International Economic Policy Coordination at the G-7 and the G-20

December 9, 2009 – October 14, 2020 R40977

International Economic Policy Coordination at
the G-7 and the G-20
Updated October 14, 2020
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R40977

The G-20 and International Economic Cooperation

Summary
The Group of Seven (G-7) and the Group of Twenty (G-20) are informal forums for advancing
international economic cooperation and coordination among countries. The G-7 dates back to the
1970s and is a small group of industrialized democracies, including Canada, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The G-20 rose to prominence during the
global financial crisis in 2008-2009 and is a broader group including the G-7 countries as well as
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, Saudi
Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, and the European Union (EU).
The G-7 and G-20 leaders generally meet annually at summits, and lower-level officials meet
throughout the year. The meetings generally focus on international economic and financial issues,
although over time the scope of the meetings have expanded to include a broad range of foreign
policy issues, including food security, climate change, and women’s empowerment, among
others.
Recent Policy Issues
 Changing U.S. role: While the United States has traditionally played a leadership role in
forging consensus at the G-7 and the G-20, the Trump Administration has clashed with other
members in the forums, particularly over trade and climate change. There is debate over
whether the Trump Administration’s approach undermines U.S. leadership in the global
economy, the divisions are overblown, or the Administration is delivering on its “America
First” campaign pledges.
 COVID-19 pandemic: In 2020, the G-7 and the G-20 have focused on coordinating the
global response to the COVID-19 pandemic, with several emergency virtual meetings
convened. The G-7 has pledged to do “whatever it takes” and the G-20 agreed to temporary
debt relief measures for low-income countries.
 Saudi Arabia & the G-20 summit: Chairing the G-20 for the first time, Saudi Arabia is
holding the November 21-22 summit virtually due to pandemic-health related concerns.
Some analysts concerned about Saudi Arabia’s human rights practices have called for a
boycott of the summit, although such proposals have not gained traction.
 G-7 summit logistics: The United States is chairing the G-7 in 2020. After the Trump
Administration faced pushback about its initial plan to host the summit at the Trump National
Doral Miami, the Administration switched the summit site to Camp David. Due to the
pandemic, however, the summit, originally scheduled for June, has been postponed until
November.
 Proposals to expand the G-7 membership: The Trump Administration has proposed adding
Australia, India, South Korea, and Russia to form the G-11. Expanding the G-7 requires
unanimous consent among members, but other countries in particular are opposed to re-
admitting Russia while it still occupies Crimea.
Role of Congress
Congress can exercise oversight over the Administration’s participation in the G-7 and G-20
through legislation, hearings, and reporting requirements. In the 116th Congress, a range of bills
were introduced pertaining to the G-7 and the G-20, including bills to prohibit the use of federal
funds for any purpose relating to the 2020 G-7 summit and the Trump National Doral Miami
(H.R. 4744; S. 2654); prohibit the authorization of federal funds to facilitate Russian participation
in the G-7 (H.R. 4721); and support U.S. leadership at the G-7 and G-20 in responding to the
COVID-19 pandemic (S. 3669).
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International Economic Policy Coordination at the G-7 and the G-20

Introduction
The Group of 7 (G-7) and Group of 20 (G-20)
are forums for international economic and
Figure 1. G-7 and G-20 Members
foreign policy coordination. The G-7 and
G-20 both hold annual meetings among
country leaders (“summits”), as well as
meetings among lower-level officials
throughout the year. The G-7 traces its roots
to the 1970s, and is a small group of
developed, industrialized democracies:
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
United Kingdom, and the United States
(Figure 1).
The G-20 is a larger and more diverse group
of developed and emerging-market
economies. The G-20 includes the G-7
members and Argentina, Australia, Brazil,
China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia,
Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea,
Turkey, and the European Union (EU)
(Figure 1). The finance ministers and central
bank governors from the G-20 countries

began meeting in 1999. The G-20 rose to
Source: Figure created by CRS.
prominence during the global financial crisis
of 2008-2009, when G-20 leaders began meeting. Today, the G-7 and the G-20 processes continue
in parallel.
The forums began convening to coordinate international economic policies, but discussions have
broadened over the years to include a range of foreign policy issues. The United States has
traditionally been a leader in the G-7 and the G-20, but President Trump’s positions on trade and
climate change have created unusual divisions between the United States and some other G-7 and
G-20 members.
The chair of the G-7 and the G-20 rotates on an annual basis. The United States is chairing the
G-7 in 2020. The annual summit, originally scheduled for June, has been postponed due to the
COVID-19 pandemic. Saudi Arabia is chairing the G-20 for the first time, and the summit
scheduled for November 21-22 will now be held virtually. Several human rights groups and
analysts have raised concerns about Saudi Arabia’s chairmanship given Saudi Crown Prince
Mohammed bin Salman’s leadership of the Saudi war effort in Yemen and repression of domestic
dissent.1 Both the G-7 and the G-20 have convened emergency virtual meetings in 2020 among
cabinet-level officials to discuss and coordinate the response to the pandemic.
Congress exercises oversight over the Administration’s participation in the G-7 and the G-20,
including the policy commitments that the Administration is making and the policies it is
encouraging other members to pursue. Additionally, legislative action may be required to

