U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions

August 20, 2021 – September 17, 2021 R46879

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover September 17, 2021
in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions
Clayton Thomas,
On August 15, 2021, the Taliban entered the Afghan capital of Kabul, completing a rapid
Coordinator
takeover over the country with a speed that surprised many Afghans and Americans alike. The
Analyst in Middle Eastern
Taliban’s advance came as the United States was completing the military withdrawal to which it
Affairs
agreed in the February 2020 U.S.-Taliban accord. The U.S. military and diplomatic withdrawal

and evacuation operation concluded on August 30, 2021, with the departure of U.S. forces from
Afghanistan.

The fall of the elected Afghan government, which had been supported by billions of dollars in U.S. assistance over the course
of nearly two decades, raises significant questions about past, present, and future U.S. policy for Members of Congress. This
report provides material related to select questions associated with U.S. policy in Afghanistan, including
 Background information for understanding the current situation in Afghanistan;
 The Taliban takeover and former Afghan government’s collapse;
 U.S. policy implications of the Taliban takeover;
 Social and economic implications of the Taliban takeover;
 Regional reactions to the Taliban’s takeover;
 U.S. military operations;
 Evacuation of U.S. citizens and some Afghans; and
 Budgetary implications of the U.S. withdrawal.
Some additional lines of inquiry that Congress may wish to explore with the executive branch are included alongside specific
topics as appropriate. The report concludes with some strategic considerations Congress may wish to contemplate as it
assesses the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for the future.

Congressional Research Service

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

Background
What are the origins of the Taliban and what was U.S. policy
toward the Taliban before 9/11?1
In 1993-1994, Afghan Muslim clerics and students, mostly of rural, Pashtun origin, formed the
Taliban movement. Many were former anti-Soviet fighters known as mujahideen who had
become disil usioned with the civil war among mujahideen parties that broke out after the 1989
Soviet withdrawal and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet-supported government in 1992.
Many members of the movement had studied in seminaries in Pakistan and chose the name
Taliban (plural of talib, a student of Islam) to distance themselves from the mujahideen.2 Pakistan
supported the Taliban because of the group’s potential to “bring order in chaotic Afghanistan and
make it a cooperative al y,” thus giving Pakistan “greater security on one of the several borders
where Pakistani military officers hoped for what they cal ed ‘strategic depth.’”3 Taliban beliefs
and practices were consonant with, and derived in part from, the conservative tribal traditions of
Pashtuns, who represent a plurality (though not a majority) of Afghanistan’s complex ethnic
makeup and who have traditional y ruled Afghanistan.4
The Taliban viewed the post-Soviet government of President Burhanuddin Rabbani as weak,
corrupt, and anti-Pashtun. The four years of civil war between the mujahideen groups (1992-
1996) created popular support for the Taliban as they were seen as less corrupt and more able to
deliver stability; as Zalmay Khalilzad, who later served as U.S. Special Representative for
Afghanistan Reconciliation ,wrote in his 2016 memoir, “I, like many, was optimistic about the
Taliban” at the outset.5 The Taliban took control of the southern city of Kandahar in November
1994 and launched a series of military campaigns throughout the country that culminated in the
capture of Kabul on September 27, 1996.
The Taliban quickly lost international and domestic support as the group imposed strict adherence
to its interpretation of Islam in areas it controlled and employed harsh punishments, including
public executions, to enforce its decrees, including bans on television, Western music, and
dancing. It prohibited women from attending school or working outside the home, except in
health care, and publicly executed women for al eged adultery. In March 2001, the Taliban drew
international condemnation by destroying monumental sixth-century Buddha statues carved into
hil s above Bamyan city, which the Taliban considered idolatrous and contrary to Islamic norms.
The United States had played a major role in supporting anti-Soviet mujahideen, but U.S.
attention to Afghanistan declined with the withdrawal of Soviet troops after the 1988 Geneva
Accords; the U.S. embassy in Kabul was evacuated for security reasons in January 1989 and
remained closed until 2001. The United States sustained some military assistance to mujahideen

1 T his section was prepared by Clayton T homas, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs.
2 See Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (Yale University Press, 2000).
3 National Commission on T errorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the
National Com m ission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, (2004) p. 64.
4 Like T aliban founder Mullah Omar, most of the senior figures in the T aliban regime were Ghilzai Pashtuns, one of the
major Pashtun tribal confederations; most modern Afghan rulers have been from the Durrani Pashtun tribal
confederation.
5 Zalmay Khalilzad, The Envoy: From Kabul to the White House, My Journey Through a Turbulent World (St. Martin’s
Press, 2016), p. 84.
Congressional Research Service

1

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

groups who continued to fight the Soviet-supported Afghan government. After that government
fel in 1992, there was little appetite to maintain U.S. engagement.6
By the time the Taliban took control of Kabul in 1996, U.S. policy toward the group was unclear
as, according to one observer, “American officials issued a cacophony of statements—some
skeptical, some apparently supportive—from which it was impossible to deduce a clear
position.”7 Rising international and U.S. popular attention to the plight of Afghan women, and a
renewed focus on human rights under Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, led to, by 1997, U.S.
policy shifting against the Taliban. This shift occurred despite support for the group from U.S.
partner Saudi Arabia (one of the three countries, along with Pakistan and the United Arab
Emirates, that recognized the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan).
The Taliban’s sheltering of Al Qaeda (AQ) leader Osama bin Laden eventual y became the
central issue affecting U.S. views of and relations with the Taliban. In 1996, bin Laden moved
from Sudan to Afghanistan, where he had previously spent most of the 1980s as a high profile
financier and organizer of efforts to aid the mujahideen. Pakistani intel igence officers reportedly
introduced Bin Laden to Taliban leaders in Kandahar;8 bin Laden established an al iance with the
Taliban whereby he provided mil ions in financial aid to the group (and military support for
Taliban efforts to complete their conquest of the country) and the Taliban provided safe haven for
AQ recruits and training camps. Over 10,000 AQ fighters may have trained at AQ camps in
Afghanistan.9 U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Bil Richardson visited Kabul in April
1998, the highest ranking U.S. official to do so in decades. In response to Richardson’s request
that the Taliban expel bin Laden, the group “answered that they did not know his whereabouts. In
any case, the Taliban said, [bin Laden] was not a threat to the United States.”10
The threat posed by bin Laden became clearer on August 7, 1998, when Al Qaeda operatives
simultaneously bombed U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, kil ing over 200 people. In
response, the United States launched cruise missile attacks on AQ targets in Afghanistan that
were unsuccessful in either kil ing bin Laden or persuading the Taliban to expel him. U.S.
pressure on the Saudis and Pakistanis to use their influence to convince the Taliban to expel the
AQ leader proved equal y unsuccessful. In July 1999, President Bil Clinton imposed sanctions
on the Taliban that were equivalent to those imposed on governments deemed state sponsors of
terror (E.O. 13129). United Nations Security Council travel and economic sanctions against the
Taliban were added in October with United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1267
and expanded with UNSCR 1333, which included an arms embargo against the Taliban, in
December 2000. In the face of these threats, Taliban leadership was unmoved; their relationship
with bin Laden was “sometimes tense” but “the foundation was deep and personal,” according to
the 9/11 Commission Report.11

6 Special Envoy to the Afghan Resistance (1989-1992) Peter Tomsen, quoted in Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret
History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to Septem ber 10, 2001 (Penguin, 2005), p,
239.
7 Coll, Ghost Wars, p. 338.
8 T he 9/11 Commission Report, p. 64.
9 T he 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 66-67.
10 T he 9/11 Commission Report, p. 111.
11 T he 9/11 Commission Report, p. 125.
Congressional Research Service

2

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

Why did the United States initially deploy military forces to
Afghanistan?12
On September 11, 2001, AQ operatives conducted a series of terrorist attacks in the United States
that kil ed nearly 3,000 people. In a nationwide address before a joint session of Congress on
September 20, 2001, President George W. Bush demanded that the Taliban hand over AQ leaders,
permanently close terrorist training camps, and give the United States access to such camps,
adding that the Taliban “must hand over the terrorists, or they wil share in their fate.”13 Taliban
leaders refused, citing bin Laden’s status as their guest.14
Pursuant to an authorization for the use of military force (AUMF) enacted on September 18, 2001
(P.L. 107-40), U.S. military action began on October 7, 2001, with airstrikes on Taliban targets
throughout the country and close air support to anti-Taliban forces in northern Afghanistan.
Limited numbers of U.S. Army Special Forces, Central Intel igence Agency (CIA) paramilitary
forces, and some conventional ground forces began deploying in Afghanistan less than two weeks
later.15 By November 13, the Taliban evacuated Kabul, which was soon retaken by those Afghan
forces (known as the Northern Al iance).
As U.S.-backed Afghan forces drew closer to the southern city of Kandahar, birthplace of the
Taliban movement and home of Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar, Taliban leaders
reportedly offered terms of surrender, including an amnesty for Taliban fighters who would lay
down their arms. U.S. officials rejected such an amnesty and while many Taliban fighters and
leaders were kil ed or captured by U.S. or Afghan forces, others (including Mullah Omar) sought
shelter in remote or rural parts of Afghanistan or escaped to Pakistan.
What was the post-2001 mission of U.S. forces in Afghanistan?16
In December 2001, Afghan delegates convened in Bonn, Germany, by the United Nations
selected Hamid Karzai to serve as head of an interim national government, marking the beginning
of post-Taliban governance. No attempt appears to have been made to include the Taliban in those
talks.17 No Taliban members participated in the 2002 emergency loya jirga (consultative
assembly) that elected Karzai as president.
The creation of the new Afghan government also represented the beginning of a major new
mission set for U.S. forces and their international partners: helping defend and develop that
government and its nascent military. Karzai attended the January 2002 State of the Union address
where President Bush previewed this expanded mission, saying that the United States and
Afghanistan were “al ies against terror” and that “we wil be partners in rebuilding that
country.”18 Congress supported the Bush Administration in this approach, authorizing and

12 T his section was prepared by Clayton T homas, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs.
13 “T ext: President Bush Addresses the Nation,” Washington Post, September 20, 2001.
14 Steve Coll, Directorate S: The CIA and America’s Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Penguin Press, 2018),
pp. 69.
15 For more on the first year of U.S. operations in Afghanistan, see Walter L. Perry and David Kassing, “T oppling the
T aliban: Air-Ground Operations in Afghanistan, October 2001 -June 2002,” RAND Corporation, 2015.
16 T his section was prepared by Clayton T homas, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs.
17 Khalilzad later wrote, “I am skeptical that the international community could have lured the T aliban to the table at
Bonn.” Khalilzad, p. 121.
18 “President Delivers State of the Union Address,” White House (archived), January 29, 2002.
Congressional Research Service

3

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

appropriating funds for more expansive U.S. military and civilian assistance missions (e.g., via
the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act, 2002, P.L. 107-327, reauthorized and expanded in the
Afghanistan Freedom Support Act Amendments of 2004, Section 7104 of P.L. 108-458). U.S.
officials declared an end to major combat operations in Afghanistan on May 1, 2003, though
then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said that “pockets of resistance in certain parts of the
country remain.”19
By 2005, scattered Taliban forces had already begun to regroup in the Pashtun heartland of
eastern and southern Afghanistan, as wel as across the border in Pakistan, where many observers
suspected that Pakistan’s security and intel igence services were tolerating, if not actively
supporting them.20 The Taliban described continuing U.S. and coalition military operations in
Afghanistan as a military occupation and characterized their Afghan government adversaries as
puppets of foreign powers.21
In response to growing Taliban activity, the United States gradual y increased forces to around
30,000 by the end of the George W. Bush Administration. Under the Obama Administration, the
United States and its partners further increased international force levels as part of a “surge”
which peaked at over 130,000 troops (of which around 100,000 were U.S. troops) in 2010-11, but
set a goal to end combat operations by the end of 2014.
U.S.-Taliban Talks Under the Obama Administration
Secret negotiations between a Taliban representative and some U.S. officials began in late 2010. Secretary of State
Hil ary Clinton framed those talks by stating in an early 2011 speech that the Taliban’s breaking with Al Qaeda,
renouncing violence, and abiding by the Afghan constitution were “necessary outcomes” of a prospective
negotiation rather than “preconditions.”22 The talks centered largely on confidence-building measures, specifical y
the issues of a prisoner exchange and the opening of a Taliban political office in Doha, Qatar.
Multiple factors, including opposition from then-President Karzai, caused the talks to col apse in early 2012. Qatari
and Pakistani mediation led to a 2013 agreement to al ow the Taliban to open an office in Doha. However, the
Taliban opened that office in June 2013 with the trappings of an official embassy, in direct violation of the terms of
the agreement; the Qatari government responded by shuttering the office less than a month later.23 In June 2014,
Qatar coordinated the release of U.S. prisoner Bowe Bergdahl in exchange for five high-ranking Taliban officials
imprisoned at Guantanamo Bay–four of them hold positions in the Taliban government announced on September
7, 2021.24 No further talks between U.S. and Taliban officials occurred under the Obama Administration.
Though that “surge” was arguably successful in weakening Taliban advances, by 2010 the Obama
Administration assessed that military means alone would not resolve the conflict.25 Preliminary
U.S.-Taliban negotiations were constrained by U.S. policy to require the inclusion of the Afghan

19 “Rumsfeld: Major combat over in Afghanistan,” CNN, May 1, 2003.
20 See, for example, Matt Waldman, “T he Sun in the Sky: T he Relationship between Pakistan’s ISI and Afghan
Insurgents,” Crisis States Research Centre, June 2010.
21 See Matthew Calvin, “T he Use of English-Language Internet Propaganda by the T aliban Insurgency in Afghanistan,
2007-2010,” Electronic Theses and Dissertations, June 2011, available at https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd/108;
T homas Ruttig, “How T ribal are the T aliban?” Afghanistan Analysts Network, 2010.
22 Hillary Clinton, Hard Choices (Simon and Schuster, 2014), p. 152.
23 See Coll, Directorate S, pp. 503-508, 578-585, 636-641.
24 T he five figures, and their positions during the T aliban’s period of rule, were Mullah Mohammad Fazl, the chief of
staff of the T aliban’s military; Noorullah Noori, the T aliban commander in northern Afghanistan; Khairullah
Khairkhwa, the T aliban regime Interior Minister; Mohammad Nabi Omari, a T aliban official; and Abdul Haq Wasiq,
the T aliban regime’s deputy intelligence chief. Mujib Mashal, “ Once Jailed in Guantánamo, 5 T aliban Now Face U.S.
at the Negotiating T able,” The New York Times, March 26, 2019.
25 Rod Nordland, “T roop ‘Surge’ in Afghanistan Ends with Mixed Results,” New York Times, September 21, 2012.
Congressional Research Service

4

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

government, with which the Taliban refused to meet, in any settlement (see textbox above).26 As
international force levels were reduced in advance of the scheduled 2014 transition, NATO began
gradual y transferring security duties to Afghan forces starting in 2011. Afghan forces assumed
full responsibility for security nationwide at the end of 2014 with the end of the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the start of the noncombat Resolute Support Mission
(RSM) that began on January 1, 2015. In addition to training, advising, and assisting Afghan
forces as part of RSM, U.S. troops in Afghanistan also conducted counterterrorism operations;
these two “complementary missions” comprised Operation Freedom’s Sentinel.
How much has DOD spent on the war in Afghanistan?27
According to the most recent DOD Cost of War quarterly report, from September 11, 2001,
through March 31, 2021, the Department obligated a total of $837.3 bil ion in current dollars for
military operations (i.e., Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Freedom’s Sentinel28) and
reconstruction activities in Afghanistan.29 (An obligation is a commitment for the payment of
goods and services.)30 According to DOD, department annual obligations in current dollars for
activities in Afghanistan peaked at $98 bil ion in FY2012 and decreased to $40 bil ion in FY2020,
the last full fiscal year for which data are available.31
According to SIGAR’s most recent quarterly report to Congress, from October 1, 2001, through
June 30, 2021, Congress has appropriated or the U.S. government has otherwise made available
approximately $145 bil ion in current dollars to federal agencies, including DOD, for
reconstruction and related activities in Afghanistan.32 According to SIGAR, of that total,
approximately $83 bil ion in current dollars went to the ASFF, which is included in the Cost of
War figure above.33
Some nongovernmental observers provide higher estimates of the cost of U.S. government
activities in Afghanistan over the past two decades. For example, as of April 15, 2021, the Costs
of War Project of the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University
estimated U.S. costs to date for the war in Afghanistan at $2.26 tril ion.34 In addition to funding

26 Evan MacAskill and Simon T isdall, “White House shifts Afghanistan strategy towards talks with T aliban,” The
Guardian (UK), July 19, 2010.
27 T his section was prepared by Brendan McGarry, Analyst in U.S. Defense Budget.
28 Operation Freedom’s Sentinel is the U.S. contribution to the NAT O-led Resolute Support Mission to train, advise,
and assist Afghan security forces and institutions. For more information, see NAT O, “ Resolute Support Mission in
Afghanistan,” updated July 6, 2021, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_113694.htm.
29 DOD, FY 2021 Quarter 2 Cost of War Update as of March 31, 2021 , on file with author.
30 GAO, A Glossary of Terms Used in the Federal Budget Process, GAO-05-734SP, September 2005, p. 70, at
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-05-734sp.pdf. T his document states in part: “ An agency incurs an obligation, for
example, when it places an order, signs a contract, awards a grant, purchases a service, or takes other actions that
require the government to make payments to the public or from one government account to another.”
31 DOD, FY 2021 Quarter 2 Cost of War Update as of March 31, 2021, on file with author.
32 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 30,
2021.
33 Ibid. DOD, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, May 2021, De fense
Budget Overview, United States Departm ent of Defense, Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request , p. 7-2, at
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2022/
FY2022_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf.
34 Figure is in nominal dollars. Brown University, Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Costs of War
website, accessed August 16, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

5

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

for overseas contingency operations of the DOD and State Department, the estimate includes
amounts for what it describes as other war-related costs, such as interest on the national debt from
borrowing, increases to the DOD base budget, and medical care for U.S. veterans who served in
Afghanistan.35
When and why did the U.S. military withdrawal begin?36
When President Donald Trump came into office in January 2017, approximately 11,000 U.S.
troops were reportedly in Afghanistan, with U.S. force levels having declined from their 2009-
2011 high point of approximately 100,000 U.S. troops.37 In June 2017, President Trump delegated
to Secretary of Defense James Mattis the authority to set force levels, reportedly limited to around
3,500 additional troops; Secretary Mattis signed orders to deploy them in September 2017.38
Those additional forces (al of which were dedicated to NATO-led RSM) arrived in Afghanistan
within months, putting the total number of U.S. troops in the country between 14,000 and 15,000
by the end of 2017.39
By mid-2018, President Trump was reportedly frustrated with the lack of military progress
against the Taliban, and he ordered formal and direct U.S.-Taliban talks without Afghan
government participation for the first time. As those talks developed under Special Representative
for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad, President Trump continued to express
frustration with the U.S. military mission in Afghanistan and a desire to withdraw U.S. forces,
saying in August 2019 that he wanted to do so “as quickly as we can.”40 U.S. force levels began
to contract in 2019: at an October 9, 2019, news conference, General Austin S. Mil er, the top
U.S. commander in Afghanistan, said that the number of U.S. forces had been gradual y reduced
by 2,000 over the past year, to between 12,000 and 13,000.41
In February 2020, the United States and the Taliban signed a formal agreement in which the
United States committed to withdrawing al of its troops, contractors, and non-diplomatic civilian
personnel from Afghanistan, with a drawdown in military forces to 8,600 by mid-July 2020 and a
complete withdrawal by the end of April 2021. In return, the Taliban committed to prevent any
groups, including Al Qaeda, from threatening the United States or its al ies by not al owing those

35 Ibid.
36 T his section was prepared by Clayton T homas, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs, and Kathleen McInnis, Specialist
in International Security.
37 While the level was reported publicly at 8,400, media outlets reported in August 2017 that the figure was actually
around 11,000 on any given day due to units rotating in and out of theater. See Gordon Lubold and Nancy Youssef,
“U.S. Has More T roops in Afghanistan T han Publicly Disclosed,” Wall Street Journal, August 22, 2017. See also CRS
Report R44116, Departm ent of Defense Contractor and Troop Levels in Afghanistan and Iraq: 2007 -2020, by Heidi M.
Peters.
38 T ara Copp, “Mattis signs orders to send about 3,500 more US troops to Afghanistan,” Military Times, September 11,
2017.
39 Dan Lamothe, “T rump added troops in Afghanistan. But NAT O is still short of meeting its goal,” Washington Post,
November 9, 2017; Greg Jaffe and Missy Ryan, “Up to 1,000 more U.S. troops could be headed to Afghanistan this
spring,” Washington Post, January 21, 2018. As of September 30, 2017, the total number of active duty and reserve
forces in Afghanistan was 15,298. Defense Manpower Data Center, Military and Civilian Personnel by Service/Agency
by State/Country Quarterly Report, September 2017.
40 Kevin Baron, “T rump Says US T roops Shouldn’t be ‘Policemen’ in Afghanistan. So Why Are T hey T here?”
DefenseOne, July 22, 2019; “ T rump Wants to Get Out Of Afghanistan ‘As Quickly As He Can,’” TOLOnews, August
1, 2019.
41 T homas Gibbons-Neff and Mujib Mashal, “U.S. Is Quietly Reducing Its T roop Force in Afghanistan,” New York
Tim es, October 21, 2019.
Congressional Research Service

6

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

groups to reside, train, or fundraise in Afghanistan. The U.S. withdrawal commitment was not
conditioned on the Taliban reducing violence against the Afghan government, making
concessions in intra-Afghan talks, or taking other actions.
The agreement also stated that up to 5,000 Taliban prisoners held by the Afghan government
(which was not a party to the agreement) and up to 1,000 Afghan personnel captured by the
Taliban “wil be released” in March 2020. Per the agreement, intra-Afghan negotiations were also
to begin that month, but talks remained unscheduled for months amid political gridlock in Kabul
and disagreements over the prisoner release. The parties to the conflict completed the prisoner
release in early September 2020, removing the main obstacle to intra-Afghan talks, which began
in Doha on September 12, 2020.
Throughout 2020, U.S. officials stated that the Taliban were not in full compliance with the
agreement, U.S. force levels continued to drop, reaching 8,600 one month ahead of the mid-July
2020 deadline in the U.S.-Taliban accord.42 Confusion about the United States’ future military
posture grew in October 2020 due to contradictory visions expressed by senior Trump
Administration officials, including President Trump’s tweet that, “We should have the smal
remaining number of our BRAVE Men and Women serving in Afghanistan home by
Christmas!”43
On November 17, 2020, then-Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher Mil er announced, “we
wil implement President Trump’s orders to continue our repositioning of forces” from
Afghanistan, and that 2,500 U.S. forces would remain in Afghanistan by January 15, 2021. Acting
Secretary Mil er characterized the drawdown (announced alongside a similar reduction of U.S.
forces from Iraq) as “consistent with our established plans and strategic objectives,” and said it
“does not equate to a change in U.S. policy or objectives.”44 On January 15, 2021, Acting
Secretary Mil er confirmed that the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan had reached 2,500.45
President Biden, who took office on January 20, 2021, reportedly opposed the Obama
Administration’s decision to increase U.S. force levels as Vice President in 2009, and expressed
skepticism about troop levels in Afghanistan as a candidate during the 2020 primary campaign.46
As President, he said in a March 16, 2021, interview that the U.S.-Taliban agreement was “not a
very solidly negotiated deal” and that meeting its May 1 withdrawal deadline “could happen” but
would be “tough.”47 He also said an Administration review of U.S. policy in Afghanistan was “in
process” and that reaching a decision would not take “a lot longer.” At a March 25, 2021, press
conference, he said “I can’t picture” U.S. troops in Afghanistan next year.48

42 Kylie Atwood and Ryan Browne, “US troop drawdown in Afghanistan running ahead of schedule,” CNN, April 30,
2020; “T aliban not living up to its commitments, U.S. Defense Secretary says,” Reuters, May 5, 2020; Robert Burns,
“US General: T aliban Not Yet Met Conditions for US Withdrawal,” Associated Press, June 10, 2020.
43 “U.S. troops in Afghanistan should be ‘home by Christmas’: T rump,” Reuters, October 7, 2020.
44 “Acting Secretary Miller Announces T roop Levels in Afghanistan and Iraq,” Department of Defense, November 17,
2020.
45 “Statement by Acting Defense Secretary Christopher Miller on Force Levels in Afghanistan,” Departm ent of Defense
January 15, 2021.
46 Coll, Directorate S, op. cit., pp. 353-354, 367; “Transcript: Joe Biden on Face the Nation,” CBS News, February 23,
2020.
47 “T RANSCRIPT : ABC News’ George Stephanopoulos interviews President Joe Biden,” ABC News, March 17, 2021.
48 “President Biden Holds News Conference,” C-SPAN, March 25, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

7

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

On April 14, 2021, President Biden announced that the United States would begin a “final
withdrawal” on May 1, to be completed by September 11, 2021.49 In a written response, the
Taliban accused the United States of breaching the February 2020 agreement and stated that the
U.S. decision to stay beyond May 1 “in principle opens the way for [Taliban forces] to take every
necessary countermeasure, hence the American side wil be held responsible for al future
consequences.”50 A senior Administration official said after the withdrawal announcement, “We
have communicated to the Taliban in no uncertain terms that if they do conduct attacks against
U.S. or al ied forces … we wil hit back hard.”51 On August 26, 2021, U.S. forces and Afghan
nationals were kil ed in an attack in Kabul claimed by the Islamic State affiliate in Afghanistan,
which has been in conflict with the Taliban. Stil , the attack may raise questions about the
Taliban’s compliance with the February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement, in which the Taliban
commit “to prevent any group or individual … from using the soil of Afghanistan to threaten the
security of the United States.
Some observers contend that the Biden Administration could have chosen to ignore the agreement
and retained a smal force in the country comprising several thousand troops in order to facilitate
an intra-Afghan peace agreement.52 According to this view, the costs of retaining such a force
would have been smal compared to the security risks associated with the Afghan government’s
collapse. By contrast, President Biden argued that retaining such a force would not have been
feasible; the smal number of U.S. troops would not have been sufficient to deter Taliban forces
and a re-escalation of U.S. forces and military capabilities into Afghanistan would ultimately
have been required.53 Stil others contend that even assuming a minimal footprint could have been
feasible, doing so would not have been worth risking further U.S. resources and lives.54
The final stage of the planned U.S. military withdrawal began on May 1, 2021, and by June,
United States Central Command (CENTCOM) reported that as much as 44% of the “retrograde
process” was complete.55 Most NATO al ies and other U.S. partners withdrew their forces by
July.56 On July 8, President Biden announced that “our military mission in Afghanistan wil
conclude on August 31st.” A rapid Taliban advance, culminating in the August taking of Kabul
and the emergency evacuation of U.S. embassy personnel and some Afghans out of Afghanistan,
prompted the United States to deploy several thousand additional troops to facilitate the
evacuation.
On August 14, President Biden released a statement saying in part, “One more year, or five more
years, of U.S. military presence would not have made a difference if the Afghan military cannot
or wil not hold its own country. And an endless American presence in the middle of another

49 White House, “Remarks by President Biden on the Way Forward in Afghanistan,” April 14, 2021.
50 “Statement of Islamic Emirate regarding recent announcement by US President Joe Biden,” Voice of Jihad, April 15,
2021.
51 White House, “Background Press Call by a Senior Administration Official on Afghanistan,” April 13, 2021.
52 United States Institute of Peace, Afghanistan Study Group: Final Report, February 2021.
53 T he White House, Remarks by President Biden on the Drawdown of U.S. Forces in Afghanistan , July 8, 2021.
54 Vanda Felbab-Brown, The US decision to withdraw from Afghanistan is the right one, T he Brookings Institution,
April 15, 2021.
55 “Update on withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan May 31, 2021,” CENT COM, June 1, 2021.
56 Geir Moulson and Kathy Gannon, “Most European troops exit Afghanistan quietly after 20 years,” Associated Press,
June 30, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

8

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

country’s civil conflict was not acceptable to me.”57 He reiterated that position in an August 16,
2021, address, saying, “there never was a good time to withdraw U.S. forces.”58
Some contend that the United States did not fully factor effective war termination into its
Afghanistan campaign strategies and force designs, resulting in a military effort that did not
enable a satisfactory conclusion to the war.59 At an operational level, some observers question the
robustness of the plan to withdraw U.S. troops and key Afghan partners from Afghanistan.60 Such
questions are also related to intel igence estimates of ANDSF abilities to resist the Taliban
advance. Congress may scrutinize whether, and how, military campaign planning could have
managed these perceived strategic and operational flaws.61
Taliban Takeover and Afghan Government Collapse
When and how did the Taliban overcome Afghan
government forces?62
Throughout 2020 and 2021, Afghan officials sought to downplay the potential detrimental impact
of the U.S. troop withdrawal while emphasizing the need for continued U.S. financial assistance
to Afghan forces.63 In a May 2021 press conference, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
General Mark Mil ey said “bad outcomes” were not “inevitable,” given what he characterized as
the strengths of the Afghan government and military.64 In its 2021 annual threat assessment, the
Office of the Director of National Intel igence reported that “the Afghan Government wil
struggle to hold the Taliban at bay if the Coalition withdraws support.”65
An external assessment published in January 2021 concluded that the Taliban enjoyed a strong
advantage over the Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) in cohesion and
a slight advantage in force employment and that the two forces essential y split on material
resources and external support. The one ANDSF advantage, size, was assessed as much narrower
than often assumed. The author concluded in his net assessment that the Taliban enjoyed a narrow
advantage over the government.66 The Taliban had also come to control significant territory: in
October 2018, the last time the U.S. government made such data publicly available, the group

