Japanese Prime Minister Abe’s Resignation and the U.S.-Japan Alliance
Updated September 24, 2020
Japanese Prime Minister Abe’s Resignation and the U.S.-Japan
Alliance
Introduction
digitization agency. In the week after becoming premier,
On August 28, 2020, after weeks of rumors in the press,
Suga’s poll numbers soared over the 60% mark, fueling
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced that he
speculation that he would dissolve the Diet’s Lower House
would resign due to the resurgence of a chronic health
and call for elections—which do not have to be held until
condition. The next month he was succeeded by his close
October 2021—in order to cement his mandate.
advisor, Yoshihide Suga. Abe, the longest-serving premier
in modern Japanese history, had been in power since 2012,
Abe’s Legacy
bringing unusual stability to Japanese politics and foreign
Abe’s longevity in office stabilized Japanese politics, which
policy. During his tenure, he expanded Japan’s military and
had been in turmoil in the years prior to his election with a
diplomatic capabilities and championed the U.S.-Japan
string of short-lived prime ministers. He also had moderate
alliance by, among other steps, aligning bilateral security
success in lifting Japan’s struggling economy through a
policy and integrating military operations more tightly.
series of reforms known as “Abenomics,” although Japan’s
economy has contracted severely during the pandemic.
Abe forged a personal relationship with President Trump to
further Japan’s interests, succeeding in convincing Trump
Abe raised Japan’s international stature through new
to adopt Abe’s vision of the Indo-Pacific strategy. He also
partnerships in Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Europe.
avoided a contentious trade fight over autos while
The Abe Administration led the resurrection of the TPP
concluding a limited trade agreement that covers about 5%
after the United States pulled out, creating a successor
of bilateral trade flows. However, the warm rapport
agreement among the remaining 11 countries. In recent
between the two leaders was insufficient to persuade Trump
years, the Abe Administration successfully managed
to remain in the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)
tensions with China that had threatened to become an active
trade agreement or support Japan’s priorities in dealing with
conflict over a set of disputed islands known as the
North Korea. While Abe received praise for strengthening
Senkakus to Japan and the Diaoyutai to China. Although
the U.S.-Japan military partnership, some observers see
Tokyo assesses the Chinese military poses a growing threat
indications of cracks that have developed, particularly in
to the Senkakus and Japan’s security interests more
the areas of cost-sharing and joint weapons deployments
broadly, day-to-day tensions have decreased.
that will almost immediately create challenges for Suga.
Abe also arguably was a cornerstone, and in some ways the
Suga Succeeds Abe
inspiration for, major elements of the Trump
Following Abe’s resignation, his ruling Liberal Democratic
Administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy, which seeks to
Party (LDP) overwhelmingly voted for Suga to serve out
compete better economically, diplomatically, and militarily
Abe’s term as party president, which ends in September
with China. Abe ensured that Japan was a major partner in
2021. Japan’s parliament, dominated by the LDP, elected
many of the Administration’s initiatives, particularly
Suga to serve as prime minister. Suga (born in 1948) served
involving Australia, key Southeast Asian countries, and
as Abe’s Chief Cabinet Secretary, Japan’s second-most
India. It is unclear whether Abe’s successor will continue,
powerful official, and was perhaps the most critical behind-
expand, or curtail this approach, particularly if U.S.-China
the-scenes player in Abe’s Cabinet.
relations continue to worsen.
Suga pledged to advance Abe’s initiatives, including
Despite these achievements, Abe fell short on several of his
revitalizing Japan’s economy and supporting the U.S.-Japan
chief goals. Domestically, he could not overcome structural
alliance. He announced a Cabinet that retained many of
obstacles and divided public opinion to amend Japan’s
Abe’s ministers in key positions, but drew some criticism
pacifist constitution to explicitly reference Japan’s military
for including only two women in Cabinet posts. Observers
forces. In foreign policy, Abe was not able to conclude a
contend that Suga lacks Abe’s deep experience in and
deal with Russia to resolve a territorial dispute over islands
passion for foreign affairs, which he used to bolster the
north of Japan that Russia has occupied since World War II.
U.S.-Japan alliance and raise Japan’s global stature.
Abe’s goal of bringing home Japanese citizens abducted by
Instead, Suga throughout his political career has been
North Korean agents decades ago also was not realized, and
animated most by domestic reform issues; aside from
behind the scenes Abe cautioned against Trump’s embrace
combating COVID-19, he has identified his priorities as
of diplomacy with Pyongyang. Relations with South Korea
administrative and structural reforms such as creating a
worsened considerably, and bitter disputes over trade and
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Japanese Prime Minister Abe’s Resignation and the U.S.-Japan Alliance
wartime legacy issues between Seoul and Tokyo harmed
August 2020, shortly before Abe announced his resignation,
U.S. interests by blocking most trilateral security
the LDP called on the Japanese government to consider
cooperation with these key U.S. allies.
