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INSIGHTi
Central America’s Northern Triangle:
Challenges for U.S. Policymakers in 2021
Updated March 12, 2021
Instability in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras (the Northern Triangle of Central America; see
Figure 1) is among the most pressing chal enges for U.S. policymakers in the Western Hemisphere. The
United States historical y has played a prominent role in the political and economic development of the
region, which has long struggled with widespread insecurity, fragile democratic institutions, and high
levels of poverty and inequality.
Already difficult living conditions have deteriorated over the past year due to the Coronavirus Disease
2019 (COVID-19) pandemic and two hurricanes. The World Bank estimates the Honduran economy
contracted by 9.7% in 2020 and the Salvadoran and Guatemalan economies contracted by 7.2% and 3.5%,
respectively. Approximately 2.9 mil ion Hondurans, 1 mil ion Salvadorans, and 3.7 mil ion Guatemalans
are contending with crisis or emergency levels of food insecurity. Although the pandemic and government
lockdowns initial y disrupted criminal activities, reports suggest domestic violence increased and gangs
and il icit trafficking groups quickly adapted to the changed circumstances. Some government officials
have sought to take advantage of the disorder, al egedly engaging in corruption, repressing dissent, and
undermining the rule of law to advance their personal and political interests.
These interrelated socioeconomic, security, and political chal enges could have far-reaching implications
for the United States. Although the Biden Administration has urged potential irregular migrants not to
make the “dangerous journey,” U.S. authorities have encountered growing numbers of Guatemalans,
Hondurans, and Salvadorans at the Southwest border. Many analysts expect these mixed migration flows
of asylum-seekers and economic migrants to swel over the course of 2021, especial y once governments
ease COVID-19-related border restrictions. Conditions in the region also could affect il icit trafficking
patterns, as some analysts warn that criminal organizations may exploit the situation to further tighten
their grip on the “economies, people, and politics” of the Northern Triangle.
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Figure 1. Map of Central America
Source: Congressional Research Service.
Since FY2016, Congress has appropriated more than $3.6 bil ion of foreign assistance through the U.S.
Strategy for Engagement in Central America to improve conditions in the region and address the
underlying drivers of migration. The Obama Administration devised the strategy after a surge of
unaccompanied minors from the Northern Triangle arrived at the Southwest border in 2014. The Trump
Administration maintained the initiative but suspended most foreign assistance for the Northern Triangle
in March 2019. It reprogrammed $396 mil ion to other foreign policy priorities and withheld most of the
remaining assistance for more than a year while it negotiated a series of border security and asylum
agreements with the Northern Triangle governments. The aid suspension resulted in U.S. agencies closing
or scaling back programs throughout the region.
U.S. policy in Central America is now at a crossroads. The United States-Northern Triangle Enhanced
Engagement Act (P.L. 116-260, Division FF, Subtitle F), signed into law in December 2020, directs the
State Department, in coordination with other U.S. agencies, to develop a new five-year strategy to
advance inclusive economic growth, combat corruption, strengthen democratic institutions, and improve
security conditions in the region. On February 2, 2021, President Biden issued Executive Order (E.O.)
14010, directing his Administration to begin preparing a strategy to address the root causes of Central
American migration. The proposed U.S. Citizenship Act of 2021 (S. 348/H.R. 1177) would authorize $4
bil ion over four years to implement the strategy.
As Congress considers potential authorization and appropriations legislation, it may assess the
effectiveness of the programs implemented under the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America. It
is difficult to evaluate the full impact of that strategy, because congressional holds on funding delayed
implementation until mid-2017 and the Trump Administration suspended funding for many programs less
than two years later. Nevertheless, a 2019 Government Accountability Office study and a 2020 State
Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) progress report suggest U.S.
programs achieved mixed results.
U.S. efforts to foster structural changes in the Northern Triangle have faced significant resistance from a
smal but powerful group of elites who benefit from the status quo. Their opposition to anti-corruption
and good governance reforms has left Northern Triangle institutions without the resources or capabilities
necessary to respond to the region’s chal enges and susceptible to cooptation by private and criminal
interests. It also contributes to a sense of hopelessness among citizens of the region that conditions could
ever improve. Accordingly, many analysts argue that combatting systemic corruption should be the U.S.
government’s top priority in the region. Among other policies, they recommend increasing political and
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financial support to reformers inside and outside of government while using diplomatic pressure and
targeted sanctions to spur political wil among those resistant to change. Although Congress has placed
anti-corruption conditions on assistance to the Northern Triangle governments and has created other anti-
corruption sanctions authorities, prior Administrations have appeared reluctant to use those policy tools in
the region. The United States-Northern Triangle Enhanced Engagement Act requires the President to
produce an annual list of corrupt actors, due by June 2021, and directs the President to impose visa
sanctions on those identified.
Sustained improvements in the region—and at the Southwest border—likely would require years of
concerted efforts by the Northern Triangle countries and international donors. Although there is some
evidence that foreign assistance can al eviate some drivers of forced displacement, such as violence and
food insecurity, economic migration appears to be more linked to long-term demographic and
development trends. To manage migration pressures in the near term, some analysts argue that
policymakers should increase legal U.S. pathways for temporary laborers and asylum-seekers while
working with partners throughout the Western Hemisphere to strengthen humanitarian protection systems.
Pursuant to E.O. 14010, which cal s for the development of a collaborative migration management
strategy, the Administration has suspended the 2019 asylum agreements with the Northern Triangle
countries, reestablished the Central American Minors program to reunite children with parents in the
United States, and begun processing asylum-seekers previously returned to Mexico. Congress may
consider additional measures, including S. 348/H.R. 1177 and H.R. 6, which would modify the legal
pathways available to those in the region and adjust the status of some Central American immigrants in
the United States.
Author Information
Peter J. Meyer
Specialist in Latin American and Canadian Affairs
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