Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs): Background and Issues for Congress

September 6, 2016 – August 27, 2021 R44629

Federally Funded Research and Development
Centers (FFRDCs): Background and Issues for
Congress
Updated August 27, 2021
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R44629

Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs)

Summary
The federal government supports research and development (R&D) that is conducted by a wide
variety of performers, including federal y owned and operated laboratories, universities, private
companies, and other research institutions. A special class of research institutions referred to as
federal y funded research and development centers, or FFRDCs, are owned by the federal
government, but operated by contractors, including universities, other nonprofit organizations,
and industrial firms. FFRDCs are intended to provide federal agencies with R&D capabilities that
cannot be effectively met by the federal government or the private sector alone. FFRDCs are
required to have a long-term strategic relationship with the federal agency that supports them.
This relationship is presumed to convey a number of benefits, including the ability of an FFRDC
to recruit and retain scientific and technical expertise; an in-depth knowledge of, and the
capability to rapidly respond to, the R&D needs of the federal agency; and the capacity to offer
independent and objective scientific and technical advice. Currently, 12 federal agencies sponsor
or co-sponsor a total of 42 FFRDCs. These FFRDCs provide R&D capabilities in support of
federal agency missions in a broad range of areas—from energy and cybersecurity to cancer and
astronomy. In FY2020, the federal government reported obligations of $15.4 bil ion or 10.2% of
its total estimated R&D spending to FFRDCs.
Congress maintains a continuing interest in FFRDCs due to their contributions to U.S.
technological and economic leadership. However, some Members of Congress have questioned
the appropriate role of FFRDCs in the federal R&D enterprise and the ability of FFRDCs to
effectively address federal agency R&D needs. The following issues have been of particular
interest: (1) the effectiveness of federal agency oversight and management of FFRDCs; (2)
competition between FFRDCs and the private sector for federal R&D funding; (3) the
diversification of FFDRC activities or “mission creep”; (4) the award of noncompetitive FFRDC
management and operation contracts; and (5) the adequacy of FFRDC facilities and
infrastructure.

Congressional Research Service

Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs)

Background
Federal y funded research and development centers (FFRDCs) are a special type of government-
owned, contractor-operated research centers—commonly referred to as “GOCOs”—that conduct
research and development (R&D) and related activities in support of a federal agency’s mission.
FFRDCs operate under the framework of the Federal Acquisition Regulation.1 They differ from
other performers of federal R&D—such as federal laboratories, universities, nonprofit
organizations, and private firms—in that they are designed to meet a “special long-term research
or development need which cannot be met as effectively by existing in-house or contractor
resources” and that they have “access, beyond that which is common to the normal contractual
relationship, to Government and supplier data, including sensitive and proprietary data, and to
employees and instal ations equipment and real property.”2
Over the years, Congress has been concerned with the oversight and management of FFRDCs,
lack of competition in contracting, and mission creep. More recently, some Members of Congress
have focused on the need to balance responsible oversight with improved efficiency,
effectiveness, and innovation.3 Additional y, the role of FFRDCs in the federal R&D enterprise,
including the use of FFRDCs as a model for the governance of federal laboratories, has been an
area of congressional interest. The use and management of FFRDCs, in addition to their role in
the federal R&D enterprise, wil likely be of continued interest.
Origins of FFRDCs
FFRDCs have their origin in World War II. During that time, the federal government sought to
mobilize the country’s scientific and engineering talent and apply it to the development of
technologies that would aid U.S. war efforts. For example, the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s)
Lincoln Laboratory was created to develop radar for identifying aircraft and ships and the Los
Alamos and Oak Ridge National Laboratories (now under the auspices of the Department of
Energy [DOE]) were established to support the development of the atomic bomb. The purpose of
FFRDCs—to bring scientific and technical expertise to bear on pressing R&D chal enges—
remains.
Then, as now, it was widely believed that a lack of flexibility in the federal government made it
difficult to recruit and maintain scientific and technical talent.4 Since FFRDCs are operated by
contractors, many federal restrictions, including restrictions on pay and hiring, do not apply, in
effect increasing the flexibility of FFRDCs compared to the federal government.
FFRDCs were cal ed “Federal Contract Research Centers” until 1967.5 In November 1967, the
chairman of the Federal Council for Science and Technology, a predecessor to the National
Science and Technology Council,6 sent a memorandum to federal science agencies formal y

1 Federal Acquisition Regulation, 35.017.
2 Ibid.
3 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Science, Space, and T echnology, Recommendations of the Commission to
Review the Effectiveness of the National Energy Laboratories, hearing, 114th Cong., 1st sess., November 18, 2015.
4 Jill M. Hruby et al., The Evolution of Federally Funded Research & Development Centers, Public Interest Report,
Federation of American Scientists, Spring 2011, p. 24.
5 National Science Foundation, Annotated List of 36 Federally Funded Research and Development Centers: Fiscal
Year 2002, General Notes, at https://wayback.archive-it.org/5902/20160210231601/http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/
nsf02317/notes.htm.
6 T he National Science and T echnology Council, located within the Executive Office of President, is tasked with
Congressional Research Service

1

link to page 7 Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs)

changing the name of Federal Contract Research Centers to FFRDCs and detailing criteria for the
establishment of an FFRDC.7 Accordingly, an FFRDC was required to
 conduct basic research, applied research, or development, or perform R&D
management;
 be independently incorporated or constitute a separate organizational unit within
the parent organization;
 perform R&D under the direction of the federal government;
 receive 70% or more of its funding from one agency;
 have a long-term relationship with its sponsoring agency (five years or more);
 be government-owned; and
 have an average annual budget of at least $500,000.8
In 1984, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) issued a policy letter revising and
updating the governance of FFRDCs.9 The OFPP issued regulations in 1990 that incorporated the
principles articulated in the policy letter as part of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR).10
The FAR now defines the purposes of an FFRDC, in addition to the policies that direct an
FFRDC’s establishment, use, review, and termination. The “Characteristics of FFRDCs” as
defined by the FAR are discussed in more detail later in this report.
Current FFRDCs
Currently, 12 federal agencies sponsor or co-sponsor a total of 42 FFRDCs.11 These FFRDCs
provide R&D capabilities in a broad range of areas—from energy and cybersecurity to cancer and
astronomy. DOE and DOD sponsor a majority of the FFRDCs, 16 and 10 respectively. The
National Science Foundation (NSF) sponsors 6 centers, the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) sponsors 3, and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) sponsors 2. The
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST), the Department of Transportation (DOT), and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) each sponsor a single FFRDC. The Department of the Treasury (Treasury),
the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and the Social Security Administration co-sponsor a
single FFRDC that serves al three.
FFRDCs are classified in three “activity type” categories under a system established by DOD and
adopted by NSF. According to NSF, the three categories—R&D laboratory, study and analysis
center, or system engineering and integration center are defined as follows:
Research and development laboratories fill voids where in-house and private sector
research and development centers are unable to meet agency core area needs. Specific
objectives for these FFRDCs are to (1) maintain over the long-term a competency in
technology areas where the Government cannot rely on in -house or private sector
capabilities, and (2) develop and transfer important new technology to the private sector so

coordinating science and technology policy across the federal government.
7 National Science Foundation, Annotated List of 36 Federally Funded Research and Development Centers: Fiscal
Year 2002, General Notes.
8 Ibid.
9 49 Federal Register 14462, April 11, 1984.
10 55 Federal Register 3885, February, 1990. T hese regulations are codified in Federal Acquisition Regulation 35.017.
11 National Science Foundation, Master Government List of Federally Funded R&D Centers, current as of July 2021 at
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/ffrdclist/.
Congressional Research Service

