The National Security Council: Background and Issues for Congress

April 28, 2017 – October 19, 2022 R44828

The National Security Council:
Background and Issues for Congress
Updated October 19, 2022
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R44828

The National Security Council: Background and Issues for Congress

Summary
On February 4, 2021, President Joseph R. Biden signed National Security Memorandum (NSM)-
2, Renewing the National Security Council System. In it, the Biden Administration articulates how
it intends to manage and coordinate national security issues among relevant departments and
agencies. This report offers a brief historical overview of the formation of the National Security
Council (NSC), clarifies the terms and structures associated with it, and provides a table of the
NSC’s current composition.

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The National Security Council: Background and Issues for Congress

Introduction1
The National Security Council (NSC) was established by statute in 1947 to create an
interdepartmental body to advise the President on matters of national security. More specifical y,
the NSC was created to integrate domestic, foreign, and military policies related to national
security, and to facilitate cooperation among the military services and other government
departments and agencies in matters of national security. Currently, statutory members of the
NSC are the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of the Treasury. Other senior officials participate in NSC
deliberations at the President’s request. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Director of National Intel igence are statutory advisers.
The President clearly holds final decisionmaking authority in the executive branch. Over the
years, however, the NSC staff has emerged as a major factor in the formulation (and at times in
the implementation) of national security policy. Similarly, the head of the NSC staff, the National
Security Adviser, has played an important, and occasional y highly public, role in policymaking.
This report summarizes the evolution of the NSC from its creation to the present.2
The organization and influence of the NSC have varied significantly from one Administration to
another, ranging from highly structured and formal systems to loose-knit teams of experts.
Although it is universal y acknowledged that the NSC staff should be organized to meet the
particular goals and work habits of an incumbent President, the history of the NSC provides
ample examples of the advantages and disadvantages of different types of policymaking
structures.
Congress enacted the statute creating the NSC and has altered the character of its membership
over the years. Congress annual y appropriates funds for its activities, but Congress does not,
routinely, receive testimony on substantive matters from the National Security Adviser or from
NSC staff. Proposals to require Senate confirmation of the Security Adviser have been discussed
but not adopted.
Pre-NSC Coordination Methods
The Need for Interdepartmental Coordination
Successful national security policymaking is based on careful analysis of the international
situation, including diplomatic, economic, intel igence, military, and morale factors. Based on a
comprehensive assessment, effective government leaders attempt to attain their goals by selecting
the most appropriate instrument of policy, whether it is military, diplomatic, economic, based on
the intel igence services, or a combination of more than one. Although this approach has been an
ideal throughout the history of international relations, prior to World War II, U.S. Presidents
focused primarily on domestic matters and lacked organizational support to integrate national
security policies. They relied instead on ad hoc arrangements and informal groups of advisers.
However, in the early 1940s, the complexities of global war and the need to work together with

1 T he author is indebted to prior co-authors Kathleen McInnis and Richard Best, former Congressional Research
Service Specialist in National Defense, whose report, “T he National Security Council: An Organizational Assessment,”
forms the basis of the historical material contained within this piece.
2 For a more in-depth treatment of this evolution, see CRS Report RL30840, The National Security Council: An
Organizational Assessm ent, by Richard A. Best Jr.
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al ies led to more structured processes of national security decisionmaking to ensure that the
efforts of the State, War, and Navy Departments were focused on the same objectives. There was
an increasingly apparent need for an organizational entity to support the President in looking at
multiple factors, military and diplomatic, that had to be faced during wartime and in the early
postwar months, when crucial decisions had to be made regarding the future of Germany and
Japan and many other countries.
In the postwar years, the United States’ continuing worldwide responsibilities involved active
diplomacy, sizable military forces, and sophisticated intel igence agencies, in addition to
economic assistance in various forms. In response to these evolving responsibilities, the United
States established organizational mechanisms to analyze the international environment, identify
priorities, and recommend appropriate policy options. Four decades later, the end of the Cold War
saw the emergence of new international concerns, including transnational threats such as
international terrorism and drug trafficking, that have continued to require the coordination of
various departments and agencies concerned with national security policies.
Past Modes of Policy Coordination
Coordinative mechanisms to implement policy are largely creations of the executive branch, but
they directly influence choices that Congress may be cal ed upon to support and fund. Congress
thus takes interest in the processes by which policies and the roles of various participants are
determined. Poor coordination of national security policy can result in cal s for Congress to take
actions that have major costs, both international and domestic, but an uncertain outcome.
Effective coordination, on the other hand, can help achieve policy goals with minimal losses
while providing the opportunity to devote material resources to other needs.
Until the 20th century, most U.S. policy coordination centered on the President, who was virtual y
the sole means of such coordination. The Constitution designates the President as Commander-in-
Chief of the Armed Forces (Article II, Section 2) and grants him broad powers in the areas of
foreign affairs (Article II, Section 2), powers that have expanded considerably in the 20th century.
Given limited U.S. foreign involvements for the first 100 or so years under the Constitution, the
smal size of the Armed Forces, the relative geographic isolation of the nation, and the absence of
any proximate threat, the President, or his executive agents in the Cabinet, provided a sufficient
coordinative base.
However, the advent of World War I, which represented a modern, complex military effort
involving broad domestic and international coordination, forced new demands on the system that
the President alone could not meet. In 1916, the Council of National Defense was established by
statute (the Army Appropriation Act of 1916). It reflected proposals that went back to 1911 and
consisted of the Secretaries of War, Navy, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce and Labor. The statute
al owed the President to appoint an advisory commission of outside specialists to aid the council.3
The Council of National Defense was intended as an economic mobilization coordinating group,
as reflected by its membership, which excluded the Secretary of State. His inclusion would have
given the council a much wider coordinative scope. Furthermore, the authorizing statute
essential y limited the council’s role to economic mobilization issues. The Council of National
Defense was disbanded in 1921, but it set a precedent for coordinative efforts that would be
needed in World War II.

