Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Origin, Evolution, and Use

November 16, 2020 – December 14, 2020 R46604

Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Origin,
December 14, 2020
Evolution, and Use
Andres B. Schwarzenberg
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 grants the Office of the United States Trade Representative
Analyst in International
(USTR) a range of responsibilities and authorities to investigate and take action to enforce U.S.
Trade and Finance
rights under trade agreements and respond to certain foreign trade practices. From the conclusion

of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations in 1994, which resulted in the
establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, until the start of the Trump

Administration, the United States used Section 301 authorities primarily to build cases and
pursue dispute settlement at the WTO. The Trump Administration has shown more willingness to go outside of the WTO to
act unilaterally under these authorities to promote what the Administration touts as “free,” “fair,” and “reciprocal” trade. The
Trump Administration’s use of Section 301 to impose tariffs as punitive measures has been the subject of congressional and
broader international debate, and some in Congress have raised a number of questions regarding USTR’s actions, including
the scope of USTR’s authorities, the types of trade actions allowed, and the tariff exclusion process.
The Trump Administration has attributed its use of Section 301 to impose tariffs as punitive measures to its determination to
close a large and persistent gap between U.S. and foreign government practices that it says may disadvantage or discriminate
against U.S. exports, firms, and workers. In addition, the Administration has justified many of its recent tariff actions—
particularly those against China—by pointing to alleged weaknesses in WTO dispute settlement procedures and the
inadequacy or nonexistence of WTO rules to address certain Chinese and other trade practices. It has also cited what it terms
as the failure of past trade negotiations and agreements to enhance reciprocal market access for U.S. firms and workers.
While some Members of Congress have applauded the Trump Administration’s Section 301 actions or called for more active
use of trade authorities, others have decried unilateral trade sanctions under Section 301 as an undesirable shift in U.S. trade
policy that could undermine the multilateral trading system.
The creation of an enforceable dispute settlement mechanism in the WTO, strongly advocated by the United States,
significantly reduced U.S. use of Section 301. There have been 130 cases under Section 301 since the law’s enactment in
1974, of which 35 have been initiated since the WTO’s establishment in 1995. Historically, Section 301 cases have targeted
primarily the European Union (EU), which accounts for about 30% of all cases—concerning mostly agricultural trade. Prior
to 2017, that is, the start of the Trump Administration, the last Section 301 investigation took place in 2013 and involved
Ukraine’s practices regarding intellectual property rights (IPR). The last case that resulted in retaliation (e.g., the imposition
of tariffs) took place in 2009 and involved Canada’s compliance with the 2006 U.S.-Canada Softwood Lumber Agreement.
During the Trump Administration, the USTR has initiated six new investigations against China, the EU, France, a group of
10 trading partners, and two against Vietnam.
The more active use of congressionally delegated trade authorities by the Trump Administration has prompted some
Members of Congress to consider amending Section 301. Congress could require greater consultation or approval before a
President takes new trade actions and request an economic impact study of how such actions may affect the U.S. economy,
global supply chains, and global trade rules. In addition, Members may consider adding provisions that grant the President
additional authorities to address new trade issues and barriers that may not be fully covered by WTO rules and disciplines
(e.g., digital trade, state-owned enterprises, environment, and corruption). While some of these issues may not be directly
related to trade, they may impair the competitiveness of U.S. exports, restrict U.S. investment abroad, and negatively impact
the U.S. economy. Congress could also consider establishing a formal product exclusion process or set specific guidelines for
when and how to grant exclusions to trade restrictions imposed under Section 301. This could potentially promote
transparency, consistency, and proper application of standards in reviewing exclusion requests, thereby ensuring that the
USTR carries out Section 301 objectives as prescribed by Congress.
Some Members have raised the issue of establishing or streamlining an exclusion process for the existing Section 301 tariffs
against China during hearings and in letters to the USTR. For instance, for the third and largest action against China, a group
of more than 160 Representatives urged the Administration to consider granting exclusions. Subsequently, the joint
explanatory statement to the FY2019 appropriations law (P.L. 116-6) directed the USTR to establish a product exclusion
process for that third stage of tariffs within 30 days of the law’s enactment. During the 116th Congress, some Members
introduced legislation to limit USTR’s discretion on whether and how to grant or deny exclusion requests, while others
supported expanding the President’s trade authorities beyond the scope of Section 301. More recently, in August 2020, some
Members proposed to suspend temporarily duties on imports of articles needed to combat the Coronavirus Disease 2019
(COVID-19) pandemic.
Congressional Research Service

Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Origin, Evolution, and Use

Background
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 grants the Office of the United States Trade Representative
(USTR) a range of responsibilities and authorities to investigate and respond to certain foreign
trade practices and take action to enforce U.S. rights under trade agreements. From the conclusion
of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations in 1994, which resulted in the
establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, until the start of the Trump
Administration, the United States used Section 301 authorities primarily to build cases and pursue
dispute settlement at the WTO. The Trump Administration has been more willing to go outside
the WTO to act unilaterally under these authorities to promote what the Administration describes
as “free,” “fair,” and “reciprocal” trade. The Trump Administration’s use of Section 301 to
impose tariffs as punitive measures has been the subject of congressional and broader
international debate. Some in Congress have raised a number of questions regarding USTR’s
actions, including the scope of USTR’s authorities, the types of trade actions allowed, and the
tariff exclusion process.
The Administration has attributed its use of Section 301 to impose tariffs as punitive measures to
its determination to close a large and persistent gap between U.S. and foreign government
practices that may disadvantage or discriminate against U.S. exports, firms, and workers.1 In
addition, the Administration has justified many of its recent tariff actions—particularly those
against China—by alleging weaknesses in WTO dispute settlement procedures and the
inadequacy or nonexistence of WTO rules to address certain Chinese and other trade practices.2 It
has also cited what it terms as the failure of past trade negotiations and agreements to enhance
reciprocal market access for U.S. firms and workers.3 While some Members of Congress have
applauded the Trump Administration’s Section 301 actions or called for more active use of trade
authorities, others have decried unilateral trade sanctions under Section 301 as an undesirable
shift in U.S. trade policy that could undermine the multilateral trading system.4
Overview of Section 301
Title III of the Trade Act of 1974 (Sections 301 through 310, P.L. 93-618; codified as amended at
19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2420), titled “Relief from Unfair Trade Practices,” is often collectively
referred to as “Section 301.” Section 301 provides a statutory means by which the United States
imposes penalties or trade restrictions (trade sanctions) on foreign countries that violate U.S.

1 See, for example, Office of the USTR, 2018 Trade Policy Agenda and 2017Annual Report of the President of the
United States on the Trade Agreements Program, March 2018.
2 For example, in its 2017 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance, the USTR noted that “it is now clear that
the WTO rules are not sufficient to constrain China’s market-distorting behavior. While some problematic policies and
practices being pursued by the Chinese government have been found by WTO panels or the Appellate Body to run
afoul of China’s WTO obligations, many of the most troubling ones are not directly disciplined by WTO rules or the
additional commitments that China made in its Protocol of Accession,” January 2018. More recently, U.S. Trade
Representative Robert Lighthizer stated that “[t]he WTO is completely inadequate to stop China’s harmful technology
practices.” (Office of the USTR, “WTO Report on US Action against China Shows Necessity for Reform,” September
15, 2020.)
3 Office of the USTR, 2018 Trade Policy Agenda and 2017Annual Report of the President of the United States on the
Trade Agreements Program, March 2018.
4 See, for example, Adam Behsudi, “Duffy Finds 18 Co-sponsors for Bill to Increase Trump’s Tariff Powers,” Politico,
January 23, 2019, and Clark Packard and Philip Wallach, “Restraining the President: Congress and Trade Policy,” R
Street Policy Study No. 158, November 2018.
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Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Origin, Evolution, and Use

trade agreements or engage in acts that are “unjustifiable” or “unreasonable” and burden U.S.
commerce. Prior to 1995 and the establishment of the WTO, the United States used Section 301
extensively to pressure other countries to eliminate trade barriers and open their markets to U.S.
exports. The creation of an enforceable dispute settlement mechanism in the WTO, strongly
advocated by the United States, significantly reduced U.S. use of Section 301.
The United States retains the flexibility to determine whether to seek recourse to challenge unfair
foreign trade practices through the WTO or to act unilaterally. The Statement of Administrative
Action (SAA)—which explained how U.S. agencies would implement the 1994 Uruguay Round
Agreements Act (URAA or “WTO Agreements,” P.L. 103-465)—states that the USTR will
invoke the dispute settlement procedures of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU)
for investigations that involve an alleged violation of (or the impairment of U.S. benefits under)
WTO Agreements.5 At the same time, the SAA states that “[n]either section 301, nor the DSU
will require the” USTR to do so if it “does not consider that a matter involves” WTO Agreements.
Such a determination appears to be solely at the USTR’s discretion. However, the USTR’s
decision to bypass WTO dispute settlement and potentially impose retaliatory measures may be
challenged at the WTO.
Origins and Evolution of Section 301
Modern U.S. trade policy, with its emphasis on reducing trade barriers, began with the passage of
the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 (P.L. 73-316). The act authorized the President to
negotiate and implement reciprocal tariff reductions of up to 50%. The Trade Expansion Act of
1962 (P.L. 87-794) eventually superseded the 1934 Act. The purpose of the 1962 Act was to use
mutually beneficial trade agreements to:
(1) stimulate the economic growth of the United States and maintain and enlarge foreign
markets for the products of U.S. agriculture, industry, mining, and commerce;
(2) strengthen economic relations with foreign countries through the development of open
and nondiscriminatory trading in the free world; and
(3) prevent Communist economic penetration in developing countries.6
Section 201 of the 1962 Act provided the President with basic authority to enter into trade
agreements and to reduce, remove, bind, or raise import restrictions. Additionally, Section 252
authorized the President to take steps to eliminate “unjustifiable” foreign import restrictions that
impaired the value of tariff commitments made to the United States, burdened U.S. commerce, or
prevented the expansion of trade. The President was authorized to take all appropriate and
feasible steps within his power to eliminate such restrictions, including suspending or
withdrawing the benefits of trade concessions made under existing trade agreements, and to
impose duties or other import restrictions on the products of any country establishing or
maintaining burdensome restrictions on U.S. exports. Section 252 was added to ensure that the
President actively followed the intent of the 1962 Act.
Congress revised and expanded Section 252 under Title III of the Trade Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-
618). At the time, Members expressed significant concerns with the U.S. trade deficit, and many

5 Statement of Administrative Action accompanying the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, Vol.
1 (1994).
6 U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, “Trade Expansion Act of 1962,” Report to Accompany H.R. 11970, Report No.
2059, 87th Congress, 2nd Session, September 14, 1962.
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believed that some U.S. trading partners were not providing the United States with reciprocal
treatment in trade. For example, the Senate Finance Committee stated that the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade’s (GATT’s) Kennedy Round (multilateral trade negotiations under the
WTO’s predecessor, which had been negotiated as authorized by the Trade Expansion Act of
1962) had failed to remedy fundamental inequities in the multilateral trading system, and that the
U.S. economy had suffered as a result.7 The committee stated that in the next round of
negotiations authorized by the bill, the United States should “obtain full reciprocity and equal
competitive opportunities for U.S. commerce.”8
The 1974 Act authorized the President to enter into negotiations to liberalize trade, but it also
sought to expand the President’s authority to address unfair foreign trade practices. Title III
provisions sought to “assure a swift and certain response to foreign import restrictions, export
subsidies and price discrimination and other unfair foreign trade practices.”9 In particular, Section
301 of the 1974 Act authorized the President to retaliate against foreign countries that imposed
“unjustifiable or unreasonable” restrictions against U.S. commerce. The act defined unjustifiable
restrictions as those that violated international law or obligations under previous agreements.
Congress further revised and expanded Section 301 in the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (P.L.
96-39), the Omnibus Tariff and Trade Act of 1984 (P.L. 98-573), and the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-418) (Table 1). The 1979 Act amended Section 301 to
establish a timetable for investigating and taking action on complaints, and to establish new
procedures and requirements for the U.S. Special Trade Representative (later renamed as the U.S.
Trade Representative, USTR) to follow and meet during investigations. In 1984, Congress
expanded the President’s authority to respond to unfair trading practices in services, investment,
and intellectual property rights (IPR). The 1984 Act also defined the terms “unreasonable,”
“unjustifiable,” and “discriminatory” trade practices. Moreover, the 1984 Act granted the USTR
the authority to self-initiate investigations.
Table 1. Amendments and Executive Orders Affecting Section 301
Title III of the Trade Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-618, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2420)
Amendments
P.L. 96-39
Trade Agreements Act of 1979
in Public Laws
P.L. 98-573
Omnibus Tariff and Trade Act of 1984
P.L. 100-418
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988
P.L. 103-465
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (1994)
P.L. 104-295
Miscellaneous Trade and Technical Corrections Act of 1996
P.L. 106-113
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2000
P.L. 106-200
Trade and Development Act of 2000
P.L. 108-429
Miscellaneous Trade and Technical Corrections Act of 2004
P.L. 114-125
Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015
Executive
E.O. 12901
Identification of Trade Expansion Priorities (1994)
Orders
E.O. 13116
Identification of Trade Expansion Priorities and Discriminatory Procurement
Practices (1999)

7 U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, “Trade Reform Act of 1974: Report of the Committee on Finance, United States
Senate, Together with Additional Views on H.R. 10710,” Report No. 93-1298, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, November
26, 1974.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
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Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Origin, Evolution, and Use

E.O. 13155
Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals and Medical Technologies (2000)
Source: Congressional Research Service.
Prior to the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (P.L. 103-465) and the establishment of the WTO in
1995, the last major revision to Section 301 took place in 1988, when Congress established
additional timetables for investigations and retaliation, expanded the definitions of unfair trading
practices, mandated certain types of retaliation (with waivers) and investigations, transferred
retaliatory authority from the President to the USTR, and made other substantive changes. In
addition, the 1988 Act established “Super 301,” which required the USTR to identify and
investigate “priority” foreign trade practices in “priority” countries that significantly hindered
U.S. exports, seek negotiations with these countries to end the unfair trading practices, and
barring successful negotiations, retaliate (see textbox).
“Super 301”
Section 310 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended by Section 1302 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act
of 1988, required the USTR, within 30 days after submitting the National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade
Barriers to Congress in 1989 and 1990, to identify U.S. trade liberalization priorities.
This identification included priority practices (e.g., practices of foreign countries that burden U.S. trade) as wel as
“Priority Foreign Countries” and estimates of the amount by which U.S. exports would be increased if the barrier
did not exist. The USTR was required to initiate Section 301 investigations on all priority practices identified for
each of the priority countries within 21 days after submitting the report to the House Ways and Means and Senate
Finance Committees. In its consultations with the foreign country, the USTR was required to seek to negotiate an
agreement that provided for the elimination of, or compensation for, the priority practices within three years after
the initiation of the investigation. This statutory requirement, however, expired in 1990.
In March 1994, President Wil iam J. Clinton issued Executive Order 12901 requiring the USTR, within six months
of the submission of the National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers for 1994 and 1995, to review
U.S. trade expansion priorities and identify priority foreign country practices, the elimination of which would likely
have the most significant potential to increase U.S. exports. In September 1995, President Clinton issued Executive
Order 12973 to extend the terms of Executive Order 12901 to 1996 and 1997. The order required the USTR to
submit to the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees and to publish in the Federal Register a report
on the Priority Foreign Country practices identified. The report was not submitted in 1998 because the authority
expired in 1997. Super 301 authorities were renewed in March 1999, pursuant to Executive Order 13116, through
the end of 2001. Thereafter, the authorities were not further renewed.
President’s Clinton’s executive order required the USTR to initiate Section 301 investigations within 21 days of the
submission of the report with respect to all Priority Foreign Country practices identified. The normal Section 301
authorities, procedures, time limits, and other requirements generally applied to these investigations. In
consultations requested with the foreign country under Section 303, the USTR was required to seek to negotiate
an agreement providing for the elimination of the practices as soon as possible or, if that was not feasible,
compensatory trade benefits. The USTR monitored any agreements pursuant to Section 306. The semiannual report
under Section 309 included the status of any investigation and, where appropriate, the extent to which it led to
increased U.S. export opportunities.
Section 314(f) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act made permanent some of the terms of the executive orders
in amending Section 310 of the Trade Act of 1974.

Source: Adapted from House Committee on Ways and Means, Overview and Compilation of U.S. Trade Statues, Part I of II, 2010
Edition, 111th Congress, 2nd Session, December 2010.
The history and evolution of Section 301 and its retaliatory provision, as reflected in
congressional statements, appear to indicate that, while U.S. policymakers were concerned and
frustrated with various foreign unfair trade practices, the motivation behind creating and
strengthening mechanisms for potential retaliation had been primarily to expand U.S. export
opportunities and to induce other nations to reduce trade barriers—not to punish or inflict
economic harm on trading partners. For example, in 1974, the Senate Finance Committee stated
that the authorities contained in the Trade Act of 1974 would:
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Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Origin, Evolution, and Use

serve as negotiating leverage to eliminate those barriers to, and other distortions of trade
which Title I of this bill gives the President broad authority to harmonize, reduce or
eliminate on a reciprocal basis. The authority in this section should not be used frivolously
or without justification. The Committee feels, however, that there must be a credible threat
of retaliation whenever a foreign nation treats the commerce of the United States unfairly.10
The amendments to Section 301 since 1974 appear to reflect an effort by Congress to promote a
more active trade policy to combat perceived unfair trading practices. By establishing timetables
and identifying and expanding the definitions of unfair trading practices, Congress appears to
have sought greater executive branch use of Section 301 to address these practices.
Section 301 Investigations
Section 301 delegates to the USTR broad authority to take action, subject to the specific direction
of the President, if any, to enforce U.S. rights under any trade agreement and address certain acts,
policies, or practices of foreign countries.11 While the law does not limit the scope of
investigations, it is possible to identify four types of foreign government conduct subject to
Section 301 action:
(1) A denial of U.S. rights under any U.S. trade agreement by a foreign country.12 This
includes: (i) a violation of the provision of any U.S. trade agreement, (ii) an act, policy, or
practice that is inconsistent with the provisions of any U.S. trade agreement, or (iii) an
act, policy, or practice that denies benefits to the United States under any U.S. trade
agreement.
(2) An “unjustifiable” action that “burdens or restricts” U.S. commerce.13 Acts, policies,
or practices are unjustifiable if they are in violation of, or inconsistent with, the
international legal rights of the United States, and they include—but are not limited to—
those that deny national or most-favored-nation treatment, the right of establishment to
U.S. enterprises, or protection of IPR.14
(3) An “unreasonable” action that “burdens or restricts” U.S. commerce.15 An act,
policy, or practice, while not necessarily in violation of—or inconsistent with—the
international legal rights of the United States, is unreasonable if it is otherwise unfair and
inequitable.
Acts, policies, and practices that are unreasonable include—but are not limited to—those
that constitute export targeting,16 deny fair and equitable opportunities for the

10 Ibid.
11 For the purposes of Section 301 investigations, “foreign country” includes any foreign instrumentality, or possession
or territory that is administered separately for customs purposes (19 U.S.C. §§ 2411(d)(7)).
12 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411(a)(1)(A) and 2411(a)(1)(B)(i).
13 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1)(B)(ii).
14 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(4). The MFN treatment generally refers to the practice of extending to a country the best trade
privileges granted to any other nation.
15 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3). In determining whether any act, policy, or practice is unreasonable, USTR has to take into
account, to the extent that is appropriate, reciprocal opportunities in the United States for foreign nationals and firms
(19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3)(D)).
16 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3)(B)(ii). The term “export targeting” refers to any foreign government plan or scheme
consisting of a combination of coordinated actions (whether carried out severally or jointly) that are bestowed on a
specific enterprise, industry, or group thereof, the effect of which is to assist the enterprise, industry, or group to
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establishment of an enterprise,17 deny adequate and effective protection of IPR,18 fail to
provide nondiscriminatory market access opportunities for U.S. persons that rely upon
intellectual property protection,19 or deny market opportunities.20
Policies and practices (or lack thereof) are also unreasonable if they constitute a
persistent pattern of conduct that (i) denies workers the right to associate, organize, and
bargain collectively, (ii) permits any form of forced or compulsory labor, or (iii) fails to
provide a minimum age for the employment of children or standards for minimum wages,
hours of work, and occupational safety and health of workers.21
(4) A “discriminatory” action that “burdens or restricts” U.S. commerce.22 Acts,
policies, and practices that are discriminatory include those that deny national or most-
favored-nation (MFN) treatment to U.S. goods, services, or investment.23
The statute defines “commerce” to include goods, services (including transfers of information)
associated with international trade (whether or not such services are related to specific goods),
and U.S. investment abroad (i.e., foreign direct investment or FDI) by U.S. persons with
implications for trade in goods or services.24
The Section 301 “injury test” (i.e., determining what actions “burden or restrict” U.S. commerce)
may not be as stringent as that of other U.S. trade laws, in that Section 301 does not demand
evidence of “substantial,” “serious,” or “material injury.” However, petitioners still have to
demonstrate a certain level of credible injury. In some instances, the USTR has refused to initiate
(or has suspended) a Section 301 investigation because of insufficient substantiation for the claim
that an allegedly unfair foreign trade practice burdens or restricts U.S. commerce.
Section 301 Committee
Section 301 investigations are conducted by a “Section 301 Committee”—a subordinate, staff-
level body of the USTR-led interagency Trade Policy Staff Committee (TPSC). The Section 301
Committee is comprised of a Chair—an official from the Office of the USTR appointed by the
U.S. Trade Representative, and, with respect to each investigation and subject to the invitation of
the Chair, members designated by agencies that have an interest in the issues raised by the
investigation. In three of the most recent investigations, members have included representatives
from the U.S. Departments of Homeland Security, the Treasury, Commerce, State, and
Agriculture and the U.S. Small Business Administration (Table 2). The functions of the

become more competitive in the export of a class or kind of merchandise (19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3)(E)).
17 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3)(B)(i)(I).
18 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3)(B)(i)(II). Acts, policies, and practices might be deemed unreasonable even if the foreign
country is in compliance with the specific obligations of the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS, referred to in 19 U.S.C. § 3511(d)(15)).
19 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3)(B)(i)(III).
20 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3)(B)(i)(IV). The denial of fair and equitable market opportunities include a foreign
government’s toleration of systematic anticompetitive activities by enterprises or among enterprises in the foreign
country that have the effect of restricting, on a basis that is inconsistent with commercial considerations, access of U.S.
goods or services to a foreign market.
21 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3)(B)(iii).
22 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(5).
23 The MFN treatment generally refers to the practice of extending to a country the best trade privileges granted to any
other nation.
24 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(1).
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committee include, among other things, to review Section 301 complaints, conduct public
hearings upon request by a complainant or an interested party, and make recommendations to the
TPSC regarding potential actions under Section 301.25 The USTR bases its final decision on the
recommendations provided by the TPSC.
Table 2. Section 301 Committee Members
Federal Agencies Represented in Select Section 301 Investigations since 2017

CASE 125
CASE 126
CASE 127
China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices
Enforcement of U.S.
France’s Digital

Related to Technology Transfer,
WTO Rights in Large
Services Tax
Intellectual Property, and Innovation
Civil Aircraft Dispute
with the EU
Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative (Chair)



U.S. Customs and Border
Protection/U.S. Department of



Homeland Security
U.S. Department of the
Treasury



U.S. Department of Commerce



U.S. Department of State



U.S. Department of Agriculture



U.S. Small Business
Administration



U.S. Department of Labor



U.S. Department of Justice


U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services


Council of Economic Advisers


U.S. Department of
Transportation



Source: Congressional Research Service with information from the Office of the USTR.
Notes: There have been representatives from the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) present in all
three Section 301 hearings. However, they are not considered members of the Section 301 Committee.
Procedures for Section 301 Action
Sections 302 through 309 of the Trade Act of 1974 describe the procedural requirements and
limitations for Section 301 actions. Figure 1 depicts the typical proceedings of a Section 301
investigation.

