 
 
 
 INSIGHTi 
 
Nuclear Arms Control After the Biden-Putin 
Summit 
Updated February 28, 2022 
After their June 2021 meeting in Geneva, President Biden and Russia’s President Vladimir Putin released 
a Joint Statement on Strategic Stability outlining a path forward for nuclear arms control and risk 
reduction. They had already
 agreed t
o extend th
e New START Treaty for five years beyond its planned 
expiration on February 5, 2021. This treaty limits deployed long-range strategic nuclear weapons but does 
not address all U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons or other factors that could affect the risk of nuclear use. 
The first round of new discussi
ons occurred on July 28, 2021, and a second rou
nd occurred on September 
30, 2021. A third round, which convened t
o address concerns about Russia’s military activities near 
Ukraine and Russia’
s demands for security assurances,
 occurred on January 10, 2022. After Russia 
invaded Ukraine in late February, the State Department
 noted that the United States did not “have any 
plans for the next iteration of the Strategic Stability Dialogue.” 
Summit Goals 
When announcing the planned Geneva meeting, the White House
 indicated that the Presidents would 
“discuss the full range of pressing issues” and would “seek to restore predictability and stability to the 
U.S.-Russia relationship.” President Bid
en emphasized that, although areas of disagreement exist, 
strategic stability is one area of possible cooperation between the two nations. Capturing this sentiment, 
the joint statement begins by recognizing that “the United States and Russia have demonstrated that, even 
in periods of tension, they are able to make progress on our shared goals of ensuring predictability in the 
strategic sphere, reducing the risk of armed conflicts and the threat of nuclear war.” 
Statement on Nuclear War 
Presidents Biden and Putin reaffirmed “the principle that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be 
fought.” Presidents Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev had issued thi
s statement in 1985, when they 
indicated that they were “conscious of the special responsibility of the USSR and the U.S. for maintaining 
peace.” By issuing this statement, Reagan and Gorbachev recognized the need to ease tensions that might 
lead to a conflict that could escalate to nuclear war. 
Congressional Research Service 
https://crsreports.congress.gov 
IN11694 
CRS INSIGHT 
Prepared for Members and  
 Committees of Congress 
 
  
 
Congressional Research Service 
2 
Some experts
 have suggested that a U.S.-Russian reaffirmation of this statement might help bolster 
international nonproliferation efforts by reducing the perceived value of nuclear weapons. On January 3, 
2022, the five nuclear weapons states recognized by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (known as the 
P5) al
so affirmed this statement. Some have suggested that both the U.S.-Russian reaffirmation and the 
P5 confirmation might offset the impression that nuclear weapons states seem to view these weapons as a 
viable tool to address regional security challenges. The statement might also signal that the nuclear 
weapons states recognize the growing risks of nuclear escalation during crises. 
Others, however, have questioned the value of the statement in the current security environment, noting 
that, in 1985, it was a reflection on the risk of large-scale nuclear war between the United States and 
Soviet Union. Moreover, some argue that a statement excluding the possible use of nuclear weapons in a 
regional conflict could undermine efforts to deter large-scale conventional attacks or even cyberattacks. 
Some have also questioned whether the United States might have to alter its employment policy or force 
posture if it acceded to a statement forswearing the value of nuclear weapons in regional conflicts. 
The Biden Administration has not addressed questions about its rationale for reaffirming the statement. 
When it
 issued its Interim National Security Strategic Guidance in March 2021, it noted that the United 
States would “take steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy.” 
Reissuing this statement on nuclear war may contribute to that goal without foreshadowing any changes 
in the U.S. nuclear posture. 
Strategic Stability Dialogue 
Presidents Biden and Putin agreed that the United States and Russia would engage in “an integrated 
bilateral Strategic Stability Dialogue” that would “seek to lay the groundwork for future arms control and 
risk reduction measures.” The United States and Russia had engaged in similar talks in the past, and both 
Presidents supported their resumption prior to the summit. In hi
s press briefing following the summit, 
President Biden noted that this dialogue would allow diplomats “to work on a mechanism that can lead to 
control of new and dangerous and sophisticated weapons that are coming on the scene now that reduce 
the times of response, that raise the prospects of accidental war.”  
The U.S.-Russian strategic stability talks will likely not include other nations with nuclear weapons—
such as China, France, and the United Kingdom—but could include discussions about other types of 
weapons beyond the long-range strategic weapons limited in New START. However, the two nations may 
hold different views on which topics they should discuss and different understandings of what constitutes 
strategic stability. In early September 2021, Bonnie Jenkins, the U.S. Under Secretary of State for 
International Security and Arms Control
, noted that the United States would seek to capture new kinds of 
intercontinental-range nuclear delivery systems and nonstrategic nuclear weapons in the upcoming talks. 
Russia appears to favor a broader agenda; Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has
 noted that the discussions 
should include everything that “influences strategic stability,” including “nuclear and non-nuclear 
weapons, offensive and defensive weapons.” For Russia, this list includes ballistic missile defense, long-
range strategic conventional arms, and weapons in space.  
At the same time, with its mention of “arms control and risk reduction measures,” the joint statement also 
seems to indicate that the talks will not focus exclusively on negotiating a new treaty limiting nuclear 
weapons. They might also address transparency and risk reduction measures that could reduce the risk of 
inadvertent or intentional escalation to nuclear use during a crisis or conflict. The agenda could also 
include emerging technologies, operational practices, or doctrinal statements that might exacerbate 
tensions or complicate crisis management.  
The United States and Russia held two rounds of talks in July and September 2021. After the second 
meeting, the delegations
 announced that they would “form two interagency expert working groups.” The 
first group would focus on “Principles and Objectives for Future Arms Control,” and the second would
  
Congressional Research Service 
3 
address “Capabilities and Actions with Strategic Effects.” While som
e press reports stated that the talks 
were suspended after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the State Department offered a more nuanced answer, 
noting that there was no schedule for future talks. 
 
Author Information 
 Amy F. Woolf 
   
Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy  
 
 
 
Disclaimer 
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff 
to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of 
Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of 
information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. 
CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United 
States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, 
as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the 
permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material. 
 
IN11694 · VERSION 5 · UPDATED