TurkStream: Russia’s Southern Pipeline to Europe
link to page 1 
Updated May 6, 2021
TurkStream: Russia’s Southern Pipeline to Europe
Gazprom, Russia’s leading state-owned energy company,
understanding with BOTAŞ Petroleum Pipeline
has long sought to protect its share of Europe’s natural gas
Corporation, a Turkish state-owned company, to construct
market. Along with the controversial and still unfinished
TurkStream.
Nord Stream 2 project (see CRS In Focus IF11138,
Russia’s Nord Stream 2 Pipeline: Continued Uncertainty),
Russian President Putin and Turkish President Recep
Gazprom’s TurkStream project may strengthen Russia’s
Tayyip Erdogan inaugurated TurkStream in January 2020.
foothold in European energy markets, especially in
The TurkStream system consists of two parallel pipelines
southeastern Europe. It also could cement Turkey’s
with a total capacity of 31.5 billion cubic meters (BCM) per
longtime status as a lead recipient of Russian gas, even as
year (15.75 BCM each). The pipelines enter the water in
Russia’s overall share of Turkish gas imports has recently
Anapa, Russia, and make landfall in Kiyikoy, close to
decreased.
Turkey’s border with Bulgaria. The first pipeline supplies
natural gas to Turkey (for more on Turkey’s status as a
Opponents of the TurkStream project, including some
regional energy transport hub, see CRS Report R41368,
Members of Congress, have expressed concern that the
Turk ey: Background and U.S. Relations). The second
project could erode Ukraine’s transit role for natural gas.
pipeline, for which onshore construction continues, extends
Many analysts maintain that Moscow could use its energy
into southeastern Europe and has begun to deliver gas to
exports as leverage in countries that are dependent upon
some markets there.
Russian natural gas. The United States, in turn, supports
projects to diversify natural gas supplies to Europe and
Many analysts view TurkStream as a counter to the U.S.-
undercut Russia’s market dominance.
backed Southern Gas Corridor project, which transports
natural gas from Azerbaijan to Europe. The Southern Gas
Background
Corridor includes three connecting pipelines: the South
The EU is Russia’s largest natural gas export market. In
Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) in Azerbaijan and Georgia; the
2019, Russia supplied about 38% of the EU’s natural gas
Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) through Turkey; and
imports. Turkey is Russia’s largest gas export market after
the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), which extends from
the EU, although volumes have fluctuated. Due to Turkish
Greece to Italy via Albania and the Adriatic Sea. These
increases in pipeline supply from Azerbaijan and spot
three pipelines have an annual total capacity of 16 BCM—
purchases from liquefied natural gas (LNG) suppliers such
roughly half the total planned capacity of TurkStream. The
as Qatar and the United States, Russia’s share of Turkey’s
first delivery of gas through TANAP to Turkey was in June
imports decreased from about 50% in 2018 to around 33%
2018, and TAP made its first deliveries in late 2020. Turkey
in 2019 and 2020. However, long-term supply contracts and
has contracted for 6 BCM from TANAP, and 10 BCM is to
other factors may affect Turkish efforts to maintain or
continue on through TAP (mostly to Italy and also to
broaden diversification.
Greece and Bulgaria).
Russia has exported natural gas to Turkey through several
Figure 1. Southeastern European Gas Infrastructure
pipelines (see Figure 1). The north-south Trans-Balkan
Pipeline (TBP), completed in the late 1980s, transported
Russian gas to Turkey until January 2020. Via Ukraine,
TBP crosses Moldova, Romania, and Bulgaria. In addition
to transporting gas to these countries and Turkey, TBP also
delivered Russian gas to North Macedonia and Greece. The
Blue Stream pipeline, which became operational in 2003, is
a joint project between Gazprom and Italy’s Eni that
crosses the Black Sea and makes landfall in central Turkey.