25 15 C.F.R. § 2002.3.
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Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Origin, Evolution, and Use

Figure 1. The Section 301 Investigative Process

Source: Congressional Research Service, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2420, and 15 C.F.R. Part 2006.
Notes: The actual process may vary and is subject to change at the discretion of the USTR.
Initiation of an Investigation
The USTR may initiate a Section 301 case as a result of a petition or can “self-initiate” a case. To
date, 60% of all Section 301 investigations have arisen from petitions that private parties
submitted to the USTR (Table A-2). However, since 1995, the USTR has initiated most
investigations (74%). In deciding whether to initiate a Section 301 investigation, the USTR has
discretion to determine if doing so would be effective in addressing the act, policy, or practice at
issue.26
Initiation by Petition
Any interested person may file a petition with the USTR requesting that the agency take action
under Section 301 (see textbox).27 Petitions submitted pursuant to Section 302 are required,
among other things, to:
(1) Describe the economic interest of the petitioner directly affected by a foreign act, policy,
or practice that is actionable under Section 301;
(2) Describe the rights of the United States being violated or denied under the trade
agreement that the petitioner seeks to enforce or the other act, policy or practice that is
the subject of the petition;
(3) Identify the product, service, IPR, or FDI matter for which the rights of the United States
under the agreement claimed to be violated or denied are sought, or that is subject to the
act, policy or practice;

26 19 U.S.C. § 2412(c).
27 The term “interested persons,” for the purposes of 19 U.S.C. §§ 2412, 2414, 2416, and 2417, includes, but is not
limited to, domestic firms and workers, representatives of consumer interests, U.S. product exporters, and any
industrial user of any goods or services that may be affected by actions taken pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 2411. The term
“person” refers to “any individual, partnership, corporation, association, organization, business trust, government
entity, or other entity subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” (19 U.S.C. § 1683(8)).
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(4) Demonstrate that rights of the United States under a trade agreement are not being
provided (or show the manner in which the foreign act, policy or practice violates or is
inconsistent with the provisions of a trade agreement or otherwise denies benefits
accruing to the United States under a trade agreement, or is unjustifiable, unreasonable,
or discriminatory and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce);
(5) Provide information concerning the degree to which U.S. commerce is burdened or
restricted, the volume of trade in the goods or services involved, and the methodology
used to calculate it; and
(6) State whether the petitioner has filed (or is filing) for other forms of relief under the
Trade Act of 1974 or any other provision of law.28
Interested Persons Requesting Action Under Section 301
An interested person is deemed to be any party that has a significant interest affected by the act, policy, or practice
in question. These include any:

producer, commercial importer, or exporter of an affected product or service;

U.S. person seeking to invest abroad directly, with implications for trade in goods or services;

person who relies on protection of IPR;

trade association, certified union or recognized union or group of workers that is representative of an industry
engaged in the manufacture, production or wholesale distribution in the United States of a product or service
so affected; or

other private party representing a significant economic interest affected directly by the act, policy or practice
complained of in the petition.
Source: Adapted from 15 C.F.R. § 2006.0(b).
Within 45 days of the receipt of a petition, the USTR must determine, after the Section 301
Committee reviews the allegations, whether to initiate an investigation.29 If the USTR determines
not to initiate an investigation, it must notify the petitioner of the reasons and publish notice of
the negative determination and a summary of such reasons in the Federal Register.30 On the other
hand, if the USTR determines to initiate an investigation, the agency must publish a summary of
the petition in the Federal Register and provide an opportunity for the presentation of views
concerning the issues raised in the petition, including a public hearing.31 The petitioner or any
interested person may also request a hearing.32
Self-Initiation
Section 301 also provides two means by which the USTR may initiate an investigation in the
absence of a petition. It can determine to investigate any matter, but only after consulting with
appropriate stakeholders and not before publishing such determination in the Federal Register.33

28 For more detail, see 15 C.F.R. § 2006.0. According to 15 C.F.R. § 2006.2, “[i]f the petition filed pursuant to Section
302 does not conform substantially to [these] requirements ... , the Chairman of the Section 301 Committee may
decline to docket the petition as filed and, if requested by petitioner, return it to petitioner with guidance on making the
petition conform to the requirements, or may nevertheless determine that there is sufficient information on which to
proceed to a determination whether to initiate an investigation.”
29 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(2).
30 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(3).
31 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(4).
32 15 C.F.R. § 2006.3(b).
33 19 U.S.C. § 2412(b)(1). Matters may include acts, policies, or practices of a foreign government identified as a “trade
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In addition, the USTR is generally required to initiate a Section 301 investigation of any country
within 30 days after identifying it as a “Special 301” “Priority Foreign Country.” In its annual
“Special 301 Report,” the USTR identifies countries with the most onerous or egregious acts,
policies, or practices that deny adequate and effective IPR protection and have the greatest
adverse impact (actual or potential) on U.S. products, services, and investments. Additionally,
these are countries that are not entering into good faith negotiations, or making significant
progress in bilateral or multilateral negotiations, to provide adequate and effective IPR
protection.34 The USTR may identify—or revoke the identification of—any foreign country as a
Priority Foreign Country at any time, subject to various reporting requirements.35 (Rules for IPR
cases initiated through Special 301 differ somewhat from those that govern standard Section 301
investigations. For more detail, see “Intellectual Property Enforcement and Section 301.”)
Request for Information and Consultations with the Targeted
Foreign Government
When the USTR receives a petition alleging violations of an international trade agreement, the
agency has to notify the government of the foreign country and may request any information
necessary to make a determination as to whether or not to initiate an investigation.36 If no
information is received within a reasonable time, the USTR may proceed based on the
information currently at its disposal.
Upon initiating an investigation, the USTR must request consultations with the targeted foreign
government regarding the issues raised.37 In preparing for these consultations, the USTR is
required to seek information and advice from the petitioner and any appropriate private sector
representatives.38 The USTR may, after consulting with the petitioner (if any), delay for up to 90
days any request for consultations with the foreign government in order to verify or improve the
petition and ensure an adequate basis for consultation.39 The agency is required to submit a notice
of any such delay to Congress and publish it in the Federal Register.40
Request for Formal Dispute Settlement
If the USTR determines that the investigation involves a trade agreement and a mutually
acceptable resolution is not reached before the close of the consultation period—if any—specified
in the trade agreement, or the 150th day after the day on which consultation was commenced,
whichever is earlier, the USTR must request formal dispute settlement proceedings under the

enforcement priority” by 19 U.S.C. § 2420(c)(2). Stakeholders include, but are not limited to, the trade policy bodies
authorized by 19 U.S.C. § 2155.
34 19 U.S.C. § 2242(b)(1).
35 19 U.S.C. § 2242(c)-(e).
36 15 C.F.R. § 2006.4.
37 19 U.S.C. § 2413(a)(1).
38 For example, committees established pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 2155.
39 19 U.S.C. § 2413(b)(1)(A).
40 19 U.S.C. § 2413(b)(2). If consultations are delayed by reason of 19 U.S.C. § 2413(b)(1)(A), each time limitation
under 19 U.S.C. § 2414 is extended for the period of such delay. Reporting requirements to Congress are outlined in 19
U.S.C. § 2419(a)(3).
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governing trade agreement (WTO or other relevant trade agreement to which the United States is
a party).41
In the past, when investigations have not involved a trade agreement, the USTR has initiated
investigations while simultaneously requesting consultations with the foreign government and
seeking information and advice from appropriate trade advisory committees. If an investigation
includes “mixed” issues, some of which are covered by an agreement and some of which are not,
the Statement of Administrative Action (SAA)—which explained how U.S. agencies would
implement the 1994 Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA)—states that the USTR will pursue
consultations within the agreement framework and through bilateral negotiations.42
Public Hearing and Request for Comments
As mentioned above, if the USTR makes an affirmative determination to initiate an investigation,
it is required to publish a summary of the petition or reasons to self-initiate such investigation in
the Federal Register.43 In addition, within 30 days of making such determination (or on a date
after such period if agreed to by the petitioner), the USTR must provide an opportunity for
interested persons to present their views concerning the issues raised in the petition, including
through a public hearing.44 However, to present views, an interested person must submit a written
brief before the close of the period of submission as announced through a public notice (see
textbox).45 At any stage of the investigation, a petitioner, or any interested person, can request to
present views at a hearing. The USTR is required to accommodate such requests within a timely
and reasonable period.
Submitting Written Briefs
To participate in the presentation of views, either at a public hearing or otherwise, an interested person must submit
a written brief before the close of the period of submission set forth in the public notice. The brief may be
supplemented by oral testimony in any public hearing, and it must state clearly the position taken and describe with
particularity the supporting rationale.
In order to assure each interested person an opportunity to contest the information provided by other parties, the
Section 301 Committee is required to entertain rebuttal briefs filed by any interested person within a time limit
specified in the public notice. Rebuttal briefs are to be strictly limited to demonstrating errors of fact or analysis not
pointed out in the briefs or hearing and be as concise as possible.
Source: Adapted from 15 C.F.R. § 2006.8.
Consultations before Making Determinations
During a Section 301 investigation and prior to making a determination on what action, if any, to
take, the USTR is required to consult with the petitioner and to seek advice from any appropriate
private sector advisory representatives.46 If expeditious action is required, the USTR must seek
such advice after making the determination. In addition, the USTR can—but is not required to—

41 19 U.S.C. § 2413(a)(2). The USTR must seek information and advice from the petitioner (if any) and the appropriate
committees established pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 2155 in preparing U.S. presentations for consultations and dispute
settlement proceedings (19 U.S.C. § 2413(a)(3)).
42 Statement of Administrative Action accompanying the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, H.R. Doc. No. 103-316,
Vol. 1 (1994).
43 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(4).
44 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(4)(A)-(B).
45 15 C.F.R. §§ 2006.8 and 2006.9.
46 15 C.F.R. § 2006.11. This includes committees established pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 2155.
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request the views of the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) concerning the impact
that a proposed retaliatory action could have on the U.S. economy. Doing so might help the
USTR avoid taking an action that could have negative effects on industries or sectors other than
those petitioning for an investigation.
Determination
Following consultations, the USTR begins its investigation to determine if the alleged conduct is
unfair or violates U.S. rights under trade agreements and is therefore actionable under Section
301. On the basis of the petition (if any), investigation, and consultations, and after receiving the
advice of the Section 301 Committee, the USTR makes a determination. However, prior to
making a recommendation on what action, if any, to take, the Section 301 Committee is required
to hold a public hearing upon the written request of any interested person.47
If the USTR’s determination is affirmative, it then decides what action—if any—to take, subject
to the direction of the President.48 In the case of an investigation involving violation of a trade
agreement, the USTR is generally required to make a determination within 30 days after the
dispute settlement procedure concludes, or 18 months after the initiation of the investigation,
whichever is earlier.49 In other cases, a determination generally must be made within 12 months
of the initiation of an investigation.
Actions
The USTR can take all appropriate and feasible action authorized under Section 301 “and all
other appropriate and feasible action within the power of the President that the President may
direct... to obtain the elimination of that act, policy, or practice. Actions may be taken that are
within the power of the President with respect to trade in any goods or services, or with respect to
any other area of pertinent relations with the foreign country.”50
Section 301 divides such actions into mandatory and discretionary categories.51
Mandatory Actions
The USTR is generally required to take action if it concludes that there is a trade agreement
violation or that an act, policy, or practice of a foreign government is “unjustifiable” and “burdens
or restricts” U.S. commerce.52 However, the law stipulates several instances in which the USTR
does not have to act. They include cases in which:

47 15 C.F.R. § 2006.7(b). If requested, such hearing should generally take place after at least 30 days’ notice or within
30 days after the determination of action is made if the USTR determines that expeditious action is required.
48 19 U.S.C. § 2414(a)(1)(B).
49 19 U.S.C. § 2414(a)(2)(A). Different determination requirements apply to investigation initiated pursuant to 19
U.S.C. § 2412(b)(2)(A) involving rights under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS, 19 U.S.C. § 3511(d)(15)) or the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 (19 U.S.C. §
3501(1)(B)) relating to products subject to intellectual property protection.
50 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1)(B)(ii) and 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b)(2).
51 The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 divided actions into mandatory (19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)) and
discretionary (19 U.S.C. § 2411(b)).
52 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1).
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(1) the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) has adopted a formal dispute settlement report
that concludes that the trade policy or practice in question does not violate or is not
inconsistent with WTO Agreements;53
(2) the USTR determines that the foreign country subject to investigation is taking
satisfactory measures to grant U.S. rights under a trade agreement;54
(3) the foreign country subject to investigation enters into a binding agreement that commits
it to stop the practice or phase out the policy,55 find a solution that eliminates the burden on
U.S. commerce,56 or provide compensatory trade benefits to the United States;57 or
(4) the USTR determines that taking action would either have an adverse impact on the U.S.
economy (substantially out of proportion to the benefits of any action taken)58 or cause
serious harm to U.S. national security.59
Discretionary Actions
The USTR has discretion to take action—if it deems doing so appropriate—in those instances in
which “an act, policy, or practice of a foreign country is unreasonable or discriminatory.”60 In
both cases, such practices must burden or restrict U.S. commerce. Any such action would be
subject to the specific direction, if any, of the President.
Retaliation
To remedy a foreign trade practice, Section 301 authorizes the USTR to (1) impose duties (i.e.,
tariffs) or other import restrictions,61 (2) withdraw or suspend trade agreement concessions,62 or
(3) enter into a binding agreement with the foreign government to either eliminate the conduct in
question (or the burden to U.S. commerce) or compensate the United States with satisfactory
trade benefits.63 The USTR must give preference to duties or tariffs if action is taken in the form
of import restrictions.64

53 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(2)(A).
54 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(2)(B)(i).
55 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(2)(B)(ii)(I).
56 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(2)(B)(ii)(II).
57 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(2)(B)(iii). 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(4) stipulates that the agreement should “provide compensatory
trade benefits that benefit the economic sector which includes the domestic industry that would benefit from the
elimination of the act, policy, or practice that is the subject of the ... [investigation], or benefit the economic sector as
closely related as possible to such economic sector, unless (A) the provision of such trade benefits is not feasible, or (B)
trade benefits that benefit any other economic sector would be more satisfactory than such trade benefits.”
58 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(2)(B)(iv).
59 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(2)(B)(v).
60 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b).
61 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(1)(B). An import restriction, other than a duty, may include “a limitation, prohibition, charge, or
exaction other than duty, imposed on importation or imposed for the regulation of importation. The term does not
include any orderly marketing agreement” (19 U.S.C. § 2481(2)).
62 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(1)(A). The USTR is also authorized to withdraw or suspend preferential duty treatment under
the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), or the Andean Trade Preferences
Act (19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(1)(C)).
63 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(1)(D).
64 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(5)(A).
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The USTR may also restrict the terms and conditions or deny the issuance of any “service sector
access authorization” issued under U.S. federal law.65 Authorizations include licenses and permits
that allow a foreign supplier of services access to the U.S. market. Such action must be applied
prospectively to authorizations granted—or applications therefor pending—on or after the date on
which a Section 301 petition is filed, or if the USTR self-initiates an investigation, the date on
which the investigation is initiated. Before imposing fees or restrictions, the USTR must consult
the federal or state agency involved in the regulation of the services.
The level of mandatory action under Section 301 should “affect goods or services of the foreign
country in an amount equivalent in value to the burden or restriction being imposed by that
country on” U.S. commerce.66 The USTR is authorized to take action against any goods or
economic sector regardless of whether they were involved in the policy or practice that is the
subject of such action.67
Implementation
Once the USTR makes a determination to take action under Section 301, the agency generally has
30 days to implement that action. The USTR may delay, by not more than 180 days,
implementation if: (1) either the petitioner or a majority of the representatives of a domestic
industry that would benefit from the action requests a delay; or (2) the USTR determines
substantial progress is being made, or that a delay is necessary or desirable, to obtain a
satisfactory solution with respect to the acts, policies, or practices that are the subject of the
action.68
Monitoring and Modifications of Actions
Sections 306 and 307 specify the requirements for monitoring, modifying, and terminating any
action taken under Section 301. In particular, the USTR is required to monitor the implementation
of any measure undertaken or agreement that is entered into by a foreign country to provide a
satisfactory resolution of a matter subject to a Section 301 investigation. If the USTR considers
that a foreign country is not satisfactorily implementing such measure or agreement, the agency
has to determine what further action it will take.69
The USTR may modify or terminate any action, subject to the specific direction, if any, of the
President, if among other things, the WTO DSB determines that the rights of the United States
under a trade agreement are not being denied, the burden or restriction on U.S. commerce has

65 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(2). The statute does not specify the services against which the USTR can take action under
Section 301. In addition, there is no precedent for that type of action. However, some trade and legal scholars—with
whom CRS spoke about Section 301—noted that the USTR might be able to impose restrictions on federal licenses and
permits for some of the following services-related activities: agriculture, alcohol beverages, animal feed and drugs,
aviation, biological products, customs brokerage, debt collection, import/export, firearms, ammunition and explosives,
fish and wildlife, food products, investment brokers/dealers/companies, medical device manufacturing, nuclear energy/
radiation-emitting products, pharmaceuticals, telecommunications/radio/television broadcasting, tobacco, and
transportation and logistics.
66 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(3).
67 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(3).
68 There are other exceptions to implementing timelines, particularly for cases of export targeting. For more detail, see
19 U.S.C. § 2415(a)(2)(B)-(C) and 19 U.S.C. § 2415(b).
69 19 U.S.C. § 2416(b)(1).
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increased or decreased, or such action is no longer appropriate.70 The USTR considers foreign
noncompliance with a measure or agreement undertaken as a result of a Section 301 investigation
a violation of an agreement under Section 301 and is subject to mandatory retaliatory action.
Section 301 actions terminate automatically after four years,71 unless the USTR receives a request
for continuation and conducts a review of the case.72
In some cases, the USTR may reinstate a previously terminated Section 301 action. The Trade
Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-125), for example, amended Section
306 of the Trade Act of 1974 to authorize the USTR to reinstate such actions in order to exercise
WTO authorization to suspend concessions or other obligations.73 The USTR may do so
following: (1) a request from the petitioner or any representative of the domestic industry that
would benefit from reinstatement of the action; (2) consultations with the petitioner, if any,
involved in the initial investigation and opportunity for the presentation of views by interested
persons; and (3) a review of the effectiveness of the action (or any other actions that could be
taken to achieve the objectives of Section 301) and its impact on the U.S. economy.
Information Open to Public Inspection
Any interested person may generally request to review written petitions, briefs, or similar
information (other than that to which confidentiality applies) submitted in the course of an
investigation, as well as records of public hearings (see textbox).74

70 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(2).
71 19 U.S.C. § 2417(c)(1) provides that if a Section 301 action has been taken by the USTR during any four-year period
(e.g., the imposition of increased tariffs on the products of a foreign country) and neither the petitioner nor any
representative of the domestic industry benefitting from the action has submitted to the USTR during the last 60 days of
the four-year period a written request for the continuation of the action, the action is to terminate at the end of the four-
year period.
72 19 U.S.C. § 2417(c)(3).
73 19 U.S.C. § 2416(c).
74 The term “interested persons,” for the purposes of 19 U.S.C. §§ 2412, 2414, 2416, and 2417, includes, but is not
limited to, domestic firms and workers, representatives of consumer interests, U.S. product exporters, and any
industrial user of any goods or services that may be affected by actions taken pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 2411. The term
“person” refers to “any individual, partnership, corporation, association, organization, business trust, government
entity, or other entity subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” (19 U.S.C. § 1683(8)).
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Public Inspection of Information
On written request and subject to availability, any person may obtain the fol owing information from the Office of
the USTR or other federal agencies:

the nature and extent of a specific trade policy or practice of a foreign government or instrumentality with
respect to particular goods, services, investment, or IPR;