57 T he White House, “Statement by President Joe Biden on Afghanistan,” August 14, 2021.
58 T he White House, “Remarks by President Biden on Afghanistan,” August 16, 2021.
59 Christopher D. Kolenda, Zero Sum Victory: What We’re Getting Wrong about War (University Press of Kentucky,
Forthcoming).
60 Devan Cole, Daniella Diaz, Melanie Zanona, Lauren Fox and Jennifer Hansler, “T op Republican on foreign affairs
committee slams Biden over ‘unmitigated disaster’ in Afghanistan,” CNN Politics, August 15, 2021. See
https://www.cnn.com/2021/08/15/politics/michael-mccaul-afghanistan-withdrawal-criticism-cnntv/index.html
61 See, for example, discussion in Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, What We Need to Learn:
Lessons from Twenty Years of Afghanistan Reconstruction , August 2021.
62 T his section was prepared by Clayton T homas, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs, and Kathleen McInnis, Specialist
in International Security.
63 Zahra Rahimi, “ANDSF Showcases Air Force as Country Braces for US Pullout,” TOLOnews, April 26, 2021.
64 T ranscript: Secretary of Defense Austin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Milley Press Briefing,
Department of Defense, May 6, 2021.
65 Annual T hreat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, April
19, 2021.
66 Jonathan Schroden, “Afghanistan Security Forces Versus the T aliban: A Net Assessment,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 14,
Issue 1, January 2021.
Congressional Research Service

9

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

controlled or contested as much as 40% of Afghanistan and the group continued to make gradual
gains in subsequent years.
In early May 2021, the Taliban began a sweeping advance that captured wide swaths of the
country’s rural areas, solidifying the group’s hold on some areas in which it already had a
significant presence. The Taliban’s seizure of other districts was more surprising: some northern
areas had militarily resisted the Taliban when the group was in power in the 1990s, making their
2021 fal to the Taliban particularly significant. One source estimated that the Taliban took
control of over 100 of Afghanistan’s 400 districts in May and June 2021.67 The speed of the
Taliban’s advance reportedly surprised some within the group, with one commander saying that
his forces were intentional y avoiding capturing provincial capitals before the departure of U.S.
forces.68 In July, the Taliban began seizing border crossings with Tajikistan, Iran, and Pakistan,
depriving the Afghan government of critical customs revenues. On July 21, 2021, General Mil ey
estimated that over 200 districts were under Taliban control, but emphasized that the Taliban had
not seized any provincial capitals, where Afghan forces had been consolidated.69
On August 6, 2021, the Taliban captured their first provincial capital, a notable achievement given
that U.S. commanders and others had often pointed to the Taliban’s inability to take and control a
provincial capital in recent years as evidence of the Afghan government’s relative strength. The
Taliban’s capture of half of Afghanistan’s provincial capitals in the following week surprised
many observers and, reportedly, U.S. officials.70 By August 13, U.S. officials were reportedly
concerned that the Taliban could move on Kabul within days. With the fal of Jalalabad in the east
and Mazar-e-Sharif in the north, the Taliban captured the last major cities and eliminated the final
outposts of organized Afghan government resistance. On the morning of August 15, 2021, the
Taliban began entering Kabul, completing their effective takeover of the country. The central and
historical y significant province of Panjshir, where some former Afghan leaders attempted to
establish an armed resistance to the Taliban, was reportedly captured by Taliban forces in
September 2021 amid reports of Taliban kil ings of civilians.71

67 Kate Clark and Obaid Ali, “A Quarter of Afghanistan’s Districts Fall to the T aleban amid Calls for a ‘Second
Resistance,’” Afghanistan Analysts Network, July 2, 2021.
68 Dan De Luce, Mushtaq Yusufzai, and Saphora Smith, “Even the T aliban are surprised at how fast they’re advancing
in Afghanistan,” NBC News, June 25, 2021.
69 Secretary of Defense Austin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Milley Press Briefing, U.S. Department
of Defense, July 21, 2021.
70 Zeke Miller et al., “Biden team surprised by rapid T aliban gains in Afghanistan,” Associated Press, August 15, 2021.
71 “Afghanistan crisis: T aliban kill civilians in resistance stronghold,” BBC, September 13, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

10

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

Figure 1. Taliban Control of Provincial Capitals, August 6-15, 2021

Source: Created by CRS. Boundaries from U.S. State Department, GADM, and Esri.
While the Taliban faced stiff, if ultimately unsuccessful, resistance from government forces in
some areas,72 some provincial capitals and other areas were taken with minimal fighting. In many
of these areas, the Taliban reportedly secured the departure of government forces (and the
handover of their weapons) through payments or through the mediation of local elders seeking to
avoid bloodshed.73
Experts have offered a number of explanations for why the ANDSF did not stem the Taliban
advance.74
 Reportedly high casualty and attrition rates in the ANDSF in recent years.75
While the ANDSF’s official force level was reported to be just under 300,000,
most observers assess its actual strength was lower.

72 BBC News, Afghanistan: T aliban continue attacks on three major cities, August 1, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/
world-asia-58040141.
73 Susannah George, “Afghanistan’s military collapse: Illicit deals and mass desertions,” Washington Post, August 15,
2021.
74 See also CRS Insight IN11728, The Collapse of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: Implications for
U.S. Security Assistance and Cooperation , by Christina L. Arabia.
75 Once-public statistics on ANDSF metrics were withheld by the U.S. military starting in October 2017. Shawn Snow,
Congressional Research Service

11

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

 Widespread corruption within the Afghan military and government, often leading
to soldiers going without salaries or even food, which arguably undermined the
government’s authority and alienated former and potential supporters.76
 A lack of preparation on the part of Afghan civilian and military leaders, who,
according to some analysts, did not believe that the United States would
ultimately withdraw troops and contractors.77
 A political calculation by the Afghan government to not cede vulnerable rural
outposts to the Taliban, leaving Afghan forces overstretched and easily isolated
by Taliban fighters.78
 The February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement, which reportedly “demoralized”
Afghan forces and prompted ever-growing numbers of Afghan soldiers to accept
Taliban payments to surrender.79 Some also argue that the end of largescale U.S.
airstrikes after the February 2020 agreement al owed the Taliban time to regroup
and further weakened Afghan forces’ wil to fight.80
 The withdrawal (per the U.S.-Taliban accord) of U.S. and international
contractors, upon whom Afghans depended for maintenance of their own air
force as wel as intel igence and close air support.81
 The centralized structure of the Afghan military, with some observers arguing
that the United States trained a centralized national military il -fitted to
Afghanistan’s unique circumstances, specifical y its ethnic diversity and history
of local y organized and led security forces.82
 The prioritization by the United States of the quantity of ANDSF forces over
their quality, which led to decisions about ANDSF end strength that was
unaffordable without international support.83
What is the status of the former Afghan government?84
President Ashraf Ghani, whose seven-year tenure was characterized by electoral crises, factional
infighting, and the gradual deterioration of Afghan forces, fled the country on the morning of

“Report: US officials classify crucial metrics on Afghan casualties, readiness,” Military Times, October 30, 2017.
76 Chas Danner, “ Why Afghanistan’s Security Forces Suddenly Collapsed,” New York Magazine, August 17, 2021;
T homas Gibbons-Neff and T aimoor Shah, “ T he T aliban Close in on Afghan Cities, Pushing the Country to the Brink,”
New York Tim es, July 9, 2021.
77 Amy Kazmin, et. al., “Low morale, no support and bad politics: why the Afghan army folded,” Financial Times,
August 15, 2021.
78 Benjamin Jensen, “How the T aliban did it: Inside the ‘operational art’ of its military victory,” Atlantic Council,
August 15, 2021.
79 George, “Afghanistan’s military collapse.”
80 Yaroslav T rofimov, “How the T aliban Overran the Afghan Army, Built by the U.S. Over 20 Years,” Wall Street
Journal, April 14, 2021.
81 Jack Detsch, “Departure of Private Contractors Was a T urning Point in Afghan Military’s Collapse,” Foreign Policy,
August 16, 2021.
82 T ara Copp, “T he US Spent $83 Billion T raining Afghan Forces. Why Did T hey Collapse So Quickly?” Defense One,
August 14, 2021.
83 For a previous discussion of this point, see Rebecca Zimmerman, “T raining Foreign Military Forces: Quantity versus
Quality,” War on the Rocks, July 15, 2015.
84 T his section was prepared by Clayton T homas, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs.
Congressional Research Service

12

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

August 15, 2021. On the evening of August 15, Ghani posted on Facebook that he left Kabul to
prevent bloodshed and that the “Taliban have won the judgment of sword and guns and now they
are responsible for protecting the countrymen’s honor, wealth and self-esteem.”85 After days of
questions about his location, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
International Cooperation announced on August 18 that “the UAE has welcomed President Ashraf
Ghani and his family into the country on humanitarian grounds.”86 As of September 17, he does
not appear to have formal y resigned his office.
Many other government-aligned elites, formerly regarded as influential powerbrokers, also have
left the country or been sidelined by the takeover. Militia commander and former Herat governor
Ismail Khan was captured by the Taliban in fighting in Herat before being al owed to relocate to
Iran; Marshal Abdulrashid Dostum and Atta Mohammad Noor, another former governor,
convened their forces in the northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif and subsequently fled to Uzbekistan.
Another group of Afghan political leaders, including High Council for National Reconciliation
Chairman Abdullah Abdullah, former President Hamid Karzai, and former Islamist insurgent
leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, met with Taliban officials after the group’s takeover, but are not
playing a role in the Taliban government. One August 26 media account described Karzai and
Abdullah as “effectively under house arrest.”87
Former First Vice President Amrullah Saleh claimed on Twitter on August 17 to be the
“legitimate care taker [sic] President” and to be “reaching out to al leaders to secure their support
& consensus.”88 Saleh had previously vowed to never submit to Taliban rule and cal ed on
Afghans to join him in resisting the group. He relocated to the central province of Panjshir, whose
strategic location and historic legacy (it was never occupied by the Soviets in the 1980s or the
Taliban in the 1990s) give it outsized import. He was joined by the son of the late Northern
Al iance commander Ahmad Shah Massoud. They stated that they have formed an armed
resistance to the Taliban and appealed for U.S. and international support.89 The Taliban claim to
have taken control of the province as of September 6, amid reports of continued sporadic fighting
and Taliban kil ings of civilians.90
With the taking of Panjshir, the Taliban appear to effectively control the entire country, unlike the
1990s when the former Northern Al iance represented significant armed opposition and held
around 10% of the country’s territory. The Taliban also have stronger ties with regional powers
(including some that once supported the Northern Al iance against the Taliban). Stil , the

85 Chantal Da Silva, Ahmed Mengli and Mushtaq Yusufzai, “From Afghan nation-builder to life in ‘exile’: Ashraf
Ghani flees country in defeat ,” NBC News, August 16, 2021. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/afghan-nation-
builder-life-exile-ashraf-ghani-flees-country-defeat-n1276826
86 UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Statement on President Ashraf Ghani, August 18
2021.
87 Nic Robertson, “T aliban removes security from ex-Afghan President Hamid Karzai and Abdullah Abdullah, source
says,” CNN, August 26, 2021.
88 Amrullah Saleh, T witter, August 17, 2021, 9:59AM, https://twitter.com/AmrullahSaleh2/status/
1427631191545589772. Section 60 of the Afghan constitution provides that the first Vice President “ shall act in
accordance with the provisions of this Constitution” in the event of the president’s “absence, resignation or death.”
Section 67 of the Afghan constitution provides that the first Vice President shall assume the responsibilities of
president in the case of the president’s resignation, impeachment, or death; the president is to “personally tender” his
resignation to the National Assembly.
89 Ahmad Massoud, “Opinion: T he mujahideen resistance to the T aliban begins now. But we need help,” Washington
Post, August 18, 2021.
90 Natasha T urak, “Fighting continues in Afghanistan’s Panjshir Valley as anti-T aliban resistance vows to hold out,”
CNBC, September 7, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

13

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

existence of resistance factions, in Panjshir or elsewhere, could serve as a ral ying point or
galvanize Taliban opponents nationwide, who might then make additional appeals for U.S. or
other international assistance.
How have the Taliban acted since taking power?91
The Taliban have controlled territory in parts of Afghanistan for years, but their takeover of the
country in August 2021 puts them in control of urban areas for the first time since 2001. The
Afghanistan that the Taliban wil govern in 2021 is different in economic, political, and social
terms from the country the group ruled two decades ago. As the Taliban consolidated power,
observers also speculated on how much they had changed and how they might govern. 92 The
hardline “caretaker” government announced by the Taliban on September 7, 2021, does not
indicate a more inclusive approach to governing.
On September 7, 2021, longtime Taliban spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid (making his first
appearance in public) announced the names of 33 individuals who were described as “acting”
ministers that fil a “caretaker cabinet” to administer the country; the Taliban refer to this
government, as they have for decades referred to themselves, as the Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan. It is unclear by whom and why these individuals might be replaced going forward or
in what sense these “caretaker” positions differ from permanent positions. The Taliban’s
government in the 1990s reportedly was also “nominal y interim.”93
Taliban leader Haibatullah Akhundzada (of whom one verified photograph exists and who has
never made a public appearance) is to hold supreme power as the group’s emir; former Taliban
Foreign Minister Mohammad Hassan Akhund is the Acting Prime Minister. One analyst describes
Akhund as “relatively weak,” an “uncontroversial” figure whose selection forestal s competition
among more powerful figures and factions within the Taliban.94 Abdul Ghani Baradar, who led
negotiations with the United States, is the Acting Deputy Prime Minister. Baradar released an
audio recording on September 13, 2021, denying rumors of his death or injury in a brawl with
other Taliban figures; the BBC reported on September 15, 2021, that Baradar had gone to
Kandahar after a heated disagreement with Haqqani figures (see below) over whether the
Taliban’s political or military wings deserve credit for the group’s takeover.95 Other key figures
include Acting Director of Intel igence Abdul Haq Wasiq (detained at the U.S. naval station at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, from 2001 until his release in a 2014 prisoner exchange) and Acting
Defense Minister Mohammad Yaqoob (son of founding Taliban leader Mohammad Omar).
Nearly al members of the “caretaker cabinet” are former Taliban officials or longtime loyalists.
Al members of the “caretaker cabinet” are male, and the vast majority are ethnic Pashtuns,
mostly from southern Afghanistan. Over half were previously designated for U.S. and/or U.N.
sanctions, including the Acting Interior Minister, Sirajuddin Haqqani. The U.S. Department of
State has for years offered a reward of up to $10 mil ion for information leading to the arrest of
Haqqani, who is the head of the Haqqani Network, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist
Organization (FTO). Some argue the Haqqanis’ role in the Taliban caretaker government is a

91 T his section was prepared by Clayton T homas, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs.
92 “T aliban Rule Begins in Afghanistan,” International Crisis Group, August 24, 2021.
93 “Who Will Run the T aliban Government?” Int ernational Crisis Group, September 9, 2021.
94 Martine van Bijlert, “T he Focus of the T aleban’s New Government: Internal cohesion, external dominance,”
Afghanistan Analysts Network, September 12, 2021.
95 Khudai Noor Nasar, “Afghanistan: T aliban leaders in bust -up at presidential palace, sources say,” BBC, September
15, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

14

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

reflection of their outsized military import, and could make U.S. cooperation with the Taliban
more difficult.96 A State Department spokesman said the government “certainly does not reflect
what the international community and what, as part of that, the United States hoped to see.”97
Some had speculated that the Taliban might reach out to former Afghan government officials
(such as former President Hamid Karzai) or to others from outside the movement as part of their
promise to establish an “inclusive government.”
It remains to be seen how this Taliban government wil address the many chal enges Afghanistan
faces, including a burgeoning economic crisis. The Taliban appear to lack many technical and
administrative capabilities and may struggle to execute the functions of government and security
nationwide, especial y without the participation of individuals who had previously supported the
former Afghan government. It is possible that the Taliban may induce or coerce such individuals
to obtain their participation. At an August 17, 2021, press conference, Mujahid reiterated the
Taliban’s proclaimed amnesty for government employees, saying
I would like to assure all the compatriots, whether they were translators, whether they were
with military activities or whether they were civilians, all of them have been important.
Nobody is going to be treated with revenge…. Thousands of [Afghan] soldiers who have
fought us for 20 years, after the occupation, all of them have been pardoned.98
Observers noted that the Taliban made similar statements after taking control of Kabul in 1996,
only to contradict them with brutal repression and human rights violations.99
Protests against the group have taken place in several cities across the country, including by
hundreds of women in Kabul. The Taliban-led Interior Ministry issued a decree on September 8,
2021, banning unapproved demonstrations. U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Michel e
Bachelet said on September 13 that Taliban forces had used “increasing violence against
protesters and journalists.”100
What are some of the implications if the Taliban is recognized as
the official government of Afghanistan by the United States and
the international community?101
No country has recognized the government established by the Taliban in the wake of their
takeover of Afghanistan. The United States has not stated whether it wil recognize an Afghan
government led by the Taliban,102 and observers say no decision for such recognition is expected

96 Stephanie Findlay, “Haqqani network’s clever game culminates with Afghan government roles,” Financial Times,
September 10, 2021.
97 Department of State, Department Press Briefing – September 9, 2021.
98 “T ranscript of T aliban’s first news conference in Kabul,” Al Jazeera, August 17, 2021.
99 Graeme Wood, “ T his Is Not the T aliban 2.0,” The Atlantic, August 18, 2021.
100 “Oral update on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan” 48th Session of the Human Rights Council, September
13, 2021.
101 T his section was prepared by Matthew C. Weed, Specialist in Foreign Policy Legislation, and Jennifer K. Elsea,
Legislative Attorney.
102 When asked, “Do you consider the T aliban the de facto ruler of Afghanistan right now?” at an August 23 press
conference, State Department spokesperson Ned Price said, “it’s been a fluid situation. T here has not been any sort of
formal transfer of power.” In an August 25 press conference, Pentagon spokesperson John Kirby referred to the T aliban
as “the titular heads of government.”
Congressional Research Service

15

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

from the U.S. government in the near term.103 While the Taliban arguably control and govern
Afghanistan at this point from a practical, or “de facto,” perspective, the international community
has not accepted the Taliban as the legitimate, or “de jure,” government of the country. Pursuant
to the law of nations, official recognition of a foreign government acknowledges that a
government has the right to control a state’s territory and exercise sovereign state power,104 and
makes such government responsible for meeting that state’s international obligations, including
complying with U.N. Security Council resolutions, of which many currently apply to
Afghanistan. Each state makes the decision to formal y recognize the government of another
state; recognition can occur via overt declaration or other positive statement of recognition, or be
implied by the actions of the recognizing state, such as by concluding an international agreement
with the government being recognized.105 Recognition is usual y a prerequisite for the
establishment of diplomatic relations. In the United States, recognized governments may sue in
U.S. courts as a foreign sovereign, and benefit from sovereign immunity from suit in certain
circumstances. Under domestic law, the authority to recognize foreign governments in the
conduct of international relations lies with the President.106
When the Taliban took control of Afghanistan in 1996, and acted as the de facto government until
the U.S. invasion in 2001, neither the United States nor the wider international community
recognized the Taliban regime as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. Three individual
states, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Pakistan, official y recognized the Taliban.
Afghanistan was represented at the United Nations by the Permanent Representative and other
officials of the predecessor Afghan government, with the Credentials Committee of the U.N.
General Assembly deferring indefinitely the question of whether the representatives of the
predecessor government or the Taliban should represent the country.107 A U.N. Security Council
resolution required states to close official Taliban diplomatic offices on their territory.108 In March
2020, U.N. Security Council Resolution 2513 held that the Taliban were “not recognized at the
United Nations, and furthermore the Security Council does not support the restoration of the
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.... ”109
The Afghan Permanent Representative (as appointed by the Ghani government) spoke on behalf
of Afghanistan before the Security Council on August 16, 2021, and has continued to be treated as
the official Afghan representative at the United Nations. A new Credentials Committee is to be
chosen during the opening of the 2021-22 U.N. General Assembly during September 2021; the
United States, as wel as other permanent members of the U.N. Security Council,110 often sit as
members of the Committee. The Committee may not make an immediate decision on Afghan
representation in the United Nations, leaving the current Afghan Permanent Representative in
place. As it did the previous time the Taliban was in power, the Committee could delay any
decision on Afghan credentials indefinitely. Despite the fact that the former Afghan government

103 See Nahal T oosi, “Biden unlikely to formally recognize T aliban government,” Politico, September 11, 2021.
104 Restatement (T hird) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 203, Comment a, p. 84 (1986).
105 I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, p. 93 (7th ed., 2008).
106 Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 11 (2015).
107 See PRACTICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN CASES OF CHALLENGED REPRESENTATION OF A MEMBER STATE—GENERAL
ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 396(V) OF 14 DECEMBER 1950, 1997 U.N. Juridical Yearbook, pp. 465-67; see also
“Credentials,” Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly of the United Nations, Part IV, Rules 27-29,
https://www.un.org/en/ga/about/ropga/credent.shtml.
108 Para. 8(a) of S/RES/1333.
109 S/RES/2513.
110 China, France, Russian Federation, and United Kingdom.
Congressional Research Service

16

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

does not seem to be asserting that it remains in power,111 leaving only the Taliban claiming a seat
in the United Nations, the Taliban could be prevented from representing Afghanistan even if no
competing representatives chal enged its authority to do so, according to at least one observer.112
Whether or not a government is democratical y elected can sometimes be an issue in the
recognition practice of many states, including in some cases the United States.113 The question of
recognition of the Taliban could be influenced if the Taliban seek accommodation with or appoint
to government posts officials of the former Ghani administration (though they did not do so in the
caretaker government announced on September 7, 2021). Such a step could be seen as a
counterweight to any il egitimacy problems the Taliban may face by having taken power from a
democratical y elected Afghan government.114 The Taliban have long sought recognition as a
legitimate governing entity, and some observers maintain the group has improved its foreign
policy apparatus since first governing Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001.115
Some states and international organizations might wish to use recognition as a tool to hold the
Taliban accountable for Afghanistan’s obligations under international law, such as conditioning
recognition on such compliance or withholding diplomatic relations until such conditions are
met.116 Only a recognized Afghan government can request foreign assistance, including military
and humanitarian aid and economic assistance from international financial institutions. On August
15, 2021, Secretary of State Antony Blinken, without mentioning the Taliban, stated that an
Afghan government that abides by its international obligations and protects the human rights of
its people “is a government we can work with and recognize.”117 China, Russia, and other
prominent states seem to have indicated that recognition of the Taliban is a possibility, citing the
Taliban’s effective, albeit nascent, rule of the majority of the country.118 As of September 2021, it
seems most states are prepared to monitor the Taliban’s actions domestical y and international y
to determine whether to recognize and form official relations with a Taliban government, instead
pledging their continued support for the Afghan people, their human rights, and humanitarian
assistance.119
Some additional questions that Congress may ask the executive branch include
 At what point might the United States consider extending official recognition to a
Taliban-led Afghan government? Short of recognition, are there opportunities for
U.S. cooperation or engagement with such a government?

111 See Federica Paddeu and Niko Pavlopoulos, “Between Legitimacy and Control: T he T aliban’s Pursuit of
Governmental Status,” Just Security, September 7, 2021.
112 Larry D. Johnson, “How Can T he T aliban Be Prevented From Representing Afghanistan In T he United Nations?”,
Just Security, August 18, 2021. It is possible that a T aliban representative could participate in Security Council
meetings concerning the situation in Afghanistan even without formal recognition as the legitimate government of the
country. T he rules of the Security Council permit the Council to invite other “ competent” parties to meetings if such
parties can provide information important to Council deliberations.
113 See Restatement (T hird) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 203, Reporter’s Note 1.
114 T ess Bridgeman and Ryan Goodman, “Recognition and the T aliban,” Just Security, August 17, 2021.
115 See Barnett R. Rubin, Leveraging the Taliban’s Quest for International Recognition , Afghan Peace Process Issues
Paper, United States Institute of Peace, March 2021.
116 See Bridgeman and Goodman, op. cit.
117 See CNN, State of the Union, August 15, 2021 (transcript).
118 Andrew Osborne, “ Russia says Kabul seems safer under T aliban than it was under Ghani,” Reuters, August 16,
2021.
119 See, e.g., State Department Office of the Spokesperson, Joint Statement on Afghanistan, August 15, 2021; Afghan
Regional Conference, Final Chairm an Statem ent, August 12, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

17

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

U.S. Policy Implications of the Taliban Takeover
How is the Taliban’s takeover affecting the U.S. diplomatic
presence in Afghanistan?120
On August 15, 2021, the State Department confirmed that it had evacuated the U.S. diplomatic
compound in Kabul and that al remaining embassy personnel were located on the premises of
Kabul International Airport. Following the completion of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan,
Secretary Blinken announced that the State Department had suspended its diplomatic presence in
the country and transferred operations to Doha, Qatar.121 Ian McCary, a career State Department
official, leads the U.S. diplomatic mission to Afghanistan in Doha.122
Some additional questions that Congress may consider or ask the executive branch include
 What kind of diplomatic presence, if any, should the United States maintain in
Afghanistan? How wil the United States perform consular or other functions
from Doha?
What is the situation regarding evacuations from Afghanistan?
On August 30, 2021, U.S. officials announced the completion of the withdrawal of its military
and diplomatic personnel from Afghanistan and largely concluded its efforts to airlift U.S.
citizens, lawful permanent residents (LPRs), and certain Afghans out of the country. 123 The State
Department and the Pentagon say they directly evacuated or facilitated the evacuations of around
124,000 individuals, including about 6,000 American citizens.124 President Biden has described
the mission as an “extraordinary success,” although U.S. officials acknowledge that around 100
American citizens and thousands of eligible Afghans remain in Afghanistan, many of whom seek
to leave.125 Some Members of Congress and rescue groups have questioned this figure, arguing
that the number of U.S. citizens in Afghanistan could total as many as several hundred more than
the Administration’s estimate.126
President Biden has said that the United States remains committed to assisting American citizens
and other eligible persons who wish to leave Afghanistan, adding that he wil hold the Taliban to
its commitment to provide safe passage.127 U.S. officials are providing limited information
regarding such evacuations, citing “an ongoing terrorist threat to operations of this nature.”128

120 T his section was prepared by Cory Gill, Analyst in Foreign Affairs.
121 U.S. Department of State, “ Secretary Antony J. Blinken’s Remarks on Afghanistan, August 30, 2021.
122 U.S. Department of State, “ Secretary Antony J. Blinken Remarks to Embassy Doha and Mission Afghanistan ,”
September 7, 2021.
123 T o review the parameters under which Afghans may be eligible for resettlement in the United States, see the “ What
is the status of U.S. efforts to provide immigration relief to Afghans who assisted the U.S. government in the fight
against the T aliban and other forces?” section of this report.
124 U.S. Department of Defense, “Secretary of Defense Austin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Milley
Press Briefing,” September 1, 2021.
125 T he White House, “Remarks by President Biden on the End of the War in Afghanistan,” August 31, 2021 ; U.S.
Department of State, “ Department Press Briefing – September 10, 2021,” September 10, 2021.
126 Julie Watson and Bernard Condon, “ Rescue groups: US tally misses hundreds left in Afghanistan,” Associated
Press, September 4, 2021.
127 T he White House, “Remarks by President Biden on the End of the War in Af ghanistan,” August 31, 2021.
128 T he White House, National Security Council, “ Statement by NSC Spokesperson Emily Horne on Further U.S.
Congressional Research Service

18

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

Following the reopening of the Kabul International Airport on September 9, 2021, the State
Department began facilitating the evacuations of American citizens and LPRs on commercial
flights. The State Department is also helping evacuate American citizens and LPRs via overland
routes to an undisclosed neighboring country.129 On September 17, a State Department
spokesperson said that since August 31, the State Department had assisted 36 U.S. citizens and 24
LPRs in departing Afghanistan via charter flights and overland routes.130
Some Members of Congress and other observers have criticized what they characterize as poorly
planned U.S. evacuation efforts, asserting that the United States failed to deliver on assurances
made to American citizens and eligible Afghans that it would help them leave the country prior to
the U.S. withdrawal.131 Press reports indicate that some personnel involved in evacuation efforts
during the withdrawal process were concerned that eligibility criteria for Afghans were “ever-
changing,” which may have led to instances where U.S. personnel prohibited eligible Afghans,
including the family members of U.S. citizens, from accessing the airport.132 Some Members have
expressed concern that many Afghans who were evacuated may not actual y qualify for
resettlement in the United States.133 Following the withdrawal, additional reports suggest that the
State Department has faced difficulties facilitating the evacuations of LPRs and eligible Afghans.
For example, U.S. efforts to evacuate hundreds of U.S. Agency for Global Media Afghan national
employees, contractors, and their families have thus far not succeeded, although Secretary
Blinken affirmed on September 14 that the State Department was stil prioritizing their
evacuation.134
Additional y, some Members have accused the Taliban of refusing to al ow American citizens to
leave Afghanistan, with one asserting that the Taliban “is holding them hostage for demands,”
including diplomatic recognition from the United States for the Taliban.135 Secretary Blinken has
said that he is not aware of any such hostage-like cases.136 On September 9, a National Security
Council spokesperson stated that the Taliban has been “cooperative” in facilitating the departures
of American citizens and LPRs.137
In addition to the matters discussed above, Members of Congress may consider the following
issues as evacuations continue.

