
March 13, 2023
Russia’s Wagner Private Military Company (PMC)
Russia utilizes private military companies (PMCs) to
Wagner became involved in supporting Russia’s
project power globally. These outfits range in size and
intervention in Syria. In some cases, Wagner reportedly
scope and act as an unofficial (albeit nominally illegal) tool
worked in coordination with Russian special forces; in
of Russian foreign policy. PMCs also appear to pursue
others, it appeared to take a leading role coordinating
semi-independent objectives, including monetary gain and
Syrian government forces.
political advantage within Russia.
Starting in the late 2010s, Wagner established operations in
The most prominent Russian PMC is the Wagner Group,
several African countries, providing security services and,
headed by Kremlin-connected businessman Yevgeny
in some cases, engaging in mining and other private sector
Prigozhin. Instead of a single entity, the Wagner Group is
activities. These countries include the Central African
more of an umbrella organization for multiple entities,
Republic, Libya, Mozambique, Mali, and Sudan.
operations, and actors overseen by Prighozin. During
Russia’s war in Ukraine since early 2022, the Wagner
Public-Private Partnership
Group’s role has increased and, in some areas, supplanted
The Wagner Group, and Russian PMCs more generally, are
that of the Russian military. Beyond Ukraine, Wagner
emblematic of Russian public-private partnerships defined
operates in multiple countries, particularly across Africa.
by the delegation of limited governmental authority to
Wagner’s rise has resulted in increased competition from
private entities. The Russian government provides partners
other Russian agencies and political elites.
in these relationships opportunities and protection
unavailable to other businesses or people. The government,
The U.S. Departments of State and the Treasury have
in essence, loans authority to these private entities, provided
designated the Wagner Group and Prigozhin for sanctions
they operate at the behest of and according to the
under multiple executive orders. In January 2023, the
government’s preferences. The U.S. Treasury Department
Biden Administration designated Wagner a Transnational
identifies the Wagner Group as “a designated Russian
Criminal Organization (TCO) and simultaneously
Ministry of Defense proxy force,” despite it being run by a
designated it under a sanctions program pertaining to the
private citizen. Such entities can pursue private or
Central African Republic (CAR).
commercial interests, but they must fulfill government
requests when called upon and ultimately remain under the
Several bills in the 118th Congresses would seek to respond
direction of the Russian government.
to the Wagner Group through sanctions, reporting
requirements, and/or other measures. Considerations for
PMCs nominally remain illegal under Russian law. Despite
Congress include the impact of such measures on Wagner’s
this, the Wagner Group registered as a legal entity in Russia
operations, the extent to which the executive branch is
in December 2022, listing itself as a management
providing sufficient information to enable oversight, and
consultant company. Additionally, Wagner opened an
potential unintended consequences, as discussed below.
office building in St. Petersburg in November 2022.
Wagner’s ability to operate openly suggests high-level
History
official support.
According to media reports, Wagner evolved out of earlier
Russian PMC outfits, including groups operating in Syria in
Prigozhin Network and Organization
2013. During this time, Russia was experimenting with
Prighozin founded and reportedly funds and oversees the
PMCs, including their role and relationship to the state.
Wagner Group. He is under U.S. sanctions and indictment
Russian military intelligence (GU) reportedly helped
for numerous activities, including interference in the 2016
establish and oversee the Wagner group, including creating
U.S. presidential election. Prigozhin denied operating the
training centers near GU Spetsnaz (elite reconnaissance)
Wagner Group (going so far as to sue journalists in the
bases. Wagner reportedly has had tense relations with the
United Kingdom for claiming that he did) until September
rest of the Russian Ministry of Defense, however (for
2022, when he publicly admitted founding it. Prigozhin also
additional background see CRS In Focus IF11650, Russian
reportedly oversees a broader network of entities beyond
Private Military Companies (PMCs), by Andrew S.
Wagner, comprising, for example, the Internet Research
Bowen).
Agency, designated a “Russian troll farm” by the U.S.
Treasury Department. Several of these entities and
Wagner first appeared as an entity in 2014, during Russia’s
individuals connected to them also are subject to U.S.
seizure and occupation of Ukraine’s Crimea region. Wagner
sanctions.
was involved in Russia’s invasion of eastern Ukraine
through 2015, including carrying out alleged assassinations
Reports indicate Prighozin financially benefits from some
of local rebel leaders. During this time and into 2016,
of Wagner’s operations, particularly in Africa, where
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Russia’s Wagner Private Military Company (PMC)
Wagner gained access to valuable natural resource
suffering numerous casualties. Smaller, more professional
concessions.