U.S. rights under any trade agreement and the remedies which may be available under that agreement and
under the laws of the United States; and

past and present domestic and international proceedings or actions with respect to the policy or practice
concerned.
If the Office of the USTR does not have, and cannot obtain from other federal agencies, the information requested,
the USTR is required to request the information from the foreign government involved or decline to request the
information and inform the person in writing of the reasons for the refusal.
The USTR is authorized to exempt from public inspection business information submitted in confidence if it
determines that such information involves trade secrets or commercial and financial information whose disclosure
is not authorized by the person furnishing it or required by law. Nevertheless, the USTR may use such information,
or at its own discretion, make it available to any federal employee for use in any Section 301 investigation or to any
other person in a form that cannot be associated with, or otherwise identify, the person providing the information.
Source: Adapted from 15 C.F.R. §§ 2006.13 and 2006.15, 19 U.S.C. § 2418.
“Carousel” Retaliation
Section 306 of the Trade Act of 1974 requires the USTR to periodically revise (e.g., rotate) the
list of products subject to retaliation (e.g., tariff or other trade restriction) when the targeted
foreign government does not implement a recommendation made pursuant to a dispute settlement
proceeding under the WTO.75 This periodic revision is known as “carousel” retaliation, and the
intent of rotating products (and/or increasing the level of additional duties) is to exert pressure on
the foreign government, through its domestic exporters, to change its position on the disputed
practice.76 The USTR has 120 days after the date in which an action is first taken (and every 180
days thereafter) to review the list of products or action and revise it—in whole or in part.77 In
revising any list or action, the USTR is required to act in a manner that is most likely to result in
the targeted government implementing the WTO DSB’s recommendations or achieving a
mutually satisfactory solution to the issue(s) raised. The law does not require a revision if the
USTR determines that compliance is imminent or agrees with the affected U.S. industry that
revising the list is not necessary.
The impetus for more pressure on foreign governments came during the 1990s, when many
Members of Congress expressed concern over the effectiveness of the WTO dispute settlement

75 19 U.S.C. § 2416.
76 In 1999, Senator Mike DeWine introduced the “Carousel Retaliation Act” as an amendment to Section 306 of the
Trade Act of 1974. For more detail, see S. 1619, “A bill to amend the Trade Act of 1974 to provide for periodic
revision of retaliation lists or other remedial action implemented under section 306 of such Act,” 106th Congress,
introduced on September 22, 1999. As noted by Senator DeWine, the “Carousel Retaliation Act” was meant to increase
pressure on U.S. trading partners to comply with WTO rules by requiring the USTR to rotate or carousel retaliation
lists. (Congressional Record, Senate, 106th Congress, 1st Session, October 13, 1999, Vol. 145, No. 138, p. S12491.)
77 The USTR is authorized to take action against any goods or economic sector regardless of whether such goods or
sector were involved in the policy or practice that is the subject of such action. The agency must give preference to
duties or tariffs if action is taken in the form of import restrictions, and it may also restrict the terms and conditions or
deny the issuance of any “service sector access authorization” issued under U.S. federal law.
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process to convince other countries to remove various trade barriers.78 In particular, congressional
concern over the European Union (EU)’s noncompliance with WTO dispute rulings led to the
amendment of Section 306 of the Trade Act of 1974 with the enactment of the Trade and
Development Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-200). Two WTO dispute cases—the U.S.-EU beef hormone79
and banana80 disputes—particularly frustrated many policymakers and U.S. exporters, because of
the length of time to decide the cases and the unlikelihood that the losing party would change its
practices.81
In response to the Section 306 amendment, the EU filed a WTO complaint challenging the
statutory provision shortly after its enactment in 2000.82 It alleged that the statute mandates
unilateral action and the taking of retaliatory action, other than that which had been authorized by
the WTO, in violation of the Dispute Settlement Understanding.83 Specifically, the EU considered
that Section 306: (1) was “in breach of the DSU since it mandates unilateral action without any
prior multilateral control”; (2) could lead the United States to unilaterally modify at will “all U.S.
concessions bound in its Schedule of commitments under the GATT 1994; (3) was “in breach of
the obligation of equivalence”; and (4) “affect[ed] the security and predictability of the
multilateral trading system.”84 Because the United States had not invoked the provision, the EU
refrained from requesting the establishment of a WTO panel in the case, thereby leaving the issue
of its legality in question.
In December 2008, the United States exercised “carousel” authorities to propose modifications to
the list of EU products subject to the WTO-authorized tariff surcharges that it had originally
imposed in the beef hormones case. A final modified list was published in January 2009.85

78 See, for example, Congressional Record, “Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions,” Vol. 145, No. 124,
pp. S11260-S11262, September 22, 1999, and S. 1619, “A bill to amend the Trade Act of 1974 to provide for periodic
revision of retaliation lists or other remedial action implemented under section 306 of such Act,” introduced on
September 22, 1999.
79 Specifically, “European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products” (WTO Cases DS26 and
DS48). Since 1989, the United States and the EU have engaged in a long-standing dispute over the EU’s decision to
ban hormone-treated meat. For more detail, see CRS In Focus IF10958, U.S. Trade Debates: Select Disputes and
Actions, by Andres B. Schwarzenberg and CRS Report R40449, The U.S.-EU Beef Hormone Dispute, by Renée
Johnson.
80 Specifically, “European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas” (WTO Case
DS27). During the 1990s, the EU banana import regime was a primary source of U.S.-EU trade tension. The regime,
instituted in 1993, granted preferential treatment to bananas from producers in the EU and former European colonies,
which adversely affected U.S. banana firms. For more detail, see CRS In Focus IF10958, U.S. Trade Debates: Select
Disputes and Actions, by Andres B. Schwarzenberg.
81 See, for example, Congressional Record, Senate, 106th Congress, 1st Session, October 13, 199, Vol. 145, No. 138, p.
S12491.
82 For more detail, see WTO Case “DS200: United States—Section 306 of the Trade Act of 1974 and Amendments
Thereto.”
83 In particular, the EU considered that Section 306, “as amended by Section 407 of the Trade and Development Act of
2000, is inconsistent with, in particular, the following WTO provisions: Articles 3.2, 21.5, 22 and 23 of the DSU;
Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement; and Articles I, II and XI of the GATT 1994.” WTO, “DS200: United States—
Section 306 of the Trade Act of 1974 and Amendments Thereto.”
84 WTO, “DS200: United States—Section 306 of the Trade Act of 1974 and Amendments Thereto.” The EU contended
that Section 306 was “in breach of the obligation of equivalence, in that it create[ed] a structural imbalance between the
cumulative level of the suspension of concessions and the level of nullification and impairment as determined under
relevant DSU procedures.”
85 Office of the USTR, “Modification of Action Taken in Connection With WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings on
the European Communities’ Ban on Imports of U.S. Beef and Beef Products,” 74 Federal Register 4265, January 23,
2009.
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Originally applicable to all covered goods entering the United States on or after March 2009, the
revisions removed some products from the original list, added new products to the list, modified
coverage with regard to certain EU member states, and increased to 300% ad valorem duties on
one product (Roquefort cheese).86 The EU announced in January 2009 that it had decided to “start
preparations” to pursue WTO dispute settlement regarding the carousel statute, stating that it
“breaches the WTO requirement of equivalence between the damage caused by the sanction or
ban and the retaliation proposed.”87 In May 2009, following a series of negotiations, the United
States and the EU signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU), which phased in certain
changes over the next several years.88 As part of this MOU, the EU granted new market access to
U.S. exports of beef raised without the use of growth hormones, and the United States suspended
its retaliatory tariffs on certain EU products. In September 2009, USTR announced it was
officially terminating its plan to rotate the list of products specific to the U.S.-EU beef hormone
dispute.89
More recently, the USTR has made use of “carousel” authorities to revise twice its Section 301
action related to the enforcement of U.S. WTO rights in the “Large Civil Aircraft” dispute with
EU. (For more detail, see “European Union: Enforcement of U.S. WTO Rights in Large Civil
Aircraft Dispute.”)
Intellectual Property Enforcement and Section 301
Congress’s enactment of Section 301 has been viewed to help U.S. negotiators secure
commitments from foreign governments to help ensure that the interests of U.S. IPR holders are
protected abroad. These laws also arguably provided impetus for many countries to adopt and
enforce their own national IP laws. Because intellectual property rights (IPR) are national rather
than international in scope, these can differ significantly from country to country. U.S. patent or
copyright rights do not extend into foreign countries, and the United States does not enforce IPR
granted solely under foreign laws. While there are no international patents, trademarks, or
copyrights, there are international conventions and treaties that establish a minimum standard of
IP protection, including the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works90
and the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).91
The two principal U.S. laws addressing trade-related IPR violations are Section 337 of the Tariff
Act of 1930 and Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. Furthermore, the Omnibus Trade and

86 Ibid.
87 European Commission, “EU Prepares WTO Action Over US Trade Sanction Law,” Press Release, January 15, 2009.
88 WTO, “European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat And Meat Products (Hormones), Joint Communication
from the European Communities and the United States,” WT/DS26/28, September 30, 2009; Office of the USTR,
“Implementation of the U.S.-EC Beef Hormones Memorandum of Understanding,” 74 Federal Register 40864, August
13, 2009, and “Implementation of the U.S.-EC Beef Hormones Memorandum of Understanding,” 74 Federal Register
48808, September 24, 2009.
89 Office of the USTR, “Implementation of the U.S.-EC Beef Hormones Memorandum of Understanding,” 74 Federal
Register 48808, September 24, 2009.
90 The Berne Convention is an international copyright convention negotiated in 1886 and revised in 1991. The Berne
Convention is administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO, a specialized United Nations
agency that also administers the Paris Convention), and is based on national treatment for works created by nationals of
other states.
91 For more detail on the TRIPS Agreement, see WTO, “Overview: The TRIPS Agreement,” and CRS Report
RL34292, Intellectual Property Rights and International Trade, by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar, Ian F. Fergusson, and Liana
Wong.
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Competitiveness Act of 1988 substantially amended the IP provisions of the Tariff Act of 1930
(see textbox) and strengthened Section 301 by creating “Special 301.”
Section 337: Unfair Practices in Import Trade
Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. §1337) prohibits unfair methods of competition or other unfair acts
in the importation of products into the United States. It also prohibits imports of articles that infringe valid U.S.
patents, copyrights, processes, trademarks, semiconductor products produced by infringing a protected “mask
work” (e.g., integrated circuit designs), or protected design rights.92 While the statute has been used to counter
imports of products judged to be produced by unfair competition, monopolistic, or anti-competitive practices, it has
become increasingly used for its intellectual property rights (IPR) enforcement functions. Under the statute, the
import or sale of an infringing product is il egal only if a U.S. industry is producing an article covered by the relevant
IPR or is in the process of establishing such production. Unlike other trade remedies, such as antidumping or
countervailing duty actions, no showing of injury because of the import is required for statutory IP cases.
The U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) administers Section 337 proceedings. The USITC investigates
complaints submitted to it, mainly by companies, and investigates concerns under its own initiative. An administrative
law judge provides an initial determination to the USITC, which can accept the initial determination or order a
further review of it in whole or in part. If the USITC finds a violation, it may issue two types of remedies: exclusion
orders or cease and desist orders.

Exclusion orders, enforced by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), are issued by the USITC to
stop infringing imports from entering the United States. Exclusion orders can be general or limited. General
exclusion orders apply to all products that are found in violation of Section 337, regardless of source. Limited
exclusion orders apply to the goods originating from the specific firm(s) found to be in violation of Section 337.
Limited exclusion orders typically are issued more commonly. The USITC issues general exclusion orders if
such a broad-based exclusion is necessary to prevent the circumvention of the limited exclusion order, or if
there is a pattern of violation and it is difficult to identify the source of infringing products.

Cease and desist orders, enforced by the USITC, require the firm to stop the sale of the infringing product in
the United States.
The USITC may consider several public interest criteria during the proceedings and decline to issue a remedy. In
addition, the President may disapprove a remedial order during a 60-day review period for “policy reasons.” A
presidential review of a remedial order often considers several relevant factors, including “(1) public health and
welfare; (2) competitive conditions in the U.S. economy; (3) production of competitive articles in the United States;
(4) U.S. consumers; and (5) U.S. foreign relations, economic and political.”

Source: Adapted from CRS Report RL34292, Intellectual Property Rights and International Trade, by Shayerah Ilias
Akhtar, Ian F. Fergusson, and Liana Wong.
Overview of “Special 301”
Section 301 is the principal U.S. statute for identifying foreign trade barriers that result from
inadequate IP protection. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 strengthened
Section 301 by creating Special 301 provisions requiring the USTR to identify foreign countries
that “deny adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights” or “deny fair and
equitable market access to United States persons that rely upon intellectual property rights.”93

92 The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 (P.L. 98-620) defines a “mask work” as “a series of related images,
however fixed or encoded, (i) having or representing the predetermined, three-dimensional pattern of metallic,
insulating, or semiconductor material present or removed from the layers of a semiconductor chip product; and (ii) in
which series the relation of the images to one another is that each image has the pattern of the surface of one form of
the semiconductor chip product” (17 U.S.C. § 901(a)(2)).
93 A foreign country denies adequate and effective protection of IPR if that country denies adequate and effective
means under the laws of the foreign country for persons who are not citizens or nationals of such foreign country to
secure, exercise, and enforce rights relating to patents, process patents, registered trademarks, copyrights, trade secrets,
and mask works. In addition, a foreign country denies fair and equitable market access if that foreign country denies
access to a market for a product protected by a copyright or related right, patent, trademark, mask work, trade secret, or
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According to an amendment to Special 301 enacted in the 1994 Uruguay Round Agreements Act,
the USTR can identify a country as denying sufficient IP protection even if the country is
complying with its commitments under the WTO TRIPS Agreement. Congress also amended
Special 301 to direct the USTR to take into account, in its review process, the history of IP laws
and practices of the foreign country, including any previous identification under “Special 301,” as
well as the history of U.S. efforts—and the response of the foreign country—to achieve adequate
and effective IPR protection and enforcement. Most recently, the Trade Facilitation and Trade
Enforcement Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-125) directed USTR to monitor foreign countries’ protection
of trade secrets in addition to the other types of IPR that the agency was already monitoring.
Within 30 days of submitting the annual “National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade
Barriers,” the USTR must determine which of the countries identified in the report are “Priority
Foreign Countries” (see textbox). According to Special 301 provisions, Priority Foreign
Countries are those that “have the most onerous or egregious acts, policies or practices that deny
intellectual property protection and limit market access to U.S. persons or firms depending on
intellectual property rights protection” and “have the greatest adverse impact (actual or potential)
on the relevant United States products.”94 The USTR cannot identify a country as Priority Foreign
Country if it is found to be entering into good faith negotiations to address IP protection or
making significant progress in improving its IP protection record. The USTR submits findings of
its review in the annual “Special 301 Report.”
“Special 301” Designations
The USTR can designate countries in one of several statutorily or administratively created categories:
 Priority Foreign Country. A statutory category for those countries that the USTR designates as having “the most
onerous or egregious acts, policies or practices that deny intellectual property protection and limit market access
to U.S. persons or firms depending on intellectual property rights protection” with the “greatest adverse impact
(actual or potential) on the relevant United States products.” The USTR may investigate these countries under
Section 301. If the USTR names a country as a Priority Foreign Country, the agency must launch an investigation
into that country’s IPR practices. The USTR may suspend trade concessions and impose import restrictions or
duties, or enter into a binding agreement with the priority country that would eliminate the act, policy, or practice
under scrutiny. Since the advent of the WTO, the United States has generally brought IPR-related cases to the
WTO rather than investigate or retaliate unilaterally.
 Priority Watch List. An administrative category that the USTR created for those countries whose acts, policies,
and practices warrant concern, but who do not meet all of the criteria for identification as a Priority Foreign
Country. The USTR may place a country on the Priority Watch List if the country lacks proper IP protection and
has a market of significant U.S. interest. After placing a country on the Priority Watch List, the USTR must develop
an action plan with respect to that country. If the President, in consultation with USTR, determines that the foreign
country fails to meet the action plan benchmarks, then the President may take appropriate action with respect to
that country.
 Watch List. An administrative category that the USTR created to designate countries that have IP protection
inadequacies that are less severe than those on the Priority Watch List but stil require U.S. attention.
 Section 306 Monitoring. A tool that the USTR uses to monitor countries for compliance with bilateral IP
agreements that resolve investigations initiated under Section 301.
 Out-of-Cycle Review. A tool that the USTR uses to monitor countries’ progress on IP issues, and which may
result in countries’ status changes for the fol owing year’s Special 301 report. In 2010, the USTR also began

plant breeder’s right, through the use of laws, procedures, practices, or regulations which violate provisions of
international law or international agreements to which both the United States and the foreign country are parties, or
constitute discriminatory nontariff trade barriers. Finally, the term “persons that rely upon intellectual property
protection” means persons involved in the creation, production or licensing of works of authorship that are copyrighted,
or the manufacture of products that are patented or for which there are process patents. For more detail, see 19 U.S.C. §
2242.
94 19 U.S.C. § 2242.
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publishing annually the Notorious Markets List as an out-of-cycle review, separately from the annual Special 301
Report. The List identifies online and physical markets “that reportedly engage in, facilitate, turn a blind eye to, or
benefit from substantial copyright piracy and trademark counterfeiting.”

Source: Adapted from CRS Report RL34292, Intellectual Property Rights and International Trade, by Shayerah Ilias
Akhtar, Ian F. Fergusson, and Liana Wong.
If the USTR names a country as a Priority Foreign Country, the agency must launch an
investigation into that country’s IPR practices. The agency conducts this investigation in a
manner similar to a Section 301 investigation. If it finds that the practices under investigation are
actionable under Section 301, then the USTR can seek to negotiate and enter into a binding
agreement with the foreign country. Such an agreement can commit the country to address or
eliminate the practices or policies under investigation or provide compensation to the United
States. Absent mutual resolution, the United States can impose retaliatory trade measures (e.g.,
tariffs), but then the foreign country could pursue WTO dispute settlement or retaliate by
targeting U.S. exports.
In its most recent Special 301 Report, the USTR placed 33 trading partners on the Priority Watch
List or Watch List (Figure 2).95 According to the agency, these are countries “that currently
present the most significant concerns regarding IP rights.”96
Figure 2. Special 301: Country Designations in 2020

Source: Congressional Research Service with information from USTR’s 2020 Special 301 Report.
Notes: China is on the “Priority Watch List” and subject to “Section 306 Monitoring.”
Procedures for Country Identification
The Special 301 statute provides the overall guidelines for identifying countries for the various
designations or lists. However, the USTR also considers a host of factors specific to the country,
including the level and scope of the country’s IPR infringement and its impact on the U.S.

