Russia’s Wagner Private Military Company (PMC)
Updated August 1, 2023
Russia’s Wagner Private Military Company (PMC)
Russia uses private military companies (PMCs) to project
Public-Private Partnership
power globally. These outfits range in size and scope and
The Wagner Group, and Russian PMCs more generally, are
act as an unofficial (albeit nominally illegal) tool of Russian
emblematic of Russian public-private partnerships defined
foreign policy. The most prominent Russian PMC is the
by the delegation of limited governmental authority to
Wagner Group, headed by Kremlin-connected businessman
private entities. PMCs nominally remain illegal under
Yevgeny Prigozhin. Instead of a single entity, the Wagner
Russian law. The Russian government, however, provides
Group is more of an umbrella organization for multiple
them opportunities and protection unavailable to other
entities, operations, and actors overseen by Prigozhin.
businesses or people. The government, in essence, loans
Wagner has played a key role in Russia’s war in Ukraine
authority to these private entities, provided they operate at
and operates in multiple countries, particularly across
the behest of and according to the government’s
Africa. Despite its widespread operations, Wagner’s status
preferences. The U.S. Department of the Treasury identifies
is unclear after an aborted mutiny against the Russian
the Wagner Group as “a designated Russian Ministry of
government in June 2023 (see below).
Defense (MoD) proxy force,” despite it being run by a
private citizen. Such entities can pursue private or
The U.S. Departments of State and the Treasury have
commercial interests, but they must fulfill government
designated the Wagner Group and Prigozhin for sanctions
requests when called upon and ultimately remain under the
under multiple executive orders. In January 2023, the Biden
direction of the Russian government.
Administration designated Wagner a Transnational
Criminal Organization (TCO) and simultaneously
Prigozhin Network and Organization
designated it under a sanctions program pertaining to the
Prigozhin founded and reportedly funds and oversees the
Central African Republic (CAR).
Wagner Group. He is subject to U.S. sanctions and under
indictment for numerous activities, including interference in
Several bills in the 118th Congresses would respond to the
the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Prigozhin denied
Wagner Group through sanctions, reporting requirements,
operating the Wagner Group (going so far as to sue
and other measures. Considerations for Congress include
journalists in the United Kingdom for claiming he did) until
the impact of such measures on Wagner’s operations, its
September 2022, when he publicly admitted founding it.
post-mutiny status and relationship with the Russian
Prigozhin also reportedly oversees a broader network of
government, the extent to which the executive branch is
entities beyond Wagner, including, for example, the
providing sufficient information to enable oversight, and
Internet Research Agency, designated a “Russian troll
potential unintended consequences.
farm” by the U.S. Department of the Treasury. Several of
these entities and individuals connected to them also are
History
subject to U.S. sanctions.
According to media reports, Wagner evolved out of earlier
Russian PMC outfits, including groups operating in Syria in
Prigozhin has used the Wagner Group to increase his
2013. During this time, Russia was experimenting with
personal political and financial influence by demonstrating
PMCs, including their role and relationship to the state.
his utility to Russian policymakers, often at the expense of
Russian military intelligence (Main Directorate of the
other Russian agencies, resulting in increased tension and
General Staff, or GU) reportedly helped establish and
infighting among other security and military leaders.
oversee the Wagner group, including creating training
centers near GU Spetsnaz (elite reconnaissance) bases.
Operations
Wagner publicly advertises a full spectrum of “regime
Wagner first appeared as an entity in 2014, during Russia’s
security” services, including propaganda and other
seizure and occupation of Ukraine’s Crimea region. Wagner
information operations. The marketing emphasizes that
was involved in Russia’s invasion of eastern Ukraine
these services come without the conditionality often
through 2015, including carrying out alleged assassinations
associated with Western donor support. Wagner has been
of local rebel leaders. During this time and into 2016,
linked to numerous human rights and war crimes violations,
Wagner became involved in supporting Russia’s
including in Ukraine and in African countries where
intervention in Syria.
Wagner operates. Some operations seem to have a clear
connection to Russian foreign policy objectives, whereas
Starting in the late 2010s, Wagner established operations in
others appear to be equally (or more) commercial in nature.
several African countries, providing security services and,
in some cases, engaging in mining and other private-sector
Wagner Group personnel appear to range from relatively
activities. These countries include the Central African
professional and well-equipped veterans of the Russian
Republic, Libya, Mozambique, Mali, and Sudan.
military to convicts recruited hastily from Russian prisons
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Russia’s Wagner Private Military Company (PMC)
to fight in Ukraine. Even prior to Russia’s 2022 invasion of
mutiny ended after a deal was announced providing for
Ukraine, there appeared to be significant variation in the
amnesty and the departure of Prigozhin and Wagner
quality of personnel. Some operators and those that
fighters for Belarus.