1 For example, see Jackson Diehl, “G-20 Leaders, Don’t Forget the Women’s Rights Advocates Rotting in Saudi
Prisons,” Washington Post, September 13, 2020; Patrick Wintour, “G20 Leaders Urged to Act over Saudi Detentions as
Summit Approaches,” Guardian, September 14, 2020; Amnesty International, “Saudi Arabia: G20 Leaders Must
Address Dire Human Rights Record as the Kingdom Takes over Presidency,” November 29, 2019.
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implement certain commitments made by the Administration in the G-7 and G-20 processes. The
G-7 and the G-20 also hold annual meetings among the members’ parliamentary speakers, which
provides another avenue for Congress to weigh in on G-7 and G-20 issues.
This report analyzes the historical origins of the G-7 and the G-20; how the forums operate; major
recent developments pertaining to the G-7 and the G-20; and debates about their effectiveness as
forums for economic cooperation and coordination.
Development and Evolution of the G-7 and the G-20
Since World War II, governments have created and used formal international institutions and
more informal forums to discuss and coordinate economic policies. Countries want to coordinate
policies to avoid unilateral “beggar-thy-neighbor” policies—policies intended to benefit the
country enacting the policy at the expense of its neighbors or trade partners. Beggar-thy-neighbor
policies, including competitive devaluations and protectionist trade policies, were prevalent
during the interwar period, and led to the Great Depression. Additionally, some economies
policies, such as fiscal stimulus, are more effective when countries implement them
simultaneously. As economic integration has increased over the past several decades,
international economic policy coordination has become even more active and significant.
Governments use a mix of formal international institutions and international economic forums to
coordinate economic policies. Formal institutions, including the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the World Bank,
and the World Trade Organization (WTO), are typically formed by an official international
agreement and have a permanent office with staff performing ongoing tasks.2 Governments have
also relied on more informal forums for economic discussions, including the G-7 and the G-20 as
well as the Paris Club, a group of donor countries that negotiate debt relief for developing
countries.3 These economic forums do not have formal rules or a permanent staff. The roots of the
G-7 trace back to the 1970s; the G-20 rose in prominence during the global financial crisis of
2008-2009.
1970s-1990s: Advanced Economies Dominate Financial Discussions
In the mid-1970s, leaders from a group of five developed countries—France, Germany, Japan, the
United Kingdom, and the United States—began meeting annually to discuss international
economic challenges, including the oil shocks and the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of
fixed exchange rates. This group, called the Group of Five (G-5) was broadened to include
Canada and Italy, and the G-7 formally superseded the G-5 in the mid-1980s. The G-7 focused on
macroeconomic policies, including exchange rates, balance of payments, globalization, trade, and
economic relations with developing countries. Meetings among finance ministers and central
bank governors typically preceded the annual summits.

2 For more information about formal international institutions, see, for example, CRS Report R42019, The
International Monetary Fund, by Martin A. Weiss; CRS Report R41170, Multilateral Development Banks: Overview
and Issues for Congress, by Rebecca M. Nelson; and CRS Report R45417, World Trade Organization: Overview and
Future Direction, coordinated by Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs.
3 The Paris Club is an informal group of developed countries. It negotiates financial services such as debt restructuring
and debt relief to indebted developing countries. For more information, see CRS Report RS21482, The Paris Club and
International Debt Relief, by Martin A. Weiss.
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Over time, the G-7’s focus on macroeconomic policies expanded to include a variety of other
global and transnational issues, including the environment, crime, drugs, AIDS, and terrorism. In
1998, Russia joined, creating the Group of Eight (G-8).4 Russia’s participation focused on foreign
policy issues; it did not usually participate in discussions on international economic policy, which
continued to occur mainly at the G-7 level.
1990s-2008: Emerging Economies Gain Greater Influence
Although emerging economies became more active in the international economy, particularly in
financial markets, starting in the early 1990s, this was not reflected in the international financial
architecture until the Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998. The Asian financial crisis demonstrated
that problems in the financial markets of emerging-market countries can have spillover effects on
financial markets in developed countries, suggesting emerging markets are too important to
exclude from discussions on economic and financial issues. The G-20 was established in late
1999 as a permanent international economic forum for encouraging coordination between
advanced and emerging economies. However, the G-20 was a secondary forum to the G-7/G-8;
the highest level G-20 officials meeting were
the finance ministers and central bank
governors, while the G-8 convened meetings
Figure 2. G-7 and Emerging-Markets:
at the leader-level.
Weight in the Global Economy
Emerging markets continued to grow,
accounting for a larger share of global
economic output, while the G-7’s share
dropped (Figure 2). Emerging markets were
granted more sway in international economic
discussions when the G-8 partly opened its
door to them in 2005.5 The United Kingdom’s
Prime Minister Tony Blair invited five
emerging economies—China, Brazil, India,
Mexico, and South Africa—to participate in
G-8 discussions but not as full participants
(the “G-8 +5”). The presence of emerging-

market countries gave them some input in the
Source: Figure created by CRS using data from the
meetings but they were clearly not treated as
World Bank, World Development Indicators,
full G-8 members. Brazil’s finance minister
October 1, 2020.
reportedly complained that developing nations were invited to G-8 meetings “only to take part in
the coffee breaks.”6