Citizen Departures from Afghanistan,” September 10, 2021.
129 U.S. Department of State, “ Department Press Briefing – September 10, 2021.”
130 U.S. Department of State, “ Department Press Briefing – September 17, 2021,” September 17, 2021.
131 House Foreign Affairs Committee (Republicans), “McCaul: ‘Disgraceful’ State Dept. Left Hundreds of USAGM
Journalists in Afghanistan,” press release, August 31, 2021.
132 Patsy Widakuswara and Carla Babb, “'Hunger Games’ Evacuations as US Left Afghanistan,” Voice of America,
September 2, 2021.
133 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Examining the U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan, 117th
Cong., 1st sess., September 14, 2021.
134 T estimony of Secretary of State Antony Blinken at Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Examining the U.S.
Withdrawal from Afghanistan, September 14, 2021.
135 House Foreign Affairs Committee Ranking Member Michael McCaul, int erview by Chris Wallace, Fox News
Sunday, September 5, 2021.
136 U.S. Department of State, “ Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin, Qatari Deputy
Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al T hani, and Qatari Deputy Prime Minister and
Defense Minister Dr. Khalid bin Mohammed Al Attiyah at a Joint Press Availability ,” September 7, 2021.
137 T he White House, “ Statement by NSC Spokesperson Emily Horne on Qatar Airways Charter Flight from Kabul,”
September 9, 2020.
Congressional Research Service

19

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

 Press reports indicate that U.S. officials are examining possible cases in which
older evacuated Afghan men were admitted into the United States with girls who
are under 18 years old whom they claim as wives, raising potential human
trafficking concerns.138 The State Department has not provided a precise number
of such cases, although one press report refers to “numerous incidents” where
“Afghan girls have been presented to authorities as the ‘wives’ of much older
men.”139 One report further notes that U.S. officials in the United Arab Emirates
transmitted a cable to Washington, DC, stating that some young Afghan girls
were forced into marriages to escape Afghanistan after the Taliban seized control
of the country.140
 What evacuation plans, if any, did the Biden Administration inherit from the
Trump Administration? What were the evacuation plans that the Biden
Administration prepared for Afghanistan and for what possible scenarios did it
plan?
What is the status of U.S. efforts to provide immigration relief to
Afghans who assisted the U.S. government in the fight against the
Taliban and other forces?141
As of the date of this report, there are two main ways that Afghan nationals can gain U.S.
admission and obtain lawful permanent resident (LPR)142 status based largely on the assistance
they provided to the United States: special immigrant visa (SIV) programs and the U.S. refugee
program. In addition, Afghans may be paroled into the United States by the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). A person granted parole (parolee) is permitted to enter
and remain in the United States for the duration of the parole grant. Parolees do not have a set
pathway to LPR status.
Special Immigrant Visas
Congress has enacted provisions to enable certain Afghans to obtain SIVs. Afghans apply for
these SIVs on their own behalf and must provide required documentation. Individuals whose
applications are approved and enter the United States on SIVs are granted LPR status upon
admission.143 As of August 28, 2021, an approximate total of 82,000 Afghans (23,000 principal
applicants and 59,000 dependent spouses and children) had been granted special immigrant status
under these provisions. In FY2021 only, as of August 28, 2021, approximately 9,000 Afghans
(2,000 principal applicants and 7,000 dependent spouses and children) had been granted special
immigrant status under these provisions.144

138 Margaret Brennan and Bo Erickson, “U.S. investigates ‘child bride’ cases among Afghan evacuees,” CBS News,
September 7, 2021.
139 Matthew Lee, “ Afghan evacuation raises concerns about child trafficking,” Associated Press, September 3, 2021.
140 Matthew Lee, “Afghan evacuation raises concerns about child trafficking,” Associated Press, September 3, 2021.
141 T his section prepared by Andorra Bruno, Specialist in Immigration Policy.
142 LPRs (also known as green card holders) can live permanently in the United States. T ypically after five years, they
can apply for U.S. citizenship, subject to applicable requirements.
143 For additional information on Afghan SIVs, see CRS Report R43725, Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa
Program s.
144 Links to Special Immigrant Visa Statistics as of June 30, 2021, are available from the U.S. Department of State,
Congressional Research Service

20

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

The SIV provisions established two programs that include Afghans. One program, which is
permanent, applies to Afghans who worked directly with U.S. Armed Forces, or under Chief of
Mission (COM) authority, as translators or interpreters and meet other requirements. The other
program, which is temporary, applies to Afghans who were employed by or on behalf of the U.S.
government, or by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), in Afghanistan and satisfy
other requirements. The latter program is subject to a 14-step application process, which has been
widely criticized for being bureaucratic, inefficient, and slow.145
President Biden’s announcement that the United States would begin the final withdrawal of U.S.
troops from Afghanistan in May 2021146 heightened long-standing concerns of, and for, Afghan
nationals who had assisted the U.S. government. In July 2021, after initial y rejecting cal s for an
evacuation of these Afghans,147 the State Department announced the arrival of “our first group of
Afghan special immigrant applicants to the United States under Operation Al ies Refuge.”148 In a
joint statement on August 15, 2021, the Department of State and the Department of Defense said,
“We wil accelerate the evacuation of thousands of Afghans eligible for U.S. Special Immigrant
Visas, nearly 2,000 of whom have already arrived in the United States over the past two weeks.”
The statement further noted: “For al categories, Afghans who have cleared security screening
wil continue to be transferred directly to the United States. And we wil find additional locations
for those yet to be screened.”149
At an August 16, 2021, press briefing, the State Department spokesperson was asked how many
Afghan SIV applicants would be relocated to the United States. He declined to provide a number,
citing the fluidity of the situation.150 Future relocations were also discussed at a Pentagon press
briefing that same day. After stating that 2,000 Afghan SIV applicants had already arrived in the
United States, Garry Reid, director of the Department of Defense’s Afghanistan Crisis Action
Group, said that “USNORTHCOM [U.S. Northern Command] and the U.S. Army are working to
create additional capacity.”151
In more recent statements, U.S. officials have not indicated how many Afghan evacuees are SIV
holders or SIV applicants. On September 3, 2021, Secretary of State Blinken referenced Afghan

Bureau of Consular Affairs at https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal/visa-law0/visa-statistics/immigrant -visa-
statistics.html. Updated FY2021 data (through August 28, 2021) were provided to CRS by the Bureau of Consular
Affairs. FY2021 data are preliminary.
145 For further information, see CRS Report R43725, Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Programs.
146 White House, Remarks by President Biden on the Way Forward in Afghanistan , April 14, 2021,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/04/14/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-way-
forward-in-afghanistan/.
147 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, Secretary Antony J. Blinken On CNN’s State of the Union
with Dana Bash, press release, June 13, 2021, https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-on-cnns-state-of-the-
union-with-dana-bash/.
148 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, Arrival of First Flight of Operation Allies Refuge, July 30,
2021, https://www.state.gov/arrival-of-first-flight-of-operation-allies-refuge/.
149 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, Joint Statement from the Department of State and
Departm ent of Defense: Update on Afghanistan , August 15, 2021, https://www.state.gov/joint -statement -from-the-
department -of-state-and-department-of-defense-update-on-afghanistan/.
150 See U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, Department Press Briefing—August 16, 2021,
https://www.state.gov/briefings/department -press-briefing-august-16-2021/.
151 U.S. Department of Defense, Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby Holds a Press Briefing , August 16, 2021,
https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/T ranscripts/T ranscript/Article/2733523/pentagon-press-secretary-john-f-kirby-
holds-a-press-briefing/. Although Reid referenced “ refugee relocation” in his remarks, he seemed to be referring to
capacity for Afghan SIV applicants. For example, he noted that the arrivals “ will have been prescreened by the
Department of Homeland Security to enter o n a condition of full immigration processing once they arrive.”
Congressional Research Service

21

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

special immigrants as a proportion of the overall evacuee population, but said he could not
provide specific numbers:
Of the roughly 124,000 people who’ve been evacuated, the vast majority—the vast
majority, 75, 80 percent—are Afghans at risk. And of those, some significant number will
be SIVs, either people who already hold an SIV visa or those who are actually in the
pipeline.152
At a September 1, 2021, press briefing, the State Department spokesperson provided data on
Afghan arrivals to the United States:
Since August 17th and through August 31st at midnight Eastern time, 31,107 people have
arrived … to the U.S. as part of this operation. So of that s ubset—which, of course, is just
a small subset of the 124,000—we understand that about 14 percent are U.S. citizens, or
4,446; about 9 percent are LPRs, 2,785; and the remaining 77 percent —23,876 individuals
—are Afghans at risk. And, of course, falling into that category are SIVs, other visa holders
….153
Press reports published on or after September 8, 2021, cite DHS data on Afghan evacuees
who have arrived in the United States. For example, a Washington Post article stated:
Of the 60,000 evacuees who have arrived so far, 11 percent are U.S. citizens and 6 percent
are legal permanent residents, according to DHS. The remaining 83 percent are considered
"at-risk Afghans" who either qualify for special immigrant visas as a result of their work
for the U.S. government, or are part of a much larger number who will arrive with a
provisional immigration status known as “humanitarian parole.”154
U.S. Refugee Program
Individuals of any nationality can be considered for refugee admission to the United States.
Among the applicable requirements, an individual must meet the definition of a refugee in the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The INA general y defines a refugee as a person who is
outside his or her country and who is unable or unwil ing to return because of persecution or a
wel -founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.155 Individuals who are admitted to the United States
as refugees are granted refugee status. After one year in the United States in refugee status,
individuals are required to apply to become LPRs.
To be considered for refugee resettlement in the United States, a foreign national must fal under
a “processing priority.” For example, Priority 1 (P-1) covers individual cases referred to the U.S.
refugee program by designated entities based on their circumstances and apparent need for
resettlement. Priority 2 (P-2) covers groups of special humanitarian concern to the United States.
It includes specific groups that may be defined by their nationalities, clans, ethnicities, or other
characteristics. P-2 groups are identified by the State Department in consultation with DHS and

152 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, Secretary Antony J. Blinken Remarks on Afghanistan at a
Press Availability, September 3, 2021.
153 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, Department Press Briefing – September 1, 2021,
https://www.state.gov/briefings/department -press-briefing-september-1-2021/.
154 Nick Miroff, “44 Afghan evacuees flagged as potential security risks,” The Washington Post, September 11, 2021,
p. A16. DHS does not seem to have otherwise made these data publicly available.
155 INA §101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(42). For additional inform ation on the U.S. refugee program, see CRS Report
RL31269, Refugee Adm issions and Resettlem ent Policy.
Congressional Research Service

22

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

others. Of particular relevance to Afghans who have assisted the United States is a new P-2 group
that was established in August 2021.156
The new P-2 group is for certain Afghan nationals and their family members (spouses and sons
and daughters of any age). A State Department fact sheet describes this new P-2 program as
providing a resettlement opportunity for “many thousands of Afghans and their immediate family
members who may be at risk due to their U.S. affiliation but who are not eligible for a Special
Immigrant Visa (SIV) because they did not have qualifying employment, or because they have
not met the time-in-service requirement to become eligible.” Among those eligible for this P-2
program are “Afghans who work or worked for a U.S. government-funded program or project in
Afghanistan supported through a U.S. government grant or cooperative agreement,” and
“Afghans who are or were employed in Afghanistan by a U.S.-based media organization or non-
governmental organization.” Eligible Afghans must be referred to this program by a U.S.
government agency or, in the case of a media organization or NGO, by the most senior U.S.
citizen employee of that organization.157
A supplementary information sheet on this P-2 program highlights relevant issues for prospective
applicants to consider. Among these considerations is that there is no U.S. refugee processing in
Afghanistan or certain neighboring countries. Individuals who want to pursue refugee
applications must travel to third countries and must do so at their own expense.158 This need to
process refugee cases in third countries was discussed at an August 2, 2021, briefing with State
Department officials. In response to a question about whether refugee applicants would be
relocated like SIV applicants, an unnamed official said: “At this time, we do not anticipate
relocating P-2 applicants prior to or during the application process. However, we continue to
review the situation on the ground.”159
More recent statements from the State Department suggest that some P-2-eligible and P-1-eligible
Afghans may have been relocated. In his September 3, 2021, comments on the “vast majority” of
Afghan evacuees that are “Afghans at risk,” Secretary Blinken indicated that “some number wil
be potential P-1 or P-2 refugees.” At the press briefing on September 1, 2021, the State
Department spokesperson also suggested that Afghans with P-1 or P-2 referrals may have entered
the United States.160
Immigration Parole
The parole provision in the INA gives the DHS Secretary discretionary authority to “parole into
the United States temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe only on a case-by-case

156 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, U.S. Refugee Admissions Program Priority 2 Designation for
Afghan Nationals, August 2, 2021, https://www.state.gov/u-s-refugee-admissions-program-priority-2-designation-for-
afghan-nationals/. T his fact sheet also describes the other processing priorities.
157 Ibid.
158 See U.S. Department of State, Information for Afghan Nationals Regarding Priority 2 (P-2) Designation,
https://www.wrapsnet.org/documents/
Information%20for%20Afghan%20Nationals%20Regarding%20Priority%202%20 (P-2)%20Designation.pdf.
159 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, Briefing with Senior State Department Officials On the U.S.
Refugee Adm issions Program Priority 2 (P-2) Designation for Afghan Nationals, August 2, 2021,
https://www.state.gov/briefing-with-senior-state-department-officials-on-the-u-s-refugee-admissions-program-priority-
2-p-2-designation-for-afghan-nationals/.
160 Persons cannot pursue U.S. refugee applications within the United States. T hey can, however, apply for asylum. For
information about asylum, see CRS Report R45539, Im m igration: U.S. Asylum Policy.
Congressional Research Service

23

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit any alien applying for
admission to the United States.”161 Parolees can apply for work authorization.
A DHS fact sheet on Operation Al ies Welcome, which is described within as “ongoing efforts
across the federal government to support vulnerable Afghans … as they safely resettle in the
United States,” discusses the use of parole for Afghans, as follows:
[Parole] permits certain Afghan nationals to come into the United States, on a case-by-case
basis, for a period of two years and subsequent to appropriate screening and vetting,
provided their movement to the United States is being carried out pursuant to the current
operation. Once paroled by CBP [DHS’s U.S. Customs and Border Protection], Afghan
nationals may be eligible to apply for immigration status through USCIS. Afghan nationals
paroled by CBP will also have conditions placed on their parole, to include medical
screening and vaccination requirements, and other reporting requirements.162
Presumably, these parolees would be among the “Afghans at risk” mentioned in the above section
on “Special Immigrant Visas.” DHS has not published data on the number of Afghans granted
parole.
Some additional questions that Congress may ask the executive branch include
 How many Afghans have pending special immigrant applications? How many of
these individuals are in the United States? How many of these individuals remain
in Afghanistan, and what plans, if any, are in place to help them leave the
country? How many Afghans who have not submitted SIV applications do you
estimate may be eligible? Where wil Afghan SIV processing take place
overseas?
 How many Afghan P-2 referrals has the State Department received? Where are
these referred individuals currently located? What plans, if any, are in place to
help referred individuals leave Afghanistan? The P-2 program announcement
indicated that these cases would take 12-14 months to process. Is this still the
expected time frame? What is the status of pending Afghan P-2 cases?
 How many Afghans have been paroled into the United States? How does the
security clearance process for Afghan parole applicants compare to that for
Afghan refugee and SIV applicants? What types of services are being provided to
Afghan parolees? How many parolees have pending applications to obtain a
more permanent immigration status, and what statuses are they pursuing?
How might the reestablishment of Taliban rule affect terrorist
groups in Afghanistan?163
Since 2001, counterterrorism has been an important component of U.S. operations in Afghanistan,
where a number of terrorist groups operate. With the Afghan government’s collapse, the United
States has lost a previous counterterrorism partner, leading to questions about the viability of U.S.
efforts to counter future terrorist threats emanating from Afghanistan. Al Qaeda and the regional

161 INA §212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. §1182(d)(5)). For additional information, see CRS Report R46570, Immigration Parole.
162 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Operation Allies Welcome,
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwjSm9PKtfz
yAhXeKVkFHWJ-C_4QFnoECAQQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.dhs.gov%2Fpublication%2Ffact -sheet -
operation-allies-welcome&usg=AOvVaw3wRvqxh_fSWBJx0NJ9fJqz.
163 T his section was prepared by Clayton T homas, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs.
Congressional Research Service

24

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

Islamic State affiliate (Islamic State-Khorasan Province, ISKP, also known as ISIS-K) are two of
the most significant terrorist groups, and the Taliban’s takeover is likely to impact them in
different ways.
The Taliban are not a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (despite at least one past
congressional attempt to cal for such a designation), though the group (since 2002) and many of
its members have been designated as Special y Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs) under
Executive Order 13224.164 SDGTs are denied access to their U.S.-based assets, U.S. persons are
prohibited from engaging in transactions with them, and any foreign financial institution found to
have conducted or facilitated a significant transaction on behalf of the SDGT can be prohibited
from using the U.S. banking system.
Al Qaeda (AQ) is stil assessed to have a presence in Afghanistan and its decades-long ties with
the Taliban appear to have remained strong in recent years. In October 2020, Afghan forces kil ed
a high-ranking AQ operative in Afghanistan’s Ghazni province, where he reportedly was living
and working with Taliban forces.165 In May 2021, U.N. sanctions monitors reported that Al Qaeda
had “minimized overt communications with Taliban leadership in an effort to ‘lay low’ and not
jeopardize the Taliban’s diplomatic position.”166 In its report on the final quarter of 2020, the
DOD Office of the Inspector General relayed an assessment from the Defense Intel igence
Agency (DIA) that the Taliban maintain ties to Al Qaeda and that some AQ members were
“integrated into the Taliban’s forces and command structure.”167 In a semiannual report released
in April 2021, the Department of Defense stated, “The Taliban have maintained mutual y
beneficial relations with AQ-related organizations and are unlikely to take substantive action
against these groups.”168 AQ-Taliban ties have been reinforced by the groups’ shared struggle in
Afghanistan and personal bonds, including marriage links.
In the U.S.-Taliban agreement, the Taliban committed to not al ow any terrorist groups, including
Al Qaeda, to use Afghan soil to threaten the security of the United States and its al ies, including
by preventing such groups from training, fundraising, recruiting, or residing in Afghanistan. The
accord does not provide for verification mechanisms to monitor Taliban compliance. The Taliban
have claimed in recent years there are no “foreign fighters”—a term general y used to denote
non-Afghans fighting with, or alongside, the Taliban—in Afghanistan. In February 2021, the
group reportedly issued a directive barring Taliban fighters from “bringing foreign nationals into
their ranks or giving them shelter.”169
One analyst argues that while some parts of the Taliban oppose the group’s ties with Al Qaeda,
citing the costs of the relationship in terms of the Taliban’s international image and U.S. pressure,
shared ideology links the two groups. While the Taliban do not have transnational aims like Al
Qaeda does, Al Qaeda, he argues, “sees the Afghan Taliban as an important partner in its

164 See H.Con.Res. 13, introduced in February 2015.
165 Jeff Seldin, “US Calls Death of al-Qaida Official a Major Setback for T error Group,” Voice of America, October 26,
2020.
166 Twelfth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2557
(2020) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace, stability
and security of Afghanistan, U.N. Document S/2021/486, released May 27, 2020.
167 Operation Freedom’s Sentinel: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, October 1, 2020 -
Decem ber 31, 2020, released February 17, 2021.
168 U.S. Department of Defense, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2020, released April 23,
2021.
169 Ayaz Gul, “Afghan T aliban Ask Fighters Not T o Harbor ‘Foreign’ Militants as US Reviews Peace Deal,’” Voice of
Am erica, February 2, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

25

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

stewardship of global jihad,” as evidenced by the al egiance successive AQ leaders have pledged
to successive Taliban leaders.170 In an August 2021 interview, a Taliban spokesman said “there
was no proof [bin Laden] was involved” in the September 11, 2001, attacks.171 AQ figures were
reportedly among the thousands of prisoners released from Parwan Detention Facility by the
Taliban in August 2021.172
U.S. officials reportedly told Senators in August 2021 that “terror groups like al-Qaida may be
able to grow much faster than expected” in the wake of the Taliban takeover.173 U.S. intel igence
officials also reportedly said in September 2021 that their “current assessment” is that Al Qaeda
could “build some capability to at least threaten the homeland” in one to two years.174 They
additional y said there are “indications of some potential movement of al Qaeda to Afghanistan,”
but that the United States faces greater terrorism threats from Yemen, Somalia, Syria, and Iraq. 175
Others argue that Al Qaeda is unlikely to resurge in Afghanistan given two decades of U.S.
counterterrorism pressure, the existence of other safe havens around the world, and the potential
for Taliban pressure.176 The power dynamic between Al Qaeda and the Taliban has changed over
the past 20 years: AQ financial and military support was critical in bolstering the Taliban before
2001, but AQ seems to have played little if any direct role in the Taliban’s 2021 return to power.
The Islamic State affiliate in Afghanistan (ISKP), on the other hand, opposes the Taliban and the
two groups have often clashed. The Islamic State views the Taliban’s nationalist political project
as opposed to their own universalist vision of a global caliphate. The Taliban’s takeover likely
represents a setback for ISKP; Taliban forces reportedly executed an imprisoned former ISKP
leader after the Taliban captured an Afghan government prison in Kabul.177 Taliban compromises
on certain issues as the group begins governing could prompt hardliners to defect to ISKP; some
Taliban fighters have associated themselves with ISKP in the past. The United States previously
supported Taliban offensives against ISKP, a rare area of prior U.S.-Taliban cooperation.178 At a
September 1, 2021, press conference, when asked about the possibility of future U.S.
coordination with the Taliban against ISKP, General Mil ey said, “It’s possible.”179
On August 26, 2021, the Islamic State claimed responsibility for an attack (comprising a suicide
bomber and additional fighters with firearms) at Kabul International Airport that left 13 U.S.
service members and more than 150 Afghans dead. The attack raises questions about the

170 Asfandyar Mir, “Untying the Gordian Knot: Why the T aliban is Unlikely to Break T ies with Al-Qaeda,” Modern
War Institute at West Point, August 10, 2021.
171 Rachel Pannett, “Taliban spokesman says ‘no proof’ bin Laden was responsible for 9/11 attacks,” Washington Post,
August 26, 2021.
172 Nick Paton Walsh and Sandi Sidhu, “Al Qaeda and T aliban members among thousands of prisoners left under
Afghan control in jail next to deserted US air base,” CNN, July 6, 2021.
173 Michael Balsamo et al., “Concerns over US terror threat rising as T aliban hold grows,” Associated Press, August
15, 2021.
174 Julian Barnes, “Al Qaeda Could Rebuilt in Afghanistan in a Year or T wo, U.S. Officials Say,” New York Times,
September 14, 2021.
175 Barnes, op. cit., Courtney McBride and Warren Strobel, “U.S. Spies See Signs of Al Qaeda Fighters Returning to
Afghanistan,” Wall Street Journal, September 14, 2021.
176 Ahmad Siddiqi, “T he West is getting Afghanistan wrong – again,” Al Jazeera, September 12, 2021; Daniel Byman,
“Will Afghanistan Become a T errorist Safe Haven Again?” Foreign Affairs, August 18, 2021.
177 Yaroslav T rifimov et al., “T aliban Consolidate Control in Afghanistan’s Capital as T housands Remain Stranded,”
Wall Street Journal, August 17, 2021.
178 Wesley Morgan, “Our secret T aliban air force,” Washington Post, October 22, 2020.
179 Secretary of Defense Austin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Milley Press Briefing on the End of the
U.S. War in Afghanistan, Department of Defense, September 1, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

26

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

Taliban’s ability (or perhaps wil ingness) to combat ISKP and the threat ISKP represents to the
Taliban’s effort to demonstrate its ability to govern and secure the country.180
Beyond Afghanistan, some argue the Taliban’s takeover in Afghanistan could boost Islamist
extremist terrorist groups worldwide; AQ supporters reportedly greeted the Taliban takeover as a
victory for the cause of global jihadism.181 One analyst has argued, in contrast, that the Taliban
takeover showed the utility of diplomacy and negotiation to the achievement of jihad aims.182
Amid the U.S. withdrawal in the summer of 2021, U.S. officials said that the United States would
maintain “over-the-horizon” capabilities to combat terrorist threats. With the Taliban in control of
the country, the United States might have to alter those plans, for instance by replacing manned
flights with drone operations, flown from U.S. bases in the Persian Gulf region that are remote
from Afghanistan’s borders.183 The lack of a U.S. military presence or partner force on the ground
may also restrict intel igence gathering capabilities. An August 29, 2021, U.S. drone strike in
Kabul that kil ed civilians demonstrated the chal enges and limitations of these restrictions.184
Some Members of Congress have argued that the Administration has not been sufficiently
forthcoming with regard to U.S. plans to counter terrorism in Afghanistan going forward.185
What are the prospects for continued U.S. civilian assistance to
Afghanistan?186
As of June 30, 2021, the United States had al ocated approximately $36.29 bil ion in current
dollars for “governance and development assistance” in Afghanistan since FY2002, representing
25% of total U.S.-provided reconstruction assistance.187 Such funding has aimed to support a
range of development goals, including expanding education, combating corruption, promoting
good governance and civil society, and empowering women and girls. The majority of civilian
assistance has been implemented by nongovernmental partners such as multilateral entities,
nonprofit organizations, universities, and private sector actors.
Congress regularly enacts laws that require the withholding of U.S. assistance subject to various
conditions including, for Afghanistan, those related to counternarcotics efforts, corruption, and
women’s rights.188 Successive Administrations have, pursuant to these laws, certified Afghan

180 Sudarsan Raghavan, “T he U.S. branded the Haqqanis terrorists and issued $5 million bounties. Now they’re in
power in the T aliban government,” Washington Post, September 11, 2021.
181 Warren Strobel and Dustin Volz, “Extremists Celebrate T aliban T akeover of Afghanistan on Social Media,” Wall
Street Journal, August 17, 2021.
182 Hassan Hassan, “What the Global War on T error Really Accomplished,” Newlines, September 9, 2021.
183 Missy Ryan and Souad Mekhennet, “After Taliban triumph, Biden faces even greater test in preventing extremist
resurgence in Afghanistan,” Washington Post, August 16, 2021.
184 Eric Schmitt and Helene Cooper, “Pentagon acknowledges Aug. 29 drone strike in Af ghanistan was a tragic mistake
that killed 10 civilians,” New York Times, September 17, 2021.
185 Jonathan Swan and Zachary Basu, “Red flags for Biden’s ‘over-the-horizon’ strategy,” Axios, September 12, 2021.
186 T his section was prepared by Emily Morgenstern, Analyst in Foreign Assistance and Foreign Policy.
187 SIGAR, June 30, 2021 Quarterly Report, p. 25. According to SIGAR, other reconstruction assistance includes
security assistance, humanitarian aid, and agency operations.
188 For example Section 7044(a)(2)(B) of the FY2016 SFOPS appropriations bill (Division K of P.L. 114-113) required
that prior to obligating Economic Support Fund and International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Funds, the
Secretary of State certify that the Government of Afghanistan had met or was meeting certain requirements. T hese
included “ ... continuing to implement laws and policies to govern democratically and protect the rights of individuals
and civil society, including steps to protect and advance the rights of women and girls ... ” and “ ... reducing corruption
Congressional Research Service

27

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

compliance with these conditions and no U.S. funds have been withheld.189 However, with the
Taliban takeover and the Afghan government’s collapse, bilateral aid that has traditional y been
implemented by nongovernmental entities may be reduced or eliminated pursuant to existing
conditions included in annual Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs
(SFOPS) appropriations measures. For example, current Economic Support Fund and
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement assistance appropriated for Afghanistan
may not be made available for any program, project or activity that —(i) cannot be
sustained, as appropriate, by the Government of Afghanistan or another Afghan entity; (ii)
is not accessible for the purposes of conducting effective oversight in accordance with
applicable Federal statutes and regulations; (iii) initiates any new, major infrastructure
development; or (iv) includes the participation of any Afghan individual, organization, or
government entity if the Secretary of State has credible information that such individual,
organization, or entity is knowingly involved in acts of grand corruption, illicit narcotics
production or trafficking, or has committed a gross violation of human rights.190
Bilateral U.S. aid to government entities in Afghanistan may also cease depending on
Administration determinations. This action might occur pursuant to Section 7021(b) of the
FY2021 SFOPS appropriations measure, which prohibits funds from being made available to any
foreign government, which the President determines “grants sanctuary from prosecution to any
individual or group which has committed an act of international terrorism” or “otherwise supports
international terrorism.”
Taliban control of Afghanistan could also raise significant concerns about the long-term
effectiveness and sustainability of any U.S.-administered assistance programs, regardless of
which implementing partners carry out such programs. The current security situation in
Afghanistan and resulting evacuations of U.S. diplomatic and development staff might also
directly affect program oversight capabilities, potential y requiring the United States to rely
heavily or solely on third-party monitoring for any assistance programs that may continue.
The Biden Administration has not signaled whether or not it wil seek to provide civilian
assistance to a Taliban-governed Afghanistan. Administration requests for funding related to
Afghanistan have primarily focused on humanitarian assistance to aid Afghans in need, including
those remaining in the country as wel as those who have fled, as wel as the processing of
Afghan refugees.191 Some Members of Congress have stated that they would not support bilateral
U.S. assistance to Afghanistan under any conditions, while others may support some aid subject
to certain criteria.192 As the situation in Afghanistan evolves, it remains to be seen how, if at al ,
civilian assistance could be delivered, administered, and overseen, and how Congress might
evaluate its funding for and conditions on assistance to the country.
Some additional questions that Congress may ask the executive branch include

and prosecuting individuals alleged to be involved in illegal activities ... ”, among others.
189 For more, see “Aid Conditionality and Oversight” in CRS Report R45818, Afghanistan: Background and U.S.
Policy, by Clayton T homas.
190 Section 7044(a)(1)(C) the FY2019 SFOPS bill (Division F of P.L. 116-6). Section 7044(a)(1)(F) of the FY2021
SFOPS bill (Division K of P.L. 117-260), reaffirms the provision’s applicability for FY20 21 appropriated funds.
191 “FY 2022 Continuing Resolution (CR) Appropriations Issues (anomalies required for a short -term CR),” at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/CR_Package_9-7-21.pdf.
192 Arshad Mohammed, Patricia Zengerle, and Jonathan Landay, "U.S. seen funding humanitarian aid for Afghanistan,
but not its government," Reuters, September 4, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

