Military Courts-Martial Under the 
August 28, 2020 
Military Justice Act of 2016 
Jennifer K. Elsea 
The Supreme Court has called military justice a system of justice separate from jurisprudence in 
Legislative Attorney 
the civilian courts. Members of the Armed Forces are subject to rules, orders, proceedings, and 
  
consequences different from the rights and obligations of their civilian counterparts. Accordingly, 
Jonathan M. Gaffney 
it might be said that discipline is as important as liberty interests in the military justice system. 
Legislative Attorney 
The Constitution specifically exempts military members accused of a crime from the Fifth 
  
Amendment right to a grand jury indictment, from which the Supreme Court has inferred there is 
no right to a civil jury in courts -martial. However, in part because of the different standards 
 
provided in courts-martial, their jurisdiction is limited to those persons and offenses the military 
has a legitimate interest in regulating. 
Congress enacted the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) under its constitutional authority to provide for disciplining 
the land and naval forces. Presidents have implemented the UCMJ through the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM). The 
MCM contains the Rules for Courts -Martial (R.C.M.), the Military Rules of Evidence (Mil. R. Evid.), and the punitive 
articles of the UCMJ, with commentary. The MCM covers almost all aspects of military law. 
The UCMJ gives courts-martial jurisdiction over servicemembers as well as several other categories of individuals connected 
to the uniformed services. There are three types of courts-martial: (1) summary court-martial (for minor offenses), (2) special 
court-martial (for offenses tantamount to misdemeanors), and (3) general court-martial (for offenses tantamount to felonies). 
While the R.C.M. and the Mil. R. Evid. are applicable to all courts -martial, the jurisdiction and authorized punishments vary 
among the different types. 
A number of concerns relating to military justice led Congress in 2016 to enact the Military Justice Act of 2016 (MJA), 
which made sweeping changes to the UCMJ. The UCMJ provides the basic framework for the military justice system and 
defines offenses subject to trial by court-martial. Proponents of reform have for decades advocated changes relating to 
military jurisdiction; pretrial, trial, and post-trial process; over charging; court-martial panel selection; and appellate review. 
A perennial concern has been the perception of a lack of complete judicial independence, as well as commander’s control 
over courts-martial, in part by choosing which charges to prefer against whom and by exercising post -trial clemency. One 
major recent concern has been the handling of sexual assault cases in the military. Congress enacted the MJA and other 
amendments to the UCMJ to address some of these issues. 
This report provides an overview of the military justice system and the reforms enacted through the MJA and other 
legislation. It begins with a discussion of due process followed by a background of constitutional underpinnings for the 
military justice system and Congress’s role in it. It follows with a discussion of military jurisdiction, military offenses s et 
forth in the punitive articles of the UCMJ, and the three types of court-martial. The report continues with overviews of 
pretrial and trial process, sentencing and post-trial process, and appellate procedures. The report concludes with a table 
comparing selected constitutional protections as they apply in general courts-martial with those that operate in federal 
criminal court. 
Congressional Research Service 
 
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Military Courts-Martial Under  the Military Justice Act of 2016 
 
Contents 
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1 
Military Due Process ....................................................................................................... 2 
Military Courts-Martial .................................................................................................... 3 
Jurisdiction ............................................................................................................... 4 
Types of Courts-Martial.............................................................................................. 5 
Summary Courts-Martial ....................................................................................... 6 
Special Courts-Martial .......................................................................................... 6 
General Courts-Martial ......................................................................................... 7 
Types of Offenses ...................................................................................................... 8 
Investigation and Charging........................................................................................ 10 
Preliminary Inquiry ............................................................................................ 10 
Preferral of Charges ............................................................................................ 11 
Referral of Charges............................................................................................. 11 
Article 32 Hearing .............................................................................................. 11 
Ancil ary Matters ............................................................................................... 12 
Pretrial and Trial Process .......................................................................................... 17 
Convening the Court-Martial................................................................................ 17 
Pretrial Matters .................................................................................................. 20 
Trial Procedure .................................................................................................. 22 
Findings............................................................................................................ 24 
Sentencing ........................................................................................................ 24 
Post-Trial Review .................................................................................................... 25 
Appel ate Review .................................................................................................... 26 
Selected Procedural Safeguards ................................................................................. 27 
 
Tables 
Table 1. Selected Procedural Safeguards in Federal and Military Courts ................................ 27 
 
Contacts 
Author Information ....................................................................................................... 33 
 
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Military Courts-Martial Under  the Military Justice Act of 2016 
 
Introduction 
A number of concerns relating to military justice led Congress to enact the Military Justice Act of 
2016 (MJA),1 comprising sweeping changes to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).2 
The UCMJ provides the basic framework for the military justice system and defines offenses 
subject to trial by court-martial. Proponents of reform have for decades advocated changes 
relating to military  jurisdiction; pretrial, trial, and post-trial process; over charging; court-martial 
panel selection; and appel ate review.3 A perennial concern has been the perception of a lack of 
complete judicial  independence,4 as wel  as commander’s control over courts-martial, in part by 
choosing which charges to prefer against whom and by exercising post-trial clemency.5 One 
major recent concern has been the handling of sexual assault cases as wel  as domestic and 
intimate partner violence in the military.6 
In part due to these concerns and because the Department of Defense (DOD) had not undertaken 
a comprehensive review of the military justice system since enactment of the UCMJ in 1950,7 the 
Secretary of Defense, on the recommendation of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
directed the DOD General Counsel to conduct a “holistic” review of the UCMJ and issue 
recommendations.8 The result was the establishment of the Military Justice Review Group 
(MJRG), which issued its final report in December 2015.9 The MJA followed a year later. One 
noted scholar of military law described the UCMJ overhaul as accomplishing the following broad 
goals: 
First, the amendments expand and solidify the role of  military  judges in the American 
military justice system. Although commanders continue to play a critical role in military 
justice, military judges will not only be able to address issues raised before charges are 
referred to a court-martial, but will also have the final say in the disposition of the court-
                                              
1 National Defense Authorization Act for FY2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328, div. E, §§  5001-5542, 130 Stat. 2000, 2894 
(2016), codified at 10 U.S.C.  §§  801-946a. T he changes did not take effect until January 1, 2019. 
2 Chapter 47 of title 10, U.S. Code,  10 U.S.C.  §§  801-946a (2019). 
3 David A. Schlueter, 
Reforming Military Justice: An Analysis of the Military  Justice Act Of 2016, 49 ST. MARY’S L.J. 
1, 14-16 (2017) (describing various proposals for reforming the military justice system). 
4 
See MILITARY JUSTICE CASES AND MATERIALS 783 (Eugene R. Fidell,  et al., eds.,  2d ed. 2012) (commenting that the 
lack of fixed term of office for military judges  could  give rise to at least the perception of a lack of judicial 
independence). 
5 Schlueter, 
supra not
e 3, at 15.  
6 
Id. at 13 (noting that Congress amended the UCMJ in 2013, 2014 and 2015, to address issues  related to sexual 
assault). For information about legislative action to address  sexual assault  in the military during the 113 th and 114th 
Congresses,  
see CRS  Report R43168, 
Military Sexual Assault: Chronology of Activity in the 113th -114th Congresses 
and Related Resources, by Barbara Salazar  T orreon and Carla Y. Davis-Castro. For an overview of the issue,  
see CRS 
Report R44944, 
Military Sexual Assault: A Fram ework for Congressional Oversight, by Kristy N. Kamarck and 
Barbara Salazar  T orreon. For current legislative activity, 
see CRS  Report R46107, 
FY2020 National Defense 
Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Issues, coordinated by Bryce H. P. Mendez. 
7 Schlueter, 
supra not
e 3, at 13-16 (explaining impetus for military justice reform). As amended  by the MJA, Art. 146 
of the UCMJ  establishes a new Military Justice  Review  Panel with the task of reviewing  the military justice system 
every eight years. 10 U.S.C.  § 946. In 2019, Congress tasked DOD with studying  an alternative military justice system 
that would  shift some court -martial decisions in many cases from the commander to a legal advisor outside  the chain of 
command. National Defense Authorization Act for FY2020 , Pub. L. No. 116-92 § 540F, 133 Stat. 1367 (2019). 
8 Schlueter, 
supra not
e 3, at 18. 
9 REPORT OF THE MILITARY JUSTICE REVIEW GROUP (2015) (hereinafter MJRG REP.), available at 
https://dacipad.whs.mil/images/Public/10-Reading_Room/04_Reports/03_DoD_Reports_Regs_Surveys/
DoD_MJRG_Report/MJRG_Report_Part1_20151222.pdf . 
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martial by issuing the “judgment” in a case, after the convening authority completes his or 
her limited  review of the court-martial. Second, the changes demonstrate the continuing 
view that the military  justice system should more closely parallel the federal criminal 
justice model. Throughout, it is clear that new procedures, and even terminology, mirror 
federal  practice.  And  third,  Congress  completely  reorganized the  punitive  articles, 
amended a significant number of those articles, and “migrated” a large number of offenses 
from coverage under Article 134, to new punitive articles. Collectively, these changes, and 
others, signal an extreme makeover of American military justice.10 
This report provides an overview of the military justice system and the reforms enacted through 
the MJA and other legislation. It begins with a discussion of due process followed by a 
background of constitutional underpinnings for the military justice system and Congress’s role in 
it. It follows with a discussion of military jurisdiction, military offenses set forth in the punitive 
articles of the UCMJ, and the three types of court-martial: summary, special, and general. The 
report continues with overviews of pretrial, trial process, sentencing, and post-trial and appel ate 
procedures. The report concludes wit
h Table 1 comparing selected constitutional protections as 
they apply in general courts-martial with those that operate in federal criminal court. 
Military Due Process 
The U.S. Constitution imposes on the government a system of restraints to provide that no unfair 
law is enforced and that no law is enforced unfairly.11 What is fundamental y fair in a given 
situation depends in part on the objectives of a given system of law weighed alongside the 
possible infringement of individual  liberties that the system might impose.12 In the criminal law 
system, some basic objectives are to discover the truth in order to punish the guilty 
proportionately with their crimes, acquit the innocent without unnecessary delay or expense, and 
prevent and deter further crime, thereby providing for public order.13 Military justice shares these 
objectives in part, but also serves to enhance discipline throughout the Armed Forces, serving the 
overal  objective of providing an effective national defense.14 
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution provides that “no person shal  be ... deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Due process includes the right to notice and the 
opportunity to be heard whenever the government places any of these fundamental liberties at 
stake.15 In the civilian setting, the exact process that is due is determined by a balancing of 
interests affected (individual or government), the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such an 
interest, and the probative value of additional  procedural rights.16 However, the Supreme Court 
has held that this balancing test does not apply in the context of military justice.17 Rather, the 
                                              
10 Schlueter, 
supra not
e 3, at 9. 
11 U.S.  CONST. amends. I-X. 
12 
See CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND 
INTERPRETATION 1534 (Centennial ed. 2013). 
13 
See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 1.2(e) (2d ed. 2003). 
14 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES I-1 (2019) (hereinafter MCM) (“The purpose of military law is to 
promote justice, to assist in maintaining good order and discipline  in the armed forces, to promote efficiency and 
effectiveness in the military establishment, and thereby to strengthen the national security of the United States.”  
15 Mathews v. Eldridge,  424 U.S.  319, 333 (1976). 
16 
Id. at 335. 
17 United States v. Weiss, 510 U.S.  163, 178-79 (1994) (finding no military due process right to military judge  with 
fixed term of office). 
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military justice system fal s under 
Middendorf v. Henry,18 which cal s for a test of whether factors 
favoring a particular right are so extraordinarily weighty as to overcome the balance struck by 
Congress. Perhaps because of this difference, military courts often use the term “military due 
process”19 to describe the rights to which the accused at a court-martial is entitled. 
The Constitution contains other explicit rights applicable to various stages of a criminal 
prosecution. Criminal proceedings provide both the opportunity to contest guilt and to chal enge 
the government’s conduct that may have violated the rights of the accused. The system of 
procedural rules used to conduct a criminal hearing serves as a safeguard against violations of 
constitutional rights that take place outside the courtroom. The differences in procedural matters 
between the military justice system and the civilian court system have frequently given rise to 
debate.20 
The Supreme Court has cal ed military justice a system of justice separate from jurisprudence in 
the civilian  courts.21 Members of the Armed Forces are subject to rules, orders, proceedings, and 
consequences different from the rights and obligations of their civilian  counterparts.22 
Accordingly, the military justice system is designed to strike a balance between individual liberty 
and unique need for discipline.23 The Constitution specifical y exempts military members accused 
of a crime from the Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury indictment.24 The Supreme Court has 
inferred from that absence that there is also no right to a civil jury in courts-martial.25 However, in 
part because of the different standards provided in courts-martial, their jurisdiction is limited to 
those persons and offenses the military has a legitimate interest in regulating.26 
Military Courts-Martial 
The Constitution, to provide for the common defense,27 gives Congress the power to raise, 
support, and regulate the Armed Forces,28 but makes the President Commander-in-Chief of the 
                                              