4 While the EU is not an official member of the G-7 or G-8, the EU has participated in meetings since 1977. The EU is
represented by the president of the European Commission and the president of the European Council. The EU does not
hold leadership positions within the G-8 or host summits.
5 Emerging markets had been sporadically invited to a few G-8 summit dinners and events as early as 1989, but their
participation was very minor compared to 2005 onward. See Peter I. Hajnal, The G8 System and the G20 (Ashgate,
2007), pp. 47-49.
6 Jonathan Wheatley, “G20 Calls for Expanded Role to Combat Economic Turmoil,” Financial Times, November 10,
2009.
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2008-Present: Emerging Economies Get a Seat at the Table
It is only with the outbreak of the global financial crisis in the fall of 2008 that emerging markets
were invited as full participants to international economic discussions at the highest (leader) level.
The G-20 leaders convened for the first time in Washington, DC in November 2008. At the third
G-20 summit, held in September 2009 in Pittsburgh, PA, the G-20 leaders decided that going
forward, the G-20 would be the “premier” form for international economic cooperation,
supplanting the G-7’s implicit role as such.
There are different explanations for why the shift from the G-7 to the G-20 occurred. Some
emphasize recognition by the leaders of developed countries that emerging markets have become
sizable players in the international economy and are simply “too important to bar from the
room.”7 Others suggest that the transition from the G-7 to the G-20 was driven by the negotiating
strategies of European and U.S. leaders. It is reported that France’s president, Nicolas Sarkozy,
and Britain’s prime minister, Gordon Brown, pushed for a G-20 summit, rather than a G-8
summit, to discuss the economic crisis in order to dilute perceived U.S. dominance over the
forum, as well as to “show up America and strut their stuff on the international stage.”8 Likewise,
it is reported that President George W. Bush also preferred a G-20 summit in order to balance the
strong European presence in the G-8 meetings.9
The G-20 initially focused on coordinating responses to the global financial crisis, but the group
has taken on a number of issues over the past decade, including women empowerment,
digitization and data flows, infrastructure, combatting terrorist financing and corruption, and the
migration crisis, among other issues.
Even with the elevation of the G-20 as the premier forum for international economic cooperation,
the G-7/G-8 has continued its separate track
of policy discussions and coordination. Its
Figure 3. G-7 and G-20 Snapshot
staying power has been attributed to
diplomatic inertia, easier ability to reach
consensus, a loss of the G-20’s momentum
after the global financial crisis, and more
like-minded economic governance and
economies.10 Following Russia’s illegal
annexation of the Crimean region of Ukraine
in 2014, the G-7 leaders disinvited Russia
and the group reverted to the G-7.
Today, the G-20 accounts for almost 85% of
global GDP, about 70% of global exports,

and about 60% of the global population; the
Source: Figure created by CRS using data from the
G-7 in contrast accounts for less than half of
World Bank, World Development Indicators,
the global GDP, about a third of global
accessed October 1, 2020.
exports, and 10% of the global population (Figure 3).