28

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

 Are there concerns that civilian assistance to the country could be at risk of
diversion by the Taliban or other, nonstate malign actors?
What U.S. policy options are available to promote human rights in
Afghanistan and respond to human rights abuses?193
Various U.S. policy options exist that may al ow the United States to pressure the Taliban to
protect human rights in Afghanistan, although the ability of the United States to induce genuine,
robust, or sustained human rights commitments or actions is arguable.194 The United States may
consider whether and, if so, how to condition U.S. recognition of the Taliban as the official
government of Afghanistan—or diplomatic relations with the government following such formal
recognition—on criteria that includes respect for human rights.195 The United States may also
consider whether to maintain, increase, or reduce U.S. sanctions depending on actions taken by
the Taliban with regard to human rights.196 Biden Administration officials have indicated that
sanctions wil not be lifted if the Taliban is not protecting the basic rights of the Afghan people,
and that the United States wil condition recognition of the Taliban in part on human rights
matters.197
To date, the United States has reportedly been working to coordinate policy on these matters with
al ies and partners, which could increase the likelihood of inducing actions or commitments by
the Taliban.198 An August 24, 2021 statement by G7 leaders stated that the Taliban “wil be held
accountable for their actions” on human rights and connected the “legitimacy of any future
government” in Afghanistan with the Taliban’s upholding of international obligations and
commitments.199 On August 30, 2021, a U.N. Security Council resolution reaffirmed “the
importance of upholding human rights including those of women, children, and minorities,” and
encouraged an “inclusive, negotiated political settlement, with the full, equal and meaningful
participation of women, that responds to the desire of Afghans to sustain and build on
Afghanistan’s gains over the last twenty years in adherence to the rule of law.”200 Secretary of
State Blinken, while co-hosting a September 8, 2021 ministerial on Afghanistan with al ies and
partners, stated that the Taliban’s desired legitimacy and support “has to be earned ... through a
sustained pattern of action that demonstrates a genuine commitment to core expectations that are

193 T his section was prepared by Michael Weber, Analyst in Foreign Affairs.
194 For an analysis of possible leverage that the United States has over the T aliban, see Desha Girod, “Can the West
Make the T aliban Moderate?” Foreign Policy, August 31, 2021.
195 See T ess Bridgeman and Ryan Goodman, “Recognition and the T aliban,” Just Security, August 17, 2021; and
“What are some of the implications if the T aliban is recognized as the official government of Afghanistan by the
United States and the international community?” above.
196 For a discussion of the possible implications of existing sanctions on the T aliban as a result of its control of
Afghanistan, see Adam M. Smith, “ T he Humanitarian and Policy Challenges of U.S. Sanctions on the T aliban ,” Just
Security, August 23, 2021.
197 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken With Jake T apper of State of the Union on CNN,”
interview, August 15, 2021; U.S. Department of State, “Department Press Briefing, September 1, 2021.
198 Ryan Heath, “ Western nations coordinating to block T aliban recognition”; Andrea Shalal, “ G7 leaders plan to
pledge unity on T aliban recognition, sanctions,” Reuters, August 23, 2021; Patrick Wintour, “ US-led meeting to set out
framework for T aliban cooperation,” The Guardian, September 8, 2021.
199 United Kingdom Prime Minister’s Office, “ G7 Leaders Statement on Afghanistan,” August 24, 2021.
200 U.N. Security Council, U.N. Document S/RES/2593 (2021), August 30, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

29

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

enshrined” in the Security Council resolution. Blinken noted that “the names in the caretaker
government do not inspire confidence” that the Taliban wil form an inclusive government.201
As noted above, reports of human rights violations in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan may raise
the prospect of targeted U.S. sanctions against individual perpetrators.202 Congress has provided
the executive branch with global authorities to target foreign persons for sanctions based on
human rights, which can aim to “name and shame” individuals, disrupt human rights violations or
abuses and/or deter future such acts, and promote accountability, among other goals. Most
prominently, the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Title XII, Subtitle F of P.L.
114-328) provides the executive branch standing discretionary capacity to impose economic and
visa sanctions on individuals or entities based on human rights.203 Executive Order 13818, which
implements and builds on the act, also provides broad scope to sanction associated networks of
individuals and entities.204 Separately, a recurring provision in SFOPS, Section 7031(c), provides
for public visa sanctions designations against foreign officials as wel as their immediate family
members for gross violations of human rights.205 Aside from utilizing these or other relevant
authorities, the executive branch could also potential y choose to draw on Presidential emergency
powers to establish an Afghanistan-specific sanctions regime that targets human rights abuses
there.206
Foreign assistance is another possible tool to promote human rights in Taliban-controlled
Afghanistan. As discussed elsewhere in this report, human rights and other conditions may lead
the United States to reduce or eliminate assistance to Afghanistan in the wake of the Afghan
government’s collapse.207 Various standing provisions of U.S. law also require or al ow assistance
restrictions based on human rights that could have relevance in the event of the Taliban’s
continued control of the country. Provisions in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended,
restrict security and development assistance to any country the government of which “engages in
a consistent pattern of gross violations of international y recognized human rights.”208 Other
provisions of law provide the capacity to more narrowly restrict certain types of assistance based
on human rights-related matters.209 The extent to which democracy assistance—which Congress

201 U.S. Department of State, “ Secretary Antony J. Blinken Opening Remarks at Ministerial on Afghanistan ,”
September 8, 2021.
202 According the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, there are “ credible reports of serious violations of
international humanitarian law, and human rights abuses, taking place in many areas under effective T aliban control.
T hey include, among others, summary executions of civilians and hors de combat members of the Afghan national
security forces; restrictions on the rights of women – including their right to move around freely and girls’ right to
attend schools; recruitment of child soldiers; and repression of peaceful protest and expression of dissent.” See U.N.
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “ Statement by Michelle Bachelet, UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights,” August 24, 2021.
203 For additional background see CRS In Focus IF10576, The Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, by
Michael A. Weber and Edward J. Collins-Chase.
204 E.O. 13818, “Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or Corruption,” 82
Federal Register 60839, December 20, 2017.
205 For additional background see CRS In Focus IF10905, FY2020 Foreign Operations Appropriations: Targeting
Foreign Corruption and Hum an Rights Vio lations, by Liana W. Rosen and Michael A. Weber
206 See CRS Report R45618, The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use,
coordinated by Christopher A. Casey.
207 See “What are the prospects for continued U.S. civilian assistance to Afghanistan ” and “What will happen to U.S.
funding provided for Afghanistan security forces?”
208 See Section 116 (22 U.S.C. §2151n) and Section 502B (22 U.S.C. §2304).
209 For instance, human trafficking and the recruitment or use of child soldiers, which the United States has previously
identified Afghanistan in association with pursuant to relevant laws. See CRS Report R44953, The State Departm ent’s
Congressional Research Service

30

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

makes available “notwithstanding any other provision of law”—wil continue in Afghanistan and
in what form is arguably uncertain given the current security situation and possible curtailments
on the activities of civil society organizations, human rights defenders, and independent media
under Taliban rule. Notably, Congress has appropriated some assistance global y for purposes of
supporting and protecting civil society activists and journalists who have been “threatened,
harassed, or attacked.”210
Some additional questions that Congress may ask the executive branch include
 What specific human rights actions or commitments are sought from the Taliban,
and how wil the United States assess the credibility of any commitments? What
actions wil the United States take in response?
 To what extent, if at al , could U.S. attempts to exercise leverage over the Taliban
be undermined by the actions of other actors such as China and Russia?
 What, if any, possible unintended humanitarian or other consequences could
result if the United States maintains or increases sanctions due to concerns over
human rights, and how, if it al , can these consequences be mitigated?
 What plans exist, if any, for U.S. democracy and human rights foreign assistance
to continue in the context of a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan?
What might the Taliban takeover mean for security cooperation as a
national security tool?211
A central aspect of the U.S. and coalition campaign in Afghanistan was training and equipping the
ANDSF.212 Some observers, citing long-standing deficiencies in certain components of the
ANDSF, as wel as recent events, have questioned the efficacy of U.S. efforts to build the security
capacity of al ies and partners writ large.213 Drawing on this example, the fact that the ANDSF did
not forestal a Taliban takeover could suggest to some that such capacity-building efforts are
strategical y problematic and that the U.S. should exercise caution when trying to build foreign
militaries. Others have countered that the situation in Afghanistan was unique, that train and
equip efforts were being conducted during wartime, and that there were myriad other factors
leading to the collapse—including the failings of the Afghan government and the unique
dependence of the Afghan military on U.S. support—that are not always present in other security
cooperation endeavors.214 A 2014 Rand Corporation study of the relationship between security
cooperation and fragility found that U.S. security cooperation efforts did correlate with a

Trafficking in Persons Report: Scope, Aid Restrictions, and Methodology, by Michael A. Weber, Katarina C. O'Regan,
and Liana W. Rosen; and CRS In Focus IF10901, Child Soldiers Prevention Act: Security Assistance Restrictions, by
Michael A. Weber.
210 See Section 7032(h) of P.L. 116-260.
211 T his section was prepared by Kathleen J. McInnis, Specialist in International Security.
212 Craig Whitlock, “ Afghan security forces’ wholesale collapse was years in the making,” The Washington Post,
August 16, 2021.
213 Anthony Capaccio,” As Kabul Fell, U.S. Watchdog Wrote Sad Coda to a 20-Year Failure,” Bloomberg News,
August 17, 2021; Kori Schake, Why the Afghan Army Folded: America has historically struggled to train foreign
militaries, The Atlantic, August 17, 2021.
214 CRS Report R44313, What Is “Building Partner Capacity?” Issues for Congress, coordinated by Kathleen J.
McInnis; Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, What We Need to Learn: Lessons from Twenty Years of
Afghanistan Reconstruction, August 2021.
Congressional Research Service

31

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

reduction in partner state fragility, but that that (a) most of the effect was concentrated at lower
funding levels; and (b) the correlation was stronger in more democratic states and those with
stronger institutions.215 In 2020, the Fund for Peace, a nongovernmental organization, ranked
Afghanistan among the ten most fragile states in the world.216 Members of Congress and others
may seek to draw lessons from security sector reform efforts in Afghanistan and determine what
lessons, if any, might be transferable or relevant in other contexts.
Some additional questions that Congress may ask the executive branch include
 With the collapse of the Afghan military, is there potential for U.S.- and
coalition-trained and armed Afghan forces to join the Taliban or regional terrorist
groups? If this happens, what are the possible threats posed by these individuals?
 Likewise, is there a possibility that some Afghan Special Forces or other
elements could form the nucleus of a credible counter-Taliban resistance
movement? Under what circumstances might the U.S. government provide
support to such a group, if any?
Social and Economic Implications of the
Taliban Takeover
What might be the implications of the Taliban takeover for Afghan
women and girls?217
Decades of war after 1978 and the repressive five-year rule of the Taliban severely undermined
the rights and development of Afghan women, who had been granted equal rights under the 1964
constitution. These rights were not always observed, but prior to 1978, women were present in
legislative bodies, universities, and work places, particularly in urban areas. During their rule
between 1996 and 2001, the Taliban “perpetrated egregious acts of violence against women” as
part of a “war against women,” according to a 2001 State Department report.218 Based on their
particularly conservative interpretation of Islam and Pashtun social norms, the Taliban prohibited
women from working, attending school after age eight, and appearing in public without a male
blood relative and without wearing a burqa. Women accused of breaking these or other
restrictions suffered severe corporal or capital punishment, often publicly.
To date, the Taliban have not described in detail how they now view women’s rights or what role
women would play in a future Taliban-governed society. In February 2020, deputy Taliban
leader Sirajuddin Haqqani wrote of “an Islamic system … where the rights of women that are
granted by Islam—from the right to education to the right to work—are protected.”219 Skeptics
note that a pledge to safeguard the rights of women “according to Islam” and their interpretation
of sharia is subjective and echoes similar pledges made by the Taliban while previously in power.

215 Michael J. McNerney et al., “Assessing Security Cooperation as a Preventiv e T ool,” Rand Corporation, 2014.
216 Fund for Peace, Fragile States Index, 2020, https://fragilestatesindex.org/.
217 T his section was prepared by Sarah R. Collins, Research Assistant. For additional background, see CRS In Focus
IF11646, Afghan Wom en and Girls: Status and Congressional Action , by Clayton T homas and Sarah R. Collins.
218 U.S. Department of State, Report on the Taliban’s War Against Women, November 17, 2001.
219 Sirajuddin Haqqani, “ What We, the T aliban, Want ,” The New York Times, February 20, 2020.
Congressional Research Service

32

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

Since taking power in August 2021, Taliban officials have reiterated their commitment to
protecting women’s rights “within the framework of Sharia.”220 Some observers question whether
the statements by the Taliban are an attempt to assuage concerns that a rollback of women’s rights
is imminent and to dispel “rumors” about reported actions recently carried out by the group, such
as forced marriages.221 In the immediate aftermath of the takeover, Taliban leaders cal ed on
women government employees to return to their posts, as long as they were wearing the hijab
(headscarf), and granted “amnesty” to al who worked with foreign powers.222 Taliban leaders
have subsequently cal ed for women to stay home temporarily, until the military situation
becomes more clear and “until we have a new procedure,” citing concerns over new Taliban
forces who “have not yet been trained very wel ” and who may mistreat, harm, or harass
women.223
The Taliban are accused of numerous attacks on girls’ schools during their insurgency. The
Taliban claim to not oppose education for girls, and in Taliban-controlled areas some girls had
been attending primary school. In some cases, before the full takeover in August, when a local
community advocated for girls’ education, the Taliban al owed it until sixth grade; when it did
not, the Taliban closed girls’ schools. A 2018 study could not identify a single girls’ secondary
school open in areas of heavy Taliban influence or control.224 On September 12, 2021, Acting
Minister for Higher Education Abdul Baqi Haqqani announced that women would be al owed to
continue attending university; however classrooms would be gender-segregated and Islamic dress
would be compulsory for women. Haqqani also noted that a curriculum review would be
undertaken, and that female students would only be al owed to be taught by women or by male
teachers if they are hidden behind a curtain or via video conferencing.225
The Taliban are often portrayed as the prime drivers of Afghan women’s oppression. Others have
noted that many people within Afghan society hold restrictive views of women’s rights that in
some cases predate the Taliban movement, particularly in rural areas where 76% of the population
resides: “For many rural women, particularly in Pashtun areas but also among other rural
minority ethnic groups, actual life has not changed much from the Taliban era, formal legal
empowerment notwithstanding.”226
Moreover, the physical and psychological toll of the conflict’s violence have further undermined
women’s development. According to the 2021 SIGAR lessons learned report on gender equality
One outcome of the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan was supposed to have been a steady
improvement in the lives of Afghan women—and, to be sure, improvements have

220 “T ranscript of T aliban’s first news conference in Kabul,” Al Jazeera, August 17, 2021.
221 Lynne O’Donnell, “ As T aliban Expand Control, Concerns About Forced Marriage and Sex Slavery Rise,” Foreign
Policy, July 23, 2021.
222 “T aliban urges government staff to return to work,” Ariana News, August 16, 2021. Other restrictions imposed in
some areas of the country since May 2021 have included ordering women not leave the home without a male guardian,
closing girls and mixed-gender schools, and banning the use of television. Afghanistan Independent Human Rights
Commission, “ Escalation of Violent Confrontations and a Rise in Violations of Human Rights, June 22 to July 6,
2021,” July 17, 2021.
223 Maggie Astor, Sharif Hassan, and Norimitsu Onishi, “A T aliban spokesman urges women to stay home because
fighters haven’t been trained to respect them,” The New York Times, August 24, 2021.
224 Ashley Jackson, “Life Under the T aliban Shadow Government,” Overseas Development Institute, June 2018.
225 Ezzatullah Mehrdad, Gerry Shih and Miriam Berger, “T aliban minister says women can attend university, but not
alongside men,” Washington Post, September 12, 2021.
226 John R. Allen and Vanda Felbab-Brown, “T he fate of women’s rights in Afghanistan,” Brookings Institution,
September 2020.
Congressional Research Service

33

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

happened. But these gains have occurred alongside, and in many cases in spite of, the
misery wrought by the last two decades of war. Violence continues to be one of the biggest
challenges facing Afghan women, both directly and indirectly [ ... ] every civilian casualty
brings with it a series of potential ripple effects: increasingly desperate poverty, mental
trauma, and the social stigma and discrimination that accompany permanent disability and
widowhood.227
For some Afghan women, particularly those in rural areas more affected by conflict, the Taliban
takeover may represent an improvement over high levels of violence that have characterized
recent years, if the group can prevent further violence and improve security conditions. Fieldwork
conducted in 2019 and 2020 found that “peace is an absolute priority for some rural women, even
a peace deal very much on the Taliban terms.”228 Some have credited the Taliban’s takeover in
1996 with reducing the widespread sexual and gender-based violence perpetuated by militias
during the preceding civil wars.229
For other women, the Taliban’s takeover in 2021 has increased fears of sexual violence,
retaliation, and displacement, and highlight longer-term concerns over the future of women’s
rights under a Taliban government.230 A number of women have publicly protested in Kabul and
other cities to demand protection for human rights and inclusion in the Taliban government.
Reports indicate some women have been beaten by Taliban fighters while protesting, and some
journalists have been detained while covering the protests.231 The caretaker cabinet announced on
September 7, 2021, reinstates the Ministry of Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice,
which enforced the Taliban’s interpretation of Islam in the 1990s. It did not include the Ministry
of Women’s Affairs, which was not present in the prior Taliban government but had been created
during the most recent Afghan government.232
The future of women’s rights and status in Afghanistan could depend on many factors, including
 Consensus, or a lack thereof, within the Taliban over which rights wil be
afforded under an Islamic system;
 The security situation and the level of violence;
 Levels of international development aid and the ability of donors to implement
programs for women; and
 The degree to which international or domestic actors can induce the Taliban to
institute policies respecting women’s rights.

227 SIGAR, Support for Gender Equality: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan, February 2021, pp. 11-12.
228 Allen and Brown, “ T he fate of women’s rights in Afghanistan”; International Crisis Group, “ What Will Peace T alks
Bode for Afghan Women?” briefing note, April 6, 2020.
229 Aisha Ahmad, “Afghan Women: T he State of Legal Rights and Security,” Policy Perspectives, Vol. 3, No. 1
(January - June 2006), pp. 25-41.
230 See e.g. “ ‘I worry my daughters will never know peace’: women flee the T aliban —again,” The Guardian, August
12, 2021; Farnaz Fassihi and Dan Bilefsky, “ For Afghan Women, T aliban Stir Fears of Return to a Repressive Past ,”
The New York Tim es, August 17, 2021.
231 Yaroslav T rofimov, “ Afghan Women Protest Hard-Line T aliban Government, Face Violent Crackdown,” Wall
Street Journal, September 8, 2021.
232 Rachel Pannett, “ Who leads Afghanistan’s new government? Here’s what we know about the T aliban’s top
officials,” Washington Post, September 8, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

34

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

How has the Taliban advance affected the humanitarian situation
on the ground in Afghanistan?233
The humanitarian situation since the Taliban takeover is fragile and subject to change.
Humanitarian needs are expected to rise significantly, and many humanitarian organizations are
assessing the status of their activities based on the security situation. Current conditions could
further hinder assistance delivery and risk the safety of humanitarian personnel. The United
Nations confirmed its commitment to stay, deliver assistance, and support the humanitarian
response in Afghanistan234; however, these efforts could shift depending on security
considerations.235 While the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) has historical y
engaged with the Taliban, the level and extent, if any, of current communications are not publicly
available. The International Committee of the Red Cross, which has been in Afghanistan since
1987 and has provided assistance across the country (including in Taliban-controlled areas), plans
to continue its efforts along with the Afghan Red Crescent Society.236 As of early 2021, roughly
half of Afghanistan’s population (18.4 mil ion people, out of a population of 35 to 40 mil ion)
faced a severe humanitarian crisis237, with approximately one-third of the population struggling
with emergency-level food insecurity.238 The Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic,
conflict, and natural disasters (most recently drought conditions) have exacerbated the
humanitarian situation, resulting in chronic vulnerability among the general population.
Escalating conflict in recent months has resulted in increasing numbers of trauma injuries among
Afghans as wel as increased overal protection concerns, particularly for women.239

233 T his section was prepared by Rhoda Margesson, Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy.
234 Humanitarian assistance is provided according to principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence.
235 U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), “Statement by Dr. Ramiz Alakbarov, U.N. [Deputy Special
Representative of the Secretary-General] DSRSG and Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator on UN staying to
support aid response in Afghanistan,” August 17, 2021. Specific U.N. entities have issued similar statements. On
September 13, 2021, U.N. Secretary-General Guterres convened a high-level ministerial meeting in Geneva,
Switzerland on the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan . See https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/secretary-
generals-remarks-high-level-ministerial-meeting-humanitarian-situation. Member States pledged more than $1.2 billion
for the people of Afghanistan at the ministerial meeting.
236 ICRC, “Afghanistan: A Statement from Robert Mardini, the Director-General of the ICRC,” August 17, 2021.
237 T he COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated the humanitarian situation; immediate and secondary impacts contributed
to a near doubling of the number of people requiring assistance, from 9.4 million in January 2020 to 18.4 million in
January 2021. U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOCHA), “ Afghanistan: Humanitarian
Response Plan (2018-2021) - Year-End Monitoring Report (Jan - Dec 2020),” January 2020, and UNOCHA,
“Afghanistan: Humanitarian Response Plan Summary 2021,” May 9, 2021. T he immediate response to COVID-19
focuses largely on the health and hygiene impacts of the pandemic, while the longer term response to the secondary
impacts focuses on protection, food security and livelihoods, nutrition, and education. T he urgent need to shift
programming and resources toward the COVID-19 response also came at the expense of some other humanitarian
priorities.
238 “WFP Afghanistan: Situation Report ,” August 16, 2021; See also, Integrated Food Security Phase Classification,
“Afghanistan: IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis: March - November 2021,” April 2021. High food insecurity is due
to a complex mix of factors, such as food prices, reduced income and poverty, conflict, COVID -19 impacts, and natural
disasters.
239 In Afghanistan, many protection concerns exist for vulnerable populations as well as the local staff aiming to assist
them. According to the United Nations, for humanitarian organizations, protection is typically about advocating for and
supporting ways to reduce and prevent people’s exposure to risks and to ensure respect for t he rights of individuals in
accordance with international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law. UNOCHA, “ Protection.” See
https://www.unocha.org/es/themes/protection. Systematic violations of international humanitarian law and international
human rights law by the T aliban and other armed groups ranged from deliberate attacks on health and education
facilities to targeted killings and the forced recruitment of children as child soldiers. Office of the Special
Congressional Research Service

35

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

U.N. Funding Appeals. Prior to the Taliban takeover, humanitarian needs were not fully met, in
part due to limited resources, government capacity shortcomings, and security constraints on
humanitarian operations. The 2021 U.N. Afghanistan Humanitarian Response Plan totaled $1.3
bil ion to meet basic needs such as food, water, shelter, protection, and medical services
(including those related to COVID-19).240 The August 27, 2021, U.N. Regional Refugee
Preparedness and Response Plan sought $299 mil ion in anticipation of half a mil ion Afghan
refugee arrivals in neighboring countries through the end of 2021.241 On September 5, 2021, the
U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs issued a flash appeal for $606 mil ion
to meet immediate humanitarian response gaps through the end of the year.242 For years, the U.S.
government has been the largest donor of humanitarian assistance for the Afghan population,
including those displaced internal y or as refugees.243
What is the status of Afghan Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)
and refugees?244
The United Nations and other humanitarian organizations continue to assess the rapidly evolving
displacement situation in Afghanistan.245 The status and number of Internal y Displaced Persons
(IDPs) in Afghanistan are not known due to the rapidly evolving security and political situation
on the ground. Prior to the Taliban takeover, the United Nations estimated there were more than
3.4 mil ion IDPs, a number which is anticipated to increase.246 Most Afghans are reportedly
staying inside the country, with some returning home as areas stabilize and others fleeing rural
areas for Kabul province and other major cities.247 Humanitarian organizations are providing
assistance to IDPs where access is possible.
The United Nations is preparing refugee-receiving countries (specifical y Iran, Pakistan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) for potential new Afghan refugee arrivals.248 The

Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, “ Afghanistan,” June 2021. See also Report
of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed conflict (A/75/873 –S/2021/437) issued on 21 June 2021, pp. 3 -5.
240 UNOCHA, Global Humanitarian Overview 2021, May Update, June 8, 2021. As of September 8, 2021, the appeal
was 40.3% funded.
241 UNHCR, Afghanistan Situation Regional Refugee Preparedness and Response Plan: Summary & Inter-agency
Funding Requirem ents July-Decem ber 2021, August 27, 2021.
242 UNOCHA, “ Afghanistan Flash Appeal: Immediate Humanitarian Response Needs (Sept - Dec 2021),” September 5,
2021.
243 USAID, Afghanistan – Complex Emergency,” Fact Sheet #5, Fiscal Year (FY) 2021, September 3, 2021.
244 T his section was prepared by Rhoda Margesson, Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy.
245 Refugees have fled their country of origin because of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons based on race,
religion, nationality, or membership in a particular social or political group. Refugees are unwilling or unable to avail
themselves of the protection of their home government due to fears of persecution. Once granted refugee status, a
person has certain rights and protections under international law. Asylum-seekers, who flee their home country, seek
sanctuary in another state where they apply for asylum (i.e., the right to be recognized as a refugee). T hey may receive
legal protection and assistance while their formal status is determined. IDPs have been forced from their homes, often
for many of the same reasons as refugees, but have not crossed an international border.
246 UNOCHA, “ Humanitarians seek $1.3 billion to help millions in war-weary Afghanistan,” January 12, 2021 and
“Afghanistan: Weekly Humanitarian Updat e (30 August – 5 September 2021); UNHCR, “ UNHCR warns
Afghanistan’s conflict taking the heaviest toll on displaced women and children ,” August 13, 2021. UNHCR,
“UNHCR Position on Returns to Afghanistan,” August 2021.
247 UNHCR Regional Bureau for Asia and the Pacific, “Flash External Update: Afghanistan Situation #4,” September
1, 2021. UNHCR, Afghanistan Situation: Supplementary Appeal: July-December 2021, August 2021.
248 UNHCR, Afghanistan Situation Regional Refugee Preparedness and Response Plan: Summary & Inter-agency
Congressional Research Service

36

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

wil ingness and capacity of neighboring countries to host Afghan refugees in the short- and long-
term remains unclear. (Iran and Pakistan already host over 2.2 mil ion registered Afghan
refugees—roughly 85% of al Afghan refugees—from previous waves of displacement.)249
Border closures with neighboring countries continue to fluctuate, although most land border-
crossing points have reportedly been closed except in limited instances. The United Nations has
consistently reported Afghans moving toward Pakistan border posts, but no large-scale
international displacement from Afghanistan has so far been observed.250 Reports of recent
Afghan arrivals in other countries, such as Turkey, are also beginning to emerge.251 Citing the
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol as wel as customary
international law, the United Nations has cal ed on al countries to al ow civilians fleeing
Afghanistan access to their territories, to support the right to seek asylum, and to ensure respect
for the principle of non-refoulement (not to forcibly return refugees).252
What are the implications of the Taliban’s takeover for
counternarcotics?253
Afghanistan is among the world’s most significant sources of il icit drugs, particularly opiates.
According to U.S. and U.N. estimates, more than 80% of the world’s heroin supply originates in
Afghanistan.254 In 2020, an estimated 215,000 hectares of opium poppy was cultivated in
Afghanistan—most of which was harvested in areas under Taliban influence or control.255
Afghanistan is also a major source of methamphetamine and cannabis products (e.g., hashish or
cannabis resin). The il icit drug trade, just one component of a broader—and thriving—informal
economy in which the Taliban have long operated, is a major source of revenue for the Taliban; it
is also vital as a driver of employment for agricultural workers in opium poppy cultivation
regions of Afghanistan. Opiates have taken a public health toll on the Afghan population, as the
country has reported some of the world’s highest substance abuse rates in recent years.256
Uncertainty surrounds the question of what type of counternarcotics posture the Taliban intend to
adopt. In 2000, following unsuccessful efforts in 1997 and 1999, the Taliban imposed a short-
lived ban that dramatical y decreased recorded opium poppy cultivation in 2001.257 A Taliban

Funding Requirem ents July-Decem ber 2021, August 27, 2021.
249 Afghans have been displaced as refugees due to different conflicts over the past four decades, creating one of the
largest protracted refugee situations in the world. Since 2002, nearly 5.3 million Afghan refugees returned to
Afghanistan under UNHCR’s facilitated Voluntary Repatriation Program.
250 UNHCR, Afghanistan Situation Regional Refugee Preparedness and Response Plan: Summary & Inter-agency
Funding Requirem ents July-Decem ber 2021, August 27, 2021.
251 T he New Humanitarian, “ T he Afghan refugee crisis brewing on T urkey’s eastern border,” August 3, 2021.
252 UNHCR, “UNHCR Position on Returns to Afghanistan,” August 2021.
253 T his section was prepared by Liana Rosen, Specialist in International Crime and Narcotics.
254 White House, Office of National Drug Control Policy, “The Office of National Drug Control Policy Releases Data
on Afghanistan Poppy Cultivation and Potential Heroin Production,” press release, July 16, 2021; U.S. Department o f
State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Vol. 1: Drug and Chemical Control, March 2021, p. 86; United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report, Booklet 2: Global Overview, June 2021, p. 51; United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report, Booklet 3: Drug Market T rends, June 2021, pp. 68, 87.
255 White House, Office of National Drug Control Policy, “The Office of National Drug Control Policy Releases Data
on Afghanistan Poppy Cultivation and Potential Heroin Production, ” press release, July 16, 2021.
256 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report, Booklet 3: Drug Market T rends, June 2021, p. 108;
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “UNODC Reports Major, and Growing, Drug Abuse in Afghanistan,”
press release, June 21, 2010.
257 U.S. Department of State, “The T aliban And T he Afghan Drug T rade,” Fact Sheet, December 20, 2000; United
Congressional Research Service