2

link to page 24 Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs)

the Government can benefit from a wider, broader base of expertise. R&D laboratories
engage in research programs that emphasize the evolution and demonstration of advanced
concepts and technology, and the transfer or transition of technology.
Study and analysis centers deliver independent and objective analyses and advise in core
areas important to their sponsors in support of policy development, decisionmaking,
alternative approaches, and new ideas on issues of significance.
System engineering and integration centers provide required support in core areas not
available from sponsor’s in-house technical and engineering capabilities to ensure that
complex systems meet operational requirements. The centers assist with the creation and
choice of system concepts and architectures, the specification of technical system and
subsystem requirements and interfaces, the development and acquisition of system
hardware and software, the testing and verification of performance, the integration of new
capabilities, and continuous improvement of system operations and logistics. They often
play a critical role in assisting their sponsors in technically formulating, initiating, and
evaluating programs and activities undertaken by firms in the for-profit sector.12
NSF has the responsibility of maintaining a master list of FFRDCs across the federal government.
According to NSF and as shown in Appendix A, 27 of the 42 current FFRDCs are R&D
laboratories, 10 are study and analysis centers, and 5 are system engineering and integration
centers.
DOD Definitions of FFRDC Categories
Under the DOD Federal y Funded Research and Development (FFRDC) Program, the department adopted the fol owing
DOD specific definitions for the three categories of FFRDCs:

Research and development laboratory FFRDCs conduct research and development, focusing on the
development and prototyping of new technologies and capabilities to meet DOD needs. Research and
development laboratory FFRDCs engage in research programs that emphasize the evolution and
demonstration of advanced concepts and technology, and transfer new technology to the private sector in
accordance with their sponsoring agreements.

Studies and analysis center FFRDCs deliver independent and objective analyses and advice in core work areas
important to the DOD in support of policy and strategy development, decisionmaking, alternative
approaches, and new ideas on significant issues for the DOD.

Systems engineering and integration center FFRDCs meet long-term technical and engineering needs with
independence and objectivity to ensure complex systems meet operational requirements. Systems
engineering and integration FFRDCs assist work sponsors with the development and choice of system
concepts and architectures; specification of technical system and subsystem requirements and interfaces;
prioritization of system-of-systems engineering capabilities, especial y for joint operations; development and
acquisition of system hardware and software; testing and verification of performance; integration and
interoperability of new capabilities; continuous improvement of system operations and logistics; evaluation of
programs and activities undertaken by for-profit organizations; and transfer of new technology to the private
sector in accordance with their sponsoring agreements.13

12 National Science Foundation, “ Master Government List of Federally Funded R&D Centers,” at https://www.nsf.gov/
statistics/ffrdclist/#def.
13 U.S. Department of Defense, DOD Instruction 5000.77: DOD Federally Funded Research and Development Center
(FFRDC) Program , December 13, 2019, at https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/
500077p.PDF?ver=2019-12-13-105837-287.
Congressional Research Service

3

Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs)

Characteristics of FFRDCs
The Federal Acquisition Regulation system (FAR) governs the establishment, use, review, and
termination of FFRDCs.14 According to the FAR, FFRDCs are intended to address an R&D need
that cannot be met as effectively by the federal government or the private sector alone.
Essential y, FFRDCs are intended to only perform work that cannot be done by other contractors.
FFRDCs accomplish their R&D through a strategic relationship with their sponsoring agency.
Two overarching characteristics—special access and longevity—define this strategic relationship.
An FFRDC may be given special access to government and supplier data, employees, and
facilities.15 This access is beyond what is typical in a normal contractual relationship and may
include access to sensitive and proprietary information. Accordingly, the FAR requires that
FFRDCs (1) operate in the public interest with objectivity and independence, (2) be free from
organizational conflicts of interest, and (3) fully disclose their activities to their sponsoring
agency.16 Additional y, FFRDCs are not al owed to use their special access to privileged
information, equipment, or property to compete with the private sector for federal R&D contracts.
However, an FFRDC is al owed to perform work for other agencies when the capabilities of the
FFRDC are not available in the private sector. Final y, the prohibition against competing with the
private sector for federal R&D contracts does not apply to the parent organization or any
subsidiary of the parent organization associated with an FFRDC.17
The other defining characteristic is the long-term relationship between an FFRDC and its
sponsoring agency. Under the FAR, the initial contract period of an FFRDC may be up to five
years, but these contracts may be renewed, following a review, in increments of up to five years.18
For example, one DOE FFRDC—the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory—has been operating
under the same contract since 1964. The FAR encourages long-term contracts to provide stability
and continuity that are intended to al ow an FFRDC to attract high-quality personnel.19
Additional y, under the FAR, a long relationship is required to enable the FFRDC to maintain in-
depth expertise, stay familiar with the needs of the agency, provide a quick response capability,
and maintain objectivity and independence.20
In addition to the described characteristics and requirements, prior to establishing an FFRDC, a
sponsoring agency must make sure that there are no existing alternatives for addressing the
agency’s R&D needs (i.e., the research cannot be done effectively by the federal government or
the private sector) and that the agency has the expertise necessary to review the performance of
the FFRDC.21 The sponsoring agency must also ensure that cost controls are in place and that the
purpose and mission of the FFRDC are clearly defined.22
Other organizations, such as University Affiliated Research Centers (UARCs), have
characteristics and requirements similar to those of FFRDCs. A brief description of UARCs is
provided in the following box.

14 Federal Acquisition Regulation 35.017.
15 Federal Acquisition Regulation 35.017(a)(2).
16 Ibid.
17 Federal Acquisition Regulation 35.017-1(c)(4).
18 Federal Acquisition Regulation 35.017-1(e).
19 Federal Acquisition Regulation 35.017(a)(4).
20 Ibid.
21 Federal Acquisition Regulation 35.017-2.
22 Ibid.
Congressional Research Service

4

link to page 9 link to page 9 link to page 10 link to page 11 link to page 13 link to page 11 Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs)

University Affiliated Research Centers (UARCs)
Currently, there are 13 University Affiliated Research Centers al sponsored by a DOD military service, agency, or
component. UARCs provide an engineering, research, or development capability to the federal agency that
supports them. UARCs are located within a university or col ege and typical y receive funding in excess of $6
mil ion per year on a noncompetitive basis from their sponsoring federal agency. As il ustrated in a 2018 report by
the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), the amount of funding DOD directs to an individual UARC
can vary widely. For example, in FY2017 one UARC received $1.2 mil ion in funding while another received $78.7
mil ion.23
UARCs are not defined in federal statute. However, DOD has established policies and procedures for their
management.24 The characteristics of UARCs are very similar to FFRDCs. The defining feature of UARCs, like
FFRDCs, is the long-term strategic relationship they have with their sponsoring federal agency. This relationship is
intended to al ow for in-depth knowledge of the agency’s research needs, independence and objectivity, freedom
from conflicts of interest, access to sensitive information, and the ability to respond quickly to emerging research
areas.
The primary differences between UARCs and FFRDCs are that UARCs must be affiliated with a university, must
have education as part of their overal mission, and have greater flexibility to compete for public and private R&D
contracts.25 According to GAO, DOD oversight of the department’s UARCs differs from its FFRDCs. The DOD
military service, agency, or component serving as the primary sponsor of a UARC conducts policy and contract
oversight of a UARC, in contrast to conducting active oversight of a DOD FFRDC (i.e., DOD must approve al
FFRDC work before it is placed on contract).26
Federal Funding of FFRDCs
According to NSF, the federal government reported obligating $150.9 bil ion on R&D in
FY2020.27 Of this amount, $15.4 bil ion or 10.2% of the total reported amount was spent on R&D
performed by FFRDCs, compared to $46.5 bil ion (30.8%) performed by industry, $42.4 bil ion
(28.1%) performed by federal agencies (intramural), and $36.1 bil ion (23.9%) performed by
universities and colleges (Figure 1). Other nonprofit organizations, state and local governments,
and foreign entities performed the remaining $10.5 bil ion (7.0%) of R&D funded by the federal
government in FY2020 (Figure 1, see box below for definitions of R&D performers. Of the
reported federal funds obligated to FFRDCs in FY2020, 42% was for basic research, 32% was for
applied research, and 26% was for development (Figure 2).
Figure 3 and Figure 4 il ustrate federal R&D spending trends for FFRDCs from FY1967 to
FY2020. Figure 3 shows that the proportion of total reported federal R&D spending obligated to

