What Is “Political Warfare”?
Updated January 9, 2023
What Is “Political Warfare”?
Background
strategic complexity. In particular, the 2014 Russian
Military theorist Carl von Clausewitz wrote in his seminal
invasion of the Crimean peninsula and subsequent proxy
book On War that “war is the continuation of politics by
war in eastern Ukraine was arguably a watershed moment
other means.” Historically, in Congress as well as in the
in international security, as it awakened dormant concerns
broader policy community, the term political warfare
about an aggressive and revanchist Russia. Months before
described the synchronized use of any aspect of national
Russia’s Crimea intervention, China began a territorial
power short of overt conventional warfare— such as
expansion as well, building artificial islands on disputed
intelligence assets, alliance building, financial tools,
features in the South China Sea that it later turned into
diplomatic relations, technology, and information
military outposts.
dominance— to achieve state objectives. It was coined in
the late 1940s by George F. Kennan, a key architect of U.S.
Complicating matters some states are collaborating with
strategy during the Cold War, as the United States began to
non-state proxies (including, but not limited to, militias,
come to grips with the challenge presented by the Soviet
criminal networks, corporations, and hackers) and
Union (USSR). As he wrote in his 1948 State Department
deliberately blurring the lines between “conventional” and
memorandum Organizing Political Warfare:
irregular conflict. Some states are also sowing confusion as
to what constitutes “civilian” versus “military” activities.
We have been handicapped … by a popular
Recent events involving China and Russia have raised a
attachment to the concept of a basic difference
number of questions that highlight this complexity:
between peace and war … and by a reluctance to
recognize the realities of international relations—
Are sales of Chinese multinational Huawei’s 5G
the perpetual rhythm of struggle, in and out of
networks around the world— including to key U.S.
war…. Political warfare is the logical application of
allies—an element of international development or a
Clausewitz’s doctrine in time of peace. In broadest
national security challenge? Similarly, is the Chinese-
definition, political warfare is the employment of
owned online platform TikTok an innocuous video
all the means at a nation’s command, short of
hosting service or a national security threat? Or do these
war, to achieve its national objectives. Such
actions fall somewhere on a continuum?
operations … range from such overt actions as
political alliances, economic measures, and ‘white’
Are infrastructure investments underwritten by China as
part of its “Belt and Road” Initiative (BRI) about
propaganda to such covert operations as clandestine
improving Chinese access to foreign markets, or is it a
support of ‘friendly’ foreign elements, ‘black’
de facto way to establish a global presence that could be
psychological warfare and even encouragement of
used for security and defense purposes—or both?
underground resistance in hostile states.
Is Russian production and dissemination of media with
Popular terms used to describe this phenomenon in the
pro-Moscow narratives to Russian minority groups in
current international security environment include strategic
neighboring countries routine messaging, or is it
competition and gray zone competition or conflict. Yet
designed to destabilize NATO countries? Likewise, is
political warfare, according to some scholars, is not mere
Russian interference in U.S. and European elections in
rivalry or competition but is also a form of war: its
2016, as described by the intelligence community, an act
objective, like that of every other form of war, is to impose
of hostility?
one’s own will on the opponent in order to achieve strategic
objectives, to conquer and destroy the opponent’s will to
Some European and Commonwealth countries that have
resist.
maintained strong economic and political relationship
with the United States are becoming increasingly
In the United States, the military dimensions of this
economically dependent on China. At what point does
competition garner significant attention and resources. Yet
this interdependence, potentially underpinned by greater
if political warfare is an adequate lens through which to
reliance on China-led economic institutions, alter the
view this strategic competition, the nonmilitary aspects of
security calculus of U.S. Allies and partners?
the competition might prove equally if not more important,
particularly as competitors deploy robust political warfare
Altogether, these events underscore to many observers that
strategies.
the United States must be prepared to compete with other
powers— powers that are willing to employ both military
Present Day Challenges
and nonmilitary means to accomplish their objectives and
Most observers of contemporary international security
potentially reshape the world order.
trends contend that the United States and its allies are
entering an era of unprecedented—and dangerous—
https://crsreports.congress.gov
What Is “Political Warfare”?