3 Paul Y. Hammond, “T he National Security Council as a Device for Interdepartmental Coordination: An Interpretation
and Appraisal,” American Political Science Review, December, 1960, p. 899; U.S. Bureau of the Budget, The United
States at War (Washington: GP O, 1946), p. 2.
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The President remained the sole national security coordinator until 1938, when the prewar crisis
began to build in intensity, presenting numerous and wide-ranging threats to the inadequately
armed United States. The State Department, in reaction to reports of Axis activities in Latin
America, proposed that interdepartmental conferences be held with War and Navy Department
representatives. In April 1938, Secretary of State Cordel Hull, in a letter to President Franklin
Roosevelt, formal y proposed the creation of a standing committee made up of the second-
ranking officers of the three departments, for purposes of liaison and coordination. The President
approved this idea, and the Standing Liaison Committee, or Liaison Committee as it was also
cal ed, was established, the members being the Under Secretary of State, the Chief of Staff of the
Army, and the Chief of Naval Operations. The Standing Liaison Committee was the first
significant effort toward interdepartmental liaison and coordination, although its work in the area
was limited and uneven. The Liaison Committee largely concentrated its efforts on Latin
American problems, and it met irregularly. Although it did foster some worthwhile studies during
the crisis following the fal of France, it was soon superseded by other coordinative modes. It was
more a forum for exchanging information than a new coordinative and directing body.4
An informal coordinating mechanism, which complemented the Standing Liaison Committee,
evolved during the weekly meetings established by Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, who took
office in June 1940. Stimson arranged for weekly luncheons with his Navy counterpart, Frank
Knox, and Cordel Hull, but these meetings also did not fully meet the growing coordinative
needs of the wartime government.
In May 1940, President Roosevelt used the precedent of the 1916 statute and established the
National Defense Advisory Council (NDAC), composed of private citizens with expertise in
specific economic sectors.5 As with the earlier Council of National Defense, the NDAC was
organized to handle problems of economic mobilization; by the end of the year, it had given way
to another organization in a succession of such groups.
During the war, a number of interdepartmental committees were formed to handle various issues,
and, while these did help achieve coordination, they suffered from two problems. First, their very
multiplicity was to some degree counterproductive to coordination, and they stil represented a
piecemeal approach to these issues. Second, and more important, these committees in many cases
were not advising the President directly, but were advising his advisers. Although their
multiplicity and possible overlapping fit Roosevelt’s preferred working methods, they did not
represent coordination at the top. Roosevelt ran the war largely through the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS), who were then an ad hoc and de facto group, and through key advisers such as Harry
Hopkins and James F. Byrnes, and via his own personal link with British Prime Minister Winston
Churchil .
The weekly meetings arranged by Stimson evolved, however, into a significant coordinative body
by 1945, with the formal creation of the State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC).
SWNCC had its own secretariat and a number of regional and topical subcommittees; its
members were assistant secretaries in each pertinent department. The role of SWNCC members
was to aid their superiors on political-military matters, and coordinating the views of the three
departments. SWNCC was a significant improvement in civilian-military liaison, and it meshed
wel with the JCS system; it did not, however, concern itself with fundamental questions of

4 Mark Skinner Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military
History, 1950), pp. 89-91, 93-94.
5 R. Elberton Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilization (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History,
1959), pp. 103-104, 109-110; Bureau of the Budget, The United States at War, pp. 22-25, 44, 50-51.
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national policy during the early months of the Cold War.6 SWNCC operated through the end of
the war and beyond, becoming SANACC (State, Army, Navy, Air Force Coordinating
Committee) after the National Security Act of 1947. It was dissolved in 1949, by which time it
had been superseded by the NSC.
The creation of SWNCC, virtual y at the end of the war, and its continued existence after the
surrender of Germany and Japan, reflected the growing awareness within the federal government
that better means of coordination were necessary. The World War II system had largely reflected
the preferred working methods of President Roosevelt, who relied on informal consultations with
various advisers in addition to the JCS structure. However, the complex demands of global war
and the postwar world rendered this system inadequate, and it was general y recognized that a
return to the simple and limited prewar system would not be possible if the United States was to
take on the responsibilities thrust upon it by the war and its aftermath.
The Creation of the NSC7
Introduction
The NSC was not created independently, but rather as one part of a complete restructuring of the
entire national security apparatus—civilian and military, including intel igence efforts—as
accomplished in the National Security Act of 1947. Thus, isolating the creation of the NSC from
the larger reorganization is difficult, especial y as the NSC was much less controversial than the
unification of the military and so attracted less attention.
Proposals
As early as 1943, General George C. Marshal , Army Chief of Staff, had proposed that the
prospect of a unified military establishment be assessed. Congress first began to consider this idea
in 1944, with the Army showing interest and the Navy opposing the idea. At the request of the
Navy, these investigations were deferred until 1945, although by then it was clear to Secretary of
the Navy James Forrestal that President Truman, who had come to the White House upon the
death of President Roosevelt in April 1945, favored some sort of reorganization. Forrestal
believed that outright opposition would not be a satisfactory Navy stance. He also realized that
the State Department had to be included in any new national security apparatus. Therefore, he had
Ferdinand Eberstadt, a leading New York attorney and banker who had served in several high-
level executive branch positions, investigate the issue.8
With respect to the formation of the NSC, a key question posed by Forrestal to Eberstadt was,

6 Ray S. Cline, Washington Command Post: The Operations Division (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military
History, 1951), pp. 326-327; John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War (New York,
Columbia University Press, 1972), p. 126; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944, v. I:
General (Washington: GPO, 1966), pp. 1466-1470.
7 One of the most thorough studies on the creation and development of the NSC through the Eisenhower
Administration, including hearings, studies, reports, recommendations and articles, can be found in U.S. Congress,
Senate, 86th and 87th Congress, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery,
Organizing for National Security, 1961, 3 vols.
8 Demetrios Caraley, The Politics of Military Unification (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), pp. 23-44;
Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York: T he Viking Press, 1951), pp. 62 -63.
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What form of postwar organization should be established and main tained to enable the
military services and other governmental departments and agencies most effectively to
provide for and protect our national security?
Eberstadt’s response to this question covered the military establishment, where he favored three
separate departments and the continuation of the JCS, as wel as the civilian sphere, where he
suggested the formation of two new major bodies “to coordinate al these [civilian and military]
elements.” Eberstadt cal ed these two bodies the National Security Council (NSC) and the
National Security Resources Board (NSRB).The NSC was composed of the President, the
Secretaries of State and the three military departments, the JCS “in attendance,” and the chairman
of the NSRB. Eberstadt also favored the creation of a Central Intel igence Agency (CIA) under
the NSC.9
Eberstadt’s recommendations clearly presaged the eventual national security apparatus, with the
exception of a unified Department of Defense. The NSC was also a useful negotiating point for
Forrestal with the Army, as Eberstadt had described one of its functions as being the “building up
[of] public support for clear-cut, consistent, and effective foreign and military policies.” This
would appeal to al the service factions as they thought back on the lean and insecure prewar
years.10
War-Navy negotiations over the shape of the reorganization continued throughout 1946 and into
1947. However, some form of central coordination, temporarily cal ed the Council of Common
Defense, was not one of the contentious issues. By the end of May 1946, agreement had been
reached on this and several other points, and by the end of the year the two sides had agreed on
the composition of the new coordinative body.11
Congressional Consideration
The creation of the NSC was one of the least controversial sections of the National Security Act
and so drew little attention compared with the basic concept of a single military department,
around which most of the congressional debate centered.
The concept of a regular and permanent organization for the coordination of national security
policy was as widely accepted in Congress as in the executive branch. When the NSC was
considered in debate, the major issues were the mechanics of the new organization, its
membership, assurances that it would be a civilian organization and would not be dominated by
the new Secretary of the National Military Establishment, and whether future positions on the
NSC would be subject to approval by the Senate.12