The TurkStream project arose after the 2014 cancellation of
Russia’s South Stream project, a Gazprom-led venture that
would have transported Russian natural gas across the
Black Sea to Bulgaria and further into Europe. The South
Stream project collapsed in the wake of Russia’s invasion
of Ukraine and amid a dispute between Gazprom and the
EU involving regulatory issues. In late 2014, Russian
Source: Created by CRS using data from U.S. Department of State,
President Vladimir Putin announced South Stream’s
IHS, ESRI, European Network of Transmission System Operators for
cancellation as Gazprom signed a memorandum of
Gas, and Bulgartransgaz.
https://crsreports.congress.gov
TurkStream: Russia’s Southern Pipeline to Europe
Southeastern European Market
Since then, and particularly after Putin showed support for
The second line of TurkStream is to transport Russian
Erdogan during the 2016 coup attempt in Turkey, Turkey
natural gas to southeastern and central European markets
and Russia have cultivated closer ties. They have more
via Bulgaria, Serbia, and Hungary. This European
closely coordinated some actions in Syria, while moving
extension, also referred to as TurkStream 2 and Balkan
forward with TurkStream, construction of Turkey’s first
Stream, comprises new and existing infrastructure. Pipeline
nuclear power plant, and the sale of a Russian S-400 air
construction in Bulgaria and Serbia, totaling about 550
defense system to Turkey. Although some differences
miles in length, is largely complete. Several compressor
persist (e.g., in Syria, Libya, and Ukraine), the two
stations and a segment connecting TurkStream to
countries’ general rapprochement has come as U.S.-Turkey
Hungarian infrastructure have not yet been completed.
relations have worsened.
In January 2020, Gazprom began deliveries via TurkStream
U.S. Policy Considerations
to Turkey, Bulgaria, Greece, and North Macedonia using
Congress and successive U.S. Administrations have
partially completed and existing infrastructure. Since then,
expressed concern over Nord Stream 2, TurkStream, and
Gazprom also has made deliveries via TurkStream to
other projects they assert will deepen Europe’s reliance on
Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Romania. TurkStream
Russian natural gas, reduce Ukraine’s role as a transit state,
has largely supplanted TBP’s role in delivering gas to
and may be a source of increased leverage for Russia. The
southeastern Europe and Turkey. As of late 2020, TBP was
Nord Stream system and TurkStream are to provide Russia
operating at less than 5% capacity, according to Ukrainian
with a total additional capacity of over 140 BCM a year to
energy officials.
Europe (including Turkey); this amount nearly equals
Ukraine’s total transit capacity of 146 BCM.
Observers consider gas markets in southeastern Europe to
be less interconnected relative to other regions of Europe
The Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia
and more reliant upon Russia as a gas supplier.
Act of 2017 (P.L. 115-44, Title II) authorizes sanctions on
TurkStream’s proponents in Bulgaria, Serbia, and Hungary
those who invest at least $1 million (or $5 million over 12
assert that the project will strengthen energy security by
months) or provide goods, services, or support valued at the
opening a new supply route; the region experienced major
same amount for the construction of Russian energy export
wintertime supply disruptions in 2009 when Russia
pipelines, including the second line of TurkStream (22
temporarily halted exports via Ukraine due to a gas contract
U.S.C. §9526).
dispute. Officials also are keen to secure transit revenue
from TurkStream. Some analysts, however, caution that
Additionally, the Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Act
TurkStream’s extension could deepen Russia’s market
of 2019, as amended in 2020 (PEESA; 22 U.S.C. §9526
dominance and leverage in some countries, including where
note), establishes sanctions on foreign persons who the
Russian-origin companies already have a significant
President determines have sold, leased, provided, or
economic footprint through energy assets.
facilitated the provision of vessels for the purpose of subsea
pipe-laying activities related to the construction of Nord
At the same time, others note that southeastern European
Stream 2 and TurkStream or any successor pipeline. As
gas markets are evolving. Existing and planned regional
amended, PEESA also targets those who provide
interconnectors and LNG terminals could further integrate
underwriting services or insurance and those who provide
gas markets and widen access to alternative suppliers.
certain upgrades or installation services. Sanctions do not
Among other developments, Gazprom’s share of Greek gas
apply to nonbusiness entities of the EU, member states, or
imports has fluctuated in recent years as LNG imports
some other European governments.