95 Office of the USTR, 2020 Special 301 Report, April 2020.
96 Office of the USTR, “USTR Releases Annual Special 301 Report on Intellectual Property Protection and Review of
Notorious Markets for Counterfeiting and Piracy,” Press Release, April 29, 2020.
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economy; the strength of the country’s IPR laws and the effectiveness of its enforcement; and
progress made by the country in improving IPR protection and enforcement in the past year.97
Additionally, the USTR considers the country’s commitment to bilateral and multilateral
agreements related to IPR (entering into bilateral trade agreements with the United States or
joining IPR-related international agreements).98 No “weighting criteria” or formula exists to
determine the placement of a country on a list. Furthermore, no particular threshold exists for
determining when a country should be upgraded or downgraded on a list. In making a
determination, the USTR gathers information based on its “National Trade Estimates of Foreign
Trade Barriers,” as well as consultations with a wide variety of sources, including government
agencies, industry groups that rely on IP protection, other private sector representatives,
Congressional leaders, and foreign governments.
Placement Considerations
The Special 301 list is a method to disseminate information on IP issues in other countries and to
guide U.S. trade policy. Country identification based on a wide variety of factors can provide a
more informed understanding of a country’s IP situation. However, some trade analysts have
speculated that the rankings are subject to external influences.99 The lack of a specific framework
for placing countries on the list—or for removing them—aside from the general directives from
the Special 301 statute, has raised concerns that foreign policy or other considerations may affect
the process.
World Trade Organization and Section 301
Background on the WTO DSU
From its inception in 1947, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)—the
predecessor to the WTO—provided for consultations and dispute resolution, allowing a GATT
party to invoke dispute settlement procedures if it believed that another party’s measure violated a
GATT provision or caused it trade injury.100 Because the original GATT did not set out a dispute
procedure with great specificity, GATT parties developed a more detailed process, including ad
hoc panels and other practices. The process was perceived to have certain deficiencies, however,
including a lack of deadlines, a consensus decision-making process, and laxity in surveillance and
implementation of panel reports—even when reports were adopted and had the status of an
official GATT decision.101 The consensus decision-making process did not ensure enforceability
because it allowed a GATT party against whom a dispute was filed to block the establishment of a
dispute panel (and the adoption of a panel report by the GATT parties as a whole).
Congress made reform of the GATT dispute process a principal U.S. negotiating objective in the
GATT Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations. These talks began in 1986 and
concluded in 1994 with the signing of the Marrakesh Agreement, which established the WTO in

97 For more detail, see “Special Rules for Identifications,” (19 U.S.C. § 2242(b)).
98 Ibid.
99 See, for example, Consumers International, “IP Watch List 2019,” February 20, 2010.
100 For more detail on the dispute settlement under GATT, see WTO, “Historic Development of the WTO Dispute
Settlement System,” Dispute Settlement System Training Module, Chapter 2.
101 Ibid.
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1995.102 In particular, U.S. officials sought to create an effective dispute resolution system to
enforce multilateral commitments under the future WTO. The WTO Agreements included several
provisions to strengthen dispute resolution procedures by providing stricter timetables for panel
decisions in trade disputes, establishing mechanisms to prevent the blocking of panel decisions by
affected countries, and broadening the ability of nations to retaliate against countries that fail to
abide by WTO dispute settlement decisions. The WTO Agreements also further reduced and
removed barriers to trade among WTO members through new market access commitments and
expansion of the level and types of trade in goods, services, and agriculture covered by
multilateral rules and disciplines. They also included new rules for trade-related investment and
IPR, among other new commitments.
Article 23 of the DSU requires that WTO members invoke DSU procedures in disputes involving
WTO agreements and that they act in accordance with the DSU (i.e., not unilaterally) when: (1)
deciding if another member has violated a WTO Agreement, (2) determining a date by which the
member must comply with a WTO decision, and (3) taking any retaliatory action against a
noncomplying member (see textbox).
Article 23: Strengthening of the Multilateral System
WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
(DSU)
“1. When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nul ification or impairment of benefits
under the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements,
they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding.
2. In such cases, Members shall:
(a) not make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred, that benefits have been nul ified or impaired
or that the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements has been impeded, except through recourse to
dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and procedures of this Understanding, and shall make any such
determination consistent with the findings contained in the panel or Appellate Body report adopted by the DSB or
an arbitration award rendered under this Understanding;
(b) fol ow the procedures set forth in Article 21 [Surveillance of Implementation of Recommendations and Rulings]
to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and
rulings; and
(c) fol ow the procedures set forth in Article 22 [Compensation and the Suspension of Concessions] to determine
the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations and obtain DSB authorization in accordance with those
procedures before suspending concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements in response to the
failure of the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings within that reasonable period of
time.”
The Statement of Administrative Action (SAA), which Congress approved in 1994 along with the
implementing legislation for the WTO Agreements, noted that the United States would commit to
pursue formal dispute settlement before the WTO if a practice or policy involved a violation of
the WTO Agreements. The creation of a strong dispute mechanism in the WTO was expected to

102 The first “principal trade negotiating objective” outlined by Congress in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act of 1988 with respect to GATT and the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations was “to ensure that...
[dispute settlement] mechanisms within the GATT and GATT agreements provide for more effective and expeditious
resolution of disputes and enable better enforcement of United States rights.” (Section 1101(b)(1), P.L. 100-418). The
WTO Agreement requires any country that wishes to be a WTO member to accept all of the multilateral trade
agreements negotiated during the Uruguay Round, including the GATT 1994 (an updated version of the GATT 1947),
as well as the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), applicable to
disputes arising under virtually all WTO agreements.
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reduce the United States’ need to take unilateral action under Section 301, which many countries
opposed.103
Relationship between the WTO and Section 301
As noted above, since the establishment of the WTO in 1995, the United States has relied
primarily on the WTO DSU to enforce its trade rights. Thus, many cases initiated under Section
301 have been brought before the WTO for dispute resolution (if initial consultations failed to
resolve the issue). In fact, in most cases, the USTR has brought disputes directly to the WTO
without carrying out a formal Section 301 investigation. However, the 1994 Statement of
Administrative Action (SAA) also made clear that the United States was not committing to
invoke dispute settlement procedures if the USTR determined that a practice under investigation
did not involve or was not covered by the WTO Agreements (see textbox).104

103 For more detail on the congressional debate with respect to the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism and the use of
Section 301, see, for example, “Uruguay Round Agreements Act,” 103rd Congress, 2nd Session, Congressional Record,
Senate, Vol. 140, No. 148, pp. 29924-30016, November 30, 1994.
104 Statement of Administrative Action accompanying the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, H.R. Doc. No. 103-316,
Vol. 1 (1994).
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Excerpts from the Uruguay Round Agreements Act’s Statement of Administrative
Action: “Enforcement of U.S. Rights”
September 1994
“The Administration intends to use section 301 to pursue vigorously foreign unfair trade barriers that violate U.S.
rights or deny benefits to the United States under the Uruguay Round agreements. The Administration equally
intends to use section 301 to pursue foreign unfair trade barriers that are not covered by those agreements. This
is what Congress intended in the Omnibus Trade and Competition Act of 1988 when, on the one hand, it made a
more effective and expeditious dispute settlement mechanism the first principal U.S. negotiating objective and, on
the other hand, the Congress made major modifications to strengthen section 301 for use against both those
practices falling within and outside trade agreements to which the United States is a party.”
“Neither section 301 nor the DSU wil require the Trade Representative to invoke DSU dispute settlement
procedures if the Trade Representative does not consider that a matter involves a Uruguay Round agreement.
Section 301 wil remain ful y available to address unfair practices that do not violate U.S. rights or deny U.S. benefits
under the Uruguay Round agreements and, as in the past, such investigations wil not involve recourse to multilateral
dispute settlement procedures.”
“Moreover, the mere fact that the Uruguay Round agreements treat a particular subject matter—such as intellectual
property rights—does not mean that the Trade Representative must initiate DSU proceedings in every section 301
investigation involving that subject matter. In the event that the actions of the foreign government in question fall
outside the disciplines of those agreements, the section 301 investigation would proceed without recourse to DSU
procedures.”
“Some foreign government practices may involve a number of actions, some of which are covered under the rules
imposed by the Uruguay Round agreements and some of which are not. In section 301 investigations involving mixed
actions of this kind, the Administration intends to continue the current practice of initiating dispute settlement
proceedings against actions falling under a trade agreement and addressing other actions through bilateral
negotiations.”
“Finally, nothing in the DSU wil affect application of section 301 against practices by governments that either are
not WTO members or by WTO members to which the United States does not apply the Uruguay Round
agreements. The Trade Representative wil address section 301 investigations of unfair trade practices by such
countries on a bilateral basis.”

Source: Statement of Administrative Action accompanying the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, Vol. 1
(1994).
In 1998, the EU filed a complaint over Section 301 at the WTO based on various obligations in
Article 23 of the DSU, which, as noted above, precludes certain unilateral actions in trade
disputes involving WTO Agreements.105 While Section 301 may generally be used consistently
with the DSU, some U.S. trading partners complained that the statute allows unilateral action and
forces negotiations through its threat of sanctions. In this case, the WTO panel found that the
language of Section 304 of the Trade Act of 1974, which requires the USTR to determine the
legality of a foreign practice by a given date, is prima facie inconsistent with DSU Article 23
because in some cases it mandates a USTR determination—and statutorily reserves a right for the
USTR to determine that a practice is WTO inconsistent—before DSU procedures are
completed.106 The panel also found, however, that the serious threat of determinations that were in
violation of U.S. obligations (and consequently prima facie inconsistent) was removed by U.S.
undertakings, as set forth in the SAA and U.S. statements made before the panel, that the USTR
would use its statutory discretion to implement Section 301 in conformity with WTO obligations.
The panel also could not find that Section 306 violated the DSU. That provision directs USTR to
make a determination as to imposing retaliatory measures by a specified date, given differing

105 For more detail, see WTO Case “DS152: United States—Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act 1974.”
106 WTO, Panel Report, “United States—Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974,” WT/DS152/R (December 22,
1999).
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good faith interpretations of the “sequencing” ambiguities in the DSU.107 The panel report, which
was not appealed, was adopted in January 2000.
The panel, however, did not address when or how the USTR could retaliate unilaterally under
Section 301. It seems that neither the legislation itself nor case law interpreting it provides
guidance as to how the USTR should determine if an act, policy, or practice of a foreign country
is actually covered by a trade agreement.
Section 301 Investigations
There have been 130 cases under Section 301 since the law’s enactment in 1974, including 35
initiated since the WTO’s establishment in 1995 (Figure 3). Historically, Section 301 cases have
targeted primarily the trade practices of the EU, which is the subject of about 30% of all cases—
mostly concerning agricultural trade. The EU is followed by Japan (12%), Canada (11%), and
South Korea (8%). Prior to 2017—that is, prior to the Trump Administration—the last Section
301 investigation took place in 2013 and involved Ukraine’s practices regarding IPR.108 However,
in light of the political situation in Ukraine at the time, the USTR determined that no action was
appropriate.109 The last investigation prior to the Trump Administration that resulted in retaliation
(i.e., tariffs) took place in 2009 and involved Canada’s compliance with the 2006 U.S.-Canada
Softwood Lumber Agreement.110 Per a U.S-Canadian understanding, the USTR suspended the
tariffs in 2010.111

107 Although many WTO rulings have been implemented satisfactorily, difficult cases have tested DSU articles on
implementation, highlighting deficiencies in the system and prompting suggestions for reform. For example, gaps in the
DSU have resulted in the problem of “sequencing,” which first manifested itself in 1998-1999 during the compliance
phase of the successful U.S. challenge of the European Union’s banana import regime. Article 22 allows a prevailing
party to request authorization to retaliate within 30 days after a compliance period ends, while Article 21.5 provides
that disagreements over the existence or adequacy of compliance measures are to be decided using WTO dispute
procedures, including resort to panels. A compliance panel’s report is due within 90 days after the dispute is referred to
the panel, and may be appealed. The DSU does not integrate an Article 21.5 procedure into the 30-day Article 22
deadline, nor does it expressly state how compliance is to be determined so that a prevailing party may pursue action
under Article 22. Given the absence of multilateral rules on the matter, disputing parties have entered into ad hoc
procedural agreements in individual disputes.
108 Office of the USTR, “Identification of Ukraine as a Priority Foreign Country and Initiation of Section 301
Investigation,” 78 Federal Register 33886, June 5, 2013.
109 Office of the USTR, “Notice of Determination in Section 301 Investigation of Ukraine,” 79 Federal Register 14326,
March 13, 2014. For more detail on Ukraine’s Euromaidan protests and Russia’s 2014 invasion and occupation of
Ukrainian territory, see Serhy Yekelchyk, The Conflict in Ukraine: What Everyone Needs to Know, Oxford University
Press, 2015.
110 Office of the USTR, “United States Imposes Tariffs On Softwood Lumber From Four Canadian Provinces Due To
Canada’s Failure To Comply With The Softwood Lumber Agreement, Press Release, April 7, 2009, and “Initiation of
Section 302 Investigation, Determination of Action Under Section 301, and Request for Comments: Canada-
Compliance With Softwood Lumber Agreement,” 74 Federal Register 16436, April 10, 2009.
111 Office of the USTR, “Notice and Modification of Action: Canada-Compliance with Softwood Lumber Agreement,”
75 Federal Register 53014, August 30, 2010.
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Figure 3. Section 301 Investigations: 1975-Present

Source: Congressional Research Service and USTR’s Federal Register.
Notes: Includes all investigations initiated by the Office of the USTR, regardless of whether the case was
suspended or combined with others, or action was ultimately taken under Section 301.
Cases during the Trump Administration
During the Trump Administration, the USTR has self-initiated six new investigations against
China, the EU, France, a group of 10 trading partners, and two against Vietnam (Figure 4). Two
investigations have resulted in the USTR imposing tariffs to date—on U.S. imports from China
and the EU. The investigation against the EU, launched in April 2019, sought to enforce a WTO
ruling in connection with the “Large Civil Aircraft Dispute.” Unlike the U.S. action taken against
China, the WTO had authorized the action against the EU.
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Figure 4. Section 301 Investigations: 2017-Present

Source: Congressional Research Service with information from the Office of the USTR.
China: Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation
Concerns over China’s policies on IPR, subsidies, technology, and innovation led the Trump
Administration to launch in August 2017 a Section 301 investigation into those policies and their
impact on U.S. stakeholders.112 The investigation, concluded in March 2018, determined that four
of China’s broad policies or practices justified U.S. action: (1) forced technology transfer
requirements; (2) cyber-enabled theft of U.S. intellectual property (IP) and trade secrets; (3)
discriminatory and nonmarket licensing practices; and (4) state-funded strategic acquisition of
U.S. assets.113 President Trump sought to justify taking unilateral action to address most of these

112 Office of the USTR, “USTR Announces Initiation of Section 301 Investigation of China,” Press Release, August 18,
2017, and “Initiation of Section 301 Investigation; Hearing; and Request for Public Comments: China’s Acts, Policies,
and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation,” 82 Federal Register 40213,
August 24, 2017. The initiation of the investigation followed the issuance of a Presidential Memorandum instructing
the USTR to determine “whether to investigate any of China’s laws, policies, practices, or actions that may be
unreasonable or discriminatory and that may be harming American intellectual property rights, innovation, or
technology development.” (Executive Office of the President, “Addressing China’s Laws, Policies, Practices, and
Actions Related to Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Technology, Memorandum for the United States Trade
Representative,” 82 Federal Register 39007, August 17, 2017. For more detail on U.S.-China trade and investment
relations, see CRS In Focus IF11284, U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relations: Overview, by Karen M. Sutter and
CRS In Focus IF11283, U.S.-China Investment Ties: Overview and Issues for Congress, by Andres B. Schwarzenberg.
113 Office of the USTR, Findings of the Investigation into China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology
Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, March 22, 2018. See also,
Executive Office of the President, “Actions by the United States Related to the Section 301 Investigation of China’s
Laws, Policies, Practices, or Actions Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation,”
Presidential Memorandum, 83 Federal Register 13099, March 27, 2018. The USTR estimated that these policies cost
the U.S. economy at least $50 billion annually (Office of the USTR, “Section 301 Fact Sheet,” March 22, 2018). Some
estimates also suggest that Chinese IPR violations are a major source of U.S. economic losses. U.S. firms cite lax IPR
enforcement as one of the primary challenges to doing business in China, and some view the enforcement shortfalls as
a deliberate effort by the Chinese government to give domestic firms an advantage over foreign competitors. In 2018,
the U.S. National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC) described China as having “expansive efforts in
place to acquire U.S. technology to include sensitive trade secrets and proprietary information.” It warned that if the
threat is not addressed, “it could erode America’s long-term competitive economic advantage.” (National
Counterintelligence and Security Center, “Foreign Economic Espionage in Cyberspace,” July 2018.)
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issues by pointing to alleged weaknesses in WTO dispute settlement procedures and the
inadequacy or nonexistence of WTO rules to address certain Chinese trade practices.114 The
Trump Administration also added issues unrelated to the Section 301 investigation to the
subsequent bilateral consultations and trade negotiations with China. These included demands
that China take steps to reduce the bilateral trade imbalance (including by making significant
purchases of U.S. products), make economic structural changes that provide the United States
greater reciprocity in access to China’s market, and address currency issues.115 The broadening in
the scope of the negotiations to include additional demands may be viewed by some to have
complicated the resolution of the issues identified by the Section 301 investigation and the
subsequent trade dispute.
Following the Section 301 findings, the
USTR, at the direction of President Trump,
Figure 5. U.S.-China Trade in 2017
took five major tariff actions in 2018 and
2019 (Table 3). Approximately three-fourths
of U.S. imports from China became subject to
increased Section 301 tariffs, ranging from
15% to 25% (Figure 5).116 The United States
and China engaged in several rounds of
negotiations to resolve U.S. concerns raised

during the investigation, as well as other
Source: Congressional Research Service with data
unrelated issues.117 These negotiations
from the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of
ultimately resulted in a “phase one” deal of
Economic Analysis.
narrow scope (so-called “U.S.-China Phase
Notes: Calculations based on pre-tariff import data.
One Trade Agreement”), signed in January
2020 and described by the Administration as the first step toward a more comprehensive trade
agreement.118 As part of the deal, the USTR announced reductions in certain tariff rate hikes,

114 See, for example, Office of the USTR, “United States—Tariff Measures On Certain Goods from China (DS543):
First Written Submission of the United States of America,” August 27, 2019. In this submission, the USTR stated that
“China has chosen to adopt a range of policies and practices to obtain an unfair competitive edge over other Members
by stealing or otherwise unfairly acquiring their technology and intellectual property. Where those policies or practices
can be addressed through WTO rules, the United States is pursuing WTO dispute settlement. Most of China’s practices,
however, are not covered by existing WTO disciplines.”
115 See, for example, Gabriel Wildau and Shawn Donnan, “US Demands China Cut Trade Deficit by $200bn:
Washington Increases Brinkmanship with Call for Beijing to Open Economy More,” Financial Times, May 4, 2018.
116 Approximately 73.1% of U.S. imports from China became subject to Section 301 tariffs ($370 billion out of $506
billion). Based on CRS calculations using 2017 (pre-tariff) data from the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of
Economic Analysis.
117 For a comprehensive timeline, see, for example, China Briefing, “The US-China Trade War: A Timeline,” Dezan
Shira & Associates. Official statements from The White House, include, among others: “Trump Administration
Officials to Host Trade Delegation from China,” May 16, 2018; “Statement from the Press Secretary Regarding the
President’s Working Dinner with China,” December 1, 2018; “Statement of the United States Regarding China Talks,”
January 31, 2019; “Statement by the Press Secretary Regarding China Talks,” February 15, 2019; “Statement of the
United States Regarding China Talks,” March 29, 2019; “Statement from the Press Secretary Regarding the
Administration’s Trade Talks with China,” April 5, 2019; “Statement from the Press Secretary Regarding the
Administration’s Trade Talks with China,” April 23, 2019; “Remarks by President Trump and Vice Premier Liu He of
the People’s Republic of China in a Meeting,” October 11, 2019.
118 Office of the USTR, “Economic and Trade Agreement between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of the People’s Republic of China,” January 15, 2020.
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effective February 2020.119 President Trump has indicated that all existing Section 301 tariffs on
U.S. imports from China will remain in place until a “phase two” deal is concluded.120
Table 3. Major Section 301 Tariff Actions on U.S. Imports from China
Stated Value of
Effective
Additional Tariff
U.S. Imports
Federal Register
Date
List
Rate (ad valorem)
Affected
Notice
07/06/2018
1
25%
$34 bil ion
83 FR 28710
08/23/2018
2
25%
$16 bil ion
83 FR 40823
83 FR 47974
09/24/2018
3
10%
$200 bil ion
83 FR 49153
25%
06/15/2019
3
$200 bil ion
84 FR 20459
(increased from 10%)
84 FR 43304
09/01/2019
4A
15%
$120 bil ion*
84 FR 45821
Source: Congressional Research Service and USTR’s Federal Register notices.
Notes: *Office of the USTR, “United States and China Reach Phase One Trade Agreement,” Press Release,
December 13, 2019. The USTR had not previously made public an official estimate of value of U.S. imports
affected by List 4A, a subset of List 4 (“$300 Bil ion Trade Action”).
The United States pursued part of the Section 301 investigation at the WTO, and in November
2018, a dispute panel was composed to review China’s technology licensing requirements.121
However, the proceedings have been suspended at the request of the United States since June
2019.122 Since April 2018, China has filed three WTO cases challenging Section 301 tariffs.123 In
September 2020, a WTO dispute settlement panel ruled in the first case and determined that
Section 301 tariffs on U.S. imports from China were not consistent with U.S. WTO
commitments.124 In response, U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer criticized the decision
and stated that the “WTO is completely inadequate to stop China’s harmful technology
practices.”125 He noted that even though the panel in the case “did not dispute the extensive
evidence submitted by the United States of intellectual property theft by China, its decision shows
that the WTO provides no remedy for such misconduct.”126 In October 2020, the United States

119 Office of the USTR, “Notice of Modification of Section 301 Action: China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to
Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation,” 85 Federal Register 3741, January 22, 2020.
120 See, for example, “Trump: U.S. Will Lift Tariffs on China after Phase 2 Deal Finished,” Reuters, January 15, 2020.
121 Office of the USTR, “Following President Trump’s Section 301 Decisions, USTR Launches New WTO Challenge
Against China,” Press Release, March 23, 2018, and WTO, “DS542: China—Certain Measures Concerning the
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights.”
122 For more detail, see WTO Case “DS542: China—Certain Measures Concerning the Protection of Intellectual
Property Rights.”
123 The WTO cases are: (1) “DS543: United States—Tariff Measures on Certain Goods from China” (April 4, 2018),
(2) “DS565: United States—Tariff Measures on Certain Goods from China II” (August 23, 2018), and (3) “DS587:
United States—Tariff Measures on Certain Goods from China III” (September 2, 2019).
124 For more detail, see WTO Case “DS543: United States—Tariff Measures on Certain Goods from China” and
“WT/DS543/R: United States—Tariff Measures on Certain Goods from China,” September 15, 2020.
125 Office of the USTR, “WTO Report on US Action against China Shows Necessity for Reform,” Press Release,
September 15, 2020.
126 Ibid.
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Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Origin, Evolution, and Use

notified the WTO Dispute Settlement Body of its decision to appeal the panel report in this
case.127
The Trump Administration has used the Section 301 investigation and the resulting threat and
imposition of tariffs as the primary tool to spur trade negotiations with China over U.S. concerns.
However, many analysts have raised concerns over the economic impact that a protracted trade
dispute between the United States and China could have on the U.S. and global economy,
bilateral commercial ties, and global supply chains that involve producers in many countries.128
The tariffs have reportedly had the impact of raising some prices for U.S. consumers and firms
that use Chinese parts and components in production and exports.129 Chinese retaliation may
continue to curtail U.S. exports to the world’s second largest economy.130
European Union: Enforcement of U.S. WTO Rights in Large Civil Aircraft
Dispute
In April 2019, the USTR initiated a Section 301 investigation in order to enforce U.S. WTO rights
in connection with the Large Civil Aircraft dispute with the EU and the United Kingdom (UK)
(together referred to as the EU in this subsection).131 Based on the WTO panel, appellate,
compliance, and arbitrator reports, and information obtained during the investigation, the USTR
determined that the EU had denied U.S. rights under WTO agreements.132 Specifically, the USTR
concluded that the EU and certain member states had not complied with a WTO DSB ruling
recommending the withdrawal of WTO-inconsistent subsidies on the manufacture of large civil
aircraft. In 2011, the DSB confirmed that these subsidies had breached the EU’s WTO obligations
under GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM

127 World Trade Organization, “United States Appeals Panel Report Regarding US Tariffs on Chinese Goods,” October
26, 2020. The WTO noted that “[g]iven the ongoing lack of agreement among WTO Members regarding the filling of
Appellate Body vacancies, there is no Appellate Body Division available at the current time to deal with the appeal.”
For more detail, see CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10553, Section 301 Tariffs on Goods from China: International and
Domestic Legal Challenges, by Nina M. Hart and Brandon J. Murrill.
128 See, for example, Mark Zandi, Jesse Rogers, and Maria Cosma, “Trade War Chicken: The Tariffs and the Damage
Done,” Analysis, Moody’s Analytics, September 2019; Shawn Donnan and Reade Pickert, “Trump’s China Buying
Spree Unlikely to Cover Trade War’s Costs,” Bloomberg, December 18, 2019; and Mary Amiti, Sang Hoon Kong, and
David E. Weinstein, “The Investment Cost of the U.S.-China Trade War,” Liberty Street Economics, Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, May 28, 2020.
129 See, for example, Mary Amiti, Stephen J. Redding, and David E. Weinstein, “Who’s Paying for the US Tariffs? A
Longer-Term Perspective,” NBER Working Paper No. 26610, January 2020; Andrea Shalal, “Trump’s Tariffs Cost
U.S. Companies $46 Billion to Date, Data Shows,” Reuters, January 9, 2020; Sylvan Lane and Alex Gangitano,
“Businesses, farmers brace for new phase in Trump trade war,” The Hill, August 8, 2019; and Reuters Staff, “Who
Pays Trump’s Tariffs, China or U.S. Customers and Companies?” Reuters, May 21, 2019.
130 See, for example, Liyan Qi, Grace Zhu and Lin Zhu, “China’s U.S. Exports Tumble as Tariffs Bite,” The Wall Street
Journal, October 14, 2019; Riley Walters, “Decreasing U.S.-China Trade Is Worrisome,” Commentary, The Heritage
Foundation, April 3, 2020; and Kenneth Rapoza, “U.S. Exports To China Down For The Second Consecutive Year,”
Forbes, April 17, 2020.
131 Office of the USTR, “Initiation of Investigation; Notice of Hearing and Request for Public Comments: Enforcement
of U.S. WTO Rights in Large Civil Aircraft Dispute,” 84 Federal Register 15028, April 12, 2019. For more detail, see
CRS In Focus IF11364, Boeing-Airbus Subsidy Dispute: Recent Developments, by Andres B. Schwarzenberg.
132 Office of the USTR, “Notice of Determination and Action Pursuant to Section 301: Enforcement of U.S. WTO
Rights in Large Civil Aircraft Dispute,” 84 Federal Register 54245, October 9, 2020.
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Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Origin, Evolution, and Use

Agreement).133 As a result, in October 2019, with WTO authorization, the United States imposed
additional tariffs on $7.5 billion worth of U.S. imports from the EU.134
The WTO’s authorization for the United States to take countermeasures against the EU—the
largest amount in the WTO’s history—came after nearly 15 years of litigation at the WTO.135 The
litigation involves the world’s two largest aerospace manufacturers, U.S.-based Boeing and EU-
based Airbus, which have competed for years for dominance in the commercial airline supply
market. The United States successfully argued that Airbus had received billions of dollars in
illegal subsidies, which resulted in a loss to Boeing of significant market share throughout the
world. The U.S. action to impose tariffs, consistent with the WTO arbitrator’s finding on the
appropriate level of countermeasures, aimed to pressure the EU into either ending the subsidies or
negotiating an agreement with the United States.
In a parallel dispute case against the United States, in October 2020, the WTO authorized the EU
to seek remedies in the form of tariffs on $4 billion worth of EU imports from the United States.
The WTO had previously determined that some of the subsidies provided by the United States for
the manufacture of Boeing’s large civil aircraft violated the WTO commitments of the United
States and had caused harm to the interests of the EU.136 The EU exercised its legal rights under
the WTO’s decision to impose retaliatory tariffs on products from the United States, effective
November 9, 2020.137 However, the tariff increases are limited to 15% on large civil aircraft and
25% on agricultural and other products. The USTR has noted that with the elimination of a
Washington State preferential tax rate in early 2020, the United States has fully implemented the
WTO’s recommendations in this case, and therefore “there is no valid basis for the EU to retaliate
against any U.S. goods.”138
Due to the magnitude of U.S.-EU trade (of which civilian aircraft, engines, and parts are a major
component) and ongoing trade frictions, some Members of Congress are closely monitoring
developments in the WTO litigation and in U.S.-EU negotiations.139

133 WTO Case “DS316: European Communities and Certain member States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil
Aircraft.”
134 Ibid. WTO, “Arbitrator Issues Decision in Airbus Subsidy Dispute,” October 2, 2020.
135 For an overview of the WTO DSU procedures in the case since 2004, see WTO Case “DS316: European
Communities and Certain member States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft.”
136 WTO, “WTO Arbitrator Issues Decision in Boeing Subsidy Dispute,” October 13, 2020. For more detail on the
EU’s case against the United States, see WTO Case “DS353: United States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil
Aircraft—Second Complaint.”
137 European Commission, “Boeing WTO Case: The EU Puts in Place Countermeasures Against U.S. Exports,” Press
Release, November 9, 2020.
138 Office of the USTR, “U.S. Notifies Full Compliance in WTO Aircraft Dispute,” Press Release, May 6, 2020, and
“EU Has No Legal Basis to Impose Aircraft Tariffs; WTO Award Relates Only to Now-Repealed Tax Break, Rejects
EU Request on Other Measures,” Press Release, October 13, 2020.
139 More recently, Senate Finance Committee Chairman Chuck Grassley called for the Trump Administration to
negotiate with the EU to resolve the long-standing dispute. (“Grassley: Administration Should Strike Boeing-Airbus
Deal with EU,” Inside U.S. Trade, October 13, 2020.)
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Following the USTR’s Section 301
investigation and its determination to enforce
U.S. WTO rights, the USTR published in
Figure 6. U.S.-EU Trade in 2018
October 2019 a list of 158 eight-digit
Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United
States (HTSUS) product lines subject to
additional duties.140 The list targeted mainly
U.S. imports from the EU member states
responsible for the illegal subsidies—France,
Germany, Spain, and the UK, but is not

limited to the aircraft industry. The tariffs
Source: Congressional Research Service with data
affected approximately $7.5 billion worth of
from the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of
imports, or about 1.5% of all U.S. goods
Economic Analysis.
imports from the EU in 2018 (Figure 6). The
Notes: Calculations based on pre-tariff import data.
WTO authorized the United States to impose
additional ad valorem duties—that is, based on the value of the import—of up to 100%; however,
at the time, the USTR indicated that the tariff increases would be limited to 10% on large civil
aircraft and 25% on agricultural and other products.141
By broad product category, aircraft (mainly from France and Germany) accounted for roughly
40% of the $7.5 billion of trade affected, while whiskies, liqueurs, and wine (mainly from the UK
and France) accounted for another 40%, and food and agricultural products (mainly from Spain
and France) accounted for the remaining 20%.142
February 2020 Revision
In December 2019, the USTR announced a review of the initial Section 301 action taken in
October 2019.143 The agency specifically requested public comments on whether (1) products
covered by the action should remain on or be removed from the tariff list, (2) the current rate of
additional duty should be increased to as high as 100% for products that remain on the list, and
(3) additional EU products should be added to the list. Based on this review, in February the
USTR increased the rate of additional duties on large civil aircraft to 15%, effective March 18,
2020, and modified the list of other products subject to additional 25% duties (by removing prune
juice and adding knives to the list), effective March 5, 2020.144 The number of product lines and
total trade affected remained unchanged.
August 2020 Revision
In June 2020, the USTR initiated a second review of the Section 301 action and requested public
comments.145 Although in July 2020 the EU announced amendments to certain French and

140 Office of the USTR, “Notice of Determination and Action Pursuant to Section 301: Enforcement of U.S. WTO
Rights in Large Civil Aircraft Dispute,” 84 Federal Register 54245, October 9, 2020.
141 Office of the USTR, “U.S. Wins $7.5 Billion Award in Airbus Subsidies Case,” Press Release, October 2, 2020.
142 CRS calculations based on 84 Federal Register 54245 and data from the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of
Economic Analysis.
143 Office of the USTR, “Review of Action: Enforcement of U.S. WTO Rights in Large Civil Aircraft Dispute,” 84
Federal Register 67992, December 12, 2019.
144 Office of the USTR, “Notice of Modification of Section 301 Action: Enforcement of U.S. WTO Rights in Large
Civil Aircraft Dispute,” 85 Federal Register 10204, February 21, 2020.
145 Office of the USTR, “Review of Action: Enforcement of U.S. WTO Rights in Large Civil Aircraft Dispute,” 85
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Spanish Airbus launch aid contracts, the USTR determined that these changes were insufficient
and did not fully implement the DSB’s recommendations.146 As a result, in August 2020, the
USTR altered the composition of the list of nonaircraft products subject to additional duties (two
product lines removed and nine added of an equivalent amount of trade), effective September 1,
2020.147 The amount of trade affected and level of additional duties remained unchanged.
As required by Section 306 of the Trade Act of 1974, the USTR plans to continue to reevaluate
the tariff actions periodically based on the progress of its negotiations with the EU (see
“Carousel” Retaliation).148
France: Digital Services Tax
France enacted a digital services tax (DST) formally on July 24, 2019, after which the USTR
responded by initiating a Section 301 investigation.149 The DST applies a 3% levy on gross
revenues derived from two digital activities of which French “users” are deemed to play a major
role in value creation: (1) intermediary services,150 and (2) advertising services based on users’
data.151 It is retroactive to digital services revenue as of January 1, 2019.152 The law excludes
certain services, including digital interfaces for the delivery of “digital content.” The DST applies
only to companies with annual revenues from the covered services of at least €750 million
(approximately $847 million) globally and €25 million (approximately $28 million) in France.153

Federal Register 38488, June 26, 2020.
146 European Commission, “EU and Airbus Member States Take Action to Ensure Full Compliance in the WTO
Aircraft Dispute,” July 24, 2020; and Office of the USTR, “Notice of Modification of Section 301 Action: Enforcement
of U.S. World Trade Organization (WTO) Rights in Large Civil Aircraft Dispute,” 85 Federal Register 50866, August
18, 2020.
147 Office of the USTR, “Notice of Modification of Section 301 Action: Enforcement of U.S. World Trade
Organization (WTO) Rights in Large Civil Aircraft Dispute,” 85 Federal Register 50866, August 18, 2020.
148 Office of the USTR, “U.S. Wins $7.5 Billion Award in Airbus Subsidies Case,” Press Release, October 2, 2019, and
“USTR Modifies $7.5 Billion WTO Award Implementation Relating to Illegal Airbus Subsidies,” Press Release,
August 12, 2020.
149 KPMG, “France: Digital Services Tax (3%) Is Enacted,” July 25, 2019. See also, Office of the USTR, “USTR
Announces Initiation of Section 301 Investigation into France’s Digital Services Tax,” Press Release, July 10, 2019,
and “Initiation of a Section 301 Investigation of France’s Digital Services Tax,” 84 Federal Register 34042, July 16,
2019. For more detail on the investigation, see CRS In Focus IF11564, Section 301 Investigations: Foreign Digital
Services Taxes (DSTs), by Andres B. Schwarzenberg.
150 According to the USTR, “intermediate” services or “‘digital interface’ services are the provision of an electronic
interface that users use to connect with other users, especially to buy and sell goods or services between themselves.
Notably, this definition excludes where a ‘digital interface’ provider (i.e., a company operating a website) sells to a user
goods or services that it owns. Additionally, the law excludes from its scope certain types of digital interfaces, namely
those used ‘primarily’ to provide ‘digital content,’ ‘communications,’ ‘payment services,’ various banking and
financial services, or the placement of targeted ads. The law gives little guidance on the scope of these carve-outs.
However, it is generally thought that the ‘digital content’ carve-out excludes interfaces primarily for the delivery of
music or movies, that the ‘communications’ carve-out excludes telecommunications providers, and that other carve-
outs exclude essentially all financial service, including payment interfaces.” (Office of the USTR, Section 301
Investigation: Report on France’s Digital Services Tax, December 2, 2019.)
151 For example, the placement of an ad targeted based on data concerning the individual who views the ad, the
monitoring of an ad placed based on data concerning the individual who views the ad, and the sale of user data in
connection with internet advertising. (Office of the USTR, Section 301 Investigation: Report on France’s Digital
Services Tax, December 2, 2019.)
152 LOI n° 2019-759 du 24 juillet 2019 portant création d’une taxe sur les services numériques et modification de la
trajectoire de baisse de l’impôt sur les sociétés [LAW no. 2019-759 dated 24 July 2019 concerning creation of a tax on
digital services and modification of the downward correction of the corporation tax].
153 Amounts stated in U.S. dollars are approximate due to exchange rate fluctuations.
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Covered companies are required to calculate revenues attributable to France (and, therefore,
covered by the DST) using formulas specified in the law.
In its investigation, initiated on July 10 and completed on December 2, 2019, the USTR
ultimately concluded that France’s DST discriminates against major U.S. digital companies and is
inconsistent with prevailing international tax policy principles.154 France suspended its DST for
the remainder of 2020 and agreed to continue working with the United States at the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to reach a compromise on international
digital taxation.155 The USTR faced a July 10, 2020 statutory deadline to make a determination on
what action to take; it ultimately determined to take retaliatory action in the form of additional
duties. On July 10, 2020, the agency announced that it would impose additional tariffs of 25% on
approximately $1.3 billion worth of imports, or about 2.2% of all U.S. goods imports from France
in 2019 (Figure 7).156 However, it delayed the implementation for up to 180 days (that is, up to
January 6, 2021) to allow more time for bilateral and multilateral discussions that could lead to a
satisfactory resolution of this matter.157
The list of imports on which USTR has
determined to impose tariffs is narrower than
Figure 7. U.S.-France Trade in 2019
that originally proposed in December 2019,
which had an annual import value of
approximately $2.4 billion and covered dairy
products, soaps, cosmetics, sparkling wine,
handbags, and porcelain.158 The final list, is
limited to certain cosmetics, soaps, and
leather goods. Moreover, whereas preliminary

notice also contemplated possible fees or
Source: Congressional Research Service with data
restrictions on services imported from France
from the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of
or provided in the United States by French
Economic Analysis.
businesses, USTR’s latest determination
Notes: Calculations based on pre-tariff import data.
imposes no such restrictions. According to the
USTR, in determining the level of trade affected by the action, the agency considered the value of
digital transactions covered by France’s DST and the amount of taxes assessed by France on U.S.

154 Office of the USTR, “Initiation of a Section 301 Investigation of France’s Digital Services Tax,” 84 Federal
Register 34042, July 16, 2019; “Conclusion of USTR’s Investigation Under Section 301 into France’s Digital Services
Tax,” Press Release, December 2, 2019; Section 301 Investigation: Report on France’s Digital Services Tax, December
2, 2019; and “Notice of Determination and Request for Comments Concerning Action Pursuant to Section 301:
France’s Digital Services Tax,” 84 Federal Register 66956, December 6, 2019.
155 James Politi, Mehreen Khan, Victor Mallet, and Martin Arnold, “France signals breakthrough in US digital tax
talks,” Financial Times, January 20, 2020, and Liz Alderman, Jim Tankersley, and Ana Swanson, “France and U.S.
Move Toward Temporary Truce in Trade War,” The New York Times, January 21, 2020. For more detail, see
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Action 1 Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation,”
Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS); CRS Report R45532, Digital Services Taxes
(DSTs): Policy and Economic Analysis, by Sean Lowry; and CRS Report R44900, Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
(BEPS): OECD Tax Proposals, by Jane G. Gravelle.
156 Office of the USTR, “Notice of Action in the Section 301 Investigation of France’s Digital Services Tax,” 85
Federal Register 43292, July 16, 2020. While the overall amount of trade affected by the action may be relatively
small, the impact on particular U.S. stakeholders or sectors of the U.S. economy could be large.
157 Ibid.
158 Office of the USTR, “Notice of Determination and Request for Comments Concerning Action Pursuant to Section
301: France’s Digital Services Tax,” 84 Federal Register 66956, December 6, 2019.
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companies.159 Finally, the USTR’s notice contemplates the possibility that the action could be
modified or the 180-day suspension shortened, depending on the progress of discussions with
France or in the OECD.160 Because progress at the OECD has been relatively slow, and the
deadline to reach an agreement was recently pushed back to mid-2021, French finance minister
Bruno LeMaire stated in October 2020 that France would begin collecting its DST in December
2020.161 It remains to be seen if the USTR will move ahead with its tariff hike as planned or
modify the 180-day suspension.
Foreign Digital Services Taxes
On June 2, 2020, the USTR launched a new Section 301 investigation into the DSTs adopted or
under consideration by Austria, Brazil, the Czech Republic, the European Union, India,
Indonesia, Italy, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom (see textbox).162 The USTR also
requested consultations with the governments of these jurisdictions. The investigation is ongoing.
DSTs Under Investigation
Adopted

Austria. Adopted a 5% tax on revenues from online advertising services. It applies to companies with at least
€750 mil ion ($847 mil ion) in annual global revenues for all services and €25 mil ion ($28 mil ion) in in-country
revenues for covered services.

India. Adopted a 2% tax that applies to nonresident companies, and covers online sales of goods and services
to, or aimed at, persons in India. The tax applies to companies with annual revenues in excess of approximately
INR 20 mil ion ($265,000).

Indonesia. Adopted a 10% value-added tax on digital products and services provided by nonresident
companies with a “significant economic presence” in the Indonesian market, including music and video
streaming services, applications, and digital games. It wil be effective July 1, 2020.

Italy. Adopted a 3% tax on revenues from targeted advertising and digital interface services. The tax applies
to companies generating at least €750 mil ion ($847 mil ion) in global revenues for all services and €5.5 mil ion
($6 mil ion) in in-country revenues for covered services.

Spain. Adopted a 3% tax on revenues from targeted advertising and digital interface services that would apply
to companies generating at least €750 mil ion ($847 mil ion) in global revenues for all services and €3 mil ion
($3 mil ion) in in-country revenues for covered services. The DST wil go into effect in January 2021.

Turkey. Adopted a 7.5% tax on revenues from targeted advertising, social media, and digital interface services.
The tax applies to companies generating €750 mil ion ($847 mil ion) in global revenues from covered digital
services and TRY 20 mil ion ($3 mil ion) in in-country revenues from covered digital services. The Turkish
President has authority to increase the tax rate up to 15%.

United Kingdom. Adopted a 2% tax on revenues above £25 mil ion from internet search engines, social
media, and online marketplaces. The tax applies to companies generating at least £500 mil ion ($640 mil ion) in
global revenues from covered digital services and £25 mil ion ($32 mil ion) in in-country revenues from covered
services.
Under Consideration

159 Office of the USTR, “Notice of Action in the Section 301 Investigation of France’s Digital Services Tax,” 85
Federal Register 43292, July 16, 2020.
160 Ibid.
161 Bjarke Smith-Meyer and Elisa Braun, “France Reinstates Digital Tax, Courting Trade War: Bruno Le Maire Said
Digital Giants Musts Begin Paying Levy in December,” Politico, October 14, 2020.
162 Office of the USTR, “USTR Initiates Section 301 Investigations of Digital Services Taxes,” Press Release, June 2,
2020, and “Initiation of Section 301 Investigations of Digital Services Taxes,” 85 Federal Register 34709, June 5,
2020. For more detail, see CRS In Focus IF11564, Section 301 Investigations: Foreign Digital Services Taxes (DSTs),
by Andres B. Schwarzenberg.
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
Brazil. Considering a 1% to 5% tax (to be levied progressively) on revenues from targeted advertising and
digital interface services. It would apply to companies generating at least BRL 3 bil ion ($534 mil ion) in annual
global revenues and at least BRL 100 mil ion ($18 mil ion) in in-country revenues for covered digital services.

Czech Republic. Considering a 7% tax on revenues from targeted advertising and digital interface services. It
would apply to companies generating €750 mil ion ($847 mil ion) in annual global revenues for all services and
CZK 50 mil ion ($2 mil ion) in in-country revenues for covered services.