9 Caraley, The Politics of Military Unification, pp. 40-41; see also Jeffrey M. Dorwart, Eberstadt and Forrestal: A
National Security Partnership, 1909-1949 (College Station, T X: T exas A & M University Press, 1991), especially pp.
90-107.
10 Ibid., pp. 86-87, 91; Hammond, “T he NSC as a Device for Interdepartmental Coordination,” pp. 900-901.
11 Caraley, Politics of Military Unification, pp. 136-137; Millis, Forrestal Diaries, p. 222.
12 T he congressional debate over the National Security Act is summarized in Caraley, Politics of Military Unification,
pp. 153-182; on the NSC, see p. 161. Examples of congressional opinion can be found throughout the lengthy debate.
Some representative comments can be found in the Congressional Record, v. 93, July 7, 1947, p. 8299, and July 9,
1947, pp. 8496-8497, 8518, 8520.
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The NSC as Created in 1947
The NSC was created by the National Security Act, which was signed by the President on July
26, 1947. The NSC appears in Section 101 of Title I, Coordination for National Security, and its
purpose is stated as follows:
(a) ... The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the
integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as
to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government
to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.
(b) In addition to performing such other functions as the President may direct, for the
purpose of more effectively coordinating the policies and functions of the departments and
agencies of the Government relating to the national security, it shall, subject to the direction
of the President, be the duty of the Council
(1) to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in
relation to our actual and potential military power, in the interest of natio nal security, for
the purpose of making recommendations to the President in connection there with; and
(2) to consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of
the Government concerned with the national security, and to make recommendations to the
President in connection therewith....
(d) The Council shall, from time to time, make such recommendations, and such other
reports to the President as it deems appropriate or as the President may require.13
The following officers were designated as members of the NSC: the President; the Secretaries of
State, Defense, Army, Navy, and Air Force; and the Chairman of the National Security Resources
Board. The President could designate the following officers as members “from time to time”:
secretaries of other executive departments and the Chairmen of the Munitions Board and the
Research and Development Board. Any further expansion required Senate approval. The NSC
was provided with a staff headed by a civilian executive secretary, appointed by the President.
The National Security Act also established the Central Intel igence Agency under the NSC, but
the Director of Central Intel igence (DCI) was not designated as an NSC member. The act also
created a National Military Establishment, with three executive departments (Army, Navy, and
Air Force) under a Secretary of Defense.
Implicit in the provisions of the National Security Act was an assumption that the NSC would
have a role in ensuring that the U.S. industrial base would be capable of supporting national
security strategies. The Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, set up by the same
act to deal directly with industrial base and civilian mobilization issues, was provided a seat on
the NSC. Over the years, however, these arrangements proved unsatisfactory and questions of
defense mobilization and civil defense were transferred to other federal agencies and the
membership of the NSC was limited to the President, Vice President, the Secretary of State, and
the Secretary of Defense.14 Thus, the need for a coordinative entity that had initial y been
perceived to center on economic mobilization issues during World War I had evolved to one that
engaged the more permanent themes of what had come to be known as national security policy.
The creation of the NSC improved past coordinative methods and organization, bringing together
as it did the top diplomatic, military, and resource personnel with the President. The addition of

13 50 U.S.C. 402.
14 More specific information on the history of the transfers of defense mobilization and civil defense authorities may be
found in Sections 402 and 404 of U.S. Code Annotated, T itle 50 (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 1991).
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the CIA, subordinate to the NSC, also provided the necessary intel igence and analyses for the
NSC so that it could keep pace with events and trends. The changeable nature of its organization
and its designation as an advisory body to the President also meant that the NSC was a mal eable
organization, to be used as each President saw fit. Thus, its use, internal substructure, and
ultimate effect would be directly dependent on the style and wishes of the President.
How Does the National Security Council Function?
According to Title 50, U.S.C. §3021, the National Security Council today has four primary
functions:
1. advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and
military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the Armed Forces
and the other departments and agencies of the U.S. government to cooperate
more effectively in matters involving the national security;
2. assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in
relation to the actual and potential military power of the United States, and make
recommendations thereon to the President
3. make recommendations to the President concerning policies on matters of
common interest to the departments and agencies of the U.S. government
concerned with the national security; and
4. Coordinate, without assuming operational authority, the U.S. Government
response to malign foreign influence operations and campaigns.15
Since its inception in 1947, the National Security Council, and the institutions that support it, has
evolved from a statutorily mandated meeting of Cabinet-level officials into a complex system of
coordination, adjudication, and in some instances formulation (as in the case of Dr. Kissinger’s
tenure as National Security Advisor) of policies among relevant departments and agencies. As a
result, when individuals refer to the “NSC,” they variously refer to the decisionmaking body
created in statute in the 1947 National Security Act, the staff that supports that decisionmaking
body, or the processes used by the White House to discuss and adjudicate decisions across
different agencies of the executive branch.
 The National Security Council is the President’s statutory advisory body on
matters related to national and international security. Pursuant to Title 50 U.S.C.
§3021, the NSC’s statutory members are the President, Vice President, Secretary
of State, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of
Energy. Other senior officials, including the National Security Advisor,
participate in NSC deliberations at the President’s request. The Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of National Intel igence are the NSC’s
statutory advisors.16 The National Security Council is chaired by the President.
 The National Security Council Staff. The NSC’s activities are coordinated and
directed by the Presidential y-appointed National Security Adviser (NSA). They
are supported by a National Security Staff (NSS, or NSC staff) comprising
permanent employees of the Executive Office of the President and detailees from
other government agencies serving temporary assignments. It is organized into

