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Updated July 8, 2022
Election Security: Federal Funding for Securing Election
Systems
State and local systems were targeted as part of efforts to
Appropriated Funding
interfere with the 2016 elections, according to the U.S.
States, territories, and localities have primary responsibility
intelligence community. Reports of those activities
for ensuring that election systems are secure, but federal
highlighted the potential for threats to the technologies,
agencies also play a role in helping identify and address
facilities, and processes used to administer elections.
election system threats and vulnerabilities. Since the 2016
Congress has responded to such threats, in part, by
elections, Congress has provided election system security
providing and proposing funding to help secure elections.
funding both to states, territories, and the District of
Columbia (DC) and to federal agencies.
This In Focus offers an overview of federal funding for
securing election systems. It starts with some background
Funding for States, Territories, and DC
on potential threats to state and local election systems and
The consolidated appropriations acts for FY2018 (P.L. 115-
then summarizes the funding Congress has provided and
141), FY2020 (P.L. 116-93), and FY2022 (P.L. 117-103)
proposed to help secure those systems.
included $380 million, $425 million, and $75 million,
Background
respectively, for payments to states, territories, and DC
under the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA; 52
Elections-related systems in all 50 states were likely
U.S.C. §§20901-21145). All three sets of payments were
targeted in the 2016 election cycle, according to a July 2019
available to the 50 states, DC, American Samoa, Guam,
report from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the FY2020
Some attempts to access state and local systems succeeded.
and FY2022 funds were also available to the
Foreign actors reportedly extracted data from the statewide
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI).
voter registration database in one state, for example, and
breached county systems in another.
Funds for the payments were appropriated under provisions
of HAVA that authorize funding for certain general
Multiple techniques were used to target state and local
improvements to election administration, which may
election systems in the 2016 cycle. Attackers tried to access
include security improvements. Explanatory statements
voter registration databases by entering malicious code in
accompanying the FY2018 and FY2020 bills also explicitly
the data fields of state or local websites, for example, and to
listed the following as acceptable uses of the funds:
gain access to county systems by sending election officials
emails with malware attached.
ï‚· replacing paperless voting equipment,
ï‚·
Election systems may also be vulnerable to other types of
implementing postelection audits,
attack. Hacked election office websites or social media
ï‚· addressing cyber vulnerabilities in election systems,
accounts might be used to disseminate disinformation, for
ï‚· providing election officials with cybersecurity training,
example. Malware might be spread among non-internet-
ï‚· instituting election system cybersecurity best practices,
connected voting machines, computer scientist J. Alex
and
Halderman has testified, in the course of programming the
ï‚· making other improvements to the security of federal
machines with ballot designs. Individuals with access to
elections.
election storage facilities might tamper with ballot boxes.
Each eligible recipient was guaranteed a minimum payment
Some threats to election systems may also be compounded
under each appropriations bill, with some recipients eligible
by the structure of U.S. election administration. States,
for additional funds based on voting-age population (see
territories, and localities—which have primary
Table 1 for the total amount available to each eligible
responsibility for conducting elections in the United
recipient under all three bills). The 50 states, DC, and
States—use different election equipment and processes and
Puerto Rico are required to provide a 5% match for the
have varying levels of access to security resources and
FY2018 funding and a 20% match for the FY2020 and
expertise. This decentralization may help guard against
FY2022 funds. All funding recipients are expected to
large-scale, coordinated attacks, but it also offers potential
submit plans for use of the payments to the U.S. Election
attackers multiple possible points of entry, some of which
Assistance Commission (EAC) and report on how they
may be less well defended than others.
spend their funds.
Limited attacks on less well defended jurisdictions might
According to the EAC, which is charged with administering
undermine voters’ confidence in the legitimacy of the
the payments, eligible recipients had received all but $7,665
election process or the winners it produces. In some cases,
of the available FY2018 and FY2020 funding as of March
some have suggested, such small-scale attacks might also
be capable of changing election outcomes.
https://crsreports.congress.gov