18 425 U.S. 25, 43-44 (1976). 
19 DAVID. A. SCHLEUTER, MILITARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 1-1(C) (9th ed. 2015). 
20 
Id. at § 1-1(A) 
21 Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 744 (1974) (“ Just as military society has been a society apart from civilian society, so 
‘[m]ilitary law ... is a jurisprudence  which exists separate and apart from the law which governs in our federal judicial 
establishment .’” (citing Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S.  137, 14 0 (1953)). 
22 United States v. Watson, 69 M.J. 415, 416 (C.A.A.F. 2011) (citing 
Parker, 417 U.S.  at 733). 
23 
See SCHLEUTER, 
supra not
e 19, §1-1; Curry v. Sec’y of Army, 595 F.2d 873, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (“T he provisions 
of the UCMJ  with respect to court -martial proceedings represent a congressional attempt to accommodate the interests 
of justice, on the one hand, with the demands  for an efficient, well-disciplined  military, on the other.”). 
24 U.S.  CONST. amend. V  (“No person shall be  held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless  on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising  in the land or na val forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public  danger  .... ”). 
25 
See Ex parte Milligan,  71 U.S.  (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). Congress has, in article 32, UCMJ, provided for a  pretrial hearing 
that performs the same basic function as a grand jury. 10 U.S.C.  §  832 (2017). Court-martial panels consist of a 
military judge  and, in some cases,  several panel members, who function similarly to a jury. 
26 United States 
ex rel. T oth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 15 (1955) (“[T]he power granted Congress ‘T o make Rules’ to 
regulate ‘the land and naval Forces’ would  seem to restrict court -martial jurisdiction to persons who are actually 
members or part of the armed forces [because]  any expansion of court -martial jurisdiction …  necessarily encroaches on 
the jurisdiction of federal courts set up  under Article III of the Constitution where persons on trial are surrounded  with 
more constitutional safeguards than in military tribunals.”). 
27 U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
28 
Id. art. I § 8, cls. 11-14 (War Powers). 
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Armed Forces.29 Article III, which governs the federal judiciary, does not give it any explicit role 
in the military, and the Supreme Court has taken the view that Congress’s power “To make Rules 
for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces”30 is entirely separate from 
Article  III.31 Therefore, courts-martial are not Article III courts and are not subject to the rules 
that apply in federal courts.32 
Congress enacted the UCMJ under its authority to provide for disciplining the land and naval 
forces.33 Presidents have implemented the UCMJ through the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM), 
which President Ronald Reagan initial y  prescribed by Executive Order 12473 on April 13, 
1984.34 The MCM contains the Rules for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.), the Military Rules of 
Evidence (Mil. R. Evid.),35 and the punitive articles of the UCMJ, with commentary. The MCM 
covers almost al  aspects of military law.36 
Jurisdiction 
The UCMJ gives courts-martial jurisdiction over servicemembers37 as wel  as several other 
categories of individuals, including retired members of a regular component of the Armed Forces 
entitled to pay38 retired members of a reserve component who are hospitalized in a military 
hospital; persons in custody of the military serving a sentence imposed by a court-martial; cadets 
and midshipmen at the service academies; members of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration and Public Health Service and other organizations, when assigned to serve with 
the military; enemy prisoners of war in custody of the military and individuals belonging to one 
of the eight categories enumerated in Article 4 of the Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War39 who violate the law of war; and persons serving with or accompanying the 
military in the field  “[i]n time of declared war or a contingency operation.”40 The last provision 
                                              
29 
Id. art. II § 2, cl. 1. 
30 
Id. art. I § 8, cl. 14. 
31 
See Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (How.) 65 (1858). 
32 
See WILLIAM WINTHROP, WINTHROP’S MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 48-49 (2d. ed. 1920) (describing courts-
martial as “ 
instrum entalities of the executive power, provided by Congress for the President as Commander -in-chief, to 
aid  him in properly commanding the army and navy and enforcing discipline  therein ”) (emphasis in original). 
33 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. 
34 MCM, 
supra not
e 14. T he current version is the 2019 edition. 
35 T he President establishes rules  of procedures and rules  of evidence for courts-martial as authorized by Art. 36, 
UCMJ,  10 U.S.C.  § 836. T he regulations are, to the extent practicable, to “ apply the principles of law and the rules of 
evidence generally recognized  in the trial of criminal cases  in the United States district courts,” but may not be contrary 
to or inconsistent with the UCMJ. 
Id. 36 Each military service supplements the MCM to meet its individual  needs. T he Army has Army Regulation 27 -10; the 
Navy and Marine Corps have the Manual for the Judge  Advocate General; and the Air Force has Air Force Instruction 
51-201. 
37 T he term servicemembers, as used  in this report, includes uniformed members of the U.S.  Army, U.S. Marine Corps, 
U.S.  Navy, U.S.  Air Force, U.S. Space  Force, and the U.S.  Coast Guard,  whether or not it is serving as part of the 
Navy. It also includes  members of the National Guard  and Air National Guard  when in federal service.  
38 T he Navy-Marines Court of Criminal Appeals recently found that, although it is constitutional to subject military 
retirees to UCMJ jurisdiction, the disparity in treatment between regular component retirees and reserve retirees 
amounts to an unconstitutional violation to the right of equal protection. United States v. Begani,  --- M.J. ----, 2019 WL 
3542910 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2019). 
39 Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, done at Geneva August  12, 1949, 6 U.S.T . 3316, 75 
U.N.T .S. 135. 
40 Art. 2, UCMJ;  10 U.S.C.  § 802(a)(10). 
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covering civilians serving with or accompanying the Armed Forces was limited by judicial 
interpretation41 to declared wars, but Congress amended it in 2006 to broaden its application to 
contingency operations.42 Jurisdiction of a court-martial does not depend on where the offense 
was committed; it depends solely on the status of the accused.43 
In the MJA, Congress expanded the provision regarding UCMJ jurisdiction over reservists and 
members of the National Guard in federal service44 to cover not only inactive duty training, but 
also periods of travel to and from the training site and intervals between consecutive periods of 
training pursuant to orders or regulations.45 This change closed a gap in jurisdiction 
encompassing the periods of time when trainees were subject to orders but were not actively 
performing training, such as off-duty time, time between classes, or travel time.46 
Types of Courts-Martial 
Congress has established three types of courts-martial: (1) summary court-martial, (2) special 
court-martial, and (3) general court-martial.47 While the R.C.M. and the Mil. R. Evid. apply to al  
courts-martial, the jurisdiction and authorized punishments vary among the different types. The 
function of the summary court-martial is to “promptly adjudicate minor offenses under a simple 
procedure” and “thoroughly and impartial y inquire into both sides of the matter,” ensuring that 
the “interests of both the Government and the accused are safeguarded and that justice is done.”48 
Special and general courts-martial adjudicate more serious offenses and can impose more severe 
punishments; thus the procedures in those tribunals are more complex. Only general courts-
martial have jurisdiction over sexual assault offenses or attempted offenses under Articles 120(a) 
(rape), 120(b) (sexual assault), 120b(a) (rape of a child), or 120b(b) (sexual assault of a child).49 
                                              
41 United States v. Averette, 41 C.M.R. 363, 365 (C.M.A.1970) (interpreting “in time of war” to refer to war declared 
by Congress). 
42 Pub. L. No. 109-364, div. A, title V, § 552, 120 Stat. 2217 (2006). “Contingency operation” is defined in 10 U.S.C. 
101(a)(13) to mean “a military operation that-(A) is designated by  the Secretary of Defense as an operation in which 
members of the armed forces are or may become involved in military actions, operations, or hostilities against an 
enemy of the United States or against an opposing military force; or (B) results  in the call or order to, or retention on, 
active duty of members of the uniformed services under  section 688, 12301(a), 12302, 12304, 12304a, 12305, or 12406 
of this title, chapter 13 of [title 10], section 712 1 of title 14, or any other provision of law during  a war  or during  a 
national emergency declared by the President or Congress.” 
43 
See Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S.  435, 440-41 (1987) (overruling O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969)). A 
few  articles in the UCMJ apply to “any person” and are thus not limited to servicemembers and other persons subject to 
the UCMJ. T hese include  spying (Art. 103, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 903), aiding the enemy (Art. 103b, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C. 
§ 903b), and violations of the law of war (Art. 18, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 818). 
44 For information about different types of reserve service, see CRS  Report RL30802, 
Reserve Component Personnel 
Issues: Questions and Answers, by Lawrence  Kapp and Barbara Salazar  T orreon . 
45 Art. 2(a)(3), UCMJ;10 U.S.C.  § 802(a)(3). 
46 Schlueter, 
supra not
e 3, at 22-23 (noting appellate court decisions creating gap, e.g. United States v. Wolpert, 75 
M.J. 777, 782 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2016); United States v. Spradley,  41 M.J. 827 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1995)). 
47 Art. 16, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  816. 
48 R.C.M. 1301(b). 
49 Art. 18(c), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 818(c). Accused  found guilty of these offenses or conspiracy to commit these 
offenses are subject  to mandatory dismissal or dishonorable discharge.  Art. 56, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  856. 
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Summary Courts-Martial 
The summary court-martial can adjudicate minor offenses al egedly committed by enlisted 
servicemembers.50 It can adjudge maximum punishments of 30 days’ confinement; hard labor 
without confinement for 45 days; restriction to specified limits for 45 days; forfeiture of two-
thirds’ pay per month for one month; and reduction to the lowest pay grade. In the case of enlisted 
members above pay grade E-4,51 the summary court-martial may not adjudge confinement or hard 
labor without confinement, and can reduce a convicted accused only to the next lower pay 
grade.52 Summary courts-martial are composed of one commissioned officer who need not be a 
lawyer.53 The accused must consent to the proceedings54 and normal y is not entitled to a lawyer.55 
If an accused refuses to consent to a trial by summary court-martial, the convening authority may 
order trial by special or general court-martial as may be appropriate.56 As amended by the MJA, a 
finding of guilty at a summary court-martial is not a criminal conviction.57 
Special Courts-Martial 
The special court-martial can try any servicemember for any non-capital offense or, under 
presidential regulation, capital offenses.58 Special courts-martial general y try offenses that are 
tantamount to misdemeanors. A special court-martial can be composed of a military judge alone 
or a military judge and four members.59 Regardless of the offenses tried, the maximum 
punishment al owed at a special court-martial with members is confinement for one year; hard 
labor without confinement for up to three months; forfeiture of two-thirds’ pay per month for up 
to one year; reduction in pay grade; and a bad-conduct discharge.60 Special courts-martial may 
not sentence officers to dismissal.61 As amended by the MJA, in the case of a special court-
martial composed of a judge alone, it may not adjudge a bad-conduct discharge, confinement of 
more than six months, or forfeiture of pay for more than six months.62 With the consent of the 
                                              
50 Art. 20, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  820. 
51 
Id. Pay grade E-4 consists of corporals or specialists (Army), petty officers 3 rd class (Navy), corporals (Marines), and 
senior airmen (Air Force). 
52 R.C.M. 1301; Art 20, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  820. 
53 Art. 16, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  816. 
54 Art. 20, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  820. 
55 Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976). 
56 Art. 20, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  820. 
57 Art. 20, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  820(b).  
58 Arts. 16 & 19, UCMJ;  10 U.S.C.  §§  816, 819; R.C.M. 201(f)(2)(A). Capital offenses, as defined by R.C.M. 103(4), 
for which there is not a mandated punishment in excess of the punitive power of a special court -martial may be referred 
and tried by  a special court -martial. R.C.M. 201(f)(2)(C). 
59 T he accused  has the right to choose whether to be tried by a military judge  alone or a military judge  and members. 
Art. 16, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 816(c). T he option for a trial by members only was  eliminated in the MJA. 
See id. T he 
MJA also increased  the size of the panel from three members to four. 
Id. Enlisted servicemembers may request that the 
members’ panel include  enlisted members. R.C.M. 903.Whenever possible, members must not be appointed who are 
junior to the accused in rank or grade. Art. 25, UCMJ;  10 U.S.C.  § 825.  
60 Art. 19, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  819; R.C.M. 201(f)(2)(B). 
61 Art. 19(a), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 819(a). 
62 Art. 19, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  819(b).  
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parties, a convening authority may appoint a magistrate judge to replace a military judge sitting 
alone.63 
In contrast to the unanimity needed in civilian  criminal trials, the agreement of three-fourths of 
the members of a special court-martial is necessary to find the accused guilty.64 Otherwise, the 
accused is acquitted.65 There are no “hung juries” in courts-martial. The accused is entitled to an 
appointed military attorney or a military counsel of his or her selection, or he can hire a civilian 
counsel at no expense to the government.66 
In the case of a trial by a military judge alone, the military judge also decides the sentence.67 
Otherwise, if the accused chooses sentencing by members, three-fourths of the members must 
concur in the sentence.68 
General Courts-Martial 
A general court-martial is the highest trial level in military law and adjudicates the most serious 
offenses, those comparable to felonies. Pursuant to amendments enacted by the MJA, in non-
capital cases, it is composed of a military judge sitting alone, if the accused so requests, or eight 
members and a military judge.69 For capital cases, twelve members are required.70 Three-fourths 
of the members must concur in order to find the accused guilty, except in capital cases, in which 
case the verdict must be unanimous.71 
The general court-martial can adjudge, within the limits prescribed for each offense, a wide range 
of punishments, including confinement; reprimand; forfeitures of up to al  pay and al owances; 
reduction to the lowest enlisted pay grade; punitive discharge (bad conduct discharge, 
dishonorable discharge, or dismissal, in the case of officers); restriction; fines; and, for certain 
offenses, death.72 The accused is entitled to an appointed military attorney or a military counsel of 
his or her selection, or the accused can hire civilian counsel at no expense to the government.73 A 
court-martial may adjudge a penalty of death only with the concurrence of al  members, if the 
case was referred to the court-martial as a capital case, and if one or more specified aggravating 
factors are proved beyond a reasonable doubt.74 Otherwise, the military judge wil  sentence the 
accused unless the accused requests sentencing by members,75 in which case three-fourths of the 
members must concur in the sentence.76 
                                              