37

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

spokesperson stated on August 17, 2021, that the Taliban envision an elimination of drug
production and smuggling in the country—and are seeking international assistance to achieve this
goal.258 Some question the credibility of such a posture, and anticipate the prospect of continued
Taliban involvement in and reliance on the opium trade as a revenue source, particularly given its
importance as a generator of labor-intensive employment and cash liquidity.259 This may include
profiting from the taxation of the movement of il icit drug-related products, such as the import of
precursor chemicals required in the processing and production of heroin and methamphetamine.
Even if the Taliban were to impose an effective ban on the il icit drug trade, revenue opportunities
in the informal or grey-zone economy—through a wide range of taxation and extortion
schemes—may likely persist or expand.260
Under Afghan Presidents Ashraf Ghani and Hamid Karzai, the U.S. government spent bil ions of
dollars supporting a wide range of capacity-building assistance, training, and mentoring projects
for counternarcotics-related ministries, task forces, and law-enforcement units in Afghanistan;
U.S. programs also sought to promote alternative licit livelihood options and address drug
treatment and rehabilitation services, particularly for women and children.
Some additional issues that Congress may consider as events continue to unfold include
 Whether to continue to support any, some, or al counternarcotics programming
in Afghanistan;
 What consequences for human and economic security may result if
counternarcotics donor funding to Afghanistan declines; and
 How the counternarcotics policy postures of regional actors, including China,
Iran, and Russia, may evolve under the current circumstances.261
How might the Taliban takeover affect Afghanistan’s relationships
with the International Financial Institutions (IFIs)?262
Since rejoining the international community in 2002, Afghanistan has been an active member of
IFIs. The World Bank committed $784 mil ion to development projects in Afghanistan in 2021,
and $5.3 bil ion to date.263 The World Bank is the largest single source of funding for
Afghanistan’s development, financing up to 30% of the country’s civilian budget and supporting

Nations International Drug Control Programme, Afghanistan: Annual Opium Poppy Survey 2001, October 2001, p. 11.
258 Joanna T aylor, “Afghanistan ‘will not be a country of cultivation of opium anymore’, Taliban insists,” Independent
(UK), August 18, 2021.
259 Jonathan Landay, “Profits and poppy: Afghanistan’s illegal drug trade a boon for T aliban,” Reuters, August 16,
2021.
260 Graeme Smith and David Mansfield, “T he T aliban Have Claimed Afghanistan’s Real Economic Prize,” New York
Tim es, guest essay, August 18, 2021; United Nations Security Council, Twelfth Report Analytical Support and
Sanctions Monitoring Team , S/2021/486, June 1, 2021, pp. 14-16; Graeme Smith, Resource Flows and Political Power
in Afghanistan, Overseas Developm ent Institute, November 2020. See also World Bank, The Long Shadow of
Inform ality: Challenges and Policies, Franziska Ohnsorge and Shu Yu, eds., 2021 , https://www.worldbank.org/en/
research/publication/informal-economy.
261 For past criticism, see Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Counternarcotics: Lessons from
the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan, SIGAR-18-52-LL, June 14, 2018; see also T ia Sewell, “ Where’s the U.S. Strategy
for Counternarcotics in Afghanistan?,” Lawfare, November 18, 2020.
262 T his section was prepared by Martin Weiss, Specialist in International T rade and Finance.
263 T he World Bank in Afghanistan, https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/afghanistan/overview.
Congressional Research Service

38

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

core functions of the government.264 As of December 2020, the Asian Development Bank (ADB)
had extended around $500 mil ion in loans and grants to Afghanistan.265 Multilateral development
bank (MDB) financing supports a wide range of endeavors. World Bank financing is largely
focused on governance efforts, including macro-fiscal policy and management; finance, private
investment, and job creation; public sector governance and anti-corruption; human capital
development and service delivery; citizen engagement and social inclusion; urban development
and infrastructure; connectivity; and sustainability. ADB financing is focused primarily on large
infrastructure projects. Both development banks are also providing Afghanistan COVID-19-
related support, such as financing to construct hospitals and train staff.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed to a $370 mil ion COVID-19 relief program for
Afghanistan in November 2020. Afghanistan also benefitted from the IMF’s disbursement of
about $220 mil ion under the Fund’s Rapid Credit Facility and debt-service relief of about $10
mil ion under a special trust fund. Additional y, Afghanistan is eligible to receive a proportionate
share of the recently agreed $650 mil ion Special Drawing Rights (SDR) al ocation that is
designed to bolster the foreign exchange reserves of member countries.266 The al ocation is
scheduled to be distributed to member states on August 23, 2021. Under the al ocation,
Afghanistan would receive around $434 mil ion of SDRs, based on its 0.07% quota in the IMF,
bringing its total SDR al ocation up to about $653 mil ion.
A key issue is whether the IMF and the MDBs recognize the Taliban as the official government of
Afghanistan. While IFI charters are explicit about the requirements for a country’s membership,
they are largely silent on the issue of representation, leaving the decision to its member
countries.267 At the IMF, IMF Press Secretary Gerry Rice released a statement on August 18 that,
“[t]here is currently a lack of clarity within the int’l community regarding recognition of a
government in Afghanistan, as a consequence of which the country cannot access SDRs or other
IMF resources.”268 The United States was also reportedly negotiating to pause the SDR al ocation
to Afghanistan.269 Some Members of Congress have expressed their concern about Afghanistan’s
SDR al ocation. On August 17, Representative French Hil and 17 other lawmakers wrote to
Treasury Secretary Janet Yel en urging the United States to intervene and help prevent
Afghanistan from accessing any IMF resources.270
The World Bank suspended funding for dozens of projects in Afghanistan on August 24, citing
questions over the legitimacy of Taliban rule. Under World Bank policies, the organization cannot
disburse funds when there is no agreement by its 189 member countries on whether a country has
a legitimate government. The World Bank completed evacuation of its Kabul-based staff to
Islamabad the previous week.

264 Josh Zumbrun, “World Bank Freezes Aid to Afghanistan,” Wall Street Journal, August 24, 2021.
265 Asian Development Bank Member Fact Sheet, June 2021, https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/27747/
afg-2020.pdf.
266 CRS In Focus IF11835, International Monetary Fund: Special Drawing Rights Allocation , by Martin A. Weiss and
Rebecca M. Nelson
267 Alison Duxbury, The Participation of States in International Organisations (Cambridge University Press, 2011), p.
20.
268 Gerry Rice (@IMFSpokesperson), T witter, August 18, 2018, available at https://twitter.com/IMFSpokesperson/
status/1428096013374410752
269 Chris Giles et al., “Afghanistan faces ‘dire’ financial outlook, warns former central bank chief,” Financial Times,
August 18, 2021.
270 T he letter is available at https://hill.house.gov/uploadedfiles/20210817ltrtosecyellenresdrstoafghanistan.pdf.
Congressional Research Service

39

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

What Afghan central bank assets did the Biden Administration put
on hold, and what are the potential implications?271
Afghanistan’s central bank (Da Afghanistan Bank) held about $9.5 bil ion in international
reserves, according to a June 2021 IMF assessment.272 Most of the central bank’s reserves are
held outside of Afghanistan. According to the end-2020 central bank balance sheet, $1.3 bil ion in
gold was held at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York; $3.2 bil ion was deposited in foreign
banks; and $4.2 bil ion in investments (mostly U.S. government securities) was managed by the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the World Bank, and the Bank for International Settlements.
On August 15, 2021 the Biden Administration put a hold on Afghan government reserves held in
U.S. bank accounts.273 The status of the central bank’s holdings of physical foreign-currency
banknotes—about $400 mil ion held primarily at the presidential palace and the central bank’s
head office—is unclear.274 The central bank’s former Acting Governor, Ajmal Ahmady, who fled
Kabul, estimated on social media that the funds accessible to the Taliban are 0.1%-0.2% of
Afghanistan’s total international reserves.275 Taliban members reportedly attempted to inspect the
foreign reserves only to be told by central bank officials that they could not access them because
they were being stored by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.276
Inability to access international reserves wil likely complicate the Taliban’s ability to manage the
economy. Afghanistan’s currency, the afghani, is trading at record lows, and the currency
depreciation is expected to fuel inflation. To tame inflation, the Taliban may restrict money
leaving the country (impose capital controls). A mix of capital controls and inflation creates a
bleak economic outlook for the Afghan people. Further, the Taliban’s capacity to manage the
economy is questionable. The Taliban named a new acting governor of Afghanistan’s central
bank, Haji Mohammad Idris, who has no formal economic training. He reportedly headed the
Taliban’s economic commission, whose activities included collecting il egal taxes from
businesses and farmers to fund the militant group’s insurgency.277
Some additional questions that Congress may ask the executive branch include
 How do U.S. government officials and outside experts assess Afghanistan’s
short- to medium-term economic prospects?
 70%-80% of the Afghanistan government’s budget has been funded historical y
by international donors.278 Without donor funding, how do the Taliban intend to
finance the government, including paying government salaries and providing
basic services?

271 T his section was prepared by Rebecca Nelson, Specialist in International T rade and Finance.
272 International reserves are gold and assets (such as cash, bank deposits, and government securities) denominated in
major foreign currencies, such as dollars and euros.
273 Jeff Stein, “Biden Administration Freezes Billions of Dollars in Afghan Reserves, Depriving T aliban of Cash,”
Washington Post, August 17, 2021.
274 JP Koning, “What Happens to the Afghanistan Central Bank’s Assets?,” Moneyness Blog, August 17, 2021.
275 Ajmal Ahmady, T witter, August 18, 2021.
276 Natalie Musumeci, “T he T aliban T ried to Get its Hands on the Afghanistan Central Bank’s Nearly $10 Billion in
Reserves, but Most of the Money Is in New York,” Business Insider, August 25, 2021,
277 Eltaf Najafizada, “T aliban Name Obscure Official as Central Bank Chief with Crisis Looming,” Bloomberg, August
23, 2021.
278 David Lawder, “T aliban Rule Presents Aid Agencies with Moral, Fiscal Dilemma,” Reuters, August 24, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

40

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

 How prepared are the Taliban to administer key economic institutions and
maintain critical infrastructure?
 How might economic collapse affect the security and stability of the country and
the potential for mass displacement? How might these considerations shape U.S.
decisions about sanctions and U.S.-imposed controls on Afghan state assets?
 Arguable points of possible U.S. leverage over the Taliban include development
assistance; sanctions (either new ones or relief from existing sanctions); holds on
Afghan central bank reserves; and extension of formal recognition. Which of
these are the most and least effective?
What is the status of the COVID-19 pandemic in Afghanistan and
what are the implications of the Taliban takeover for COVID-19
control and vaccine distribution?279
As of September 13, 2021, Afghanistan has reported more than 155,000 confirmed cases of
COVID-19 and 7,000 deaths from the disease.280 Public health responders in the country believe
the actual figures are likely higher due to low testing rates and lack of a national death
registration system.281 On September 2, 2021, WHO officials reported that 18% of COVID-19
diagnostic tests were positive; transmission of the highly contagious Delta variant is reportedly
contributing to a fourth wave of the pandemic in the country.282 Instability and interruption to aid
flows have also forced temporary suspension of some COVID-19 responses, particularly plans to
establish new diagnostic laboratories, instal oxygen plants in hospitals, and expand isolation
centers and intensive care unit beds for COVID-19.283 According to WHO, after September 5,
2021, 3% of the country’s isolation beds and 8% of its intensive care unit (ICU) beds wil remain
operational.284
Since the beginning of the pandemic, WHO, UN agencies, and Gavi, the Vaccine Al iance, have
worked with the country’s Ministry of Health on the COVID-19 response, including by helping to
strengthen laboratory capacity and training vaccinators to deploy the COVID-19 vaccine.285
WHO reported that its work builds on routine health care activities in the country, such as polio
immunization campaigns and health systems capacity strengthening.286 As of September 13,
2021, approximately 1.9 mil ion COVID-19 vaccines had been administered in Afghanistan,
covering roughly 5% of the country’s population.287 According to the most recently available

279 T his section was prepared by Sara T harakan, Analyst in Global Health and International Development, and T iaji
Salaam-Blyther, Specialist in Global Health.
280 WHO, COVID-19 Dashboard: Afghanistan, accessed on September 13, 2021.
281 Emma Farge, “Hundreds of health centres at risk of closure in Afghanistan – WHO,” Reuters, September 6, 2021.
Diaa Hadid, “ A Crippling 3rd Wave Of COVID Adds T o Afghanistan’s Woes,” NPR, July 2, 2021.
282 WHO, “Afghanistan Emergency Situation Report Issue 5,” September 2, 2021, accessed on September 13, 2021.
283 WHO, “ Statement by the WHO Representative in Afghanistan,” August 24, 2021.
284 WHO, Afghanistan Emergency Situation Report Issue 5, September 2, 2021, accessed on September 13, 2021.
285 Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, “Resourceful Optimism: Fighting COVID-19 in Afghanistan,” April 20, 2021.
286 WHO, “ WHO continues fight against pandemic amid worsening global public health emergency and uneven
vaccine rollout,” July 20, 2021.
287 WHO, “ Statement by the WHO Representative in Afghanistan,” August 24, 2021; and WHO, COVID-19
Dashboard: Afghanistan, accessed on September 13, 2021. Johns Hopkins University Coronavirus Resource Center,
Afghanistan: Country Profile, accessed September 13, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

41

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

reports, prior to the Taliban takeover, Afghanistan was in phase one of its vaccination campaign,
and was vaccinating front-line healthcare workers, media personnel, teachers, and its security and
defense forces.288 In the longer term, it is unclear how supply chain disruptions associated with
earlier Kabul International Airport (formerly Hamid Karzai International Airport) closures wil
affect the COVID-19 vaccine supply, as wel as other necessary health and hospital supplies.
The implications of the Taliban’s takeover, in terms of prospects for COVID-19 control, remain
to be seen. Though WHO and UN agencies have committed to long-term operations in the
country, including delivering COVID-19 and polio immunizations (Afghanistan is one of the last
countries where polio is endemic), the World Bank and WHO warn that the interruption of aid
flows may leave mil ions of Afghans without access to health services and jeopardize the progress
on health indicators of the past 20 years (such as reductions in maternal and infant mortality and
increases in immunization rates).289
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), in early September 2021, 90% of health
facilities in Afghanistan closed due to restrictions on aid financing to the Taliban; WHO is
funding 500 clinics as a stopgap measure, though 75% of clinics remain closed.290 Health
facilities continue to experience critical shortages in medical supplies due to earlier uncertainty at
the Kabul international airport, which has created a backlog of deliveries.291 The airport’s
reopening and resumption of some flights is expected to increase aid flows eventual y.292
Overcrowding among displaced people has reportedly limited infection prevention measures and
increased the risk of transmission of different types of infections, including COVID-19.
Historical y, the Taliban has opposed vaccines, including reportedly committing attacks on health
workers providing polio vaccines. In earlier waves of the pandemic, they reportedly assisted
domestic and international efforts to combat COVID-19.293 Some observers dismissed the
Taliban’s earlier response and charged that the Taliban’s escalation of violence since 2019 was
the main factor impeding the country’s response to the pandemic.294 WHO officials have warned
that Taliban attacks on health care workers remain a chal enge, and have said large numbers of
internal y displaced persons are fostering conditions for increased COVID-19 transmission.295

288 WHO, “WHO continues fight against pandemic amid worsening global public health emergency and uneven
vaccine rollout,” July 20, 2021.
289 WHO, “ Afghanistan Emergency Situation Report Issue 5,” September 2, 2021, accessed on September 13, 2021.
Karl Blanchet, Ahmed Shah Salahi, and Sayed Saeedzai, et al., “Afghanistan needs international support. But what
kind?," The New Hum anitarian , September 13, 2021. Irwin Roy, "Afghan healthcare under threat from international
aid freeze," The New Hum anitarian, September 6, 2021. WHO, Statem ent on Afghanistan by Dr Ahm ed Al-Mandhari,
WHO Regional Director for the Eastern Mediterranean , August 18, 2021.
290WHO, “ Afghanistan Emergency Situation Report Issue 5,” September 2, 2021, accessed on September 13, 2021;
Irwin Loy, “Afghan healthcare under threat from international aid freeze,” The New Humanitarian, September 6, 2021.
291 Apoorva Mandivilli , "Health care in Afghanistan is crumbling, aid groups warn," The New York Times, September
13, 2021.
292 "Kabul airport reopens to receive aid, domestic flights restart," Reuters, September 4, 2021.
293 See Ashley Jackson, “For the T aliban, the Pandemic is a Ladder,” Foreign Policy, May 6, 2020, and “T he T aliban
are joining Afghanistan’s fight against covid-19,” Econom ist, May 9, 2020. Abdul Qadir Sediqi and Orooj Hakimi,
“Coronavirus makes T aliban realise they need health workers alive not dead,” Reuters, March 18, 2020. Ruchi Kumar,
“T aliban launches campaign to help Afghanistan fight coronavirus,” Al Jazeera, April 6, 2020.
294 Ashley Jackson, “For the T aliban, the Pandemic is a Ladder,” Foreign Policy, May 6, 2020.
295 WHO, Afghanistan Emergency Situation Report Issue 5, September 2, 2021, accessed on September 13, 2021.
WHO, Statem ent on Afghanistan by Dr Ahm ed Al-Mandhari, WHO Regional Director for the Eastern Mediterranean ,
August 18, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

42

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

Given these factors, it is unclear whether to, and what extent, the new government formed by the
Taliban wil assist in COVID-19 control and vaccination campaigns.
How have other countries reacted to the
Taliban’s takeover?
How have NATO allies responded to the U.S. withdrawal?296
Following the February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement and subsequent U.S. consultations with
NATO al ies, NATO announced in April 2021 that it would begin withdrawing from Afghanistan
on May 1, 2021, and complete the withdrawal “within a few months.”297 Some European al ies
expressed unease that the mission—which they viewed as a symbol of European solidarity with
the United States following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001—was ending on terms
determined largely by the United States and with what they viewed as limited European
involvement.298 Criticism increased during the Taliban takeover in August, driven by a belief that
Europeans in Afghanistan and their Afghan partners were put at heightened risk due to actions
taken by the United States.299 European al ies also have expressed concern about the longer-term
implications for Europe of the withdrawal, particularly with respect to potential refugee flows and
terrorist threats. More broadly, the withdrawal has reportedly raised questions in Europe about
European al ies’ dependence on the United States and about U.S. reliability as an al y.300
NATO’s almost 20-year engagement in Afghanistan was by far the most expansive military
operation in the al iance’s history. Close to one-third of the fatalities suffered by coalition forces
in Afghanistan were from non-U.S. NATO member and partner countries.301 In 2011, the high
point of the NATO mission in Afghanistan in terms of troop numbers, about 40,000 of the
130,000 troops deployed to the mission were from non-U.S. NATO countries and partners.302
Given their level of engagement, European al ies were critical of the Trump Administration’s lack
of consultation with them prior to its February 2020 agreement with the Taliban.303 Although they
welcomed President Biden’s pledge of more substantive consultations before finalizing decisions
on the U.S. withdrawal, many European al ies subsequently asserted that “the timing and nature
of the withdrawal were set in Washington” and that they were not adequately consulted during the
planning process.304 Such criticism continued into late August, as several al ied governments,

296 T his section was prepared by Paul Belkin, Analyst in European Affairs.
297 NAT O, “NAT O and Afghanistan,” updated regularly at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm.
298 See, for example, Jacopo Barigazzi, “Biden’s Afghan pullout triggers unease among NAT O allies,” Politico, April
15, 2021.
299 Matthew Karnitsching, “Disbelief and betrayal: Europe reacts to Biden’s Afghanistan ‘miscalculation,’” Politico,
August 17, 2021.
300 Josep Borrell Fontelles, “Europe, Afghanistan is Your Wake-Up Call,” New York Times, September 1, 2021; Gilles
Gressani, “Elements for a Doctrine: A Conversation with Charles Michel,” Groupe d’Etudes Geopolitiques, September
8, 2021.
301 “Afghanistan Coalition Military Fatalities by Year,” icasualties.org. Figures are updated regularly.
302 NAT O, ISAF: Key Facts and Figures, June 6, 2011, at https://www.nato.int/isaf/placemats_archive/2011-06-06-
ISAF-Placemat.pdf.
303 “Germany Worried at Possible U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan,” DeutscheWelle, December 28, 2018; Ben
Farmer, “Britain Left in Dark over U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan,” The Telegraph, December 21, 2018.
304 Josep Borrell Fontelles, “Europe, Afghanistan is Your Wake-Up Call,” New York Times, September 1, 2021
Congressional Research Service

43

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

including France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (UK), unsuccessfully requested that the
Biden Administration extend the August 31 deadline for withdrawal from Afghanistan.305
As European al ies were withdrawing forces over the summer, they also began to facilitate the
removal of smal numbers of Afghans. By the end of August, European al ies and Canada had
evacuated more than 28,000 Afghan citizens, including more than 8,000 by the UK, almost 5,000
by Italy, 4,100 by Germany, 2,600 by France, and 1,900 by Spain.306 NATO al ies Albania and
North Macedonia, as wel as neighboring Kosovo, reportedly agreed to host several thousand at-
risk Afghan evacuees seeking entry into the United States and other third countries (Albania
about 4,000, Kosovo about 2,000, and North Macedonia between 800 and 1,800).307
The resettlement of Afghans in Europe comes as the European Union (EU) and its member states
have struggled to address migration and refugee flows to Europe and are eager to avoid a
recurrence of the 2015 crisis in which over a mil ion migrants and refugees reached Europe. Prior
to the Taliban takeover, some governments had moved to repatriate Afghan asylum-seekers
rejected on the grounds that conditions in Afghanistan, aided by NATO engagement, did not merit
refugee status. Afghan repatriation has since halted, but many European governments have
expressed concern about the potential for growing numbers of migrants and refugees from
Afghanistan.308 These concerns could be compounded by fears of a potential y heightened
terrorist threat to Europe posed by Taliban rule. European al ies continue to grapple with the
threat posed by ISIS and affiliated groups both in the Middle East and Africa. European citizens
who have trained with these terrorist groups and the potential for refugees or migrants to become
radicalized after arriving in Europe have been particular concerns.309
The U.S. withdrawal also has raised broader questions about European reliance on the United
States, particularly militarily, and about potential y shifting U.S. priorities. As noted above, some
European al ies were critical of their lack of involvement in determining the end of an operation
they viewed largely as an example of transatlantic cooperation and unity. For these critics, the
withdrawal has compounded existing concerns about U.S. credibility based on policy reversals
experienced during the Trump Administration; perceived U.S. political fragmentation; and
concerns about longer-term U.S. foreign policy trends, such as a potential embrace of
isolationism. Others in Europe have stressed that the Afghanistan mission, and the nature of the
withdrawal, exposed critical shortfal s in European military capabilities—in this view, European
reliance on U.S. defensive capabilities meant that European troops could not safely remain in
Afghanistan without U.S. support.310
These considerations have heightened longer-standing cal s in Europe for European al ies to
reduce dependency on the United States and pursue a more autonomous EU foreign and security

305 Matthew Lee, Jim Lawless, and Aamer Madhani, “G-7 Leaders Can’t Sway Biden to Delay Afghanistan
Withdrawal,” Associated Press, August 25, 2021.
306 George Bowden, “Afghanistan: Final Flights Arriving as UK’s Campaign Ends,” BBC News, August 29, 2021;
“Factbox: Evacuations from Afghanistan by Country,” Reuters, August 30, 2021.
307 “Albania: First Arrivals of Afghan Refugees,” EuroNews, August 27, 2021; “Afghans Evacuated from Kabul in
U.S. Airlift Arrive in Kosovo,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, August 29, 2021 ; “More than 100 Afghan Citizens
Offered Refuge in North Macedonia,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, August 31, 2021.
308 Katrin Bennhold and Steven Erlanger, “Why Europe’s Leaders Say they Won’t Welcome More Afghan Refugees,”
New York Tim es, August 23, 2021; Lili Bayer and Zia Weise, “ Migration Fears Complicate Europe’s Response to
Afghanistan Crisis,” Politico.eu, August 16, 2021.
309 Atlantic Council. “Experts React: What the Fall of Afghanistan Means for Europe,” August 18, 2021; Laurens
Cerulus, “Europe Needs Security ‘Screening’ of Afghan Refugees, T op Official Says,” Politico.eu, August 26, 2021.
310 Steven Erlanger, “Afghan Fiasco Raises Hard Questions for Europe,” New York Times, August 31, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

44

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

policy. Proponents of increased EU “strategic autonomy,” including French President Macron,
have said a more independent and militarily capable Europe would benefit both Europe and the
United States by ensuring more equitable burden-sharing.311 Others in Europe, including Poland
and the Baltic States, have been more reluctant to endorse policies that might be viewed as
undermining strong U.S. leadership of NATO.312
How have regional countries reacted to the Taliban’s takeover?313
Pakistan. Pakistan has played an active and, by many accounts, disruptive and destabilizing role
in Afghan affairs for decades. Afghanistan’s former leaders, along with many U.S. and Western
officials, attribute the Taliban’s existence—as wel as its strength and endurance over the past two
decades—to either the active or passive support of Pakistan’s military and intel igence services,
including al owing the Taliban to maintain safe havens on Pakistani territory.314 The Trump
Administration sought and received Islamabad’s assistance in facilitating U.S. talks with the
Taliban after 2018, and U.S. assessments of Pakistan’s role in this process have general y been
positive.315 Islamabad welcomed the February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement as a vindication of its
“long-held stance that there is no military solution of the Afghan conflict,” and it contended that
the agreement would pave the way for intra-Afghan negotiations. U.S. withdrawal appears to
many observers to have validated Pakistan’s broader post-2001 strategy.316
At present, Pakistan claims to seek the establishment of an inclusive government in Afghanistan
and it vows to be “a responsible partner for peace and security in Afghanistan.”317 The first high-
ranking Pakistani official to visit Afghanistan after the Taliban takeover was the chief of
Pakistan’s lead intel igence agency, Inter-Services Intel igence (ISI), leading to speculation that
he had “brokered” a subsequent power-sharing arrangement among Afghan Taliban leaders. Five
days later, CIA Director Wil iam Burns was in Pakistan to consult on Afghanistan with both
Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff and the ISI chief.318

311 Sam Fleming et al., “Afghanistan pullout deepens EU concern over lack of military power,” Financial Times,
September 2, 2021.
312 Justyna Gotkowska, “Poland and the Baltic States: A Preference for a Renewed West,” Heinrich Boll Stiftung,
January 8, 2021.
313 T his section was prepared by Cory Welt, Specialist in Russian and European Affairs; Andrew Bowen, Analyst in
Russian and European Affairs; Caitlin Campbell, Analyst in Asian Af fairs; Chris Blanchard, Specialist in Middle
Eastern Affairs; Ken Katzman, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs; Alan Kronstadt, Specialist in South Asian Affairs;
Maria Blackwood, Analyst in Asian Policy; and Clayton T homas, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affa irs.
314 See, for example, “Some Afghans Blame Neighboring Pakistan for T aliban Gains,” Associated Press, August 12,
2021; White House, Rem arks by President Trum p on the Strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia , August 21, 2017, and
the July 8, 2021, remarks by a Pentagon spokesperson at https://go.usa.gov/xFeAg.
315 For example, Special Representative Khalilzad thanked Pakistan for releasing Baradar from custody in October
2018 and for facilitating the travel of T aliban figures to talks in Doha. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin “ expressed
gratitude” to his Pakistani counterpart in March 2021 for Pakistan’s “continued support for the Afghan peace process”
(“Mullah Baradar released by Pakistan at the behest of US: Khalilzad,” The Hindu, February 9, 2019; Baqir Sajjad
Syed, “Pentagon chief praises Pakistan’s role in Afghan peace process,” Dawn, March 23, 2021).
316 See the February 29, 2020, Foreign Affairs Ministry release at https://tinyurl.com/tx2ezo7; Anne Patterson, “What’s
Next for Pakistan and the US?,” Middle East Institute, April 15, 2021 . According to a major early 2021 assessment,
“Pakistan has adopted a policy that can loosely be described as preferring instability in Afghanistan to a stable
Afghanistan that is allied to India” (“ Afghan Study Group Final Report: A Pathway for Peace in Afghanistan,” U.S.
Institute of Peace, February 3, 2021).
317 Amb. Asad Majeed Khan, “Inclusive Government Needed in Afghanistan” (op -ed), Washington Times, September
2, 2021.
318 ISI Director-General Lt. Gen. Faiz Hameed was in Kabul on September 4 (“DG ISI Meets T aliban Leaders in
Congressional Research Service

45

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

Senior Pakistani officials have issued some expressions of enthusiasm over the Taliban’s swift
victory. In mid-August, as the Taliban entered Kabul, Prime Minister Imran Khan said, “What is
happening in Afghanistan now, they have broken the shackles of slavery.”319 Pakistan’s security
establishment, seeking to prevent establishment of a pro-India government in Kabul, apparently
continues to view the Afghan Taliban as a relatively friendly and reliably anti-India element in
Afghanistan. Pakistani leaders claim that their influence over the group is limited.320 Many
observers see the Taliban’s takeover as a substantive triumph for Pakistan, bolstering its influence
in Afghanistan and, correspondingly, advancing its decades-long efforts to limit Indian influence
there. These developments provide Pakistan with possible advantages as regional powers attempt
to gain influence in South and Central Asian politics.321
Despite some implicitly pro-Taliban statements from top Pakistani officials, numerous analysts
question whether Pakistan’s preferred outcome in Afghanistan was a Taliban-dominated
government, in particular one that emerged through military means (which Pakistani leaders
continue to deny having sought).322 In this way, the Taliban takeover appears to be dividing
Pakistan’s strategic community.323 Afghanistan-Pakistan relations have been complicated by the
presence of at least 1.4 mil ion Afghan refugees in Pakistan (unofficial estimates reach up to 3
mil ion) since the 1990s, as wel as an historical, ethnical y tinged dispute over their shared
1,600-mile-long border. Pakistan has in recent years fenced 90% of that frontier and operates 800-
900 checkpoints there.324 As of mid-September 2021, the tide of refugees has not been as great as
many predicted, but a new influx may present difficulties for Pakistan, including domestic
political and ethnic-based resistance.325 The Taliban (like past Afghan governments) have never
accepted the British colonial-era “Durand Line” as a legitimate international frontier separating
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Such differences may exacerbate Pashtun nationalism inside Pakistan,
creating a potential flashpoint in future relations.326

