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April 11, 2019
TurkStream: Another Russian Gas Pipeline to Europe
Russia’s state-owned natural gas company Gazprom has
Turkey’s status as a regional energy transport hub, see CRS
long sought to protect its share of Europe’s natural gas
Report R41368, Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations,
market. Along with the controversial Nord Stream 2 project
by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.
(see CRS In Focus IF11138, Nord Stream 2: A Fait
Accompli?
), Gazprom’s TurkStream project could
Many analysts view TurkStream as a counter to the U.S.-
strengthen Russia’s foothold in the European energy
backed Southern Gas Corridor project, which is to transport
market, especially southern Europe. It also could cement
natural gas from Azerbaijan to Europe. The Southern Gas
Turkey’s status as a lead recipient of Russian gas, at a time
Corridor, in its present form, includes three connecting
of relatively strong Turkish-Russian relations. Opponents of
pipelines with an annual capacity of 16 BCM—roughly half
the TurkStream project, including the Trump
the proposed capacity of TurkStream: the South Caucasus
Administration and some Members of Congress, have
Pipeline (SCP) in Azerbaijan and Georgia; the Trans-
expressed concern that the project could also help erode
Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) through Turkey; and the
Ukraine’s transit role for natural gas.
Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), currently under construction
from Greece to Italy, via Albania. First delivery through
In 2018, Gazprom supplied more than 40% of the EU’s
TANAP to Turkey was in June 2018, and TAP is scheduled
natural gas imports and about 50% of Turkey’s. Many
to begin operations in 2020. Turkey has contracted for 6
analysts maintain that Moscow could use its energy exports
BCM from TANAP, and 10 BCM will continue on to Italy.
as leverage in countries that are dependent upon Russian
natural gas. The United States, in turn, has long supported
Project Status
projects to diversify natural gas supplies to Europe and
TurkStream’s subsea portion was completed in November
undercut Russia’s market dominance.
2018. Construction continues for the onshore component
between the Kiyikoy terminal and Luleburgaz, Turkey.
Background
Turkey is Russia’s largest natural gas export market after
Figure 1. Southern Europe Gas Infrastructure
Germany. Russia currently exports natural gas to Turkey
through several pipelines (see Figure 1). The Blue Stream
pipeline, which became operational in 2003, is a joint
project between Gazprom and Italy’s Eni that crosses the
Black Sea and makes landfall in central Turkey. Russia also
supplies gas to Turkey via the Trans-Balkan gas pipeline,
which crosses Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, and Bulgaria.
The TurkStream project arose after the 2014 cancellation of
Russia’s South Stream project, a Gazprom-led venture that
was launched in 2007 to transport Russian natural gas
across the Black Sea to Bulgaria and farther into Europe. It
was also viewed as a counter to the Western-backed
Nabucco pipeline. The South Stream project collapsed,
however, in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and
amid a dispute between Gazprom and the EU involving EU
regulatory demands. In December 2014, Russian President

Vladimir Putin announced the cancellation of South Stream
Source: Gazprom, edited by CRS.
as Gazprom signed a Memorandum of Understanding with
A proposed extension of the second TurkStream line would
BOTAŞ Petroleum Pipeline Corporation, a Turkish state-
transport Russian natural gas from the Turkish landing
owned company, to construct TurkStream.
point to southern and central European markets, either via
Greece to Italy, or via Bulgaria, Serbia, and Hungary to
The TurkStream project is to consist of two parallel
Austria. The latter route, which Moscow reportedly favors,
pipelines with a total capacity of 31.5 billion cubic meters
would be similar to the canceled South Stream project,
(BCM) per year (15.75 BCM each). The pipelines are to
albeit smaller in scope. Both routes would require
enter the water in Anapa, Russia, and make landfall in
construction of an additional pipeline, and may face issues
Kiyikoy, close to Turkey’s border with Bulgaria and
depending upon ownership structures and EU regulations.
Greece. The first pipeline, which is scheduled for
completion in late 2019, is expected to supply natural gas to
A TurkStream extension to Europe has broad domestic
Turkey. The second pipeline, which remains in the planning
political support in Greece and Bulgaria, which could earn
phase, is intended to deliver gas to European markets via an
revenue from transit fees. Bulgarian leaders stated that an
extension to Bulgaria or Greece. For information on
extension through Bulgaria would dovetail with their
https://crsreports.congress.gov

