determining the parameters of diplomatic
engagement and representation. In areas such as the disposition of U.S.-based Afghan central
bank assets, the Administration has taken steps to prevent Taliban access that some in Congress
welcome, but Congress has not precluded the Administration from changing that decision. The
following sections outline selected U.S. policy issues, along with consideration of possible
congressional action.
Recognition and Diplomatic Representation
In September 2021, Secretary Blinken stated in testimony before the House Foreign Affairs
Committee that the Taliban is “the de facto government of Afghanistan” following their takeover
of the country.196 The United States now faces the question of whether to recognize formal y the
Taliban as the government of Afghanistan. This decision has attracted congressional interest given
its potential y wide-ranging implications for other U.S. priorities.
According to one expert, recognition is different from, but related to, the establishment of
diplomatic representation, which refers only to the exchange of ambassadors and associated
rights.197 Formal recognition may be conferred explicitly via oral and written statements or
implicitly by concluding an international treaty, sending or receiving diplomatic representation, or
other means. In 2015’s Zivotofsky v. Kerry, the Supreme Court held that “the President alone
effects the formal act of recognition,” citing the need for the United States to “have a single
policy regarding which governments are legitimate in the eyes of the United States and which are
not.”198 Despite this finding that “the formal act of recognition is an executive power that
Congress may not qualify,” Congress has considerable powers to influence the implementation of
any recognition decisions. The Senate may decline to confirm an ambassador, and Congress may
limit or refuse to fund embassy construction, or take other actions, in the process making
recognition “a hollow act.” Stil , according to the Supreme Court, “none of these acts would alter
the President’s recognition decision.”199 The consequences of formal recognition are partly legal
in nature: recognized governments may sue in U.S. courts and benefit from sovereign immunity
as wel as the act of state doctrine. The international consequences of U.S. recognition (or its
absence) are also significant.
U.S. relations with Afghanistan before 2001 demonstrates the variety of ways in which the U.S.
government may relate to another government. The United States closed its embassy in Kabul in
January 1989, due to security concerns following the withdrawal of Soviet forces, which
concluded in February 1989. Stil , the State Department’s Office of the Legal Advisor wrote in its
Digest of United States Practice in International Law 1989-1990 that the United States

196 “House Foreign Affairs Committee Holds Hearing on Afghanistan,” CQ Congressional Transcripts, September 13,
2021.
197 Scott Anderson, “History and Recognition of the T aliban,” Lawfare, August 26, 2021.
198 Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. __ (2015).
199 Ibid.
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maintained diplomatic relations with Afghanistan. Moreover, it stated, “Before American
personnel were evacuated, the U.S. Embassy did not conduct normal diplomatic relations with the
current Kabul regime [the Soviet-backed Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, led by
Mohammad Najibullah]. Our limited presence there did not imply acceptance of the regime as the
lawful government in Afghanistan.”200
The Soviet-backed government survived until April 1992, when opposition mujahideen forces
entered Kabul. After selecting Burhanuddin Rabbani as the nation’s president, those mujahideen
forces soon started fighting each other in a devastating civil war that culminated in the Taliban’s
takeover of Kabul in September 1996. Despite Rabbani’s relocation to the smal part of northern
Afghanistan under the control of the opposition Northern Al iance, Rabanni appointees were
present in most world embassies, including Afghanistan’s embassy in Washington (reportedly
leading to disputes between embassy employees there about whether to fly the flag of the
Rabbani government or the Taliban).201
The United States did not recognize the 1996-2001 Taliban government, maintaining that between
1996 and 2000, “there was no functioning central government” in Afghanistan.202 A U.S. official
said in 2000 that Afghanistan was not designated as a state sponsor of terror “because we don’t
recognize the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan, nor does the U.N.”203 This lack of
recognition did not preclude some limited official U.S.-Taliban contacts, including an April 1998
visit to Afghanistan by then-U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Bil Richardson and Assistant Secretary
of State Karl Inderfurth. In May 1997, the Taliban government was recognized by three countries:
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
Military action by the United States and international and Afghan partners after the September 11,
2001, terrorist attacks removed the Taliban from power, with many of their leaders kil ed,
detained, or in hiding. U.N.-convened talks between a number of anti-Taliban factions in
Germany led to the formation of an Interim Authority for Afghanistan, which the United States
recognized as the government of Afghanistan when it assumed power on December 22, 2001.204
The United States had previously, on December 16, 2001, opened a Liaison Office in Kabul. A
spokesperson said at the time, “The United States has continued to maintain diplomatic relations
with the state of Afghanistan, even though we have not for some time recognized that the Taliban
or anyone else is capable of speaking for Afghanistan international y.”205
The U.S. embassy in Kabul was fully evacuated by the evening of August 15, 2021, hours after
Taliban fighters entered the city. Some personnel were transferred to Doha, where an Afghanistan
affairs mission was established. In the past, the United States has similarly relocated diplomats to
outside of unstable countries (e.g., to Malta and Tunisia from Libya in 2014; to Saudi Arabia from
Yemen in 2015; and to Colombia from Venezuela in 2019), sometimes for years at a time.206 U.S.

