Updated August 4, 2020
United States European Command: Overview and Key Issues
History
north, particularly through reportedly adding nuclear-
United States European Command (or EUCOM,
capable missiles to Kaliningrad (a Russian territory on the
pronounced “YEW-com”) is headquartered in Stuttgart,
Baltic Sea that is not contiguous with Russia itself),
Germany, and was established in 1952. Today its area of
enhancing its air patrolling activities close to other states’
responsibility comprises 51 countries stretching from
airspace, and enhancing its naval presence in the Baltic Sea,
Portugal’s Azores Islands to Iceland and Israel.
the Arctic Ocean, and the North Sea. Taken together, these
USEUCOM’s commander is currently U.S. Air Force
moves have heightened some congressional concerns about
General Tod Wolters, who is simultaneously the North
Russian aggression and its implications for NATO
Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Supreme Allied
territories, particularly among Central and Eastern
Commander, Europe (SACEUR). During the Cold War, the
European NATO allies.
European theater was a primary focus for U.S. defense and
national security and EUCOM was focused almost
To Europe’s south, instability resulting in part from the
exclusively on deterring, and if necessary defeating, the
“Arab Spring” led to collapse of states, civil war in some
Soviet Union. At the height of the Cold War, there were
instances, and significant refugee flows into Europe. The
more than 400,000 U.S. troops stationed in Europe.
conflicts in Iraq and Syria are examples, although some
European countries are also concerned about conditions in
The collapse of the Soviet Union led to a withdrawal of the
Libya. This has led to political tensions across the broader
bulk of forward-deployed U.S. troops in the European
European Union, and to concerns about terrorists
theater. Decisions to do so were arguably based on a
“embedding” within refugee flows. In 2014, EUCOM
number of strategic assumptions held by successive
began transforming itself back into a warfighting command,
administrations after the end of the Cold War, including
while retaining its missions to support CENTCOM and
that Europe could be stable, whole, and free; Russia could
AFRICOM, perform crisis management operations, and
be a constructive partner in the Euro-Atlantic security
build partner states’ security capacity.
architecture; and particularly prior to September 11, 2001,
threats posed by terrorism and migration from the Middle
U.S. Forces in Europe Today
East/North Africa region were limited.
The United States fields two primary types of forces in

Europe: permanent and rotational. “Permanent” refers to
EUCOM subsequently focused its activities on non-
those U.S. personnel who live in Europe and are assigned to
warfighting missions, including building the security
U.S. European Command. The length of these assignments
capacity and capability of former Soviet bloc states,
for most service members is between three and five years.
prosecuting “crisis management” operations in the Balkans,
Approximately 74,000 personnel are permanently assigned
and logistically supporting other combatant commands (by
to EUCOM. These include 34,000 Army personnel, 27,000
providing, in particular, critical medical evacuation
Air Force personnel, 3,000 Marine personnel, and 10,000
facilities at Landstuhl), including U.S. Central Command
Navy personnel (these figures subject to change; more
(CENTCOM) and U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM).
below). An additional 20,000 permanent DOD civilians are
also authorized for EUCOM and its supporting commands.
Over the past 25 years, decisions regarding U.S. basing and