increased and TAP began deliveries in late 2020. Planned
regional interconnectors could expand Bulgaria and
U.S. officials and many Members of Congress have
Serbia’s access to supplies via LNG and TAP, as well.
expressed support for initiatives to increase energy security
and diversification in Europe. The European Energy
Relations Between Russia and Turkey
Security and Diversification Act of 2019 (22 U.S.C. §§9561
It is unclear to what extent TurkStream reflects or
et seq.) enables support through the U.S. International
reinforces seemingly improved ties between Russia and
Development Finance Corporation (DFC) for some types of
Turkey, traditional rivals whose relations often have been
energy projects in Europe by easing country-income-level
fraught. Turkey is a NATO member and a long-standing
restrictions. In December 2020, DFC approved an initial
U.S. ally with geostrategic importance. Some analysts view
$300 million commitment to the investment fund of the
the Turkey-Russia relationship as less a potential strategic
Three Seas Initiative, a U.S.-backed platform among 12 EU
partnership than a “marriage of convenience” as the two
member states in central and southeastern Europe
countries compartmentalize relations, alternating between
(including Hungary and Bulgaria) aimed at expanding
cooperation and competition depending on the issue.
regional connectivity in energy and other sectors (see CRS
In Focus IF11547, The Three Seas Initiative).
A low point in Russia-Turkey relations—and TurkStream
Sarah E. Garding, Analyst in European Affairs
negotiations—came in 2015-2016, after Turkey downed a
Michael Ratner, Specialist in Energy Policy
Russian plane near the Turkey-Syria border and Russia
Cory Welt, Specialist in Russian and European Affairs
temporarily imposed sanctions until receiving an apology
from Turkish President Erdogan.
Jim Zanotti, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
IF11177
https://crsreports.congress.gov
TurkStream: Russia’s Southern Pipeline to Europe
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to
congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has
been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the
United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be
reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include
copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permissio n of the copyright holder if you
wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11177 · VERSION 4 · UPDATED
Updated May 6, 2021
TurkStream: Russia’s Southern Pipeline to Europe
Gazprom, Russia’s leading state-owned energy company,
understanding with BOTAŞ Petroleum Pipeline
has long sought to protect its share of Europe’s natural gas
Corporation, a Turkish state-owned company, to construct
market. Along with the controversial and still unfinished
TurkStream.
Nord Stream 2 project (see CRS In Focus IF11138,
Russia’s Nord Stream 2 Pipeline: Continued Uncertainty),
Russian President Putin and Turkish President Recep
Gazprom’s TurkStream project may strengthen Russia’s
Tayyip Erdogan inaugurated TurkStream in January 2020.
foothold in European energy markets, especially in
The TurkStream system consists of two parallel pipelines
southeastern Europe. It also could cement Turkey’s
with a total capacity of 31.5 billion cubic meters (BCM) per
longtime status as a lead recipient of Russian gas, even as
year (15.75 BCM each). The pipelines enter the water in
Russia’s overall share of Turkish gas imports has recently
Anapa, Russia, and make landfall in Kiyikoy, close to
decreased.
Turkey’s border with Bulgaria. The first pipeline supplies
natural gas to Turkey (for more on Turkey’s status as a
Opponents of the TurkStream project, including some
regional energy transport hub, see CRS Report R41368,
Members of Congress, have expressed concern that the
Turk ey: Background and U.S. Relations). The second
project could erode Ukraine’s transit role for natural gas.
pipeline, for which onshore construction continues, extends
Many analysts maintain that Moscow could use its energy
into southeastern Europe and has begun to deliver gas to
exports as leverage in countries that are dependent upon
some markets there.