63 Art. 19, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.   §  819(c). 
64 Art. 52, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  852. 
65 R.C.M. 921(c).  
66 R.C.M. 901(d)(4)(A). 
67 Art. 52, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  852. 
68 Art. 52, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  852; Art. 53, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  853. 
69 Art. 16, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  816(c). Prior to the MJA, panels consisted of no fewer than five members.  
70 Art. 25a, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  825a. 
71 Art. 52, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  852. 
72 Art. 18, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  818; R.C.M. 1003.  
73 Art. 38, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  838; R.C.M. 901(d)(4)(A). 
74 R.C.M. 1004. In cases where the death penalty is sought, the accused  is, “[t]o the greatest extent practicable,” entitled 
to a defense  counsel who is learned in the applicable law.  Art. 27, UCMJ;  10 U.S.C.  § 827(d).  
75 Art. 53, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  853. 
76 Art. 52, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  852. 
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Types of Offenses 
Courts-martial try “military offenses,” which are listed in the punitive articles of the UCMJ and 
codified in 10 U.S.C. §§ 877-934. Some “military offenses” have a civilian analog, but some are 
exclusive to the military, such as failure to obey an order.77 The UCMJ authorizes the President to 
prescribe the punishments that a court-martial may impose within the limits established by 
Congress.78 As amended by the MJA, the court-martial is to “impose punishment that is 
sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to promote justice and to maintain good order and 
discipline in the armed forces, taking into consideration [a number of factors].”79 
A court-martial may try a servicemember for offenses not specifical y covered in the other 
punitive articles through the use of the General Article—UCMJ Article 134.80 The General Article 
defines as offenses al  unenumerated conduct in three categories: (1) “disorders and neglects to 
the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces,” (2) “al  conduct of a nature to 
bring discredit upon the armed forces,” and (3) “crimes and offenses not capital, of which persons 
subject to this chapter may be guilty.” These offenses are to “be taken cognizance of by a general, 
special, or summary court martial, according to the nature and degree of the offense.”81 The 
Armed Forces have used the third category in Article 134 to assimilate state and federal offenses 
for which there is no analogous crime in the UCMJ in order to impose court-martial jurisdiction. 
The MJA amended Article 134 to define the term “crimes and offenses not capital” to include 
conduct committed outside the United States “that would constitute a crime or offense not capital 
if the conduct had been engaged in within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States….”82 The intent for the change was to make military practice uniform throughout 
the world.83 Previously, extraterritorial conduct was not chargeable under the third prong of 
Article 134 unless the analogous federal offense was itself applicable extraterritorial y.84 
Otherwise, the government had to charge federal crimes indirectly by proving not only the 
elements of the federal crime, but also that the conduct was prejudicial of good order and 
discipline or discrediting to service to satisfy the first two categories of Article 134.85 
The MJA added four new offenses to the punitive articles and spel ed out a number of offenses 
that had been prosecuted under Article 134.86 The new offenses are 
                                              
77 Military-specific offenses include mutiny or sedition (Art. 94, UCMJ); insubordinate contact (Art. 91, UCMJ); 
failure to obey an order (Art. 92, UCMJ); cruelty and maltreatment (Art. 93, UCMJ); and misconduct as a prisoner 
(Art. 105, UCMJ). 
78 Art. 56, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  856. 
79 Art. 56, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.   §  856(c). Congress in 2019 directed the Secretary of Defense to develop nonbinding 
guidelines  on sentences for all UCMJ  offenses. Pub. .L. No. 116-92 § 537, 133 Stat. 1363 (2019), codified at 10 U.S.C. 
§ 856 note. 
80 Art. 134, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  934. 
81 
Id. 
82 Special  maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States is  defined in 18 U.S.C.  § 7. 
83 MJRG  Rep., 
supra not
e 9, at 987 (explaining the recommended language would  provide “world-wide  applicability of 
federal offenses charged  under clause  3 [of Article 134]”). 
84 
Id. 85 
Id. 86 Schlueter, 
supra not
e 3, at 93. T he enumeration of offenses previously charged under  Article 134 means that the 
government will no longer need  to prove that the conduct discredits the Armed Forces or is prejudicial  to discipline. 
See MJRG  Rep., 
supra not
e 9, at 987. 
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  Article 93a, Prohibited Activities with Military  Recruit or Trainee by Person in 
Position of Special Trust;87 
  Article 121a, Fraudulent Use of Credit Cards, Debit Cards, and Other Access 
Devices;88 
  Article 123, Offenses Concerning Government Computers;89 and 
  Article 132, Retaliation.90 
Newly codified offenses previously prosecuted under Article 134 include solicitation,91 
misprision of a serious offense,92 subornation of perjury,93 false official statements,94 obstruction 
of justice,95 prevention of authorized seizure of property,96 public records offenses,97 parole 
violation98 or escape from custody,99 bribery100 and graft,101 kidnapping,102 arson,103 assault,104 
domestic violence,105 burglary,106 child endangerment,107 and breach of medical quarantine.108 
Some of these offenses that might be considered military offenses include missing movement,109 
offenses by or toward a sentinel or lookout,110 offenses involving passes,111 impersonation of an 
officer,112 and wearing unauthorized insignia.113 
                                              
87 10 U.S.C.  § 893a (prohibiting inappropriate physical intimacy, as defined in regulation, between  recruiters and 
applicants for military service, between drill instructors and trainees, and between faculty and  staff of the service 
academies  and cadets or midshipmen). 
88 Art. 121a, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  921a. 
89 Art. 123, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  923. 
90 Art. 132, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  932 (protection for witnesses, victims, and other persons who report criminal activity). 
91 Art. 82, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  882. 
92 Art. 131c, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  931c. 
93 Art. 131a, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  931a. 
94 Art. 107, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  907. 
95 Art. 131b, UCMJ;  10 U.S.C.  § 931b. 
96 Art. 131e, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  931e. 
97 Art. 104, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  904. 
98 Art. 107a, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  907a. 
99 Art. 87b, UCMJ;  10 U.S.C.  §  887b. 
100 Art. 124a, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  924a. 
101 Art. 124b, UCMJ;  10 U.S.C.  § 924b. 
102 Art. 125, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  925. 
103 Art. 126, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  926. 
104 Art. 128, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  928. 
105 Art. 128b, UCMJ;  10 U.S.C.  § 928b. 
106 Art. 129, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  929. 
107 Art. 119b, UCMJ;  10 U.S.C.  § 919b. For a complete list, see Schlueter, 
supra not
e 3, at 94-105. 
108 Art. 84, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  884. 
109 Art. 87, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  887. 
110 Arts. 95-95a, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §§  895-95a. 
111 Art. 105a, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  905a. 
112 Art. 106, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  906.
 
113 Art. 106a, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  906a. 
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The MJA also amended Article 79 to authorize the President to prescribe lesser-included 
offenses.114 This change was intended to provide notice by means other than the “elements test”—
a lesser-included offense is a subset of elements of an offense—so that offenses charged under 
Article 134 may be brought within other punitive articles as lesser-included offenses.115 The 
reform was considered advisable because the first two clauses of Article 134 provide that the 
offense must discredit the armed forces or be prejudicial to good order and discipline, elements 
not “articulated []or inherent in any of the enumerated punitive articles.”116 This meant that, prior 
to the MJA, such offenses could not be the basis for conviction on lesser-included offenses. The 
non-exhaustive list of designated lesser-included offenses now provided in Appendix 12 of the 
MCM may reduce the charges that could accrue for the same conduct and reduce criminal 
liability.117 
Investigation and Charging 
The first step in the military justice system is the preliminary inquiry. If warranted, the 
commander or other accuser may issue a written charge sheet, subject to a preliminary hearing 
under Art. 32, which is similar to a grand jury, and then referred to court-martial for trial. 
Preliminary Inquiry 
When a servicemember has reportedly committed an offense, the accused’s immediate 
commander wil  conduct a preliminary inquiry.118 This inquiry may include an examination of the 
charges, which varies in length and scope depending on the offense(s) al eged and the complexity 
of the case, and an investigative report or summary of expected evidence.119 Members of the 
command may conduct the investigation or, in complex cases, military and civilian  law 
enforcement officials may conduct it.120 Once investigators gather evidence and the inquiry is 
complete, the commander can choose to dispose of the charges by (1) taking no action, 
(2) initiating  administrative action,121 (3) imposing non-judicial punishment,122 (4) preferring 
charges, or (5) forwarding to a higher authority for preferral of charges.123 
                                              
114 Art. 79, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  879. 
115 MJRG  Rep., 
supra not
e 9, at 680. 
116 
Id. at 678. 
117 
Id. at 680 (explaining that “[c]onvening authorities [may] refer to trial only the charges that capture the gravamen of 
the accused’s  misconduct, instead of having to file additional, alternative charges, which unnecessarily expose the 
accused  to excessively greater criminal liability”). 
118 R.C.M. 303. A commander who receives a report of a sex -related offense by a servicemember in her chain of 
command is to refer the report to the appropriate military criminal investigative organization. 
Id. (discussion). 
119 
Id. (discussion). 
120 
Id. (discussion). 
121 Administrative action can include “counseling, admonition, reprimand, exhortation, disapproval, criticism, censure, 
reproach, rebuke, extra military instruction, or the administrative withholding of privileges,” among other things. 
R.C.M. 306(c)(2). Administrative discharge may also be considered  where warranted.  
Id. (discussion). 
122 Art. 15, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  815. 
123 R.C.M. 306(c)(5). 
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Preferral of Charges 
The first formal step in a court-martial, preferral of charges, consists of drafting a charge sheet 
containing the charges and specifications124 against the accused. The accuser must sign the charge 
sheet125 “under oath before a commissioned officer ..  authorized to administer oaths.”126 The 
accused’s immediate commander must inform the accused of the charges “as soon as practicable” 
after they are preferred.127 Pre-referral proceedings may be conducted by a military judge, or in 
some cases by a magistrate, to review requests for investigative subpoenas, search warrants, 
orders for electronic communications, the appointment of an individual to represent the interests 
of a victim, or matters related to pretrial confinement, mental capacity of the accused, or requests 
for individual  counsel.128 
Referral of Charges 
After preferral of charges, a convening authority129 may refer130 them to one of the three types of 
courts-martial: summary, special, or general.131 The seriousness of the offenses al eged general y 
determines the type of court-martial. The convening authority must be an officer with sufficient 
legal authority and wil  general y be the commander of the unit to which the accused is 
assigned.132 In the case of sex-related offenses committed in the United States, the victim is to 
have an opportunity to express views as to whether to prosecute the offense by court-martial or in 
a civilian court with jurisdiction.133 If the victim prefers prosecution in a civilian court, the 
commander or convening authority must notify the appropriate authorities and notify the victim 
of the decision by those authorities to prosecute or not to prosecute.134 
Article 32 Hearing 
Prior to convening a general court-martial, a preliminary hearing is required.135 This hearing, 
known as an Article 32 hearing, is meant to ensure that there is a basis for prosecution.136 A 
                                              
124 “A specification is a plain, concise, and definite statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.” 
R.C.M. 307(c)(3). 
125 “Any person subject to the UCMJ may prefer charges [as the accuser].” R.C.M. 307(a).  
126 R.C.M. 307(b). 
127 Art. 30, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  830(c); R.C.M. 308. 
128 Art. 30a, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  830a (added  by the MJA and amended by Pub.  L. No. 116-92 § 531, 133 Stat. 1359 
(2019)); R.C.M. 309. Recipients of a subpoena or order to provide electronic communications may request the military 
judge  to quash the subpoena or order. R.C.M. 309(b)(3). 
129 R.C.M. 504. Persons authorized to act as convening authorities for courts-martial are set forth in Arts. 22 -24, 
UCMJ;  10 U.S.C.  §§  822-24. 
130 Referral is  the convening authority’s order “that charges and specifications against an accused  be  tried by a specified 
court -martial.” Art. 34, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 834(d). 
131 R.C.M. 401(c). 
132 R.C.M. 103(6). 
133 R.C.M. 306(e). 
134 
Id. 
135Art. 32, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 832; R.C.M. 405. 
136 Art. 32, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  832. As revised in the MJA, the preliminary hearing officer is charged with (1) deciding 
whet her the specification alleges an UCMJ  offense, (2) determining whether there is probable cause  to believe that the 
accused  committed the offense, (3) determining whether the convening authority has jurisdict ion over the offense and 
the accused,  and (4) providing the convening authority with a recommendation for disposition of the charges. 
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preliminary  hearing officer, who must be a commissioned officer and, except under “exceptional 
circumstances,” a certified judge advocate,137 presides, and the accused has the same entitlements 
to counsel as in a general- or special courts-martial.138 However, unlike in a civilian  grand jury 
investigation, where the accused has no access to the proceedings, the accused in an Article 32 
hearing is afforded the opportunity to examine the evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and 
present his own arguments.139 Any victim of the offense has the right to notification and the 
opportunity to be present during the preliminary hearing,140 but a victim is not required to 
testify.141 The government, the accused, and any victims may submit additional materials for the 
preliminary hearing officer’s consideration.142 If the hearing uncovers evidence that the accused 
has committed an offense not charged, the hearing officer can recommend additional charges.143 
Likewise, if the hearing officer believes that evidence is insufficient to support a charge, he can 
make recommendations to that effect.  
Once the Article 32 hearing is complete, the hearing officer makes recommendations to the 
convening authority’s legal advisor. The legal advisor, in turn, provides the convening authority 
with a formal written recommendation, known as the Article 34, UCMJ advice, regarding the 
disposition of the charges. The convening authority then determines whether to convene a court-
martial or dismiss the charges.144 
Ancillary Matters 
A number of other issues may arise in the pretrial phase, including questioning the accused, 
determining whether to impose pretrial confinement, and assessing whether the accused has the 
mental capacity to stand trial. 
Self-Incrimination  during Questioning 
Servicemembers are entitled to Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination.145 Due to 
the inherently coercive environment in the military,146 Congress provided in the UCMJ for the 
                                              
