Election Security: Federal Funding for Securing Election Systems
link to page 2 
Updated May 8, 2023
Election Security: Federal Funding for Securing Election
Systems
Foreign efforts to interfere in the 2016 elections highlighted
technology and security. Explanatory statements
the potential for threats to the technologies, facilities, and
accompanying the FY2018 and FY2020 acts also explicitly
processes used to administer elections. The federal
listed the following as permissible uses of the funds:
government has responded to such threats, in part, by
• replacing paperless voting equipment,
proposing and providing funding that can be used to help
secure election systems.
• implementing post-election audits,
This In Focus offers an overview of federal funding for
• addressing cyber vulnerabilities in election systems,
election system security. It starts by describing funding
•
Congress and federal agencies have made available since
providing election officials with cybersecurity training,
the 2016 elections for securing election technologies,
• instituting election system cybersecurity best practices,
facilities, and processes. It then summarizes legislative
and
proposals to authorize or appropriate further funding.
• making other improvements to the security of federal
The In Focus does not cover funding for addressing threats
elections.
to election workers or the health and safety risks to voters
and election officials posed by the Coronavirus Disease
Each eligible recipient was guaranteed a minimum amount
2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. For more on federal funding
under each of the above appropriations acts, with some
proposed or provided for those purposes, see CRS Insight
entitled to additional funds based on voting-age population
IN11831, Election Worker Safety and Privacy, by Sarah J.
(see Table 1 for the total amount available to each eligible
Eckman and Karen L. Shanton; and CRS Report R46646,
recipient under all four acts). The 50 states, DC, and Puerto
Election Administration: Federal Grant Funding for States
Rico have been required to provide a 5% match for the
and Localities, by Karen L. Shanton.
FY2018 funding and a 20% match for the FY2020,
FY2022, and FY2023 funds. All recipients have also been
Federal Funding
expected to submit plans for use of the funding to the U.S.
States, territories, and localities have primary responsibility
Election Assistance Commission (EAC) and report to the
for securing elections, but federal agencies also play a role
agency on their spending.
in helping identify and address election system threats and
According to the EAC, which is charged with administering
vulnerabilities. Since the 2016 elections, Congress has
the funds, just over $874 million of the $880 million
provided funding that can be used to help secure election
available for FY2018, FY2020, and FY2022 had been
systems both to states, territories, and the District of
distributed to the states, territories, and DC as of March 15,
Columbia (DC) and to federal agencies. Agencies have also
2023. Spending plans and budgets for the FY2023 funds
designated some of the funding they have received for more
were due to the agency on February 28, 2023.
general purposes for activities related to election system
security.
In addition to the HAVA funding Congress designated
specifically for elections activities, some funding has also
Funding for States, Territories, and DC
been available for securing election systems under more
The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA; P.L. 107-
general purpose grant programs. The U.S. Department of
252) established a grant program for making certain general
Homeland Security (DHS) has encouraged recipients of its
improvements to election administration. Congress has
State and Local Cybersecurity Grants to include election
included funding for that grant program in multiple regular
officials on their Cybersecurity Planning Committees, for
appropriations acts since the 2016 elections: $380 million,
example, and required FY2023 State Homeland Security
$425 million, $75 million, and $75 million, respectively, in
Program and Urban Area Security Initiative grantees to
the consolidated appropriations acts for FY2018 (P.L. 115-
allocate a share of their funds to enhancing election
141), FY2020 (P.L. 116-93), FY2022 (P.L. 117-103), and
security. For more on some of those grant programs, see
FY2023 (P.L. 117-328). All four rounds of funding were
CRS Report R44669, Department of Homeland Security
available to the 50 states, DC, American Samoa, Guam,
Preparedness Grants: A Summary and Issues, by Shawn
Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the FY2020,
Reese.
FY2022, and FY2023 funds were also available to the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI).
Funding for Federal Agencies
Various federal agencies play a role in helping secure
The appropriations acts made the HAVA funding broadly
election systems. The EAC is dedicated to election
available for general improvements to the administration of
administration, for example, and DHS’s Cybersecurity and
federal elections, including improvements to election
Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has taken on new
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Election Security: Federal Funding for Securing Election Systems
election security responsibilities following the department’s
example, proposed FY2021 appropriations bills and
2017 designation of election systems as critical
amendments to FY2019 measures would have provided
infrastructure. For more on the EAC, federal agencies’
funding under the same provisions of HAVA and the same
work on election security, and the critical infrastructure
or similar terms and conditions as the FY2018, FY2020,
designation, respectively, see CRS Report R45770, The
FY2022, and FY2023 consolidated appropriations acts.