15 P.L. 115-232 §1043(a)(1).
16 T his “statutory advisor” designation exists to help prevent the politicization of the military and intelligence inputs
into the national security decisionmaking process.
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offices that focus on a variety of long-term strategic issues and ad hoc working
groups that address emerging topics. Each President configures the NSC to
address risks to U.S. global security interests according to prescribed policy
priorities. The size of the NSC staff and ratio of political appointees to detailees
have varied with each Administration. In P.L. 114-328, the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Congress limited the number of policy-
focused individuals serving on the NSC staff to 200 persons. During the Obama
Administration, the Homeland Security Committee and National Security
Council staffs were combined into an organization cal ed the National Security
Staff.
 Decisionmaking committees. Coordinating and managing U.S. national security
affairs requires routine coordination and discussion among relevant departments
and agencies. Most Administrations have therefore set up a hierarchical system of
committees designed to discuss, and when appropriate decide, national security
matters. These committees meet as frequently as the White House deems
necessary. The design and composition of the committee structure is the
prerogative of the President, but the approach has often included some variant of
the following:
 The Principals Committee (PC) is a level below the NSC, convened by the
National Security Advisor. The PC does not need to include al statutory NSC
members, but it general y includes the heads of departments or agencies
involved with the subject matter being discussed at a given meeting.
 The Deputies Committee (DC) is convened by the Deputy National
Security Advisor, and general y includes the deputy heads of departments
(i.e., the Deputy Secretary of Defense or Deputy Secretary of State) involved
with the subject matter being discussed at a given meeting.
 Interagency Policy Committees (IPCs) are established by the National
Security Advisor in consultation with the Deputies Committee and are
responsible for day-to-day management of national security matters on a
given region or topic at the Assistant Secretary level from relevant agencies.
These are chaired by members of the National Security Staff whose subject
matter portfolios are relevant to the issue at hand. Different Administrations
have used various titles for these committees; under President Trump, this
forum was cal ed the Policy Coordination Committee.
Other Named NSC Positions
There are currently two positions within the National Security Council that were established by
Congress:
 The Special Advisor to the President on International Religious Freedom.
Established P.L. 105-277. According to Title 50 U.S.C., the Special Adviser
should “serve as a resource for executive branch officials, compiling and
maintaining information on the facts and circumstances of violations of religious
freedom (as defined in Section 6402 of title 22), and making policy
recommendations. The Special Adviser should serve as liaison with the
Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom, the United States
Commission on International Religious Freedom, Congress and, as advisable,
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religious nongovernmental organizations. The position should be comparable to
that of a director within the Executive Office of the President.”17
 Coordinator for combating malign foreign influence operations and
campaigns. Established in P.L. 115-232 §1043(a)(2). This individual is to be an
employee of the National Security and designated by the President as
“responsible for the coordination of the interagency process for combating
malign foreign influence operations and campaigns” and is required to brief
Congress on the responsibilities and activities of the employees no less than
twice yearly.
Overal , the NSC and its supporting processes and institutions are designed to be flexible, thereby
affording the President maximum latitude to create a security advisory body that suits his unique
decisionmaking style. Apart from appropriating the NSC annual budget, Congress has little
oversight over the Executive Office of the President, and the National Security Council system in
particular, due to the fact that most national security positions within the White House itself (as
opposed to the senior levels of Departments and Agencies) are not currently subject to the advice
and consent of the Senate. Some observers over the years have argued that the position of
National Security Adviser should be subject to Senate confirmation and available to testify before
congressional committees, as are officials from other government departments and agencies.
Others argue that the President is entitled to confidential advice from his immediate staff.
NSC Functions: Theory vs. Practice
As noted earlier, the 1947 National Security Act established the NSC in order to “advise the
President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the
national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of
the government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.”
Presidents have latitude to structure and use the NSC as they see fit. In practice, the NSC staff’s
activities now extend somewhat beyond providing policy advice. First, as one former NSC
official notes, “White House involvement is often needed for precise execution of policy,
especial y when secrecy is required to perform delicate tasks.” Second, the rise in strategic
importance of transnational threats such as terrorism and narco-trafficking, along with post-Cold
War military campaigns in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan, has increasingly necessitated
“whole of government” responses that leverage diplomatic, military, and development tools from
a variety of different U.S. government agencies. The NSC often coordinates such responses, and
as the international security environment has become more complex, whole-of-government
responses to individual crises have become more frequent, translating into even greater NSC
involvement. This expanding role is leading many scholars and practitioners to question the
appropriate size, scope and role for the NSC.
NSC Reform?
Currently, two primary schools of thought exist regarding what types of reforms are necessary.
One view reflects the U.S. experience during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and maintains that
interagency coordination issues prevented the United States from consolidating gains after
achieving tactical military successes. Greater synchronization and integration of the instruments
of national power are required to achieve desired campaign effects. According to this view, much
of the needed policy synchronization is now occurring at the NSC rather than at lower levels due

17 50 U.S.C. §3021.
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to insufficient interagency coordination mechanisms. In the absence of meaningful interagency
reform, the size of the NSS has grown in order to help manage U.S. policy in an era of greater
complexity and to mitigate policy “immobilization” in the interagency. Under this school of
thought, right-sizing and scoping the NSC therefore requires legislation akin to the 1986
Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reform Act, to promote better coordination among executive branch
departments (see CRS Report R44474, Goldwater-Nichols at 30: Defense Reform and Issues for
Congress, by Kathleen J. McInnis).
Others believe that the enlarged NSC staff itself is what drives the organization to take on
“operational” roles that are inappropriate, given the NSC’s mandate to help the President
formulate strategy and monitor its implementation. These observers point to the fact that the NSC
staff in the early 1990s under the George H.W. Bush Administration averaged approximately 50
persons; by contrast, the current NSC comprises between 300-400 people, although during the
final years of the Obama Administration, NSA Rice reduced its size by 10%. According to this
view, the comparatively large staff (relative to prior Administrations) has resulted in the
“micromanagement” of the activities of the Departments in the executive branch, often by
relatively junior personnel. Some therefore believe that in order to force the National Security
Staff to focus on its core, strategic responsibilities, its size should be limited.
NSC Executive and Congressional Liaison
As part of the Executive Office of the President, the NSC does not have the same relationship
with Congress and its committees that the member departments and agencies have. Most briefings
on intel igence matters are undertaken by the DNI; information on diplomatic and military
matters comes primarily from the Departments of State and Defense. As noted above, the
National Security Adviser is not subject to confirmation by the Senate.
Over the years, there have been a considerable number of congressional hearings and reports
relating to the NSC. However, many have had to do with topics peculiar to a given period:
wiretaps against NSC staff members al egedly ordered by Henry Kissinger, the unauthorized
transfer of NSC documents to officials in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and information on Al Qaeda
prior to 9/11. More recently, as part of the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act deliberations,
Congress examined the appropriate size of the National Security Council Staff, and whether it
was inappropriately “micromanaging” the operations of the departments it oversees.18
Often annual hearings are held concerning the NSC budget, and occasional hearings have been
held concerning NSC organization and procedures. Very few of these hearings and reports have
served as briefings for Congress on current issues that the NSC might have been considering.
NSC appropriations are handled by the Subcommittees on Financial Services and General
Government of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees.
Congress’s role in NSC matters and its relationship with the NSC are limited. As noted above, the
Senate does not approve the appointment of the National Security Adviser, although it does
confirm statutory NSC members. Congress does have authority over the designation of those
positions that are to have statutory NSC membership, as wel as budgetary authority over the
NSC. In 2007, as part of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-140, §932),
Congress added the Secretary of Energy to the NSC. However, notwithstanding the legislative
provisions enacted as part P.L. 114-328, Congress has little direct say in matters of NSC

