Central America’s Northern Triangle: Challenges for U.S. Policymakers in 2021
link to page 2 
INSIGHTi
Central America’s Northern Triangle:
Challenges for U.S. Policymakers in 2021
Updated May 13, 2021
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, located in the Northern Triangle region of Central America (see
Figure 1), have long struggled with high levels of poverty and inequality, widespread insecurity, and
fragile democratic institutions. Already-difficult living conditions have worsened over the past year due to
the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic and two hurricanes. The International Monetary
Fund estimates the Salvadoran economy contracted by nearly 8.6% in 2020 and the Honduran and
Guatemalan economies contracted by 8.0% and 1.5%, respectively. Nearly 1 mil ion Salvadorans, 3.1
mil ion Hondurans, and 3.7 mil ion Guatemalans are contending with crisis or emergency levels of food
insecurity. Although the pandemic and government lockdowns initial y disrupted criminal activities,
reports suggest domestic violence increased and gangs and il icit trafficking groups quickly adapted to the
changed circumstances. Amid these chal enges, the Northern Triangle governments have sought to
undermine anti-corruption efforts, weaken judicial independence, and consolidate power, in the view of
many analysts.
The deteriorating situation in the Northern Triangle could have far-reaching implications for the United
States. U.S. authorities encountered (apprehended or expel ed under a public health authority)
approximately 112,000 Hondurans, 96,000 Guatemalans, and 30,000 Salvadorans at the Southwest border
in the first four months of 2021. Migration levels typical y peak in the spring, but mixed flows of asylum-
seekers and economic migrants could swel again later in the year as governments further ease COVID-
19-related border restrictions. Conditions in the region also could affect il icit trafficking patterns, as
some analysts warn that criminal organizations may exploit the situation to further tighten their grip on
the “economies, people, and politics” of the Northern Triangle.
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
IN11603
CRS INSIGHT
Prepared for Members and
Committees of Congress
Congressional Research Service
2
Figure 1. Map of Central America
Source: Congressional Research Service.
From FY2016 to FY2021, Congress appropriated more than $3.6 bil ion of foreign assistance supporting
the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America to improve conditions in the region and address the
underlying drivers of migration. The Obama Administration devised the strategy after a surge of
unaccompanied minors from the Northern Triangle arrived at the Southwest border in 2014. The Trump
Administration maintained the initiative but suspended most foreign assistance for the Northern Triangle
in March 2019. It reprogrammed $396 mil ion to other foreign policy priorities and withheld most of the
remaining assistance for more than a year while it negotiated a series of border security and asylum
agreements with the Northern Triangle governments. The aid suspension resulted in U.S. agencies scaling
back many programs less than two years into implementation, making it difficult to assess the
effectiveness of U.S. assistance efforts in the region. Nevertheless, a 2019 Government Accountability
Office study and a 2020 progress report suggest U.S. programs have achieved mixed results.
In addition to the chal enges posed by funding interruptions, U.S. efforts to foster structural changes in
the Northern Triangle have faced significant resistance from smal but powerful groups of elites who
benefit from the status quo. Their opposition to anti-corruption and good governance reforms, experts say,
has left Northern Triangle institutions without the resources or capabilities necessary to respond to the
region’s chal enges and susceptible to cooptation by private and criminal interests. It has also been seen to
contribute to a sense of hopelessness among citizens of the region that conditions could ever improve.
Accordingly, many analysts argue that combatting corruption should be the U.S. government’s top
priority in the region. Among other policies, they recommend increasing political and financial support to
reformers inside and outside of government while using diplomatic pressure and targeted sanctions to
spur political wil among those resistant to change. Congress has placed anti-corruption conditions on
assistance to the Northern Triangle governments and created several other anti-corruption sanctions
authorities. The United States-Northern Triangle Enhanced Engagement Act (P.L. 116-260, Division FF,
Subtitle F) requires the President to produce an annual list of corrupt actors in the region, due by June
2021, and directs the President to impose visa sanctions on those identified. Although sanctioning corrupt
officials may help foster long-term improvements in governance in the region, it could complicate short-
term government-to-government cooperation on other issues, such as deterring migrant flows.