U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC): Overview and
Some Members have also introduced legislation to
Selected Issues for Congress, by Karen L. Shanton; CRS
authorize other election system security spending. The For
Report R46146, Campaign and Election Security Policy:
the People Act of 2021 (H.R. 1/S. 1/S. 2093) would have
Overview and Recent Developments for Congress,
authorized grant programs for various election security
coordinated by R. Sam Garrett; and CRS In Focus IF10677,
purposes, including replacing paperless voting systems, for
The Designation of Election Systems as Critical
example, and the 118th Congress’s Sustaining Our
Infrastructure, by Brian E. Humphreys.
Democracy Act (S. 630) would provide for ongoing
funding for securing election infrastructure and other
Congress has designated some of the funding it has
elections activities.
appropriated to such agencies specifically for helping
secure election systems. Report language for recent DHS
Such proposals have taken various approaches to helping
appropriations measures has recommended funding for
CISA’s election security
secure election systems. Some of the ways they vary are
initiatives, for example, and the
explanatory statement accompanying the FY2023
• Type of threat addressed. Election systems face
consolidated appropriations act directed the department’s
multiple threats. Bad actors might target technological,
Science and Technology Directorate to consider research on
physical, or human vulnerabilities in the system, or
voting technologies and election data security procedures.
more than one of the above. Funding proposals
introduced since the 2016 elections have aimed to
Agencies may also choose to spend some of the funding
address several types of threat. For example, the FAST
they receive for more general purposes on activities related
Voting Act of 2019 (H.R. 1512) would have authorized
to election system security. The Defense Advanced
funding that could be used to secure the physical chain
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has provided funding
of custody of voting machines, among other purposes,
to advance development of a secure, open-source voting
and the EAC Reauthorization Act of 2017 (H.R. 794)
system, for example, and the National Science Foundation
would have authorized funding for grants to upgrade the
(NSF) has awarded grants for voting technology research.
technological security of voter registration lists.
Table 1. Total HAVA General Improvements Grant
• Timing of response. Efforts to secure election systems
Funding Allocated to Each Eligible Recipient Under
can be aimed at mitigating a risk at any point in their
the FY2018, FY2020, FY2022, and FY2023
lifecycles (e.g., identifying, protecting, detecting,
Consolidated Appropriations Acts
responding, or recovering). Funding has been proposed
($, rounded in millions)
for interventions at various points. Some of the funding
provisions of the SAFE Act (H.R. 2722/S. 2053/S.
AL
15.2 IN
18.7 NV
11.1 TN
18.7
2238; 116th Congress) were directed at protecting
AK
8.0 IA
11.8 NH
8.6 TX
57.9
election systems against attacks, for example, while
others would have helped officials respond to them.
AZ
18.6 KS
11.3 NJ
24.1 UT
10.7
• Specificity of uses. Some of the funding provisions of
AR
11.5 KY
14.3 NM
9.9 VT
8.0
election security bills have focused on specific
CA
85.2 LA
14.5 NY
47.9 VA
22.4
activities. Others would authorize appropriations for
more general purposes and delegate responsibility for
CO
15.8 ME
8.6 NC
25.7 WA
19.7
identifying the best uses of the funds to states or other
CT
12.9 MD
17.5 ND
8.0 WV
9.7
entities. For example, the Election Security Assistance
Act of 2019 (H.R. 3412) would have left decisions about
DE
8.0 MA
19.5 OH
29.9 WI
17.2
how to use its payments largely to states, territories, and
DC
8.0 MI
26.3 OK
13.0 WY
8.0
DC. The 115th Congress’s Secure Elections Act (H.R.
6663/S. 2261/S. 2593) would have established an
FL
47.7 MN
16.3 OR
13.4 AS
1.6
election cybersecurity advisory panel, among other
GA
25.6 MS
11.5 PA
33.1
provisions, and authorized a grant program for
CNMI
1
implementing the panel’s guidelines.
HI
8.7 MO
17.8 RI
8.2 GU
1.6
Among the proposed bills listed above, an FY2021
ID
8.9 MT
8.1 SC
15.0 PR
8.9
consolidated appropriations bill (H.R. 7617) and versions of
the SAFE Act (H.R. 2722) and the For the People Act of
IL
32.4 NE
9.4 SD
8.0 VI
1.6
2021 (H.R. 1) were passed by the House. None of the other
Source: CRS, based on data from the EAC.
proposals had passed either chamber as of this writing.