18 S. 2943.
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10

The National Security Council: Background and Issues for Congress

organization, procedure, role, or influence, although a number of hearings on these topics have
been held.
The NSC is not a primary and regular source of national security information for Congress.
National security information is for the most part provided by those departments and agencies
that are represented on the NSC. The NSC, as a corporate entity, rarely testifies before or briefs
Congress on substantive questions, although in some Administrations informal briefings have
been provided.
Conclusion
The NSC is an organ devoted to the workings of the executive branch in the broad area of
national security. Its role is basical y that of policy analysis and coordination and, as such, it has
been subject to limited oversight and legislative control by Congress. Both in its staff
organization and functioning, the NSC is extremely responsive to the preferences and working
methods of each President and Administration. It would be difficult to design a uniform NSC
structure that would meet the requirements of chief executives, who represent a wide range of
backgrounds, work styles, and policy agendas.
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link to page 16 link to page 24 The National Security Council: Background and Issues for Congress

Appendix A. Comparative Charts of Individuals
Named as Members or Attendees of NSC and/or PC
Meetings19
Table A-1 depicts the membership of the NSC, from the Reagan Administration through the
Biden Administration. This report uses the following categories to classify NSC membership:
 Statutory Members—positions specifical y designated as comprising the NSC
by 50 U.S.C. §3021 during the indicated Administration.
 Statutory Advisors—positions designated by law as principal advisors to the
President, the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council
during the indicated Administration. Currently, 50 U.S.C. §3023 designates the
Director of National Intel igence as the principal adviser to the President, to the
National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council for intel igence
matters related to national security. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is
designated by 10 U.S.C. §151 as the principal military adviser to the President,
the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary
of Defense.
 Other Members or Regular Attendees—positions not statutorily designated as
comprising the NSC by 50 U.S.C. §3021 during the indicated Administration, but
explicitly identified as a “member” or “regular attendee” of the NSC in the
presidential directive establishing the structure and function of the NSC for the
indicated Administration.
 Named Attendees—positions not statutorily designated as comprising the NSC
by 50 U.S.C. §3021 during the indicated Administration, but explicitly identified
as an invited or required attendee of the NSC in the presidential directive
establishing the structure and function of the NSC for the indicated
Administration.
 Situational Attendees—positions not statutorily designated as comprising the
NSC by 50 U.S.C. §3021 during the indicated Administration, but explicitly
identified as an invited or required attendee of the NSC in certain specific
circumstances in the presidential directive establishing the structure and function
of the NSC for the indicated Administration.
Table A-2 depicts the membership of the PC, from the George H.W. Bush Administration through
the Biden Administration.

19 T he author is grateful to Heidi Peters, CRS Research Librarian, who compiled the NSC and PC participation tables.
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Table A-1. NSC Membership in Presidential Administrations, as Established by Presidential Directive
Other Members
Administration
Statutory Members
Statutory Advisers
or Regular Attendees
Named Attendees
Situational Attendees
Ronald W.
 President
 Director of Central
See table notes b and c below.
—
 Heads of other executive
Reagana
 Vice President
Intel igence
departments and agenciesd


Secretary of State
Chairman, Joint Chief
of Staff
 Secretary of
Defense
George
 President
 Director of Central
—
 Chief of Staff to the
 Secretary of the Treasuryf
H.W. Bushe
 Vice President
Intel igence
President
 Attorney Generalg



Secretary of State
Chairman, Joint Chief
Assistant to the
 Heads of other executive
of Staff
President for National

departments and agencies,
Secretary of
Security Affairs
Defense
the special statutory
(National Security
advisors to the NSC, and
Adviser)
other senior officialsh
William J.
 President
 Director of Central
Members—
—
 Attorney Generalj
Clintoni

Intel igence
Vice President
 Secretary of the Treasury
 Heads of other executive


Secretary of State
Chairman, Joint Chief
 Representative of the
departments and agencies,
of Staff
the special statutory

United States to the United
Secretary of
advisors to the NSC, and
Defense
Nations
other senior officialsk
 Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
 Assistant to the President
for Economic Policy
 Chief of Staff to the
Presidentc
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Other Members
Administration
Statutory Members
Statutory Advisers
or Regular Attendees
Named Attendees
Situational Attendees
Barack
 President
 Director of National
Members—
 Counsel to the
When international
Obamas

Intel igenceu
Presidentv
economic issues were on
Vice President
 Secretary of the Treasury
the NSC agendax—



Secretary of State
Chairman, Joint Chief
 Attorney General
Assistant to the
of Staff
President and Deputy
 Secretary of Commerce
 Secretary of
 Secretary of Homeland
National Security
Defense
Security
 U.S. Trade Representative
Advisorw

 Assistant to the President
Secretary of
 Representative of the

Energyt
United States to the United
for Economic Policy
Nations
 Chair of the Council of
 Assistant to the President
Economic Advisers
and Chief of Staff (Chief of
When homeland security
Staff to the President)
or counter-terrorism

related issues were on the
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
NSC agendaw—
(National Security Advisor)
 Assistant to the President
for Homeland Security and
Counter-Terrorism
When science and
technology related issues
were on the NSC
agendaw—
 Director of the Office of
Science and Technology
Policy
As appropriatey—
 Heads of other executive
departments and agencies,
and other senior officials
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Other Members
Administration
Statutory Members
Statutory Advisers
or Regular Attendees
Named Attendees
Situational Attendees
Donald J.
 President
 Director of National
Regular attendees—
 Assistant to the
 Heads of executive
Trumpz

Intel igence
President and Chief of
departments and agencies,
Vice President
 Secretary of the Treasury
(NSPM-2)
Staff (Chief of Staff to
and other senior officialsbb


Secretary of State
Chairman, Joint Chief
 Attorney General
of Staff
the President)aa
When international
 Secretary of
 Secretary of Homeland
 Assistant to the
economic issues were on
Defense
Security
President and Chief
the NSC agenda—
 Secretary of Energy
 Assistant to the President
Strategistaa
 Secretary of Commerce
for National Security Affairs
 Counsel to the
(National Security Advisor)
 U.S. Trade Representative
Presidentaa


Assistant to the President
Assistant to the President
 Deputy Counsel to
for Homeland Security
for Economic Policy
the President for
(Homeland Security
National Security

Advisor)
Affairsaa

 Representative of the
 Director of the Office
United States to the United
of Management and
Nations
Budgetaa
Donald J.
 President
 Director of National
Regular attendees—
 Assistant to the
 Heads of executive
Trumpcc

Intel igence
President and Chief of
departments and agencies,
Vice President
 Secretary of the Treasury
(NSPM-4)
Staff (Chief of Staff to
and other senior officialsee


Secretary of State
Chairman, Joint Chief
 Attorney General
of Staff
the President)dd
When international
 Secretary of
 Secretary of Homeland
 Counsel to the
economic issues are on
Defense
Security
Presidentdd
the NSC agenda—
 Secretary of Energy
 Assistant to the President
 Deputy Counsel to
 Secretary of Commerce
for National Security Affairs
the President for
(National Security Advisor)
 U.S. Trade Representative
National Security


Assistant to the President
Affairsdd
Assistant to the President
for Homeland Security
for Economic Policy
 Director of the Office
(Homeland Security
of Management and
Advisor)
Budgetdd
 Representative of the
 Assistant to the
United States to the United
President and Chief
Nations
Strategist (removed in
 Director, Central
NSPM-4)
Intelligence Agency
(added in NSPM-4)
CRS-16

