United States European Command: Overview and Key Issues
Updated March 30, 2022
United States European Command: Overview and Key Issues
History
Kaliningrad (a Russian territory on the Baltic Sea that is not
United States European Command (or EUCOM,
contiguous with Russia itself), enhancing its air patrolling
pronounced “YEW-com”) is headquartered in Stuttgart,
activities close to other states’ airspace, and increasing its
Germany, and was established in 1952. USEUCOM’s
naval presence in the Baltic Sea, the Arctic Ocean, and the
commander, U.S. Air Force General Tod D. Wolters, is
North Sea. Taken together, these moves have heightened
simultaneously the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s
congressional concerns about Russian aggression and its
(NATO) Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR).
implications for NATO territories, particularly Central and
During the Cold War, the European theater was a primary
Eastern European NATO allies.
focus for U.S. defense and national security and EUCOM
was focused almost exclusively on deterring, and if
To Europe’s south, instability resulting in part from the
necessary defeating, the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.
“Arab Spring” led to collapse of states, civil war in some
At the height of the Cold War, there were more than
instances, and significant refugee flows into Europe. The
400,000 U.S. troops stationed in Europe.
conflicts in Iraq and Syria are examples; some European
countries are also concerned about conditions in Libya.
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact led
This has led to political tensions across the broader
to a withdrawal of the bulk of forward-deployed U.S. troops
European Union, as well as to concerns about terrorists
in the European theater. Decisions to do so were arguably
“embedding” within refugee flows. In 2014, EUCOM
based on a number of strategic assumptions held by
began transforming itself back into a warfighting command,
successive administrations after the end of the Cold War,
while retaining its missions to support CENTCOM and
including that Europe could be stable, whole, and free;
AFRICOM, perform crisis management operations, and
Russia could be a constructive partner in the Euro-Atlantic
build partner states’ security capacity.
security architecture; and particularly prior to September
11, 2001, threats posed by terrorism and migration from the
U.S. Forces in Europe Today
Middle East/North Africa region were limited.
The United States fields two primary types of forces in
Europe: permanent and rotational. “Permanent” refers to
EUCOM in recent decades focused its activities on non-
those U.S. personnel who live in Europe and are assigned to
warfighting missions, including building the security
U.S. European Command. The length of these assignments
capacity and capability of former Soviet bloc states,
for most service members is between three and five years.
prosecuting “crisis management” operations in the Balkan
On February 11, 2020, the Department of Defense (DOD)
and logistically supporting other combatant commands (by
announced the reactivation of the V Corps headquarters at
providing, in particular, critical medical evacuation
Fort Knox, KY, with a forward site in Poland, which will
facilities at Landstuhl), including U.S. Central Command
provide operational command and control for U.S., allied,
(CENTCOM) and U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM).
and partner formations in Europe.
Over the past 25 years, decisions regarding U.S. basing and
Rotational Forces
posture in the European theater were designed to support
Since the Russian occupation of Crimea and areas of
expeditionary and cooperative security operations. The bulk
eastern Ukraine in 2014, DOD has also increased its
of U.S. forces in Europe have been withdrawn and many
rotations of temporary forces in and out of EUCOM to
bases and outposts were either consolidated or closed.
assure allies of the United States’ commitment to their
However, two Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) were
security. Dubbed “heel-to-toe” rotations, air, ground and
retained (in Italy and Germany) as were some naval bases,
naval assets are deployed from the continental United States
particularly those along NATO’s south, and a number of
to conduct exercises with NATO allies for several months;
Air Force bases that were deemed critical for supporting
they are then immediately replaced by other like units. Of
operations in the Middle East, Africa, and Europe.
these rotations, U.S. ground forces have been largely
stationed in Poland, with elements also conducting training
USEUCOM’s Current Geopolitical
and exercises in the Baltic States, Bulgaria, Romania, and
Challenges
Germany. The “heel-to-toe” rotations are part of Operation
Events in recent years, particularly since 2014, have tested,
Atlantic Resolve (OAR). The European Deterrence
if not undermined, the strategic assumptions underpinning
Initiative is the key mechanism through which activities
EUCOM’s posture. To Europe’s east, Russia occupied
under OAR are organized and funded.
Crimea and launched a separatist war in eastern Ukraine, is
modernizing its conventional and nonconventional forces,
Several observers have asserted that it might be more
and launched an invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
politically reassuring and financially efficient to
Russia also increased its military activities in Europe’s
permanently station these “heel-to-toe” rotational forces.
north, particularly by adding nuclear-capable missiles to
Others contend that these rotations force military units in
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United States European Command: Overview and Key Issues
the continental United States to routinely test their ability to
5,000 troops in early February to more than 18,000 in mid-
deploy to other theaters and exercise critical logistics
March. Critics maintain that NATO’s force posture may not
capabilities. Studies comparing the expenses of permanent
be sufficient to deter or defend against a potential Russian
versus rotational forces argue that in the medium- to long-
invasion and that doing so will require greater defense
term, rotational forces are more costly than permanently
investments by European allies. As of 2021, 10 allies met
stationed troops.