European Union. Considering a DST as part of the financing package for its proposed Coronavirus Disease
2019 (COVID-19) recovery plan. It is based on a 2018 DST proposal that would: (1) include a 3% tax on
revenues from targeted advertising and digital interface services, and (2) apply only to companies generating at
least €750 mil ion ($847 mil ion) in global revenues from covered digital services and at least €50 mil ion ($56
mil ion) in EU-wide revenues for covered services.
Source: Adapted from Office of the USTR, 85 Federal Register 34709 (June 6, 2020).
Note: Amounts stated in U.S. dol ars are approximate due to exchange rate fluctuations.
As part of the investigation, the agency may seek to address several issues, including
 Are the taxes discriminatory and do they burden or restrict U.S. commerce? Are
these jurisdictions unfairly aiming to tax certain U.S. firms?
 What are the implications of applying the taxes retroactively? Some taxes are (or
will be) applied retroactively, raising administrative and legal questions as to how
firms will be able to calculate their potential liabilities.
 Is the tax policy “unreasonable”? The USTR has indicated that these DSTs
appear to diverge from norms reflected in U.S. and international tax systems,
particularly because of their extraterritorial scope and their taxing of revenue
instead of income.
 Are the DSTs inconsistent with international commitments and obligations under
the WTO or other agreements?
 Does the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) cover digital
trade? If so, the USTR may invoke the dispute settlement procedures of the WTO
DSU.
The United States and more than 130 countries, comprising both members and nonmembers of
the OECD, are negotiating policy recommendations in an attempt to update the global tax system
and develop an international digital tax framework.163 The OECD Secretariat originally
announced its intent to conclude these negotiations by the end of 2020. However, due to the
COVID-19 pandemic and critical policy differences among countries, the organization as of
October 2020 was aiming to reach a deal by mid-2021.164 The European Commission has stated
that if work at the OECD level fails, the EU would go ahead with a common taxation framework
for digital services across the EU during the first half of 2021.165 EU officials are reportedly

163 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Action 1 Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation,”
Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS).
164 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalization—Report on
the Pillar Two Blueprint: Inclusive Framework on BEPS, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project,
October 9, 2020.
165 European Commission, “Remarks by Executive Vice-President Dombrovskis at the Informal ECOFIN Press
Conference,” Speech, September 12, 2020.
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hoping that an EU-wide DST would prevent the proliferation of unilateral measures by individual
EU member states that could fragment the single market.166
If an international tax agreement is not reached at the OECD in the near term, and the USTR
determines that the DST of any country under investigation is unreasonable or discriminatory and
burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, the USTR could seek to negotiate and enter into a binding
agreement that commits a trading partner to eliminate the tax policy or that provides
compensation to the United States. Absent mutual resolution, a likely scenario would be the
imposition of tariffs and the escalation of tensions in U.S. economic relations with these trading
partners. Should the United States impose retaliatory trade measures, the affected parties could
pursue WTO dispute settlement or retaliate by targeting U.S. exports.
Vietnam: Timber Trade and Currency Practices
On October 2, 2020, the USTR announced that it had initiated two separate Section 301
investigations with respect to Vietnam’s trade with the United States.167 The investigations pertain
to Vietnam’s acts, policies, and practices related to timber trade and currency valuation. The
USTR will review Vietnam’s importation of timber that may have been illegally harvested or
traded, used as input for its timber product-manufacturing sector, and subsequently exported to
the United States.168 In a separate investigation, the USTR will also review, in consultation with
the Department of the Treasury, any practices that may have contributed to the undervaluation of
Vietnam’s currency and impaired the competitiveness of U.S. exports.169 The USTR has
requested consultations with the government of Vietnam, sought public comments on any issue
covered by the investigations, and will held public hearings on December 28 and 29, 2020.170
The Trump Administration and some Members of Congress have expressed concern over the
rapidly growing U.S. merchandise trade deficit with Vietnam, which reached an all-time high of
$55.8 billion in 2019 (a 74% increase from the level registered in 2016).171 They have attributed
this trend primarily to Vietnam’s trade practices and unfair export competitiveness, which they
claim is afforded by manipulative currency undervaluation.172 Others contend that recent changes

166 See, for example, Deloitte, “European Union Alert: European Commission Proposes Tax on Digital Services,
Structural Changes to PE Rules,” March 23, 2018, and European Commission, “Commission Gathers Views on How to
Tax the Digital Economy Fairly and Effectively,” Press Release, October 26, 2017.
167 Office of the USTR, “USTR Initiates Vietnam Section 301 Investigation,” Press Release, October 2, 2020. For more
detail, see CRS In Focus IF11683, Section 301 Investigations: Vietnam’s Timber Trade and Currency Practices, by
Andres B. Schwarzenberg and Rebecca M. Nelson.
168 Office of the USTR, “Initiation of Section 301 Investigation: Vietnam’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to the
Import and Use of Illegal Timber,” 85 Federal Register 63639, October 8, 2020.
169 Office of the USTR, “Initiation of Section 301 Investigation: Vietnam’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to
Currency Valuation,” 85 Federal Register 63637, October 8, 2020.
170 For more detail, see Office of the USTR, “Notice of Public Hearing in Section 301 Investigation of Vietnam’s Acts,
Policies, and Practices Related to the Import and Use of Illegal Timber,” 85 Federal Register 75398, November 25,
2020, and “Notice of Public Hearing in Section 301 Investigation of Vietnam’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to
Currency Valuation,” 85 Federal Register 75397, November 25, 2020.
171 CRS calculations with data sourced from the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Census Bureau.
172 See, for example, David Lawder, “U.S. Treasury says Vietnam currency was undervalued in 2019 in tire probe
assessment,” Reuters, August 25, 2020; James Politi, “US Proposes Punishment For Countries That Manipulate
Currencies: President Trump Seeks To Inject Measures Preventing Devaluations Into Trade Deals,” Financial Times,
May 24, 2019; Dat Nguyen, “US Adds Vietnam to Currency Manipulation Watchlist,” VN Express International, May
29, 2019; Steve Goldstein, “Trump Threatens Vietnam, Which Has Been Benefiting From U.S. Tariffs on China,”
Market Watch, June 26, 2019; Reuters Staff, “After Trump Threat, Vietnam Says It Wants Free and Fair Trade with
U.S.,” Reuters, June 28, 2019; and John Boudreau and Michelle Jamrisko, “Lighthizer Says Vietnam Must Cut Its
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in the sources of U.S. imports are due mainly to other factors. For example, manufacturing
companies are reportedly relocating production from other countries in Asia to Vietnam to take
advantage of lower costs and to avoid Section 301 tariffs on U.S. imports from China.173 In
August 2020, the Department of the Treasury found that Vietnam—through its central bank, the
State Bank of Vietnam (SBV)—deliberately undervalued its currency against the U.S. dollar in
2019.174 The assessment is part of a countervailing duty (CVD) investigation by the Department
of Commerce, which, as of this year, is allowed to consider currency undervaluation in its subsidy
investigations.
Import and Use of Illegal Timber
During the past decade, Vietnam has become one of the world’s largest exporting countries of
timber and timber products, with exports valued at approximately $9.5 billion in 2019.175 As a
processing hub, Vietnam is heavily reliant on imports of timber harvested in other countries,
particularly for the manufacturing and export of high-end products such as furniture. According to
the USTR, a significant portion of the timber inputs used in these products may have been
illegally harvested or traded.176 The agency further asserts that some of that timber may be from
species listed under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora (CITES).177 As parties to the Convention, both the United States and Vietnam are bound
by CITES provisions designed to curb illegal timber trade.178
The main destination market for Vietnam’s exports was the United States (48%).179 In announcing
the investigation, the USTR noted that “[u]sing illegal timber in wood products exported to the
U.S. market harms the environment and is unfair to U.S. workers and businesses who follow the
rules by using legally harvested timber.”180 In 2019, Vietnam was the third largest supplier of U.S.
timber and timber-based product imports, after Canada and China. U.S. imports from Vietnam of
these products totaled $5.8 billion—of which $3.7 billion accounted for wooden furniture (Figure
8).181 In nominal terms, this is up 34% from 2018, and it represents a 77% increase from 2016.

Trade Surplus with U.S.,” Bloomberg, July 29, 2019.
173 See, for example, Brad W. Setser, “Vietnam Looks To Be Winning Trump’s Trade War,” Council on Foreign
Relations, May 27, 2019, and Paul Wiseman, Anne D'innocenzio, and Joe McDonald, “Facing Trump’s Tariffs, Some
Companies Move, Change or Wait,” AP News, July 18, 2019. See, also, Chuin-Wei Yap, “American Tariffs on China
Are Being Blunted by Trade Cheats,” The Wall Street Journal, June 26, 2019, and Eamon Barrett, “Vietnam Is
Receiving Diverted U.S. Orders from China. That Doesn’t Mean It’s Winning the Trade War,” Fortune, July 18, 2019.
174 For more detail on how countries can allegedly use policies to manipulate the value of their currency to gain an
unfair trade advantage against other countries, see CRS In Focus IF10049, Debates over Currency Manipulation, by
Rebecca M. Nelson.
175 CRS calculations using data sourced from UN Comtrade Database.
176 Office of the USTR, “Initiation of Section 301 Investigation: Vietnam’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to the
Import and Use of Illegal Timber,” 85 Federal Register 63639, October 8, 2020.
177 Ibid.
178 See, for example, Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, “CITES
Conference to Strengthen Wildlife Trade Rules for Fisheries, Timber, Exotic Pets, Elephants and More,” Press Release,
August 7, 2019.
179 CRS calculations using data sourced from UN Comtrade Database.
180 Office of the USTR, “USTR Initiates Vietnam Section 301 Investigation,” Press Release, October 2, 2020.
181 CRS calculations using data sourced from the U.S. International Trade Commission’s DataWeb.
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Figure 8. U.S. Imports from Vietnam: Timber and Timber-Based Products

Source: Congressional Research Service with data from USITC’s DataWeb.
Notes: Not adjusted for inflation. *Calculations do not include wood pulp, paper and paperboard, and printed
books and newspapers.
In light of these concerns, the USTR is to address several issues in its ongoing investigation,
including
 Is Vietnam importing illegal timber to supply the inputs needed for its timber-
manufacturing sector?182 Are these imports inconsistent with Vietnam’s domestic
laws (e.g., those concerning the import, processing, and re-export of timber), the
laws of exporting countries, or international agreements and commitments? The
agency is to examine whether timber imported by Vietnam has been harvested
against the laws of source countries, particularly those of Cambodia, and traded
illegally—for example, in violation of log export bans, CITES, or U.S. wildlife
trade laws and regulations.
 Do Vietnamese officials improperly record the origin of timber crossing the
Cambodia-Vietnam border, facilitate illegal timber imports, or allow the
importation of CITES-listed species based on invalid permits?183 The USTR is to
investigate if certain aspects of the importation and processing of this timber may
violate Vietnam’s domestic laws and be inconsistent with CITES. The agency
alleges that timber processors in Vietnam may be failing to ensure the lawful
origins of the timber they use and that Vietnamese authorities may not be
enforcing import or re-export permits or certification requirements.
 To what extent are products made in Vietnam from illegal timber, including
wooden furniture, imported into the United States?184 The agency seeks to
determine if Vietnam’s practices related to the import and use of illegal timber
burden or restrict U.S. commerce and what actions the United States should take
to address them.

182 Office of the USTR, “Initiation of Section 301 Investigation: Vietnam’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to the
Import and Use of Illegal Timber,” 85 Federal Register 63639, October 8, 2020.
183 Ibid.
184 Ibid.
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Currency Valuation
The government of Vietnam, through the SBV, tightly manages the value of its currency—the
Vietnamese dong. (SBV’s management of the dong is tied closely to the U.S. dollar.) The USTR
reviewed evidence that indicates that the dong has been undervalued in recent years, which may
be due, in part, to SBV’s active intervention in the foreign exchange market.185 In announcing the
investigation, U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer stated that “unfair currency practices
can harm U.S. workers and businesses that compete with Vietnamese products that may be
artificially lower-priced because of currency undervaluation.”186
The USTR seeks to determine whether Vietnam’s currency practices are unreasonable or
discriminatory, and whether they burden or restrict U.S. commerce. Specifically, the investigation
will focus on (1) whether SBV’s interventions in exchange markets contribute to the
undervaluation of the dong; (2) the specific acts, policies, or practices that may contribute such
undervaluation; (3) the nature and level of burden or restriction on U.S. commerce caused by
these practices, particularly the undervaluation of the dong; and (4) the actions the United States
should take to address them.187 In conducting its investigation, the USTR stated that it would
work with the Department of the Treasury on matters related to currency valuation and exchange
rate policies. The investigation is ongoing.
Tariff Exclusions on U.S. Imports from China
As noted above, in 2018 the USTR determined, pursuant to an investigation under Section 301,
that China’s acts, policies, and practices related to technology transfer, IP, and innovation are
unreasonable or discriminatory, and burden or restrict U.S. commerce. To counter them and
obtain their elimination, the Trump Administration imposed, under Section 301, four rounds of
additional tariffs of up to 25% on approximately two-thirds of U.S. imports from China (under
four separate actions, per Lists 1, 2, 3, and 4).
During the Section 301 notice, hearing, and comment period on proposed tariff increases, the
USTR heard from numerous U.S. stakeholders who expressed concerns about how additional
tariffs could affect their businesses, as well as the possible impact on U.S. consumers. In
response, for each Section 301 action regarding a new list of covered products, the USTR
instituted “tariff exclusions” for certain U.S. imports from China that would otherwise be subject
to tariffs whereby interested parties could request that a particular product be excluded from the
tariffs, subject to certain criteria. This was the first and only time that the agency has established
an exclusion request process, and several Members of Congress raised concerns about its
implementation.188 (The USTR has not established an exclusion process for U.S. imports from the

185 In January 2020, the U.S. Department of the Treasury found that Vietnam and nine other major trading partners
warranted placement on Treasury’s “Monitoring List” of major trading partners that merit close attention to their
currency practices. (U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Releases Report on Macroeconomic and Foreign
Exchange Policies of Major Trading Partners of the United States,” Press Release, January 13, 2020.). For more recent
developments, see, for example, David Lawder, “U.S. Treasury says Vietnam currency was undervalued in 2019 in tire
probe assessment,” Reuters, August 25, 2020; Michelle Jamrisko, “U.S. Treasury Says Vietnam Deliberately
Weakened Currency,” Bloomberg, August 25, 2020.
186 Office of the USTR, “USTR Initiates Vietnam Section 301 Investigation,” Press Release, October 2, 2020.
187 Office of the USTR, “Initiation of Section 301 Investigation: Vietnam’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to
Currency Valuation,” 85 Federal Register 63637, October 8, 2020.
188 See, for example, Representative Ron Kind, “Rep. Ron Kind Introduces Bipartisan Bill to Establish a Section 301
Exclusion Process for Tariffs,” Press Release, February 28, 2019, and Representative Jackie Walorski, “Walorski, Kind
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EU subject to Section 301 tariffs.) Title III of the Trade Act of 1974 does not outline a formal
process for exclusions or require the USTR to establish one. The determination to do so appears
to be solely at the USTR’s discretion.
In particular, some Members and stakeholders have questioned USTR’s ability to “pick winners
and losers” through granting or denying requests, or have pushed for broad tariff relief amid
concerns about the negative impact of tariffs on the U.S. economy.189 Others, however, not
wanting to undermine the use of Section 301 to address China’s unfair trade practices, have
discouraged the USTR from granting tariff exclusions at all.190 To date, the agency has
established an exclusion process for each of the four stages of tariff increases under Section
301—all of which have now closed.191
The USTR’s latest action in response to the COVID-19 pandemic seems to suggest that new
exclusions might be limited in scope to apply to trade in medical supplies related to COVID-19,
and not be aimed at providing broader tariff relief.192 The agency has prioritized the review of
exclusion requests concerning medical products, resulting in new exclusions for some personal
protective equipment (PPE) in short supply. Separately, the USTR requested public comments on
whether to remove additional products covered by any tariff list that are relevant to the U.S.
response to COVID-19.193
Tariff Exclusion Process
The tariff exclusion process enabled interested parties—including law firms, trade associations,
and customs brokers, among others—to petition for an exemption from the Section 301 tariff
increases for specific imports classified within a 10-digit Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the
United States (HTSUS) subheading. The time window to submit new exclusion requests closed in
January 2020, but the USTR is considering extensions of exclusions granted from Lists 1, 2, 3,
and 4. While the USTR approved, on average, 35% of requests under the first two actions, the
approval rates under the third and four actions were 5% and 7%, respectively.194
According to the USTR, all requests are evaluated on a case-by-case basis.195 The agency has
indicated that, in determining which requests to grant, it considers the following:

Introduce Bicameral, Bipartisan Bill to Establish a Section 301 Exclusion Process,” February 28, 2019. For a list of
legislation introduced in the 116th Congress to alter the President’s trade authorities under Section 301, see Table B-1.
189 See, for example, Ed Crooks and Fan Fei, “Trade War Winners and Losers Grapple with Trump Tariff Chaos,”
Financial Times, July 23, 2018.
190 Since first announcing the procedures and criteria related to requests for product exclusions, the USTR has indicated
that it evaluates each request “on a case-by-case basis, taking into account whether the exclusion would undermine the
objective of the Section 301 investigation.” See, for example, Office of the USTR, “Procedures to Consider Requests
for Exclusion of Particular Products from the Determination of Action Pursuant to Section 301: China’s Acts, Policies,
and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation,” 83 Federal Register 32181, July
11, 2018.
191 For more detail on the exclusion process for each of the four stages, see Office of the USTR, “China Section 301—
Tariff Actions and Exclusion Process.”
192 Office of the USTR, “Request for Comments on Additional Modifications to the 301 Action to Address COVID-19:
China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation,” 85
Federal Register 16987, March 25, 2020.
193 Office of the USTR, “USTR: Response to Coronavirus Crisis,” Press Release, March 20, 2020.
194 CRS calculations based on information sourced from the Office of the USTR, “China Section 301—Tariff Actions
and Exclusion Process.”
195 See, for example, Office of the USTR, “Procedures to Consider Requests for Exclusion of Particular Products from
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1. availability of the product in question from non-Chinese sources,
2. attempts by the importer to source the product from the United States or third
countries,
3. the extent to which the imposition of Section 301 tariffs on the particular product
will cause severe economic harm to the importer or other U.S. interests, and
4. the strategic importance of the product to “Made in China 2025” or other Chinese
industrial programs.196
Past exclusions also have been granted for reasons that are thought to include, among others, U.S.
national security interests and demonstrable economic hardship from the tariffs for small
businesses.
There is no timetable for providing responses to filed requests, but the agency periodically
announces decisions on pending requests through Federal Register notices. The “index” on the
USTR Exclusion Portal also indicates the status of each request in the review process: (1) Public
Comment Period; (2) Initial Substantive Review; (3) Administrability Review; (4) Publication in
Progress; (5) Granted; and (6) Denied.197 When the USTR issues an exclusion, it is generally
valid for one year after the exclusion notice is published in the Federal Register and retroactive to
the imposition of the tariffs (with the starting date varying by applicable list). Exclusions are not
specific to the requestor, so any party importing a product covered by an exclusion may take
advantage of the exclusion and request retroactive tariff refunds from U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP).198
Through January 31, 2020, the USTR received a total of 52,746 exclusion requests, pertinent to
all four actions (Figure 9).199 Of these, 6,804 (13%) have been granted and 45,942 (87%) have
been denied (as of December 8, 2020). Specifically, the exclusions are reflected in approximately
90 10-digit HTSUS tariff subheadings and 2,120 specially prepared product descriptions—all of
which cover 6,804 separate requests. Because most exclusions apply to specific products within a
relevant subheading, and not to entire subheadings, CRS cannot determine the exact amount of
trade covered by the exclusions. The USTR has also issued extensions to certain exclusions that
have expired or are set to expire soon. These apply to 42 (of the 89) HTSUS subheadings and 507
(of the 2,120) specially prepared product descriptions.

the Determination of Action Pursuant to Section 301: China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology
Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation,” 83 Federal Register 32181, July 11, 2018.
196 Ibid. For more detail on “Made in China 2025,” see CRS In Focus IF10964, “Made in China 2025” Industrial
Policies: Issues for Congress, by Karen M. Sutter.
197 Office of the USTR, “USTR Comments Portal: Public Dockets.”
198 See, for example, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Guidance: Section 301 Product Exclusions from Tranche
4A—$300B Round from China,” CSMS #41955151, March 9, 2020. According to CBP, “[t]o request a refund of
Section 301 duties paid on previous imports of products granted duty exclusions by the USTR, importers may file a
Post Summary Correction (PSC) if within the PSC filing timeframe.”
199 CRS calculations based on information sourced from the Office of the USTR, “China Section 301—Tariff Actions
and Exclusion Process.”
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Figure 9. Section 301 Exclusions and Extensions Related to U.S. Imports from China

Source: Congressional Research Service with information from the Office of the USTR.
Notes: Figures may not reflect amendments to product specific exclusions and do not include requests
submitted on or after 03/25/2020 in response to 85 Federal Register 16987. However, those earlier requests may
have informed exclusions granted to date and noted here.
COVID-19 and Medical-Care Products
The USTR announced on March 20, 2020, that even prior to the COVID-19 outbreak, it had been
working with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) “to ensure that critical
medicines and other essential medical products were not subject to additional Section 301
tariffs.”200 Consequently, the United States has not imposed tariffs on certain critical medical
products, such as ventilators, oxygen masks, and nebulizers. Moreover, the USTR indicated that,
in recent months, it had prioritized the review of requests for exclusions on medical care
products, resulting in exclusions granted on basic medical supplies, including gloves, soaps,
medical-quality facemasks, surgical drapes, and hospital gowns.
Since March 2020, the USTR has exempted certain medical products from Section 301 tariffs in
several rounds of exclusions.201 CRS could not determine exactly how many of these products
have been exempted on the basis of COVID-19 concerns, as the USTR does not specify the
rationale for granting exclusions in its announcements. While some products can be easily
identified, there are others with known or potential medical uses—or inputs for the manufacture
thereof—that have received exclusions but whose ultimate purpose cannot always be ascertained
from HTSUS subheadings or the product descriptions provided (e.g., organic chemicals or
textiles for the manufacture of pharmaceuticals or PPE).
New Exclusion Process?
In March 25, 2020, the USTR published a Federal Register notice seeking comments over a
three-month period to determine if further modifications to the Section 301 tariffs on U.S. imports

200 Office of the USTR, “USTR: Response to Coronavirus Crisis,” Press Release, March 20, 2020.
201 For more detail on all exclusions granted, see Office of the USTR, “China Section 301—Tariff Actions and
Exclusion Process.”
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from China are necessary to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States.202
Specifically, the agency requested comments on whether to remove Section 301 duties on
“medical-care products” related to the COVID-19 response.203 Comments could be submitted
regarding any medical product subject to Section 301 tariffs, whether or not it was subject to a
pending or denied exclusion request.
The notice provided no further guidance on the types of products that the USTR considers to be
“medical-care products.” Petitioners were required to “identify [specifically] the particular
product of concern and explain precisely how the product relates to the response to the COVID-
19 outbreak.”204 For example, comments could “address whether a product is directly used to
treat COVID-19 or to limit the outbreak, and/or whether the product is used in the production of
needed medical-care products.”205 In addition, commenters were asked to include, to the extent
possible, the 10-digit “subheading of the HTSUS applicable to the product, and the identity of the
particular product in terms of its functionality and physical characteristics (e.g., dimensions,
material composition, or other characteristics).”206
The review of comments runs parallel to, and is not to affect, any ongoing product exclusion
requests still under review.207 The USTR has not indicated what form the response will take or
when it will respond to comments—only that it will review them on a rolling basis. These
comments may already be informing product exclusion decisions, or may lead to the
establishment of a new formal exclusion process, akin to that used for Lists 3 and 4A, but strictly
for medical products. In August 2020, some Members introduced a bill to suspend all duties,
including Section 301 tariffs, on imports of articles needed to combat the COVID-19
pandemic.208
Tariff Exclusions and Congressional Action
In recent years, some Members have raised the issue with the USTR of establishing or
streamlining an exclusion process during hearings and in letters to the USTR. For instance, for
the third and largest action (List 3), a bipartisan group of more than 160 Representatives urged the
Trump Administration to consider granting exclusions. Subsequently, the joint explanatory