TurkStream: Another Russian Gas Pipeline to Europe
ambitions to make Bulgaria a “Balkan Gas Hub” for trading
U.S. Policy Considerations
and transporting gas from multiple sources. Sources could
Until recently, congressional and Administration concerns
include not only Russia but also the Southern Gas Corridor,
about European energy dependence on Russia have focused
the Black Sea shelf, and liquefied natural gas (LNG) from
on Nord Stream 2. The Countering Russian Influence in
the United States and other suppliers. Analysts contend that
Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (CRIEEA; P.L. 115-44,
Bulgaria’s hub ambitions are constrained by the country’s
Title II) states that it is U.S. policy to “continue to oppose
limited interconnector infrastructure and storage facilities,
the Nord Stream 2 pipeline given its detrimental impacts on
as well as by its energy market, which would likely require
the EU’s energy security, gas market development in
reforms to be a viable hub.
Central and Eastern Europe, and energy reforms in
Ukraine.” In November 2018, U.S. Secretary of State
Some EU member states have expressed opposition to
Michael Pompeo said that Nord Stream 2 “undermines
natural gas pipelines like Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream
Ukraine’s economic and strategic security and risks further
that would increase Russian gas exports to the EU.
compromising the sovereignty of European nations that
Opponents of these projects are expected to call for strict
depend on Russian gas.” In December 2018, the House of
application of EU natural gas regulations to any proposed
Representatives passed H.Res. 1035, which called for the
pipelines in EU member states such as Greece and Bulgaria.
cancellation of Nord Stream 2 and the imposition of
The regulations require ownership unbundling and third-
sanctions with respect to the project.
party access to pipelines, among other provisions. Under
the EU’s unbundling regulation, Gazprom could not
More recently, U.S. Department of Energy officials,
simultaneously own the pipeline and provide a majority of
including Secretary Rick Perry, have also expressed U.S.
the gas running through it. Russia abandoned South Stream
opposition to TurkStream. In the 116th Congress, H.R. 1081
when the European Commission deemed it noncompliant
would require the Administration to submit reports to
with these rules, and Gazprom was unwilling to modify the
Congress on European energy security, including on U.S.
terms of its agreements with partners in the EU.
efforts to oppose Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream and on
entities involved in the construction of both pipelines.
The impact of EU regulations on TurkStream remains
unclear. On a March 2019 visit to Bulgaria, Russian Prime
It is unclear how existing sanctions might be applied to
Minister Dmitry Medvedev stated that an extension to
TurkStream. CRIEEA authorizes (but does not require)
Europe would not move forward without a guarantee from
sanctions on those who invest at least $1 million, or $5
the European Commission that the extension would be
million over 12 months, or engage in trade valued at an
exempt from EU regulations. Many analysts believe the EU
equivalent amount for the construction of Russian energy
is unlikely to provide such an exemption. Nevertheless, in
export pipelines (§232; 22 U.S.C. 9526). The Trump
recent months Russian officials have met with their
Administration has released guidance noting that Section
counterparts in Bulgaria and Serbia to negotiate pipeline
232 sanctions would not apply to projects for which a
construction in the two countries.
contract was signed before August 2, 2017.
Relations Between Russia and Turkey
Some Members of Congress and the Administration have
It is unclear to what extent TurkStream reflects or
expressed concerns about the impact of Nord Stream 2 and
TurkStream on Ukraine’s role as a transit state for Russian
reinforces seemingly improved ties between Russia and
Turkey, traditional rivals whose relations have often been
gas. The Nord Stream system and TurkStream are to
fraught. Turkey is a NATO member and a long-standing
provide Russia with a total additional capacity of over 140
U.S. ally with geostrategic importance. Some analysts view
BCM a year to Europe (including Turkey). This amount
nearly equals Ukraine’s total transit capacity of 146 BCM.
the Turkey-Russia relationship as less a potential strategic

partnership than a “marriage of convenience” as the two
U.S. LNG Exports
countries compartmentalize relations, alternating between
cooperation and competition depending on the issue.
Although Turkey has received about 4% of U.S. liquefied
natural gas (LNG) exports since they began in 2016, the
Russia-Turkey relations—and, at times, TurkStream
volumes are a small fraction compared to what Russia
negotiations—were tested by recent flashpoints in broader
supplies to Turkey via pipeline. Russia can offer lower
tensions over the conflict in Syria. In November 2015,
prices in markets it wants to influence, which could make it
Turkey shot down a Russian military aircraft on the Syria-
difficult for U.S. LNG export projects to compete.
Turkey border for violating Turkish airspace. Russia
Nevertheless, growing U.S. gas exports provide an
responded by imposing economic sanctions against Turkey
alternative supply source.
and sustaining them until Turkish President Recep Tayyip
Erdogan issued an apology in June 2016. In December
Sarah E. Garding, Analyst in Balkan and Southeast
2016, an off-duty policeman assassinated the Russian
Europe Affairs
ambassador to Turkey in Istanbul, further testing relations.
Michael Ratner, Specialist in Energy Policy
Since then, Turkey and Russia have coordinated action
Beryl E. Taylor, Research Associate
more closely in Syria, while also moving forward with
Cory Welt, Specialist in European Affairs
TurkStream and a possible Russian S-400 air defense
Jim Zanotti, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
system sale to Turkey. This rapprochement comes at a time
of tension in U.S.-Turkish relations.
IF11177

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TurkStream: Another Russian Gas Pipeline to Europe



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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11177 · VERSION 1 · NEW