23 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Defense Science and Technology: Actions Needed to Enhance Use of
Laboratory Initiated Research Authority, GAO-19-64, December 20, 2018, pp. 28-29, Table 1, https://www.gao.gov/
products/GAO-19-64.
24 U.S. Department of Defense, University Affiliated Research Center (UARC) Management Plan, July, 2010, at
https://acc.dau.mil/adl/en-US/458427/file/58921/UARC%20%20Mgmt%20Plan-
Jun%2023%2010%20FINAL%206811.doc.
25 Jill M. Hruby et al., The Evolution of Federally Funded Research and Development Centers, Public Interest Report,
Federation of American Scientists, Spring 2011, p. 25.
26 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Defense Science and Technology: Actions Needed to Enhance Use of
Laboratory Initiated Research Authority, GAO-19-64, December 20, 2018, p. 55, T able 5, https://www.gao.gov/
products/GAO-19-64.
27 National Science Foundation, National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics, Survey of Federal Funds for
Research and Developm ent, Fiscal Years 201 9–20, at https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsf21329. A total of 33 federal
agencies reported R&D data to NSF for the survey for FY201 9-FY2020. As described by NSF, “ some measurement
problems are known to exist in the Federal Funds Survey data. Some agencies cannot report the full costs of R&D, the
final performer of the R&D, or the R&D plant data.” For more information on the survey design, data collection and
processing, and survey quality measures, among other areas, see “ Survey Description,” at https://www.nsf.gov/
statistics/srvyfedfunds/#tabs-1&sd.
Congressional Research Service

5

link to page 13 link to page 28

Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs)

FFRDCs has varied over time, ranging from a high of 11.6% in FY1983 to a low of 6.4% in
FY2008. On average, between FY1967 and FY2020, the federal government reported obligating
9.2% of its federal R&D spending to FFRDCs. In constant dollars, federal funding for FFRDCs
grew from $7.8 bil ion to $15.4 bil ion from FY1967 to FY2020 (Figure 4). This increase
represents a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 1.27% compared to the CAGR of 0.75%
for total reported federal R&D spending over the same period. Federal funding for FFRDCs in
FY2020 ($15.4 bil ion) was 3.2% higher than in FY2019 ($14.9 bil ion) and represents the largest
amount of federal funding for FFRDCs to date. As shown in Appendix B, the number of
FFRDCs has fluctuated over time, from a high of 74 in FY1969 to a low of 34 in FY1982.
Figure 1. Share of Federal R&D Obligations by R&D Performer, FY2020

Source: CRS analysis of data from National Science Foundation, Survey of Federal Funds for Research and
Development, Fiscal Years 2019–20, Table 2, https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsf21329.
Notes: Components may not sum to 100% due to rounding. Thirty-three federal agencies reported R&D data
to NSF for the survey for FY2019-FY2020. As described by NSF, “some measurement problems are known to
exist in the Federal Funds Survey data. Some agencies cannot report the ful costs of R&D, the final performer of
the R&D, or the R&D plant data.” For more information on the survey design, data col ection and processing,
and survey quality measures, among other areas, see “Survey Description,” at https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/
srvyfedfunds/#tabs-1&sd.
Congressional Research Service

6

Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs)

Figure 2. Federal Obligations to FFRDCs by Character of Work, FY2020

Source: CRS analysis of data from National Science Foundation, Survey of Federal Funds for Research and
Development, Fiscal Years 2019–20, Table 2, https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsf21329.
Notes: Thirty-three federal agencies reported R&D data to NSF for the survey for FY2019-FY2020. As
described by NSF, “some measurement problems are known to exist in the Federal Funds Survey data. Some
agencies cannot report the ful costs of R&D, the final performer of the R&D, or the R&D plant data.” For more
information on the survey design, data col ection and processing, and survey quality measures, among other
areas, see “Survey Description,” at https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/srvyfedfunds/#tabs-1&sd.

Congressional Research Service

7

Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs)

Figure 3. Share of Federal R&D Obligations to FFRDCs, FY1967-FY2020

Source: CRS analysis of data from National Science Foundation, Survey of Federal Funds for Research and
Development, Fiscal Years 2019–20, Table 116, https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsf21329.
Notes: As described by NSF, “some measurement problems are known to exist in the Federal Funds Survey
data. Some agencies cannot report the ful costs of R&D, the final performer of the R&D, or the R&D plant
data.” For more information on the survey design, data col ection and processing, and survey quality measures,
among other areas, see “Survey Description,” at https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/srvyfedfunds/#tabs-1&sd.
Congressional Research Service

8

Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs)

Definitions Associated with Federal R&D Performers28
Intramural performers are the agencies of the federal government. R&D is carried out directly by agency
personnel.
Extramural performers are organizations outside the federal sector that perform R&D with federal funds
under contract, grant, or cooperative agreement. Types of extramural performers:
Businesses or Industrial firms: organizations that may legal y distribute net earnings to individuals or to other
organizations.
Universities and col eges: institutions of higher education in the United States that engage primarily in providing
resident or accredited instruction for a not less than a 2-year program above the secondary school level that
is acceptable for ful credit toward a bachelor’s degree or that provide not less than a 1 -year program of
training above the secondary school level that prepares students for gainful employment in a recognized
occupation.
Other nonprofit institutions: private organizations other than educational institutions whose net earnings do not
benefit either private stockholders or individuals and other private organizations organized for the exclusive
purpose of turning over their entire net earnings to such nonprofit organizations.
Federal y funded research and development centers (FFRDCs): R&D-performing organizations that are exclusively
or substantial y financed by the federal government and are supported by the federal government either to
meet a particular R&D objective or in some instances to provide major facilities at universities for research
and associated training purposes. Each center is administered by an industrial firm, a university, or another
nonprofit institution.
State and local governments: State and local government agencies, excluding state or local universities and
col eges, agricultural experiment stations, medical schools, and affiliated hospitals. R&D activities are
performed either by the state or local agencies themselves or by other organizations under grants or
contracts from such agencies.
Foreign performers: Foreign citizens, organizations, or governments, as wel as international organizations
performing R&D work abroad financed by the federal government.