Kabul,” News International (Karachi), September 5, 2021; “Endless Warfare Lies Ahead Afghanistan Despite ISI -
Brokered Deal to Appoint Name Minister,” First Post (Delhi), September 6, 2021). See the Pakistan Army’s September
9, 2021, release at https://ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail.php?id=6273.
319 “T aliban Has ‘Broken Shackles of Slavery,” Says Pak PM Imran Khan,” NDT V (Delhi), August 16, 2021.
320 In June 2021, Pakistan’s Prime Minister seemed to blame the United States for this development, telling an
interviewer, “ Given that the United States gave a date of withdrawal, from then onward, our lev erage diminished on the
T aliban” (“Imran Khan Urges a New Pakistan-U.S. Bond” (interview), New York Times, June 25, 2021).
321 “T he Real Winner of the Afghan War? It’s Not Who You T hink,” New York Times, August 26, 2021; “Pakistan,
China, India Jockey for Position in Afghanistan’s New Great Game,” Reuters, August 23, 2021.
322 Husain Haqqani, “Pakistan’s Pyrrhic Victory in Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs, July 2021; “Pakistan, After Rooting
for Afghanistan’s T aliban, Faces a Blowback,” Wall Street Journal, July 9, 2021; Hamid Mir, “Pakistanis Aren’t
Rejoicing Over the T riumph of the T aliban” (op-ed), Washington Post, August 16, 2021.
323 “Pakistan Divided Over T aliban Victories in Afghanistan,” Gandhara (Prague), July 19, 2021. In the words of one
longtime observer, “many Pakistanis are gloating, while others are warning about the future. We are doing a victory
dance, but there is dread in our hearts” (Mohammed Hanif, “ In Pakistan, We Cultivated the T aliban, T hen We T urned
on T hem” (op-ed), Guardian (London), August 24, 2021).
324 “For Afghanistan Peace and Order, World Leaders Must Learn From Past Mistakes” (interview with Pakistan’s
Ambassador to the United States), USA Today, August 19, 2021.
325 “Afghans Who Fled the First T aliban Regime Found Precarious Sanctuary in Pakistan,” Time, August 18, 2021;
“Afghans Flee to Pakistan, an Uncertain Future Awaits,” New York Times, September 8, 2021. Pakistan’s government
has anticipated as many as 700,000 new Afghan refugees at a potential cost of $2.2 billion as officials establish camps
and ways to track and feed them (“Hosting 700k Afghans W ill Cost $2.2b for 3 years,” Express Tribune (Karachi), July
18, 2021).
326 Madiha Afzal, “An Uneasy Limbo for US-Pakistan Relations Amidst the Withdrawal from Afghanistan,” Brookings
Institution, August 6, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

46

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

The Taliban’s victory may pose other chal enges for Pakistan. Many commentators, including
some from Pakistan, express strong concerns about the prospect that the takeover could empower
Islamist militant groups that have continued to operate on Pakistani territory.327 Given Pakistan’s
own experience with domestic Islamist militancy over the past two decades, some analysts doubt
that Islamabad wil support a Taliban regime in Kabul in the same manner as it did in the
1990s.328 The threat of increasing Islamist militancy in Afghanistan could have serious
implications for Pakistan’s internal security. Terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda, the Islamic State,
and its regional affiliate, Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP, also known as ISIS-K and
founded mainly by Pakistani militants) have long considered the Pakistani government to be a
prime regional adversary and may be further empowered.329
The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP or Pakistani Taliban) conducted numerous domestic
terrorist attacks in Pakistan that cost thousands of lives from 2007 to 2014. Pakistani Army
operations in western Pakistan in 2014 reduced such incidents, but the group appears to be
resurging in 2021—in concert with Al Qaeda—with up to 6,000 cadres.330 The Afghan Taliban
have, as part of their takeover, freed thousands of prisoners from Afghan government jails,
including some high-ranking TTP figures and a reported 780 fighters.331 The Pakistani Taliban,
which is distinct from but has significant ideological ties to the Afghan Taliban, seemingly have
renewed their “al egiance to the Islamic Emirate” in Afghanistan. The two groups reportedly have
been described as “two faces of the same coin” by top Pakistani security officials.332
China (People’s Republic of China, or PRC). China’s leaders likely fear unmoderated Taliban
control of Afghanistan wil enable the spread of terrorism in the region and harm China’s security
interests. China may try to foster friendly ties with the Taliban in an attempt to influence the
group’s activities in ways that protect China’s interests.333 The U.S. withdrawal and Taliban
takeover have afforded the PRC an opportunity to criticize the United States and question
Washington’s credibility with al ies and partners.334

327 “T he Fall and Rise of the T aliban,” Dawn (Karachi), August 29, 2021; “On Afghanistan, Pakistan Walks T ightrope
of Optimism and Caution,” Al Jazeera (Doha), August 28, 2021; Abdul Basit, “A T aliban T akeover Will Strengthen
Pakistan’s Jihadis,” Foreign Policy, August 17, 2021.
328 See, for example, Madiha Afzal and Michael O’Hanlon, “Why Staying in Afghanistan Is the Least Bad Choice for
Biden” (op-ed), Washington Post, March 8, 2021; “Enough is Enough: Pakistan Not Happy With Afghan T aliban,”
News International (Karachi), April 28, 2021.
329 Robin Wright, “Afghanistan, Again, Becomes a Cradle for Jihadism – and Al Qaeda,” New Yorker, August 23,
2021; “Zahid Hussein, “Multiple Security Challenges for Pakistan as Afghan War Comes Close to Borders” (op -ed),
Arab News (Jeddah), July 17, 2021. On IS-K, see “ Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K),” Center for Strategic and
International Studies, 2018.
330 Abdul Sayed and T ori Hamming, “T he Revival of the Pakistani T aliban,” CTC Sentinel, April/May 2021; Colin
Clarke, “T wenty Years After 9/11: What is the Future of the Global Jihadi Movement?,” CTC Sentinel, September
2021.
331 “Despite T aliban Assurances, World Frets Again About Afghan Militant Havens,” Reuters, August 18, 2021.
332 “Pakistani T aliban’s Emir Renews Allegiance to Afghan T aliban,” Long War Journal, August 19, 2021; “Pakistani
Army Warns of Blowback in Crackdown on Afghan T aliban,” Gandhara (Prague), July 2, 2021.
333 In recent years, and especially since 2019, Beijing has increased engagement with the T aliban as it became apparent
that the group would remain a major political and military force in Afghanistan and as China sought to establish a
facilitator role for itself in the Afghan reconciliation process. Jason Li, “ China’s Conflict Mediation in Afghanistan,”
Stimson Center, August 16, 2021, at https://www.stimson.org/2021/chinas-conflict-mediation-in-afghanistan/?
utm_source=Stimson+Center&utm_campaign=9d5166cab8-RA%2FComms%2FAsia+Digest+August&utm_medium=
email&utm_term=0_15c3e20f70-9d5166cab8-403780106.
334 Yue Xiaoyong, China’s special envoy for Afghan affairs, called the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan “hasty and
irresponsible” and other PRC officials and media have offered scathing critiques of the United States. A spokesperson
Congressional Research Service

47

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

After the Taliban proclaimed victory, China’s government sent a strong signal that it intends to
treat the organization as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, although it has not recognized
it as such as of September 17, 2021. Reiterating the PRC’s proclaimed foreign policy principle of
“non-interference in external affairs,” PRC officials repeatedly have cal ed on the Taliban to
establish “solidarity” with “al factions and ethnic groups in Afghanistan” and build an “open and
inclusive political structure” with which to govern Afghanistan.335 Spokespeople of China’s
Ministry of Foreign Affairs welcomed multiple Taliban statements relevant to China’s interests.
These included statements that it would protect foreign missions in the country, support positive
relations with China (including China’s participation in reconstruction and development in the
country), and—most importantly to China’s leaders—prevent Afghan territory from being used to
engage in terrorist acts against China.336 For their part, the Taliban has indicated it intends to
cooperate closely with China, with a Taliban spokesperson reportedly suggesting in one foreign
media interview that China would be the Afghan government’s most important partner going
forward.337
PRC leaders and experts have long been concerned that Afghanistan-based terrorists pose a
“direct threat” to China’s national security.338 Afghanistan shares a mountainous 47-mile-long
border with China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, which is home to most of China’s
predominantly Muslim Uyghur ethnic group.339 Since 2009, Xinjiang has been the site of
intensive security measures—including arbitrary mass internment—by the PRC to combat
“terrorism, separatism and religious extremism” in response to Uyghur demonstrations, ethnic
unrest, and scattered violent incidents purportedly carried out by Uyghurs.340 Chinese leaders fear
terrorist groups operating out of Central Asia and Afghanistan either harbor Uyghur terrorists or

for China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs remarked on August 17, 2021: “ T he U.S launched the Afghan War in the name
of counterterrorism. But has the U.S. won? After 20 years, the number of terrorist organizations in Afghanistan has
grown to more than 20 from a single digit. Has the U.S. brought peace to the Afghan people? For 20 years, more than
100,000 Afghan civilians have been killed or wounded in the gunfire of U.S. troops and its ally forces, and more than
10 million people have been displaced.... Wherever the U.S. sets foot, be it Iraq, Syria or Afghanistan, we see
turbulence, division, broken families, deaths and other scars in the mess it has left. T he U.S. power and role is
destructive rather than constructive.” CGT N, “ Chinese diplomat: U.S. bears ‘inescapable responsibility’ for
Afghanistan’s situation,” August 14, 2021, at https://news.cgtn.com/news/2021-08-14/U-S-bears-inescapable-
responsibility-for-Afghanistan-s-situation-12IphvoB6Mg/index.html; PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “ Foreign
Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference on August 17, 2021 ,” August 17, 2021, at
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1900083.shtml.
335 T he spokesperson further noted, “ China respects the Afghan people’s right to decide on their own future
independently. We are ready to continue to develop good-neighborliness and friendly cooperation with Afghanistan
and play a constructive role in Afghanistan ’s peace and reconstruction.” PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “ Foreign
Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference on August 16, 2021 ,” August 16, 2021, at
http://www.china-un.ch/eng/zgyw/t1899785.htm.
336 China has maintained contacts with the Afghan T aliban to varying degrees over the decades with the goal of
securing commitments from the organization that it would not engage in or otherwise support terrorist acts against
China. T he PRC engaged more closely with the T aliban starting in the mid-2010s amid reconciliation efforts between
the Afghan government and the T aliban. Andrew Small, The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics, Oxford
University Press, 2015, p. 128; Andrew Small, “ Why Is China T alking to the T aliban?” Foreign Policy, June 21, 2013,
at https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/06/21/why-is-china-talking-to-the-taliban/.
337 Mattia Sorbi, “Afghanistan, il portavoce dei talebani Zabiullah Mujahid: ‘Chiediamo all’Italia di riconosceri. La
Cina ci finanziera,” La Repubblica, September 1, 2021.
338 PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “ Wang Yi Meets with Head of the Afghan T aliban Political Commission Mullah
Abdul Ghani Baradar,” July 28, 2021, at https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1895950.shtml.
339 Uyghurs are a T urkic ethnic group who practice a moderate form of Sunni Islam.
340 CRS In Focus IF10281, China Primer: Uyghurs, by T homas Lum and Michael A. Weber.
Congressional Research Service

48

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

support Uyghur terrorist groups.341 Chinese officials have asked the Taliban to “make a clean
break with” the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a smal group that seeks to establish
an independent Islamic state for the Uyghurs.342 The Taliban has insisted it wil not tolerate
ETIM’s activities in Afghanistan, suggesting that most ETIM fighters had already left the country
at the Taliban’s urging.343
Chinese leaders also fear a resurgent Afghan Taliban may empower and embolden regional
terrorist groups—including the Pakistani Taliban, which claimed responsibility for an April 2021
car bombing of a Pakistan hotel minutes before the PRC ambassador to the country was
scheduled to arrive.344 The hotel bombing was one of three attacks reported to target, injure, or
kil PRC nationals in Pakistan since April.345
Iran opposed the Taliban while the group was formerly in power, with the two sides nearly
coming into direct conflict in 1998 when the Taliban kil ed ten Iranian diplomats in northern
Afghanistan. Iran later helped U.S. officials establish the post-Taliban Afghan government in
2001.346 Despite consistent wariness of Taliban intent, Iran appears to be seeking accommodation
with the group. Iranian officials met with the Taliban numerous times after 2018, including
hosting a senior Taliban delegation in Tehran in February 2021. U.S. officials have also al eged
that some Taliban fighters have received arms and other support from Iran.347 Iran’s interests in
Afghanistan include preserving its historic influence in western Afghanistan, protecting
Afghanistan’s Shia minority (the Hazaras), and reducing the flow of refugees into Iran (Iran hosts
mil ions of documented and undocumented Afghans).
The Iranian government, whose embassy in Kabul remains open, appears to view positively the
departure of U.S. troops from Afghanistan (which President Ebrahim Raisi characterized as a
“defeat”) and has cal ed for national unity in Afghanistan.348 Some have speculated that Iran, as it
did during the 1990s, might support Afghans in northern, western, and central Afghanistan against
the Taliban, particularly if a Taliban-led government expresses hostility toward Tehran. Iranian
officials condemned the Taliban’s September 2021 takeover of Panjshir, the last bastion of armed

341 William Yang, “China Ready for ‘Friendly Relations’ with the T aliban,” Independent, August 17, 2021; Janka
Oertel and Andrew Small, “After the withdrawal: China’s interests in Afghanistan,” European Council on Foreign
Relations, August 5, 2021.
342 PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “ Wang Yi Meets with Head of the Afghan T aliban Political Commission Mullah
Abdul Ghani Baradar Wang Yi Meets with Head of the Afghan T aliban Political Commission Mullah Abdul Ghani
Baradar,” July 28, 2021, at https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1895950.shtml. T he U.S. government
designated the East T urkistan Islamic Movement (ET IM) as a terrorist organization under Executive Order 13224 in
2002 (to block terrorist financing) and in 2004 placed ET IM on the T errorist Exclusion List, which bars members of
terrorist groups from entering the United States. In November 2020, the T rump Administration removed ET IM from
the T errorist Exclusion List, stating that “for more than a decade, there has been no credible evidence that ET IM
continues to exist.” In June 2021, however, United Nations sanctions monitors reported that ET IM has hundreds of
fighters in Northeast Afghanistan and a larger presence in Idlib, Syria, and moves fighters between the two areas. CRS
In Focus IF10281, China Prim er: Uyghurs, by T homas Lum and Michael A. Weber.
343 Xie Wenting and Bai Yunyi, “ Exclusive: New Afghan govt eyes exchanging visits with China; ET IM has no place
in Afghanistan: T aliban spokesperson,” Global Tim es, September 9, 2021.
344 Asif Shahzad, “Car bombing at hotel in southwest Pakistan kills 4, wounds 11,” Reuters, April 21, 2021.
345 Lucas Niewenhuis, “ ‘Not the outcome China wanted’: Why a T aliban-controlled Afghanistan makes Beijing
anxious,” SupChina, August 16, 2021, at https://supchina.com/2021/08/16/not-the-outcome-china-wanted-why-a-
taliban-controlled-afghanistan-makes-beijing-anxious/.
346 Barnett Rubin, “A New Look at Iran’s Complicated Relationship with the T aliban,” War on the Rocks, September
16, 2020.
347 Ibid.
348 Maziar Motamedi, “US ‘defeat’ in Afghanistan a chance for peace: Iran president,” Al Jazeera, August 16, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

49

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

resistance.349 Other analysts argue Iran is unlikely to oppose the Taliban, to avoid further
instability, and wil continue to seek accommodation with the group.350
Russia. Russia’s response to the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan has included expressions of
both satisfaction and concern. On the one hand, Russian officials and commentators have
expressed some satisfaction at the rapid collapse of Afghanistan’s government and military after
twenty years of U.S. support. Some have framed the outcome as “America’s failure” and contrast
it to what they characterize as Russia’s prudent outreach to the Taliban in recent years.351 At the
same time, Russian authorities have long been concerned about instability in Afghanistan and the
potential spread of radical Islam, drugs, and refugees throughout the neighboring Central Asia
region and into Russia.352
Initial Russian statements suggest the Russian government seeks to build constructive relations
with the Taliban while encouraging them to avoid rule by terror as they consolidate power.
Russian officials said they have no intention of evacuating the Russian embassy in Kabul and that
Taliban forces pledged to provide security for Russia’s embassy and personnel.353 The Russian
ambassador to Afghanistan remarked in the first days of the Taliban’s takeover that the situation
in Kabul was “better than it was under Ashraf Ghani.”354 At the same time, Russian authorities
have said that for now Russia wil continue to consider the Taliban a terrorist organization.355
In recent years, Russian authorities have increased their political and intel igence connections to
the Taliban, as wel as to other local power brokers in Afghanistan.356 Russia has been party to
numerous peace talks and consultations involving a variety of actors, including the Taliban, aimed
at securing a negotiated political settlement to Afghanistan’s civil conflict. Reports indicate
Russia’s outreach to the Taliban began years ago, including clandestine political and intel igence
contacts and, potential y, military assistance.357

349 Farzin Nadimi, “Iran Sets Its Eyes on Afghanistan,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July 19, 2021; “Iran
condemns T aliban for assault on holdout fighters in Panjshir Valley,” Times of Israel, September 6, 2021.
350 Murat Sofuoglu, “After a short honeymoon, are Iran-Taliban relations deteriorating?” TRT World, September 9,
2021.
351 Mark Galeotti, “Moscow Watches Kabul’s Fall with Some Satisfaction, Much Concern,” Moscow Times, August 16,
2021; Felix Light and Pjotr Sauer, “ Chaos Engulfs Kabul, Russia Says It’s Ready to Work with the T aliban,” Moscow
Tim es, August 16, 2021; and Julia Davis, “ Russia Is ‘Enjoying’ America’s Failure—and Cozying Up to the T aliban,”
Daily Beast, August 16, 2021.
352 Nurlan Aliyev, “How Russia Views Afghanistan T oday,” War on the Rocks, October 19, 2020; T om Balmforth and
Gabrielle T etrault -Farber, “ For Russia, U.S. Afghan Exit Creates Security T hreat on Southern Flank,” Reuters, July 8,
2021; Robyn Dixon, “Why Afghanistan’s Growing Chaos Alarms Leaders from T ajikistan to Russia,” Washington
Post, July 9, 2021; and Kathy Gannon, Vladimir Isachenkov, and Mstyslav Chernov, “ Russia: Afghan Instability
Heightens with Hasty U.S. Retreat,” Associated Press, July 16, 2021.
353 Yana Pashaeva, “Will Russia and the T aliban Become Friends?” Slate, August 19, 2021. https://slate.com/news-
and-politics/2021/08/taliban-afghanistan-russia.html
354 Andrew Osborn, “Russia Says Kabul Seems Safer Under T aliban T han It Was Under Ghani,” Reuters, August 16,
2021.
355 Nastassia Astrasheuskaya and Stephanie Findlay, “Russia Seeks to Forge T ies with T aliban as US T roo ps Leave
Afghanistan,” FT, July 27, 2021; and Anton T roianovski, “Russian Officials Are Staying in Kabul, Saying T hey Have
Nothing to Fear as Others Race to Leave,” New York Times, August 16, 2021.
356 T ASS Russian News Agency, “T aliban Delegation Is Currently in Moscow, Representative Says,” July 8, 2021;
T ASS Russian News Agency, “ T alks with the Kremlin Are Necessary, Says Kremlin,” July 9, 2021; and Maxim
Suchkov, “Russia’s ‘T roubleshooting T actics’ with the T aliban,” Middle East Institute, July 14, 2021.
357 T homas Gibbons-Neff, “Russia is Sending Weapons to T aliban, T op U.S. General Confirms,” Washington Post,
April 24, 2017; and Mujib Mashal and Michael Schwirtz, “ How Russia Built a Channel to the T aliban, Once an
Enemy,” New York Times, July 13, 2020.
Congressional Research Service

50

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

Prior to the Taliban’s takeover, Russia began planning for contingencies by bolstering its military
and security posture in neighboring Central Asia.358 With regional military bases and its
leadership of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Russia acts as the primary
security guarantor in Central Asia against spil over from Afghanistan.359 September 2021 visits to
India and Tajikistan by Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev and statements by
military officials have highlighted Russian concerns about the potential for instability to
spread.360 In the summer of 2021, Russia bolstered its military presence in Central Asia, including
by modernizing its forces in Tajikistan (Russia has an estimated 7,000 troops at the 201st Military
Base in Dushanbe), increasing coordination among CSTO members, bolstering intel igence and
border forces, and conducting multiple military exercises.361
Central Asia. Many analysts assess that Central Asian governments’ primary concern following
the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan is maintaining stability and ensuring their own countries’
security, as well as the potential for large numbers of refugees, and possibly IS-affiliated
extremists, to flow into their countries.362 Taliban leaders have reportedly stated that they will not
violate the territorial integrity of Afghanistan’s Central Asian neighbors, and that they do not
pose a threat to the region.363 The governments of Central Asia have generally adopted a
pragmatic approach toward the Taliban, particularly Afghanistan’s immediate neighbors
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.364 In a statement issued on September 8, Uzbekistan’s Ministry of
Foreign Affairs welcomed the creation of an interim government in Afghanistan, adding, “We
hope that this decision will be the first step toward achieving a broad national consensus and
lasting peace and stability in that country. We express our readiness to develop a constructive
dialogue and practical cooperation with the new state organs of Afghanistan.”365 The government
of Tajikistan, which also shares a border w ith Afghanistan, has by contrast expressed strong
opposition to the Taliban government in Afghanistan.366

358 Dan De Luce, “Bounties or Not, Russia Has Worked to Expand its Clout in Afghanistan as the U.S. Eyes an Exit,”
NBC News, June 30, 2020; and Dara Massicot, “ Can a Pragmatic Relationship with the T aliban Help Russia Counter
T errorism,” National Interest, September 3, 2021.
359 Vusula Abbasova, “Russia Pledges Military Assistance to Central Asian Allies,” Caspian News, July 31, 2021.
360 T ass, “Russia-led Bloc Members Must be Ready for Any Scenario in Afghanistan, T op Brass Says,” September 9,
2021; and T ass, “T op Russian Security Official to Discuss Afghanistan with Post -Soviet Bloc in Dushanbe,”
September 14, 2021.
361 Reuters, “Russia to Reinforce Military Base in T ajikistan,” July 21, 2021; Moscow Times, “Russia to Boost
T ajikistan Army Amid Afghanistan ‘Deterioration,’” July 28, 2021; Vladimir Isachenkov, “Russia, Central Asian
Allies Hold Drills Near Afghanistan,” Associated Press, August 10, 2021; and RFE/RL, “Russia Wraps Up Drills With
Uzbek and T ajik T roops Near Afghan Border,” August 11, 2021.
362 Kate Mallinson, “Afghanistan Creates T ricky New Reality for Central Asia,” Chatham House, August 27, 2021 ;
Mansur Mirovalev, “Afghanistan’s Central Asian Neighbours Panic, Reject Refugees,” Al Jazeera, August 19, 2021;
Chris Rickleton, “ Central Asia and Afghanistan: Enemies at the Gate?” Eurasianet, August 13, 2021.
363 Vladimir Isachenkov, “ Russian envoy expects T aliban not to threaten Central Asia,” Associated Press, July 14,
2021; Vladimir Isachenkov, “ T aliban visit Moscow to say their wins don’t threaten Russia,” Associated Press, July 8,
2021; “As T ajikistan Mobilizes 20,000 T roops, Taliban Says It Poses No T hreat,” Eurasianet, July 6, 2021.
364 Ivan Klyszcz, “ Don’t Underestimate T ajikistan in the Afghanistan Crisis,” The Diplomat, September 2, 2021;
“T urkmenistan: T aliban of Brothers,” Eurasianet, August 24, 2021; Gavin Helf and Barmak Pazhwak, “ Central Asia
Prepares for T aliban T akeover,” United States Institute of Peace, July 20, 2021.
365 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan, “ O‘zbekiston Respublikasi T ashqi ishlar vazirligi rasmiy
vakilining bayonoti” [Statement by the official representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
Uzbekistan], September 8, 2021.
366 Bruce Pannier, “T ajikistan: T he T aliban’s T oughest Critic,” RFE/RL, September 13, 2021; Ivan Klyszcz, “ Don’t
Underestimate T ajikistan in the Afghanistan Crisis,” The Diplom at, September 2, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

51

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

In the weeks leading up to the U.S. withdrawal, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan bolstered the
military presence at their borders with Afghanistan.367 In August and September, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan participated in bilateral and multilateral military exercises
with Russia that focused on potential security threats emanating from Afghanistan.368 Tajikistan
also held an anti-terrorism exercise with China.369 Further military exercises by the Russia-led
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) are planned in Tajikistan for October and
November.370 Analysts assess that recent events in Afghanistan may lead to an intensified Russian
security presence in Central Asia.371
International human rights organizations have urged Central Asian countries to take in refugees
from Afghanistan, while regional governments have been reluctant to accept large numbers of
Afghans.372 Although officials in Tajikistan initial y signaled wil ingness to take in as many as
100,000 refugees, in September the country’s Minister of Internal Affairs stated that Tajikistan
lacks the resources to do so without international assistance.373 Thousands of Afghan troops
reportedly fled to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan as the Taliban established control of northern
Afghanistan; some have subsequently been sent back.374 Between August 14 and 15, a reported
46 aircraft from the Afghan Air Force crossed into Uzbekistan carrying some 500 people,
including pilots, crew, and their families.375 The government of Uzbekistan reportedly faced
pressure from the Taliban to return the personnel and their aircraft to Afghanistan, and requested
that the United States relocate them.376 On September 12 and 13, the Afghans were transferred
from Uzbekistan to a U.S. base in the United Arab Emirates.377 It remains unclear what wil

367 “T ajikistan Holds Massive Combat -Readiness Check Amid Rising Instability In Neighboring Afghanistan ,”
RFE/RL, July 22, 2021; “ T urkmenistan: As T aliban arrives at the gates, diplomats and army scramble,” Eurasianet,
July 13, 2021.
368 “Russia Wraps Up Drills With Uzbek And T ajik T roops Near Afghan Border,” RFE/RL, August 11, 2021; “ Russia-
Led CST O T o Hold Military Drills In Central Asia Due T o Situation In Afghanistan,” RFE/RL, August 27, 2021;
“Russia-Led CST O Starts Military Drills In Kyrgyzstan Due T o Situation In Afghanistan ,” RFE/RL, September 7,
2021.
369 Laura Zhou, “ China conducts anti-terror drill with T ajikistan, as Afghan spillover worries grip central Asia,” South
China Morning Post, August 18, 2021.
370 “Russia-Led CST O T o Hold Military Drills In Central Asia Due T o Situation In Afghanistan ,” RFE/RL, August 27,
2021.
371 T emur Umarov, “Do the T aliban Pose a T hreat to Stabilit y in Central Asia?” Carnegie Moscow Center, September
3, 2021; Kate Mallinson, “Afghanistan Creates T ricky New Reality for Central Asia,” Chatham House, August 27,
2021; Andrew Kramer and Anton T roianovski, “ With Afghan Collapse, Moscow T akes Charge in Central Asia,” New
York Tim es, August 19, 2021.
372 Mihra Rittman and Hugh Williamson, “ Uzbekistan Should Do More to Help Afghans,” The Diplomat, September 8,
2021; Mansur Mirovalev, “Afghanistan’s Central Asian Neighbours Panic, Reject Refugees,” Al Jazeera, August 19,
2021; “Central Asia Refuses to Accept Afghan Refugees,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, September 8, 2021.
373 “Unpacking Eurasia’s role in the Afghanistan evacuation,” Eurasianet, September 3, 2021; “T ajikistan Can’t Afford
to T ake in Afghan Refugees Without Help – Police Chief,” Reuters, September 2, 2021.
374 “Unpacking Eurasia’s role in the Afghanistan evacuation,” Eurasianet, September 3, 2021.
375 Catherine Putz, “Afghan Forces Flee, Fly to Central Asia,” The Diplomat, August 17, 2021; Siobhan Hughes and
Jessica Donati, “ Uzbekistan Warns U.S. T hat Afghan Pilots and T heir Families Can’t Stay ,” Wall Street Journal,
August 30, 2021; Jessica Donati and Siobhan Hughes, “ Afghan Pilots Who Sought Safety in Uzbekistan Begin U.S.
T ransfer Under New Agreement ,” Wall Street Journal, September 13, 2021.
376 Phil Stewart, “Afghan Pilots Start Leaving Uzbekistan for UAE, Despite T aliban Pressure—Source,” Reuters,
September 12, 2021; Siobhan Hughes and Jessica Donati, “ Uzbekistan Warns U.S. T hat Afghan Pilots and T heir
Families Can’t Stay,” Wall Street Journal, August 30, 2021.
377 Jessica Donati and Siobhan Hughes, “ Afghan Pilots Who Sought Safety in Uzbekistan Begin U.S. T ransfer Under
New Agreement ,” Wall Street Journal, September 13, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

52

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

happen to the aircraft, which are said to include Black Hawk helicopters and PC-12 surveil ance
aircraft supplied to Afghanistan by the United States.378 On August 15, a smal er group,
reportedly over 140 people and around 18 aircraft, flew from Afghanistan to Tajikistan.379 A State
Department spokesperson was quoted in the press as stating, “the Afghan personnel and aircraft
are secure and being housed by the government of Tajikistan.”380 Some of the Afghan pilots
currently in Tajikistan have appealed for asylum in Canada.381
Central Asian countries have assisted evacuation efforts out of Afghanistan. The U.N. Assistance
Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) has temporarily relocated some of its staff to Almaty,
Kazakhstan. The UNAMA staff deployed to Almaty, who number about 100, are expected to stay
in Kazakhstan for six months, although conditions in Afghanistan may lead to the extension of
their stay; depending on the security situation in Afghanistan, U.N. staff may use Almaty as a hub
to rotate in and out of the country.382 Uzbekistan facilitated the transit of Afghans and foreign
nationals out of Afghanistan, al owing European military aircraft to fly evacuees from Kabul to
airports in Tashkent, Navoi, and Bukhara.383 From there, evacuees, including some U.S. citizens,
were flown to Europe on special y chartered civilian airliners.384 Tajikistan also facilitated
evacuations from Afghanistan, including flights via Dushanbe organized by Turkey and India.385