7 “After the Fall,” The Economist, November 15, 2009.
8 “Not a Bad Weekend’s Work,” The Economist, November 16, 2008.
9 Ibid.
10 Mark Sobel and Matthew P. Goodman, “G7 Needs the Right Kind of Reset,” Center for Strategic and International
Studies, June 12, 2020.
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G-7 and G-20 Operations
Frequency of Meetings
The G-7 and G-20 meetings among heads of state, or “summits,” are the focal points of the
discussions. G-7 and G-20 summits are generally held annually. Various lower-level officials
meet frequently before the summits to begin negotiations and after the summits to discuss the
logistical and technical details of implementing the agreements announced at the summits. In
particular, the finance ministers and central bank governors meet multiple times per year, and
foreign affairs ministers generally meet once per year. Other G-7 and G-20 cabinet-level officials
convene regularly at the request of country leaders but not always on an annual basis. For
example, meetings have occurred among G-7 and/or G-20 ministers responsible for agriculture,
education, energy, environment, health, labor and employment, digitalization, tourism,
transportation, and trade. There are also meetings among the leaders’ personal representatives,
known as “sherpas.”11 The G-7 and G-20 also hold annual Parliamentary Speakers’ Summits as
part of wider efforts to bring a parliamentary dimension to global governance. The G-20 chair
also at times convenes meetings among businesses, think tanks, and civil society groups from the
member countries to gain their perspectives inform the G-20 work.
Overall, the G-7 and G-20 process has led to the creation of a complex set of interactions among
many different levels of government officials. Some argue that the high frequency of interactions
is conducive to forming open communication channels, while others argue that the G-7 and G-20
processes have created undue administrative burden on the national agencies tasked with
implementing and managing their countries’ participation in multilateral forums.
U.S. Representation
Within the U.S. government, the Department of the Treasury is the lead agency in coordinating
U.S. participation in the G-7 and G-20 processes. However, the G-7 and G-20 works on a variety
of issues, and the Department of the Treasury works closely with other U.S. agencies, including
the Federal Reserve, the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and
the Department of Energy. The White House, particularly through the National Security Council
and the U.S. Trade Representative, is also heavily involved in the G-7 and G-20 planning process.
Location of Meetings and Attendees
Unlike formal international institutions, such as the United Nations and the World Bank, the G-7
and the G-20 do not have a permanent headquarters or staff. Instead, each year, a member country
serves as the chair. The chair hosts the meetings and shapes the year’s agenda. The chair also
establishes a temporary office that is responsible for the group’s secretarial, clerical, and
administrative affairs, known as the temporary “secretariat.” The secretariat also coordinates the
various meetings for the duration of its term as chair and typically posts details about the
meetings and work programs on the forum’s website.
The chair rotates among members and is selected from a different region each year (Figure 4).
The United States has never officially chaired the G-20, although the United States did host G-20

11 The term “sherpa” is a play on words. Typically, sherpas refer to local people, typically men, in Nepal who are
employed as guides for mountaineering expeditions in the Himalayas. Recall that meetings held among leaders are
referred to “summits,” which also refers to the highest point of a mountain.
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summits in 2008 and 2009 during the height of the global financial crisis. In 2021, the United
Kingdom will chair the G-7 and Italy will chair the G-20.
Figure 4. Chairs of the G-7 and the G-20

Source: Figure created by CRS using data from the University of Toronto’s G7 and G20 Information Centres.
In addition to the formal G-7 and G-20 members, some countries attended the G-20 summits at
the invitation of the chair. Several regional organizations and international organizations also
regularly attend the summits. For example, four countries, nine international organizations, and
six regional organizations are expected to participate in the G-20 summit in 2020.12 Since the
1980s, the EU has been represented in all G-7 working sessions, even though it is not a formal
member and does not assume the rotating G-7 chair.13
Agreements
All agreements, comments, recommendations, and policy reforms reached by the G-7 and G-20
ministers, central bankers, and leaders are done so by consensus. There is no formal voting
system as in some other international organizations, like the IMF or the World Bank. Participation
in the G-20 meetings is restricted to members and invited participants and is not open to the
public. After each meeting, however, the group publishes the agreements reached among
members, typically as communiqués or declarations.14 The forums do not have a way to enforce
implementation of the agreements at the national level beyond moral suasion; the G-7 and G-20

12 The invited countries include Jordan Singapore, Spain, and Switzerland. The invited international organizations
include the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the Financial Stability Board (FSB), the International Labour
Organization (ILO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), the United Nations, the World Bank Group, the World Health Organization, and the World
Trade Organization. The invited regional organizations include the Arab Monetary Fund, Islamic Development Bank,
the Chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Chair of the African Union (AU), the Chair of
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and the Chair of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD).
13 European Commission, “Role of the G7,” accessed on September 22, 2020.
14 The G-20 communiqués are posted online at http://www.g20.org/pub_communiques.aspx.
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do not have a formal enforcement mechanism and the commitments are nonbinding. This
contrasts with the World Trade Organization (WTO), for example, which does have formal
enforcement mechanisms in place. Major outcomes from the 2019 summits are highlighted in the
textbox below.
Major Outcomes from the 2019 Summits (Selected)

G-7 Summit, Biarritz, France, August 26, 201915

Trade: The G-7 reiterated commitments to open and fair world trade, and an overhaul of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) with regard to intellectual property protection, dispute settlement, and
unfair trade practices.

Iran, Libya, and Hong Kong: Agreed to ensure Iran never acquires nuclear weapons, supported a
truce in Libya to lead to a long-term ceasefire; reaffirmed the existence and importance of the Sino-
British Joint Declaration of 1984 on Hong Kong (which stipulates the sovereign and administrative
arrangement of Hong Kong after 1997).

Inequality and Climate Change: The Chair issued statements on G-7 discussions about inequality as a
“significant challenge” to global stability and prosperity, as well as on discussions pertaining to climate
change and the oceans.

Digital Issues: The G-7 plus Australia, Chile, India, and South Africa made a number of commitments
related to digital issues, including rights of freedom of opinion, respect for cross-border data legal
frameworks, and to reinforce democracies against cyber threats from foreign hostile interference.

G-20 Summit, Osaka, Japan, June 28-29, 201916

Global Economy: The G-20 reaffirmed their commitment to use “all policy tools” to achieve strong,
sustainable, balanced, and inclusive growth. The G-20 leaders also noted population aging as a policy
issue that wil require a number of economic policy actions.