137 R.C.M. 405(d)(1). A commissioned officer is a member of the uniformed services not in an enlisted pay grade and 
includes  a commissioned warrant officer (10 U.S.C.  §101). 
138 Art. 32(d), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 832(d). 
139 Art. 32(d), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 832(d); R.C.M. 405(f). 
See United States v. Davis, 64 M.J. 445 (2007). 
140 R.C.M. 405(g). T he judge  may exclude  the victim from the proceeding only in circumstances where a similarly 
situated victim would  be  excluded  at trial. 
Id. 
141 Art. 32(d)(3), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 832(d)(3). 
142 Art. 32(c)(3), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 832(c)(3). 
143 Art. 32(f), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 832(f). 
144 Article 33, UCMJ, requires  the President to direct the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of 
Homeland Security, to issue  “ non-binding guidance  regarding  factors that commanders, convening authorities, staff 
judge  advocates, and judge  advocates should  take into account when exercising their duties with respect to disposition 
of charges and specifications in the interest  of justice and discipline.” 10 U.S.C.  §  833. T he guidance is located in 
Appendix 2.1 of the MCM, 
supra not
e 14. 145 
See Mil. R. Evid. 304(a)(1)(A) (defining involuntary statement to mean “a statement obtained in violation of the 
self-incrimination privilege or Due Process Clause  of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article 
31, or through the use of coercion, unlawful  influence, or unlawful  inducement”). T he Supreme Court has never held 
that “the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination ...  applies of its own force to the military,” but noted 
that it need not decide the issue  because  the MCM applies it and military appellate courts have construed the Supreme 
Court’s Fifth Amendment cases to military interrogations. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457 n. * (1994). 
146 MODERN MILITARY JUSTICE 152 (Gregory E. Maggs  and Lisa M. Schenck, eds.  2d ed. 2015). 
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right to freedom from coercion during interrogation and the right to a warning147 similar to the 
familiar  
Miranda warning required for interrogation of civilians in police custody.148 These 
Article 31(b) warnings are required prior to any official law enforcement or disciplinary 
interrogation149 of a suspect,150 who need not be in custody to be entitled to a warning.151 The 
warning includes notification of (1) the nature of the accusation, (2) the right to remain silent, and 
(3) the fact that any statement made may be used as evidence in a trial by court-martial.152 The 
right to be informed of the right to counsel attaches once the accused is in custody or charges are 
preferred.153 A failure to give a required warning or otherwise compel ing a suspect or accused to 
provide involuntary testimony usual y results in the exclusion of such evidence at trial.154 
Apprehension and  Pretrial Confinement 
Apprehension in the military, like  arrest in the civilian  context, means taking a person into 
custody.155 Upon reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that the person to be 
apprehended has committed it, any officer, petty officer, warrant officer, noncommissioned 
officer, or member of the military police or others performing law enforcement or guard duty may 
apprehend a servicemember.156 No warrant is required.157 An apprehension may occur by oral or 
written notice, but force may be used as reasonably necessary.158 
                                              
147 Art. 31, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  831. 
148 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 489 (1966) (observing that the requirement to inform the accused of his right to 
stay silent and to warn that statements may be used  against him had long been provided in  the UCMJ). 
149 Casual  conversations conducted in other than an official capacity do not require an Article 31 warning.  MODERN 
MILITARY JUSTICE, 
supra not
e 1467, at 158 (citing United States v. Duga, 10 M.J. 206 (C.M.A. 1981); United States v. 
Loukas, 29 M.J. 385 (C.M.A. 1990); United States v. Jones, 73 M.J. 357 (C.A.A.F. 2014)); United States v. Ra mos, 76 
M.J. 372, 374 (C.A.A.F. 2017) (stating that “warning rights are required  when ‘(1) a person subject to the UCMJ, (2) 
interrogates or requests any statement, (3) from an accused or person suspected  of an offense, and (4) the statements 
regard  the offense of which the person questioned is  accused  or suspected.’”) (citing 
Jones, 73 M.J. at 361 (C.A.A.F. 
2014)). T he rights warning is also required  for some “verbal acts” or actions that amount to a statement, such as 
compulsion to produce certain evidence a servicemember is  not ordinarily required to make available. SCHLEUTER, 
supra not
e 19, § 5-4(A)(1) 
150 Whether a servicemember is a “suspect” depends on whether the questioner believes the servicemenber committed 
an offense and whether a reasonable person would  have considered  the servicemember to be a suspect.  SCHLEUTER, 
supra not
e 19, § 5-4(B)(1) (citing military case law). 
151 Art. 31(b), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 831(b) (providing that “[n]o person subject to this chapter may interrogate, or 
request any statement from, an accused or a person suspected of an offense without first informing him of the nature of 
the accusation and advising  him that he does not have to make any statement regarding the offense of which he is 
accused  or suspected and that any statement made by him may be used  as  evidence against  him in a trial by court -
martial”); 
see also MILITARY JUSTICE CASES AND MATERIALS, 
supra not
e 4, at 987 (comparing 
Miranda requirements 
with Article 31(b)). 
152 Mil. R. Evid. 305(c). 
153 SCHLEUTER, 
supra not
e 19, § 5-4(B)(2). 
154 
Id. (describing  voluntariness test); 
id. § 5-4(B)(3) (giving reasons an unwarned  statement may nevertheless be 
admissible). 
155 Art. 7, UCMJ;  10 U.S.C.  § 807; R.C.M. 302. 
156 
Id.; R.C.M. 302(b)-(c); MODERN MILITARY JUSTICE, 
supra note 7, at 164 (describing who may conduct 
apprehensions, noting that noncommissioned officers and petty officers should not apprehend an officer unless directed 
by a commissioned officer to do so). 
157 R.C.M. 302(d). 
158 
Id. 
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As required by the circumstances,159 servicemembers who are apprehended on suspicion of 
having committed an offense may be subjected to one of four types of pretrial restraint. Pretrial 
confinement is the most severe type of restraint and is subject to restrictions.160 The other forms 
of restraint are moral rather than physical and include conditions on liberty (ordering a 
servicemember to do or refrain from certain acts); restriction in lieu of arrest (ordering a 
servicemember to stay within certain limits while continuing to perform duties); and arrest 
(ordering a servicemember to stay within specific limits without performing full military 
duties).161 None of the forms of restraint may be used to punish the suspect.162 If pretrial arrest or 
confinement is ordered, the commander is required to take “immediate steps” to inform the 
confinee of the specific charges serving as the basis for confinement and to either begin trial or 
release the individual  from confinement.163 
Pretrial confinement, or depriving a person of freedom pending disposition of charges, is 
available  only for serious charges where probable cause exists. There must be a reasonable belief 
that “(1) an offense triable by court-martial has been committed; (2) the person confined 
committed it; and (3) confinement is required by the circumstances.”164 To continue confinement 
past 72 hours, the commander must also determine that confinement is necessary because it is 
foreseeable that 
(a) The confinee will not appear at trial, pretrial hearing, or preliminary hearing, or 
(b) The confinee will engage in serious criminal misconduct.165 
If the commander approves continued confinement, he must document the reasons for the 
decision in a “72-hour memorandum.”166 
The R.C.M. also requires that a neutral and detached magistrate review the propriety of pretrial 
confinement within 48 hours of the commencement of the confinement,167 which is the equivalent 
                                              
159 R.C.M. 304(c). Conditions that may require pretrial restrain include flight risk and danger  to the unit, where lesser 
forms of restraint are inadequate. MODERN MILITARY JUSTICE, 
supra not
e 1467, at 165. 
160 R.C.M. 305. 
161 R.C.M. 304. 
162 Art. 13, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  813; R.C.M. 304(f). 
163 Art. 10, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  810 (as amended by the MJA). 
164 R.C.M. 305(d). 
165 R.C.M. 305(h)(2). Some of the factors which should  be considered, according to the R.C.M. 305(h) discussion, 
include 
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offenses charged or suspected, including  extenuating 
circumstances; 
(2) the weight of the evidence against the confinee; 
(3) the confinee’s ties to the locale, including family, off-duty employment, financial resources, and 
length of residence; 
(4) the confinee’s character and mental condition; 
(5) the confinee’s service record, including  any record of previous misconduct; 
(6) the confinee’s record of appearance at or flight from other pretrial investigations, trials, and 
similar proceedings; and 
(7) the likelihood that the confinee can and will commit further serious criminal misconduct if 
allowed  to remain at liberty. 
166 R.C.M. 305(h)(2)(C). 
167 R.C.M. 305(i)(1). 
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of a probable cause hearing conducted by a magistrate in the civilian justice system.168 Final y, a 
neutral and detached officer assigned the task by regulation conducts a seven-day probable cause 
review to determine whether circumstances warrant continued confinement.169 The impartial 
reviewer may review the commander’s 72-hour memorandum and any other written materials, 
consider statements by the accused or his counsel, as wel  as consider views offered by the 
victim, where applicable.170 If the charges are referred to court-martial, the military judge wil  
upon motion review the seven-day confinement decision for abuse of discretion and may order 
release or administrative credit if there was such abuse or other requirements were not met.171 The 
military judge may also order release if new information not presented to the reviewing officer 
requires release or there was no independent review and no reason exists for continued 
confinement.172 The typical remedy for noncompliance with the requirements is administrative 
credit against the eventual sentence.173 
Searches and Seizures 
Military  searches and seizures are governed by the Fourth Amendment174 and the Military Rules 
of Evidence.175 The main difference between the application of the Fourth Amendment right to be 
free from unreasonable government intrusions in the military and civilian  contexts is the reduced 
expectation of privacy in the military, especial y  regarding searches that take place on 
government property.176 A neutral and detached commander may issue a search authorization 
upon the existence of probable cause to believe evidence of a crime is present in an area under his 
command or on the person of a servicemember.177 A military judge or magistrate may also issue a 
search authorization,178 or a search may be conducted pursuant to a search warrant issued by a 
civilian  judge or magistrate.179 A search authorization or warrant may be unnecessary in exigent 
circumstances created where delay “would result in the removal, destruction, or concealment of 
the property or evidence sought,” if military operational necessity would prevent communication 
with the person who would grant the search authorization, or where the Constitution does not 
require a warrant.180 
                                              
168 SCHLEUTER, 
supra not
e 19, § 5-9(D)(1). 
169 R.C.M. 305(i)(2). 
170 R.C.M. 305(i)(2)(A). T he victim is entitled to notice that the hearing will take place, but the hearing may not be 
unduly  delayed  to facilitate the victim’s attendance. 
Id. 
171 R.C.M. 305(j). 
172 SCHLEUTER, 
supra not
e 19, § 5-9(E). 
173 R.C.M. 305(k). In the event the treatment amounts to pretrial punishment, the remedy is “meaningful sentence 
relief,” which  could amount to more credit time than time served. SCHLEUTER, 
supra not
e 19, § 5-10(D). 
174 U.S.  CONST. amend. IV  (“ T he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures,  shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue  but upon probable cause .”); 
United States v. Middleton, 10 M.J. 123, 126 –27 (C.M.A. 1981) (“While certain protections [of the Bill of Rights] have 
been deemed  inapplicable, neither this Court nor the Supreme Court has ever held that the Fourth Amendment does not 
shield  the American serviceperson.” (citing United States v. Ezell, 6 M.J. 307, 313 (C.M.A. 1979)).  
175 Mil. R. Evid. 311-17. 
176 SCHLEUTER, 
supra not
e 19, § 5-3(A) (noting that the expectation of privacy is limited and the commander has power 
to intrude into areas under  his control). 
177 Mil. R. Evid. 315(d) & (f). 
178 Mil. R. Evid. 315(d). 
179 Mil. R. Evid. 315(b)(2). 
180 Mil. R. Evid. 315(g). 
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As in the civilian  context, some searches are reasonable even if conducted without probable 
cause.181 These include border searches for immigration or customs purposes; searches conducted 
upon entry or exit of a military  instal ation, aircraft, or vessel; searches of government property 
not issued for personal use; searches pursuant to voluntary and authorized consent; searches 
incident to a lawful stop (including stop and frisk as wel  as vehicle searches); searches incident 
to apprehension; searches within jails or other places of confinement; emergency searches to save 
lives or other emergency purposes; and searches of open fields.182 
Evidence procured through an unreasonable search or seizure, or evidence derived from such 
evidence, is inadmissible at court-martial unless an exception applies.183 The exceptions are 
evidence used for impeachment purposes, evidence that inevitably would have been discovered, 
or evidence acquired by good-faith reliance on an invalid  search authorization or warrant.184 
Evidence that is uncovered during a valid inspection or inventory is admissible at court-martial.185 
An “inspection” is defined as “an examination of the whole or part of a unit, organization, 
instal ation, vessel, aircraft, or vehicle ... conducted as an incident of command the primary 
purpose of which is to determine and to ensure the security, military fitness, or good order and 
discipline of the unit, organization, instal ation, vessel, aircraft, or vehicle.”186 “Inventory” is 
defined as an administrative, “reasonable examination, accounting, or other control measure used 
to account for or control property, assets, or other resources.”187 However, inspections and 
inventories conducted for law enforcement or disciplinary purposes are not valid, and any 
evidence of criminal activity discovered during their conduct may be inadmissible at court-
martial.188 
Mental Capacity 
The mental capacity of the accused may have bearing on whether he may be prosecuted or 
convicted. A court-martial may not try an individual  if he is suffering from a mental disease or 
defect such that he is unable to understand the nature of the proceedings or conduct or cooperate 
intel igently  in the defense.189 In the event the mental capacity or mental responsibility of the 
accused is in question, the convening authority or military judge may order an examination.190 
The examination, often cal ed an R.C.M. 706 Board, must answer the four questions: (1) at the 
time of the al eged criminal conduct, did the accused have a severe mental disease or defect; (2)                                               
181 Mil. R. Evid. 314. T he Supreme Court has asserted that “ the most basic constitutional rule in [Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence”  is that “ searches conducted outside the judicial  process, without prior approval by judge  or magistrate, 
are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment —subject only to a few specially established  and well-delineated 
exceptions.” Coolidge v. New  Hampshire, 403 U.S.  443, 454–55 (1971) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 
357 (1967)); G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 352 –53, 358 (1977). Such warrant exceptions include 
exigent circumstances (Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980)); “ stop and frisk” searches (T erry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S.  1 (1968)); searches incident to custodial arrests (United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)); seizures of 
contraband “in plain view” (Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1 (1982)); searches and seizures  at the border (United 
States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977)). 
182 Mil. R. Evid. 314.
 