Geopolitical Competition and the 2022 U.S.
challenged on moral, geopolitical, and competency
National Security Strategy
grounds, suggesting to some observers that the United
The Biden Administration’s 2022 National Security
States should account for, and better synchronize, these
Strategy makes frequent mention of geopolitical
dimensions of statecraft and strategy into the future.
competition and competitors, describing the end of the post-
Cold War era and a competition between major powers to
Economic Statecraft
shape world order. The 2022 U.S. National Security
A complex web of institutions, routinized behaviors
Strategy (NSS) notes:
(“norms”), legal agreements, commercial ties, interpersonal
relations, and power structures have served as mechanisms
The most pressing strategic challenge facing our
to manage economic relations between countries. This web
vision is from powers that layer authoritarian
of formal and informal relationships is often referred to as
governance with a revisionist foreign policy. It is
“world order” or the “international system.” The web of
their behavior that poses a challenge to international
relations that has been largely shaped by the interests and
peace and stability—especially waging or preparing
values of the United States and its allies for the past 70
for wars of aggression, actively undermining the
years is often called the post-World War II liberal world
democratic political processes of other countries,
order, although some scholars question whether this liberal
leveraging technology and supply chains for
world order is more a myth than historic reality.
coercion and repression, and exporting an illiberal
model of international order. Many non-
At the same time, policymakers generally consider national
democracies join the world’s democracies in
security and the requirement for trade and investment
forswearing these behaviors. Unfortunately, Russia
relations as interrelated strategic priorities. The United
and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) do not.
States has traditionally used its leadership position to
pursue increased economic engagement to bring emerging
The NSS goes on to say that both Russia and the PRC pose
powers into the post-World War II liberal world order. Yet
different challenges to geopolitical competition. Russia
concerns over growing economic challenges, including the
poses an immediate threat to the free and open international
unequal distribution of gains from globalization, have led
system, recklessly flouting the basic laws of the
some countries to embrace populist political views and
international order today, as its war of aggression against
economic nationalism, and to pursue mercantilist policies.
Ukraine has shown. The PRC, by contrast, is the only
This has led to a reevaluation of the so-called liberal
competitor with both the intent to reshape the international
economic order and as such, a number of countries,
order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military,
including the United Kingdom, Italy, and the United States,
and technological power to advance that objective.
appear to be pursuing increasingly protectionist trade and
financial policies as they face a more competitive and
Both China and Russia, for example, according to
multipolar global economy. The Biden Administration’s
Understanding the Current International Order (a 2016
NSS leans in this direction by advocating a “Modern
RAND report), “resent key elements of the U.S. conception
Industrial and Innovation Strategy” that will identify and
of postwar order, such as promotion of liberal values …
invest in private sector companies to protect core economic
viewing them as tools used by the United States to sustain
and national security interests.
its hegemony.” China appears to be using its wealth to
assert security interests in the Pacific, deepen and formalize
Diplomatic Tools
the region’s economic integration through efforts such as
The Biden Administration appears to be increasing funding
BRI, and assert larger influence at international institutions
of at least one element of political warfare. Its FY2023
such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and the
International Affairs budget, which supports U.S. embassies
International Monetary Fund. These institutions, however,
and diplomatic activities as well as foreign assistance,
are rooted in a shared sets of values and norms, and it
requested $66 billion—17% above the FY2022-enacted
remains uncertain if China’s efforts align with these
level—with increases across a wide range of programs and
common values or whether China is instead seeking to
accounts, from global health security to climate change to
create a new international consensus.
development finance.
Further, U.S. competitors are not just challenging American
promulgation of values; they are challenging the arguments
CRS Products
for continued United States leadership of the global system
CRS Report R45142, Information Warfare: Issues for Congress,
itself. Critics contend that the United States has overly
by Catherine A. Theohary
militarized its foreign policy; that it has unnecessarily used
CRS Report R43838, Great Power Competition: Implications for
force in the pursuit of often-unachievable strategic
Defense—Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke
objectives; and that its economic policies have led to global
financial crises. In Munich in 2007, for example, coming on
the heels of the U.S. “surge” in Iraq and shortly before the
2008 global financial crisis, Russian President Vladimir
Putin essentially argued that U.S. “unipolar” management
Catherine A. Theohary, Specialist in National Security
of the global system has been both immoral and
Policy, Cyber and Information Operations
incompetent. Subsequent Russian activities in the Ukraine
Martin A. Weiss, Specialist in International Trade and
have led some to view Putin’s critique with skepticism.
Finance
Still, U.S. leadership of the extant world order is being
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What Is “Political Warfare”?
IF11127
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