200 Available at https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/139393.pdf.
201 T odd Beamon, “Flag switch sparks tension at Afghan embassy,” Washington Post, May 29, 1997; Eric Lekus, “T he
Afghan Ambiguity in D.C.,” Baltimore Sun, July 7, 1997.
202 See Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, U.S. Departm ent of State.
203 “Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright and Michael Sheehan, Counter-T errorism Coordinator, On-the-Record
Briefing on the 1999 Annual ‘Patterns of Global T errorism’ Report,” U.S. Department of State, May 1, 2000.
204 Digest of United States Practice in International Law, 2001, Office of the Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State,
pp. 423-426.
205 Ibid.
206 Elizabeth Hagedorn, “After Afghanistan pullout, US pursues long-distance diplomacy from Qatar,” Al-Monitor,
September 8, 2021.
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officials met with a Taliban delegation led by acting foreign minister Muttaqi in Doha in October
2021 for talks a State Department official described as “candid and professional.”207
U.S. officials have said that U.S. recognition of the Taliban government is not under
consideration in the short term; White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki, asked on September 7,
2021, about a timeline to recognize the Taliban, said, “there is no rush to recognition. It real y is
going to be dependent on what steps the Taliban takes.”208
No other government has, as of November 2021, extended formal recognition to the Taliban
government. However, several embassies (including those of Russia, China, Iran, Qatar, Turkey,
and the Central Asian republics) reportedly remain open in Kabul. Additional y, some senior
regional officials (including Pakistan’s intel igence chief and the Qatari and Uzbek foreign
ministers) have had formal meetings with high-ranking Taliban officials, as have the U.N.
Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan and the British Prime Minister’s
Representative for the Afghan Transition. Taliban figures have reportedly taken up positions at
Afghan diplomatic facilities in Pakistan, though Pakistan’s ambassador to Afghanistan said his
government’s issuance of diplomatic visas to these individuals “does not mean recognition.”209
Many Members of Congress have expressed opposition to the possibility of U.S. recognition of
the Taliban government. No Afghan alternative to the Taliban with requisite security capability in
Afghanistan or political support appears to exist at present (see “Current and Potential
Opposition,” above). Some in Congress have cal ed on the Administration to withhold recognition
from the Taliban in favor of a “government-in-exile” led by former First Vice President Saleh.210
Some Members of Congress have also introduced legislation that seeks to constrain the ability of
the executive branch to recognize or establish diplomatic ties with the Taliban government:
 H.Res. 604, introduced by Rep. Dan Crenshaw on August 24, 2021, would
express the sense of the House that the United States should not extend
diplomatic recognition and relations to the Taliban and should recognize Saleh as
“Acting President.”
 S. 2745, introduced by Senator Marco Rubio on September 14, 2021, would
prohibit the use of funds to implement or enforce any U.S. policy that extends
diplomatic recognition to the Taliban government.
 H.R. 5272, introduced by Representative John Curtis on September 17, 2021,
would, among other provisions, direct the Secretary of State to instruct the U.S.
representatives of al international organizations to advocate that those
organizations not recognize the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan.
Sanctions and Terrorist Designations
Since the late 1990s, the Taliban have been subject to a variety of U.S. sanctions. Some Members
have introduced additional sanctions-related proposals, including measures to mandate the
Taliban’s designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.
The United States first imposed sanctions on the Taliban in July 1999, when President Bil
Clinton signed Executive Order (E.O.) 13129 that declared the Taliban’s harboring of Al Qaeda a

207 “T aliban, US conclude ‘candid, professional’ talks in Doha,” Al Jazeera, October 10, 2021.
208 “Press Gaggle by Press Secretary Jen Psaki En Route Queens, New York,” White House, September 7, 2021.
209 T ahir Khan, “T aliban Install Diplomats in Pakistan Embassy, Mission,” Voice of America, October 29, 2021.
210 Najibullah Lalzoy, “Former Afghan officials announce government in exile,” Khaama Press, September 29, 2021.
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national emergency.211 Under E.O. 13129, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign
Assets Control was authorize to block al property in the United States that the Taliban controlled
or that supported the group, and to block al transactions that benefitted the Taliban (including
exports to or imports from “the territory of Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban”). Presidents
Clinton and George W. Bush extended the national emergency under E.O. 13129 for two year-
long periods.
On September 23, 2001, in the wake of the September 11 attacks, President Bush issued E.O.
13224, blocking the U.S.-based property of and prohibiting transactions with persons who
“support or otherwise associate with” terrorists, as designated by the President. That list of
designated individuals is referred to as the Special y Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) list, and
original y comprised 27 individuals and entities (such as Al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden). On
July 2, 2002, with the Taliban no longer in power, President Bush issued E.O. 13268, terminating
the national emergency declared by E.O. 13129 and adding the Taliban and then-leader Mullah
Mohammad Omar to the list of entities designated as SDGTs under E.O. 13224. Both remain
designated as SDGTs (Omar died in 2013; sanctions remain in place to cover any issues that arise
regarding the distribution of or claim made to any remaining estate or assets stil in the United
States). E.O. 13886, issued by President Trump in September 2019, amended E.O. 13224 to
authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to prohibit the U.S.-based accounts of foreign financial
institutions that facilitate transactions for designated entities.
The SDGT list is often compared to the separate, and statutorily established, list of designated
Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs).212 Designation as an FTO makes it unlawful to provide
“material support or resources” to the designated group (including activities conducted outside
the United States) and prohibits a designated members from entering the United States. An FTO
designation arguably has greater scope than SDGT designation, which blocks the group’s U.S.-
based property.213 The State Department says FTO designation “stigmatizes and isolates”
designated organizations, “heightens public awareness and knowledge” about them, and “signals
to other governments” U.S. concerns.214 FTO designations may be blocked or revoked by an Act
of Congress.
The Taliban have not been designated as an FTO. A resolution that would have supported such a
designation was introduced in the House in 2015 (H.Con.Res. 13) and not considered further.
Some argued that the Taliban’s designation as an FTO could forestal the possibility of a political
settlement between the Taliban and the U.S.-backed Afghan government, a long-sought U.S.
goal.215 The Haqqani Network (a semi-autonomous component of the Taliban) was designated as
an FTO in 2012, after Congress passed a law (P.L. 112-168) cal ing for FTO designation and

