Political Transition in Tokyo
INSIGHTi
Political Transition in Tokyo
Updated September 10, 2021
On September 3, 2021, Japan’s Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga abruptly withdrew from seeking
reelection as leader of Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Suga’s announcement thrust
Japanese politics into uncertainty, with the range of outcomes holding potential y significant implications
for the U.S.-Japan al iance. Suga’s support ratings had fal en to 30% and below, mainly from widespread
perceptions that his government was mishandling the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.
For months, infection and hospitalization numbers have risen, prompting the government to redeclare a
state of emergency in many regions, due in part to Japan’s slow progress on vaccinating its population.
Hosting the Olympics and Paralympics in Tokyo during the summer failed to give Suga a hoped-for boost
in the polls.
Upcoming Election Season
Japan is facing a crowded political calendar to end the year, with LDP leadership elections in September
2021 and general elections for the Lower House of Japan’s parliament (known as the Diet) due in October
or November 2021. Whomever the LDP chooses as party president wil lead the party in the general
election campaign. Given the LDP and its coalition partner’s control of the Diet, the next LDP leader is
overwhelmingly favored to become the next Prime Minister. Since the spring of 2021, Suga’s
unpopularity appears to have convinced him and party leaders that he posed an electoral vulnerability, a
perception that was reinforced by multiple LDP defeats in by-elections and local elections in the spring
and summer of 2021, including in Suga’s home city of Yokohama.
Likely Candidates
Several candidates have already declared their intention to compete in the leadership elections: Taro Kono
(Minister of Administrative Reform and vaccine czar, as wel as a former Defense Minister and Foreign
Affairs Minister), Fumio Kishida (former holder of the powerful party policy chief position as wel as
former Foreign Affairs Minister), Sanae Takaichi (former Minister of Internal Affairs and
Communications, as wel as several other Cabinet posts), and Seiko Noda (executive acting secretary
general of the LDP and former Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications). Kono appears to lead in
the polls, with Kishida, Takaichi, and Noda behind him. Kono, 58, is considered a political maverick,
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displays media savvy through his popular Twitter accounts, and speaks fluent English due to his education
in the United States. If elected, Takaichi or Noda would be Japan’s first woman premier. Takaichi is
rumored to have Former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s backing.
Questions About the LDP’s Dominance and Leadership Continuity
With fractured and weak opposition parties not expected to threaten the LDP coalition’s majority in the
parliamentary elections, Japan likely wil remain essential y a one-party system, as the LDP has held
power for nearly al of the post-World War II period. In general, disarray among Japan’s opposition
parties since 2012 has contributed to the electoral success of the LDP and its smal coalition partner, the
Komeito Party. For example, Japan’s largest opposition party, the center-left Constitutional Democratic
Party (CDP), has rarely broken out of the single digits in opinion polls in recent months, compared to
over 30% for the LDP. However, some analysts anticipate this election might reflect a generational shift,
with traditional political factions holding less sway over the process of selecting a party leader and
candidate for Prime Minister. If the CDP is able to coordinate with other opposition parties to present
single candidates in district elections and appeal to independent voters, as it successfully did in earlier
2021 local elections, it could make the fal general election surprisingly competitive. Recently, the CDP
and three other opposition parties announced a joint policy agenda for the upcoming campaign. The
removal of the unpopular Suga, however, deprives the opposition of the chance to make the election a
referendum on his leadership.
Regardless of who becomes premier, it appears inevitable that he or she wil continue to grapple with
curbing COVID-19 in Japan and the economic implications of the global pandemic. It is unclear
whether—or which—new Prime Ministers wil continue Suga’s additional priorities of an aggressive
campaign to lower Japan’s carbon emissions and green its economy, his emphasis on digitalization of
Japan’s outdated administrative systems, or his and Abe’s proactive foreign policy that dovetails with the
U.S. approach to the region.
Some observers fear that without a natural successor in place, Japanese politics wil revert to its earlier
pattern of short-lived leadership. Before Abe became Japan’s longest-serving postwar leader from 2012 to
2020, Japan experienced a slew of premiers serving for year-long stints: six different men (including Abe
for his first term) served as Prime Minister in just over seven years. This period of political turbulence—
which also coincided with leadership transitions in Washington—made policy coordination in the U.S.-
Japan al iance more difficult.
Implications for U.S.-Japan Relations
The Biden Administration has emphasized the U.S. al iance with Japan as a key plank of its Indo-Pacific
approach, particularly its stance of mobilizing al ies and partners to push back against perceived Chinese
aggression. Abe was widely viewed as a stabilizing force in Japan’s foreign policy, and he and Suga were
highly supportive of reinforcing the U.S.-Japan al iance. If Japan were to return to a practice of frequently
shifting leaders, Tokyo could be viewed as a less reliable partner. Japan’s constraints on its ability to use
force—particularly those enshrined in the pacifist Article 9 of its constitution—can limit joint U.S.-Japan
military operations. While those constraints have loosened over the years as threats from North Korea
persist and fears of China’s regional intentions rise, some security analysts believe that Japan’s defense
policy requires more flexibility in order to meet those chal enges. Without an effective leader at the helm,
initiating and executing such changes becomes more unlikely.
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Author Information
Emma Chanlett-Avery
Mark E. Manyin
Specialist in Asian Affairs
Specialist in Asian Affairs
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