September 8, 2020
Japanese Prime Minister Abe’s Resignation and the U.S.-Japan
Alliance
Introduction
defense (defense of another country against attack) and the
On August 28, 2020, after weeks of rumors in the press,
subsequent legislation to adjust alliance operations helped
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced that he
bolster the alliance and raised Japan’s global stature.
would resign due to the resurgence of a chronic health
condition. Abe, the longest-serving premier in modern
Abe’s Legacy
Japanese history, had been in power since 2012, bringing
Abe’s longevity in office also stabilized Japanese politics,
unusual stability to Japanese politics and foreign policy.
which had been in turmoil in the previous years with a
During his tenure, he expanded Japan’s military and
string of short-lived prime ministers. He also had moderate
diplomatic capabilities and championed the U.S.-Japan
success in lifting Japan’s struggling economy through a
alliance by, among other steps, aligning bilateral security
series of reforms known as “Abenomics,” although Japan’s
policy and integrating military operations more tightly.
economy has contracted severely during the pandemic.
Abe forged a personal relationship with President Trump to
Abe also raised Japan’s international stature through new
further Japan’s interests, succeeding in convincing Trump
partnerships in Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Europe.
to adopt Abe’s vision of the Indo-Pacific strategy. He also
The Abe Administration led the resurrection of the TPP
avoided a contentious trade fight over autos while
after the United States pulled out, creating a successor
concluding a limited trade agreement that covers about 5%
agreement among the remaining 11 countries. In recent
of bilateral trade flows. However, the warm rapport
years, the Abe Administration successfully managed
between the two leaders was insufficient to persuade Trump
tensions with China that had threatened to become an active
to remain in the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)
conflict over a set of disputed islands known as the
trade agreement or support Japan’s priorities in dealing with
Senkakus to Japan and the Diaoyutai to China. Although
North Korea. While Abe received praise for strengthening
Tokyo assesses the Chinese military poses a growing threat
the U.S.-Japan military partnership, some observers see
to the Senkakus and Japan’s security interests more
indications of cracks that have developed, particularly in
broadly, day-to-day tensions have decreased in recent years.
the areas of cost-sharing and joint weapons deployments
that will almost immediately create challenges for Abe’s
Abe also arguably was a cornerstone, and in some ways the
successor.
inspiration for, major elements of the Trump
Administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy, which seeks to
The Succession Process
compete better economically, diplomatically, and militarily
Abe’s resignation will not trigger new general elections.
with China. Abe ensured that Japan was a major partner in
The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is to select a
many of the Administration’s initiatives, particularly
new party leader to serve out Abe’s term, which ends in
involving Australia, key Southeast Asian countries, and
September 2021. Abe did not cultivate a successor, but the
India. It is unclear whether Abe’s successor will continue,
intra-party process favors insiders and the LDP’s largest
expand, or curtail this approach, particularly if U.S.-China
factions are supporting Yoshihide Suga, Abe’s Chief
relations continue to worsen.
Cabinet Secretary since 2012 and Japan’s second-most
powerful official. Suga was perhaps the most critical
Despite these achievements, Abe fell short on several of his
behind-the-scenes player in Abe’s Cabinet. Other
chief goals. Domestically, he could not overcome structural
contenders are former Foreign Minister Fumio Kushida
obstacles and divided public opinion to amend Japan’s
and former Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba, who ran
pacifist constitution to explicitly reference Japan’s military
against Abe in 2012 and 2018. Ishiba tops most polls
forces. In foreign policy, Abe was not able to conclude a
among the Japanese public, but is reportedly not well-liked
deal with Russia to resolve a territorial dispute over islands
by many LDP leaders.
north of Japan that Russia has occupied since World War II.
Abe’s goal of bringing home Japanese citizens abducted by
None of the aspirants are expected to make a radical break
North Korean agents decades ago also was not realized, and
from Abe’s strong support for the U.S.-Japan alliance, but
behind the scenes Abe cautioned against Trump’s embrace
they also are unlikely to have Abe’s political or diplomatic
of diplomacy with Pyongyang. Relations with South Korea
heft, which allowed him to make sometimes controversial
worsened considerably, and bitter disputes over trade and
decisions. For example, the Abe Administration’s efforts to
wartime legacy issues between Seoul and Tokyo harmed
reinterpret the constitution to allow for collective self-
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Japanese Prime Minister Abe’s Resignation and the U.S.-Japan Alliance
U.S. interests by blocking most trilateral security
systems for defensive purposes, it currently does not have
cooperation with these key U.S. allies.
the ability to conduct missile strikes on enemy territory. In
August 2020, shortly before Abe announced his resignation,
Burden-Sharing Negotiations Loom
the LDP called on the Japanese government to consider
The timing of Abe’s resignation allowed him to avoid one
acquiring this capability; some observers expect the change
of the most fraught issues facing the alliance: the question
