China-Russia Relations
Updated September 13, 2023
China-Russia Relations
The People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) and the
guide collaboration in this sphere. The PRC and Russia are
Russian Federation (Russia) maintain a strategic and
founding members of the Eurasia-based Shanghai
multifaceted relationship with extensive military,
Cooperation Organization (SCO), an intergovernmental
diplomatic, and economic connections. Although the
group mainly focused on security affairs.
contemporary China-Russia relationship began with the
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the two countries
The PRC and Russia also enjoy strong commercial and
share a longer history that has included periods of security
financial ties and are partners in their attempts to “de-
and diplomatic cooperation, rivalry, and crises and a border
dollarize” the global economy, which they see as beholden
war in the 1960s. Many experts trace the current dynamism
to the United States. (See CRS In Focus IF11885, De-
of the relationship to 2014, when the reaction of the United
Dollarization Efforts in China and Russia.) Both
States, the European Union (EU), and some other countries
governments express opposition to the use of unilateral
to Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine, including sanctions,
sanctions as tools of policy.
led Moscow to seek to strengthen its ties with China and
other countries.
The PRC and Russia often cooperate and coordinate in
multilateral settings, including the United Nations; the
The two countries’ apparent affinity has led some U.S.
SCO; the BRICS grouping; and the Group of 20 (G20). In
policymakers and Members of Congress to express concern
2022, the PRC joined Russia in vetoing a U.S.-led draft
that Beijing and Moscow constitute a de facto alliance, and
U.N. resolution that would have tightened sanctions against
to seek ways to counter their global influence. The PRC and
North Korea over its missile launches. Where frictions may
Russia’s bilateral relationship falls short of a mutual
arise, the PRC and Russia have tried to harmonize the
defense pact, more closely resembling a non-binding
interests of overlapping ventures, such as the Belt and Road
alignment based on shared opposition to what they describe
Initiative (BRI) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU).
as the U.S.-led international order. This common opposition
has spurred cooperation between the two countries, but has
PRC and Russian Perspectives
not overcome their historical strategic mistrust. In the wake
PRC officials frequently describe the current moment as a
of Russia’s renewed invasion of Ukraine starting in 2022,
“historic high” in the China-Russia relationship, with the
Russia’s reliance on China’s economic and political support
two sides mutually supporting each other’s positions on
has grown, increasing China’s advantage in the
national sovereignty, security, territorial integrity, and
relationship.
economic development. For the PRC, one of the guiding
principles of the relationship would seem to be flexibility,
Key Features of the Relationship
as is evident in its call to “form partnerships, not alliances.”
Building on the foundation of the 1991 Sino-Soviet Border
This approach has allowed it to distance itself from some of
Agreement, the 2001 Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and
Russia’s behavior in the international arena. Russia’s role
Friendly Cooperation, among other things, noted Beijing’s
as a strategic partner in global affairs has at times been
and Moscow’s satisfaction on border issues and set broad
disruptive for the PRC, which values access to the markets,
areas of cooperation ranging from economics and trade to
including capital markets, of the United States and Europe.
counterterrorism. The renewal of the treaty in 2021 reflects
the overall positive trajectory of relations.
Russian concerns over China’s economic advantage often
are overshadowed by the benefits (and, perhaps, necessity)
The direction of the bilateral relationship appears, in part, to
of greater economic, political, and military cooperation.
reflect close personal ties between Presidents Xi Jinping
Despite being aware of the practical benefits of a close
and Vladimir Putin. Since 2013, Xi and Putin have met
relationship with the PRC, Russian policymakers remain
numerous times and established regular dialogue
guarded and harbor skepticism toward China’s leaders. This
mechanisms at lower levels. In 2019, PRC and Russian
includes avoiding the binding obligations of a formal
leaders announced their intention to develop a
alliance, especially commitments that could draw it into a
“Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of Coordination for a
potential conflict over Taiwan. Russian officials appear to
New Era,” professing a “high degree of political trust” and
reject the label of a “junior” partner and seek to manage the
“all-around cooperation.”
relationship on mutually beneficial terms.
Military cooperation between the PRC and Russia is
Selected Issues
significant, encompassing exchanges and joint exercises, as
well as intelligence sharing and joint development of
Challenging the Global Order
weapons systems. In November 2021, the two sides signed
PRC and Russian officials view each other as partners in
a Road Map for Military Co-operation for 2021-2025 to
their efforts to challenge the U.S.-led global order. During a
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China-Russia Relations
phone call with Putin on December 30, 2022, Xi expressed
largest individual importers of Russian natural gas. (For
that “in a changing and turbulent international environment,
more on economic relations between China and Russia, see
it is important that China and Russia remain true to the
CRS In Focus IF12120, China’s Economic and Trade Ties
original aspiration of cooperation, maintain strategic focus,
with Russia.)
enhance strategic coordination,” and “continue to be each
other’s development opportunity and global partner.”