Russian natural gas. The United States, in turn, supports
projects to diversify natural gas supplies to Europe and
Many analysts view TurkStream as a counter to the U.S.-
undercut Russia’s market dominance.
backed Southern Gas Corridor project, which transports
natural gas from Azerbaijan to Europe. The Southern Gas
Background
Corridor includes three connecting pipelines: the South
The EU is Russia’s largest natural gas export market. In
Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) in Azerbaijan and Georgia; the
2019, Russia supplied about 38% of the EU’s natural gas
Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) through Turkey; and
imports. Turkey is Russia’s largest gas export market after
the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), which extends from
the EU, although volumes have fluctuated. Due to Turkish
Greece to Italy via Albania and the Adriatic Sea. These
increases in pipeline supply from Azerbaijan and spot
three pipelines have an annual total capacity of 16 BCM—
purchases from liquefied natural gas (LNG) suppliers such
roughly half the total planned capacity of TurkStream. The
as Qatar and the United States, Russia’s share of Turkey’s
first delivery of gas through TANAP to Turkey was in June
imports decreased from about 50% in 2018 to around 33%
2018, and TAP made its first deliveries in late 2020. Turkey
in 2019 and 2020. However, long-term supply contracts and
has contracted for 6 BCM from TANAP, and 10 BCM is to
other factors may affect Turkish efforts to maintain or
continue on through TAP (mostly to Italy and also to
broaden diversification.
Greece and Bulgaria).
Russia has exported natural gas to Turkey through several
Figure 1. Southeastern European Gas Infrastructure
pipelines (see Figure 1). The north-south Trans-Balkan
Pipeline (TBP), completed in the late 1980s, transported
Russian gas to Turkey until January 2020. Via Ukraine,
TBP crosses Moldova, Romania, and Bulgaria. In addition
to transporting gas to these countries and Turkey, TBP also
delivered Russian gas to North Macedonia and Greece. The
Blue Stream pipeline, which became operational in 2003, is
a joint project between Gazprom and Italy’s Eni that
crosses the Black Sea and makes landfall in central Turkey.
The TurkStream project arose after the 2014 cancellation of
Russia’s South Stream project, a Gazprom-led venture that
would have transported Russian natural gas across the
Black Sea to Bulgaria and further into Europe. The South
Stream project collapsed in the wake of Russia’s invasion
of Ukraine and amid a dispute between Gazprom and the
EU involving regulatory issues. In late 2014, Russian
Source: Created by CRS using data from U.S. Department of State,
President Vladimir Putin announced South Stream’s
IHS, ESRI, European Network of Transmission System Operators for
cancellation as Gazprom signed a memorandum of
Gas, and Bulgartransgaz.
https://crsreports.congress.gov
TurkStream: Russia’s Southern Pipeline to Europe
Southeastern European Market
Since then, and particularly after Putin showed support for
The second line of TurkStream is to transport Russian
Erdogan during the 2016 coup attempt in Turkey, Turkey
natural gas to southeastern and central European markets
and Russia have cultivated closer ties. They have more
via Bulgaria, Serbia, and Hungary. This European
closely coordinated some actions in Syria, while moving
extension, also referred to as TurkStream 2 and Balkan
forward with TurkStream, construction of Turkey’s first
Stream, comprises new and existing infrastructure. Pipeline
nuclear power plant, and the sale of a Russian S-400 air
construction in Bulgaria and Serbia, totaling about 550
defense system to Turkey. Although some differences
miles in length, is largely complete. Several compressor
persist (e.g., in Syria, Libya, and Ukraine), the two
stations and a segment connecting TurkStream to
countries’ general rapprochement has come as U.S.-Turkey
Hungarian infrastructure have not yet been completed.
relations have worsened.
In January 2020, Gazprom began deliveries via TurkStream
U.S. Policy Considerations
to Turkey, Bulgaria, Greece, and North Macedonia using
Congress and successive U.S. Administrations have
partially completed and existing infrastructure. Since then,
expressed concern over Nord Stream 2, TurkStream, and
Gazprom also has made deliveries via TurkStream to
other projects they assert will deepen Europe’s reliance on
Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Romania. TurkStream
Russian natural gas, reduce Ukraine’s role as a transit state,
has largely supplanted TBP’s role in delivering gas to
and may be a source of increased leverage for Russia. The
southeastern Europe and Turkey. As of late 2020, TBP was
Nord Stream system and TurkStream are to provide Russia
operating at less than 5% capacity, according to Ukrainian
with a total additional capacity of over 140 BCM a year to
energy officials.