202 The comment period remained opened until June 25, 2020. Office of the USTR, “USTR: Response to Coronavirus
Crisis,” Press Release, March 20, 2020, and “Request for Comments on Additional Modifications to the 301 Action to
Address COVID-19: China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and
Innovation,” 85 Federal Register 16987, March 25, 2020.
203 Office of the USTR, “FAQs for Request for Comments on Additional Modifications to the 301 Action to Address
COVID-19: China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and
Innovation,” June 26, 2020.
204 Office of the USTR, “Request for Comments on Additional Modifications to the 301 Action to Address COVID-19:
China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation,” 85
Federal Register 16987, March 25, 2020.
205 Ibid.
206 Ibid.
207 Office of the USTR, “FAQs for Request for Comments on Additional Modifications to the 301 Action to Address
COVID-19: China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and
Innovation,” June 26, 2020.
208 On August 8, 2020, Senators Pat Toomey and Margaret Wood Hassan introduced S. 4497, “Stop PPE Taxes Act of
2020.” The bill would suspend—through December 31, 2022—any duty imposed on specified articles and articles
identified by the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) as related to the response to COVID-19, including any
duty imposed pursuant to (1) Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, (2) Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of
1962, or (3) the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.
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statement to the FY2019 appropriations law (P.L. 116-6) directed the USTR to establish a product
exclusion process for that third stage of tariffs within 30 days of the law’s enactment. During the
first session of the 116th Congress, some Members introduced legislation to limit USTR’s
discretion on whether and how to grant or deny exclusion requests. These proposals included the
American Business Tariff Relief Act of 2019 (S. 2362) and the Import Tax Relief Act of 2019 (S.
577/H.R. 1452).
Court Challenge to Section 301
On September 10, 2020, importers of vinyl tile—HMTX Industries LLC, Halstead New England
Corporation, and Metroflor Corporation—filed a complaint at the U.S. Court of International
Trade (USCIT) challenging both the substantive and procedural processes followed by the USTR
when instituting Section 301 tariffs under List 3, and subsequently List 4A (HMTX Industries
LLC et al. v. United States).209 The complaint alleges that USTR’s imposition of these tariffs
violated the Trade Act of 1974 because: (1) the action was taken more than a year after USTR
initiated the underlying Section 301 investigation; (2) the rationale and justification to take the
action were unrelated to the acts, policies, or practices that USTR investigated pursuant to the
underlying Section 301 investigation; and (3) the statute does not authorize the USTR “to
increase tariff actions that are no longer ‘appropriate,’ but rather only to delay, taper, or terminate
such actions.”210
In addition, the plaintiffs allege that the manner in which in the tariff action was implemented
violated the Administrative Procedure Act211 because the USTR: (1) exceeded its authority under
the 1974 Act; (2) did not “offer any evidence for any asserted ‘increased burden’ from China’s
intellectual property policies and practices that were the subject of USTR’s Section 301
investigation,” and (3) “did not provide a sufficient opportunity for comment, failed to
meaningfully consider relevant factors when making their decisions, and failed to adequately
explain their rationale.”212 As of September 20, 2020, more than 3,000 companies had joined
HMTX Industries LLC et al. in filing lawsuits at the USCIT against the Trump Administration’s
use of Section 301 tariffs.213
Role of Congress
Congress exerts oversight by reviewing, monitoring, and supervising USTR’s activities, exercise
of authorities, and implementation of actions taken under Title III of the Trade Act of 1974. In
addition, the USTR is required to report to Congress regularly on a number of matters. These
include

209 U.S. Court of International Trade, HMTX Industries LLC, Halstead New England Corporation, and Metroflor
Corporation vs. United States of America; Office of the United States Trade Representative; Robert E. Lighthizer, U.S.
Trade Representative; U.S. Customs & Border Protection; Mark A. Morgan, U.S. Customs & Border Protection Acting
Commissioner, Court No. 20-00177, September 10, 2020. For more detail, see CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10553, Section
301 Tariffs on Goods from China: International and Domestic Legal Challenges, by Nina M. Hart and Brandon J.
Murrill.
210 Ibid.
211 5 U.S.C. Chapter 5: Administrative Procedure.
212 Ibid.
213 John Brew, “HTMX et al. v. United States – An (ongoing?) Opportunity for Importers to Recover Section 301
Tariffs Paid on Section 301 List 3 (and List 4a) Products,” LexBlog, September 23, 2020.
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Update on Section 301 Investigations. The USTR is required to submit, on a biannual basis, a
report to the House of Representatives and Senate describing petitions filed or investigations
initiated under Section 301, the determinations made, and actions taken. The report must also
provide updates on the development and status of ongoing investigations and on the
implementation of agreements entered into as part of past investigations.214
Modification or Termination of Section 301 Investigations. The USTR may modify or
terminate any Section 301 action, subject to the specific direction, if any, of the President and
criteria set forth in legislation.215 The USTR is required to publish notice of the modification or
termination in the Federal Register and submit a written report to Congress on the reasons for
doing so.216
Delaying Request for Consultation with Foreign Governments. During a Section 301
investigation, the USTR may, after consulting with the petitioner (if any), delay for up to 90 days
any request for consultations with the foreign government concerned for the purpose of verifying
or improving the petition to ensure an adequate basis for consultation. If consultations are
delayed, the USTR is required to publish notice of the delay in the Federal Register and report to
Congress on the reasons for delaying consultations in its semiannual report to the House of
Representatives and the Senate.217
Notice of Inability to Resolve Issues through Formal Dispute Settlement. In Section 301 cases
involving a trade agreement, if a dispute is not resolved before the close of the minimum dispute
settlement period provided for in the agreement, the USTR is required to submit a report to
Congress, within 15 days after the close of such period, setting forth the reasons why the dispute
was not resolved, the status of the case, and the prospects for resolution.218
Export Targeting Assessment.219 If the USTR makes an affirmative determination in a Section
301 investigation involving export targeting by a foreign country and determines to take no
action, the USTR shall establish an advisory panel to recommend measures that will promote the
competitiveness of the domestic industry affected by the export targeting. By no later than six
months after it is established, the advisory panel shall submit to the USTR and to Congress a
report on measures that it recommends be taken by the United States to promote the
competitiveness of the affected industry.220
Based on the recommendations of the report, and subject to the specific direction, if any, of the
President, the USTR may take any administrative actions authorized under any other provision of
law, and, if necessary, propose legislation to implement any other actions, that would restore or
improve the industry’s international competitiveness. By no later than 30 days after the

214 19 U.S.C. § 2419(3).
215 Specifically, 19 U.S.C. § 2417(a)(1).
216 19 U.S.C. § 2417(b).
217 19 U.S.C. § 2413(b)(2)(B), as required under 19 U.S.C. § 2419(a)(3).
218 19 U.S.C. § 2414(a)(4).
219 The term “export targeting” refers to any foreign government plan or scheme consisting of a combination of
coordinated actions (whether carried out severally or jointly) that are bestowed on a specific enterprise, industry, or
group thereof, the effect of which is to assist the enterprise, industry, or group to become more competitive in the
export of a class or kind of merchandise (19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3)(E)).
220 19 U.S.C. § 2415(b)(2)(B).
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Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Origin, Evolution, and Use

submission of the panel report, the USTR is to submit a report to Congress on actions taken and
proposals made.221
Trade Enforcement Priorities under Section 310
 The USTR is required to consult, by no later than May 31 of each calendar year,
with the Senate Committee on Finance and the House Committee on Ways and
Means on acts, policies, or practices of foreign governments that raise concerns
with respect to obligations under the WTO Agreements or any other U.S. trade
agreement, or that otherwise create or maintain barriers to U.S. goods, services,
or investment.222
 The USTR is required to report, by no later than July 31 of each calendar year, to
the Senate Committee on Finance and the House Committee on Ways and Means
on acts, policies, or practices of foreign governments identified as trade
enforcement priorities (based on consultations and criteria set forth in statute).223
When reporting to the committees, the USTR is also required to include, as
relevant, a description of actions taken to address trade enforcement priorities
identified in preceding calendar years.224
 The USTR is required to consult, at the same time as the reporting above225 and
no later than January 31 of each calendar year, with the Senate Committee on
Finance and the House Committee on Ways and Means on acts, policies, or
practices of foreign governments of concern with respect to obligations under the
WTO Agreements or any other U.S. trade agreement, or that otherwise create or
maintain trade barriers to U.S. goods, services, or investment.226 In consultations,
the USTR is required to address (1) those acts, policies, and practices that the
agency is actively investigating,227 (2) all ongoing enforcement actions taken by
or against the United States,228 and (3) the availability of resources and
constraints on monitoring and enforcement activities.229
 The USTR is required to notify and consult with the Senate Committee on
Finance and the House Committee on Ways and Means in advance of the
initiation of any formal trade dispute by or against the United States taken in
regard to an obligation under the WTO Agreements or any other U.S. trade
agreement.230 The USTR is also required to notify and consult with the
committees in advance of the announced or anticipated circulation of any report

221 19 U.S.C. § 2415(b)(1)(C).
222 19 U.S.C. § 2420(a)(1).
223 19 U.S.C. § 2420(a)(3)(A). Specifically, based on consultations under 19 U.S.C. § 2420(a)(1) and criteria set forth in
19 U.S.C. § 2420(a)(2).
224 19 U.S.C. § 2420(a)(3)(B).
225 Specifically, under 19 U.S.C. § 2420(a)(3).
226 19 U.S.C. § 2420(b)(1).
227 19 U.S.C. § 2420(b)(3).
228 19 U.S.C. § 2420(b)(4).
229 19 U.S.C. § 2420(b)(5).
230 19 U.S.C. § 2420(d)(1).
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of a WTO dispute settlement panel or the Appellate Body or of a dispute
settlement panel under any other U.S. trade agreement.231
Priority Foreign Countries. The USTR is not required to initiate a Section 301 investigation
with respect to any act, policy, or practice of a “Priority Foreign Country” if doing so would be
detrimental to U.S. economic interests.232 (For more detail, see “Intellectual Property
Enforcement and Section 301.”) If the agency makes such a determination, then the USTR is
required to submit to Congress a written report setting forth the reasons for the determination and
the U.S. economic interests that would be adversely affected by the investigation.233
Outlook and Issues for Congress
Congress plays a major role in shaping U.S. trade policy through its legislative and oversight
authority. Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to “regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations” and to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises.”
Congress exercises this authority in numerous ways, including the enactment of laws authorizing
trade programs and measures to address unfair and other trade practices. Congress also conducts
oversight of trade policies, programs, and agreements. These include such areas as U.S. trade
agreement negotiations, tariffs and nontariff barriers, trade remedy laws, import and export
policies, economic sanctions, and the trade policy functions of the federal government. In many
of these areas, particularly in the negotiation of trade agreements and U.S. efforts to eliminate
unfair foreign trade barriers against U.S. exports and investment abroad, Congress has delegated
certain authorities to the President. Section 301 is one of these congressionally delegated trade
authorities.
Since the establishment of the WTO, the United States has generally pursued bilateral and
multilateral negotiations with many of its trading partners to resolve disagreements or diffuse
tensions over discrete issues and achieve expanded market access for U.S. firms. The United
States has also resorted to the multilateral forum provided by the WTO to settle trade disputes,
and it has used Section 301 authorities primarily to build cases and pursue dispute settlement
there. The Trump Administration has been more willing to act unilaterally, and its use of
delegated authorities to impose Section 301 tariffs as punitive measures has been the subject of
congressional and broader international debate. While some Members of Congress have
applauded the Section 301 actions by the Trump Administration or called for more active use of
trade authorities, others have decried unilateral trade sanctions under Section 301 as an
undesirable shift in U.S. trade policy that could undermine the multilateral trading system.234
Whether a more unilateral approach to trade disputes will become a prominent feature of U.S.
trade negotiations remains to be seen.
Current Debate over the Use of Section 301
In light of the Trump Administration’s more active use of trade authorities, many Members of
Congress, U.S. businesses, interest groups, and trade partners have raised questions about the

231 19 U.S.C. § 2420(d)(2).
232 Specifically, a foreign country identified under 19 U.S.C. § 2242(a)(2).
233 19 U.S.C. § 2412(b)(2)(C).
234 See, for example, Adam Behsudi, “Duffy Finds 18 Co-sponsors for Bill to Increase Trump’s Tariff Powers,”
Politico, January 23, 2019, and Clark Packard and Philip Wallach, “Restraining the President: Congress and Trade
Policy,” R Street Policy Study No. 158, November 2018.
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economic and broader policy implications of imposing unilateral trade restrictions under Section
301.235 The Trump Administration and some U.S. stakeholders, including some domestic
producers, argue that Section 301 tariffs and other import restrictions are necessary to level the
playing field for U.S. firms and workers.236 In their view, Section 301 tariffs are meant, in part, to
obtain the elimination of foreign protectionist policies and practices that impair the
competitiveness of U.S. exporters and investors abroad.237 The Administration and some
Members also contend that while past trade negotiations and agreements have lowered or
eliminated U.S. trade restrictions, they have failed to enhance reciprocal market access for U.S.
firms and workers.238 Section 301 tariffs can potentially incentivize U.S. trading partners to enter
into negotiations to achieve broader trade barrier reductions and develop new trade rules on issues
not adequately covered by existing WTO agreements.
Some analysts and trading partners, on the other hand, are concerned that Section 301 tariffs—or
threat thereof—threaten the U.S. and global economies and the rules-based multilateral trading
system that the United States helped to establish following World War II.239 They emphasize that
the economic repercussions of U.S. actions are felt not only by U.S. consumers and producers
who rely on imports subject to Section 301 tariffs, but also by U.S. exporters targeted for
retaliation.240 Some companies also report that the uncertainty resulting from the unpredictable
nature of the U.S. and retaliatory actions has made long-term planning difficult.241 This may be
affecting U.S. and global economic activity, and it could result in disrupted global supply chains
(as firms find ways to avoid tariffs), job losses, deferred investments, lost profits, and lost export
markets.
In addition, some Members and U.S. trading partners contend that the Trump Administration’s
Section 301 tariffs undermine—and potentially violate—WTO rules and could lead to a tit-for-tat
escalation of trade-restrictive measures around the world.242 They see the imposition of U.S. trade

235 See, for example, Mark Zandi, Jesse Rogers, and Maria Cosma, “Trade War Chicken: The Tariffs and the Damage
Done,” Analysis, Moody’s Analytics, September 2019; Shawn Donnan and Reade Pickert, “Trump’s China Buying
Spree Unlikely to Cover Trade War’s Costs,” Bloomberg, December 18, 2019; and Mary Amiti, Sang Hoon Kong, and
David E. Weinstein, “The Investment Cost of the U.S.-China Trade War,” Liberty Street Economics, Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, May 28, 2020.
236 See, for example, Office of the USTR, Findings of the Investigation into China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices
Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974,
March 22, 2018.
237 See, for example, Office of the USTR, “Statement by U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer on Section 301
Action,” Press Release, July 10, 2018.
238 See, for example, Office of the USTR, 2019 Trade Policy Agenda and 2018 Annual Report of the President of the
United States on the Trade Agreements Program, March 2019.
239 See, for example, “EU Backs China’s WTO Challenge of U.S. Section 301 Tariffs,” Inside U.S. Trade, September
27, 2020, Vol. 37, No. 38; and Colin Patch, “A Unilateral President vs. A Multilateral Trade Organization: Ethical
Implications In The Ongoing Trade War,” The Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics, 2019, Vol. 32, pp. 883-902.
240 See, for example, Mark Zandi, Jesse Rogers, and Maria Cosma, “Trade War Chicken: The Tariffs and the Damage
Done,” Analysis, Moody’s Analytics, September 2019; Shawn Donnan and Reade Pickert, “Trump’s China Buying
Spree Unlikely to Cover Trade War’s Costs,” Bloomberg, December 18, 2019; and Mary Amiti, Sang Hoon Kong, and
David E. Weinstein, “The Investment Cost of the U.S.-China Trade War,” Liberty Street Economics, Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, May 28, 2020.
241 For a discussion on the effects of uncertainty, see, for example, Eddy Bekkers and Sofia Schroeter, “An Economic
Analysis of the US-China Trade Conflict,” Staff Working Paper ERSD-2020-04, World Trade Organization, Economic
Research and Statistics Division, March 19, 2020; and Aaron Flaaen and Justin Pierce, “Disentangling the Effects of
the 2018-2019 Tariffs on a Globally Connected U.S. Manufacturing Sector,” Finance and Economics Discussion Series
2019-086, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, December 23, 2019.
242 See, for example, World Bank, Global Economic Prospects: The Turning of the Tide?, June 2018; Wang Yong,
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restrictions as an undesirable shift in U.S. trade policy, and they argue that the United States
should make use of WTO dispute settlement procedures to address U.S. trade concerns rather
than resorting to unilateral action. In contrast, the Trump Administration has argued that Section
301 tariffs are justified as a response to violations of existing commitments under the WTO by
other trading partners, particularly China.243 In response to the President’s actions, China and
some U.S.-based importers have challenged Section 301 tariffs in international and domestic legal
fora, and the outcome of these cases could have implications for the United States and the future
of the multilateral trading system.244
Potential Options and Questions for Congress
The use of Section 301 authorities to impose trade restrictions on U.S. imports does not require
formal approval by Congress or an affirmative finding by an independent agency such as the U.S.
International Trade Commission. As a result, the President has broad discretion in determining
when and how to act. Should Congress disapprove the President’s exercise of authorities and
implementation of actions taken under Title III of the Trade Act of 1974, Members’ current
recourse is largely limited to passing new legislation or using informal tools to pressure the
Administration to change course. Some Members and observers have suggested that Congress
should require additional steps in the Section 301 process in order to promote transparency,
consistency, and proper application of authorities and to ensure that the President and the USTR
carry out Section 301 objectives as prescribed by Congress.
In the 116th Congress, debate over congressional and executive powers to regulate tariffs has
generated multiple proposals to revise the President’s trade authorities to take action under
Section 301, along with other reforms (Table B-1). The majority of these proposals would expand
the role of Congress in determining whether or not to impose tariffs, for example, by requiring
congressional approval before certain presidential trade actions can go into effect. Two bills
introduced during the 116th Congress would grant the President additional authorities to increase
tariff rates.245
As debates continue, Congress may consider the following:
 Has the use of Section 301 in recent years been in line with congressional intent
in crafting the delegated authorities to the President?
 What is the impact of taking unilateral actions to impose tariffs under Section
301—and of retaliatory tariffs by trading partners—on U.S. consumers and
different sectors of the U.S. economy?

“The U.S. and China: Domestic Adjustment and Trade Relations Crisis,” AmCham Shanghai, January 23, 2019; “EU
Backs China’s WTO Challenge of U.S. Section 301 Tariffs,” Inside U.S. Trade, September 27, 2020, Vol. 37, No. 38;
and Colin Patch, “A Unilateral President vs. A Multilateral Trade Organization: Ethical Implications In The Ongoing
Trade War,” The Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics, 2019, Vol. 32, pp. 883-902.
243 See, for example, Office of the USTR, 2019 Trade Policy Agenda and 2018Annual Report of the President of the
United States on the Trade Agreements Program, March 2019, and “Statement by U.S. Trade Representative Robert
Lighthizer on Section 301 Action,” Press Release, July 10, 2018.
244 Since April 2018, China has filed three WTO cases challenging Section 301 tariffs. The WTO cases are: (1)
“DS543: United States—Tariff Measures on Certain Goods from China” (April 4, 2018), (2) “DS565: United States—
Tariff Measures on Certain Goods from China II” (August 23, 2018), and (3) “DS587: United States—Tariff Measures
on Certain Goods from China III” (September 2, 2019). For more detail on the complaint filed at the U.S. Court of
International Trade (USCIT), see HMTX Industries LLC et al. v. United States.
245 H.R. 764, “United States Reciprocal Trade Act,” 116th Congress, January 24, 2019. See also, S. 2409, “United
States Reciprocal Trade Act, 116th Congress, July 31, 2019.
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Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Origin, Evolution, and Use

 Should Congress consider establishing a formal product exclusion process or set
specific guidelines for when and how to grant exclusions to trade restrictions
imposed under Section 301?
 Does the current use of Section 301 set a precedent for other countries to bypass
WTO dispute settlement and act unilaterally? Do these actions undermine the
credibility and effectiveness of the multilateral trading system?
 Should Congress consider amending current delegated authorities under Section
301 by clarifying provisions or clearly specifying requirements for carrying out
Section 301 investigations?
 Should Congress consider adding provisions that grant the President additional
authorities to address new trade issues and barriers that may not be fully covered
by WTO rules and disciplines (e.g., digital trade, state-owned enterprises,
environment, and corruption)?

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Appendix A. Section 301 Investigations
Table A-1. Section 301 Investigations Since the Establishment of the WTO: 1995-Present
Federal
Retaliatory
Type of
Register
Action by
Case
Year
Economy
Issue
Investigation
Notice
USTR
Type of Action
Notes

96
1995
Colombia
Exportation of
Self-Initiated
60 FR 3283
No
Governments reached a
Bananas to the EU
satisfactory resolution.

97
1995
Costa Rica
Exportation of
Self-Initiated
60 FR 3284
No
Governments reached a
Bananas to the EU
satisfactory resolution.