garnered the highest salaries came from elite units of the
Russian military; others have less military experience and
The status of the Wagner Group and Prigozhin remains
have been described by some observers as “adventurers”
fluid and uncertain. Reports indicate Wagner has begun
rather than military professionals.
setting up training camps in Belarus to train the Belarusian
military, while Prigozhin has been documented at several
Russia’s War in Ukraine and Wagner Mutiny
events inside Russia. Other reports indicate some Wagner
The Wagner Group has played a large role in Russia’s
fighters felt mislead by Prigozhin and signed contracts with
invasion of Ukraine. The group’s role became more
the MoD. Russian officials also have stated that Wagner’s
prominent around mid-2022, after the Russian military’s
global operations (particularly in Africa) will continue. The
initial failure to achieve key objectives. Wagner has been
Russian government would likely find it difficult to replace
linked to numerous instances of potential war crimes and
Wagner’s operations and connections in Africa and the
human rights violations in Ukraine, even against its own
Middle East, although the exact nature and control of these
personnel.
operations remains unclear.
Initially, Wagner reportedly provided small groups of
U.S. Policy and Issues Before Congress
relatively well-trained and equipped personnel to support
In 2017, the Trump Administration designated the Wagner
the Russian military. As the war continued and the Russian
Group for financial sanctions and entry restrictions under
military continued to underperform, Wagner expanded to
Executive Order (E.O.) 13660, pertaining to Ukraine. In
conduct large-scale operations, specifically seeking to
2022, the Department of State also designated the Wagner
capture the Ukrainian town of Bakhmut. Prigozhin also
Group pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating in the defense
recruited large numbers of convicts from prisons across
and related materiel sector of the Russian economy. In
Russia to fight in Ukraine, with the promise of clemency.
January 2023, the Biden Administration designated it as a
These troops were used in “human wave” attacks, in which
Transnational Criminal Organization under E.O. 13581, as
units composed of convicts launched assaults against
amended by E.O. 13863, citing its implication in human
Ukrainian forces and suffered numerous casualties.
rights abuses in CAR and Mali, and concurrently
designated it under E.O. 13667, pertaining to CAR. The
As the Russian military underperformed Russian
United States also has designated Prigozhin, multiple
intelligence and government expectations, Prigozhin
Wagner subsidiaries, and associated individuals and entities
exploited the Russian military’s failures and sought to
for sanctions under E.O.s pertaining to Russia, election
increase his profile by presenting Wagner as a more capable
interference, cybercrime, and the conflict in CAR.
and efficient service able to achieve objectives the military
could not. This led to public infighting between Prigozhin
Several bills introduced in the 118th Congress would
and the military (as well as other members of the Russian
establish additional actions to counter the Wagner Group,
elite) and included accusations of incompetence against the
increase executive branch reporting on its activities, or
MoD and the withholding of needed supplies and
both. At least two bills, H.R. 506 and S. 416, would require
ammunition to the Wagner Group.
the Secretary of State to designate the Wagner Group a
Foreign Terrorist Organization. Such a designation could
In response, the Russian military hierarchy took actions to
have implications for U.S. relations with Russia or other
undermine Prigozhin and appeared to gain the upper hand
countries whose governments have contracted Wagner’s
by gradually limiting the group’s autonomy. Wagner lost
services.
the right to recruit from Russia’s prisons, and the MoD
announced all “volunteer units” had to sign contracts with
Members may consider whether to pursue other available
the MoD by July 1. Such measures would effectively bring
legislative and oversight options to further restrict and
Wagner under the full command of the MoD, severely
counter the global presence of the Wagner Group (including
undermining Prighozin’s control and the Wagner Group’s
its new presence in Belarus) or its affiliates. Members also
independence.
may consider whether to investigate other strategies and
tools for the United States to incentivize countries away
Tensions and infighting culminated with Prigozhin accusing
from engaging with the Wagner Group. Additionally,
Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General
Members may investigate what measures are available to
Staff Valery Gerasimov of lying to Russian President
assist in the identification and prosecution of Wagner
Vladimir Putin about the justification for the invasion and
Group personnel involved in war crimes and human rights
the current state of the war. Russian authorities
abuses. For more, see CRS Insight IN12186, Wagner
subsequently released an arrest warrant, leading to
Group Mutiny in Russia, by Andrew S. Bowen; CRS In
Prigozhin and the Wagner Group launching a mutiny
Focus IF12389, Russia’s Wagner Group in Africa: Issues
against Russian authorities, including seizing the
for Congress, coordinated by Alexis Arieff.
headquarters of Russia’s Southern Military District in the
southern city of Rostov-on-Don and marching toward
Andrew S. Bowen, Analyst in Russian and European
Moscow. Prigozhin claimed his mutiny was not against
Affairs
Putin but rather against the military leadership and other
IF12344
advisers who were misleading the president. The short-lived
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Russia’s Wagner Private Military Company (PMC)
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF12344 · VERSION 4 · UPDATED