India. New Delhi’s Afghanistan policies have been conceived largely through the lens of
competition and proxy conflict with Indian rival Pakistan. New Delhi’s interests primarily focus
on limiting the activities and reach of the numerous regional Islamist, anti-India terrorist groups
that pose an ongoing threat to India, perhaps especial y as related to Kashmiri separatism and
militancy (which Pakistan is widely believed to support). India also has a keen interest in securing
access to and greater connectivity with Central Asia, which Pakistan presently obstructs.386 Like
Iran and Russia, India supported the Northern Al iance against the Taliban in the 1990s and
backed the elected post-2001 Afghan government, but reportedly established some backchannel
communications with the Taliban in recent months.387 India had been the leading regional

378 Ibid.
379 Bruce Pannier, “T ajikistan: T he T aliban’s T oughest Critic,” RFE/RL, September 13, 2021; Catherine Putz, “ What’s
Next for Afghan Pilots Who Escaped to Central Asia?” The Diplom at, September 13, 2021.
380 Catherine Putz, “ What’s Next for Afghan Pilots Who Escaped to Central Asia?” The Diplomat, September 13, 2021.
381 Murray Brewster, “ Former Afghan air force pilots renew plea for Canada’s help,” CBC News, September 13, 2021.
382 United Nations Kazakhstan, “UN Statement on T emporary Relocation of the UNAMA Staff to Almaty,” August 20,
2021; United Nations, “ Daily Press Briefing by the Office of the Spokesperson for the Secretary -General,” August 18,
2021; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, “On T emporary Deployment of the UN Mission in
Almaty,” August 18, 2021.
383 “Uzbekistan predostavil tretii aeroport dlia evakuatsii iz Afganistana—Bukharu” [Uzbekistan has made a third
airport available for evacuation from Afghanistan—Bukhara], Fergana News, August 23, 2021.
384 “‘You have seen the outrageous and achieved incredible things,’ Germany tells troops,” Reuters, August 27, 2021;
“AKK spricht mit Bundeswehrsoldaten in T aschkent ” [AKK speaks with Bundeswehr soldiers in T ashkent], Deutsche
Welle, August 27, 2021; Official Website of the Republic of Poland, T he Chancellery of the Prime Minister, “ Premier:
Polska jest tam, gdzie inni tej pomocy od nas potrzebują” [Prime Minister: Poland is there when others need help from
us], August 26, 2021, available at https://www.gov.pl/web/premier/premier-polska-jest-tam-gdzie-inni-tej-pomocy-od-
nas-potrzebuja; “ Hungary Ends Afghan Evacuations With 540 Flown Out ,” Agence France Presse, August 26, 2021.
385 “Afghanistan Evacuees Arrive In T ajikistan, Uzbekistan,” RFE/RL, August 21, 2021; Manjeet Negi, “IAF T ransport
Aircraft Return from T ajikistan after Afghanistan Evacuations,” India Today, August 30, 2021.
386 Suhasini Haidar, “T aliban gains complicate India’s options,” The Hindu, August 13, 2021.
387 “In a Huge Shift, India Opens Channels with Afghan T aliban Factions and Leaders,” Hindustan Times (Delhi), June
Congressional Research Service

53

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

supporter of the former Afghan government, providing more than $3 bil ion in development
assistance affecting al of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. Any gains accrued through this “soft
power” emphasis on infrastructure and social services may be lost with the Taliban takeover.388
India has evacuated most of its personnel and shuttered its diplomatic operations in Afghanistan.
The Taliban takeover in Kabul sent shockwaves through India’s strategic and security
communities, where Islamist militant gains are widely predicted to benefit anti-India terrorist
groups, especial y those oriented toward Kashmir, such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the Jaish-e-
Mohammed (JeM), and the Haqqani Network, al of which have conducted major terrorist attacks
in India.389 The developments also could bolster Beijing’s regional influence and present India
with “encirclement” by a “consolidated front” comprised of China, Pakistan, and the Taliban.390
Many Western analyses take a similar view, warning of a broad resurgence of regional Islamist
militancy that wil target India and its interests.391 Thousands of LeT and JeM militants, many of
them Pakistani nationals, reportedly have fought alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan, and
Taliban military chiefs, notably including those from the vehemently anti-India Haqqani
Network, are said to be coordinating with their LeT and JeM counterparts. According to at least
one assessment citing Afghan sources, “These are individuals who have trained with the Pakistani
military....” Pakistan’s main intel igence service reportedly has colluded with Taliban elements to
attack Indian targets in Afghanistan.392 In late August, a Taliban official in Qatar reportedly said,
“India is very important for this subcontinent. We want to continue our cultural, economic and
trade ties with India like in the past.”393
By some accounts, India “missed the bus” diplomatical y and is facing a return to the “worst-case
scenario” with Afghanistan.394 Since mid-August, a debate has been underway in India about the
wisdom of recognizing and pursuing engagement with a Taliban-dominated Afghan government.
Some analysts counsel against such engagement, arguing that there is no “reformed Taliban 2.0”
and that India has little or nothing to gain from negotiating with “a Pakistani proxy.”395 Others
favor engagement in order to leverage India’s purported popularity and soft power in Afghanistan

9, 2021; “ Indian Delegation Met T aliban in Doha, Says Qatari Official,” Hindu (Chennai), June 21, 2021.
388 Aparna Pande, “India in the Eye of the T aliban” (op-ed), T he Hill, August 23, 2021.
389 Avinash Paliwal, “A Strategic Shock for the Subcontinent” (op -ed), Hindustan Times (Delhi), August 25, 2021;
“T aliban Advances in Afghanistan Give Kashmir Militants a Boost,” Der Welte (Berlin), July 8, 2021.
390 “With the U.S. Exit From Afghanistan, India Fears an Increasingly Hostile Region,” NPR, August 27, 2021. In the
words of one longtime observer, “What New Delhi fears most is Beijing’s ability to expand its political and diplomatic
footprint in Afghanistan with the return of a T aliban regime” (Sumit Ganguly, “What the Taliban T akeover Means for
India,” Foreign Policy, August 17, 2021).
391 “T aliban T akeover T hreatens to Raise India-Pakistan T ensions,” Wall Street Journal, September 1, 2021. See also
Kabir T aneja and Mohamed Sinan Siyech, “T errorism in South Asia After the Fall of Afghanistan,” War on the Rocks,
August 23, 2021.
392 “Pak’s T error Groups Join T aliban War, India Wary,” Hindustan Times (Delhi), July 11, 2021; Rudra Chaudhuri,
“Will the T aliban Keep T heir Promises in Afghanistan?,” Carnegie India (Delhi), August 17, 2021; “Pakistani Fighters,
T aliban Instructed to T arget Indian Assets in Afghanistan, Sources Say,” India Today (Delhi), July 18, 2021.
393 “India Important, Want to Maintain T ies: T aliban Leadership in Qatar,” Indian Express (Delhi), August 30, 2021.
One senior T aliban/Haqqani Network figure reportedly has stated that his group seeks good relations with India and
does not intend to “meddle” in Kashmir (“Won’t Meddle in Kashmir: Long-T ime T aliban Ally Haqqani Network,”
Tim es of India (Delhi), September 2, 2021).
394 Shanthie Mariet D’Souza, “In Afghanistan, How India Missed the Bus” (op -ed), Hindustan Times (Delhi), July 21,
2021.
395 Chetan Rana, “A T aliban Outreach that Needs Correction” (op -ed), Hindu (Chennai), August 26, 2021; Gautam
Makophadhaya, “With the T aliban T akeover of Kabul, a T horny Question Confronts India: Should We Recognize the
T aliban?” (op-ed), Times of India (Delhi), August 27, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

54

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

while pressing for democratic values.396 Stil others cal for diplomatic patience in a stil -fluid
situation, contending that India’s interests wil be advanced by highlighting Pakistan’s “symbiotic
relationship” with the Taliban.397
Several Indian analysts have issued harsh criticisms of the “precipitous” U.S. withdrawal and its
implications for India; others have raised new questions about American credibility as a strategic
partner for India as it seeks to balance against China.398 At the same time, some commentators
foresee a circumstance in which the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, with its attendant reduced
American reliance on Pakistan, may benefit New Delhi’s efforts to address Pakistan going
forward.399 For some, the Taliban win marks a major turning point in regional geopolitics; in the
words of one senior analyst, it means for India “greater cooperation with Washington, deeper
conflicts with Beijing, and wider fissures in the traditional strategic partnership with Moscow. ”400
Gulf States. The Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf are longtime security partners of the
United States and host U.S. forces at military bases on their territory, many of which have been
used for U.S. operations in Afghanistan since 2001.
The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia were the two states that, along with Pakistan,
recognized the pre-2001 Taliban government. As of September 17, 2021, no Gulf state
government had recognized the new Taliban-led government, and, it remains unclear whether or
how any future Gulf state relations with the Taliban may affect U.S. use of Gulf bases to conduct
counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan. Qatar, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates
temporarily hosted Afghan nationals evacuated in August 2021 by U.S. and coalition operations.
Secretary of State Blinken has thanked officials from those countries for their support and has
thanked Kuwait for facilitating the transit of U.S. government personnel and U.S. citizens
evacuated from Afghanistan.
At the virtual ministerial on Afghanistan on September 8, 2021, Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister
Prince Faisal bin Farhan bin Abdullah Al Saud expressed the kingdom’s “support for the Afghan
people and the future choices they make for their country without any external interference” and
said “the formation of the caretaker government would be a step in the right direction toward
achieving security and stability, rejecting violence and extremism and building a bright future for
Afghans.”401 The United Arab Emirates has facilitated the delivery of humanitarian assistance
into Kabul International Airport,402 and separately facilitated the removal of members of the

396 Bharat Karnad, “With the T aliban T akeover of Kabul, a T horny Question Confro nts India: Should We Recognize
the T aliban?” (op-ed), Times of India (Delhi), August 27, 2021; MK Bhadrakumar, “India’s Interests Won’t Be Served
by Demonizing T aliban” (op-ed), Indian Express (Delhi), September 11, 2021.
397 Shyam Saran, “On Kabul, India Need Not Hurry” (op-ed), The Print (Delhi), August 25, 2021. See also C. Raja
Mohan, “It is Pakistan’s Moment of T riumph in Afghanistan, But India Must Bet on Patience” (op -ed), Indian Express
(Delhi), August 25, 2021; HS Panag, “ India Backed the Wrong Horse in Afghanistan and Has Gone Into a Strategic
Sulk Now” (op-ed), The Print (Delhi), August 26, 2021.
398 See, for example, Brahma Chellaney, “Biden’s Afghan Blunder,” Project Syndicate, July 13, 2021; Aparna Pande,
“India in the Eye of the T aliban” (op-ed), T he Hill, August 23, 2021; Shekhar Gupta, “Kabul Shows Up Biden as a
Sheep in Sheep’s Clothing” (op-ed), The Print (Delhi), August 28, 2021.
399 Rajesh Rajagopalan, “A US Not T ied in Afghanistan Only Helps India Deal with Pakistan Problem Better” (op -ed),
The Print (Delhi), August 23, 2021.
400 C. Raja Mohan, “Post -American Afghanistan and India’s Geopolitics,” Foreign Policy, August 18, 2021.
401 Saudi Press Agency, “ Foreign Minister Participates in Virtual Ministerial Meeting on Afghanistan,” September 9,
2021.
402 France 24, “ UAE operating aid air bridge to Kabul as Pakistan's PIA to resume commercial flights,” September 11,
2021.
Congressional Research Service

55

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

Afghan Air Force from Uzbekistan, where they had fled with their aircraft and families as the
Taliban advanced through Afghanistan in mid-August.403
Qatar, in particular, has played an active role in negotiations and in operations related to the
winding down of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan; Secretary Blinken said on September 7, 2021,
visit to Doha with Secretary of Defense Austin, “Many countries have stepped up to help the
evacuation and relocation efforts in Afghanistan, but no country has done more than Qatar.”404
Qatar hosted U.S.-Taliban talks after 2018 and hosted senior Taliban leaders in Doha until their
return to Afghanistan after the Taliban takeover. Qatari Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin
Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al Thani said on August 23, “We remain that impartial mediator
throughout this process.”405 Following the evacuation of the U.S. embassy in Kabul in August
2021, operations were transferred to the U.S. Embassy in Doha. Qatari technicians have also been
instrumental in undertaking repairs that enabled Kabul International Airport to resume some
flights in early September. Several Qatar Airways charter flights have since evacuated additional
Americans and other foreign nationals who sought to leave Afghanistan. On September 12, 2021,
Qatari Foreign Minister Al Thani met Taliban government Acting Prime Minister Akhund to
discuss a range of issues, including Qatar’s continuing efforts to evacuate foreign nationals, and,
according to Qatar’s Foreign Ministry, cal ed on the Taliban to “involve al Afghan parties in
national reconciliation.”406
Gulf state officials are likely to consider how Taliban governance and security conditions in
Afghanistan affect the threats posed by transnational terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda and the
Islamic State. Humanitarian conditions in Afghanistan, the effects of the situation there on the
government of Pakistan, and Taliban-Iran relations are other relevant considerations for Gulf
policymakers.
U.S. Military Operations: Summary of Evacuation
Efforts and Budgetary Implications
What U.S. military operations were conducted during the
withdrawal from Afghanistan?407
There were three major operational actions ongoing in Afghanistan as of August 26, 2021. The
first was the redeployment or repositioning of U.S. troops and capabilities that were once part of
the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission (RSM) or Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS). On July
12, 2021, command of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) was transferred from General Scott
Mil er (USA) to CENTCOM Commander General Frank McKenzie (USMC).408 On the ground,
USFOR-A had a forward element in Kabul led by Navy Rear Admiral Peter Vasely.409 Prior to the

403 “Afghan pilots start leaving Uzbekistan for UAE, despite T aliban pressure-source,” Reuters, September 12, 2021.
404 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken And Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin,” September 7,
2021.
405 “Qatar is an ‘impartial mediator’ amid Afghanistan evacuations: FM,” Al Jazeera, August 23, 2021.
406 Reuters, “Qatar's foreign minister visits premier of T aliban-ruled Afghanistan,” September 12, 2021.
407 T his section was prepared by Kathleen McInnis, Specialist in International Security, and Andrew Feickert,
Specialist in Military Ground Forces.
408 Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report: Security, July 30, 2021, p. 49.
409 Ibid.
Congressional Research Service

56

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

August 15, 2021, collapse of the Afghan government, between 650 and 1,000 U.S. troops were on
the ground conducting withdrawal operations.410 As part of the transition, U.S. security
cooperation activities in support of the ANDSF were transferred from Combined Security
Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) to the Qatar-based Defense Security Cooperation
Management Office- Afghanistan (DSCMO-A), led by Army Brigadier General Curtis
Buzzard.411 Given the collapse of the ANDSF, it is unclear what role DSCMO-A wil play, if any.
The second major operational action was Operation Al ies Refuge (OAR), which was initiated on
July 17, 2021, to support relocation flights for Afghan nationals and their families eligible for
Special Immigrant Visas (SIVs).412 On August 12, 2021, in light of the deteriorating security
situation in Afghanistan, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and Secretary of State Antony
Blinken informed President Ghani that the United States would begin reducing its civilian
footprint in Kabul, and would accelerate flights of SIV applicants.413
The Department of Defense also announced the commencement of Noncombatant Evacuation
Operations (NEO) from Afghanistan.414 At an August 18 press conference, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff General Mark Mil ey stated that the NEO operation had five core tasks:415
 Establish and maintain security at the Kabul International Airport;
 Defend the airport from attack. Evacuate al American citizens from Afghanistan
who desire to leave this country;
 Evacuate any third country national, or al ies and partners as designated by the
Secretary of State;
 Evacuate personnel with State Department-designated Special Immigrant Visas;
and
 Evacuate any other evacuees that the State Department designates.
In support of OAR and U.S. withdrawal operations, DOD announced that at least the following
actions were taken:416
 Three infantry battalions—two Marine Corps, one U.S. Army—deployed to
Kabul International Airport.417
 The Marine units were from the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and
the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force-Crisis Response

410 Deirdre Shesgreen, “ US troops leave Bagram Airfield, suggesting full US withdrawal from Afghanistan is near ,
USA Today, July 2, 2021; John R. Kirby (@PentagonPressSec), T witter, August 14, 2021, https://twitter.com/
PentagonPresSec/status/1426655650499727367?s=20.
411 Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report: Security, July 30, 2021, p. 49.
412 U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan, Operation Allies Refuge, https://af.usembassy.gov/operation-allies-refuge/.
413 U.S. Department of Defense, Readout of Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III’s Call With President of the
Islam ic Republic of Afghanistan Ashraf Ghani, August 12, 2021.
414 U.S. Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense Austin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Milley
Press Briefing, August 18, 2021. https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/T ranscripts/T ranscript/Article/2738086/
secretary-of-defense-austin-and-chairman-of-the-joint-chiefs-of-staff-gen-mille/.
415 Ibid.
416 Jim Garamone, “DOD Deploys Forces to Protect Kabul Embassy Drawdown,” DOD News, August 12, 2021.
417 U.S. Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense Austin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen Milley
Press Briefing, August 18, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

57

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

(SPMAGTF-CR) assigned to U.S. CENTCOM. The Army unit was from the
Minnesota National Guard.418
 The U.S. Air Force 621st Contingency Response Group at Joint Base McGuire-
Dix-Lakehurst deployed to assist in running operations at Kabul International
Airport.419
 A joint U.S. Army/Air Force support element of around 1,000 personnel was to
be sent to Qatar, and possibly to Afghanistan (or to other areas where Afghans
wil be processed) to facilitate the processing of SIV applicants.420
 One battalion of the 10th Mountain Division (U.S. Army) deployed to Kabul to
assist with U.S. Embassy security.421
 Two battalions of the 82nd Airborne Division (U.S. Army) were to be deployed to
Afghanistan (it was previously announced that one of these battalions would be
sent to Kuwait as a quick reaction force. The deployment of a second battalion
was announced on August 16, 2021.)422
 A headquarters element of the 82nd Airborne Division (U.S. Army) was deployed
in support of efforts to secure Kabul International Airport (KAIA).423
On August 26, 2021, thirteen U.S. service members and more than 100 Afghans were kil ed in an
Islamic State attack at Kabul International Airport.424 A further U.S. eighteen service members
were wounded in the attack.425
The U.S. military withdrawal and noncombatant evacuation operation ended on August 30, 2021.
Some additional questions that Congress may ask the executive branch include
 What kinds of contingency plans were developed for the collapse of the Afghan
government and the need to evacuate U.S. personnel from Afghanistan? If such
plans were developed, when did planning start and were plans approved by the
Secretary of Defense?
 How wil Congress and the executive branch review U.S. military and
intel igence assessments and actions with regard to the events of August 2021?
How if at al might the results of related findings be shared with the public?

418 U.S. Department of Defense, Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby Holds an Off-Camera Press Briefing, August
18, 2021.
419 Ibid.
420 Jim Garamone, “DOD Deploys Forces to Protect Kabul Embassy Drawdown,” DOD News, August 12, 2021.
421 U.S. Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense Austin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen Milley
Press Briefing, August 18, 2021.
422 Ibid; Robert Burns, Matthew Lee and Ellen Knickmeyer, “US sending 3K troops for partial Afghan embassy
evacuation,” AP News, August 12, 2021; U.S. Department of Defense, Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby Holds
an Off-Camera Press Briefing, August 16, 2021.
423 U.S. Department of Defense, Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby Holds a Press Briefing, Pentagon Press
Secretary John F. Kirby; Major General Hank Taylor, Deputy Director of the Joint Staff For Regional Operations, J -
35, August 17, 2021.
424 Yaroslav T rofimov, Nancy A. Youssef and Sune Engel Rasmussen , “Kabul Airport Attack Kills 13 U.S. Service
Members, at Least 90 Afghans,” The Wall Street Journal, August 27, 2021.
425 Ibid.
Congressional Research Service

58

link to page 64 U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

 Does the U.S. Department of Defense intend to investigate the circumstances
related to the U.S. military and intel igence assessments and actions associated
with the events of August 2021?
 How does the current security situation in Afghanistan impact DOD’s ability to
conduct “over the horizon” counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan? What,
precisely, does DOD mean by the term “over the horizon” counterterrorism
operations, and what kinds of equipment, personnel, and capabilities are required
to perform such missions? How might the conduct of those missions differ from
U.S. counterterrorism missions under Operation Freedom’s Sentinel?
How did the United States conduct the aerial evacuation?426
On August 15, 2021,427 the U.S. military began evacuating thousands of persons from Kabul
International Airport (formerly Hamid Karzai International Airport).
The U.S. military utilized a number of cargo aircraft for the aerial evacuation of U.S. government
personnel, U.S. civilian personnel and U.S. citizens, and certain other individuals departing
Kabul. When performing airlift operations, aircraft are limited by the amount of weight they can
carry for take offs and landings (cal ed maximum takeoff weight and maximum landing
weight).428 These weight limits are intended to prevent structural damage to an aircraft. Based on
these limitations, aircrews must balance the amount of cargo—or people—with the weight of the
fuel. In addition, Air Forces Central Command (AFCENT) advised aircraft that Kabul
International Airport had extremely limited fuel quantities, and as a result aircraft should not
refuel while on the ground.429 Most U.S. cargo aircraft, however, have the ability to receive fuel
while airborne from tanker aircraft, known as aerial refueling.430 Aerial refueling al ows cargo
aircraft to load more cargo on the ground, trading off fuel against the maximum takeoff weight,
ensuring the aircraft is able to get off the ground. In this approach, the cargo aircraft would then
rendezvous with a tanker aircraft to receive additional fuel before proceeding on to its destination.
The U.S. military employed KC-135s and KC-10s tankers to establish an airbridge—using aerial
tankers to refuel aircraft midflight to extend an aircraft’s range—to support air evacuations.431
The U.S. military utilized C-17 aircraft to transport personnel; other cargo aircraft such as the
Marine Corps’ KC-130, the Air Force’s C-5, and the Air Force’s C-130 were utilized for
personnel evacuation as wel (Figure 2). The C-17 is reportedly able to transport approximately

426 T his section was prepared by John Hoehn, Analyst in Military Capabilities and Programs. For additional
background and context see CRS Insight IN11730, Afghan Aerial Evacuation in Context, by John R. Hoehn and
Jeremiah Gertler.
427 Department of Defense, "Secretary of Defense Austin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Milley Press
Briefing," press release, August 18, 2021.
428 T ypically maximum takeoff weight is equal to or greater than maximum landing weight because an aircraft will
reduce its weight in transit by burning fuel.
429 Defense Internet Notice to Airmen Service, August 17, 2021, https://www.notams.faa.gov/dinsQueryWeb/
queryRetrievalMapAction.do?reportType=Raw&retrieveLocId=oakx&actionType=notamRetrievalbyICAOs.
430 T his includes the C-5, C-17, and C-130. It is unclear if the Marine Corps’ KC-130 can refuel midair.
431 For a definition of an airbridge see Air Force Doctrine Publication 3 -36, Air Mobility Operations, June 28, 2019,
https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDP_3-36/3-36-D25-Mobility-Refuel-Ops.pdf.
Congressional Research Service

59

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

102 troops or 170,900 pounds of cargo.432 One C-17 reportedly carried over 800 passengers to Al
Udeid airbase in Qatar.433
Figure 2. C-130, C-5 and C-17 Comparison

Source: https://defense-arab.com/vb/threads/166318/.
Note: Two C-130 are pictured at the top, a C-5 in the middle, and a C-17 is pictured at the bottom.
Several constraints affected air operations for the Kabul airlift. First, Kabul Airport had a single
runway and a relatively smal parking area for aircraft,434 physical y limiting the number of
aircraft. Second, a limited amount of fuel was at the airfield, and DOD instructed aircraft not to
refuel on the ground. Third, airlift operations were dependent on the number of State Department
consular officers processing visas in Qatar,435 Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates; the
Department of Defense announced that a fourth location would start in Germany,436 Spain,437 and

432 T roop capacity is based on paratrooper operations, which implies the aircraft reaches space constraints instead of
weight constraints. AFCENT , however, has stated that aircraft shall not refuel on the ground, implying if an aircraft is
at maximum weight, it will need to refuel midair. U.S. Air Force, “C-17 Globemaster III Fact Sheet,” press release,
May 14, 2018.
433 Joseph T revithick, “Packed C-17 Cargo Jet Out Of Kabul Actually Had 823 People Onboard Setting New Record,”
The Drive, August 20, 2021.
434 Republic of Afghanistan, Aeronautical Information Publication: Aerodrome Part 3, July 19, 2018,
https://acaa.gov.af/wp-content/uploads/AERODROME.pdf.
435 “U.S. pauses Afghanistan evacuation flights as processing facility hits capacity,” CBS News, August 20, 2021,
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/afghanistan-evacuations-pause-taliban-doha-kabul/.
436 Department of Defense, "Ramstein Air Base: Setting Up an Instant City for Afghan Evacuees," press release,
September 12, 2021.
437 U.S. Embassy in Spain and Andorra, "U.S.-Spain Cooperation to Assist Evacuees from Afghanistan.”
Congressional Research Service

60

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

Italy.438 On August 22, 2021, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin ordered the Department of
Defense’s Transportation Command to activate the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) to buttress the
U.S. military’s evacuation efforts.439
What was the role of U.S. contractors and contract operations in
Afghanistan?440
Overseas contingency operations in recent decades have highlighted the role that contractors play
in supporting the U.S. military, both in terms of the number of contractor personnel and the work
performed by these individuals.441 Analysts have highlighted the benefits of using contractors to
support the military. Some of these benefits include freeing up uniformed personnel to focus on
military-specific activities; providing supplemental expertise in specialized fields, such as
linguistics or weapon systems maintenance; and, providing a surge capability to quickly deliver
critical support tailored to specific military needs. Just as the effective use of contractors can
augment military capabilities, the ineffective use of contractors can prevent troops from receiving
what they need when they need it and can potential y lead to wasteful spending. Some argue that
contractors can also compromise the credibility and effectiveness of the U.S. military and
undermine operations.442
In the February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement, the United States committed to withdrawing the
“private security contractors” of the United States, its al ies, and Coalition partners as part of the
military withdrawal.443 Although it is unclear if individual contractors in other mission categories
were also subject to the same withdrawal commitment, an August 11, 2021, DOD press briefing
indicated that at that time, DOD planned to continue to carry out some types of contract-based
activities in Afghanistan, reportedly to include contract maintenance support for Afghan Air Force
airframes.444 Following the Taliban takeover and withdrawal of U.S. military forces, these
activities were not to continue.445
Since 2008, CENTCOM has published quarterly contractor census reports, which provide
aggregated data–including figures on mission category and nationality–regarding contractors
employed through DOD-funded contracts who are physical y located within the CENTCOM area
of responsibility (AOR), which includes Afghanistan.446 The personnel counts included in

438 U.S. Embassy in Italy, "U.S. Flights T ake Afghan Evacuees from Italy to the United States," press release, August
29, 2021.
439 See CRS Insight IN11731, Afghanistan Evacuation: The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) and the Defen se
Production Act (DPA), by Michael H. Cecire and Heidi M. Peters.
440 T his section was prepared by Heidi Peters, Analyst in U.S. Defense Acquisition Policy.
441 For past CRS analysis, see CRS Report R43074, Department of Defense’s Use of Contractors to Support Military
Operations: Background, Analysis, and Issues for Congress, by Heidi M. Peters.
442 U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Operational Contract Support: Management and Oversight Improvements
Needed in Afghanistan,” GAO-12-290, March 29, 2012, p. 1-2.
443 See Department of State, “ Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between the Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan which is not recognized by the United States as a state and is known as the T aliban and the United States
of America,” February 29, 2020, at https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Agreement -For-Bringing-
Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf.
444 See Department of Defense, “ Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby Holds a Press Briefing,” transcript, August 11,
2021, at https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/T ranscripts/T ranscript/Article/2728440/pentagon-press-secretary-john-f-
kirby-holds-a-press-briefing/.
445 Jack Detsch, “Departure of Private Contractors Was a T urning Point in Afghan Military’s Collapse,” Foreign
Policy, August 16, 2021.
446 See CRS Report R44116, Department of Defense Contractor and Troop Levels in Afghanistan and Iraq: 2007 -2020,
Congressional Research Service