183 Mil. R. Evid. 311. 
184 
Id. 
185 Mil. R. Evid. 313. 
186 Mil. R. Evid. 313(b). 
187 Mil. R. Evid. 313(c). 
188 Mil. R. Evid. 313; SCHLEUTER, 
supra not
e 19, § 5-3(E)(1). 
189 R.C.M. 909(a). 
190 R.C.M. 706. 
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what is the clinical psychiatric diagnosis; (3) was the accused, at the time of the al eged criminal 
conduct and as a result of such severe mental disease or defect, unable to appreciate the nature or 
wrongfulness of his conduct; and (4) is the accused currently suffering from a mental disease or 
defect to the point that he is unable to understand the nature of the proceedings or to conduct or 
cooperate intel igently  in the defense?191 
The report of the R.C.M. 706 Board may lead to the case’s suspension, dismissal of charges by 
the convening authority, administrative separation of the accused from military service, or the 
trial of charges by court-martial.192 Although an accused may be found competent to be tried by 
court-martial, that determination does not prohibit the accused from claiming the defense of lack 
of mental responsibility.193 To prevail on a defense of lack of mental responsibility, the accused 
must prove by clear and convincing evidence that at the time of the commission of the acts 
constituting the offense, because of a severe mental disease or defect, he was unable to appreciate 
the nature and quality or wrongfulness of his acts.194 Regardless of an initial competency 
determination, a military judge may order additional examinations at any stage of the proceedings 
if the accused’s mental capacity is in question.195 
Pretrial and Trial Process 
When a convening authority refers charges, the referral triggers a series of steps beginning with 
the convening of the court-martial.196 This post-referral process involves both pretrial matters, 
including the exchange of evidence, and the actual trial, including the selection of the 
members  of 
special and general courts-martial—the equivalent of civilian jurors197—and presentation of 
evidence. The process ends with the court-martial’s 
findings—or verdicts on the referred 
charges198—and, if the accused is convicted, sentencing. 
Convening the Court-Martial 
After referral, the convening authority wil  issue an order convening the court-martial. The order 
must designate the type of court-martial—general, special, or summary199—and detail the 
members (for special or general courts-martial) or presiding officer (for summary courts-
martial).200 The convening order may also specify where the court-martial wil  meet.201 For 
special and general courts-martial, the military judge and counsel wil   be assigned under 
regulations issued by the secretaries of each military department.202 
                                              
191 R.C.M. 706(c)(2). 
192 R.C.M. 706(c)(3) (discussion). 
193 R.C.M. 916(b)(2). 
194 R.C.M. 916(k)(1). 
195 R.C.M. 706(c)(4). T he accused’s mental capacity is relevant at all stages of the proceedings, including,  but not 
limited to, the arraignment, court -martial, and post -trial matters. 
See R.C.M. 1107. 
196 
See Arts. 22-24, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §§  822-24; R.C.M. 504. 
197 R.C.M. 502(a)(2)(A) (“The members of a court -martial shall determine whether the accused is  proved guilty ....”). 
198 
See R.C.M. 918(a) (“T he general findings of a court -martial state whether the accused is  guilty of each charge and 
specification.”) 
199 
See discussion  
supra page 5 on types of courts-martial and who may convene each type. 
200 R.C.M. 504(d). 
201 
Id. 202 Arts. 26, 27, UCMJ;  10 U.S.C.  §§  826, 827; R.C.M. 503. 
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Members 
For special and general courts-martial, the convening authority must 
detail—assign—members to 
serve on the court-martial.203 The convening authority must select members who are on active 
duty and who, in the convening authority’s opinion, “are best qualified for the duty by reason of 
age, education, training, experience, length of service, and judicial temperament.”204 Any 
commissioned officer may serve as a member of a court-martial,205 but warrant officers may only 
do so if the accused is not a commissioned officer.206 Enlisted servicemembers may not serve 
unless the accused is also an enlisted servicemember.207 No accuser, witness for the prosecution, 
or individual  who served as a preliminary hearing officer or counsel in the same case may serve 
as a member.208 If possible, members should not be junior in rank or grade to the accused.209 
The number of members a convening authority must detail depends on the type of court-martial 
and the nature of the charges against the accused.210 The convening authority must detail at least 
the number of members required for a given type of court-martial and has discretion to authorize 
a military judge to impanel alternate members.211 
General courts-martial typical y consist of eight members,212 with three exceptions. First, in 
capital cases (where the accused may be sentenced to death), a general court-martial must consist 
of twelve members.213 Second, in non-capital cases, an accused may request trial by a military 
judge alone.214 Third, in non-capital cases, a panel may consist of six or seven members if, after 
impanelment, members of the panel are excused or chal enged and no alternates are available.215 
Special courts-martial consist of four members,216 unless the accused requests trial by a military 
judge alone or the case is referred for trial by a military judge alone.217 
Military  Judges 
Military  judges preside over general and special courts-martial.218 A military  judge must be “[1] a 
commissioned officer of the armed forces [2] who is a member of the bar of a Federal court or the                                               
203 R.C.M. 503(a)(1); 
see also R.C.M. 501(a) (prescribing the composition of general and special courts-martial). 
204 Art. 25(e)(2), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 825(e)(2); R.C.M. 502(a)(1). 
205 Art. 25(a), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 825(a); R.C.M. 502(a)(1)(A). 
206 Art. 25(b), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 825(b); R.C.M. 502(a)(1)(B). 
207 Art. 25(c), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 825(c); R.C.M. 502(a)(1)(C). An accused who is  an enlisted servicemember has a 
right to request a court -martial with membership consisting entirely of officers or at least one-third enlisted members. 
Art. 25(c)(2), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  825(c)(2); R.C.M. 503(a)(2). 
208 Art. 25(e)(2), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 825(e)(2). 
209 Art. 25(e)(1), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 825(e)(1). 
210 Arts. 25, 25a, 29, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §§  825, 825a, 829; R.C.M. 501. 
211 R.C.M. 501(a)(1)(ii), (a)(1)(B)(ii), (a)(2)(B). 
212 Art. 16(b)(1), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 816(b)(1); R.C.M. 501(a)(1)(A)(ii). Before the MJA amendments, both general 
and special courts-martial required at least five members in non-capital cases. 
See 10 U.S.C.  § 816 (2000). 
213 Art. 25a(a), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 825a(a); R.C.M. 501(a)(1)(B)(i). Before the MJA amendments, general courts-
martial in capital cases  required  at least twelve members, unless  twelve members were not reasonably available.  
See 10 U.S.C.  §  825a (2006). 
214 Art. 16(b)(3), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 816(b)(3); R.C.M. 501(a)(1)(A)(iii). 
215 Art. 29(c), (d), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 829(c), (d); R.C.M. 501(a)(1)(A)(iv). 
216 Art. 16(c)(1), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 816(c)(1); R.C.M. 501(a)(2)(A). 
217 Art. 16(c)(2), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 816(c)(2); R.C.M. 501(a)(2)(C), (D). 
218 Art. 16(b)-(c), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 816(b)-(c). Any commissioned officer may serve as a summary court -martial. 
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highest court of a State and [3] certified to be qualified, by reason of education, training, 
experience, and judicial temperament, for duty as a military judge by the Judge Advocate General 
of the armed force of which such military judge is a member.”219 Military judges general y must 
serve terms of at least three years.220 The Judge Advocate General of each service branch or a 
military judge who reports directly to the Judge Advocate General may detail military judges to 
serve on general and special courts-martial.221 
A military judge may not be an accuser or witness for the prosecution and may not consult with 
the members of the court-martial except in the presence of the accused and counsel.222 Before a 
court-martial is assembled, the detailing authority may replace a military judge without 
explanation.223 Once a court-martial is assembled, a military judge may be removed only for 
disqualification or good cause.224 Convening authorities and their staff may not “prepare or 
review any report concerning the effectiveness, fitness, or efficiency” of a military judge.225 
Counsel 
In general and special courts-martial, trial counsel—which serves as the prosecutor226—and 
defense counsel wil  be detailed to the court-martial under regulations prescribed by the 
secretaries of each service branch.227 Trial and defense counsel detailed in general courts-martial 
must be judge advocate officers who are “member[s] of the bar of a Federal court or of the 
highest court of a State” and approved by the appropriate Judge Advocate General.228 Defense 
counsel detailed in special courts-martial must have the same credentials,229 but trial counsel in 
special courts-martial may be any commissioned officer “determined to be competent to perform 
such duties by the Judge Advocate General.”230 
An accused has a right to counsel in general and special, but not summary, courts-martial.231 An 
accused may be represented by (1) military counsel detailed to a court-martial; (2) civilian 
counsel provided by the accused; or (3) military counsel selected by the accused if that counsel is 
                                              
Art. 16(d), UCMJ;  10 U.S.C.  § 816(d). 
219 Art. 26(b), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 826(b); R.C.M. 502(c)(1). 
220 R.C.M. 502(c)(3). 
221 Art. 26(c)(1), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 826(c)(1); R.C.M. 503(b)(1). 
222 Art. 26(d)-(e), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 826(d)-(e). 
223 R.C.M. 505(e)(1). 
224 R.C.M. 505(e)(2). 
225 Art. 26(c)(2), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 826(c)(2). 
226 Art. 38(a), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 838(a); R.C.M. 502(d)(4). 
227 Art. 27(a)(1), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 827(a)(1); R.C.M. 501(b), 503(c)(1). 
228 Art. 27(b)(1), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 827(b); R.C.M. 502(d)(1), (2)(A). 
229 Art. 27(c)(1), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 827(c)(1); R.C.M. 502(d)(2)(A). 
230 Art. 27(c)(2), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 827(c)(2); R.C.M. 502(d)(1)(B). 
231 Art. 38(b)(1), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C  § 838(b)(1); R.C.M. 506, 1301(e). 
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“reasonably available.”232  If an accused retains civilian counsel, the defense counsel detailed to 
the court-martial wil  serve as an associate defense counsel unless excused by the accused.233 
A person who has previously served in certain roles in a case may not be detailed as trial counsel 
or, unless expressly requested by the accused, as defense counsel.234 These roles include (1) the 
accuser; (2) an investigating or preliminary hearing officer; (3) a military judge or appel ate 
military judge; or (4) a member.235 “No person who has acted for the prosecution may act later in 
the same case for the defense, nor may any person who has acted for the defense act later in the 
same case for the prosecution.”236 
Pretrial Matters 
Once the convening authority issues the order convening the court-martial and detailing its 
personnel but before the trial begins, the court-martial must address several pretrial matters. 
These tasks differ depending on the type of court-martial but general y include preparing 
evidence and identifying witnesses. Pretrial activity may also include plea bargaining and an 
evaluation of the accused’s mental capacity.237 
General and Special  Courts-Martial 
Before trial by a general or special court-martial, counsel for each side and the court-martial have 
the opportunity to obtain witnesses and other evidence and must share information through the 
discovery process.238 During this process, trial counsel must provide evidence and information to 
the defense, including 
  the convening order, charge sheet, and any accompanying papers or 
statements;239 
  relevant documents, papers, or objects in the trial counsel’s possession;240 
  the names and contact information of witnesses;241 
  records of the accused’s prior convictions, if any;242 
                                              