Joseph R.
 President

Chairman of the

Attorney General,
 Counsel to the
 Secretary of Commerce
Biden
 Vice President
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Secretary of Homeland
President
 Secretary of Labor


Security

Secretary of State

Director of National
Deputy Counsel to
 Secretary of Health
Intel igence
the President


and Human Services
Secretary of

Representative of the
Defense
United States of America
 NSC Legal Advisor
 Administrator of the
to the United Nations
(NSC Legal Advisor)
 Secretary of Energy
Environmental Protection

Assistant to the President
 The Assistant to the
Agency
 Secretary of the
and Chief of Staff (Chief of
President and Deputy
Treasury
 Director of the Office of
Staff to the President)
National Security
Management and Budget

Assistant to the President
Advisor (serving as
 U.S. Trade Representative
for National Security
Secretary)
Affairs (National Security
 National Cyber Director
Advisor)
 Assistant to the President

Assistant to the President
for Economic Policy
and Director of the Office
 Assistant to the President
of Science and Technology
for Domestic Policy
Policy (OSTP Director)
 Chairman of the Council of

Administrator, the United
Economic Advisers
States Agency for

International Development
Assistant to the President
for Homeland Security and

Director of the Central
Deputy National Security
Intel igence Agency (in
Advisor (Homeland
advisory capacity)
Security Advisor
 Deputy Assistant to the
President and Deputy
National Security Advisor
for Cybersecurity and
Emerging Technologies
(Deputy National Security
Advisor for Cybersecurity)
 Deputy Assistant to the
President and Deputy
National Security Advisor
for International
Economics (Deputy
National Security Advisor
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Other Members
Administration
Statutory Members
Statutory Advisers
or Regular Attendees
Named Attendees
Situational Attendees
for International
Economics)
 COVID-19 Response
Coordinator
 Special Presidential Envoy
for Climate.
 Heads of other executive
departments and agencies,
and other senior officials,
as appropriate.
Sources: National Security Decision Directive-2 (1982); National Security Directive-1 (1989); Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-2 (1993); National Security
Presidential Directive-1 (2001); Presidential Policy Directive-1 (2009); National Security Presidential Memorandum-2 (January 2017); and National Security Presidential
Memorandum-4 (April 2017).
a. As established by National Security Decision Directive (NSDD)-2, “National Security Council Structure,” January 12, 1982.
b. Note that while Reagan’s NSDD-2 does not explicitly name the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs as either a member of the NSC or an
attendee of NSC meetings, the directive established that the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs was “responsible for developing, coordinating,
and implementing national security policy as approved by” the President; was to “determine and publish the agenda of NSC meet ings;” and was to “ensure that the
necessary papers are prepared and – except in unusual circumstances – distributed in advance to Council members.” NSDD-2 also established that the Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs was also responsible for preparing decision documents, and for disseminating such documents after approval by the
President.
c. In presidential directives establishing the structure and function of the NSC, the participation of the Chief of Staff to the President in NSC meetings has differed by
Administration—in some Administrations, the Chief of Staff to the President is specifical y designated as a “member” or “regular attendee” of the NSC, while other
Administrations have characterized the Chief of Staff to the President as an invited or required attendee at NSC meetings.
d. NSDD2 established that the heads of Departments and Agencies that were not “regular members” would participate in NSC meeting s as appropriate, “when
matters affecting their Departments or Agencies are concerned.”
e. As established by National Security Directive (NSD)-1, “Organization of the National Security Council System,” January 30, 1989.
f.
NSD-1 established that the Secretary of the Treasury would “normal y” attend NSC meetings, “except that on occasions when the sub ject matter so indicates, he
wil not be asked to attend.”
g. NSD-1 established that the Attorney General would attend “meetings pertaining to his jurisdiction, including covert actions.”
h. NSD-1 established that the President intended to “invite the heads of other Executive departments and agencies, the special statutory advisors to the NSC, and
other senior officials to attend meetings of the NSC where appropriate in light of the issues to be discussed.”
i.
As established by Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)/NSC-2, “Organization of the National Security Council,” January 29, 1993.
j.
PDD/NSC-2 established that the Attorney General would be “invited to attend meetings pertaining to his jurisdiction, including covert actions.”
CRS-18

k. PDD/NSC-2 established that the heads of “other Executive departments and agencies, the special statutory advisors to the NSC, and other senior officials shal be
invited to attend meetings of the NSC where appropriate.”
l.
As established by National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-1, “Organization of the National Security Council System,” February 13, 2001.
m. As established by NSPD-1, the Chief of Staff to the President was “invited to attend any NSC meeting.”
n. NSPD-1 established that the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy was “invited to attend any NSC meeting.”
o. As established by NSPD 1, the Counsel to the President was to be “consulted regarding the agenda of NSC meetings,” and was to “attend any meeting when, in
consultation with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, he deems it appropriate.”
p. As established by NSPD-1, the Attorney General was to be “invited to attend meetings pertaining to [his or her] responsibilities,” which was to include “those
matters within the Justice Department’s jurisdiction and those matters implicating the Attorney General’s responsibility under 28 U.S.C. §511 to give his advice and
opinion on questions of law when required by the President.”
q. NSPD-1 established that the Director of the Office of Management and Budget was to be “invited to attend meetings pertaining to [his or her] responsibilities.”
r. As established by NSPD-1, the “heads of other executive departments and agencies, as wel as other senior officials,” were to be “invited to attend meetings of the
NSC when appropriate.”
s. As established by Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-1, “Organization of the National Security Council System,” February 13, 2009.
t.
In December 2007, P.L. 110-140 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §3021(a)) added the Secretary of Energy to the statutory members of the NSC.
u. In December 2004, P.L. 108-458 (Intel igence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, or IRTPA) abolished the position of Director of Central Intel igence
(DCI), replacing the position with a new Director of National Intel igence (DNI). The DCI position was created by President Truman in 1946 (by presidential letter),
prior to passage of the National Security Act of 1947 (P.L. 80-253). Provisions in the act authorized a “triple-hatted” arrangement in which the DCI simultaneously
served as community manager for the intel igence community, Director of the Central Intel igence Agency (CIA) and chief intel igence adviser to the President.
IRTPA divided the DCI’s three major responsibilities between two new positions—the Director of the CIA (DCIA) and DNI—making the new DNI community
manager and principal adviser to the President, and leaving leadership of the CIA to the DCIA.
v. PPD-1 established that the Counsel to the President “shal be invited to attend every NSC meeting.”
w. PPD-1 established that the Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Adviser “shal attend every meeting” of the NSC and would serve as Secretary.
x. As established by PPD-1, the NSC’s “regular attendees” would include the named positions when related issues were on the NSC agenda.
y. As established by PPD-1, the heads of other executive departments and agencies, and other senior officials, were to be “invited to attend meetings of the NSC as
appropriate.”
z. As established by National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM)-2, “Organization of the National Security Council and the Homeland Security Council,”
January 28, 2017.
aa. As established by NSPM-2, the Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff; the Assistant to the President and Chief Strategist; the Counsel to the President; the
Deputy Counsel to the President for National Security Affairs; and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget are “invited as attendees to any NSC
meeting.”
bb. As established by NSPM-2, “invitations to participate in specific” NSC meetings are to be “extended to those heads of executive departments and agen cies, and
other senior officials, who are needed to address the issue or issues under consideration.”
cc. As established by National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM)-4, “Organization of the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and
Subcommittees,” April 4, 2017.
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dd. As established by NSPM-4, the Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff; the Counsel to the President; the Deputy Counsel to the President for National
Security Affairs; and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget are “invited as attendees to any NSC meeting.”
ee. As established by NSPM-4, “invitations to participate in specific” NSC meetings are to be “extended to those heads of executive departments and agencies, and
other senior officials, who are needed to address the issue or issues under consideration.”
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Table A-2. NSC Principals Committee (PC) Membership in Prior Presidential Administrations,
as Established by Presidential Directive
Administration
Regular Attendees
Other Participants
Situational Participants
George H.W. Busha
 Assistant to the President for
—
 Secretary of the Treasury—governed by