Wagner units then attacked Ukrainian positions once the
positions were identified and weakened by the human wave
Many analysts also believe Prighozin uses the Wagner
attacks. These attacks appear to have gradually worn down
Group to increase his personal political influence and
Ukrainian defenses, but at a cost tens of thousands of
position. Prighozin reportedly uses Wagner to demonstrate
Wagner convict recruits.
his utility to Russian policymakers, often at the expense of
other Russian elites and agencies, resulting in increased
As the Russian military has underperformed Russian
tension. Prighozin may seek to expand the Wagner Group
intelligence and government expectations, Prighozin has
as a more institutionalized power base within Russian
exploited the Russian military’s failures and sought to
politics. In January 2023, National Security Council
increase his profile by presenting Wagner as a more capable
spokesperson John Kirby stated, “Wagner is becoming a
and efficient service able to achieve objectives the military
rival power center to the Russian military and other Russian
cannot. This has led to public infighting between Prighozin
ministries.”
and the military (as well as other members of the Russian
elite). Prigozhin also alleges the military has sabotaged
Operations
Wagner operations by withholding ammunition and reports
Wagner publicly advertises a full spectrum of “regime
that Wagner can no longer recruit from prisons in Russia.
security” services, including propaganda and other
information operations. The marketing emphasizes that
Despite these tensions, reports indicate local Russian
these services come without the conditionality often
military and Wagner commanders maintain cordial
associated with Western donor support. Wagner has been
relations. Wagner must rely on the Russian military for
linked to numerous human rights and war crimes violations,
logistics and artillery support. As such, Wagner does not
including in Ukraine and in African countries where
operate entirely independently of the Russian military and
Wagner operates. Some operations seem to have a clear
instead is an auxiliary force that is part of a complex and
connection to Russian foreign policy objectives, whereas
evolving set of command relationships.
others appear to be equally (or more) commercial in nature.
To conduct its activities, the Wagner Group uses various
U.S. Policy and Issues Before Congress
corporate entities and shell companies to shield its
In 2017, the Trump Administration designated the Wagner
operations from scrutiny and financial sanctions
Group for financial sanctions and entry restrictions under
Executive Order (E.O.) 13660, pertaining to Ukraine. In
Wagner Group personnel appear to range from relatively
2022, the Department of State also designated it pursuant to
professional and well-equipped veterans of the Russian
E.O. 14024 for operating in the defense and related materiel
military to, most recently, convicts recruited hastily from
sector of the Russian economy. In January 2023, the Biden
Russian prisons to fight in Ukraine. Even prior to Russia’s
Administration designated it as a Transnational Criminal
2022 invasion of Ukraine, there appeared to be significant
Organization under E.O. 13581, as amended by E.O. 13863,
variation in the quality of personnel. Some operators and
citing its implication in human rights abuses in CAR and
those that garnered the highest salaries came from elite
Mali, and concurrently designated it under E.O. 13667,
units of the Russian military; others have less military
pertaining to CAR. The United States also has designated
experience, and some observers describe them as
Prigozhin, multiple Wagner subsidiaries, and associated
“adventurers” rather than military professionals.
individuals and entities for sanctions under E.O.s pertaining
to Russia, election interference, cybercrime, and the conflict
Russia’s War in Ukraine
in CAR.
The Wagner Group has played a large role in Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine. The group’s role became more
Several bills introduced in the 118th Congress would
prominent around mid-2022, after the Russian military’s
establish additional actions to counter the Wagner Group,
initial failure to achieve key objectives. Wagner has been
increase executive branch reporting on its activities, or
linked to numerous instances of potential war crimes and
both. At least two bills, H.R. 506 and S. 416, would seek to
human rights violations in Ukraine, even against its own
require the Secretary of State to designate the Wagner
personnel.
Group a Foreign Terrorist Organization. Such a designation
could have implications for U.S. relations with Russia or
Initially, Wagner reportedly provided small groups of
other countries whose governments have contracted
relatively well-trained and equipped personnel to support
Wagner’s services.
the Russian military. As the war continued and the Russian
military continued to underperform, Wagner expanded to
Members may consider whether to pursue other available
conduct large-scale operations, specifically seeking to
legislative and oversight options to further restrict and
capture the Ukrainian town of Bakhmut. Prighozin also
counter the growing global presence of the Wagner Group.
recruited large numbers of convicts from prisons across
Members also may consider whether to investigate other
Russia to fight in Ukraine, with the promise of clemency.
strategies and tools for the United States to incentivize
countries away from engaging with the Wagner Group.
Instead of massed artillery, Wagner adopted new tactics to
Additionally, Members may investigate what measures are
weaken Ukrainian forces. Specifically, it used “human
available to assist in the identification and prosecution of
wave” attacks, in which units composed of convicts
Wagner Group personnel involved in war crimes and
launched indiscriminate assaults against Ukrainian forces,
human rights abuses.
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Russia’s Wagner Private Military Company (PMC)
Andrew S. Bowen, Analyst in Russian and European
Affairs
IF12344
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF12344 · VERSION 1 · NEW