The Biden Administration is requesting $861 mil ion in FY2022 to begin implementing its proposed four-
year, $4 bil ion plan to foster systemic change and address the root causes of irregular migration from
Central America. According to the Administration, the funding “would al ow the United States to sustain
effective regional partnerships and strengthen host government accountability to bolster service delivery
Congressional Research Service
3
and security by curtailing endemic corruption, preventing violence, reducing poverty, and expanding
economic development opportunities.” The U.S. Citizenship Act of 2021 (S. 348/H.R. 1177) would
authorize $1 bil ion annual y from FY2022 through FY2025 to combat corruption, strengthen the rule of
law, and consolidate democratic governance; reduce criminal violence and improve citizen security;
counter sexual, gender-based, and domestic violence; and tackle extreme poverty and advance economic
development in Central America. Although there is evidence that foreign assistance can al eviate some
drivers of forced displacement, such as violence and food insecurity, economic migration appears to be
linked to long-term demographic and development trends.
To manage migration pressures in the near term, some analysts argue policymakers should increase legal
U.S. pathways for temporary laborers and asylum-seekers while working with partners throughout the
Western Hemisphere to strengthen humanitarian protection systems. In February 2021, President Biden
issued Executive Order 14010, cal ing for a comprehensive regional framework to manage migration
flows. Pursuant to the executive order, the Administration suspended the 2019 asylum agreements with
the Northern Triangle countries, reestablished the Central American Minors program to reunite children
with parents in the United States, began processing asylum-seekers previously returned to Mexico, and
reserved 6,000 temporary, non-agricultural worker visas for individuals from the region. Congress may
consider additional measures, including S. 348/H.R. 1177 and H.R. 6—passed by the House in March
2021—that would modify the legal pathways available to those in the region and adjust the status of some
Central American immigrants in the United States.
For further analysis, see CRS In Focus IF11151, Central American Migration: Root Causes and U.S.
Policy, and CRS In Focus IF10371, U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America: An Overview.
Author Information
Peter J. Meyer
Specialist in Latin American and Canadian Affairs
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff
to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of
Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of
information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role.
CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United
States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However,
as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the
permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
IN11603 · VERSION 4 · UPDATED
INSIGHTi
Central America’s Northern Triangle:
Challenges for U.S. Policymakers in 2021
Updated May 13, 2021
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, located in the Northern Triangle region of Central America (see
Figure 1), have long struggled with high levels of poverty and inequality, widespread insecurity, and
fragile democratic institutions. Already-difficult living conditions have worsened over the past year due to
the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic and two hurricanes. The International Monetary
Fund estimates the Salvadoran economy contracted by nearly 8.6% in 2020 and the Honduran and
Guatemalan economies contracted by 8.0% and 1.5%, respectively. Nearly 1 mil ion Salvadorans, 3.1
mil ion Hondurans, and 3.7 mil ion Guatemalans are contending with crisis or emergency levels of food
insecurity. Although the pandemic and government lockdowns initial y disrupted criminal activities,
reports suggest domestic violence increased and gangs and il icit trafficking groups quickly adapted to the
changed circumstances. Amid these chal enges, the Northern Triangle governments have sought to
undermine anti-corruption efforts, weaken judicial independence, and consolidate power, in the view of
many analysts.
The deteriorating situation in the Northern Triangle could have far-reaching implications for the United
States. U.S. authorities encountered (apprehended or expel ed under a public health authority)
approximately 112,000 Hondurans, 96,000 Guatemalans, and 30,000 Salvadorans at the Southwest border
in the first four months of 2021. Migration levels typical y peak in the spring, but mixed flows of asylum-
seekers and economic migrants could swel again later in the year as governments further ease COVID-
19-related border restrictions. Conditions in the region also could affect il icit trafficking patterns, as
some analysts warn that criminal organizations may exploit the situation to further tighten their grip on
the “economies, people, and politics” of the Northern Triangle.
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
IN11603
CRS INSIGHT
Prepared for Members and
Committees of Congress
Congressional Research Service
2
Figure 1. Map of Central America
Source: Congressional Research Service.
