 
 
 
 INSIGHTi 
 
 HSA@20 Episode Companion: Cybersecurity 
April 10, 2023 
This Insight accompanies the “Cybersecurity” episode of 
The Homeland Security Act at 20 podcast series 
and includes background information on the issues discussed during the podcast. 
Click thi
s link to ask questions, provide feedback, or offer suggestions for future topics. You can also e-
mail the podcast team at
 HSA20@loc.gov.  Thank you for your engagement.    
Cybersecurity and the Homeland Security Act (HSA) 
Although the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA;
 P.L. 107-296) rearranged some cybersecurity 
functions, substantive changes to cybersecurity began in earnest 2013. 
Phase I: Before 9/11 
  Cybersecurity was on the agenda, but not in the forefront of public debate. 
  Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change: The Phase III Report of the 
U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, informally known as the Hart-
Rudman Report. 
  Senator Domenici’s bill:
 S.1407, the Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001.  
  “Information security” policy development and operations were largely being conducted 
by the Department of Defense in the classified realm, as they had the capability, the 
expertise, the capacity, and the authority to carry it out. 
  Other federal actors included: 
  The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)—the longstanding 
federal authority for computer security; and 
  Law enforcement agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and 
U.S. Secret Service (USSS). 
Phase II: The HSA Moves Some Elements to DHS; Policy Doesn’t Change Much 
  The HSA moved certain components into the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIP) in 2003: 
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  The Federal Computer Incident Response Center from the General Services 
Administration (now the U.S. Computer Emergency Response Team (US-CERT)); 
  The National Communications System from the Department of Defense; 
  The National Infrastructure Protection Center from the FBI; and 
  The Energy Security and Assurance Program from the Department of Energy. 
  Policymaking was characterized by the initial development of coordination mechanisms 
and federal strategies. 
  Cybersecurity was (and still is) seen as a shared responsibility. 
  DHS’s cybersecurity activity focused on existing communication and coordination 
roles, rather than establishing new ones. 
  The first U.S. national cybersecurity strategy was the George W. Bush Administration’s 
National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (February 2003). 
  The HSA’s original cybersecurity provisions are at
 P.L. 107-296, Title II, Subtitle C, 
“Information Security.” 
  USSS authorities for investigating unauthorized access to computers and access device 
fraud (18 U.S.C. §1029(d)) come from the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 
(P.L. 98-473). 
  
Further cybersecurity reorganization in the early years of DHS: 
  IAIP dissolved in a July 2005 reorganization, and many of these functions moved to 
the Directorate for Preparedness.  
  In 2007, the Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act
 (P.L. 109-295, Title 
VI) removed part of the Directorate, returning it to FEMA. 
  A further reorganization created the National Protection and Programs Directorate 
(NPPD), which included the cybersecurity functions. 
Phase III: Congress Establishes New Federal Roles and Resources 
  “Catalytic” cybersecurity events: 
  Heartland Payment Processing data breach (a.k.a. the “Target breach”): Senate 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation March 26, 2014 hearing, 
“Protecting Personal Consumer Information From Cyber Attacks and Data 
Breaches.” 
  North Korean cyber operations:
 DPRK Cyber Threat Advisory (cisa.gov). 
  
Selected evolutionary legislative steps on cybersecurity: 
  
113th Congress:  
  
P.L. 113-282, the “National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014”—National 
Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) authorization in 
NPPD; 
  
P.L. 113-274, the “Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014”—NIST 
Cybersecurity Framework; and 
  
P.L. 113-283, the “Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014”—
first comprehensive “.gov” cybersecurity reform since 2002. 
  
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114th Congress: P.L. 114-113, Division N, the “Cybersecurity Act of 2015”—created 
new information sharing programs at NPPD that operate outside the federal 
government. 
  
115th Congress: P.L 115-454, the “Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency 
Act of 2018”—CISA Authorization. 
  
116th Congress: P.L. 116-283, the “William H. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021”—National Cybersecurity Director authorized 
(Title XVII, §1752), implementing a key recommendation from t
he Cyberspace 
Solarium Commission. 
  
117th Congress:  
  Two supplemental appropriations measures included authorization and funding 
for new initiatives: 
  American Rescue Plan Act
 (ARPA; P.L. 117-2)—included $2 billion for 
federal IT improvements, including $650 million for CISA for cybersecurity 
risk mitigation. 
  Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act 
(IIJA; P.L. 117-58)—included $2 
billion for cybersecurity modernization and resiliency improvements, 
including: 
  $20 million each year from FY2022-FY2026 for the “Cybersecurity 
Response and Recovery Fund”; 
  $1 billion for FEMA grants spread over FY2022-FY2025 for state, local, 
tribal and territorial governments to improve cybersecurity and critical 
infrastructure protection; 
  $250 million for energy sector cybersecurity research and development; 
and 
  $250 million to fund the Rural and Municipal Utility Advanced 
Cybersecurity Grant and Technical Assistance Program. 
  The Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 202
2 (Division Y 
of P.L. 117-103; CIRCIA) directs CISA to issue a regulation requiring covered 
private sector entities to report to the federal government when they experience 
certain cyber incidents.  
Why Total Federal Cybersecurity Spending Cannot Be Tracked  
  Methodologies that assess what does and does not count as “cybersecurity” evolve over 
time. 
  Not all appropriations specify amounts for cybsersecurity spending. 
  Cross-cutting discussion of federal cybersecurity funding is provided in the Analytical 
Perspectives volume of th
e President’s annual budget request.   
  This is primarily an analysis of the funding requested, rather than the funding provided, 
or how prior year appropriations were applied to cybersecurity or information technology. 
  An authoritative top-line total or historical tracking would not be indicative of whether 
the federal government is investing its resources in the right places.
  
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Looking Ahead 
  Congress has recently taken an interest in the interaction and relationship between the 
public and private sectors for cybersecurity. 
  The
 National Cybersecurity Strategy released in March 2023, provides Congress a an 
additional opportunity to focus oversight on the agency activities outlined in the strategy 
and debate legislative options concerning shifts in responsibilities and regulatory 
changes.. 
FOR MORE INFORMATION 
  For more information on cybersecurity issues, see CRS Video WVB00451, 
2022 Issues 
& Policy - The Evolution of Cybersecurity Issues in the 117th Congress, by Chris 
Jaikaran.  
  For more episodes of this podcast series, search “HSA@20” on the CRS website. 
NEXT EPISODE 
After a brief hiatus, new episodes will begin on May 8th. 
Music: Icas, by Audiorezout, as carried o
n freemusicarchive.org, under the terms of its Creative 
Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International license. 
 
Author Information 
 William L. Painter, Coordinator 
  Chris Jaikaran 
Specialist in Homeland Security and Appropriations 
Specialist in Cybersecurity Policy 
 
 
 
 
 
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