acquiring this capability; some observers expect the change
could be reflected in Japan’s National Security Strategy
Burden-Sharing Negotiations Loom
update, expected in late 2020. If adopted, it would represent
The timing of Abe’s resignation allowed him to avoid one
a drastic shift in Japan’s defense policy.
of the most fraught issues facing the alliance: the question
of how Japan and the United States share the costs of
Movement toward adopting a strike mission—sometimes
hosting U.S. military troops in Japan. About 54,000 U.S.
referred to as “counterattack” by Japanese strategists, who
troops are stationed in Japan and are based in 85 facilities.
insist the capability would only be used in a defensive
Currently, Japan pays roughly $2 billion per year to defray
manner—has been driven in part by North Korea’s
the cost of stationing U.S. military personnel in Japan. In
increasingly capable missile forces and China’s regional
addition, Japan pays compensation to localities hosting U.S.
assertiveness. It also reflects aspirations by some Japanese
troops, rent for the bases, and the costs of new facilities to
to achieve greater strategic autonomy, as well as concerns
support the realignment of U.S. troops. Japan’s current five-
that the U.S. commitment to the alliance is waning. Japan’s
year cost-sharing agreement with the United States, known
adoption of a counterattack mission could mark a departure
as the “Special Measures Agreement” or SMA, is due to be
from the long-standing division of labor in the alliance with
renegotiated before the end of 2020.
the United States as the “spear” and Japan as the “shield.”
Given the United States’ protracted and bitter SMA talks
COVID-19 Outbreaks in U.S. Troops in
with South Korea, which are ongoing, Japanese officials
Okinawa
expect the Trump Administration to demand steep increases
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreaks on U.S.
in Japan’s contributions. According to former National
bases in Japan—which appeared to peak in late summer and
Security Advisor John Bolton’s memoir, Trump demanded
have since declined—have alarmed some Japanese
that Japan pay $8 billion annually; press reports say the
communities, many of which are struggling to contain the
United States seeks $5 billion. While such cost-sharing
virus spread, thereby introducing new complications into
talks are always contentious, some analysts expect that a
alliance relations. The outbreaks among U.S. troops in
new U.S. Administration could make future negotiations
Okinawa—where the U.S. military presence has been a
easier. For decades, Trump has expressed doubts about the
long-standing source of tension—have caused particular
value of U.S. alliances, including the U.S.-Japan alliance.
consternation. Part of Abe’s focus on the alliance included
reaffirming a U.S.-Japan plan to relocate a controversial
Japan Suspends Aegis Ashore Plans
U.S. Marine Corps base to a less-congested part of the
In an about-face that surprised many U.S. and Japanese
prefecture. The plan is widely unpopular in Okinawa, and
observers, in June 2020, Japan suspended its planned
local sentiment toward the troops could turn more negative
purchase from the United States of two Aegis Ashore
due to public health concerns.
ballistic missile defense batteries. Cost overruns, technical
challenges, and opposition from local communities near the
Okinawan Governor Denny Tamaki requested that the U.S.
planned deployment sites factored in the suspension.
military suspend rotations into the island in order to prevent
Japan’s acquisition of Aegis Ashore had been announced in
the spread of the virus. By mid-August U.S. Forces Japan
2017, as North Korea ramped up nuclear and ballistic
(USFJ) had reported more than 300 servicemembers based
missile testing. Alliance officials had touted the move as a
in Okinawa had tested positive. Japan has established
central component of Japan’s defense against North Korea.
safeguards preventing inbound travelers to Japan from
In addition to Japan’s seven Aegis-equipped naval ships
spreading the virus, but the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces
and Patriot Advanced Capability 3 interceptors, Aegis
Agreement, or SOFA, which governs the legal treatment of
Ashore would have provided a new layer of defense against
USFJ personnel stationed in Japan, allows U.S. military
incoming North Korean ballistic missiles for Japan and U.S.
personnel to fly directly into U.S. bases, rather than through
forces stationed there.
commercial airports that implement testing procedures.
This exception has led to some concern about U.S.
Whether Japan will pursue alternative ballistic missile
personnel spreading the virus in Japan.
defense options is unclear. According to U.S. defense
officials, the deployment would have afforded the U.S.
USFJ has been operating under a country-wide Public
military the flexibility to deploy its own Aegis ships now
Health Emergency since April 2020 and has limited
defending Japan to other parts of the region, including the
personnel movement. This includes a mandatory 14-day
South China Sea, Philippine Sea, and Indian Ocean.
Restriction of Movement for all inbound USFJ personnel in
addition to contact tracing and similar measures.
Toward a More Autonomous Defense?
The Aegis Ashore decision has intensified a decades-long
Emma Chanlett-Avery, Coordinator, Specialist in Asian
debate over whether Japan should acquire strike
Affairs
capabilities. Although Japan is pursuing other missile
Caitlin Campbell, Analyst in Asian Affairs
systems for defensive purposes, it currently does not have
Mark E. Manyin, Specialist in Asian Affairs
the ability to conduct missile strikes on enemy territory. In
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Japanese Prime Minister Abe’s Resignation and the U.S.-Japan Alliance
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