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Election Security: Federal Funding for Securing Election Systems
31, 2022. Spending plans and budgets for the FY2022 funds
appropriations measures would have provided funding
were due to the EAC on May 2, 2022.
under the same provisions of HAVA and the same or
similar terms and conditions as the FY2018, FY2020, and
Table 1. Total HAVA Funding Allocated to Each
FY2022 bills.
Eligible Recipient Under the FY2018, FY2020, and
FY2022 Consolidated Appropriations Acts
Some Members have also introduced bills to authorize other
election system security spending. For example, the For the
($, rounded in millions)
People Act of 2021 (H.R. 1/S. 1/S. 2093) would authorize
AL
14.2 IN
17.4 NV
10.1 TN
17.4
grant programs for various election system security
purposes, including replacing paperless voting systems, and
AK
7.0 IA
10.8 NH
7.6 TX
53.7
the 117th Congress’s Freedom to Vote Act (S. 2747),
AZ
17.2 KS
10.3 NJ
22.4 UT
9.7
Freedom to Vote: John R. Lewis Act (H.R. 5746), and
Sustaining Our Democracy Act (H.R. 7992/S. 4239) would
AR
10.5 KY
13.3 NM
8.9 VT
7.0
provide for ongoing funding for securing election
CA
79.3 LA
13.5 NY
44.7 VA
20.9
infrastructure and other elections activities.
CO
14.6 ME
7.6 NC
23.9 WA
18.2
Such proposals have taken various approaches to securing
election systems. Some of the ways in which they vary are:
CT
11.9 MD
16.2 ND
7.0 WV
8.7
ï‚· Type of Threat Addressed. Election systems face
DE
7.0 MA
18.1 OH
27.9 WI
16.0
multiple threats. Bad actors might target technological,
DC
7.0 MI
24.5 OK
12.0 WY
7.0
physical, or human vulnerabilities in the system, for
example, or more than one of the above. Funding
FL
44.2 MN
15.2 OR
12.4 AS
1.4
proposals offered since the 2016 elections have aimed to
GA
23.7 MS
10.5 PA
30.9
address several types of threat. For example, the FAST
CNMI
0.8
Voting Act of 2019 (H.R. 1512) would have authorized
HI
7.7 MO
16.6 RI
7.2 GU
1.4
funding that could be used for securing the physical
chain of custody of voting machines, among other
ID
7.9 MT
7.1 SC
13.9 PR
8.4
purposes, and the EAC Reauthorization Act of 2017
IL
30.3 NE
8.4 SD
7.0 VI
1.4
(H.R. 794) would have authorized appropriations for
Source: CRS, based on data from the EAC.
payments to upgrade the technological security of voter
registration lists.
Notes: Figures reflect the total HAVA funds available to each eligible
recipient under the FY2018, FY2020, and FY2022 consolidated
ï‚· Timing of Response. Efforts to secure election systems
appropriations acts. They do not include HAVA funds available under
can be aimed at mitigating a risk at any point in its
the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act.
lifecycle (e.g., identifying, protecting, detecting,
responding, or recovering). Funding has been proposed
Funding for Federal Agencies
for interventions at various points. Some of the funding
Multiple federal agencies, from the Department of
provisions of the SAFE Act (H.R. 2722; 116th Congress)
Homeland Security (DHS) to the Department of Justice, are
were directed at protecting election systems against
involved in helping secure election systems. For more
attacks, for example, while others would have helped
information about the role of any given agency, see CRS
officials respond to them.
Report R45302, Federal Role in U.S. Campaigns and
ï‚· Specificity of Uses. Some of the funding provisions of
Elections: An Overview, by R. Sam Garrett.
election system security bills have focused on specific
Congress has designated some of the funding it has
activities. Others would authorize appropriations for
appropriated to such agencies specifically for helping
more general purposes and delegate responsibility for
secure election systems. For example, DHS designated
identifying the best uses of the funds to states or other
election systems as critical infrastructure in January 2017,
entities. The Election Security Assistance Act of 2019
and report language for subsequent DHS appropriations
(H.R. 3412), for example, would have left decisions
measures has recommended funding for the agency’s
about how to use its payments largely to states and
election security initiatives.
territories. The 115th Congress’s Secure Elections Act
(H.R. 6663/S. 2261/S. 2593) would, among other
Agencies may also spend some of the funding they receive
provisions, have established an election cybersecurity
for more general purposes on activities related to election
advisory panel and authorized a grant program for
system security. The EAC devotes some of its operational
implementing the panel’s guidelines.
funding to developing voluntary guidelines for voting
systems, for example, and the Defense Advanced Research
Among the proposed bills listed above, an FY2021
Projects Agency has provided funding to advance
consolidated appropriations bill (H.R. 7617), the Freedom
development of a secure, open-source voting system.
to Vote: John R. Lewis Act (H.R. 5746; 117th Congress),
the SAFE Act (H.R. 2722; 116th Congress), and a version of
Proposed Funding
the For the People Act of 2021 (H.R. 1) have been passed
Proposals to provide states with grant funding for election
by the House. None of the other legislative proposals listed
system security have been offered in each appropriations
above had passed either chamber as of this writing.
cycle since the 2016 elections. For example, proposed
FY2021 appropriations bills and amendments to FY2019
https://crsreports.congress.gov

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Election Security: Federal Funding for Securing Election Systems

Karen L. Shanton, Analyst in American National
Government
IF11286


Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to
congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has
been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the
United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be
reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include
copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you
wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11286 · VERSION 3 · UPDATED

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