National Security Affairs (Chair of
guidelines for participation in NSC meetings,
the PC)
which established that Secretary of the Treasury
 Secretary of State
would “normal y” attend NSC meetings, “except

that on occasions when the subject matter so
Secretary of Defense

indicates, he wil not be asked to attend.”
Director of Central Intel igence


Attorney General—governed by guidelines for
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
participation in NSC meetings, which established
that the Attorney General would attend
“meetings pertaining to his jurisdiction, including
covert actions.”
 Heads of other executive departments and
agencies, the special statutory advisors to the
NSC, and other senior officials—when invited by
the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, in consultation with the Secretary
of State and the Secretary of Defense, where
appropriate in light of the issues to be discussed.
William J. Clintonb
 Assistant to the President for
 Assistant to the President for Economic
 Secretary of the Treasury—“invited as needed.”

National Security Affairs (Chair of
Policy—“as appropriate.”
 Attorney General—“invited as needed.”
the PC)
 Heads of other executive departments and
 Secretary of State (if unavailable,
agencies—“invited as needed.”
the Deputy Secretary of State or
the designee of the Secretary of
State)
 Secretary of Defense (if unavailable,
the Deputy Secretary of Defense
or the designee of the Secretary of
Defense)
 Representative of the United States
to the United Nations
 Director of Central Intel igence
 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
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link to page 28 link to page 28
Administration
Regular Attendees
Other Participants
Situational Participants
George W. Bushc
 Assistant to the President for
 Assistant to the President and Deputy
 Director of Central Intel igence—to attend
National Security Affairs (Chair of
National Security Adviser (PC Executive
“where issues pertaining to [his or her]
the PC)
Secretary)—to attend “al meetings” of the
responsibilities and expertise are to be discussed.”
 Secretary of State
PC.
 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff—to attend “where
 Secretary of the Treasury
 Chief of Staff to the Vice President—to
issues pertaining to [his or her] responsibilities
 Secretary of Defense
attend “al meetings” of the PC.
and expertise are to be discussed.”



Chief of Staff to the President
National Security Adviser to the Vice
Attorney General—to be invited to attend
President—to attend “al meetings” of the
meetings “pertaining to [his or her]
PC.
responsibilities,” including both those “matters
within the Justice Department’s jurisdiction and
those matters implicating the Attorney General’s
responsibility under 28 U.S.C. §511 to give his
advice and opinion on questions of law when
required by the President.”
 Director of the Office of Management and
Budget—to be invited to attend meetings
“pertaining to [his or her] responsibilities.”
 Counsel to the President—to be consulted
regarding the agenda of the PC, and to attend
“any meeting when, in consultation with the
Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs, he deems it appropriate.”
When international economic issues were on the PC
agenda, the PC’s regular attendees included—

Secretary of Commerce

U.S. Trade Representative

Assistant to the President for Economic Policy
(Chair for agenda items that principal y
pertained to international economics)

Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers

Secretary of Agriculture—when the “issues
pertain to her responsibilities”
Barack H. Obamad
 Assistant to the President for

Assistant to the President and Deputy
When international economic issues were on the PC
National Security Affairs (Chair of
National Security Advisor—to be “invited
agenda, the PC’s regular attendees included—
the PC)
to attend every meeting” of the PC.

Secretary of Commerce
 Secretary of State

Deputy Secretary of State—to be “invited

U.S. Trade Representative
 Secretary of the Treasury
to attend every meeting” of the PC.
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link to page 28
Administration
Regular Attendees
Other Participants
Situational Participants
 Secretary of Defense

Counsel to the President—to be “invited

Assistant to the President for Economic Policy
 Attorney General
to attend every meeting” of the PC.
(who, at the discretion of the National Security
 Secretary of Energy

Assistant to the Vice President for
Advisor, served as Chair)


Secretary of Homeland Security
National Security Affairs—to be “invited

Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers

to attend every meeting” of the PC.
When homeland security or counter-terrorism
Director of the Office of
Management and Budget
related issues were on the PC agenda, the PC’s

regular attendees included—
Representative of the United States
to the United Nations

Assistant to the President for Homeland
Security and Counter-Terrorism (who, at the
 Director of National Intel igence
discretion of the National Security Advisor,
 Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff
served as Chair)
When science and technology related issues were on
the PC agenda, the PC’s regular attendees included—
 Director of the Office of Science and Technology
Policy
Invited as appropriate—
 Heads of other executive departments and
agencies, and additional senior officials
Donald J. Trumpe
 Assistant to the President for

Counsel to the President—“may attend al
 Director of National Intel igence—to attend
(NSPM-2)
National Security Affairs (Chair of
[meetings]” of the PC.
“where issues pertaining to [his or her]
the PC)

Deputy Counsel to the President for
responsibilities and expertise are to be discussed.”
 Secretary of State
National Security Affairs—“may attend al
 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff—to attend “where
 Secretary of the Treasury
[meetings]” of the PC.
issues pertaining to [his or her] responsibilities

and expertise are to be discussed.”
Secretary of Defense

Director, Office of Management and

Budget—“may attend al [meetings]” of

Attorney General
Representative of the United States to the United

the PC.
Nations—“may attend as appropriate.”
Secretary of Homeland Security


Assistant to the President and Deputy
 Assistant to the President for Intragovernmental
Assistant to the President and
Chief of Staff
National Security Advisor—“shal attend
and Technology Initiatives—“may attend as
al [meetings]” of the PC.
appropriate.”
 Assistant to the President and


Chief Strategist

Deputy Assistant to the President and
Cabinet-level heads of executive departments and
National Security Adviser to the Vice
agencies, and other senior officials—“who are
 Homeland Security Advisor
President—“shal attend al [meetings]” of
needed to address the issue under consideration.”
the PC.