28 National Science Foundation, National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics, Survey of Federal Funds for
Research and Developm ent, Fiscal Years 201 9–20, T echnical Notes, at https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsf21329#technical-
notes_definitions.
Congressional Research Service

9

link to page 14 link to page 14 link to page 14

Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs)

Figure 4. Federal R&D Obligations to FFRDCs, FY1967-FY2020
in bil ions of constant FY2020 dol ars

Source: CRS analysis of data from National Science Foundation, Survey of Federal Funds for Research and
Development, Fiscal Years 2019-20, Table 116, https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsf21329.
Notes: As described by NSF, “some measurement problems are known to exist in the Federal Funds Survey
data. Some agencies cannot report the ful costs of R&D, the final performer of the R&D, or the R&D plant
data.” For more information on the survey design, data col ection and processing, and survey quality measures,
among other areas, see “Survey Description,” at https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/srvyfedfunds/#tabs-1&sd.
Table 1 shows the amount of reported preliminary federal funding obligated to FFRDCs in
FY2020, the share of total FFRDC funding provided by each agency, and the share of each
agency’s R&D budget spent at FFRDCs. Three federal agencies—DOE, NASA, and DOD—
accounted for nearly 92% of al reported preliminary federal R&D funding obligated to FFRDCs
in FY2020. DOE accounted for $10.5 bil ion (68.5%) of the total $15.4 bil ion in preliminary
FFRDC funding reported for FY2020. This represented 65.1% of DOE’s total R&D budget,
indicating the central role FFRDCs play in fulfil ing the agency’s research needs. By comparison,
NASA accounted for $2.1 bil ion (13.5%) of total preliminary FFRDC funding, which
represented 15.5% of the agency’s R&D budget and DOD accounted for $1.5 bil ion (10.0%) of
the total funding, which represented 2.5% of DOD’s R&D budget (Table 1).
Similar to DOE, the United States Courts and the NRC relied heavily on FFRDCs to execute their
R&D needs in FY2020. The United States Courts spent al of its R&D budget on R&D performed
by FFRDCs ($7.7 mil ion) and the NRC obligated 37.4% ($24.4 mil ion) of the agency’s R&D
budget to FFRDCs (Table 1). Other federal agencies spent variable amounts of their agency’s
estimated FY2020 R&D budget on R&D performed by FFRDCs. For example, HHS spent
$584.7 mil ion or 1.4% of its R&D budget, NSF spent $316.6 mil ion or 5.1% of its R&D budget,
DOT spent $147.6 mil ion or 11.1% of its R&D budget, DHS spent $43.1 mil ion or 8.5% of its
Congressional Research Service

10

link to page 14 link to page 28 Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs)

R&D budget, and the Department of Commerce (DOC) spent $25.1 mil ion or 1.5% of its R&D
budget on R&D performed by FFRDCs (Table 1).
Table 1. Preliminary Federal Agency R&D Obligations to FFRDCs, FY2020
dol ars in mil ions
% of
% of Total
Agency
Federal R&D
R&D
FFRDC Obligations to
Budget to
Obligations
FFRDCs
FFRDCs

Department of Energy
$10,511.6
68.5%
65.1%
National Aeronautics and Space
$2,070.8
13.5%
15.5%
Administration
Department of Defense
$1,538.4
10.0%
2.5%
Department of Health and Human Services
$584.7
3.8%
1.4%
National Science Foundation
$316.6
2.1%
5.1%
Department of Transportation
$147.6
1.0%
11.1%
Department of Veterans Affairs
$75.1
0.5%
4.7%
Department of Homeland Security
$43.1
0.3%
8.5%
Department of Commerce
$25.1
0.2%
1.5%
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
$24.4
0.2%
37.4%
Department of the Treasury
$7.9
<0.1%
13.0%
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts
$7.7
<0.1%
100.0%
Department of the Interior
$0.6
<0.1%
0.1%
Department of Education
$0.5
<0.1%
0.2%
Total
$15,354.2
100.0%
10.2%
Source: CRS analysis of data from National Science Foundation, Survey of Federal Funds for Research and
Development, Fiscal Years 2019–20, https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsf21329.
Notes: Components may not sum to 100% due to rounding. As described by NSF, “some measurement
problems are known to exist in the Federal Funds Survey data. Some agencies cannot report the ful costs of
R&D, the final performer of the R&D, or the R&D plant data.” For more information on the survey design, data
col ection and processing, and survey quality measures, among other areas, see “Survey Description,” at
https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/srvyfedfunds/#tabs-1&sd.
Issues for Congress
FFRDCs have attracted the attention of Congress for decades. Historical y, congressional concern
focused on the growth of FFRDCs and their cost to the government (see Appendix B for the
number of FFRDCs from FY1967 to FY2020). In more recent years, Congress has focused on the
management and oversight of FFRDCs and their insulation from competition. Many of these
concerns remain. The following sections describe some of these issues.
Effectiveness of Oversight and Management
The adequacy of agency oversight and management of FFRDCs is a long-standing congressional
concern. Some Members of Congress have repeatedly expressed concern about the ability of
Congressional Research Service

11

Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs)

federal agencies to control costs and address perceived mismanagement at FFRDCs. For example,
in 1992, a Senate subcommittee report indicated “that FFRDCs today operate under an
inadequate, inconsistent patchwork of federal cost, accounting and auditing controls, whose
deficiencies have contributed to the wasteful or inappropriate use of mil ions of federal dollars.”29
In a 2016 hearing examining the mission and management of DOE’s FFRDCs, Representative
Fred Upton, Chairman of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, stated
DOE’s safety, security, and contract management problems span administrations, span
Congresses. From my experience, and as our witnesses will explain, improving DOE’s
performance requires long, sustained attention to ensure sustained improvement in agency
performance.30
Congressional scrutiny is driven, in part, by a number of high-profile incidents. For example, in
2000, two Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) computer hard drives went missing and an
employee was accused of planning to sel nuclear information to China.31 In 2004, the
mishandling of classified data and the partial blinding of a student from a laser accident closed
LANL for seven months, costing $370 mil ion.32 Additional y, in 2016, an investigation found
that LANL mishandled hazardous waste, and nine LANL workers were injured during routine
maintenance of an electrical substation.33
Since the early 1990s, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has designated DOE’s
contract management as a high-risk area for fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement.34 In 2013,
GAO narrowed its high-risk designation to major contracts and projects within DOE’s Office of
Environmental Management and the National Nuclear Security Administration, which manages
three DOE FFRDCs.35 In 2018, while noting some of the progress made by DOE in addressing its
oversight and management chal enges, GAO indicated that “chal enges remain.”36 And, in a 2019
review of how DOE evaluates the performance of contractors who manage and operate DOE
facilities, including FFRDCs, GAO found the following:
In analyzing DOE’s fiscal year 2016 Performance Evaluation Reports (PER), GAO found
that these reports provided less information on M&O [management and operating]
contractors’ cost performance than on contractors’ technical and administrative
performance. The cost information provided in the PERs often was not detailed, did not
indicate the significance of the performance being described, and applied only to specific
activities. Further, the information is of limited use for acquisition decision-making, such

29 Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, Co mmittee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate,
Inadequate Federal Oversight of Federally Funded Research and Developm ent Centers, 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., S.Prt.
102-98, (Washington, DC: GPO 1992), p. iii.
30 Statement of Chairman Fred Upton, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee
on Oversight and Investigations, DOE for the 21st Century: Science, Environm ent, and National Security Missions,
hearing, 114th Cong., 2nd sess., February 24, 2016.
31 Suzanne Struglinski, “DOE: Abraham Announces Los Alamos Contract Will Undergo Competitive Bidding,”
Greenwire, May 1, 2003.
32 Mary O’Driscoll, “Nuclear Safety: Lawmakers Seek GAO Help in Solving Los Alamos Problems,” Greenwire,
February 21, 2007.
33 “National Labs: Los Alamos’ Mission in Question amid Management T urmoil,” Greenwire, January 4, 2016.
34 U.S. Government Accountability Office, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-15-290, February, 2015, p. 294.
35 Ibid.
36 David C. T rimble, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, U.S. Government Accountability Office,
T estimony before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Senate Committee Armed Services, Departm ent of Energy:
Continued Actions Needed to Address Managem ent Challenges, March 14, 2018, pp. 14-21.
Congressional Research Service