Fostering Robust Global Economic Growth: The G-20 committed to open markets, rapid resolution
on excess steel capacity issues, continue efforts underway to address cross-border data flow issues,
pursue “quality” infrastructure, strengthen global financial safety nets, and advance debt transparency by
both borrowing countries and creditor countries.

Anti-corruption: The G-20 committed to continue implementing the G-20 “Anti-Corruption Action
Plan 2019-2021,” and intensify efforts to combat foreign bribery, including national laws in all G-20
countries for criminalizing foreign bribery.

Addressing Inequalities: The G-20 recognized the importance of promoting a healthy and active ageing
society that enables workers to participate in the labor market at older ages, while continuing to
increase participation of youth, women, and persons with disabilities in economic activities. The
countries also reconfirmed their commitments to reducing the gender labor force participation gap by
2025.

Realizing an Inclusive and Sustainable World: The G-20 members remained resolved to playing a
leading role in the timely implementation of the U.N. sustainable development goals and replenishing
resources at the International Development Association (part of the World Bank) and the African
Development Fund. They reiterated their commitment to moving towards achieving universal health
coverage “according to national contexts and priorities” and improving public health preparedness and
response. The statement reflected the division between the United States and the other G-20 members
of the Paris Agreement on climate change (the Trump Administration announced U.S. withdrawal from
the agreement in 2017). The G-20 also emphasized the importance of shared actions to address the
root causes of the migration crisis and response to growing humanitarian needs.

15 The G-7 leaders’ statement from 2019 is available at http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2019biarritz/declaration-of-
leaders.html.
16 The G-20 leaders’ statement from 2019 is available at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2019/2019-g20-osaka-leaders-
declaration.html.
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Recent Policy Issues and Debates
The G-7 and G-20 have featured prominently in recent policy debates, including the reorientation
of U.S. foreign policy under the Trump Administration, the global response to the COVID-19
pandemic, human rights concerns about Saudi Arabia, conflict-of-interest controversies within the
U.S. government, and whether the membership of the G-7 needs to be expanded. These issues are
discussed in more detail below.
Changing U.S. Role under the Trump Administration
U.S. participation in the G-7 and the G-20 has shifted dramatically under President Trump. The
United States has traditionally been a leader seeking consensus at the G-7 and G-20, but the
Trump Administration has clashed with other members in key policy discussions, particularly the
G-7 and G-20’s traditional support for free trade and efforts to combat climate change. The
Trump Administration’s trade policies, such as withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP) and application of steel and aluminum tariffs for national security reasons, and climate
changes policies, including the withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on climate change, put it at
odds with other G-7 and G-20 members.
In 2018, President Trump withdrew his initial support for the eight-page G-7 communiqué that
had been negotiated in the weeks leading up to the summit, an unprecedented action in the
forum’s four decade history. Also in 2018, the G-20 communiqué reflected the differing views on
climate change between the United States and the other 19 members. The clear statement of
division among members was unprecedented in a G-20 communiqué. Many analysts now refer to
the forums as the “G-6+1” and the “G-19+1” to underscore the divisions between the United
States and other member countries.17
The deep divisions between the United States and the other G-7 and G-20 countries contribute to
questions about U.S. world leadership under the Trump Administration. Since World War II, the
United States, working with allies, has developed and promoted an open and rules-based
international order. President Trump campaigned on an “America First” platform and has pursued
significant changes in U.S. foreign and trade policy. Directly challenging other members,
including those that are western, capitalist democracies and longstanding key U.S. allies, appears
to be part of that shift from the principles governing U.S. foreign policy over the past several
decades. It may also represent a transition in the U.S. role at international forums, from one of
building consensus to confrontation. Key Trump Administration advisors and supporters have
argued that the differences between the United States and other countries are overblown, and that
President Trump is pursuing foreign policies consistent with his campaign pledges.18

