Nuclear Arms Control After the Biden-Putin Summit

Nuclear Arms Control After the Biden-Putin Summit

INSIGHTi

Nuclear Arms Control After the Biden-Putin
Summit
Updated February 28, 2022
After their June 2021 meeting in Geneva, President Biden and Russia’s President Vladimir Putin released
a Joint Statement on Strategic Stability outlining a path forward for nuclear arms control and risk
reduction. They had already agreed to extend the New START Treaty for five years beyond its planned
expiration on February 5, 2021. This treaty limits deployed long-range strategic nuclear weapons but does
not address all U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons or other factors that could affect the risk of nuclear use.
The first round of new discussions occurred on July 28, 2021, and a second round occurred on September
30, 2021. A third round, which convened to address concerns about Russia’s military activities near
Ukraine and Russia’s demands for security assurances, occurred on January 10, 2022. After Russia
invaded Ukraine in late February, the State Department noted that the United States did not “have any
plans for the next iteration of the Strategic Stability Dialogue.”
Summit Goals
When announcing the planned Geneva meeting, the White House indicated that the Presidents would
“discuss the full range of pressing issues” and would “seek to restore predictability and stability to the
U.S.-Russia relationship.” President Biden emphasized that, although areas of disagreement exist,
strategic stability is one area of possible cooperation between the two nations. Capturing this sentiment,
the joint statement begins by recognizing that “the United States and Russia have demonstrated that, even
in periods of tension, they are able to make progress on our shared goals of ensuring predictability in the
strategic sphere, reducing the risk of armed conflicts and the threat of nuclear war.”
Statement on Nuclear War
Presidents Biden and Putin reaffirmed “the principle that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be
fought.” Presidents Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev had issued this statement in 1985, when they
indicated that they were “conscious of the special responsibility of the USSR and the U.S. for maintaining
peace.” By issuing this statement, Reagan and Gorbachev recognized the need to ease tensions that might
lead to a conflict that could escalate to nuclear war.
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Some experts have suggested that a U.S.-Russian reaffirmation of this statement might help bolster
international nonproliferation efforts by reducing the perceived value of nuclear weapons. On January 3,
2022, the five nuclear weapons states recognized by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (known as the
P5) also affirmed this statement. Some have suggested that both the U.S.-Russian reaffirmation and the
P5 confirmation might offset the impression that nuclear weapons states seem to view these weapons as a
viable tool to address regional security challenges. The statement might also signal that the nuclear
weapons states recognize the growing risks of nuclear escalation during crises.
Others, however, have questioned the value of the statement in the current security environment, noting
that, in 1985, it was a reflection on the risk of large-scale nuclear war between the United States and
Soviet Union. Moreover, some argue that a statement excluding the possible use of nuclear weapons in a
regional conflict could undermine efforts to deter large-scale conventional attacks or even cyberattacks.
Some have also questioned whether the United States might have to alter its employment policy or force
posture if it acceded to a statement forswearing the value of nuclear weapons in regional conflicts.
The Biden Administration has not addressed questions about its rationale for reaffirming the statement.
When it issued its Interim National Security Strategic Guidance in March 2021, it noted that the United
States would “take steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy.”
Reissuing this statement on nuclear war may contribute to that goal without foreshadowing any changes
in the U.S. nuclear posture.
Strategic Stability Dialogue
Presidents Biden and Putin agreed that the United States and Russia would engage in “an integrated
bilateral Strategic Stability Dialogue” that would “seek to lay the groundwork for future arms control and
risk reduction measures.” The United States and Russia had engaged in similar talks in the past, and both
Presidents supported their resumption prior to the summit. In his press briefing following the summit,
President Biden noted that this dialogue would allow diplomats “to work on a mechanism that can lead to
control of new and dangerous and sophisticated weapons that are coming on the scene now that reduce
the times of response, that raise the prospects of accidental war.”
The U.S.-Russian strategic stability talks will likely not include other nations with nuclear weapons—
such as China, France, and the United Kingdom—but could include discussions about other types of
weapons beyond the long-range strategic weapons limited in New START. However, the two nations may
hold different views on which topics they should discuss and different understandings of what constitutes
strategic stability. In early September 2021, Bonnie Jenkins, the U.S. Under Secretary of State for
International Security and Arms Control, noted that the United States would seek to capture new kinds of
intercontinental-range nuclear delivery systems and nonstrategic nuclear weapons in the upcoming talks.
Russia appears to favor a broader agenda; Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has noted that the discussions
should include everything that “influences strategic stability,” including “nuclear and non-nuclear
weapons, offensive and defensive weapons.” For Russia, this list includes ballistic missile defense, long-
range strategic conventional arms, and weapons in space.
At the same time, with its mention of “arms control and risk reduction measures,” the joint statement also
seems to indicate that the talks will not focus exclusively on negotiating a new treaty limiting nuclear
weapons. They might also address transparency and risk reduction measures that could reduce the risk of
inadvertent or intentional escalation to nuclear use during a crisis or conflict. The agenda could also
include emerging technologies, operational practices, or doctrinal statements that might exacerbate
tensions or complicate crisis management.
The United States and Russia held two rounds of talks in July and September 2021. After the second
meeting, the delegations announced that they would “form two interagency expert working groups.” The
first group would focus on “Principles and Objectives for Future Arms Control,” and the second would

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address “Capabilities and Actions with Strategic Effects.” While some press reports stated that the talks
were suspended after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the State Department offered a more nuanced answer,
noting that there was no schedule for future talks.

Author Information

Amy F. Woolf

Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy

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