HSA@20 Episode Companion: Cybersecurity

HSA@20 Episode Companion: Cybersecurity

INSIGHTi

HSA@20 Episode Companion: Cybersecurity
April 10, 2023
This Insight accompanies the “Cybersecurity” episode of The Homeland Security Act at 20 podcast series
and includes background information on the issues discussed during the podcast.
Click this link to ask questions, provide feedback, or offer suggestions for future topics. You can also e-
mail the podcast team at HSA20@loc.gov. Thank you for your engagement.
Cybersecurity and the Homeland Security Act (HSA)
Although the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA; P.L. 107-296) rearranged some cybersecurity
functions, substantive changes to cybersecurity began in earnest 2013.
Phase I: Before 9/11
 Cybersecurity was on the agenda, but not in the forefront of public debate.
 Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change: The Phase III Report of the
U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, informally known as the Hart-
Rudman Report.
 Senator Domenici’s bill: S.1407, the Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001.
 “Information security” policy development and operations were largely being conducted
by the Department of Defense in the classified realm, as they had the capability, the
expertise, the capacity, and the authority to carry it out.
 Other federal actors included:
 The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)—the longstanding
federal authority for computer security; and
 Law enforcement agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and
U.S. Secret Service (USSS).
Phase II: The HSA Moves Some Elements to DHS; Policy Doesn’t Change Much
 The HSA moved certain components into the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIP) in 2003:
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 The Federal Computer Incident Response Center from the General Services
Administration (now the U.S. Computer Emergency Response Team (US-CERT));
 The National Communications System from the Department of Defense;
 The National Infrastructure Protection Center from the FBI; and
 The Energy Security and Assurance Program from the Department of Energy.
 Policymaking was characterized by the initial development of coordination mechanisms
and federal strategies.
 Cybersecurity was (and still is) seen as a shared responsibility.
 DHS’s cybersecurity activity focused on existing communication and coordination
roles, rather than establishing new ones.
 The first U.S. national cybersecurity strategy was the George W. Bush Administration’s
National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (February 2003).
 The HSA’s original cybersecurity provisions are at P.L. 107-296, Title II, Subtitle C,
“Information Security.”
 USSS authorities for investigating unauthorized access to computers and access device
fraud (18 U.S.C. §1029(d)) come from the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984
(P.L. 98-473).
 Further cybersecurity reorganization in the early years of DHS:
 IAIP dissolved in a July 2005 reorganization, and many of these functions moved to
the Directorate for Preparedness.
 In 2007, the Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (P.L. 109-295, Title
VI) removed part of the Directorate, returning it to FEMA.
 A further reorganization created the National Protection and Programs Directorate
(NPPD), which included the cybersecurity functions.
Phase III: Congress Establishes New Federal Roles and Resources
 “Catalytic” cybersecurity events:
 Heartland Payment Processing data breach (a.k.a. the “Target breach”): Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation March 26, 2014 hearing,
“Protecting Personal Consumer Information From Cyber Attacks and Data
Breaches.”
 North Korean cyber operations: DPRK Cyber Threat Advisory (cisa.gov).
 Selected evolutionary legislative steps on cybersecurity:
 113th Congress:
 P.L. 113-282, the “National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014”—National
Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) authorization in
NPPD;
 P.L. 113-274, the “Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014”—NIST
Cybersecurity Framework; and
 P.L. 113-283, the “Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014”—
first comprehensive “.gov” cybersecurity reform since 2002.

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 114th Congress: P.L. 114-113, Division N, the “Cybersecurity Act of 2015”—created
new information sharing programs at NPPD that operate outside the federal
government.
 115th Congress: P.L 115-454, the “Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
Act of 2018”—CISA Authorization.
 116th Congress: P.L. 116-283, the “William H. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021”—National Cybersecurity Director authorized
(Title XVII, §1752), implementing a key recommendation from the Cyberspace
Solarium Commission.
 117th Congress:
 Two supplemental appropriations measures included authorization and funding
for new initiatives:
 American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA; P.L. 117-2)—included $2 billion for
federal IT improvements, including $650 million for CISA for cybersecurity
risk mitigation.
 Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA; P.L. 117-58)—included $2
billion for cybersecurity modernization and resiliency improvements,
including:
 $20 million each year from FY2022-FY2026 for the “Cybersecurity
Response and Recovery Fund”;
 $1 billion for FEMA grants spread over FY2022-FY2025 for state, local,
tribal and territorial governments to improve cybersecurity and critical
infrastructure protection;
 $250 million for energy sector cybersecurity research and development;
and
 $250 million to fund the Rural and Municipal Utility Advanced
Cybersecurity Grant and Technical Assistance Program.
 The Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022 (Division Y
of P.L. 117-103; CIRCIA) directs CISA to issue a regulation requiring covered
private sector entities to report to the federal government when they experience
certain cyber incidents.
Why Total Federal Cybersecurity Spending Cannot Be Tracked
 Methodologies that assess what does and does not count as “cybersecurity” evolve over
time.
 Not all appropriations specify amounts for cybsersecurity spending.
 Cross-cutting discussion of federal cybersecurity funding is provided in the Analytical
Perspectives volume of the President’s annual budget request.
 This is primarily an analysis of the funding requested, rather than the funding provided,
or how prior year appropriations were applied to cybersecurity or information technology.
 An authoritative top-line total or historical tracking would not be indicative of whether
the federal government is investing its resources in the right places.

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
Looking Ahead
 Congress has recently taken an interest in the interaction and relationship between the
public and private sectors for cybersecurity.
 The National Cybersecurity Strategy released in March 2023, provides Congress a an
additional opportunity to focus oversight on the agency activities outlined in the strategy
and debate legislative options concerning shifts in responsibilities and regulatory
changes..
FOR MORE INFORMATION
 For more information on cybersecurity issues, see CRS Video WVB00451, 2022 Issues
& Policy - The Evolution of Cybersecurity Issues in the 117th Congress, by Chris
Jaikaran.
 For more episodes of this podcast series, search “HSA@20” on the CRS website.
NEXT EPISODE
After a brief hiatus, new episodes will begin on May 8th.
Music: Icas, by Audiorezout, as carried on freemusicarchive.org, under the terms of its Creative
Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International license.

Author Information

William L. Painter, Coordinator
Chris Jaikaran
Specialist in Homeland Security and Appropriations
Specialist in Cybersecurity Policy

Disclaimer
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