211 Cited statutes are the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National
Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and Section 301 of T itle 3, United States Code.
212 See “House Foreign Affairs Committee Holds Hearing on Afghanistan,” CQ Congressional Transcripts, September
13, 2021.
213 Some question the practical impact of FT O designation on groups, such as the Haqqani Network, whose members
and assets are largely not in the United States. “Politics, Strategy and the Haqqani Network,” Small Wars Journal,
September 6, 2012. In its 2020 T errorist Assets Report, the Treasury Department reported that, as of 2020, it had
blocked $3,857 in funds related to the Haqqani Network. Terrorist Assets Report, Calendar Year 2020 , Office of
Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Department of the Treasury, released September 8, 2021. For more on “ material support,”
see CRS Report R41333, Terrorist Material Support: An Overview of 18 U.S.C. §2339A and §2339B .
214 “Foreign T errorist Organizations,” U.S. Department of State, available at https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-
organizations/.
215 Masood Farivar, “Why Isn’t the Afghan T aliban on US List of Foreign T error Groups?” VOA, February 20, 2017.
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directing the Administration to submit a report on whether the group met the criteria for such
designation.
With the Taliban back in power, some have advocated (including through the introduction of
legislation, listed above) that the Administration designate the group as an FTO. In supporting
this approach, they in some cases identify the prominence of the FTO-designated Haqqani
Network within the Taliban and the Taliban’s longstanding ties with Al Qaeda. Others have
spoken against such designation, questioning its utility (given existing sanctions on the group).
These observers also argue that it might unnecessarily complicate the delivery of humanitarian
assistance, citing for comparison the complications that arose for delivering humanitarian
assistance when the Trump Administration designated Yemen’s Houthis as an FTO in January
2021.216
In the wake of the Taliban’s August 2021 takeover, some Members have introduced legislation
related to sanctions on the Taliban, including via FTO designation:
 On August 31, 2021, Representative Mike Gal agher introduced H.R. 5127,
which would, among other provisions, prohibit the use of funds for any activity
that would support the removal of bilateral or multilateral sanctions on the
Taliban.
 On September 10, 2021, Representative Scott Perry introduced H.R. 5236, which
would prohibit the removal of any existing sanctions on the Taliban absent
legislation specifical y providing for such removal.
 On September 14, 2021, Senator Lindsay Graham and Representative Michael
Waltz introduced S.Res. 358 and H.Res. 645, respectively, which would express
the sense of the Senate and House, respectively, that the Secretary of State should
designate the Taliban as an FTO and their takeover as a coup d’etat.217
 On September 14, 2021, Senator Marco Rubio introduced S. 2745, which would
direct the Secretary of State to designate the Taliban as an FTO. It would also
direct the President to impose certain sanctions on foreign persons who provide
support to or are involved in transactions with the Taliban.
 On September 21, 2021, Senator Tom Cotton introduced S. 2770, which would
direct the Secretary of State to designate the Taliban as an FTO.
 On September 27, 2021, Senator James Risch introduced S. 2863, which would
direct the President to impose sanctions on Taliban members and others who
support terrorist groups, engage in human rights abuses, and play a role in
international narcotics trafficking in Afghanistan. The measure would also direct
the President to impose those same sanctions on any foreign person who the
President determines provides material support to the Taliban.
Independent of congressional action, the President could choose to declare a national emergency
with respect to conditions in Afghanistan and propose possible sanctions pursuant to IEEPA with
regard to criteria of the Administration’s choosing. In other cases, the executive branch has done
so in order to exert potential U.S. influence over political transitions and assert U.S. priorities
with regard to governance, conflict, human rights, and outside interference.

216 See CRS Insight IN11585, Yemen: Recent Terrorism Designations, coordinated by Jeremy M. Sharp.
217 For more, see CRS In Focus IF11267, Coup-Related Restrictions in U.S. Foreign Aid Appropriations.
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Humanitarian Concerns
Congress appears to possess consensus on maintaining terrorism-related sanctions on the Taliban
to prevent the group’s access to financial resources while allowing for the provision of
humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan. Some Members of Congress have expressed concern
about the potential impact of sanctions on the Afghan people in light of the overlapping and
growing economic, financial, and humanitarian crises in the country.
Prior to the Taliban’s August 2021 takeover, a severe humanitarian crisis already existed in
Afghanistan, due primarily to conflict, drought, and the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
pandemic. Indicators suggest that conditions continue to worsen: the World Food Programme
reported in early September 2021 that the proportion of Afghans reporting insufficient food
consumption increased from 80% to 93% after the Taliban’s takeover.218 U.N. Children’s Fund
(UNICEF) estimated that “at least 1 mil ion” Afghan children are “at risk of dying due to severe
acute malnutrition without immediate treatment.”219 Looking ahead, the U.N. Development
Programme (UNDP) warned in September 2021 that, under various scenarios, real gross domestic
product (GDP) could decline by as much as 13% by June 2022, leading to “near-universal
poverty” (97% of Afghanistan’s population).220
It remains unclear to what extent, if at all, U.S. sanctions are affecting humanitarian conditions in
Afghanistan. Some nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other entities delivering
humanitarian assistance in a Taliban-governed Afghanistan may curtail or suspend their activities
in order to avoid civil and criminal penalties for sanctions violations, reputational risks, and other
potential hazards.221 Since the Taliban’s takeover, the Department of the Treasury has issued
several licenses outlining the U.S. position and stating that U.S. sanctions do not prohibit the
provision of humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan:
 The Treasury Department reportedly issued a specific license (specific licenses
are general y not made public) on August 25, 2021, authorizing the U.S
government and its implementing partners to facilitate targeted humanitarian
assistance in Afghanistan.222
 On September 24, 2021, Treasury issued two General Licenses:
 General License 14, to authorize otherwise sanction-able transactions with
the Taliban or Haqqani Network by the United States, U.N. agencies and
other multilateral institutions, and NGOs to provide humanitarian assistance
and “other activities that support basic human needs in Afghanistan,” except
for financial transfers.223