posture in the European theater have largely reflected these
On February 11, 2020, DOD announced the reactivation of
assumptions. The bulk of U.S. forces in Europe have been
the V Corps headquarters in Fort Knox, KY, which will
withdrawn and many bases and outposts were either
provide command and control for U.S., allied, and partner
consolidated or closed. However, two Brigade Combat
formations in Europe. Poland has been selected as the
Teams (BCTs) were retained (in Italy and Germany) as
forward site for V Corps; approximately 200 V Corps
were some naval bases, particularly those along NATO’s
personnel will rotate to that site, likely beginning in the
southern flank, and a number of Air Force bases that were
latter half of 2020.
deemed critical for supporting operations in the Middle
East, Africa, and Europe.
Rotational Forces
Since the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, DOD has
USEUCOM’s Current Geopolitical
also increased its rotations of temporary forces in and out of
Challenges
EUCOM to assure allies of the United States’ commitment
Events in recent years, particularly since 2014, have tested,
to their security. Dubbed “heel-to-toe” rotations, air, ground
if not undermined, the strategic assumptions underpinning
and naval assets are deployed from the continental United
EUCOM’s posture. To Europe’s east, Russia annexed
States to conduct exercises with NATO allies for several
Crimea, began a proxy war in Eastern Ukraine, and is
months; they are then immediately replaced by other like
modernizing its conventional and nonconventional forces.
units. U.S. ground forces have been largely stationed in
Russia also increased its military activities in Europe’s high
Poland, with elements also conducting training and
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United States European Command: Overview and Key Issues
exercises in the Baltic States, Bulgaria, Romania, and
result, the United States has shouldered too much of the
Germany. The “heel-to-toe” rotations are part of Operation
financial burden associated with Europe’s defense. Such
Atlantic Resolve (OAR). The European Deterrence
observers often contend that while the United States spends
Initiative (EDI, formerly called the European Reassurance
3.2% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defense,
Initiative; see below) is the key mechanism through which
most of NATO’s allies in Europe have not yet met a 2014
activities under OAR are organized and funded.
pledge to increase their defense budgets to 2% of GDP by
2024. Others argue that the United States spends
Several observers have asserted that it might be more
significantly more on defense than its European allies
politically reassuring and financially efficient to
because the United States has global responsibilities that are
permanently station these “heel-to-toe” rotational forces.
independent of Europe’s security. It is difficult to parse the
Others contend that these rotations force military units in
defense budget in a manner that identifies what specific
the continental United States to routinely test their ability to
percentage is dedicated to operations and presence in
deploy to other theaters and exercise critical logistics
Europe. Whatever the percentage, the investment is
capabilities. Studies comparing the expenses of permanent
intended to enable the United States to conduct military
versus rotational forces argue that in the medium- to long-
operations in the Middle East and Africa and to respond
term, rotational forces are more costly than permanently
rapidly to other crises.
stationed troops.
EUCOM Funding
Posture Changes?
DOD budget documentation does not break out total
On July 29, 2020, Secretary of Defense Mark Esper
funding by combatant command. Forces and operations
announced a series of significant changes to EUCOM’s
assigned to the commands are, in general, funded by the
posture. As part of these plans, approximately 11,900
military services (either in their regular, or base, budgets or
military personnel and their dependents will be withdrawn
with funding designated for Overseas Contingency
from Germany. Of these personnel, slightly less than half
Operations, or OCO). Combatant command funding is, with
(5,600) will be repositioned within other NATO countries;
some exceptions, largely limited to Operation and
the remainder, including the 2nd Cavalry Regiment (a
Maintenance (O&M) accounts for headquarters and mission
Stryker unit), will return to the continental United States.
support activities. In the case of EUCOM, the U.S. Army is
According to DOD, many of the latter forces will
the Combatant Command Support Agent (CCSA) and
subsequently return to Europe as part of the “heel-to-toe”
primarily responsible for funding its headquarters. For
force rotations. Some observers question the cost and
FY2021, the Army requested approximately $280.8 million
efficacy of these moves, pointing out that they are estimated
in the O&M budget subactivity group (SAG) for U.S.
to cost several billion dollars. They also express concern
European Command, including $160.8 million in base
about the extent to which U.S. deterrence in Europe vis-à-
funding and $120.0 million in OCO funding.
vis Russia could be undermined by such a shift in force
posture. Congress may seek to restrict the proposed
European Deterrence Initiative: Funding?
changes. The House-passed version of the FY2021 National
EDI was established in 2014 with funding designated for
Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 6395) would limit use of
Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO). For FY2021, the
authorized funds to reduce the number of U.S. forces in
Trump Administration requested $4.5 billion in OCO
Europe until DOD assesses potential cost and other
funding for EDI, including the Ukraine Security Assistance
impacts, and certifies that the shift will not significantly
Initiative (USAI). Appropriations associated with EDI are
undermine the security of the United States or its allies in
located in multiple titles and budget lines. Some observers
the region.
contend that EDI should be made part of the “base” defense
budget rather than part of OCO. Doing so, in their view, has
European Command and NATO
two primary advantages. First, it would signal to allies that
EUCOM and NATO, while strategically interconnected, are
U.S. security commitments to Europe are enduring, and
different organizations with different missions. NATO is an
second, programs and capabilities that EDI supports are no
alliance of 30 nations that are signatories to the 1949
longer “contingency” operations, but rather a part of DOD’s
Washington Treaty; the United States is a NATO member.
regular programming. Others counter that shifting EDI to
U.S. European Command, by contrast, is the focal point for
the base budget would subject EDI to inter-service rivalries
the United States military’s presence in Europe. Only some
and priorities within the Pentagon, which may differ from
of EUCOM’s activities support NATO’s operations and
those of EUCOM.
activities; the remainder advance U.S. objectives with
individual countries, across the region, and across the
Further Reading
Middle East and Africa, though they do generally reinforce
CRS In Focus IF10542, Defense Primer: Commanding
NATO as well. The complementary nature of these dual
U.S. Military Operations, by Kathleen J. McInnis
roles and missions is one of the rationales behind dual-
hatting the Commander of U.S. European Command as
NATO’s S
Kathleen J. McInnis, Specialist in International Security
upreme Allied Commander, Europe.
Brendan W. McGarry, Analyst in U.S. Defense Budget
Burdensharing?
IF11130
Some observers contend that European allies have not
invested sufficient resources in their militaries, and that as a


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United States European Command: Overview and Key Issues


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