Legislative Proposals
Karen L. Shanton, Analyst in American National
Proposals to provide states, territories, and DC with funding
Government
they can use to help secure their elections have been offered
in each appropriations cycle since the 2016 elections. For
IF11286
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Election Security: Federal Funding for Securing Election Systems
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to
congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has
been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the
United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be
reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include
copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you
wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11286 · VERSION 5 · UPDATED
Updated May 8, 2023
Election Security: Federal Funding for Securing Election
Systems
Foreign efforts to interfere in the 2016 elections highlighted
technology and security. Explanatory statements
the potential for threats to the technologies, facilities, and
accompanying the FY2018 and FY2020 acts also explicitly
processes used to administer elections. The federal
listed the following as permissible uses of the funds:
government has responded to such threats, in part, by
• replacing paperless voting equipment,
proposing and providing funding that can be used to help
secure election systems.
• implementing post-election audits,
This In Focus offers an overview of federal funding for
• addressing cyber vulnerabilities in election systems,
election system security. It starts by describing funding
•
Congress and federal agencies have made available since
providing election officials with cybersecurity training,
the 2016 elections for securing election technologies,
• instituting election system cybersecurity best practices,
facilities, and processes. It then summarizes legislative
and
proposals to authorize or appropriate further funding.
• making other improvements to the security of federal
The In Focus does not cover funding for addressing threats
elections.
to election workers or the health and safety risks to voters
and election officials posed by the Coronavirus Disease
Each eligible recipient was guaranteed a minimum amount
2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. For more on federal funding
under each of the above appropriations acts, with some
proposed or provided for those purposes, see CRS Insight
entitled to additional funds based on voting-age population
IN11831, Election Worker Safety and Privacy, by Sarah J.
(see Table 1 for the total amount available to each eligible
Eckman and Karen L. Shanton; and CRS Report R46646,
recipient under all four acts). The 50 states, DC, and Puerto
Election Administration: Federal Grant Funding for States
Rico have been required to provide a 5% match for the
and Localities, by Karen L. Shanton.
FY2018 funding and a 20% match for the FY2020,
FY2022, and FY2023 funds. All recipients have also been
Federal Funding
expected to submit plans for use of the funding to the U.S.
States, territories, and localities have primary responsibility
Election Assistance Commission (EAC) and report to the
for securing elections, but federal agencies also play a role
agency on their spending.
in helping identify and address election system threats and
According to the EAC, which is charged with administering
vulnerabilities. Since the 2016 elections, Congress has
the funds, just over $874 million of the $880 million
provided funding that can be used to help secure election
available for FY2018, FY2020, and FY2022 had been
systems both to states, territories, and the District of
distributed to the states, territories, and DC as of March 15,
Columbia (DC) and to federal agencies. Agencies have also
2023. Spending plans and budgets for the FY2023 funds
designated some of the funding they have received for more
were due to the agency on February 28, 2023.
general purposes for activities related to election system
security.
In addition to the HAVA funding Congress designated
specifically for elections activities, some funding has also
Funding for States, Territories, and DC
been available for securing election systems under more
The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA; P.L. 107-
general purpose grant programs. The U.S. Department of
252) established a grant program for making certain general
Homeland Security (DHS) has encouraged recipients of its
improvements to election administration. Congress has
State and Local Cybersecurity Grants to include election
included funding for that grant program in multiple regular
officials on their Cybersecurity Planning Committees, for
appropriations acts since the 2016 elections: $380 million,
example, and required FY2023 State Homeland Security
$425 million, $75 million, and $75 million, respectively, in
Program and Urban Area Security Initiative grantees to
the consolidated appropriations acts for FY2018 (P.L. 115-
allocate a share of their funds to enhancing election
141), FY2020 (P.L. 116-93), FY2022 (P.L. 117-103), and
security. For more on some of those grant programs, see
FY2023 (P.L. 117-328). All four rounds of funding were
CRS Report R44669, Department of Homeland Security
available to the 50 states, DC, American Samoa, Guam,
Preparedness Grants: A Summary and Issues, by Shawn
Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the FY2020,
Reese.
FY2022, and FY2023 funds were also available to the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI).
Funding for Federal Agencies
Various federal agencies play a role in helping secure
The appropriations acts made the HAVA funding broadly
election systems. The EAC is dedicated to election
available for general improvements to the administration of
administration, for example, and DHS’s Cybersecurity and
federal elections, including improvements to election
Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has taken on new
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Election Security: Federal Funding for Securing Election Systems
election security responsibilities following the department’s
example, proposed FY2021 appropriations bills and
2017 designation of election systems as critical
amendments to FY2019 measures would have provided
infrastructure. For more on the EAC, federal agencies’
funding under the same provisions of HAVA and the same
work on election security, and the critical infrastructure
or similar terms and conditions as the FY2018, FY2020,
designation, respectively, see CRS Report R45770, The
FY2022, and FY2023 consolidated appropriations acts.