232 Art. 38(b)(2)-(3), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 838(b)(2)-(3). The following persons are, by regulation, not reasonably 
available to serve as defense counsel: (1) generals and flag  officers; (2) trial or appellate military judges;  (3) trial 
counsel; (4) appellate defense or government counsel; (5) principal legal advisors  to military commands, organizations, 
and agencies;  (6) instructors and students at service academies;  (7) college or university students; and (8) members of 
the staffs of the Judge  Advocates General. R.C.M. 506(b)(1). 
233 Art. 38(b)(4), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 838(b)(4). 
234 Art. 27(a)(2), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 827(a)(2); R.C.M. 502(d)(3). 
235 Art. 27(a)(2), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 827(a)(2); R.C.M. 502(d)(3). 
236 Art. 27(a)(2), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 827(a)(2). 
237 For an overview of mental capacity determinations, see the discussion 
supra in
 “Mental Capacity.” 
238 Art. 46(a), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 846(a) (“ In a case referred for trial by court -martial, the trial counsel, the defense 
counsel, and the court -martial shall have equal opportunity to obtain witnesses and other evidence in accordance with 
such regulations as the President may prescribe.”); 
see also R.C.M.  701. 
239 R.C.M. 701(a)(1). 
240 R.C.M. 701(a)(2). 
241 R.C.M. 701(a)(3). 
242 R.C.M. 701(a)(4). 
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  information trial counsel intends to present at sentencing;243 and 
  any evidence favorable to the defense.244 
Defense counsel must likewise disclose certain documents and evidence, the names of witnesses, 
and the accused’s intent to use certain defenses.245 
In addition, both trial and defense counsel may, in exceptional circumstances, depose witnesses to 
preserve their testimony.246 An “exceptional circumstance” is one where the witness “is likely to 
be unavailable  to testify at the time of trial.”247 The convening authority, before referral, or the 
military judge, after referral, decides whether to al ow depositions to take place.248 
Summary  Courts-Martial 
Compared to general and special courts-martial, summary courts-martial employ a greatly 
simplified procedure.249 A summary court-martial is a non-criminal forum without civilian 
analog.250 A single officer (who need not be a lawyer), serves as the trial judge and finder of 
fact.251 After convening, the officer serving as the summary court-martial must “examine the 
charge sheet, [any associated] papers, and the immediately available  personnel records of the 
accused.”252 The summary court-martial must report any irregularities in those documents and 
may correct the charge sheet or amend the charges and specifications.253 
Before trial, the summary court-martial must hold a preliminary proceeding.254 During this 
proceeding, the summary court-martial must inform the accused of, among other things, (1) the 
nature of the charges; (2) the right to plead guilty or not guilty; (3) the right to examine evidence 
and cal  witnesses; (4) the maximum sentence the summary court-martial may adjudge; and (5) 
the “right to object to trial by summary court-martial.”255 
After the preliminary proceeding, the summary court-martial must give the accused “a reasonable 
period of time to decide whether to object to trial by summary court-martial.”256 If the accused 
objects, the summary court-martial must return the case to the convening authority for assignment 
                                              
243 R.C.M. 701(a)(5). 
244 R.C.M. 701(a)(6). 
245 R.C.M. 701(b) 
246 Art. 49, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  849; R.C.M. 702. 
247 R.C.M. 702(a)(2). 
248 R.C.M. 702(b). 
249 
See R.C.M. 1301(b) (“ T he function of the summary court -martial is to promptly adjudicate minor offenses under  a 
simple disciplinary proceeding.”). 
250 Art. 20, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  820(b); 
see Mittendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 38-42 (describing the differences 
between a summary court -martial and civilian criminal proceedings and holding  that “ a summary court -martial is not a 
‘criminal prosecution’ for purposes of the Sixth Amendment”). 
251 Art. 16, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C.  §  816(d). 
252 R.C.M. 1304(a)(1). 
253 R.C.M. 1304(a)(2)-(4). 
254 R.C.M. 1304(b)(1). 
255 R.C.M. 1304(b)(1). 
256 R.C.M. 1304(b)(2)(A). 
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to a special or general court-martial.257 If the accused does not object, the summary court-martial 
trial may proceed.258 
Plea Agreements 
At any point before the announcement of the court-martial’s findings, an accused and a 
convening authority may enter into a plea agreement.259 The parties can agree to dispose of one or 
more charges or specifications or to limits on the sentence imposed for one or more charges or 
specifications.260 For example, an accused could promise to plead guilty to one charge in 
exchange for a promise from the convening authority not to refer other charges.261 Likewise, a 
convening authority could agree to refer charges to a specific type of court-martial or to refer a 
potential y capital case as non-capital.262 The accused must freely and voluntarily agree to al  plea 
agreement provisions, and a plea agreement cannot deprive an accused of certain rights, including 
the rights to counsel and due process.263 Once a general or special court-martial has convened, a 
plea agreement is not binding unless approved by the military judge..264 The military judge may 
not, however, participate in plea agreement discussions.265 
Trial Procedure 
Once al  pretrial matters have concluded, and absent a plea agreement, the case proceeds to trial. 
Trials by court-martial are general y public266 and begin with the formal arraignment of the 
accused before proceeding to the presentation of evidence. They conclude with the announcement 
of findings and adjudging of sentences. As with the pretrial process, trial procedures vary between 
types of courts-martial. 
Summary  Courts-Martial 
A trial by summary court-martial begins with the 
arraignment of the accused.267 The summary 
court-martial reads the charges and specifications to the accused, considers motions to dismiss or 
for other relief, and asks the accused to plead to each specification and charge.268 An accused may 
plead not guilty or guilty or may refuse to plead and may change any plea at any time before the 
court-martial announces its findings.269 Once the accused pleads to each charge and specification, 
the summary court-martial cal s and examines witnesses and considers evidence.270 In particular, 
                                              
257 R.C.M. 1304(b)(2)(A). 
258 R.C.M. 1304(b)(2)(A). 
259 Art. 53a, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  853a; R.C.M. 705(a). 
260 Art. 53a(1), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 853a(1); R.C.M. 705(b). 
261 R.C.M. 705(b). 
262 R.C.M. 705(b). 
263 R.C.M. 705(c)(1). 
264 
See Art. 53a(b)-(d), UCMJ;  10 U.S.C.  § 853a(b)-(d). 
265 Art. 53a(a)(2), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 853a(a)(2). 
266 R.C.M. 806(a). 
267 R.C.M. 1304(b)(2)(B). 
268 R.C.M. 1304(b)(2)(B)-(D). 
269 R.C.M. 1304(b)(2)(D). 
270 R.C.M. 1304(b)(2)(E). 
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the summary court-martial must “obtain evidence which tends to disprove the accused’s guilt or 
establishes extenuating circumstances.”271 
General and Special  Courts-Martial 
A trial by a general or special court-martial begins with an opening session.272 During this 
session, the military judge considers any preliminary motions and must inform the accused of the 
accused’s right to counsel.273 The accused chooses whether to be represented by counsel and 
whether to be tried before members or a military judge alone.274 The military judge then arraigns
 
the accused by reading the charges and specifications and asking the accused to plead to each 
charge or specification.275 An accused may plead (1) guilty of the charged offense; (2) not guilty 
of the charged offense, but guilty of a lesser included offense; (3) guilty with exceptions or 
substitutions of the charges; or (4) not guilty.276 
If the accused has elected to be tried by a court-martial consisting of members (instead of before a 
military judge alone), the military judge begins assembling the members.277 Trial counsel and the 
accused may question and 
challenge the members, or request that members be excused from the 
court-martial.278 This process is equivalent to 
voir dire, or the selection of a jury in civilian 
trials.279 Chal enges  may take two forms: (1) chal enges for cause, such as bias, which the 
military judge decides; and (2) peremptory chal enges, which require no cause and the military 
judge does not review.280 Each side may chal enge an unlimited number of members for cause but 
may exercise only one peremptory chal enge.281 If a judge’s excusal of a member based on a 
chal enge reduces the court-martial to fewer than the number of required members, the convening 
authority must detail additional  members to the court-martial unless it is not possible to do so.282 
After the trial counsel and accused have exercised their chal enges, the military judge randomly 
selects the required number of members to form the court-martial and administers an oath to 
impanel the members and any alternates.283 
Following the impaneling  of the members, trial counsel and the accused each present their 
case.284 Each side may present evidence and examine witnesses, subject to the military rules of 
evidence.285 Witnesses must be examined under oath286 and may testify remotely under 
                                              
271 R.C.M. 1304(b)(2)(E)(iv). 
272 R.C.M. 901. 
273 R.C.M. 901(d)(4). 
274 R.C.M. 901(d)(4), 903. 
275 R.C.M. 904. 
276 R.C.M. 910(a); 
see also Art. 45, UCMJ;  10 U.S.C.  § 845. 
277 R.C.M. 911. 
278 Art. 41, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  841; R.C.M. 912. 
279 
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 24. 
280 Art. 41, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  841; R.C.M. 912. 
281 Art. 41, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  841; R.C.M. 912. 
282 Arts. 29(d), 41, UCMJ;  10 U.S.C.  §§  829(d), 841. 
283 Arts. 29(b), (d), 41-42, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §§  829(b)-(d), 841-42. 
284 R.C.M. 913. 
285 R.C.M. 912-13; 
see supra not
e 35. 
286 Art. 42(b), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 842(b). 
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procedures set by the military judge.287 No convening authority or commanding officer may 
attempt to prevent or deter a witness from testifying.288 
Once the prosecution has presented its case, and again after the close of evidence, the military 
judge may enter a finding of not guilty for any charge not supported by sufficient evidence.289 In 
addition, the military judge may declare a mistrial if “manifestly necessary in the interests of 
justice” because the fairness of the trial is in doubt.290 
Findings 
After the presentation of evidence and, in general and special courts martial, the military judge 
has ruled on al  questions of law,291 the court-martial deliberates and decides whether the accused 
is guilty of each charge and specification.292 These conclusions are cal ed 
findings.293 For each 
charge or specification, the court-martial can find an accused (1) guilty, (2) guilty of a lesser 
charge, (3) not guilty only by reason of lack of mental responsibility, or (4) not guilty.294 
Who determines the findings depends on the type of court-martial. For trials by summary courts-
martial, the officer serving as the summary court-martial determines the findings.295 For trials by 
general and special courts-martial consisting of a military judge alone, the military judge 
determines and announces the findings.296 For trials by general and special courts-martial 
consisting of both members and a military judge, the members meet in closed session to vote on 
each finding.297 At least three-fourths298 of members must vote to find an accused guilty of a 
charge or specification,299 but in capital cases, a court-martial may not impose the death penalty 
absent a unanimous conviction.300 Any vote that does not meet the three-fourths threshold results 
in a finding of not guilty.301 
Sentencing 
If the court-martial finds the accused guilty of a charge or specification, it must adjudge a 
sentence for that finding. The prosecution and defense have the opportunity to present arguments 
regarding the appropriate sentence, including aggravating or mitigating evidence.302 In summary 
                                              
287 R.C.M. 914A-14B. 
288 Art. 37(a)(2), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 837(a)(2). 
289 R.C.M. 917. 
290 R.C.M. 915(a). 
291 Art. 51(b), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 851(b). 
292 R.C.M. 921. 
293 R.C.M. 918(a). 
294 R.C.M. 918(a)(1)-(2). 
295 R.C.M. 1304(b)(2)(G). 
296 Art. 51(d), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 851(d); R.C.M. 922(b). 
297 Art. 51(a), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 851(a); R.C.M. 921. 
298 Before the MJA amendments, two-thirds of members had to agree to find an accused  guilty of a charge or 
specification, except for cases where the death penalty was mandatory, which r equired  a unanimous vote. 
See 10 U.S.C.  §  852 (2012).  
299 Art. 52(a)(3), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 852(a)(3); R.C.M. 921(c)(2). 
300 Art. 52(b)(2), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 852(b)(2). 
301 R.C.M. 921(c)(3). 
302 
See R.C.M. 1001(a)(1). 
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courts-martial, the officer serving as the summary court-martial adjudges the sentence.303 In 
general or special courts-martial before a military judge alone, the military judge adjudges the 
sentence.304 For general and special courts-martials with members, the accused may elect to be 
sentenced by the members or the military judge, except members must adjudge sentences for al  
offenses for which the court-martial could impose the death penalty.305 Three-fourths of members 
must agree to any sentence except death, which requires unanimous agreement.306 
A court-martial has wide discretion to adjudge sentences.307 Unless the UCMJ or the MCM 
impose mandatory minimum sentences, the court-martial can adjudge “any punishment 
authorized ..., including the maximum punishment or any lesser punishment, or may adjudge a 
sentence of no punishment.”308 The sentence must be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary, 
to promote justice and to maintain good order and discipline in the armed forces.”309 
Post-Trial Review 
Following the verdict and sentencing in a general or special court-martial, the military judge must 
enter into the record a “Statement of Trial Results” (STR), including each plea entered by the 
accused, the court-martial findings, any sentence imposed, and any other information required by 
the President.310 The military judge then forwards the STR, along with statements by the accused 
and victim, for post-trial review by the convening authority.311 As amended in 2013312 and again 
by the MJA,313 the UCMJ permits the convening authority to act on the findings of a special or 
general court-martial only in certain cases. The convening authority is not authorized to act on the 
court-martial findings in cases in which (1) the authorized maximum confinement exceeds two 
years; (2) the sentence includes a dismissal or a dishonorable or bad-conduct discharge; (3) the 
confinement for al  offenses running consecutively is more than six months; or (4) the accused 
was convicted of one of the sexual offenses listed in Articles 120(a)-(b), 120b, 125, or any other 
offense specified by the Secretary of Defense.314 
Upon review of the record of trial and the SJA’s recommendation and taking into consideration 
statements submitted by the accused or a victim,315 the convening authority may, in applicable 
cases, suspend al  or part of the sentence, disapprove a finding or conviction, or lower the 
sentence. The convening authority may not reduce, commute, or suspend (1) a sentence of 
confinement exceeding six months; (2) a sentence of dismissal, dishonorable discharge, or bad-
                                              