Impact of Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has drawn increased scrutiny
A number of experts contend that while the PRC and Russia
to the Beijing-Moscow relationship, including questions
both appear to reject the current world order, their visions
regarding the extent to which China is willing and able to
of what ought to replace it may not be consistent. Many
relieve sanctions pressure on Russia. China has avoided
analysts view the PRC as a “revisionist” power working to
public condemnation of Russia’s actions, even though some
change certain aspects of the existing order, possibly with
observers believe Russia’s invasion strained relations.
the intention of superseding it in the long run. PRC officials
According to these observers, China was unaware of
often depict China’s vision for global order as based on the
Russia’s plans and remains unwilling to be drawn into the
principles of state sovereignty and non-interference in
conflict. Russia, meanwhile, appears to be turning to China
domestic affairs, and contrast it with the current order,
to circumvent Western sanctions, including selling oil and
which they describe as having subordinated these principles
purchasing critical components for its defense industry. A
to human rights and interventionism. Russian policymakers
July 2023 report by the Office of the Director of National
argue that the existing global order ignores the position and
Intelligence found that the PRC has become “an even more
sovereignty of great powers other than the United States,
critical economic partner for Russia” since the latter’s 2022
and denies other powers what Russian policymakers view
invasion of Ukraine.
as legitimate spheres of influence. Russian leaders therefore
attempt to push back against what they see as U.S. unipolar
Some trade data suggests some PRC firms may be
overreach, and to remind the United States of Russia’s great
providing dual-use goods to Russia that may be
power status and role in the international system.
contributing to its war effort. However, it is unclear
whether and to what extent these activities are state-
Defense Cooperation
directed. Media reports suggest the PRC government is
The PRC and Russia are close partners in military and
selective in its engagement, allowing transactions that
defense affairs. The PRC historically has been a major
maximize advantages to China—such as buying oil at a
buyer of Russian arms to modernize its military. Defense
discount—but is unwilling to supply lethal weaponry.
trade has become more complex as the PRC’s defense
industry has grown more sophisticated, reportedly
The Biden Administration has repeatedly warned China
increasing Russian concerns about technology transfer and
against assisting Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In January
intellectual property violations. Russia’s defense industry
2023, State Department Spokesperson Ned Price stated:
relies on importing key components and investment from
“We’ve been very clear with the PRC, including in private
China for the development of advanced weapon systems.
[ ... ] about any costs that would befall the PRC should they
decide to assist Russia in a systematic effort to evade U.S.
The two countries conduct combined military exercises,
sanctions or in the provision of security assistance that
developing interoperability, and increasing defense sector
would then be used against the Ukrainian people in
cooperation and joint arms development. Russia has sought
Ukraine.” Sixteen firms registered in China have been
to increase its participation in military exercises with the
sanctioned pursuant Executive Order 14024 in connection
PRC, including at the strategic and tactical level, as well as
to Russia’s invasion.
naval exercises and air patrols in the Asia Pacific. Russia
arguably conducts these exercises to develop
Issues for Congress
interoperability with PRC forces and to signal that Russia
U.S. policymakers, including in Congress, have identified
remains a player in the region. In August 2023, a joint PRC
countering coordinated PRC and Russian challenges to the
and Russian flotilla conducted a maritime patrol in areas
current international order as a top national security
including the vicinity of Alaska.
priority. Both the Trump and Biden Administrations
included such language in their national security strategies.
Energy and Economics
The James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act
Economic relations between China and Russia are
for Fiscal Year 2023 (P.L. 117-263) requires a report on
asymmetrical; China’s economy is considerably larger and
whether and how the PRC has provided support to Russia
more dynamic. China is Russia’s second largest export
with respect to its war against Ukraine. The Consolidated
market after the EU; Russia is China’s ninth largest.
Appropriations Act, 2023 (P.L. 117-328) appropriated $325
Russia’s role as a key provider of PRC energy imports is a
million and $300 million, respectively, for the Countering
defining feature of the bilateral relationship. According to
PRC Influence Fund and Countering Russian Influence
PRC customs data, Russia tied Saudi Arabia as China’s
Fund. The 118th Congress may review how these funds are
largest source of crude oil in 2022, providing approximately
being used to counter PRC and Russian narratives. It may
17% of China’s total imports. China’s planned transition
also consider how sanctions, including sanctions on PRC-
away from coal potentially could lead to a greater role for
based entities, may affect China-Russia relations.
Russian hydrocarbons (including “green coal” and natural
gas). The Power of Siberia Pipeline, which is expected to
Ricardo Barrios, Analyst in Asian Affairs
reach full capacity by 2027, could make China one of the
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China-Russia Relations
IF12100
Andrew S. Bowen, Analyst in Russian and European
Affairs
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF12100 · VERSION 11 · UPDATED