12

Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs)

as deciding whether to extend the length of a contract, because it does not permit an overal
assessment of cost performance.37
Since 2002, DOE has been shifting its FFRDC oversight from a transactional model to a systems -
based approach that assesses analytical information collected by the FFRDCs through what is
known as contractor assurance systems (CAS).38 Many stakeholders recognize the use of CAS as
a positive step to improving DOE oversight.39 However, in 2013, the National Academy of Public
Administration (NAPA) cal ed on DOE to exercise caution as it transitioned to this oversight
model.40 NAPA indicated that the maturity of CAS varies and that DOE needs to verify the ability
of an FFRDC’s CAS to identify problems before they occur.
In contrast, others view DOE’s overal oversight and management activities as burdensome,
counterproductive, and a distortion of the FFRDC model.41 Critics assert that the original benefit
of the FFRDC model—flexibility—has been substantial y diminished because DOE now
micromanages its FFRDCs. According to a 2013 report by the Information Technology and
Innovation Foundation, the Center for American Progress, and the Heritage Foundation,
Decisions that should be made by research teams and lab managers are instead preapproved
and double checked by a long and growing chain of command at DOE. There is no better
example of this oversight than the hundreds of DOE site-office42 employees staffed to
regulate lab managers and research by proxy. This adds considerable delay and introduces
additional costs to routine business decisions.43
Some of those concerned about the detrimental effects of increased micromanagement would like
to see a return to the original intent of the FFRDC model: a model where the government sets the
overal strategic direction and provides the necessary funding and the FFRDC is given the
flexibility to determine how to address the identified chal enges.44 Critics indicate that a lack of
trust currently exists between DOE and its laboratories and that in order to return to the
partnership envisioned by the FFRDC model, this trust needs to be restored. They recommend
that DOE provide its FFRDCs with more authority and flexibility, and then hold each FFRDC to
a high standard of transparency and accountability.45 According to the Information Technology
and Innovation Foundation, the Center for American Progress, and the Heritage Foundation, if an

37 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Department of Energy: Performance Evaluations Could Better Assess
Managem ent and Operating Contractor Costs, GAO-19-5, February 26, 2019, https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-
5.
38 T ransactional oversight is an oversight model that ensures contractor performance by identifying those technical
areas, activities, or actions that will be observed, reviewed, or approved by the oversight organization. A systems-based
approach, on the other hand, is intended to ensure performance through the implementation of an effective management
system that provides high-quality information for decisionmaking. For an example of a DOE contractor assurance
system, see https://commons.lbl.gov/download/attachments/77332681/PUB+5520+UC+CAS+Description.pdf.
39 National Academy of Public Administration, Positioning DOE’s Labs for the Future: A Review of DOE’s
Managem ent and Oversight of the National Laboratories, January 2013, p. 47.
40 Ibid.
41 Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, Center for American Progress, and the Heritage Foundation,
Turning the Page: Reim agining the National Labs in the 21 st Century Innovation Econom y, June 2013, p. 19.
42 Each DOE FFRDC has a co-located field office staffed by agency employees who supervise the day to day
operations of the FFRDC.
43 Ibid., p. 20.
44 U.S. Department of Energy, Commission to Review the Effectiveness of the National Energy Laboratories, Securing
America’s Future: Realizing the Potential of the Department of Energy’s National Laboratories, Volume 2 : T echnical
Chapters and Appendices, October 28, 2015, p. 1 5.
45 Ibid., p. 27.
Congressional Research Service

13

Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs)

individual FFRDC does not meet its obligations, corrective actions, including punitive restrictions
and possibly the firing of the FFRDC contractor, are valid options, but they assert that the
mistakes of one FFRDC should not result in new regulations and additional oversight for al DOE
FFRDCs.46
Competition with the Private Sector
Congress and the executive branch have been interested in promoting competition in federal
procurement, including the procurement of R&D, for decades. However, federal law explicitly
exempts FFRDCs from competitive practices.47 Historical y, critics of this exemption have
asserted that it prohibits the federal government from receiving the best possible R&D at the most
competitive price.48 For example, in a 1997 report, the Defense Science Board stated, “the lack of
competition for much of the work being done in the FFRDCs is not justified, nor in the long run
is it in the best interests of the DOD.”49 Additional y, some critics have pointed out that the R&D
capabilities of the private sector have increased dramatical y since World War II and the
continued use of FFRDCs is in direct opposition to their original intent—to conduct R&D that
cannot be done as effectively by the private sector or the federal government.50 A 2016 report by
the Defense Business Board—an advisory committee composed of business leaders and
managers—stated
Today, the for-profit sector can provide most of the technical services that was, in the past,
only available from a FFRDC. However, in many cases there remain sound reasons to give
the work to FFRDCs, such as avoiding potential conflicts of interest, access to confidential
competitive information or deep historical knowledge and experience not available in for-
profit companies.51
More recently, critics have focused on the use of FFRDCs for systems engineering and
integration (SE&I) services.52 The Professional Services Council (PSC), the national trade
association of the government professional and technical services industry, has asserted that the
SE&I capabilities of the private sector are as good as or better than those of FFRDCs.53
According to PSC, “prior to the 1990s, FFRDCs were often favored over for-profit systems
engineering companies on grounds of avoiding potential conflicts of interest.”54 However, PSC

46 Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, Center for American Progress, and the Heritage Foundation,
Turning the Page: Reim aging the National Labs in the 21 st Century Innovation Economy, June 2013, p. 24.
47 T he Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) of 1984 (T itle VII of P.L. 98-369) directs competition practices in
federal contracting. CICA requires the use of “full and open competition” in the procurement of goods and services.
However, the CICA also permits the use of noncompetitive procedures in a number of circumstances, including
“establishing or maintaining an essential engineering, research, or development capability” pr ovided by an FFRDC.
48 U.S. General Accounting Office, Competition: Issues on Establishing and Using Federally Funded Research and
Developm ent Centers, GAO-88-22, March, 1988, p. 8.
49 U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Science Board, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
T echnology, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Federally Funded Research and Developm ent
Centers (FFRDC) and University Affiliated Research Centers (UARC) , January, 1997, p. 5.
50 Professional Services Council, Federally Funded Research and Development Centers: A Strategic Reassessment for
Budget-Constrained Tim es, June 5, 2012, pp. 8-9.
51 Defense Business Board, Future Models for Federally Funded Research and Development Contracts, DBB FY17-
02, October 2016, p. 6, https://dbb.defense.gov/Portals/35/Documents/Reports/2017/DBB%20FY17-
02%20FFRDCs%20Completed%20Study%20 (October%202016).pdf.
52 Ibid., p. 2.
53 Ibid., p. 4.
54 Ibid,. p. 9.
Congressional Research Service