Executive Secretary (Executive Secretary
of the PC)—“shal attend al [meetings]”
of the PC.
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Administration
Regular Attendees
Other Participants
Situational Participants
Donald J. Trumpf
 Assistant to the President for

Counsel to the President—“may attend al
 Cabinet-level heads of executive departments and
(NSPM-4)
National Security Affairs (Chair of
[meetings]” of the PC.
agencies, and other senior officials—“who are
the PC)

Deputy Counsel to the President for
needed to address the issue under consideration.”
 Secretary of State
National Security Affairs—“may attend al
 Assistant to the President for Intragovernmental
 Secretary of the Treasury
[meetings]” of the PC.
and Technology Initiatives—“may attend as
 Secretary of Defense

Director, Office of Management and
appropriate.”

Budget—“may attend al [meetings]” of
When international economic issues were on the PC
Attorney General
agenda, the PC’s regular attendees included (Added

the PC.
Secretary of Homeland Security
in NSPM-4)—


Assistant to the President and Deputy
Assistant to the President and

Chief of Staff
National Security Advisor—“shal attend

Secretary of Commerce
al [meetings]” of the PC.



U.S. Trade Representative
Representative of the United States

to the United Nations

Deputy Assistant to the President and

Assistant to the President for Economic Policy
National Security Adviser to the Vice

(who serves as Chair for agenda items that
Homeland Security Adviser (Chair,
President—“shal attend al [meetings]” of
principal y pertain to international economics)
as and when directed by the
the PC.
National Security Advisor)




Executive Secretary (Executive Secretary
Secretary of Energy (Added in
of the PC)—“shal attend al [meetings]”
NSPM-4)
of the PC.
 Director of National Intel igence

Deputy National Security Adviser for
(Added in NSPM-4)
Strategy (Added in NSPM-4)—“shal
 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
attend al [meetings]” of the PC.
Staff (Added in NSPM-4)
 Director of the Central Intel igence
Agency (Added in NSPM-4)
 Assistant to the President and Chief
Strategist (Removed in NSPM-4)
Joseph R. Bideng
 The National Security Advisor

Director of National Intel igence (in an
 Secretary of Labor
(serving as chair)
advisory capacity)
 Secretary of Commerce
 Secretary of State

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (in an  Secretary of Health and Human Services,
 Secretary of the Treasury
advisory capacity)
 Administrator of the Environmental Protection
 Secretary of Defense

Director of the Central Intel igence
Agency
 Attorney General
Agency (in an advisory capacity)
 U.S. Trade Representative


Secretary of Energy

Principal Deputy National Security
 National Cyber Director

Advisor
Secretary of Homeland Security
 Assistant to the President for Economic Policy


Counsel to the President
Director of the Office of
 Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
Management and Budget

NSC Legal Advisor
 Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy
 OSTP Director
CRS-24

Administration
Regular Attendees
Other Participants
Situational Participants
 Representative of the United States 
National Security Advisor to the Vice
 Deputy National Security Advisor for
of America to the United Nations
President
Cybersecurity
 Administrator of the United States
 Deputy National Security Advisor for
Agency for International
International Economics
Development
 COVID-19 Response Coordinator
 Chief of Staff to the President.
 Special Presidential Envoy for Climate
 Homeland Security Advisor, who, at the
discretion of the National Security Advisor, may
serve as Chair (when homeland security-related
issues are on the agenda)
 Heads of other executive departments and
agencies, along with additional senior officials,
shal be invited as appropriate
Sources: National Security Directive-1 (1989); Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-2 (1993); National Security Presidential Directive-1 (2001); Presidential Policy
Directive-1 (2009); National Security Presidential Memorandum-2 (January 2017); and National Security Presidential Memorandum-4 (April 2017).
a. As established by National Security Directive (NSD) 1, “Organization of the National Security Council System,” January 30, 1989.
b. As established by Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)/NSC 2, “Organization of the National Security Council,” January 29, 1 993.
c. As established by National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 1, “Organization of the National Security Council System,” February 13, 2001.
d. As established by Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 1, “Organization of the National Security Council System,” February 13, 2009.
e. As established by National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM)-2, “Organization of the National Security Council and the Homeland Security Council,”
January 28, 2017.
f.
As established by National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM)-4, “Organization of the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and
Subcommittees,” April 4, 2017.
g. As established in National Security Memorandum-2, “Memorandum on Renewing the National Security Council System,” February 4, 2021.

CRS-25

The National Security Council: Background and Issues for Congress

Appendix B. As Established in National Security
Memorandum-2, “Memorandum on Renewing the
National Security Council System,” February 4,
2021, National Security Advisers, 1953-Present
Robert Cutler
March 23, 1953
April 2, 1955
Dil on Anderson
April 2, 1955
September 1, 1956
Robert Cutler
January 7, 1957
June 24, 1958
Gordon Gray
June 24, 1958
January 13, 1961
McGeorge Bundy
January 20, 1961
February 28, 1966
Walt W. Rostow
April 1, 1966
January 20, 1969
Henry A. Kissinger
January 20, 1969
November 3, 1975
Brent Scowcroft
November 3, 1975
January 20, 1977
Zbigniew Brzezinski
January 20, 1977
January 21, 1981
Richard V. Al en
January 21, 1981
January 4, 1982
Wil iam P. Clark
January 4, 1982
October 17, 1983
Robert C. McFarlane
October 17, 1983
December 4, 1985
John M. Poindexter
December 4, 1985
November 25, 1986
Frank C. Carlucci
December 2, 1986
November 23, 1987
Colin L. Powel
November 23, 1987
January 20, 1989
Brent Scowcroft
January 20, 1989
January 20, 1993
W. Anthony Lake
January 20, 1993
March 14, 1997
Samuel R. Berger
March 14, 1997
January 20, 2001
Condoleezza Rice
January 22, 2001
January 25, 2005
Stephen Hadley
January 26, 2005
January 20, 2009
James L. Jones
January 20, 2009
October 8, 2010
Thomas E. Donilon
October 8, 2010
July 1, 2013
Susan E. Rice
July 1, 2013
January 20, 2017
Michael T. Flynn
January 20, 2017
February 14, 2017
LTG H.R. McMaster
February 20, 2017
April 9, 2018
John Bolton
April 9, 2018
September 10, 2018
Charles Kupperman (Acting)
September 10, 2019
September 18, 2019
Robert O’Brien
September 18, 2019
January 20, 2021
Jake Sul ivan
January 20, 2021
Present

Congressional Research Service

26

The National Security Council: Background and Issues for Congress

Author Information

John W. Rollins

Specialist in Terrorism and National Security

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Economic Policy

Intelligence and National Security

National Defense

Report Type: CRS Report

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