303 Art. 53(b)(2), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 853(b)(2). 
304 Art. 53(b)(1)(A), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  853(b)(1)(A). 
305 Art. 25(d)(1)-(2), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 825(d)(1)-(2). 
306 Art. 52(b)(2), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 852(b)(2). 
307 R.C.M. 1002(a).  
308 R.C.M. 1002(a). For limits on the types of punishments that summary and special courts-martial may impose, see 
the 
“T ypes of Courts-Martial” section of this report. 
309 R.C.M. 1002(f). 
310 Art. 60, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  860. 
311 
Id. 
312 National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-66, title XVII, § 1702, 127 Stat. 672, 954 (Dec. 
26, 2013), codified at 10 U.S.C.  § 860 (2013). 
313 Pub. L. No. 114-328, div. E, § 5322, 130 Stat. 2924 (Dec. 23, 2016), codified at 10 U.S.C. §  860a.  
314 Art. 60a, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  860a; R.C.M. 1107. 
315 Art. 60a(e), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 860a(e). 
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conduct discharge; or (3) a sentence of death.316 Sentences of dismissal, discharge, or 
confinement are subject to suspension only if the military judge recommends that the sentence be 
suspended based on sufficient supporting facts or the accused substantial y cooperating in the 
investigation or prosecution of another person.317 The convening authority may not suspend a 
mandatory minimum sentence or suspend a sentence in excess of the suspension recommended 
by the military judge.318 The convening authority may not increase the sentence or submit 
findings of not guilty for rehearing.319 Once the convening authority takes action on the case, it is 
returned to the military judge for entry of final judgment,320 and the conviction is ripe for an 
appeal. 
Al   court-martial convictions not reviewed by the service appel ate courts321 may, upon timely 
application by the accused, be reviewed by the Judge Advocate General.322 “[T]he Judge 
Advocate General may modify or set aside, in whole or in part, the findings and sentence in a 
court-martial,” or may forward the case for review by the court of criminal appeals.323 
Appellate Review 
Convictions by a special or general court-martial are subject to an automatic324 appeal to a service 
Court of Criminal Appeals if the sentence includes confinement for two years or more, a bad-
conduct or dishonorable discharge, death, or a dismissal in the case of a commissioned officer, 
cadet, or midshipman.325 Appeal is mandatory and cannot be waived when the sentence includes 
death.326 Article 66 of the UCMJ, empowers military courts of criminal appeal to review court-
martial cases not only for legal sufficiency but also for factual sufficiency,327 including a potential 
assessment of the credibility of witnesses, a power that does not exist in civilian courts. 328 If the 
service court of criminal appeals affirms the conviction, the appel ant may request review by the 
                                              
316 Art. 60a(c), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 860a(c). 
317 Art. 60a(d), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 860a(d). 
318 Art. 60a(c)(2), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 860a(c)(2). 
319 Art. 60b, UCMJ;  10 U.S.C.  §  860b. 
320 Art. 60c, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  860c. In the case of a summary court -martial, the results are final upon the decision of 
the convening authority. R.C.M. 1111. 
321 Art. 66, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  866. T here are three service appellate courts: the Navy -Marine Corps Court of Criminal 
Appeals, the Army Court of Criminal Appeals, and the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals.   
322 Art. 69, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C.  §  869, R.C.M. 1201. 
323 
Id. 
324 Military appellate courts are required  to review cases  over which they have jurisdiction unless  the appellant waives 
his or her right to appeal.  
325 Art. 66, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  866. 
326 R.C.M. 1115. 
327 Art. 66(d), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  § 866(d). T he standard for factual sufficiency review asks  whether, “after weighing all 
of the evidence in the record of trial and making allowances  for not personally having heard and seen the witnesses, the 
members of the Court of Military Review  are themselves convinced of the accused’s  guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
United States v. T urner, 25 M.J. 324, 325 (C.M.A. 1987).  
328 
See, 
e.g. United States v. Baker, 28 M.J. 121, 122 (C.M.A. 1989) (noting that Article 66, UCMJ “gives powers to a 
Court of Military Review [now called  Courts of Criminal Appeal] that are unparalleled among civilian appellate 
tribunals. It not only considers issues  of law  but also makes factual findings  and determines sentence 
appropriateness.”). 
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Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF)329 and ultimately the U.S. Supreme Court.330 
Review by these courts is discretionary. 
Supreme Court review by writ of certiorari is limited to cases where the CAAF has conducted a 
review, whether mandatory or discretionary, or has granted a petition for extraordinary relief.331 
The Court does not have jurisdiction to review a denial of discretionary review by the CAAF,332 
nor does it have jurisdiction to consider denials of petitions for extraordinary relief.333 
Servicemembers whose petitions for review or extraordinary relief are denied by the CAAF may 
seek additional review only through collateral means by, for example, petitioning for habeas 
corpus to an Article III court.334 A collateral appeal to an Art. III court also could provide an 
alternate avenue for Supreme Court review. 
Selected Procedural Safeguards 
The following table provides examples of constitutional safeguards and compares how they apply 
in federal criminal courts and military general courts-martial. The table cites relevant federal rules 
and or court decisions, as wel  as provisions of the UCMJ and applicable rules, but makes no 
effort to provide an exhaustive list of al  procedural authorities. 
Table 1. Selected Procedural Safeguards in Federal and Military Courts 
Constitutional 
Safeguards 
Federal Court 
General Courts-Martial 
Presumption  of 
If the defendant fails to enter a proper 
If the defendant fails to enter a proper plea, 
Innocence 
plea, a plea of not guilty wil   be entered. 
a plea of not guilty wil   be entered. R.C.M. 
“The principle that there 
Fed. R. Crim.  P. 11(a). 
910(b). 
is a presumption of 
Defendant is entitled to jury instructions 
Members  of court-martial must be 
innocence in favor of the 
explaining that guilt must be proved on the  instructed that the “accused must be 
accused is the 
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. 
presumed to be innocent until the 
undoubted law, 
Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978). 
accused’s guilt is established by legal and 
axiomatic and 
Defendant is entitled to appear in court 
competent evidence beyond a reasonable 
elementary,  and its 
without unnecessary physical restraints  or 
doubt.” 
enforcement lies  at the 
other indicia of guilt, such as appearing in 
R.C.M. 920(e). 
foundation of the 
prison uniform, that may be prejudicial  to 
administration of our 
The accused shal  be properly attired in 
jury. 
criminal  law.” 
uniform with grade insignia and any 
See Holbrook  v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 
decorations to which entitled. Physical 
Coffin v. United States, 
(1986). 
restraint shal  not be imposed unless 
156 U.S. 432, 453 
prescribed  by the military  judge. 
(1895). 
R.C.M. 804(e). 
                                              
329 Art. 67, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  867. T he Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF)  is a civilian court composed 
of five civilian judges  appointed by the President. Art. 142, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C.  §  942. 
330 T he U.S. Supreme  Court did  not have jurisdiction over decisions of the CAAF  until Congress  granted it in 1984. 
Military Justice Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-209 § 10(a)(1), 97 Stat. 1393, codified at 28 U.S.C. §  1259. 
331 28 U.S.C.  § 1259. 
332 Art. 67a, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C.  §  867a. 
333 
Id. 
334 
See  Burns  v. Wilson, 346 U.S.  137, 139–40 (1953) (noting that “because of the peculiar relationship between the 
civil and military law,” civilian courts’ consideration of military habeas cases  “has always  been more narrow than in 
civil cases”) (citing Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S.  103, 70 (1950)). 
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Constitutional 
Safeguards 
Federal Court 
General Courts-Martial 
Right  to Remain 
Incriminating statements made by 
Coerced confessions  or confessions  made 
Silent 
defendant under duress or without prior 
without statutory equivalent of Miranda 
“No person ... shal  be 
Miranda  warning are inadmissible  as 
warning are not admissible  as evidence. 
compel ed  in any 
evidence of guilt in a criminal  trial.  Miranda  Art. 31, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 831. 
criminal  case to be a 
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
The prosecutor must notify the defense of 
witness against himself 
Before  a jury is al owed to hear evidence 
any incriminating  statements made by the 
....  ” 
of a defendant’s confession, the court 
accused that are relevant to the case prior 
Amendment V.  
must determine  that it was voluntarily 
to the arraignment. Motions to suppress 
given. 
such statements must be made prior to 
18 U.S.C.  § 3501. 
pleading. 
Mil. R. Evid. 304. 
Freedom from 
Evidence, including derivative evidence, 
“Evidence obtained as a result of an 
Unreasonable 
gained through unreasonable searches and 
unlawful search or seizure  . . is inadmissible 
Searches & Seizures 
seizures  may be excluded in court. Boyd v. 
against the accused” unless certain 
“The right of the people 
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); 
exceptions apply. 
to be secure ...  against 
Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S.  338 
Mil. R. Evid. 311. 
unreasonable searches 
(1939); Fed. R. Crim.  P. 41. 
“Authorization to search” may be oral or 
and seizures,  shal  not be 
A search warrant issued by a magistrate 
written, and may be issued by a military 
violated; no Warrants 
on a showing of probable cause is 
judge or an officer  in command of the area 
shal  issue,  but upon 
general y required  for law enforcement 
to be searched, or if the area is not under 
probable cause. ..” 
agents to conduct a search of an area 
military  control, with authority over 
Amendment IV.  
where the subject has a reasonable 
persons subject to military  law or the law 
expectation of privacy, including searches 
of war. It must be based on probable cause. 
and seizures  of telephone or other 
communications and emissions  of heat and 
Mil. R. Evid. 315. 
other phenomena detectable with means 
Interception of wire  and oral 
other than human senses.  Katz v. United 
communications within the United States 
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
requires  judicial application in accordance 
Evidence resulting from  overseas searches 
with federal law. 
of American  property by foreign officials  is 
R.C.M. 703A; Mil. R. Evid. 317. 
admissible  unless foreign police conduct 
A search conducted by foreign officials is 
shocks judicial conscience or participation 
unlawful only if the accused is subject to 
by U.S. agents is so substantial as to 
“gross and brutal maltreatment.” 
render the action that of the United 
Mil. R. Evid. 311(b). 
States. United States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 
1087 (9th Cir. 1995). 
Assistance of 
Defendants in criminal  cases have the right 
The defendant has a right to military 
Effective Counsel 
to representation by an attorney at al  
counsel at government expense. The 
“In al  criminal 
stages of prosecution. The defendant may 
defendant may choose counsel, if that 
prosecutions,  the 
hire an attorney or, if indigent, have 
attorney is reasonably available, and may 
accused shal  enjoy the 
counsel appointed at the government’s 
hire a civilian attorney in addition to 
right . .  to have the 
expense. If two or more  co-defendants are  military  counsel. 
Assistance  of Counsel 
represented  by one attorney, the court 
Art 38, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C.  § 838. 
for his defense.” 
must inquire as to whether a conflict of 
interest exists. 
Appointed counsel must be certified  as 
Amendment VI.  
qualified and may not be someone  who has 
Fed. R. Crim.  P. 44. 
taken any part in the investigation or 
Conversations between attorneys and 
prosecution, unless explicitly requested by 
clients are privileged.  Fed. R. Evid. 502. 
the defendant. 
Procedures for ensuring adequate 
Art. 27, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 827. 
representation of defendants are outlined 
The attorney-client privilege  is honored. 
at 18 U.S.C.  §§ 3005 (capital cases) and 
Mil. R. Evid. 502. 
3006A. 
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Constitutional 
Safeguards 
Federal Court 
General Courts-Martial 
Right  to Indictment 
When the accused is faces an infamous 
The right to indictment by grand jury  is 
and Presentment 
punishment if convicted, he has the right 
explicitly excluded in “cases arising in the 
“No person shal  be held 
to insist that he not be tried except on the  land or naval forces.” 
to answer for a capital, 
accusation of a grand jury. 
Ex parte 
Amendment V. 
or otherwise  infamous 
Wilson,  114 U.S.  417 (1885); Fed. R. Crim. 
Whenever  an offense is al eged, the 
crime,  unless on a 
P. 7. 
commander  is responsible  for initiating a 
presentment or 
Jurors must be selected from a fair cross 
preliminary  inquiry and deciding how to 
indictment of a Grand 
section of the community; otherwise,  an 
dispose of the offense. R.C.M. 303-06. 
Jury, except in cases 
accused can chal enge the indictment. 28 
arising in the land or 
U.S.C.  §§1861-1878 
naval forces, or in the 
Once an indictment is given, its scope may 
Militia,  when in actual 
not be increased.  Amendments to an 
service  in time  of War 
indictment must undergo further grand 
or public danger.... ” 
jury process 
Amendment V.  
Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1 (1887). 
Right  to Written 
Defendant has a right to be informed of 
Charges and specifications must be signed 
Statement  of 
the nature of the charge with sufficiently 
under oath and made known to the 
Charges 
reasonable certainty to al ow for 
accused as soon as practicable. Art. 30, 
“In al  criminal 
preparation of defense. 
UCMJ, 10 U.S.C.  § 830. 
prosecutions,  the 
Cook v. United States, 138 U.S. 157 
accused shal  enjoy the 
(1891). 
right ...  to be informed 
of the nature and cause 
of the accusation ....” 
Amendment VI. 
Right  to be Present 
“The language, history, and logic of Rule 
The presence of the accused is required 
at Trial 
43 support a straightforward 
during arraignment, at the plea, and at 
The Confrontation 
interpretation that prohibits the trial  
in 
every stage of the court-martial  unless the 
Clause of Amendment VI  
absentia of a defendant who is not present 
accused waives the right by voluntarily 
guarantees the accused’s 
at the beginning of trial.” 
absenting him or herself  from the 
right to be present in the  Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255, 262  proceedings after the arraignment or by 
courtroom  at every 
(1993); Fed. R. Crim.  P. 43. 
persisting in conduct that justifies the trial 
stage of his trial. 
judge in ordering  the removal  of the 
When the defendant knowingly absents 
accused from the proceedings. 
Il inois  v. Al en,  397 U.S. 
himself  from court during trial,  court may 
337 (1970). 
“proceed with trial in like  manner and 
R.C.M. 804. 
with like  effect as if he were present.” 
Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 455 
(1912). 
Prohibition  Against 
Congress general y  may not pass a law 
Courts-martial wil   not enforce an ex post 
Ex Post Facto Crimes 
punishing conduct that was not a crime 
facto law, including increasing amount of 
“No . . ex post facto Law 
when perpetrated, increasing the possible 
pay to be forfeited for specific  crimes. 
shal  be passed.” 
sentence for a crime,  or reducing the 
United States. v. Gorski,  47 M.J. 370 
government’s  evidentiary burden for a 
Art. I, § 9, cl. 3.  
(C.A.A.F.  1997). 
crime.   
Calder v. Bul ,  3 Dal . (3 U.S.) 386 (1798); 
Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333 (1867). 
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Constitutional 
Safeguards 
Federal Court 
General Courts-Martial 
Protection Against 
Jeopardy attaches once the jury is sworn 
Double jeopardy clause applies.  
See Wade 
Double Jeopardy 
or where there is no jury,  when the first 
v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 688-89 (1949). 
“[N]or shal  any person 
evidence is presented. If the trial is 
Art. 44, UCMJ prohibits double jeopardy 
be subject for the same 
terminated after jeopardy has attached, a 
(cal ed “former jeopardy”), provides for 
offence to be twice put 
second trial may be barred in a court 
jeopardy to attach after the impanelment of 
in jeopardy of life or 
under the same sovereign,  particularly 
members,  or in a court-martial by judge 
limb ....” 
where it is prosecutorial  conduct that 
only, after the introduction of evidence. 
brings about the termination  of the trial. 
Amendment V. 
10 U.S.C.  § 844. 
Il inois  v. Somervil e,  410 U.S. 458 (1973). 
Subject to “dual 
General  court-martial proceeding is 
sovereign”  doctrine, that 
considered a federal trial  for double 
is, federal  and state 
jeopardy purposes. Former  jeopardy does 
courts may prosecute an 
not result from charges brought in state or 
individual for the same 
foreign courts, although court-martial in 
conduct without 
such cases is disfavored.   
violating the clause. 
United States v. Stokes,  12 M.J. 229 (C.M.A. 
United States v. Gamble, 
1982). 
139 S. Ct. 1960 (2019).
 