14

Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs)

also suggested that congressional y initiated reforms through the Weapon System Acquisition
Reform Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-23) have resulted in a sizable number of private sector SE&I
companies that are conflict free, independent, and capable of performing the SE&I work currently
going to FFRDCs.55
In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Section 895 of P.L. 114-92),
Congress included a provision to address concerns about conflicts of interest and unfair
competitive advantages associated with sole-source task orders to entities that provide technical
advice on defense programs. Specifical y, the provision requires DOD to review and, if necessary,
issue policy guidance related to the identification, mitigation, and prevention of potential unfair
competitive advantages conferred to technical advisors to acquisition programs. As detailed in the
joint explanatory statement accompanying the bil , technical advisors are contractors, FFRDCs,
university-affiliated research centers, nonprofit entities, and federal laboratories that provide,
among other services, systems engineering and technical direction.56 In carrying out the
provision, the joint explanatory statement directs DOD
To review the efficacy of current conflict-of-interest policies, the use of non-disclosure
agreements, the application of appropriate regulations, and decisions to allocate resources
through direct award of funds to intramural programs or sole-source task orders to entities
that provide technical advice on defense programs versus open and competitive extramural
solicitations.57
In December 2019, GAO reviewed DOD’s use of study and analysis FFRDCs and found that al
five of DOD’s study and analysis centers had conflict of interest policies and practices in line
with the FAR and DOD guidance related to FFRDCs.58
It is less clear, however, if the private sector could fully address the work being performed by
FFRDCs categorized as R&D laboratories. According to PSC, FFRDCs “maintain laboratories
and specialized test and evaluation facilities beyond those available to the government and its for-
profit contractors.”59 Additional y, proponents assert that FFRDCs “occupy a key role in the
nation’s S&T [science and technology] community that cannot be carried out solely by academic
institutions or the business sector.”60 FFRDCs are widely seen as contributing to U.S.
technological and economic leadership.
Mission Creep
The diversification of FFDRC activities or “mission creep” is an issue closely related to concerns
about competition with the private sector. A poorly defined mission or scope may make it more
difficult to determine what R&D tasks are appropriate for an FFRDC to perform and what tasks
are better left to the private sector. Concerns over mission creep are associated not only with the
broadening of FFRDC activities into new fields, but also with the broadening of FFRDC clients

55 Ibid., pp. 9-10.
56 Joint Explanatory Statement on S. 1356 published in Congressional Record, November 5, 2015, p. H7989.
57 Ibid.
58 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Federal Research: DOD’s Use of Study and Analysis Centers, GAO-20-31,
December 9, 2019, pp. 28-29, https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-20-31.
59 Professional Services Council, Federally Funded Research and Development Centers: A Strategic Reassessment for
Budget-Constrained Tim es, June 5, 2012, p. 4.
60 U.S. Department of Energy, Commission to Review the Effectiveness of the National Energy Laboratories,
“Securing America’s Future: Realizing the Potential of the Department of Energy’s National Laboratories,” Volume 1:
Executive Report, October 28, 2015, p. 7.
Congressional Research Service

15

Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs)

(e.g., work for other agencies). Some analysts have asserted that diversification of FFRDC
activities is contrary to the intent of FFRDCs—to serve a special R&D need—and an ineffective
means for accomplishing the federal agency’s mission.61 In 1995, a task force examining the
future of the DOE national laboratories stated that applying the technical competencies of the
national laboratories to new problem areas needed to be carefully managed.62 Specifical y, the
task force said such activities
should not be a license to expand into areas of science and technology which already are
being addressed effectively or more appropriately by other Research and Development
(R&D) performers in government, academia and the private sector.63
Agencies have approached mission creep concerns in different ways. DOE has placed limits on
the amount of work its FFRDCs can perform for other agencies. Specifical y, if the work for other
agencies and nongovernmental entities in a DOE Office of Science FFRDC is 20% above the
FFRDC’s operating budget, then DOE requires an in-depth review prior to approving the work.64
Such a review is intended to ensure the work that DOE FFRDCs are performing for other entities
wil not impede its ability to meet DOE’s research needs. However, in a 2013 report, GAO
indicated that DOE is not consistently fulfil ing agency requirements—project approval, cost
recovery, or program review—to ensure its work for others program is not negatively affecting
the laboratories’ mission.65
In regards to DOD, Congress has included language each year since 1993 in the defense
appropriations bil that prohibits DOD from establishing new FFRDCs.66 Congress has also
placed an annual limit on the number of Staff Years of Technical Effort (STE) that DOD FFRDCs
can use to perform work for the agency.67 STE is a cap on personnel time which translates into a
cap on funding levels for each FFRDC. DOD al ocates a portion of STE to each of its FFRDCs.
Limiting the personnel time available to each DOD FFRDC is believed to drive prioritization of
needs and provide greater assurance that the work being performed by FFRDCs is appropriate in
scope.68 As noted by the Defense Business Board, the STE limitation does not apply to work that
DOD FFRDCs perform for other agencies and “it is not clear how much rigor is applied to the
[STE] al ocation process.”69 According to a 2018 report by GAO, DOD officials reported that the
STE limitation “significantly constrains the use of DOD’s FFRDCs and that DOD customer

61 Letter from Stan Soloway, President and Chief Executive Officer of Professional Services Council, to Dr. Reginald
Brothers, Under Secretary for Science and T echnology, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, at
http://www.pscouncil.org/PolicyIssues/GovernmentCompetition/FFRDCCompetition/
Letter_to_DHS_on_HSOAC_FFRDC.aspx .
62 U.S. Department of Energy, Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, Report of the T askforce on Alternative Futures for
the Department of Energy Laboratories, Alternative Futures for the Departm ent of Energy Laboratories, February,
1995, at, http://www2.lbl.gov/LBL-PID/Galvin-Report/index.html.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid., p. 22.
65 U.S. Government Accountability Office, National Laboratories: DOE Needs to Improve Oversight of Work
Perform ed for Non-DOE Entities, GAO-14-78, October, 2012, p. 25.
66 See, for example, Section 8025 of P.L. 116-93.
67 Ibid.
68 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Federal Research: Opportunities Exist to Improve the Management and
Oversight of Federally Funded Research and Developm ent Centers, GAO-09-15, October, 2008, p. 16.
69 Defense Business Board, Future Models for Federally Funded Research and Development Contracts, DBB FY17-02,
October 2016, p. 8, https://dbb.defense.gov/Portals/35/Documents/Reports/2017/DBB%20FY17-
02%20FFRDCs%20Completed%20Study%20 (October%202016).pdf.
Congressional Research Service

16

Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs)

demand for their services is significantly greater than the annual STE limit,” which leads to
FFRDC-related work being deferred to later years.70
In general, according to GAO, federal agency approval of annual FFRDC R&D plans should
ensure activities remain within the scope, mission, and purpose of the FFRDC.71 Additional y, the
Defense Business Board recommended that DOD conduct periodic in-depth reviews of its
FFRDCs every seven to ten years using independent experts to review an FFRDC’s mission and
priorities; assess the quality of an FFRDC’s work; and assess the relevance of their strategic or
technical expertise.72
Competition of FFRDC Contracts
A hal mark of FFRDCs is the long-term relationship each has with its sponsoring agency. A long-
term relationship is believed to provide stability and continuity and is considered central to
attracting and retaining scientific and technical expertise. Many FFRDCs have been managed by
the same contractor since they were created. For example, Associated Universities, Inc. has
operated NSF’s National Radio Astronomy Observatory since 1956; RAND Corporation has
operated DOD’s Project Air Force since 1946; and MITRE Corporation has operated FAA’s
Center for Aviation System Development since 1990. However, some Members of Congress,
GAO, and others have criticized the use of noncompetitive procedures for FFRDC contracts.73
These critics view competition as the best way to decrease costs and increase quality. For
example, in 2003, a report by the Blue Ribbon Commission on the Use of Competitive
Procedures for the Department of Energy Labs found that “competition imposes discipline and
can elicit quality performance and efficient operation in ways simply not inspired by oversight
alone.”74
DOE has shifted from a position of not regularly conducting full and open competitions for its
FFRDCs to routinely subjecting its FFRDCs to competition. Congressional action spurred this
shift. Specifical y, between FY1998 and FY2009 congressional appropriations acts mandated the
use of competition for al DOE FFRDC contracts unless the Secretary of Energy granted a waiver
to competition and provided the appropriations committees with a detailed justification for the
waiver.75