218 “Afghanistan Food Security Update,” World Food Programme, September 10, 2021.
219 “Half of Afghanistan’s children under five expected to suffer from acut e malnutrition as hunger takes root for
millions,” UNICEF Afghanistan, October 5, 2021.
220 “Economic Instability and Uncertainty in Afghanistan after August 15: A Rapid Appraisal,” UNDP Afghanistan,
September 9, 2021.
221 Kelly Moss and Jacob Kurtzer, “U.S. Sanctions Squeeze Humanitarian Assistance in Afghanistan,” CSIS,
September 29, 2021.
222 Daphne Psaledakis, “EXCLUSIVE: U.S. T reasury issued new license to ease flow of aid in Afghanistan,” Reuters,
August 31, 2021.
223 Available at https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/ct_gl14.pdf.
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 General License 15, to authorize al otherwise sanction-able transactions with
the Taliban or Haqqani Network necessary for the export of agricultural
commodities (including food) and medicine to Afghanistan.224
It was reported in October 2021 that the UNDP would assume responsibility for direc t payments
to medical workers in Afghanistan (a program formerly funded by the World Bank; see more
below), a development “facilitated” by the licenses above.225 Treasury reportedly also informed
financial institutions that they may process remittances (whic h Western Union and other firms
had suspended after the Taliban takeover), a key source of income for many Afghans. 226
Even with the licenses and other Treasury actions above, the sometimes amorphous nature of the
Taliban (which is more of a movement with which individuals associate to varying degrees than a
formal organization), and the historically unprecedented situation of a U.S. SDGT-designated
entity taking effective control of a country, make the path forward unclear.
At an October 5, 2021, Senate hearing, one expert recommended that the Administration provide
a more explicit explanation of how it views the application of sanctions on the Taliban.227 Further,
he outlined three potential options: (1) applying only to the explicitly sanctioned entities, rather
than the government or the state (comparable to the U.S. sanctions regime imposed on entities
and individuals in Burma); (2) applying to the de facto government, but not the state (comparable
to Venezuela); or (3) applying to both the government and the state (comparable to Iran). The
first two options might provide some flexibility for the U.S. government in determining which
transactions are sanctionable. Some mechanisms to facilitate humanitarian trade with Iran
(including the Swiss Humanitarian Trade Arrangement, founded in February 2020) could serve as
models for the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan, though they have had
relatively little affect.
Possible Purposes of Sanctions
The debate over potential FTO designation and other possible measures raises questions about
what U.S. sanctions on the Taliban might be intended to achieve. The United States may seek to
affect the perception of the Taliban within Afghanistan, isolate the Taliban internationally, or
spur changes in Taliban governance. If the United States seeks to use sanctions to change Taliban
behavior or compel the group to make policy changes (such as in how it treats women’s rights or
relates to terrorist groups), the Taliban have given few signs that they are susceptible to such
pressure.
The Taliban may be willing to tolerate significant levels of sanctions -related economic distress in
exchange for an unfettered approach to governance. Many countries, including those like Russia
with which the Taliban have developed more regular ties, have expressed a desire for the Taliban
to form an “inclusive” government. The government announced by the Taliban in September
2021, composed almost entirely of male Pashtuns who are longtime Taliban loyalists, indicates
that the advantages of maintaining internal cohesion for the Taliban may outweigh the benefits of
satisfying appeals from the international community. Acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan

224 Available at https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/ct_gl15.pdf.
225 Karen DeYoung, “U.N. agency to pay salaries of Afghan health-care workers to help stave off humanitarian crisis,”
Washington Post, October 6, 2021.
226 Andrea Shalal, “U.S. allows personal remittances to flow to Afghanistan,” Reuters, September 2, 2021.
227 “Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee Holds Hearing on Afghanistan,” CQ Congressional
Transcripts, October 5, 2021.
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Muttaqi said in a September 2021 press conference, “We want to have good relations with the
world’s countries, but want them to not pressure Afghanistan, because pressure does not
work.”228
The United States may seek to use sanctions to undermine the Taliban’s hold on power. The
group has never appeared to have significant nationwide popular support, and sporadic protests
against Taliban rule have occurred since their August 2021 return to power. However, no
nationally organized opposition exists at present, with all former Afghan leaders having fled the
country, been sidelined by the Taliban, or expressed support for the group. Sanctions-related
economic distress could inspire popular support for potential anti-Taliban alternatives, but could
also reinforce Taliban appeals for popular support as the group portrays itself as having overcome
foreign interference to reestablish Afghanistan’s sovereignty and independence.229
The United States may seek to use sanctions to isolate the Taliban internationally (for whatever
reason), though that effort could be constrained by Taliban efforts to establish economic and
other ties with other states. While no foreign countries have recognized the Taliban’s
government, the level of Taliban engagement with the international community far exceeds that
of the 1990s. Regional trade appears reduced but has continued, with some Afghan
businesspeople reportedly welcoming what they characterize as the Taliban’s less corrupt
approach to administration.230 At the same time, sanctions could exacerbate the Taliban’s
governance chal enges, given the group’s lack of experience and capacity.231 Some may also
support sanctions as an end in itself, as a tool to punish a former military adversary and a
governing entity deemed objectionable.232
Foreign Assistance and Security Cooperation
Non-humanitarian foreign assistance was a significant part of prior U.S. efforts to stabilize
Afghanistan and support its former government. According to SIGAR, as of June 30, 2021,
Congress appropriated nearly $125 bil ion for reconstruction and related activities in Afghanistan
(not including humanitarian assistance or agency operations) since FY2002. Of this $125 bil ion,
nearly $89 bil ion was for security and $36 bil ion was for governance and development. The
Taliban’s August 2021 takeover raises significant concerns about U.S. assistance going forward,
both for Afghanistan and more broadly.
Since the Taliban’s takeover, the group’s leaders have cal ed for greater international assistance as
the country faces looming and intersecting financial, economic, and humanitarian crises.233 U.S.
officials maintain, as a State Department spokesperson said on September 24, 2021, that “the
Taliban wil need and in fact want international assistance.” However, in a September 2021
Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Secretary Blinken indicated potential limits to the
kinds of aid the Taliban accepts or facilitates: “while the Taliban seeks and probably wil support
and protect basic humanitarian assistance.. it may be a different story when it comes to things that

228 Avik Roy, “Will coordinate with countries pledging humanitarian aid to Afghanistan: T aliban,” Hindustan Times,
September 14, 2021.
229 “T aliban declare Afghanistan ‘free, sovereign’ nation, vow ‘good relations’ with rest of world,” Arab News, August
31, 2021.
230 Secunder Kermani, “Afghanistan: Life under T aliban rule one month on,” BBC, September 15, 2021.
231 “Afghan merchants fear for future as T aliban take-over raises costs,” France 24, September 21, 2021.
232 Kim Richard Nossal, “International Sanctions as International Punishment,” International Organization, Vol. 43,
No. 2 (Spring 1989), pp. 301-322.
233 “T aliban call for international aid as WHO chief visits Kabul,” Express Tribune, September 21, 2021.
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are directed specifical y at women and girls.”234 In some areas, such as economic development
and education, U.S. interests may intersect with the Taliban’s, al owing for some limited
cooperation. It is unlikely that large-scale U.S. foreign assistance could resume in the continued
absence of U.S. diplomatic personnel, given statutorily mandated oversight requirements.235
Secretary Blinken also said “we should be looking at and maybe building upon previous
verification and distribution models and mechanisms in other countries, including those
developed by the United Nations, where assistance can successfully incentivize positive actions
by the government.”236 Congress might also consider development assistance as a means of
influencing how the Taliban govern; however, it remains unclear whether U.S. or other foreign
assistance represents a sufficient incentive for the Taliban to moderate its policies or otherwise
compromise on key issues. The limits of the international community’s leverage appear reflected
in the Taliban’s establishment of a non-inclusive government.
Questions of U.S. aid to the Taliban also relate to the contentious question of international
recognition of the Taliban as Afghanistan’s government, which U.S. officials have said wil
depend on the Taliban’s actions, including how it treats Afghan women and girls. Lack of U.S.
recognition may constrain or complicate the delivery of aid, but would not preclude it. Shortly
after the Taliban takeover, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said, “there are a range of
different diplomatic relationships the United States has with countries around the world,
including some in very difficult or nonexistent relationships with governments where we stil
provide forms of aid to people.”237 Some Members of Congress have introduced legislation that
would prohibit or condition al U.S. assistance (including humanitarian assistance) that would
benefit the Taliban:
 On August 27, 2021, Representative Scott Perry introduced H.R. 5121, which
would terminate Afghanistan’s designation as a Major Non-NATO Al y.
 On August 31, 2021, Representative Mike Gal agher introduced H.R. 5127,
which would, among other provisions, prohibit the use of funds for any activity
that would support the Taliban, including payments to the Taliban (either directly
or through third parties) and the removal of bilateral or multilateral sanctions on
the Taliban.
 On September 3, 2021, Representative Carlos Gimenez introduced H.R. 5164,
which would prohibit the provision of U.S. funds to the Taliban or to other
persons who might make such funds available to benefit the Taliban.
 On September 10, 2021, Representative Scott Perry introduced H.R. 5236, which
would prohibit the use of U.S. funds to support the Taliban, including financial,
humanitarian, or materiel assistance.
 On September 27, 2021, Senator James Risch introduced S. 2863, which would
suspend U.S. assistance to governments or organizations assessed by the