U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC): Overview and
Some Members have also introduced legislation to
Selected Issues for Congress, by Karen L. Shanton; CRS
authorize other election system security spending. The For
Report R46146, Campaign and Election Security Policy:
the People Act of 2021 (H.R. 1/S. 1/S. 2093) would have
Overview and Recent Developments for Congress,
authorized grant programs for various election security
coordinated by R. Sam Garrett; and CRS In Focus IF10677,
purposes, including replacing paperless voting systems, for
The Designation of Election Systems as Critical
example, and the 118th Congress’s Sustaining Our
Infrastructure, by Brian E. Humphreys.
Democracy Act (S. 630) would provide for ongoing
funding for securing election infrastructure and other
Congress has designated some of the funding it has
elections activities.
appropriated to such agencies specifically for helping
secure election systems. Report language for recent DHS
Such proposals have taken various approaches to helping
appropriations measures has recommended funding for
CISA’s election security
secure election systems. Some of the ways they vary are
initiatives, for example, and the
explanatory statement accompanying the FY2023
• Type of threat addressed. Election systems face
consolidated appropriations act directed the department’s
multiple threats. Bad actors might target technological,
Science and Technology Directorate to consider research on
physical, or human vulnerabilities in the system, or
voting technologies and election data security procedures.
more than one of the above. Funding proposals
introduced since the 2016 elections have aimed to
Agencies may also choose to spend some of the funding
address several types of threat. For example, the FAST
they receive for more general purposes on activities related
Voting Act of 2019 (H.R. 1512) would have authorized
to election system security. The Defense Advanced
funding that could be used to secure the physical chain
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has provided funding
of custody of voting machines, among other purposes,
to advance development of a secure, open-source voting
and the EAC Reauthorization Act of 2017 (H.R. 794)
system, for example, and the National Science Foundation
would have authorized funding for grants to upgrade the
(NSF) has awarded grants for voting technology research.
technological security of voter registration lists.
Table 1. Total HAVA General Improvements Grant
• Timing of response. Efforts to secure election systems
Funding Allocated to Each Eligible Recipient Under
can be aimed at mitigating a risk at any point in their
the FY2018, FY2020, FY2022, and FY2023
lifecycles (e.g., identifying, protecting, detecting,
Consolidated Appropriations Acts
responding, or recovering). Funding has been proposed
($, rounded in millions)
for interventions at various points. Some of the funding
provisions of the SAFE Act (H.R. 2722/S. 2053/S.
AL
15.2 IN
18.7 NV
11.1 TN
18.7
2238; 116th Congress) were directed at protecting
AK
8.0 IA
11.8 NH
8.6 TX
57.9
election systems against attacks, for example, while
others would have helped officials respond to them.
AZ
18.6 KS
11.3 NJ
24.1 UT
10.7
• Specificity of uses. Some of the funding provisions of
AR
11.5 KY
14.3 NM
9.9 VT
8.0
election security bills have focused on specific
CA
85.2 LA
14.5 NY
47.9 VA
22.4
activities. Others would authorize appropriations for
more general purposes and delegate responsibility for
CO
15.8 ME
8.6 NC
25.7 WA
19.7
identifying the best uses of the funds to states or other
CT
12.9 MD
17.5 ND
8.0 WV
9.7
entities. For example, the Election Security Assistance
Act of 2019 (H.R. 3412) would have left decisions about
DE
8.0 MA
19.5 OH
29.9 WI
17.2
how to use its payments largely to states, territories, and
DC
8.0 MI
26.3 OK
13.0 WY
8.0
DC. The 115th Congress’s Secure Elections Act (H.R.
6663/S. 2261/S. 2593) would have established an
FL
47.7 MN
16.3 OR
13.4 AS
1.6
election cybersecurity advisory panel, among other
GA
25.6 MS
11.5 PA
33.1
provisions, and authorized a grant program for
CNMI
1
implementing the panel’s guidelines.
HI
8.7 MO
17.8 RI
8.2 GU
1.6
Among the proposed bills listed above, an FY2021
ID
8.9 MT
8.1 SC
15.0 PR
8.9
consolidated appropriations bill (H.R. 7617) and versions of
the SAFE Act (H.R. 2722) and the For the People Act of
IL
32.4 NE
9.4 SD
8.0 VI
1.6
2021 (H.R. 1) were passed by the House. None of the other
Source: CRS, based on data from the EAC.
proposals had passed either chamber as of this writing.
Legislative Proposals
Karen L. Shanton, Analyst in American National
Proposals to provide states, territories, and DC with funding
Government
they can use to help secure their elections have been offered
in each appropriations cycle since the 2016 elections. For
IF11286
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Election Security: Federal Funding for Securing Election Systems
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to
congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has
been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the
United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be
reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include
copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you
wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11286 · VERSION 5 · UPDATED