70 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Defense Science and Technology: Actions Needed to Enhance Use of
Laboratory Initiated Research Authority, GAO-19-64, December 20, 2018, p. 34.
71 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Federal Research: Opportunities Exist to Improve the Management and
Oversight of Federally Funded Research and Development Centers, GAO-09-15, October, 2008, p. 15.
72 Defense Business Board, Future Models for Federally Funded Research and Development Contracts, DBB FY17-02,
October 2016, p. 9, htt ps://dbb.defense.gov/Portals/35/Documents/Reports/2017/DBB%20FY17-
02%20FFRDCs%20Completed%20Study%20 (October%202016).pdf.
73 See, for example, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, Committee on Governmental Affairs,
U.S. Senate, Inadequate Federal Oversight of Federally Funded Research and Developm ent Centers, 102nd Cong., 2nd
sess., S.Prt. 102-98 (Washington, DC: GPO 1992), p. 31.
74 U.S. Department of Energy, Report of the Blue Ribbon Commission on the Use of Competitive Procedur es for the
Department of Energy Labs, Com peting the Managem ent and Operations Contracts for DOE’s National Laboratories,
November 2003, p. 10.
75 See, for example, Section 301 of the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, 2002, P.L. 107-66.
Congressional Research Service

17

Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs)

Annual appropriations language was not included after FY2009 because on December 22, 2009,
the Secretary of Energy released a policy on the agency’s use of competition for the management
and operation of its FFRDCs.76 The policy states
DOE does not default to a posture of determining a priori either that the Department wil
conduct competitions for all its M&O contracts, or that it will extend all these contracts.
DOE recognizes a preference for full and open competition, and exercises, on a case-by-
case basis, the authorities available to the Secretary.
According to DOE, the agency general y uses full and open competition under the following
circumstances: when the performance of an FFRDC operator is viewed as unsatisfactory; when
the potential for improved costs or technical performance has been identified; when viable
alternatives exist in the marketplace; or when the agency decides to change the focus or mission
of an FFRDC.77 In 2018, DOE awarded a new contract to Triad National Security, LLC—a
partnership between Battel e Memorial Institute, the Texas A&M University System, and the
Regents of the University of California—for the management and operation of Los Alamos
National Laboratory. The new contract was awarded due to concerns with the performance of the
previous contractor, which included health and safety issues.78 Media reports, however, question
the ability of Triad National Security to make significant improvements as one of the entities
involved in the partnership, the University of California, was part of the previous contract
management team.79
Although competition is widely seen as an important tool for increasing performance and
efficiency, some experts have asserted that there are downsides associated with the competition of
FFRDC contracts.80 Specifical y, critics view competition of existing FFRDCs as disruptive,
costly, and harmful to FFRDC productivity.81 According to DOE, the time to conduct an FFRDC
competition is approximately 18 months and it is estimated to cost a contractor preparing a bid
between $3 mil ion and $5 mil ion.82 In describing its experiences with increased competition,
DOE has stated
although some efficiencies or improved contractual agreements have been made possible
as a result of the new contracts the overall performance of the new contractors has in most
cases not surpassed that of the old, and it is arguable that what improvements have been
observed could have been achieved even in the absence of competition.83

76 U.S. Department of Energy, Policy Regarding the Competition of Contracts to Manage and Operate Its National
Laboratories, December 22, 2009, at, http://science.energy.gov/~/media/lp/pdf/management -and-operating-contracts/
DOE_Policy_Extension_or_Competition_of_Contracts_for_National_Labs_2009-12-22.pdf.
77 Ibid.
78 U.S. Government Accountability Office, National Nuclear Security Administration Contracting: Review of the
NNSA Report on the Los Alamos National Laboratory Contract Competition, GAO -20-292R, January 2020,
https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-20-292R.
79 Rebecca Moss, “T he Government’s New Contractor to Run Los Alamos Includes the Same Manager It Effectively
Fired for Safety Problems,” ProPublica, June 8, 2018, https://www.propublica.org/article/new-contractor-los-alamos-
university-of-california-safety-problems.
80 U.S. Department of Energy, Report of the Blue Ribbon Commission on the Use of Competitive Procedures for the
Departm ent of Energy Labs: Com peting the Managem ent and Operations Contracts for DOE’s National Laboratories,
November 2003, p. 14.
81 Ibid.
82 U.S. Department of Energy, Policy Regarding the Competition of Contracts to Manage and Operate Its National
Laboratories, December 22, 2009, at, http://science.energy.gov/~/media/lp/pdf/management -and-operating-contracts/
DOE_Policy_Extension_or_Competition_of_Contracts_for_National_Labs_2009-12-22.pdf.
83 Ibid.
Congressional Research Service

18

Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs)

In 2008, GAO found that while most agencies required full and open competition for their
FFRDC contracts, DOD continued to award noncompetitive or sole-source contracts to its
FFRDCs.84 However, GAO also found that in response to criticism DOD began conducting more
detailed and comprehensive reviews before renewing its FFRDC contracts.85 Additional y, a 2009
report by NASA’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) found that the agency did not conduct an
assessment of possible competitors, as required by the FAR, for operation of the Jet Propulsion
Laboratory.86 According to the NASA OIG, without performing the assessment NASA could not
determine if it was getting the best value for the operation of its FFRDC.87
Condition of FFRDC Infrastructure
Similar to other government-owned laboratories, the facilities and infrastructure of many
FFRDCs are decades old. According to GAO, DOD FFRDC officials cited aging facilities and
equipment as a hindrance to research and development efforts. For example, officials from the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology—the contractor and administrator of Lincoln Laboratory—
indicated that some of the facilities “were not structural y designed for modern research and have
relatively poor vibration isolation, resulting in inefficient workarounds or work that could not be
performed.”88
In a recent report, the Inspector General of the Department of Energy listed infrastructure
modernization as one of DOE’s top management chal enges, stating,
Facilities and infrastructure can have a substantial impact on laboratory research and
operations in a variety of ways. For instance, poor conditions in laboratory facilities and
infrastructure can lead to inadequate functionality in mission performance; negative effects
on the environment, safety, and health of the site; higher maintenance costs; and problems
with recruiting and retaining high-quality scientists and engineers.89
Furthermore, a 2017 report on the state of DOE’s national labs, indicates that despite investment
by DOE “the condition of a large percentage of the infrastructure is substandard or inadequate for
the mission as a result of more than five decades of aging, deterioration, and insufficient funding
to keep pace with needed improvements.”90
According to GAO, NASA’s Inspector General has also identified aging infrastructure and
facilities as a management chal enge for the agency, including for NASA’s FFRDC—the Jet