234 “Senate Foreign Relations Committee Holds Hearing on Afghanistan,” CQ Congressional Transcripts, September
14, 2021.
235 Section 7044(a)(1)(F) of Division K of P.L. 117-260.
236 “Secretary Antony J. Blinken Opening Remarks at Ministerial on Afghanistan,” U.S. Department of State,
September 8, 2021.
237 “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan,” White House, August
17, 2021.
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Secretary of State to provide material support to the Taliban (with a national
security waiver and humanitarian exceptions).
Administration actions (possibly with congressional input) may also place limits on U.S. foreign
assistance. During the Taliban’s 1990s rule, U.S. aid to Afghanistan was restricted by successive
presidential determinations under Section 490 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended,
that Afghanistan was a major drug producing and/or major drug transit country unable to receive
most forms of U.S. bilateral assistance. Since 2001, successive Administrations have continued to
designate Afghanistan as a major drug producing and/or major drug transit country but have not
subjected it to aid limitations.238 The Taliban successfully banned opium production for a brief
period of their 1996-2001 rule, but profited from narcotics production and trafficking during their
insurgency, leading to questions about how they might approach the issue after their 2021
takeover.
Security assistance may also be an element of the U.S. policy response to the Taliban
government. Some Members have cal ed for U.S. support to anti-Taliban opposition led by
Ahmad Massoud, though those cal s largely predate the reported Taliban capture of the opposition
stronghold of Panjshir. One Member reportedly said in August 2021 that “we’re going to take a
play out of Charlie Wilson’s playbook,” referring to the former Congressman known for his role
in securing material support for anti-Soviet Afghan mujahideen in the 1980s.239 The United States
might also consider security assistance to the country’s neighbors as they confront the impacts of
the Taliban’s takeover on humanitarian conditions and regional terrorist groups. Two of
Afghanistan’s six neighbors are not U.S. partners (Iran and China), and the United States has had
varying degrees of cooperation with the other four (Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and
Turkmenistan), including on border security issues.
International Financial Institutions
International financial institutions (IFIs) provided or facilitated bil ions of dollars in assistance to
Afghanistan over the past twenty years. Their decision to block the country’s access to funds after
the Taliban takeover, due to lack of clarity among the international community over recognizing a
Taliban government in Afghanistan, creates new complications. The United States plays a
leadership role in IFI decisions, giving Congress potential influence on related U.S. approaches.
International Monetary Fund
On August 2, 2021, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved an al ocation of $650
bil ion in “special drawing rights” (SDRs), its fourth and largest ever such al ocation, to
supplement global reserves during the global pandemic. SDRs are international reserve assets that
can be converted into “hard” currency (such as dollars and euros that are widely used in
international transactions) through trades with other IMF members. SDRs are al ocated to IMF
members in proportion to their weight in the global economy, and Afghanistan’s share is
approximately $440 mil ion. The new SDRs were to be made available to al IMF member
countries on August 23, and many policymakers expressed concern that the Taliban might gain
access to these new funds.240 The United States reportedly negotiated to pause the SDR

238 For more, see CRS Report R46695, The U.S. “Majors List” of Illicit Drug-Producing and Drug-Transit Countries,
by Liana W. Rosen.
239 Alexander Ward, “Conservatives are backing Afghanistan’s resistance movement,” Politico, August 27, 2021.
240 “IMF Funding for the T aliban?” (editorial), Wall Street Journal, August 25, 2021.
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al ocation.241 On August 17, 2021, Representative French Hil and 17 other lawmakers wrote to
Treasury Secretary Janet Yel en urging the United States to intervene and help prevent the Taliban
from accessing IMF resources.242
Days after the Taliban takeover, on August 18, 2021, an IMF spokesperson said,
As is always the case, the IMF is guided by the views of the international community.
There is currently a lack of clarity within the international community regarding
recognition of a government in Afghanistan, as a consequence of which the country cannot
access the Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) or other IMF resources.
That spokesperson added on September 16, 2021, “our engagement with Afghanistan has been
suspended until there is clarity within the international community on the recognition of the
government” but that “we stand ready to work with the international community to advocate for
urgent actions to stal a looming humanitarian crisis.”243 As of November 2021, the Taliban have
not gained access to the SDRs.
World Bank and Other Multilateral Development Banks
Afghanistan has received significant support from multilateral development banks, including the
World Bank ($5.3 bil ion from 2002-February 2021) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB)
($6.4 bil ion from 2002-June 2021). Both institutions’ funds have supported grants and loans to
projects in infrastructure, agriculture, health, and other sectors. The World Bank had $1.2 bil ion
in active projects in Afghanistan as of February 2021.
On August 25, 2021, a World Bank spokesperson reportedly said “We have paused disbursements
in our operations in Afghanistan and we are closely monitoring and assessing the situation in line
with our internal policies and procedures,” citing concerns about “the country’s development
prospects, especial y for women.”244 World Bank staff based in Kabul had days earlier reportedly
been evacuated to Pakistan.245 In a factsheet published in September 2021, the ADB said it “wil
continue to assist Afghanistan with COVID-19 pandemic recovery” as wel as the agriculture,
energy, natural resources, and other sectors.
On September 23, 2021, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi cal ed for the IMF and World Bank to
release Afghan government accounts “as soon as possible,” alongside criticism of other sanctions
on Afghanistan and the U.S. freezing of DAB assets (see below). In October 2021, the
administration of direct payments to basic health providers in Afghanistan, a program formerly
funded by the World Bank, was reported to be taken over by the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) with funding from the Global Fund, an international health organization.246
Those funds (which amount to $15 mil ion for October 2021) are to be deposited in a UNDP
account in an Afghan commercial bank, as permitted by licenses issued by the U.S. Treasury in
September 2021, after which UNDP wil distribute the funds to NGO implementers. Without
making reference to this or other specific arrangements, U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres

241 David Lawder, “IMF blocks Afghanistan’s access to SDR reserves over lack of clarity on government,” Reuters,
August 18, 2021.
242 T he letter is available at https://hill.house.gov/uploadedfiles/20210817ltrtosecyellenresdrstoafghanistan.pdf.
243 “T ranscript of IMF Press Briefing,” IMF, September 16, 2021.
244 “Afghanistan: World Bank halts aid after T aliban takeover,” BBC, August 25, 2021.
245 “World Bank’s Kabul-based staff evacuated to Pakistan- internal memo,” Reuters, August 20, 2021.
246 Karen DeYoung, “U.N. agency to pay salaries of Afghan health -care workers to help stave off humanitarian crisis,”
Washington Post, October 6, 2021.
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said on October 11, 2021, “We must seek ways to create the conditions that would al ow Afghan
professionals and civil servants to continue working to serve the Afghan population,” and further
cal ed on the international community to “take action and inject liquidity into the Afghan
economy to avoid collapse.”247
U.S. Policy and Congressional Role
As the largest shareholder in both the IMF (16.5% voting share) and the World Bank (16% voting
share), the United States has a role in their decisionmaking. Within the Executive Branch, the
Treasury Department is the lead agency on the IFIs. Congress plays a role in shaping U.S. policy
at the IFIs. Congress authorizes and appropriates U.S. financial contributions to the institutions. It
also passes legislation directing the U.S. representatives at the institutions to use its “voice and
vote” to advocate for specific policies, including prohibiting U.S. support for loans to certain
countries or under certain conditions.248
Some Members have, since the Taliban’s takeover, introduced measures that would direct U.S.
actions at the IMF, including:
 H.R. 5055, introduced by Representative Andy Biggs on August 20, 2021, would
require the Secretary of the Treasury to oppose the IMF’s recognition of the
Taliban as Afghanistan’s government, subject to a presidential waiver certifying
Taliban actions to uphold women’s rights and not support international terrorist
groups.
 H.R. 5316, introduced by Representative Gregory Steube on September 21, 2021,
would prevent al ocations of SDRs at the IMF for countries that perpetrate
genocide or are state sponsors of terrorism.
No similar measures related to other IFIs have been introduced.
U.S.-based Central Bank Reserves
When Taliban opposition forces entered Kabul in November 2001, the Afghan central bank had
around $90,000 in foreign exchange reserves; Taliban fighters reportedly took the rest (over $5
mil ion) as they fled the city.249 In January 2002, the United Nations removed the central bank
from its list of sanctioned authorities, and the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury authorized the
Federal Reserve to unblock over $200 million in central bank assets frozen in 1999 under E.O.
13129.250 Over the next 18 years, the bank (Da Afghanistan Bank, or DAB) built up over $10
bil ion in assets as of June 21, 2021, the date of the latest DAB monthly statement.251
As of June 2021, these assets included $1.3 bil ion in gold held at the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York; $6.2 bil ion in investments, including U.S. Treasury bil s at the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York; and funds managed by the International Reconstruction and Development Bank, a

247 “Opening remarks to the press on Afghanistan,” United Nations Secretary-General, October 11, 2021.
248 See CRS Report R41170, Multilateral Development Banks: Overview and Issues for Congress, by Rebecca M.
Nelson and CRS Report R42019, The International Monetary Fund, by Martin A. Weiss.
249 Andrew Higgins, “Afghanistan’s Looted Central Bank Offers Scant Reserves for Rebuilding,” Wall Street Journal,
December 4, 2001.
250 “T reasury signs license unblocking frozen Afghan assets,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, January 24, 2002.
251 T he value of these assets inside Afghanistan is dependent on the exchange rate of Afghanistan’s currency, the
afghani, and other factors.
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branch of the World Bank. DAB also reported $1.9 bil ion in assets deposited at other foreign
banks. The bank also reported a number of assets within Afghanistan, including approximately
$144 mil ion in gold and silver held at the Presidential Palace in Kabul and nearly $321 mil ion in
foreign currency cash reserves held at the head office and bank branches throughout the
country.252
The Taliban’s August 2021 takeover led to fears that the group would have unfettered access to
the entirety of the central bank’s $10 bil ion in assets. The Taliban reportedly visited the central
bank and asked to inspect its reserves, only to be told that most were located in New York.253
About 5% of central bank assets were physical y located in Afghanistan at the time of the
Taliban’s takeover.
On August 15, 2021, the day the Taliban entered Kabul, the Treasury Department blocked DAB
assets held in U.S. accounts. Administration officials have not stated the process or authorities
under which the assets have been blocked, but one former official has speculated that the
Taliban’s continued designation as an SDGT under E.O. 13224 provided the authority.254
The Taliban appear to view the unblocking of DAB assets as a critical issue. The Taliban acting
foreign minister reportedly raised it in October 2021 meetings with U.S. officials in Doha, and
Taliban spokesmen amplified September 2021 demonstrations in Kabul over the U.S. hold on
Afghan reserves.255 Some Afghans not aligned with the Taliban appear to agree on the issue’s
urgency. One Afghan central bank board member (and appointee of former president Ghani)
cal ed in September 2021 for the international community to “al ow Afghanistan to gain limited
and monitored access to its reserves” to prevent “an economic collapse.”256 One former U.S.
official has echoed support for this approach, suggesting that DAB funds abroad could be used to
finance approved bilateral trade. He asserted in October 2021 testimony before the Senate
Banking Committee that while “there [will] be some seepage to the Taliban,” material goods are
less fungible than currency, offering fewer chances for assistance to boost the Taliban.257
On September 10, 2021, Representative Madison Cawthorn introduced H.Res. 627, which would
express the sense of the House of Representatives that the Biden Administration should continue
to hold al Afghan government assets held in U.S. financial institutions. Congress could also
direct the Administration to continue to block those assets via legislation, though no such
legislation has been introduced as of November 2021. The Biden Administration appears unlikely,
in the short term, to unblock them. In October 2021 testimony, Deputy Treasury Secretary Wal y
Adeyemo said, “I see...no situation in which we would al ow the Taliban to have access to the
reserves that belong to the Afghan people.”258

