INSIGHTi  
The U.S. Summit for Democracy 
December 6, 2021 
On December 9-10, the United States is to convene a virtual 
“Summit for Democracy,” with participation 
by leaders of foreign governments, civil society organizations, and the private sector. Leading up to the 
event, the U.S. government is hosti
ng side events, including inter-parliamentary sessions facilitated by t
he 
House Democracy Partnership. Roughly a year after the virtual Summit, the Biden Administration 
anticipates a second, in-person Summit to follow up on commitments made at the initial meeting. U.S. 
commitments made at the Summit could prompt congressional oversight and/or legislation and affect 
appropriations decisions. 
Background and Summit Origins 
Experts contend that the world is experiencing an ongoing global  
“democratic recession.” Globa
l indexes 
general 
y  indicate that the aggregate level of democracy—as measured on dimensions such as the extent 
of free and fair elections, the rule of law, and respect for fundamental freedoms—has not advanced since 
around 2006; further, some amount of overal  democratic backsliding or “autocratization” has occurred in 
more recent years. A variety of factors may be affecting democracy and human rights around the world, 
including dissatisfaction with government performance within many democracies; evolving regulatory 
and technological means by which governments are able to repress political dissent; and the international 
influence of powerful authoritarian governments. Democracy’s global appeal—t
hough resilient—may 
also 
be chal enged to some extent by the example of economical y successful authoritarian countries and 
the erosion of some democratic institutions within leading democracies, including t
he United States. 
As a candidate, Joe Bide
n  pledged that the United States would host a Summit for Democracy to “bring 
together the world’s democracies to strengthen our democratic institutions, honestly confront nations that 
are backsliding, and forge a common agenda.” Biden stated that the Summit would build on the model of 
t
he Nuclear Security Summit process instituted during the Obama Administration. The planned Summit 
reflects the Biden Administration’s broader focus on democracy as a major concept undergirding its 
foreign policy strategy. The Administration’s March 
2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (INSSG) states that “authoritarianism is on the global march” and pledges to “join with likeminded al ies 
and partners to revitalize democracy the world over.” 
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Agenda and Themes 
The White House has indicated that the virtual summit wil  be organized around three themes: 1) 
defending against authoritarianism; 2) combating corruption; and 3) promoting human rights. The 
Administration
 has stated that the United States is consulting with governments, multilateral 
organizations, civil society, and the private sector to solicit ideas around these three principal themes. The 
Summit is intended to “provide a platform for leaders to announce both individual and collective 
commitments ... to defend democracy and human rights at home and abroad.” The Administration has not 
otherwise publicly described what commitments it hopes wil  be made at the Summit, although there are 
reports about some planne
d initiatives. A State Departme
nt description of broad factors affecting 
democracy global y refers to political polarization, weak state capacity, inequality, corruption, and 
transnational actions by authoritarian governments, among other chal enges. Some Members of Congress 
have
 raised concerns over lack of outreach from the executive branch regarding the Summit’s agenda. 
Participants 
A major question in the lead up to the Summit has been whether the Administration would weigh strategic 
considerations alongside democratic credentials in determining which governments to invite. The 
Administration invited a total of
 111 governments, but has not publicly articulated the criteria that guided 
invitation decisions beyond 
a stated desire to be “as inclusive as possible” and ensure participation among 
“a regional y diverse set of wel -established and younger democracies whose progress and commitments 
wil  advance a more just and peaceful world.” Prior to publication of the official invitation list, a 
November letter by some Senators to President Biden urged clarity regarding the criteria for determining 
government invites, and inquired about civil society and congressional participation at the Summit, 
among other matters. 
In general, the invitation  list and accompanying executive branch messaging appear to reflect 
considerations that include the state and trajectory of democracy in foreign countries; the wil ingness of 
governments to commit to pro-democracy initiatives; and U.S. geopolitical interests. The list may be a 
product of numerous discrete bureaucratic debates within the State Department as much as it is a 
reflection of consistently applied criteria. The list includes some countries that score poorly on democracy 
indexes and/or that have sustained significant democratic decline in recent years, such as the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Pakistan, and the Philippines. Notable non-invited governments that are U.S. 
NATO al ies  include Hungary and Turkey. According t
o one analysis, 69% of invited governments 
represent countries rated “free” by Freedom House for 2020, 28% rated “partly free,” and 3% rated “not 
free.” 
Som
e analysts ha
ve argued that the presence of non-democratic countries could dilute the stated focus of 
the event and negatively affect Summit outcomes
. Experts have als
o raised questions over whether 
declining global perceptions of the strength of democracy in the United States could diminish U.S. efforts 
to galvanize international action. Notably, the Administration’s INSSG includes a focus on “revitalizing” 
democracy at home in addition to abroad, and the State Department ha
s indicated that the United States 
wil  announce its own domestic and international commitments at the Summit across a range of possible 
areas. Aside from governments, som
e analysts ha
ve advocated for robust civil society participation at the 
Summit given the importance of nongovernmental actors in advocating for democracy in al  countries. 
Outlook 
Whether Summit participants wil  be able to translate rhetoric into actions that help address some of the 
broad chal enges facing democracy around the world remains to be seen. Ma
ny analysts ha
ve emphasized
  
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that actionable goals and sustained follow-up wil  be necessary if the Summit is to achieve genuine 
impacts. This could include mechanisms for encouraging accountability regarding the implementation of 
Summit commitments in the intervening period between the first and a second Summit meeting and 
beyond. Related major questions include what new international initiatives  or groupings may emerge 
from the Summit meetings; whether and to what extent existing institutions wil  be leveraged as part of 
follow-on activities from the meetings; and 
how lessons a
nd chal enges with prior democracy-focused 
initiatives  might inform these plans. 
 
Author Information 
 Michael A. Weber 
   
Analyst in Foreign Affairs  
 
 
 
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