Europe (including Turkey); this amount nearly equals
Ukraine’s total transit capacity of 146 BCM.
Observers consider gas markets in southeastern Europe to
be less interconnected relative to other regions of Europe
The Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia
and more reliant upon Russia as a gas supplier.
Act of 2017 (P.L. 115-44, Title II) authorizes sanctions on
TurkStream’s proponents in Bulgaria, Serbia, and Hungary
those who invest at least $1 million (or $5 million over 12
assert that the project will strengthen energy security by
months) or provide goods, services, or support valued at the
opening a new supply route; the region experienced major
same amount for the construction of Russian energy export
wintertime supply disruptions in 2009 when Russia
pipelines, including the second line of TurkStream (22
temporarily halted exports via Ukraine due to a gas contract
U.S.C. §9526).
dispute. Officials also are keen to secure transit revenue
from TurkStream. Some analysts, however, caution that
Additionally, the Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Act
TurkStream’s extension could deepen Russia’s market
of 2019, as amended in 2020 (PEESA; 22 U.S.C. §9526
dominance and leverage in some countries, including where
note), establishes sanctions on foreign persons who the
Russian-origin companies already have a significant
President determines have sold, leased, provided, or
economic footprint through energy assets.
facilitated the provision of vessels for the purpose of subsea
pipe-laying activities related to the construction of Nord
At the same time, others note that southeastern European
Stream 2 and TurkStream or any successor pipeline. As
gas markets are evolving. Existing and planned regional
amended, PEESA also targets those who provide
interconnectors and LNG terminals could further integrate
underwriting services or insurance and those who provide
gas markets and widen access to alternative suppliers.
certain upgrades or installation services. Sanctions do not
Among other developments, Gazprom’s share of Greek gas
apply to nonbusiness entities of the EU, member states, or
imports has fluctuated in recent years as LNG imports
some other European governments.
increased and TAP began deliveries in late 2020. Planned
regional interconnectors could expand Bulgaria and
U.S. officials and many Members of Congress have
Serbia’s access to supplies via LNG and TAP, as well.
expressed support for initiatives to increase energy security
and diversification in Europe. The European Energy
Relations Between Russia and Turkey
Security and Diversification Act of 2019 (22 U.S.C. §§9561
It is unclear to what extent TurkStream reflects or
et seq.) enables support through the U.S. International
reinforces seemingly improved ties between Russia and
Development Finance Corporation (DFC) for some types of
Turkey, traditional rivals whose relations often have been
energy projects in Europe by easing country-income-level
fraught. Turkey is a NATO member and a long-standing
restrictions. In December 2020, DFC approved an initial
U.S. ally with geostrategic importance. Some analysts view
$300 million commitment to the investment fund of the
the Turkey-Russia relationship as less a potential strategic
Three Seas Initiative, a U.S.-backed platform among 12 EU
partnership than a “marriage of convenience” as the two
member states in central and southeastern Europe
countries compartmentalize relations, alternating between
(including Hungary and Bulgaria) aimed at expanding
cooperation and competition depending on the issue.
regional connectivity in energy and other sectors (see CRS
In Focus IF11547, The Three Seas Initiative).
A low point in Russia-Turkey relations—and TurkStream
Sarah E. Garding, Analyst in European Affairs
negotiations—came in 2015-2016, after Turkey downed a
Michael Ratner, Specialist in Energy Policy
Russian plane near the Turkey-Syria border and Russia
Cory Welt, Specialist in Russian and European Affairs
temporarily imposed sanctions until receiving an apology
from Turkish President Erdogan.
Jim Zanotti, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
IF11177
https://crsreports.congress.gov
TurkStream: Russia’s Southern Pipeline to Europe
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to
congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has
been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the
United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be
reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include
copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permissio n of the copyright holder if you
wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11177 · VERSION 4 · UPDATED