Once military  authorities have turned 
servicemember  over to civil  authorities for 
trial,  military  may have waived jurisdiction 
for that crime,  although it may be possible 
to charge the individual for another crime 
arising from the same  conduct. 
See 54 AM. 
JUR. 2D, Military and Civil  Defense §§  227-
28. 
Speedy & Public Trial 
Trial must begin within seventy days of 
In general, accused must be brought to trial 
“In al  criminal 
indictment or original  appearance before 
within 120 days of the preferral  of charges 
prosecutions,  the 
court. 
or the imposition  of restraint, whichever 
accused shal  enjoy the 
18 U.S.C.  § 3161. 
date is earliest. 
right to a speedy and 
Closure  of the courtroom during trial 
R.C.M. 707(a). 
public trial,....  ” 
proceedings is justified only if (1) the 
The right to a public trial applies in courts-
Amendment VI.  
proponent of closure advances an 
martial  but is not absolute. 
overriding  interest likely  to be prejudiced; 
R.C.M. 806. 
(2) the closure is no broader than 
necessary; (3) the trial court considers 
The military  trial judge may exclude the 
reasonable alternatives to closure; and (4) 
public from portions of a proceeding  for 
the trial court makes  findings adequate to 
the purpose of protecting classified 
support closure.   
information if the prosecution 
demonstrates  an overriding  need to do so 
See Wal er  v. Georgia,  467 U.S. 39, 48 
and the closure  is no broader than 
(1984). 
necessary. 
United States v. Grunden, 2 M.J. 116 (CMA 
1977). 
Burden  & Standard  of  Defendant is entitled to jury instructions 
Members  of court-martial must be 
Proof 
clarifying that the prosecution has the 
instructed that the burden of proof to 
Due Process requires 
burden of presenting evidence sufficient to 
establish guilt is upon the government and 
the prosecution to prove  prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
that any reasonable doubt must be 
the defendant guilty of 
Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100 
resolved  in favor of the defendant. 
each element  of a crime 
(1978). 
R.C.M. 920(e). 
beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 
358 (1970). 
Congressional Research Service  
 
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Military Courts-Martial Under  the Military Justice Act of 2016 
 
Constitutional 
Safeguards 
Federal Court 
General Courts-Martial 
Privilege Against Self-
Defendant may not be compel ed  to 
No person subject to the UCMJ may 
Incrimination 
testify. Jury may not be instructed that 
compel any person to answer incriminating 
“No person . . shal  be 
guilt may be inferred from  the defendant’s 
questions. Art. 31(a) UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. 
compel ed  in any 
refusal to testify. 
§ 831(a). 
criminal  case to be a 
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
Defendant may not be compel ed  to give 
witness against 
Witnesses  may not be compel ed  to give 
testimony that is immaterial  or potential y 
himself….” 
testimony that may be incriminating unless 
degrading. Art.  31(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. 
Amendment V.  
given immunity  for that testimony. 
§ 831(c). 
18 U.S.C.  § 6002. 
No adverse inference is to be drawn from 
a defendant’s refusal to answer any 
questions or testify at court-martial. 
Mil. R. Evid. 301(f). 
Witnesses  may not be compel ed  to give 
testimony that may be incriminating unless 
granted immunity for that testimony  by a 
general court-martial convening authority, 
as authorized by the Attorney General,  if 
required. 
18 U.S.C.  § 6002; R.C.M. 704. 
Right  to Examine or 
Rules of Evidence prohibit general y  the 
Hearsay rules apply as in federal  court.  
Have Examined 
introduction at trial of statements made 
Mil. R. Evid. 801-807 
Adverse Witnesses 
out of court to prove the truth of the 
In capital cases, sworn depositions may not 
“In al  criminal 
matter stated unless the declarant is 
be used in lieu of witness, unless court-
prosecutions,  the 
available for cross-examination  at trial 
martial  is treated as non-capital or it is 
accused shal  enjoy the 
(hearsay rule).  
introduced by the defense.  
right . .  to be confronted 
Fed. R. Evid. 801-807 
with the witnesses 
Art. 49, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 849. 
The government is required to disclose  to 
against him ....” 
defendant any relevant evidence in its 
Amendment VI.  
possession  or that may become  known 
through due diligence. 
Fed. R. Crim.  P. 16. 
Right  to Compulsory 
Defendants have the right to subpoena 
Defendants before court-martial have the 
Process to Obtain 
witnesses  to testify in their defense.  The 
right to compel  appearance of witnesses 
Witnesses 
court may punish witnesses  who fail to 
necessary to their defense. 
“In al  criminal 
appear.  
R.C.M. 703. 
prosecutions,  the 
Fed. R. Crim.  P. Rule 17. 
Process to compel witnesses  in court-
accused shal  enjoy the 
martial  cases is to be similar  to the process 
right . .  to have 
used in federal  courts.  
compulsory  process for 
obtaining witnesses  in his 
Art. 46, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 846. 
favor ....” 
Amendment VI.  
Congressional Research Service  
 
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Military Courts-Martial Under  the Military Justice Act of 2016 
 
Constitutional 
Safeguards 
Federal Court 
General Courts-Martial 
Right  to Trial by 
The independence of the judiciary from 
A qualified military  judge is detailed to 
Impartial Judge 
the other branches was established to 
preside  over the court-martial. The 
“The judicial Power of 
ensure trials are decided impartial y, 
convening authority may not prepare or 
the United States, shal  
without the “potential domination by 
review  any report concerning the 
be vested in one 
other branches of government.” 
performance or effectiveness  of the military 
supreme  Court, and in . . 
United States v. Wil ,  449 U.S. 200, 217-18  judge.  
inferior  courts ....  The 
(1980). 
Art. 26, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 826. 
Judges . . shal  hold their 
Judges with a pecuniary interest in the 
Article  37, UCMJ, prohibits unlawful 
Offices during good 
outcome of a case or other conflicts of 
command influence of courts-martial 
Behaviour, and shal  ... 
interest are disqualified and must recuse 
through admonishment,  censure, or 
receive  for their 
themselves. 
reprimand of its members  by the convening 
Services,  a 
authority or commanding officer,  or any 
Compensation, which 
28 U.S.C.  § 455. 
unlawful attempt by a person subject to the 
shal  not be diminished 
UCMJ to coerce or influence the action of 
during their Continuance 
a court-martial or convening authority. 
in Office.” 
Art. 37, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 837. 
Article  III § 1. 
Right  to Trial By 
The pool from which juries  are drawn 
A military  accused has no Sixth 
Impartial Jury 
must represent  a fair cross section of the 
Amendment right to a trial by petit jury.   
“The Trial of al  Crimes, 
community.  
Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 39-40 (1942) 
except in Cases of 
Taylor v. Louisiana,  419 U.S. 522 (1975). 
(dicta). 
Impeachment, shal  be by  There must further be measures  to ensure  However,  “Congress has provided for trial 
Jury....” 
individual jurors  selected  are not biased 
by members  at a court-martial.”  
Art III § 2 cl. 3. 
(i.e.,  the 
voir dire process).  
United States v. Witham, 47 MJ 297, 301 
“In al  criminal 
Lewis  v. United States, 146 U.S. 370 
(1997); Art. 25, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C.  § 825. 
prosecutions,  the 
(1892); 
see Fed. R. Crim.  P. 24 
The Sixth Amendment requirement  that 
accused shal  enjoy the 
(peremptory chal enges). 
the jury be impartial applies to court-
right to a . .  trial, by an 
The trial must be conducted in a manner 
martial  members  and covers  not only the 
impartial  jury of the  
designed to avoid exposure of the jury to 
selection  of individual jurors,  but also their 
state ....” 
prejudicial  material or undue influence. If 
conduct during the trial proceedings and 
Amendment VI.  
the locality of the trial has been so 
the subsequent deliberations.   
saturated with publicity about a case that 
United States v. Lambert,  55 M.J. 293 
it is impossible  to assure jurors  wil  not be 
(C.A.A.F.  2001). 
affected by prejudice,  the defendant is 
entitled to a change of venue.  
The absence of a right to trial by jury 
precludes criminal  trial of civilians  by court-
Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961). 
martial. 
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); Kinsel a 
v. United States 
ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 
234 (1960). 
Right  to Appeal  to 
Original y,  the writ of habeas corpus 
The writ of habeas corpus provides the 
Independent 
permitted col ateral  attack upon a 
primary  means by which those sentenced 
Reviewing Authority 
prisoner’s  conviction only if the sentencing 
by military  court, having exhausted military 
“The Privilege  of the 
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.  It 
appeals, can chal enge a conviction or 
Writ  of Habeas Corpus 
later evolved into an avenue for the 
sentence in a civilian court. The scope of 
shal  not be suspended, 
chal enge of federal and state convictions 
matters that a court wil   address is 
unless when in Cases of 
on other due process  grounds, to 
narrower  than chal enges of federal or 
Rebel ion  or Invasion the 
determine  whether a prisoner’s  detention 
state convictions. 
public Safety may require 
is contrary to the Constitution or laws or 
Burns v. Wilson,  346 U.S.  137 (1953). 
it.” 
treaties of the United States. 
However,  Congress created a civilian 
Article  I § 9 cl. 2. 
 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255 
court, the Court of Appeals for the Armed 
Forces,  to review  military  cases.  10 U.S.C. 
§ 867. 
Congressional Research Service  
 
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Military Courts-Martial Under  the Military Justice Act of 2016 
 
Protection Against 
The death penalty is not 
per se 
Death may only be adjudged for certain 
Excessive Penalties 
unconstitutional, but its discriminatory  and  crimes  where the defendant is found guilty 
“Excessive bail shal  not 
arbitrary imposition  may be, and the death 
by unanimous vote of 12 court-martial 
be required,  nor 
penalty may not be automatic.  
members.  Prior  to arraignment, the trial 
excessive  fines imposed, 
See Gregg v. Georgia,  428 U.S. 153 (1976);  counsel must give the defense written 
nor cruel and unusual 
18 U.S.C.  § 3592 (mitigating /aggravating 
notice of aggravating factors the 
punishments inflicted.” 
circumstances). 
prosecution intends to prove.  
Amendment VIII. 
When the death penalty may be imposed, 
R.C.M.1004. 
the defendant must be provided a list of 
 
potential jurors  and witnesses,  unless the 
court finds that such action might 
“jeopardize the life or safety of any 
person.” 
18 U.S.C.  § 3432. 
A special hearing is held to determine 
whether the death sentence is warranted. 
18 U.S.C.  § 3593. 
 
 
Author Information 
 Jennifer K. Elsea 
  Jonathan M. Gaffney 
Legislative Attorney 
Legislative Attorney 
    
    
 
 
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Congressional Research Service  
R46503
 · VERSION 1 · NEW 
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