NATO’s guideline to devote at least 2% of GDP to annual
defense spending. Since Russia’s invasion, several allies,
Response to Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine
including Germany, have said they would significantly
On February 24, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin
increase defense spending, and the allies are expected to
announced a “special military operation” to protect the
consider more substantive changes to NATO’s force
civilian population and to “demilitarize” and “de-Nazify”
posture in Eastern Europe, including possibly endorsing
Ukraine (the latter term understood by many observers as a
permanent stationing of troops in the region. Long-standing
false pretext for overthrowing the democratically elected
concerns that the United States has shouldered too much of
Ukrainian government). According to DOD, an additional
the burden associated with Europe’s defense could affect
15,000 U.S. soldiers have deployed to Europe since early
discussions over possible longer-term changes to U.S. force
February 2022 to augment defense and deterrence efforts,
posture in Europe in response to Russia’s invasion.
bringing the total U.S. force posture in Europe, including
permanently stationed forces, to approximately 100,000
EUCOM Funding
military personnel. The new deployments bring the total
DOD budget documentation does not typically enumerate
U.S. military presence in Poland to about 9,500—including
total funding by combatant command. Forces and
800 soldiers deployed to the U.S.-led NATO battlegroup—
operations assigned to the commands are, in general,
and in Romania to about 1,900. In addition, about 800 U.S.
funded by the military services. Funding identified in the
soldiers and 20 attack helicopters have been deployed to the
budget as being for a combatant command is, with some
Baltic region, along with eight F-35 joint strike fighters
exceptions, largely limited to Operation and Maintenance
deployed to NATO’s eastern flank. An additional 7,000
(O&M) accounts for headquarters and mission support
U.S. soldiers, including an armored Brigade Combat Team,
activities. In the case of EUCOM, the U.S. Army is the
have deployed to Germany to reinforce deterrence efforts.
Combatant Command Support Agent (CCSA) and is
primarily responsible for funding its headquarters. For
FY2022 Supplemental Funding for Ukraine
FY2022, the Army requested $293.9 million in the O&M
As part of the Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act,
line item for EUCOM, according to DOD budget
2022 (Division N of P.L. 117-103), Congress provided
documents. Congress provided $299.2 million for this
$13.6 billion in emergency funding for the situation in
activity—$5.3 million (1.8%) more than the request,
Ukraine and for related expenses, including $6.528 billion
according to the explanatory statement accompanying the
for DOD. The DOD funding included $3.028 billion for
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2022 (Division
EUCOM operations mission support, the deployment of
C of P.L. 117-103).
personnel to the region, and intelligence support, and $3.5
billion to replenish U.S. stocks of equipment sent to
European Deterrence Initiative (EDI)
Ukraine, according to a summary of the legislation released
The initiative currently known as EDI was established in
by the House Appropriations Committee.
2014. For FY2022, the Administration requested $3.7
billion for EDI, including $250 million for the Ukraine
European Command and NATO
Security Assistance Initiative (USAI). Appropriations
EUCOM and NATO, while strategically interconnected, are
associated with EDI are located in multiple budget line
different organizations with different missions. NATO is an
items. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
alliance of 30 nations that are signatories to the 1949
Year 2022 (P.L. 117-81) and the Department of Defense
Washington Treaty; the United States is a NATO member.
Appropriations Act, 2022 (Division C of P.L. 117-103), did
U.S. European Command, by contrast, is the focal point for
not specify a total amount for EDI; the latter provided $300
the United States military’s presence in Europe. Only some
million for USAI. A summary of the FY2022 NDAA
of EUCOM’s activities support NATO’s operations and
released by the House Armed Services Committee stated in
activities; the remainder advance U.S. objectives with
part that the legislation authorized “$4 billion for the
individual countries, across the region, and across the
European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) and additional
Middle East and Africa, though they do generally reinforce
investments for EDI purposes.”
NATO as well. The complementary nature of these dual
roles and missions is one of the rationales behind dual-
Further Reading
hatting the Commander of U.S. European Command as
NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.
CRS In Focus IF10542, Defense Primer: Commanding
U.S. Military Operations, by Kathleen J. McInnis
Burdensharing
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has heightened questions
Kathleen J. McInnis, Specialist in International Security
about NATO’s capacity and willingness to defend NATO’s
Brendan W. McGarry, Analyst in U.S. Defense Budget
eastern member states from a potential attack. Since early
Paul Belkin, Analyst in European Affairs
February 2022, NATO has more than tripled its force
presence in Poland and the three Baltic states—from about
IF11130
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United States European Command: Overview and Key Issues
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