61

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

quarterly contractor census reports should be used cautiously as they do not necessarily reflect the
actual on-the-ground situation. In particular, in the report for the third quarter of FY2021, DOD
indicated that the reported personnel counts for Afghanistan were derived from DOD information
systems as of early June 2021, with the number of contract personnel in country subsequently
“decreas[ing] due to ongoing redeployment and related drawdown activities in accordance with
the President’s direction.”447
During the third quarter of FY2021, CENTCOM reported a total of 7,795 contractor personnel
working for DOD in Afghanistan, down nearly 54% from the second quarter of FY2021.448 In
Afghanistan, as of the third quarter of FY2021, U.S. citizens accounted for about 34% of DOD’s
7,795 reported individual contractors. Third-country nationals represented approximately 32%
and local/host-country nationals (i.e., from Afghanistan) made up roughly 34%. After the collapse
of the Afghan government, the number of third-country national and U.S. citizen contractor
personnel remaining in country, if any, is unclear.
In Afghanistan, DOD has used armed and unarmed private security contractors to provide
services such as protecting fixed locations; guarding traveling convoys; providing security
escorts; and training police and military personnel. The number of private security contractor
employees under contract with DOD in Afghanistan fluctuated significantly over time, depending
on various factors. As of the third quarter of FY2021, DOD reported 1,356 security contractors in
Afghanistan (down from 2,856 in the previous quarter), with 466 specifical y categorized as
armed private security contractors (compared to 1,520 in the previous quarter).449
At the time of the Taliban’s takeover on August 15, 2021, obligations for al DOD-funded
contracts performed within the Afghanistan area of operation between FY2011 and FY2020
totaled approximately $100.4 bil ion in FY2022 dollars, with an estimated additional $1.2 bil ion
in FY2022 dollars obligated year-to-date in FY2021 for DOD-funded contracts performed within
the Afghanistan area of operations.450
Standard federal procurement contract provisions offer options for modifying, changing, or
terminating contracts. These provisions include, but are not limited to, clauses that al ow
contracting officers to modify or terminate an existing contract in response to changing
circumstances.451

by Heidi M. Peters.
447 See Department of Defense, “Contractor Support of U.S. Operations in the USCENT COM Area of Responsibility ,”
July 2021, at https://www.acq.osd.mil/log/PS/.CENT COM_reports.html/FY21_3Q_5A_Jul2021.pdf.
448 See Department of Defense, “Contractor Support of U.S. Operations in the USCENT COM Area of Responsibility ,”
July 2021. Comparable historical or current data from the Departm ent of State and the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID), or other executive branch agencies, are not routinely released to the public.
449 See Department of Defense, “Contractor Support of U.S. Operations in the USCENT COM Area of Responsibility,”
July 2021, and Department of Defense, “Contractor Support of U.S. Operations in the US CENT COM Area of
Responsibility, April 2021, at https://www.acq.osd.mil/log/PS/.CENT COM_reports.html/FY21_2Q_5A_Apr2021.pdf.
450 FY2021 figures include obligations during the period of October 1, 2020 through July 31, 2021. CRS adjustments
for inflation using deflators for converting into FY2022 dollars derived from Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller), Department of Defense, National Defense Budget Estim ates for FY2022 , “ Department of Defense
Deflators–T OA By Category ‘T otal Non-Pay,’” T able 5-5, pp. 64-65, August 2021. See also the overview of
“Analytical Methodology” for CRS Report R44116, Department of Defense Contractor and Troop Levels in
Afghanistan and Iraq: 2007-2020, by Heidi M. Peters for a discussion of how CRS determines annual obligations
associated with the Afghanistan area of operations.
451 Federal procurement contracts generally must include some variation of a changes clause that allows contracting
officers to modify existing contracts based on a change in government requirements (see Federal Acquisition
Regulation [FAR] Subpart 43.2). In other instances, contracting officers can exercise the right to terminate a contract in
Congressional Research Service

62

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

What will happen to U.S. funding provided for Afghanistan
security forces?452
To date, U.S. defense officials have not stated in detail how developments in Afghanistan may
change their plans for the use of Afghan Security Forces Funds (ASFF) appropriated for FY2021
and prior years, or requested for FY2022. At an August 24, 2021, press conference, DOD
spokesperson Kirby said that “we’re working closely with Congress” on money intended for the
ASFF but that “that money is being held now.”453
On August 25, 2021, Bloomberg News reported that the DOD was consulting with Congress and
the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) over “at least $6 bil ion in unspent
funds for the now-defunct Afghan Security Force,” including “$600 mil ion in previously
approved but unspent fiscal 2020 funds, as wel as $2.3 bil ion in this fiscal year as of June plus
$3.3 bil ion requested for fiscal 2022.”454
As part of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2021 (Division C of P.L. 116-260),
Congress provided $3.05 bil ion for the ASFF, to remain available until September 30, 2022. In
May 2021, then-Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs David
Helvey testified before the House Armed Services Committee that the department expected to
continue supporting the ASFF after U.S. military personnel withdrew from the country,
particularly salaries of the Afghan security forces, supplies and equipment for the ANDSF, and
operations and functions of the Afghan Air Force and Afghan Special Mission Wing.455
In the ASFF appropriation for fiscal year FY2021, Congress limited the obligation of such funds
until the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, certifies in writing to
the congressional defense committees “that such forces are controlled by a civilian, representative
government that is committed to protecting human rights and women’s rights and preventing
terrorists and terrorist groups from using the territory of Afghanistan to threaten the security of
the United States and United States al ies.”456
On August 24, 2021 (as discussed in more detail below),457 DOD transferred more than $1 bil ion
from the ASFF to Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid, Defense (OHDACA) account

whole or in part for the government’s convenience if the U.S. government no longer requires the contracted goods or
services (see FAR Part 49). See CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10428, COVID-19 and Federal Procurem ent Contracts, by
David H. Carpenter for a discussion of legal options associated with the inability of a federal contractor to perform
government procurement contracts as originally contemplated.
452 T his section was prepared by Brendan McGarry, Analyst in U.S. Defense Budget.
453 Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby and Major General Hank T aylor, Deputy Director of the Joint Staff for
Regional Operations Press Briefing, Department of Defense, August 24, 2021.
454 Anthony Capaccio, “Pentagon’s Afghan Exit Leaves Unused $6 Billion to Fight Over,” Bloomberg News, August
25, 2021, at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-08-25/pentagon-s-afghan-exit-leaves-unused-6-billion-to-
fight-over.
455 Congressional Quarterly, “House Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on Afghanistan,” transcript, May 12,
2021. Given this testimony, the FY2022 DOD budget documentation does not explain why funding requested for ASFF
was included in direct war costs (i.e., those that are not expected to continue once combat operations end at major
contingency locations) rather than in enduring operations (i.e., in -theater and stateside costs that will remain after
combat operations end).
456 House Committee Print 116-68, p. 389, at https://www.congress.gov/116/cprt/HPRT 42770/CPRT-
116HPRT 42770.pdf.
457 See the question below, “ How much has DOD spent on withdrawing U.S. military and civilian personnel from
Afghanistan?”
Congressional Research Service

63

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

“to relocate Afghan special immigrant visa (SIV) applicants and their families, and other
individuals at risk, in conjunction with the withdrawal of military forces from Afghanistan,”
according to a department reprogramming action that required the prior approval of congressional
defense committees.458 The funding was available from the ASFF “because the Department has
curtailed support to the Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces in light of current
circumstances.”459
On September 7, 2021, as part of a short-term continuing resolution for FY2022, the Biden
Administration requested language be added to the FY2021 ASFF appropriation to authorize such
amounts to be available to cover costs associated with the recovery, repair, storage, and disposal
of equipment and supplies acquired for the Afghanistan security forces; termination of previous
contracts funded by the ASFF; and temporary support for certain members of the Afghanistan
security forces.460
On September 8, 2021, DOD’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) issued policy
guidance to defense agencies related to Building Partner Capacity (BPC) cases funded with
ASFF.461 In the policy, DSCA directed the agencies to “identify any close-out activities for ASFF-
related BPC cases and return any unobligated funds not required to support close-out activities.”
In justifying the $3.3 bil ion requested for ASFF in FY2022, DOD stated that, given the planned
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan, the assistance was “even more important than
previously to maintain the viability of the Afghan forces and strengthening the Afghan
government leverage in negotiations to end the war on terms that preserve a democratic form of
government.”462
In July, prior to the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, the House Appropriations Committee
reported a version of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2022 (H.R. 4432), that
would provide $3.05 bil ion for ASFF.463 In July, the Senate Armed Services Committee approved
a version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 that would authorize
“the appropriation of funds for the Afghanistan security forces beyond the transition of U.S. and
coalition nations from the country,” according to an executive summary of the document.464

458 DOD, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Budget Execution,
Reprogramming Actions, “ Afghan Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) Program #2,” FY21-16 PA, August 24, 2021, p. 1, at
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/execution/reprogramming/fy2021/prior1415s/21 -
16_PA_Afghan_SIV_Program_2_Request.pdf.
459 Ibid., p. 2.
460 White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB), “Delivering for the American People and Meeting Urgent
Needs in the New Fiscal Year,” blog post by Acting OMB Director Shalanda Young, September 7, 2021, at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/briefing-room/2021/09/07/delivering-for-the-american-people-and-meeting-urgent -
needs-in-the-new-fiscal-year/. See link from “ technical assistance” in the text to the document, “ FY 2022 Continuing
Resolution (CR) Appropriations Issues (anomalies required for a short -term CR),” pp. 27-28, at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/CR_Package_9 -7-21.pdf.
461 DOD, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “ Immediate Return of Unobligated Afghanistan Security Forces
Funds, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), DSCA Policy 21 -67,” September 8, 2021, at
https://samm.dsca.mil/policy-memoranda/dsca-21-67.
462 DOD, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2022, May 2021,
Justification for the FY 2022 Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) , p. 7, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/
Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2022/FY2022_ASFF_Justification_Book.pdf.
463 H.R. 4432, p. 10, at https://www.congress.gov/117/bills/H.R. 4432 /BILLS-117hr4432rh.pdf. T he Senate
Appropriations Committee has not yet approved its version of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2022.
464 Senate Armed Services Committee, “ SASC Completes Markup of Fiscal Year 2022 National Defense Authorization
Act,” press release, July 22, 2021, at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/press-releases/-sasc-completes-markup-of-
Congressional Research Service

64

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

In September, following the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, the House Armed Services
Committee approved a version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year FY2022
(H.R. 4350), that would authorize a total of $325 mil ion for ASFF for “contract close-out and
other close-out operations.”465
What has happened to U.S. military equipment and other personal
property brought to, or purchased for use by, U.S. Forces in
Afghanistan?466
In general, during an organized withdrawal of U.S. forces from an area of operations, there are
two ordered processes by which DOD and the Military Services (hereinafter “Services”) are to
manage military equipment and other materiel (i.e., personal property467) not organically assigned
to a military unit. These two processes are explained below.
 Retrograde: “The process for the movement of non-unit equipment and materiel
from a forward location to a reset (replenishment, repair, or recapitalization)
program or to another directed area of operations to replenish unit stocks, or to
satisfy stock requirements.”468 Essential y, DOD-owned equipment that is stil
required to meet current and future military needs is returned to the United States
or to an alternate location determined by the Services.
 Disposition: “The process of reusing, recycling, converting, redistributing,
transferring, donating, sel ing, demilitarizing, treating, destroying, or fulfil ing
other end of life tasks or actions for DOD property. Does not include real (real
estate) property.”469 DOD-owned equipment that is no longer needed (cal ed
“excess” property), or is cost-prohibitive to transport (i.e., the transportation cost
exceeds replacement value) is either demilitarized, destroyed and/or sold, or can

fiscal-year-2022-national-defense-authorization-act. See link to Fiscal Year 2022, National Defense Authorization Act,
Senate Arm ed Services Com m ittee, U.S. Senato r Jack Reed, Chairm an, U.S. Senator Jim Inhofe, Ranking Mem ber
[Executive Sum m ary], p. 5, at https://www.armed-
services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FY22%20NDAA%20Executive%20Summary.pdf .
465 H.R. 4350, p. 1265, at https://www.congress.gov/117/bills/H.R. 4350 /BILLS-117hr4350rh.pdf.
466 T his section was prepared by G. James Herrera, Analyst in U.S. Defense Readiness and Infrastructure.
467 DOD defines personal property as “property except real property. [This definition] excludes records of the Federal
Government, battleships, cruisers, aircraft carriers, destroyers, and submarines.” See DOD Manual 4160.21-V1,
October 22, 2015 (Change 3, 10/02/2019), p. 90, available at https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/
issuances/dodm/416021_vol1.pdf?ver=2019-10-02-080613-750#page=90.
468 DOD, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Chiefs of Staff, As of January 2020, p. 187,
available at https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf#page=193.
469 DOD, DOD Manual (DODM) 4160.21 Defense Materiel Disposition: Disposal Guidance and Procedures, Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S)), Incorporating Change 3, October 2, 2019 , p. 83,
available at https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodm/416021_vol1.pdf?ver=2019-10-02-
080613-750#page=83. DOD disposition activities are executed according to multiple statutory requirements and
authorities, some broadly applicable, and others specific to Afghanistan for a specified period of time. For example,
“defense articles” determined to be “non-excess” to DOD needs were available for transfer to the Afghan government
pursuant to the authority and requirements in Section 1222 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for
Fiscal Year (FY) 13 (P.L. 112-239). T he term ‘‘defense articles’’ has the meaning given the term in Section 644(d) of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. §2403(d)). See Section 1222 of P.L. 112-239. Other examples are the
statutory requirements set forth under T itle 40 United States Code (U.S.C.), Chapter 7 —Foreign Excess Property,
which provide the conditions by which foreign excess personal property, or FEPP, can be disposed of by federal
executive agencies (see 40 U.S.C. §704).
Congressional Research Service

65

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

be made available under various statutory authorities to certain foreign
governments.
According to the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction Quarterly Report of
July 30, 2021
CENTCOM estimated it had completed more than half of the retrograde process by June
14, and more than 90% by July 5. This process included 984 C-17 transport aircraft loads
out of Afghanistan, more than 17,000 pieces of equipment turned over to DLA [the Defense
Logistics Agency] for disposition, and 10 facilities, including Bagram Airfield, handed
over to Afghanistan’s Ministry of Defense. Included in the retrograde are thousands of
vehicles and other equipment, including over 400 pieces of rolling stock and more than
6,600 pieces of non-rolling stock. The two most expensive retrograded items were 14 air-
defense artillery pieces valued at more than $144 million, and five “Enhanced Sentinel
FMTVs (Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles)” valued at more than $16 million.470
Dispositioning of DOD-owned personal property in Afghanistan—largely through transfers to the
Afghan government—is not the same process as procuring equipment with U.S. funds
specifical y for the ANDSF.471 In the case of Afghanistan, the Afghan government and other
partner nations have received dispositioned U.S. military equipment and materials to advance
U.S. national security and foreign policy interests.472 As of September 17, 2021, DOD has not
published a complete public estimate of how much DOD-owned personal property has been
destroyed or abandoned in Afghanistan, or the amount of DOD-owned personal property
remaining in Afghanistan. Much of this this equipment and material is likely now to be possessed
by the Taliban, but exact quantities are not known.473
Following the completion of the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan on August 30,
CENTCOM Commander General McKenzie, stated the U.S military had demilitarized (i.e.,
destroyed) their Counter-Rocket, Artil ery, Mortar (C-RAM) protection systems in place at Kabul
International Airport. These systems were destroyed to prevent them from being used against U.S.
forces while U.S. operations were ongoing. He also stated that up to 70 Mine-Resistant Ambush
Protected (MRAP) vehicles, 27 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWVs), and
73 aircraft were demilitarized.474 He asserted that “those aircraft wil never fly again... they'l
never be able to be operated by anyone. Most of them were non-mission capable to begin with,
but certainly they'l never be able to be flown again.”475
During the September 1, 2021, markup of the House committee version of the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 (H.R. 4350), a provision was included

470 SIGAR Quarterly Report to Congress, July 30, 2021.
471 For more information on U.S.-funded equipment and materiel for the ANDSF—which includes the Afghan National
Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP)—see Government Accountability Office (GAO) report GAO-17-
667R Afghanistan Security (August 10, 2017), available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-17-667r.pdf.
472 See Military Equipment Transferred to the Afghan Government: DOD Did Not Conduct Required Monitoring to
Account for Sensitive Articles, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), December 2020;
Also, see DOD, “Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby Holds an Off-Camera Press Briefing,” Pentagon Press
Secretary John Kirby, August 18, 2021.
473 Idrees Ali and Patricia Zengerle, Jonathan Landay, “Planes, guns, night -vision goggles: T he T aliban’s new U.S.-
made war chest,” Reuters Aerospace & Defense, August 19, 2021 ; Adam T aylor, “T he T aliban is flaunting captured
U.S. weapons that may be worth billions. Can it use them?” Washington Post, August 20, 2021.
474 Recorded statement of General Kenneth “Frank” McKenzie, accessible at CBSnews.com; see Caroline Linton and
Eleanor Watson, “ Pentagon announces last U.S. troops have left Afghanistan,” CBSnews.com, August 31, 2021.
475 Ibid.
Congressional Research Service

66

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

under Section 1054 that would require DOD to provide a report and briefing on “covered United
States equipment, property, and classified material” that was destroyed, surrendered, or
abandoned in Afghanistan during the “covered period.”476 The covered period would mean the
period that began on February 29, 2020, and ends 120 days after the FY2022 NDAA is enacted.
Covered equipment, property, and classified material includes al real property, personal property,
equipment including al nonexpendable items needed to outfit or equip an individual or
organization, and classified information in any form.477 As of September 17, 2021, an FY2022
NDAA has not been introduced in the Senate.
According to U.S. officials and press and social media reports, the Taliban have also captured
equipment procured with U.S. funds for the ANDSF, including aircraft, ground vehicles, small
arms, and ammunition. On August 17, U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said, “We
don’t have a complete picture, obviously, of where every article of defense materials has gone,
but certainly a fair amount of it has fal en into the hands of the Taliban.”478 On August 18,
General Mark Mil ey stated that the U.S. government had unspecified “capabilities” relevant to
U.S.-origin equipment seized by the Taliban.479 Additional y, fleeing ANDSF personnel
reportedly took some military equipment and arms—including aircraft—to neighboring countries,
including Iran, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan.480
Some additional questions that Congress may ask the executive branch include
 How wil the fal of U.S. military equipment, supplies, munitions, and explosives
into the hands of the Taliban affect U.S. security interests in and around
Afghanistan?
 To what extent wil the Taliban, or other foreign nations or groups, be able to use
and sustain U.S.-origin equipment?
 To what extent can demilitarized U.S.-origin military equipment, supplies, and
munitions be reverse-engineered, disassembled, or tested for physical and cyber
vulnerabilities by foreign actors, including competitor nation states?481
 Is there potential for these items to be transferred to transnational y active
terrorist groups? To U.S. adversaries and competitors?
 How might unemployed U.S.-trained personnel improve the capabilities of
Taliban forces or other groups active in Afghanistan?

476 H.R. 4350, Section 1054, available at https://www.congress.gov/117/bills/H.R. 4350 /BILLS-
117hr4350rh.pdf#page=797.
477 Ibid.
478 White House, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, August 17,
2021.
479 Secretary of Defense Austin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Milley Press Briefing, August 18, 2021.
480 Haley Willis, Christiaan T riebert, Evan Hill, Brenna Smith and Dmitriy Khavin , “What Scenes From the T aliban’s
Victory in Afghanistan Reveal,” New York Tim es, August 16, 2021; and, Alan Cullison and Gordon Lubold, “ Some
Afghan Military Members Fled T aliban T akeover in U.S.-Supplied Aircraft , Wall Street Journal, August 18, 2021.
481 For a public reference of potential vulnerabilities, see DefenseOne article “ How Equipment Left In Afghanistan
Will Expose US Secrets,” by Patrick T ucker, September 10, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

67

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

How much has DOD spent on withdrawing U.S. military and
civilian personnel from Afghanistan?482
DOD has not released estimated or actual costs associated with withdrawing U.S. military
personnel from Afghanistan.483 When asked at an August 23 press conference about the cost of
evacuation efforts, Pentagon spokesperson Kirby said, “we’re not letting cost drive the
operation,” and the Commander of Transportation Command, General Stephen Lyons, said,
“we’re cracking costs, but we’re nowhere close to accumulating that data for public
dissemination.”484
In May 2021, the number of U.S. military personnel in the country reportedly totaled 3,500,485
down from a high in FY2011 of approximately 100,000.486 In 2017, the department stopped
publicly reporting the number of U.S. military personnel deployed in support of operations in
Afghanistan and certain other countries.487 For FY2021, which ends September 30, 2021, DOD
planned to spend $12.9 bil ion on direct war costs in Afghanistan and assumed an average annual
troop strength of 8,600 U.S. military personnel in the country, according to the department’s
FY2022 budget documentation.488 DOD describes direct war costs in part as “combat or combat
support costs that are not expected to continue once combat operations end at major contingency
locations.”489 It is unclear how much of this funding, if any, has been used to date for withdrawing
military and civilian personnel from Afghanistan.
In August, DOD transferred a total of $1.462 bil ion to Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and
Civic Aid (OHDACA) account to provide temporary housing, sustainment, and other
humanitarian assistance to special immigrant visa (SIV) applicants and their families, according
to two department reprogramming actions that required the prior approval of congressional
defense committees.490 That figure includes $396.39 mil ion in a reprogramming action dated
August 5, 2021, and $1.066 bil ion in a reprogramming action dated August 21, 2021. The latter
involved transferring amounts from the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF). According to

482 T his section was prepared by Brendan McGarry, Analyst in U.S. Defense Budget.
483 Missy Ryan and Karen DeYoung, “ Biden will withdraw all U.S. forces from Afghanistan by Sept. 11, 2021,” The
Washington Post, April 13, 2021.
484 Gen. Stephen R. Lyons, Commander of U.S. T ransportation Command, and Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby
Press Briefing, Department of Defense, August 23, 2021.
485 See, for example, T homas Gibbons-Neff, Eric Schmitt and Helene Cooper, “Pentagon Accelerates Withdrawal From
Afghanistan,” The New York Tim es, updated July 4, 2021.
486 For more information, see CRS Report R44116, Department of Defense Contractor and Troop Levels in
Afghanistan and Iraq: 2007-2020, by Heidi M. Peters.
487 Ibid.
488 DOD, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, May 2021, Defense Budget
Overview, United States Departm ent of Defense, Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request, p. 7-3, at
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2022/
FY2022_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf.
489 Ibid., p. 7-2.
490 DOD, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Budget Execution,
Reprogramming Actions, “ Afghan Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) Program,” FY21-13PA, August 5, 2021, at
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/executio n/reprogramming/fy2021/prior1415s/21-
13_PA_Afghan%20SIV_Request_Revised_Baseline.pdf; and “ Afghan Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) Program #2 ,”
FY21-16PA, August 24, 2021, at
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/execution/reprogramming/fy2021/prior1415s/21 -
16_PA_Afghan_SIV_Program_2_Request.pdf.
Congressional Research Service

68

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

the department budget execution documentation, “funds from Afghanistan Security Forces Fund
(ASFF) are available because the Department has curtailed support to the Afghanistan National
Defense and Security Forces in light of current circumstances.”491
On September 7, 2021, as part of a short-term continuing resolution for FY2022, the Biden
Administration requested $2.4 bil ion in supplemental appropriations for DOD to cover costs
related to the relocation of individuals from Afghanistan.492 Of that amount, $2.2 bil ion was
requested for the OHDACA account, to remain available through September 30, 2023; the rest of
the funding was requested for various operation and maintenance (O&M) and military personnel
(MILPERS) accounts, to remain available through September 30, 2022.493
The Administration also requested that DOD general transfer authority thresholds for FY2020 and
FY2021 be increased by a total of $600 mil ion “to replace the general transfer authority that was
used to fund the relocation and support of Afghanistan personnel.”494 That figure includes
increases of $100 mil ion for FY2020 (bringing the total general transfer authority to $4.1
bil ion), and $500 mil ion for FY2021 (bringing the total general transfer authority to $4.5
bil ion).495
How will the withdrawal of U.S. military personnel from
Afghanistan impact the budget?496
Some Members of Congress and nongovernmental officials have discussed the possibility of not
expending or redirecting funding after withdrawing U.S. military personnel from Afghanistan.
The Chair of the House Armed Services Committee has said avoiding the expense of direct war
costs in Afghanistan “on a year in and year out basis ... is going to give us greater flexibility—
certainly over a five-year period.... If, come October 1, we’re not in Afghanistan anymore that is
going to save some amount of money.”497 Jim McAleese, a defense consultant, has reportedly said
withdrawing U.S. military personnel from Afghanistan could potential y provide up to $21 bil ion
of DOD funding for “currently under-resourced missions.”498
How much funding might be unobligated or redirected is unclear, in part because DOD planned
to fund activities in Afghanistan after withdrawing U.S. military personnel. Of the $42.1 bil ion
requested for contingency operations in FY2022, DOD requested $8.9 bil ion for direct war costs

491 Ibid.
492 White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB), “ Delivering for the American People and Meeting Urgent
Needs in the New Fiscal Year,” blog post by Acting OMB Director Shalanda Young, September 7, 2021, at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/briefing-room/2021/09/07/delivering-for-the-american-people-and-meeting-urgent -
needs-in-the-new-fiscal-year/. See link from “ technical assistance” in the tex t to the document, “ FY 2022 Continuing
Resolution (CR) Appropriations Issues (anomalies required for a short -term CR),” p. 29, at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-cont ent/uploads/2021/09/CR_Package_9-7-21.pdf.
493 OMB, “FY 2022 Continuing Resolution (CR) Appropriations Issues (anomalies required for a short -term CR),” p.
29, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/CR_Package_9 -7-21.pdf.
494 Ibid., p. 28.
495 Ibid.
496 T his section was prepared by Brendan McGarry, Analyst in U.S. Defense Budget.
497 Representative Adam Smith, remarks during American Enterprise Institute webinar hosted by Mackenzie Eaglen, A
conversation with House Arm ed Services Com m ittee Chairm an Adam Sm ith: Priorities for the fiscal year 2022 defense
budget, April 22, 2021.
498 Jim McAleese, as quoted in Bryan Bender, “ Biden bucks the brass on Afghanistan,” Politico Pro Morning Defense
newsletter, April 15, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

69

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

in Afghanistan even though it assumed no U.S. military personnel in the country during
FY2022.499 The department’s FY2022 budget documentation states in part, “Although the United
States plans withdrawal from Afghanistan by September 11, 2021, there are residual costs in the
FY 2022 budget, which include equipment reset and readiness, in-theater support, and
operations/force protection.”500 The department includes in funds requested for direct war costs
$3.3 bil ion for the ASFF. For the $5.6 bil ion in remaining funds requested for direct war costs in
Afghanistan for FY2022, the department did not identify functional or mission categories for
activities in or specifical y related to Afghanistan. Similarly, of the $24.1 bil ion requested for
“enduring theater requirements and related missions” in FY2022, DOD did not identify how
much would be for activities in or specifical y related to Afghanistan. It is unclear how the
Taliban takeover might impact U.S. spending.
Possible Strategic-level Congressional Questions
and Considerations
The U.S. experience in Afghanistan could provide U.S. policymakers and the broader public an
opportunity to reflect upon, and learn from, its successes and failures in order to inform both
policies elsewhere as wel as the future of U.S. policy in Afghanistan. Such questions might
include, but are not limited to
 To what extent was there a shared national consensus about the purposes and
importance of U.S. military operations and foreign assistance in Afghanistan?
How did that consensus, or the lack thereof, impact U.S. policy in Afghanistan?
 How did successive Administrations and Members of Congress inform the public
about the goals, means, and outcomes of U.S. efforts? To what extent did these
efforts result in the development of an informed national conversation about U.S.
policy and consensus about the future of U.S. policy?
 To what extent were U.S. policies and strategies incongruent with on the ground
realities? To what extent did such mismatches contribute to campaign
disconnects and failures?
 What mechanisms did successive Congresses and Administrations use to review
U.S. strategy, policy, and resources toward Afghanistan, assess progress, measure
risks, and renew authorizations and appropriations? Were those mechanisms
sufficient?
 How might U.S. government efforts be better coordinated and integrated across
the elements of the interagency to greater effect on the ground?
 How did oversight mechanisms, including hearings, briefings, reporting
requirements, and inspectors general, inform the development and
implementation of U.S. policy toward Afghanistan? What indications did these
mechanisms provide with regard to the strengths and weaknesses of the Afghan
government and the effectiveness of U.S. military and civilian operations in
Afghanistan?

499 DOD, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, May 2021, Defense Budget
Overview, United States Departm ent of Defense, Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request, p. 7-3, at
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2022/
FY2022_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf.
500 Ibid., p. 7-2.
Congressional Research Service

70

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

 What do U.S. train and equip efforts in Afghanistan suggest about security
cooperation enterprise more broadly? Where else might similar circumstances—
corruption, dependence on the United States for critical enablers, and political
factors—threaten the success of U.S. security cooperation efforts? How similar
or dissimilar is the situation in Afghanistan to other large-scale security U.S.
cooperation efforts in the Middle East and Africa?
 How have U.S. al ies, partners, and adversaries perceived and responded to the
U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and the U.S. response to the August 2021
collapse of the Afghan government? What implications might these responses
have for U.S. national security policy in the future?

Congressional Research Service

71

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

Author Information

Clayton Thomas, Coordinator
John R. Hoehn
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
Analyst in Military Capabilities and Programs

Brendan W. McGarry
Caitlin Campbell
Analyst in U.S. Defense Budget
Analyst in Asian Affairs

Kathleen J. McInnis
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in International Security
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Cory R. Gill
Christopher M. Blanchard
Analyst in Foreign Affairs
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Emily M. Morgenstern
G. James Herrera
Analyst in Foreign Assistance and Foreign Policy
Analyst in U.S. Defense Readiness and

Infrastructure

Sarah R. Collins
Liana W. Rosen
Research Assistant
Specialist in International Crime and Narcotics

Heidi M. Peters
Matthew C. Weed
Analyst in U.S. Defense Acquisition Policy
Specialist in Foreign Policy Legislation

Rhoda Margesson
Jennifer K. Elsea
Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy
Legislative Attorney

Andrew Feickert
Andorra Bruno
Specialist in Military Ground Forces
Specialist in Immigration Policy

Cory Welt
K. Alan Kronstadt
Specialist in Russian and European Affairs
Specialist in South Asian Affairs

Andrew S. Bowen
Tiaji Salaam-Blyther
Analyst in Russian and European Affairs
Specialist in Global Health

Sara M. Tharakan
Michael A. Weber
Analyst in Global Health and International
Analyst in Foreign Affairs
Development

Rebecca M. Nelson
Paul Belkin
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
Analyst in European Affairs

Martin A. Weiss
Maria A. Blackwood
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
Analyst in Asian Policy

Congressional Research Service

72

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should n ot be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

Congressional Research Service
R46879 · VERSION 8 · UPDATED
73