252 Da Afghanistan Bank, Statement of Financial Position as at 31 Jawza 1400 (21 Jun 2021), available at
https://dab.gov.af/sites/default/files/2021-
08/Monthly%20Financial%20statement%20%20for%20the%20month%20of%20Jawza%20%201400%20%28English
%29%20%20.pdf.
253 Joe Boone, “How exile changed the T aliban,” Financial Times, August 25, 2021.
254 Jeff Stein, “ Biden Administration freezes billions of dollars in Afghan reserves, depriving T aliban of cash,”
Washington Post, August 17, 2021.
255 “Hundreds Protest in Kabul to Demand Release of Afghan Foreign Reserves,” Reuters, September 24, 2021.
256 Josh Smith, “Afghanistan central bank board member urges Biden, IMF to release funds,” Reuters, September 1,
2021.
257 “Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee Holds Hearing on Afghanistan,” CQ Congressional
Transcripts, October 5, 2021.
258 “Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee Holds Hearing on International Sanctions Policy,” CQ
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Outlook for Policymakers
The United States’ relations with the Taliban have been complicated and often contentious. The
United States refused to recognize the group’s rule in the 1990s, and led a military effort to
depose it in 2001. Given the history of the Taliban, and the legacy of adversarial U.S.-Taliban
relations, the prospect of working with the group is objectionable to many Americans. Some
Members have referred to U.S. citizens and others who remain in Afghanistan but seek to leave as
“behind enemy lines.”259 Moreover, the Taliban’s values and policies are at odds with or actively
undermine several U.S. interests. A U.S. policy approach that rejects the group and actively seeks
to weaken it may have broad support.
Such an approach could entail a lack of formal U.S. recognition of the Taliban government and
penalties for states that do recognize the Taliban; materiel or other support for Taliban adversaries
(inside and outside of Afghanistan); broader and stricter sanctions on the Taliban, its members,
and those who are assessed to provide support to it; U.S. action to prevent the release of IFI assets
to Afghanistan; and continued U.S. blocking of Afghan central bank reserves. Pursued separately
or in combination, these pressures would be intended to weaken or even depose the Taliban,
either directly, by empowering its opponents, or indirectly, by creating the kinds of conditions
that might spur a critical mass of Afghans to oppose the group’s rule. Conversely, perceptions that
the United States is trying to influence outcomes in Afghanistan, or that its actions lead to
negative outcomes for Afghans, could have the opposite effect. U.S. cooperation with or support
for anti-Talban entities in Afghanistan could sap the group’s strength, but could also have
negative repercussions in other areas, particularly if those entities act contrary to U.S. interests.
Much depends on the approach of other countries. If other countries, such as Pakistan, Russia, or
China, or U.S. partners, such as Qatar, move toward greater acceptance of the Taliban, this could
isolate the United States, weakening its leverage and giving the Taliban greater opportunities to
evade or counter U.S. pressure. Most immediately, a more punitive U.S. approach could
exacerbate already dire humanitarian conditions in Afghanistan, with uncertain implications for
Taliban rule and regional dynamics.
Alternatively, the United States could take an approach more accepting of the Taliban’s position.
Tacit or explicit dealings between the United States and the Taliban could arguably represent a
continuation of official U.S. engagement with the group that began in 2018. Some may see the
Taliban’s takeover as a fait accompli with which U.S. policymakers should work, however
regrettable or distasteful it might be, to further U.S. interests.
Such an approach could entail the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Taliban
government (including the exchange of ambassadors); relaxing U.S. sanctions on the group;
delivering and facilitating humanitarian and other assistance; working to boost Afghanistan’s role
in regional and global trade; accepting or facilitating Afghanistan’s access to IFI assets; and
unblocking Afghan central government assets for use by the Taliban government. Such steps
could decrease the Taliban’s incentives to establish closer ties with China and others and perhaps
increase the United States’ influence with the Taliban. It is not clear, however, to what extent, if at
al , the Taliban would change their policies on critical issues (such as women’s rights or
counterterrorism) in exchange for or in response to U.S. recognition or assistance (however
offered) or that Chinese or other foreign sources of influence would be affected. If the Taliban do
not make compromises on key issues, U.S. assistance to the Taliban could undermine U.S.

Congressional Transcripts, October 19, 2021.
259 See “House Foreign Affairs Committee Holds Hearing on Afghanistan,” CQ Congressional Transcripts, September
13, 2021.
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interests by strengthening the group’s position. Acceptance of a Taliban government that acts to
secure some U.S. national security interests (such as combat ing ISKP) while not governing
democratical y or protecting human rights could also pose a difficult, if familiar, chal enge for
U.S. policymakers.

Author Information

Clayton Thomas

Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
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under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should n ot be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
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