could be reflected in Japan’s National Security Strategy
of how Japan and the United States share the costs of
update, expected in late 2020. If adopted, it would represent
hosting U.S. military troops in Japan. About 54,000 U.S.
a drastic shift in Japan’s defense policy.
troops are stationed in Japan and are based in 85 facilities.
Currently, Japan pays roughly $2 billion per year to defray
Movement toward adopting a strike mission—sometimes
the cost of stationing U.S. military personnel in Japan. In
referred to as “counterattack” by Japanese strategists, who
addition, Japan pays compensation to localities hosting U.S.
insist the capability would only be used in a defensive
troops, rent for the bases, and the costs of new facilities to
manner—has been driven in part by North Korea’s
support the realignment of U.S. troops. Japan’s current five-
increasingly capable missile forces and China’s regional
year cost-sharing agreement with the United States, known
assertiveness. It also reflects aspirations by some Japanese
as the “Special Measures Agreement” or SMA, is due to be
to achieve greater strategic autonomy, as well as concerns
renegotiated before the end of 2020.
that the U.S. commitment to the alliance is waning. Japan’s
adoption of a counterattack mission could mark a departure
Given the United States’ protracted and bitter SMA talks
from the longstanding division of labor in the alliance with
with South Korea, which are ongoing, Japanese officials
the United States as the “spear” and Japan as the “shield.”
expect the Trump Administration to demand steep increases
in Japan’s contributions. According to former National
COVID-19 Outbreaks in U.S. Troops in
Security Advisor John Bolton’s memoir, Trump demanded
Okinawa
that Japan pay $8 billion annually; press reports say the
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreaks on U.S.
United States seeks $5 billion. While such cost-sharing
bases have alarmed some Japanese communities, many of
talks are always contentious, some analysts expect that a
which are struggling to contain the virus spread, thereby
new U.S. Administration could make future negotiations
introducing new complications into alliance relations. The
easier. For decades, Trump has expressed doubts about the
outbreaks among U.S. troops in Okinawa—where the U.S.
value of U.S. alliances, including the U.S.-Japan alliance.
military presence has been a long-standing source of
tension—have caused particular consternation. Part of
Japan Suspends Aegis Ashore Plans
Abe’s focus on the alliance included using his political
In an about-face that surprised many U.S. and Japanese
capital to reaffirm a U.S.-Japan plan to relocate a
observers, in June 2020 Japan suspended its planned
controversial U.S. Marine Corps base to a less-congested
purchase from the United States of two Aegis Ashore
part of the prefecture. The plan is widely unpopular in
ballistic missile defense batteries. Cost overruns, technical
Okinawa, and local sentiment toward the troops could turn
challenges, and opposition from local communities near the
more negative due to public health concerns.
planned deployment sites factored in the suspension.
Japan’s acquisition of Aegis Ashore had been announced in
Okinawan Governor Denny Tamaki requested that the U.S.
2017, as North Korea ramped up nuclear and ballistic
military suspend rotations into the island in order to prevent
missile testing. U.S. and Japanese officials had touted the
the spread of the virus. As of mid-August U.S. Forces Japan
move as a central component of Japan’s defense against
(USFJ) reported more than 300 service members based in
North Korea. In addition to Japan’s seven Aegis-equipped
Okinawa had tested positive. Japan has avoided the worst of
naval ships and Patriot Advanced Capability 3 interceptors,
the pandemic, in part because it has established safeguards
Aegis Ashore would have provided a new layer of defense
preventing inbound travelers to Japan from spreading the
against incoming North Korean ballistic missiles for Japan
virus. Some in Japan have expressed concerns that U.S.
and U.S. forces stationed there.
military personnel and their families could skirt these public
health requirements. The U.S.-Japan Status of Forces
Whether Japan will pursue alternative ballistic missile
Agreement, or SOFA, which governs the legal treatment of
defense options is unclear. U.S. officials offered a muted
USFJ personnel stationed in Japan, allows U.S. military
response to the cancellation, and it remains to be seen how
personnel to fly directly into U.S. bases, rather than through
the decision will affect U.S. defense planning. According to
commercial airports that implement testing procedures.
U.S. defense officials, the deployment would have afforded
the U.S. military the flexibility to deploy its own Aegis
USFJ has been operating under a country-wide Public
ships currently defending Japan to other parts of the region,
Health Emergency since April 2020 and has limited
including the South China Sea, Philippine Sea, and Indian
personnel movement. This includes a mandatory 14-day
Ocean.
Restriction of Movement for all inbound USFJ personnel in
addition to contact tracing and similar measures.
Toward a More Autonomous Defense?
The Aegis Ashore decision has intensified a decades-long
Emma Chanlett-Avery, Coordinator, Specialist in Asian
debate over whether Japan should acquire strike
Affairs
capabilities. Although Japan is pursuing other missile
Caitlin Campbell, Analyst in Asian Affairs
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Japanese Prime Minister Abe’s Resignation and the U.S.-Japan Alliance

IF11644
Mark E. Manyin, Specialist in Asian Affairs


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11644 · VERSION 1 · NEW

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