84 T he Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (P.L. 98-369) includes a statutory exemption for FFRDCs.
U.S. Government Accountability Office, Federal Research: Opportunities Exist to Im prove the Managem ent and
Oversight of Federally Funded Research and Developm ent Centers, GAO-09-15, October, 2008, p. 9.
85 Ibid., p. 29.
86 Office of Inspector General, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA Should Reconsider the Award
Evaluation Process and Contract Type for th e Operation of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Report No. IG-09-022-R,
September 25, 2009, p. iii.
87 Ibid.
88 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Defense Science and T echnology: Actions Needed to Enhance Use of
Laboratory Initiated Research Authority, GAO-19-64, December 20, 2018, p. 34, https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-
19-64.
89 Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of Energy, Management Challenges at the Department of Energy -
Fiscal Year 2020, DOE-OIG-20-09, November 15, 2019, p. 19, https://www.energy.gov/ig/downloads/special-report -
doe-oig-20-09.
90 U.S. Department of Energy, Annual Report on the State of the DOE National Laboratories, January 2017, p. 87,
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/02/f34/
DOE%20State%20of%20the%20National%20Labs%20Report%2002132017.pdf .
Congressional Research Service

19

Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs)

Propulsion Laboratory (JPL)—where more than 50% of JPL’s facilities are more than 50 years
old.91

91 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Defense Science and T echnology: Actions Needed to Enhance Use of
Laboratory Initiated Research Authority, GAO-19-64, December 20, 2018, p. 44, https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-
19-64.
Congressional Research Service

20

Appendix A. List of Federally Funded Research and Development Centers,
as of July 2021
FY2019 Federal R&D
Sponsoring Agency
Name of FFRDC
Activity Type
Contractor
Obligations
(in mil ions)
Department of Defense
Aerospace Federal y Funded
Systems Engineering
The Aerospace Corporation
$259.68
Research and Development Center
and Integration
Center

Arroyo Center
Study and Analysis
RAND Corp.
$21.79
Center

National Security Engineering Center
Systems Engineering
MITRE Corp.
$164.97
and Integration
Center

Center for Naval Analyses
Study and Analysis
The CNA Corporation
$72.03
Center

Center for Communications and
R&D Laboratory
Institute for Defense Analyses
$55.86
Computing

Lincoln Laboratory
R&D Laboratory
Massachusetts Institute of
$397.94
Technology

National Defense Research Institute
Study and Analysis
RAND Corp.
$13.41
Center

Project Air Force
Study and Analysis
RAND Corp.
$2.23
Center

Software Engineering Institute
R&D Laboratory
Carnegie Mel on University
$35.18

Systems and Analyses Center
Study and Analysis
Institute for Defense Analyses
$37.67
Center
Department of Energy
Ames Laboratory
R&D Laboratory
Iowa State University
$29.85

Argonne National Laboratory
R&D Laboratory
UChicago Argonne, LLC
$640.04
CRS-21

FY2019 Federal R&D
Sponsoring Agency
Name of FFRDC
Activity Type
Contractor
Obligations
(in mil ions)

Brookhaven National Laboratory
R&D Laboratory
Brookhaven Science
$479.73
Associates, LLC

Fermi National Accelerator
R&D Laboratory
Fermi Research Al iance, LLC
$315.89
Laboratory

Idaho National Laboratory
R&D Laboratory
Battel e Energy Al iance, LLC
$2,140.63

Lawrence Berkeley National
R&D Laboratory
University of California
$757.03
Laboratory

Lawrence Livermore National
R&D Laboratory
Lawrence Livermore National
$1,049.43
Laboratory
Security, LLC

Los Alamos National Laboratory
R&D Laboratory
Triad National Security, LLC
$845.66

National Renewable Energy
R&D Laboratory
Al iance for Sustainable
$347.38
Laboratory
Energy, LLC

Oak Ridge National Laboratory
R&D Laboratory
UT-Battel e, LLC
$1,073.09

Pacific Northwest National
R&D Laboratory
Battel e Memorial Institute
$413.90
Laboratory

Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory
R&D Laboratory
Princeton University
$127.71

Sandia National Laboratories
R&D Laboratory
National Technology and
$1,515.40
Engineering Solutions of
Sandia, LLC

Savannah River National Laboratory
R&D Laboratory
Savannah River Nuclear
$34.21
Solutions, LLC

SLAC National Accelerator
R&D Laboratory
Stanford University
$274.28
Laboratory

Thomas Jefferson National
R&D Laboratory
Jefferson Science Associates,
$131.52
Accelerator Facility
LLC
Department of Health and Human
CMS Al iance to Modernize
Study and Analysis
MITRE Corp.
<$0.05
Services
Healthcare
Center
CRS-22

FY2019 Federal R&D
Sponsoring Agency
Name of FFRDC
Activity Type
Contractor
Obligations
(in mil ions)

Frederick National Laboratory for
R&D Laboratory
Leidos Biomedical Research,
$492.26
Cancer Research
Inc.
Department of Homeland Security
Homeland Security Operational
Study and Analysis
RAND Corp.
$6.25
Analysis Center
Center

Homeland Security Systems
Systems Engineering
MITRE Corp.
$21.73
Engineering and Development
and Integration
Institute
Center

National Biodefense Analysis and
Study and Analysis
Battel e National Biodefense
$17.51
Countermeasures Center
Center
Institute
Department of Transportation
Center for Advanced Aviation System R&D Laboratory
MITRE Corp.
$96.96
Development
Department of the Treasury,
Center for Enterprise Modernization
Systems Engineering
MITRE Corp.
$138.39
Department of Veterans Affairs, and
and Integration
the Social Security Administration
Center
National Aeronautics and Space
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
R&D Laboratory
California Institute of
$2,315.34
Administration
Technology
National Institute of Standards and
National Cybersecurity Center of
Systems Engineering
MITRE Corp.
$18.95
Technology
Excel ence
and Integration
Center
National Science Foundation
Green Bank Observatory
R&D Laboratory
Associated Universities, Inc.
a

National Center for Atmospheric
R&D Laboratory
University Corporation for
$176.29
Research
Atmospheric Research

National Optical Astronomy
R&D Laboratory
Association of Universities for
$29.16
Observatory
Research in Astronomy, Inc.
CRS-23

FY2019 Federal R&D
Sponsoring Agency
Name of FFRDC
Activity Type
Contractor
Obligations
(in mil ions)

National Radio Astronomy
R&D Laboratory
Associated Universities, Inc.
$105.30
Observatory

National Solar Observatory
R&D Laboratory
Association of Universities for
Research in Astronomy, Inc.
$16.39

Science and Technology Policy
Study and Analysis
Institute for Defense Analyses
$7.22
Institute
Center
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Center for Nuclear Waste
Study and Analysis
Southwest Research Institute
Regulatory Analyses
Center
$5.30
Source: National Science Foundation, Master List of Federal y Funded R&D Centers, at http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/ffrdclist/ and CRS analysis of data from National Science
Foundation, Survey of Federal Funds for Research and Development, Fiscal Years 2019–20, Table 13, https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsf21329.
a. The Green Bank Observatory was added to the Master List of Federal y Funded R&D Centers in 2021 and is not included in the Survey of Federal Funds for Research and
Development, Fiscal Years 2019–20.

CRS-24

Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs)

Appendix B. Number of FFRDCs, FY1967–FY2021
Figure B-1. Number of FFRDCs by Fiscal Year, 1967-2021

Source: CRS generated figure. Data from U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, A History of the
Department of Defense Federal y Funded Research and Development Centers, OTA-BP-ISS-157 (Washington,
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1995), pp. 51-52; and National Science Foundation, Master List of
Federal y Funded R&D Centers, at http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/ffrdclist/.

Author Information

Marcy E. Gallo

Analyst in Science and Technology Policy

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should n ot be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

Congressional Research Service
R44629 · VERSION 7 · UPDATED
25

Download PDF

Download EPUB

Revision History

Aug. 27, 2021

HTML · PDF

Apr. 3, 2020

HTML · PDF

12% changed

Dec. 1, 2017

HTML · PDF

2% changed

Sep. 6, 2016