17 For example, see Steward M. Patrick, “The Ugly American: Trump Attends the G6+1 Summit,” Council on Foreign
Relations, June 8, 2018; Sam Fleming, Jim Pickard, Chris Giles, and Michael Peel, “G7 Left Reeling after Trump’s
Last-Minute Reversal,” Financial Times, June 10, 2018; Demetri Sevastopulo and Stefan Wagstyl, “G20 Allies Learn
to Work with, and around, Donald Trump,” Financial Times, July 9, 2017; and Hung Tran, “The G20 Turns into the
G19+1,” Atlantic Council, July 2, 2019.
18 Gary D. Cohn and H.R. McMaster, “The Trump Vision for America Abroad,” New York Times, July 13, 2017 and
Kyle Feldscher, “Washington Examiner, July 9, 2017 and Kyle Feldscher, “Newt Gingrich: ‘G-19’ Criticism of
Trump’s Foreign Policy is a ‘Good Thing’,” Washington Examiner, July 9, 2017.
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Coordinating the Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic
The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 was a complex and devastating shock to the
global economy. Combatting the pandemic required shutting down large portions of the economy.
It roiled stock markets, upended oil and other commodity markets, created mass unemployment,
disrupted trade, resulted in shortages of food and medical supplies, and threatened the solvency of
businesses and governments around the world. In April 2020, the IMF cautioned that COVID-19
will likely be the worst recession since the Great Depression, far worse than the recession
following the global financial crisis of 2008-2009.19
Early in the pandemic, governments were divided over the appropriate response and in some
cases acted unilaterally, particularly when closing borders and imposing export restrictions on
medical equipment and medicine. An emergency, virtual meeting of G-7 finance ministers on
March 3, 2020, fell short of the aggressive and concrete coordinated action that investors and
economists had been hoping for, and U.S. and European stock markets fell sharply after the
meeting.20 However, on March 16, 2020, the leaders of the G-7 countries held an emergency
summit by teleconference to discuss and coordinate their policy responses to the economic fallout
from the global spread of COVID-19. In the joint statement released by the G-7 leaders after the
emergency teleconference summit, the leaders stressed they are committed to doing “whatever is
necessary to ensure a strong global response through closer cooperation and enhanced
cooperation of efforts.”21 The countries pledged to coordinate research efforts, increase the
availability of medical equipment; mobilize “the full range” of policy instruments, including
monetary and fiscal measures, as well as targeted actions, to support workers, companies, and
sectors most affected by the spread of COVID-19; task the finance ministers to coordinate on a
weekly basis, and direct the IMF and the World Bank Group, as well as other international
organizations, to support countries worldwide as part of a coordinated global response.22
G-7 coordination has not been unproblematic however, including disagreement among G-7
foreign affairs ministers about how to refer to the virus (coronavirus or the “Wuhan virus”) and
concerns about collaboration on vaccine research.23 The G-7 summit for 2020, originally
scheduled for June, has been postponed until after the U.S. presidential election in November.
The G-20 was slower to respond to the pandemic. Even though G-20 coordination is widely
viewed as having been critical in the response to the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, several
factors may have complicated current G-20 coordination: the Trump Administration’s
prioritization of an “America First” foreign policy over one committed to multilateralism; the
2020 chair of the G-20, Saudi Arabia, is embroiled in disputes over its human rights practices and
the economic and fiscal fallout of COVID-19 and lower oil prices; and U.S.-China tensions make
G-20 consensus more difficult.24 The G-20 held a summit by teleconference on March 26, 2020,

19 Gita Gopinath, "The Great Lockdown: Worst Economic Downturn since the Great Depression," IMF Blog, April 14,
2020.
20 Jack Ewing and Jeanna Smialek, “Economic Powers Vow to Fight Crisis,” New York Times, March 3, 2020.
21 White House, G-7 Leaders’ Statement, March 16, 2020, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/g7-
leaders-statement/.
22 Ibid.
23 “Pompeo, G-7 Foreign Ministers Spar over ‘Wuhan Virus’,” Politico, March 25, 2020; Katrin Bennhold and David
E. Sanger, “U.S. Offered ‘Large Sum’ to German Company for Access to Coronavirus Vaccine Research, German
Officials Say,” New York Times, March 15, 2020.
24 Matthew Goodman and Mark Sobel, “Time to Pull the G-20 Fire Bell,” Center for Strategic and International
Studies, March 18, 2020.
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but the resulting communique was criticized for failing to include concrete action items beyond
what national governments were already doing.25
G-20 coordination gained momentum in April, most notably with the G-20 agreement on debt
relief for low-income countries. The G-20 finance ministers agreed to suspend debt service
payments for the world’s poorest countries through the end of 2020. The Institute of International
Finance (IIF), which represents 450 banks, hedge funds, and other global financial funds, also
announced that private creditors will join the debt relief effort on a voluntary basis. This debt
standstill will free up more than $20 billion for these countries to spend on improving their health
systems and fighting the pandemic.26 Private sector commitments were critical for official
creditors, so that developing countries could redirect funds to improving health systems rather
than repaying private creditors. However, implementation of the Debt Service Suspension
Initiative (DSSI) has proved complicated. There is debate among creditor governments about
what debts should be included in the standstill, and how it can be enforced. In May, the IIF in a
letter laid out some of the obstacles facing private sector participation, raising questions about
whether private creditors will participate in the debt standstill.27 Reportedly, some African
countries are opting to negotiate debt relief individually with China and other creditor nations
because of concerns they will be blocked from financial markets if they participate in the G-20
debt standstill.28
The health and economic consequences of the pandemic are expected to dominate G-7 and G-20
discussions at least through the end of the 2020, and likely well into 2021. Due to the pandemic,
the United States postponed the G-7 summit from June until November. Saudi Arabia announced
that the G-20 summit on November 21-22 will be held virtually rather than in Riyadh as
originally planned.
In May 2020, Senator Menendez (NJ) introduced legislation in the Senate supporting, among
other initiatives, U.S. leadership in the G-7 and the G-20 in coordinating a comprehensive
response to the pandemic and preventing future waves of the infection (S. 3669).
Concerns about Saudi Arabia Chairing the G-20
Saudi Arabia is hosting the G-20 for the first time in 2020, and several human rights groups and
analysts have raised concerns about Saudi Arabia’s chairmanship, given Saudi Crown Prince
Mohammed bin Salman’s leadership of the Saudi war effort in Yemen and repression of domestic
dissent. A United Nations expert who investigated the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, a U.S.-based
journalist and critic of Saudi Arabia's government who was murdered in the Saudi consulate in
Istanbul in 2018, called on world powers to consider relocating the 2020 summit, or boycott the
summit altogether.29 Some policy analysts also have called on leaders to condition their
participation in the summit on the release of imprisoned women’s rights advocates.30 Some