98
1995
Canada
Communications
Petition
60 FR 8101
No
Private parties (Country
Practices (U.S.-
Music Television and the
Owned
New Country Network)
Programming
reached a resolution.
Services)

99
1995
Japan
Consumer
Petition
60 FR 35447
No
The United States filed a case
Photographic Film
before the WTO (DS44).
and Paper

100
1995
EU
EU Banana Regime Self-Initiated
60 FR 52026
No
The United States filed a case
before the WTO (DS27).

101
1995
EU
EU Enlargement
Self-Initiated
60 FR 55076
No
Governments signed the
(Withdrawing
“Agreement for the
Concessions and
Conclusion of Negotiations
Increasing Tariffs
Between the United States
on U.S. Trade)
and the European
Community Under Article
XXIV:6 of the GATT of
1994” (formally signed on
07/22/1996 with effect
12/30/1995) (61 FR 56082).

102
1996
Canada
Discriminatory
Self-Initiated
61 FR 11067
No
The United States filed a case
Treatment of
before the WTO (DS31).
CRS-53

Federal
Retaliatory
Type of
Register
Action by
Case
Year
Economy
Issue
Investigation
Notice
USTR
Type of Action
Notes
Imported
Periodicals

103
1996
Portugal
Term of Patent
Self-Initiated
61 FR 19970
No
The United States filed a case
Protection
before the WTO (DS37).

104
1996
Pakistan
Patent Protection
Self-Initiated
61 FR 19971
No
The United States filed a case
for
before the WTO (DS36).
Pharmaceuticals
and Agricultural
Chemicals

105
1996
Turkey
Discriminatory
Self-Initiated
61 FR 32883
No
The United States filed a case
Tax on Box Office
61 FR 30646
before the WTO (DS43).
Revenues

106
1996
India
Patent Protection
Self-Initiated
61 FR 35857
No
The United States filed a case
for
before the WTO (DS50).
Pharmaceuticals
and Agricultural
Chemicals

107
1996
Australia
Subsidies Affecting Petition
61 FR 55063
No
The United States filed a case
Leather
before the WTO (DS57).

108
1996
Argentina
Duties and Non-
Self-Initiated
61 FR 53776
No
The United States filed a case
Tariff Barriers
before the WTO (DS56).
Affecting Apparel,
Textiles, and
Footwear

109
1996
Indonesia
Incentives Related
Self-Initiated
61 FR 54246
No
The United States filed a case
to the Promotion
before the WTO (DS59).
of the Indonesian
Motor Vehicle
Sector

110
1996
Brazil
Trade and
Self-Initiated
61 FR 54485
No
The United States filed a case
Investment in the
before the WTO
Auto Sector
(DS52/DS65).
CRS-54

Federal
Retaliatory
Type of
Register
Action by
Case
Year
Economy
Issue
Investigation
Notice
USTR
Type of Action
Notes

111
1997
EU
Subsidies Affecting Petition
62 FR 12264
No
The investigation was
Access to the
terminated effective
EU’s Market for
06/06/1997 (62 FR 32398).
Modified Starch

112
1997
Japan
Market Access
Self-Initiated
62 FR 53853
No
The United States filed a case
Barriers to
before the WTO (DS76).
Agricultural
Products

113
1997
Canada
Export Subsidies
Petition
62 FR 53851
No
The United States filed a case
and Market
before the WTO (DS103).
Access for Dairy
Products

114
1997
EU
Circumvention of
Self-Initiated
62 FR 53852
No
The United States filed a case
Export Subsidy
before the WTO (DS104).
Commitments on
Dairy Products

115
1997
Korea
Auto Import
Self-Initiated
62 FR 55843
No
Governments reached a
Barriers
satisfactory resolution and
signed a memorandum of
understanding (MOU). The
investigation was terminated
on 10/20/1998 (63 FR
59836).
116
1997
Honduras
Intellectual
Self-Initiated
62 FR 60299
Yes
Suspend preferential
Retaliatory action was
Property
(Unilateral)
treatment accorded under terminated. Governments
the Generalized System of reached a satisfactory
Preferences (GSP) and
resolution. The United States
Caribbean Basin Initiative
restored the tariff-free
(CBI) programs to certain
treatment under the
products from Honduras,
Generalized System of
including certain
Preferences (GSP) and
cucumbers, watermelons,
Caribbean Basin Initiative
and cigars.
(CBI) programs accorded to
CRS-55

Federal
Retaliatory
Type of
Register
Action by
Case
Year
Economy
Issue
Investigation
Notice
USTR
Type of Action
Notes
products of Honduras in
response to the Government
of Honduras’ measures to
combat piracy and to protect
U.S. intellectual property
rights.

117
1998
Paraguay
Intellectual
Self-Initiated
63 FR 9292
No
Governments reached a
Property
satisfactory resolution and
signed a memorandum of
understanding (MOU). The
investigation was terminated
on 11/17/1998 (63 FR
64982). New MOU signed on
04/20/2008.

118
1998
Mexico
High Fructose
Petition
63 FR 28544
No
The United States filed a case
Corn Syrup
before the WTO
(DS101/DS132).

119
1999
Canada
Tourism and
Petition
64 FR 28545
No
Governments reached a
Sport Fishing
satisfactory resolution.
Ontario revoked the
provincial measures affecting
certain U.S. providers of
tourism services and the
Government of Canada
agreed that the immigration
measure under investigation
would be reviewed by the
NAFTA Temporary Entry
Working Group. The
investigation was terminated
on 02/15/2000 (65 FR 7606).

120
2000
Canada
Canadian Wheat
Petition
65 FR 69362
No
The United States filed a case
Board
before the WTO (DS276).
CRS-56

Federal
Retaliatory
Type of
Register
Action by
Case
Year
Economy
Issue
Investigation
Notice
USTR
Type of Action
Notes
121
2001
Ukraine
Intellectual
Self-Initiated
66 FR 18346
Yes
Suspended preferential
Retaliatory action was
Property
(Unilateral)
treatment accorded under terminated. Governments
the Generalized System of reached a satisfactory
Preferences (GSP) to
resolution. The United States
certain products from
terminated the 100% ad
Ukraine (Action 1).
valorem duties in place on
Imposed 100% ad valorem U.S. imports from Ukraine in
duties on Ukrainian
response to the Government
products with an annual
of Ukraine’s adoption of
trade value of
improvements to its
approximately $75 mil ion
legislation protecting
(Action 2)
intellectual property rights
(Action 1). The United States
subsequently restored the
tariff-free treatment under
GSP accorded to products of
Ukraine and revoked the
identification of Ukraine as a
“Priority Foreign Country”
under Section 182 of the
Trade Act of 1974 and placed
it on the “Priority Watch
List” in response to the
Government of Ukraine's
improving its intellectual
property right enforcement
efforts (Action 2).
122
2009
Canada
Softwood Lumber
Self-Initiated
74 FR 17276
Yes
Imposed 10% ad valorem
Retaliatory action was
Agreement
74 FR 16436
(Unilateral)
duties on imports of
terminated. Governments
Compliance
softwood lumber
reached a satisfactory
products from the
resolution. The United States
provinces of Ontario,
terminated the 10% ad
Quebec, Manitoba, and
valorem duties on imports of
Saskatchewan due to
softwood lumber products in
Canada's failure to comply response to the Government
with certain obligations
of Canada's adoption of its
CRS-57

Federal
Retaliatory
Type of
Register
Action by
Case
Year
Economy
Issue
Investigation
Notice
USTR
Type of Action
Notes
under the 2006 Softwood
own measures to address its
Lumber Agreement (SLA). breach of the SLA.
The duties were to be
imposed until the United
States had col ected $54.8
mil ion.

123
2010
China
Trade and
Petition
75 FR 64776
No
Governments reached a
investment in
satisfactory resolution. China
Green
invalidated WTO-
Technologies
inconsistent measures.

124
2013
Ukraine
Intellectual
Self-Initiated
78 FR 33886
No
Retaliatory action not taken
Property
due to Ukraine's political
situation.
125
2017
China
Technology
Self-Initiated
82 FR 40213
Yes
Imposed additional ad
Governments reached a
transfer,
(Unilateral)
valorem duties of 10%,
partial agreement (“U.S.-
Intellectual
15%, and 25% on over
China Phase One Trade
Property, and
two-thirds of U.S. imports Agreement”) on 01/15/2020.
Innovation
from China.
The United States also filed a
case before the WTO
(DS542) pertaining China’s
discriminatory technology
licensing requirements.
However, the case was
suspended, most recently,
effective 06/08/2020. For
details on China’s WTO case
against the United States, see
DS543.
126
2019
EU
Subsidies to the
Self-Initiated
84 FR 15028
Yes
Imposed additional ad
The United States filed a case
large civil aircraft
(WTO-
valorem duties of 10% and
before the WTO (DS316),
domestic industry
Sanctioned)
25% on a list of products
and it used Section 301
with an approximate
authorities to implement
annual trade value of $7.5
WTO-sanctioned tariffs.
bil ion.
CRS-58

Federal
Retaliatory
Type of
Register
Action by
Case
Year
Economy
Issue
Investigation
Notice
USTR
Type of Action
Notes
127
2019
France
Digital Services
Self-Initiated
84 FR 34042
Yes
Imposed additional ad
Application of additional
Tax
(Unilateral/
valorem duties of 25% on
duties was immediately
Suspended)
$1.3 bil ion worth of
suspended, effective
French imports.
07/10/2020 until 01/06/2021
(85 FR 43292).
128
2020
Austria
Digital Services
Self-Initiated
85 FR 34709

Investigation is ongoing.
Brazil
Taxes
Czech
Republic
EU
India
Indonesia
Italy
Spain
Turkey
UK
129
2020
Vietnam
Currency
Self-Initiated
85 FR 63637

Investigation is ongoing.
Valuation
130
2020
Vietnam
Import and Use of
Self-Initiated
85 FR 63639

Investigation is ongoing.
Il egal Timber
Source: Congressional Research Service with information sourced from the Federal Register, the Office of the USTR’s annual “Trade Policy Agendas” and “Annual
Reports of the President of the United States on the Trade Agreements Program,” and the U.S. International Trade Commission’s “Year in Trade” reports.
CRS-59

Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Origin, Evolution, and Use

Table A-2. Section 301 Investigations: 1975-Present
Case
Economy
Year
Petition/Self-Initiated
1
Guatemala
1975
Petition
2
Canada
1975
Petition
3
European Communities
1975
Petition
4
European Communities
1975
Petition
5
European Communities
1975
Petition
6
European Communities
1975
Petition
7
European Communities
1976
Petition
8
European Communities
1976
Petition
9
Taiwan
1976
Petition
10
European Communities
1976
Petition

Japan

11
European Communities
1976
Petition
12
Brazil
1977
Petition

Korea

China

13
Japan
1977
Petition
14
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union)
1977
Petition
15
Canada
1978
Petition
16
European Communities
1978
Petition
17
Japan
1979
Petition
18
Argentina
1979
Petition
19
Japan
1979
Petition
20
Korea
1979
Petition
21
Switzerland
1979
Petition
22
European Communities
1981
Petition
23
European Communities
1981
Petition
24
Argentina
1981
Petition
25
European Communities
1981
Petition
26
European Communities
1981
Petition
27
Austria
1982
Petition
28
France
1982
Petition
29
Italy
1982
Petition
30
Sweden
1982
Petition
31
United Kingdom
1982
Petition
32
Canada
1982
Petition
Congressional Research Service

60

Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Origin, Evolution, and Use

Case
Economy
Year
Petition/Self-Initiated
33
Belgium
1982
Petition
34
Canada
1982
Petition
35
Brazil
1982
Petition
36
Japan
1982
Petition
37
Korea
1982
Petition
38
Taiwan
1982
Petition
39
Korea
1983
Petition
40
Brazil
1983
Petition
41
Portugal
1983
Petition
42
Spain
1983
Petition
43
Taiwan
1983
Petition
44
Argentina
1983
Petition
45
Taiwan
1984
Petition
46
European Communities
1984
Petition
47
European Communities
1984
Petition
48
Japan
1985
Petition
49
Brazil
1985
Self-Initiated
50
Japan
1985
Self-Initiated
51
Korea
1985
Self-Initiated
52
Korea
1985
Self-Initiated
53
Argentina
1986
Petition
54
European Communities
1986
Self-Initiated
55
Canada
1986
Petition
56
Taiwan
1986
Self-Initiated
57
Taiwan
1986
Self-Initiated
58
Canada
1986
Self-Initiated
59
India
1987
Petition
60
European Communities
1987
Petition
61
Brazil
1987
Petition
62
European Communities
1987
Self-Initiated
63
European Communities
1988
Petition
64
Korea
1988
Petition
65
Korea
1988
Petition
66
Japan
1988
Petition
67
Korea
1988
Petition
68
Argentina
1988
Petition
Congressional Research Service

61

Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Origin, Evolution, and Use

Case
Economy
Year
Petition/Self-Initiated
69
Japan
1988
Self-Initiated
70
European Communities
1988
Petition
71
European Communities
1989
Self-Initiated
72
Thailand
1989
Petition
73
Brazil
1989
Self-Initiated
74
Japan
1989
Self-Initiated
75
Japan
1989
Self-Initiated
76
Japan
1989
Self-Initiated
77
India
1989
Self-Initiated
78
India
1989
Self-Initiated
79
Norway
1989
Petition
80
Canada
1990
Petition
81
European Communities
1990
Self-Initiated
82
Thailand
1990
Petition
83
European Communities
1991
Petition
84
Thailand
1991
Petition
85
India
1991
Self-Initiated
86
China
1991
Self-Initiated
87
Canada
1991
Self-Initiated
88
China
1991
Self-Initiated
89
Taiwan
1992
Self-Initiated
90
Indonesia
1992
Petition
91
Brazil
1993
Self-Initiated
92
China
1994
Self-Initiated
93
Japan
1994
Self-Initiated
94
European Communities
1994
Petition
95
Korea
1994
Petition
96
Colombia
1995
Self-Initiated
97
Costa Rica
1995
Self-Initiated
98
Canada
1995
Petition
99
Japan
1995
Petition
100
European Union
1995
Self-Initiated
101
European Union
1995
Self-Initiated
102
Canada
1996
Self-Initiated
103
Portugal
1996
Self-Initiated
104
Pakistan
1996
Self-Initiated
Congressional Research Service

62

Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Origin, Evolution, and Use

Case
Economy
Year
Petition/Self-Initiated
105
Turkey
1996
Self-Initiated
106
India
1996
Self-Initiated
107
Australia
1996
Petition
108
Argentina
1996
Self-Initiated
109
Indonesia
1996
Self-Initiated
110
Brazil
1996
Self-Initiated
111
European Union
1997
Petition
112
Japan
1997
Self-Initiated
113
Canada
1997
Petition
114
European Union
1997
Self-Initiated
115
Korea
1997
Self-Initiated
116
Honduras
1997
Self-Initiated
117
Paraguay
1998
Self-Initiated
118
Mexico
1998
Petition
119
Canada
1999
Petition
120
Canada
2000
Petition
121
Ukraine
2001
Self-Initiated
122
Canada
2009
Self-Initiated
123
China
2010
Petition
124
Ukraine
2013
Self-Initiated
125
China
2017
Self-Initiated
126
European Union
2019
Self-Initiated
127
France
2019
Self-Initiated
128
Austria
2020
Self-Initiated
Brazil
Czech Republic
European Union
India
Indonesia
Italy
Spain
Turkey
United Kingdom
129
Vietnam
2020
Self-Initiated
130
Vietnam
2020
Self-Initiated
Source: Congressional Research Service with information sourced from the Federal Register, the Office of the
USTR’s annual “Trade Policy Agendas” and “Annual Reports of the President of the United States on the Trade
Agreements Program,” and the U.S. International Trade Commission’s “Year in Trade” reports.
Notes: Includes all investigations initiated by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, regardless of whether
the case was suspended or combined with others, or whether the USTR ultimately took action under Section
301.
Congressional Research Service

63

Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Origin, Evolution, and Use

Table A-3. Summary of Section 301 Investigations by Economy: 1975-Present
Economy
Frequency
European Union (EU) or EU Member States
45
EU (including European Communities)
30
Austria
2
France
2
Italy
2
Portugal
2
Spain
2
United Kingdom
2
Belgium
1
Czech Republic
1
Sweden
1
Japan
15
Canada
14
Korea
11
Brazil
9
Taiwan
7
Argentina
6
China
6
India
6
Indonesia
3
Thailand
3
Turkey
2
Ukraine
2
Vietnam
2
Australia
1
Colombia
1
Costa Rica
1
Guatemala
1
Honduras
1
Mexico
1
Norway
1
Pakistan
1
Paraguay
1
Switzerland
1
Soviet Union (USSR)
1
Congressional Research Service

64

Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Origin, Evolution, and Use

Source: Congressional Research Service with information sourced from the Federal Register, the Office of the
USTR’s annual “Trade Policy Agendas” and “Annual Reports of the President of the United States on the Trade
Agreements Program,” and the U.S. International Trade Commission’s “Year in Trade” reports.
Notes: Includes all investigations initiated by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, regardless of whether
the case was suspended or combined with others, or whether the USTR ultimately took action under Section
301.
Congressional Research Service

65

Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Origin, Evolution, and Use

Appendix B. Legislative Proposals Related to
Section 301
Table B-1. Select Legislative Proposals Related to Section 301 Authorities
116th Congress (2019-Present)
Date of
Introduction
Legislation
Title
Brief Description
01/03/2019
H.Con.Res. 2
Reclaiming
Establishes (1) a Joint Ad Hoc Committee on Trade
Congress's
Responsibilities to develop a plan under which the
Constitutional
functions and responsibilities of the Office of the USTR
Mandate in Trade
shall be moved to the legislative branch, and (2) a
Resolution
Congressional Advisory Board on Trade
Responsibilities to advise the committee in its
development of the plan.
01/17/2019
S. 188
Border, Law
Makes revenue from certain duties imposed on goods
Enforcement,
imported from the China available for border security,
Operational
and for other purposes.
Control, and
Sovereignty Act of
2019
01/23/2019
H.R. 723
Global Trade
Requires congressional approval of unilateral trade
Accountability Act
actions. Such actions may take effect without
of 2019
congressional approval for one 90-day period if the
President determines that it is necessary because of a
national emergency, because of an imminent threat to
health or safety, for the enforcement of criminal laws,
or for national security; and submits written notice of
the determination to Congress.
01/30/2019
H.R. 902
Protect American
Directs the President to impose duties on merchandise
IPR Act
from the China to compensate holders of U.S.
intellectual property rights for losses resulting from
violations of such intellectual property rights in China,
and for other purposes.
02/27/2019
S. 577
Import Tax Relief
Requires the President to establish a process by which
Act of 2019
certain articles imported from China may be excluded
from duties.
02/28/2019
H.R. 1452
Import Tax Relief
Requires the President to establish a process by which
Act of 2019
certain articles imported from China may be excluded
from duties.
03/27/2019
S. 899
Reclaiming
Limits the authority of the President to modify duty
Congressional
rates for national security reasons and to limit the
Trade Authority
authority of the USTR to impose certain duties or
Act of 2019
import restrictions, and for other purposes.
05/02/2019
S. 1284
Global Trade
Provides for congressional review of the imposition of
Accountability Act
duties and other trade measures by the executive
of 2019
branch, and for other purposes
06/25/2019
H.R. 3477
Reclaiming
Limits the authority of the President to modify duty
Congressional
rates for national security reasons and to limit the
Trade Authority
authority of the USTR to impose certain duties or
Act of 2019
import restrictions, and for other purposes.
Congressional Research Service

66

Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Origin, Evolution, and Use

Date of
Introduction
Legislation
Title
Brief Description
07/31/2019
S. 2362
American Business Requires the USTR to establish a process whereby U.S.
Tariff Relief Act of
businesses may request that articles newly subject to
2019
raised import duties be excluded from such duties. For
an exclusion to be granted, the business seeking the
exclusion must demonstrate the article’s unavailability
from any other source or that the duty would cause
economic harm to a U.S. interest.
10/24/2019
S. 2697
Tariff Tax Credit
Allows a new refundable tax credit for the return to
Act of 2019
taxpayers of revenue raised from duties imposed on
goods imported from China in preceding calendar
years.
07/16/2020
H.R. 7665
To direct the
Requires the USTR to extend for at least one year the
United States
exclusion of certain Chinese goods from additional
Trade
duties. Such goods include medical-care products
Representative to
needed to address the COVID-19 pandemic.
extend the
exclusions of
goods of China
from additional
duties imposed
under section 301
of the Trade Act
of 1974, and for
other purposes.
08/06/2020
S. 4493
USTR Inspector
Requires the President to appoint an Inspector General
General Act of
of the Office of the USTR, who shall conduct an audit
2020
of the process for excluding articles from certain duties
with respect to articles imported from China.
08/06/2020
S. 4497
Stop PPE Taxes
Suspends through December 31, 2022, any duty
Act of 2020
imposed on specified articles and articles identified by
the U.S. International Trade Commission as related to
the response to COVID-19, including any duty imposed
pursuant to (1) Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974,
(2) Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, or
(3) the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.
08/07/2020
H.R. 7980
USTR Inspector
Amends the Inspector General Act of 1978 to establish
General Act of
an Inspector General of the Office of the United States
2020
Trade Representative, and for other purposes.
09/17/2020
S. 4629
America LEADS
Addresses issues involving the People’s Republic of
Act
China (including Section 301 actions).
Source: Congressional Research Service with information from CONGRESS.GOV.

Congressional Research Service

67

Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Origin, Evolution, and Use

Author Information

Andres B. Schwarzenberg

Analyst in International Trade and Finance

Acknowledgments
The author is grateful to the following individuals for their thoughtful and detailed comments and
suggestions: Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs, Christopher A. Casey, Rachel F. Fefer, Vivian C. Jones, Brandon
J. Murrill, Dianne E. Rennack, and Mallary A. Stouffer. The author also thanks Amber Hope Wilhelm for
developing graphics for this report.

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
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