From FY2016 to FY2021, Congress appropriated more than $3.6 bil ion of foreign assistance supporting
the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America to improve conditions in the region and address the
underlying drivers of migration. The Obama Administration devised the strategy after a surge of
unaccompanied minors from the Northern Triangle arrived at the Southwest border in 2014. The Trump
Administration maintained the initiative but suspended most foreign assistance for the Northern Triangle
in March 2019. It reprogrammed $396 mil ion to other foreign policy priorities and withheld most of the
remaining assistance for more than a year while it negotiated a series of border security and asylum
agreements with the Northern Triangle governments. The aid suspension resulted in U.S. agencies scaling
back many programs less than two years into implementation, making it difficult to assess the
effectiveness of U.S. assistance efforts in the region. Nevertheless, a 2019 Government Accountability
Office study and a 2020 progress report suggest U.S. programs have achieved mixed results.
In addition to the chal enges posed by funding interruptions, U.S. efforts to foster structural changes in
the Northern Triangle have faced significant resistance from smal but powerful groups of elites who
benefit from the status quo. Their opposition to anti-corruption and good governance reforms, experts say,
has left Northern Triangle institutions without the resources or capabilities necessary to respond to the
region’s chal enges and susceptible to cooptation by private and criminal interests. It has also been seen to
contribute to a sense of hopelessness among citizens of the region that conditions could ever improve.
Accordingly, many analysts argue that combatting corruption should be the U.S. government’s top
priority in the region. Among other policies, they recommend increasing political and financial support to
reformers inside and outside of government while using diplomatic pressure and targeted sanctions to
spur political wil among those resistant to change. Congress has placed anti-corruption conditions on
assistance to the Northern Triangle governments and created several other anti-corruption sanctions
authorities. The United States-Northern Triangle Enhanced Engagement Act (P.L. 116-260, Division FF,
Subtitle F) requires the President to produce an annual list of corrupt actors in the region, due by June
2021, and directs the President to impose visa sanctions on those identified. Although sanctioning corrupt
officials may help foster long-term improvements in governance in the region, it could complicate short-
term government-to-government cooperation on other issues, such as deterring migrant flows.
The Biden Administration is requesting $861 mil ion in FY2022 to begin implementing its proposed four-
year, $4 bil ion plan to foster systemic change and address the root causes of irregular migration from
Central America. According to the Administration, the funding “would al ow the United States to sustain
effective regional partnerships and strengthen host government accountability to bolster service delivery
Congressional Research Service
3
and security by curtailing endemic corruption, preventing violence, reducing poverty, and expanding
economic development opportunities.” The U.S. Citizenship Act of 2021 (S. 348/H.R. 1177) would
authorize $1 bil ion annual y from FY2022 through FY2025 to combat corruption, strengthen the rule of
law, and consolidate democratic governance; reduce criminal violence and improve citizen security;
counter sexual, gender-based, and domestic violence; and tackle extreme poverty and advance economic
development in Central America. Although there is evidence that foreign assistance can al eviate some
drivers of forced displacement, such as violence and food insecurity, economic migration appears to be
linked to long-term demographic and development trends.
To manage migration pressures in the near term, some analysts argue policymakers should increase legal
U.S. pathways for temporary laborers and asylum-seekers while working with partners throughout the
Western Hemisphere to strengthen humanitarian protection systems. In February 2021, President Biden
issued Executive Order 14010, cal ing for a comprehensive regional framework to manage migration
flows. Pursuant to the executive order, the Administration suspended the 2019 asylum agreements with
the Northern Triangle countries, reestablished the Central American Minors program to reunite children
with parents in the United States, began processing asylum-seekers previously returned to Mexico, and
reserved 6,000 temporary, non-agricultural worker visas for individuals from the region. Congress may
consider additional measures, including S. 348/H.R. 1177 and H.R. 6—passed by the House in March
2021—that would modify the legal pathways available to those in the region and adjust the status of some
Central American immigrants in the United States.
For further analysis, see CRS In Focus IF11151, Central American Migration: Root Causes and U.S.
Policy, and CRS In Focus IF10371, U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America: An Overview.
Author Information
Peter J. Meyer
Specialist in Latin American and Canadian Affairs
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff
to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of
Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of
information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role.
CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United
States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However,
as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the
permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
IN11603 · VERSION 4 · UPDATED