25 Matthew Goodman, Stephanie Segal, and Mark Sobel, “Assessing the G20 Virtual Summit,” Center for Strategic and
International Studies, March 27, 2020.
26 Davide Barbuscia, Marwa Rashad, and Andrea Shalal, “G20 Countries Agree Debt Freeze for World’s Poorest
Countries,” Reuters, April 15, 2020
27 Patrick Bolton, Lee Buchheit, Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, et al, “Sovereign Debt Standstills: An Update,” VoxEU,
May 28, 2020.
28 Jevans Nyabiage, “All Eyes on China as Africa Spurns G20 Debt Relief Plan,” South China Morning Post, May 26,
2020.
29 “UN Expert Urges World Powers to Reconsider G-20 Riyadh Summit,” Aljazeera, July 3, 2019.
30 Jackson Diehl, “G-20 Leaders, Don’t Forget the Women’s Rights Advocates Rotting in Saudi Prisons,” Washington
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experts have “low expectations” for G-20 commitments on climate change and women’s
empowerment with Saudi Arabia chairing the group, even though these issues have become more
prominent at the G-20 in recent years.31
It is not clear that leaders are planning to boycott or condition their participation in the G-20
summit, but several mayors, including from New York, Los Angeles, Paris, and London,
boycotted Saudi Arabia’s “Urban 20” (U20) summit on September 30-October 2 in solidarity
with political prisoners in Saudi Arabia.32
Debate over the G-7 Summit Location
The G-7 and G-20 host countries select the summit’s location. Usually hosts choose locations that
are remote, scenic, and/or symbolic.33 After considering a number of sites as venues for the 2020
summit, on October 17, 2019 the Trump Administration announced that the summit would be
held at the Trump National Doral Miami. Several U.S. policymakers and watchdog groups raised
concerns about conflicts of interest, because of the president’s opportunity to profit from the
summit.34
On October 18, 2019, Representative Frankel (FL-21) introduced legislation in the House
prohibiting the use of federal funds for any purpose relating to the 2020 G-7 summit and the
Trump National Doral Miami, unless the Secret Service certifies to Congress that such an
expenditure is necessary to provide required protection (H.R. 4744). Senator Blumenthal (CT)
introduced a companion bill in the Senate (S. 2654).
On October 20, 2019, President Trump announced that the G-7 summit would instead be held at
Camp David, a retreat in Maryland for use by the President. Presidents have used Camp David to
host other summits; for example, President Obama hosted the G-8 at Camp David in 2012. The
2020 summit has been postponed due to health concerns from the pandemic, as noted above.
With the United States chairing the G-7 in 2020, Speaker Pelosi (CA-12) hosted the G-7
parliamentary session virtually on October 12, 2020.35
Proposals to Expand the G-7 Membership
Russia was excluded from the G-8 following its illegal annexation of the Crimean region of
Ukraine. President Trump has called for Russia to be readmitted to the G-7 even though Russia
still occupies Crimea. Many Members of Congress and other G-7 countries oppose re-inviting
Russia to the G-7.36 In October 2019, Representative Hill (CA-25) introduced legislation in the

Post, September 13, 2020.
31 Matt Goodman, “Parsing the Osaka G20 Communiqué,” CSIS, July 3, 2019.
32 Patrick Wintour, “Sadiq Khan Refuses to Attend City Mayors’ Summit in Saudi Arabia,” The Guardian, September
30, 2020.
33 For example, see Siobhán O’Grady and Miriam Berger, “Trump Will Host the G-7 Summit at his Own Hotel. Here’s
How Other Countries Decide Where to Host It,” Washington Post, October 17, 2019.
34 For example, see Maggie Haberman, Eric Lipton, and Katie Rogers, “Why Trump Dropped His Own Idea to Hold
the G7 at His Own Hotel,” New York Times, October 20, 2019.
35 “Pelosi Opening Remarks at Virtual G7 Speakers’ Meeting Today ‘Addressing the Climate Crisis with Economic
and Environmental Justice for All’,” September 12, 2020, https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/91220.
36 For example, see Felicia Sonmez, “Trump Renews Call for Russia to be Readmitted to G-7,” Washington Post,
August 20, 2019; Jordain Carney, “McConnell: Russia Should not be Admitted to G-7,” The Hill, June 30, 2020;
Juliegrace Brufke, “House Passes Resolution Disapproving of Russia being Included in Future G7 Summits,” The Hill,
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House that would prohibit the authorization of Federal funds to facilitate Russian participation
any G-7 or reconstituted G-8 meetings (H.R. 4721).
In May 2020, President Trump called the G-7 an “outdated” group of countries, and suggested
that a larger grouping including Australia, India, South Korea, and Russia would serve as a
stronger alliance to counter China.37 The G-7 host country can invite other leaders to attend the
meetings, but formal membership must be approved by the group. Several G-7 countries continue
to oppose re-inviting Russia into the group and it is not clear there is traction on otherwise
expanding the group.38
Role of Congress and Potential Policy Questions
Although U.S. participation in the G-7 and G-20 is conducted through the Administration and the
Executive branch, Congress can exercise oversight of U.S. participation through legislation,
hearings, reporting requirements, and public statements. Members of Congress can also issue
public statements to articulate their policy differences with Administration policies and priorities
advanced at the G-7 and the G-20.
Congress has used a mix of these oversight tools in relation to the G-7 and the G-20 to varying
degrees. Members in the 116th Congress have introduced a number of bills relating to the G-7 and
G-20. Some Members of Congress have also issued public statements that rebut the Trump
Administration’s policies articulated at these international forums.39 Hearings specifically on the
G-7 and G-20 have been more infrequent; the last such hearing was held by the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee in November 2009 (“The U.S. and the G-20: Remaking the International
Economic Architecture” with then-Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner). The G-7 and G-20
parliamentary speakers’ summits are also opportunities for Congress to weigh in on G-7 and G-20
issues.
Policy questions about the G-7 and the G-20 that Congress may want to consider include:
 In 2009, leaders announced that the G-20 would be the premiere forum for
economic cooperation. However, the G-7 has continued to meet during the
following decade and was quicker to mobilize in response to the COVID-19
pandemic than the G-20. Is the G-20 still considered the premier forum for
economic cooperation? Are both forums needed and if so, what should the
division of labor be between the two?
 What is the record on implementation and follow-up on commitments at the G-7
and the G-20?
 The policy issues discussed at both the G-7 and the G-20 have expanded over the
years. Does the inclusion of a broad range of issues dilute meaningful discussion
and commitments, or does it enable negotiations and trade-offs to be made that
would be otherwise infeasible in more narrow discussions?

December 3, 2019; “G7 Leaders Reject Russia’s Return after Trump Summit Invite,” BBC, June 2, 2020; “Germany
Rejects Trump’s Call to Re-admit Russia to the G7,” Business Insider, July 27, 2020.
37 Maggie Haberman, “Trump Postpones G7 Summit and Calls for Russia to Attend,” New York Times, May 30, 2020.
38 “Donald Trump is Right that The G7 Needs Updating. But What For?,” Economist, June 4, 2020.
39 For example, Senators McCain and Flake issued statements on Twitter articulating differences with the Trump
Administration’s policy priorities and approaches at the G-7 summit in June 2017,
https://twitter.com/senjohnmccain/status/1005614491768360960?lang=en and
https://twitter.com/jeffflake/status/1005886122440970242?lang=en.
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 Is coordination on some issues, such as monetary policy conducted largely by
independent central bankers, easier and/or more effective than other issues, such
as fiscal policies that must be approved by national legislatures? If so, should
such considerations shape the focus of G-7 and G-20 discussions?
 Is the composition of the G-7 outdated, as suggested by President Trump? Would
expanding the G-7 create a more effective forum, or would it be more difficult to
reach consensus in a larger group?
 G-7 and G-20 leaders meet annually but a broad range of lower-level officials
meet throughout the year. Are meetings throughout the year helpful for
facilitating global dialogue, or do they place undue administrative burdens on a
range of federal agencies? Do federal agencies need more resources to facilitate
their preparations for and participation in G-7 and G-20 meetings?
 With summit agendas shifting from one year to the next depending on the host
country and current events, is there sufficient follow-through from one G-7 or
G-20 summit to the next? Are countries effectively held accountable through peer
pressure to implement their G-7 and G-20 commitments?
 Does the Trump Administration’s approach at the G-7 and G-20 help further U.S.
interests by pushing for debate and discussions, or does it harm U.S. interests by
alienating historically-key U.S. allies?
 What more could or should the G-7 and G-20 be doing to encourage economic
recovery amidst the global pandemic?
 Is it appropriate for the United States or other countries to boycott or condition
their participation in international meetings on policy changes in the host country
and if so, under what circumstances?
 When the United States chairs the G-7 or G-20, how should meeting sites be
selected?

Author Information

Rebecca M. Nelson

Specialist in International Trade and Finance

.
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Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
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under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
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