Burma’s Prospects for Peace in 2019
link to page 1 
Updated June 19, 2019
Burma’s Prospects for Peace in 2019
The announcement on December 21, 2018, by Burma’s
launched a series of attacks on security outposts and troops
Commander-in-Chief, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, of
on patrol. The AA has stated it seeks to create an
a unilateral ceasefire in eastern (but not western) Burma has
autonomous state in northern Rakhine State, similar to the
raised many questions about prospects for ending the
one created by the United Wa State Army in Shan State.
nation’s long-standing civil war. Some observers viewed
The AA is also fighting alongside the KIA, MNDAA, and
the announcement as a possible breakthrough for the stalled
TNLA in Shan State.
“peace process” backed by Min Aung Hlaing and State
Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi. Others saw it as a ruse
Figure 1. Map of Fighting in Burma in 2018
designed to promote discord among Burma’s various ethnic
Conflict by State or Region
armed organizations (EAOs), continue the military’s
campaign in western Burma, and possibly set the stage for
Min Aung Hlaing’s political ambitions to be selected as
Burma’s next President in 2020.
Min Aung Hlaing’s decision on April 30, 2019, to extend
the ceasefire for an additional two months has done little to
resolve the outstanding issues that are preventing an end to
Burma’s decades-old civil war. Some of the EAOs that
previously were involved in the “peace process” have
suspended their participation; other EAOs are preparing for
an escalation in fighting once the ceasefire is over.
Both the Obama and Trump Administrations backed the
“peace process,” both financially and as a matter of policy.
The lack of significant progress in the negotiations and the
continuing escalation in fighting have raised questions in
Congress about the effectiveness of U.S. policy in Burma.
Source: CRS; based on data from Armed Conflict Location and
Intensified Fighting in 2018
Event Data Project (ACLED), accessed January 2019.
In 2018, fighting between the Burmese military, or
Developments in 2019
Tatmadaw, and several EAOs escalated in Kachin and Shan
As 2018 came to an end, the “peace process” appeared to be
States, and erupted in Chin, Karen (Kayin), and Rakhine
stalled. On December 12, 2018, the AA, MNDAA, and
States. According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event
TNLA announced that they would cease all military
Data Project (ACLED), fighting occurred in 7 of Burma’s
operations if allowed to participate in the peace
14 States or Regions in 2018 (see Figure 1).
negotiations, from which they had previously been
excluded. On December 21, 2018, the Tatmadaw released a
In Kachin State, the Tatmadaw launched an offensive
statement indicating that it would cease all its military
against the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) that resulted
operations in Northern, Northeast, Eastern, Middle East,
in the internal displacement of over 5,000 civilians by the
and Triangle Command regions—effectively Kachin and
end of 2018. According to some accounts, the Tatmadaw
Shan States—until April 30, 2019. The ceasefire
intentionally attacked civilians in villages, mirroring the
announcement did not include Western Command, which
attacks on Rohingya villages in Rakhine State in late 2017.
includes Chin and Rakhine States, where the Tatmadaw is
fighting the AA. The Tatmadaw has since extended the
In Shan State, fighting between the Tatmadaw and the
deadline to June 30, 2019.
combined forces of the KIA, the Myanmar National
Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the Ta’ang
Some observers believe that China pressured Min Aung
National Liberation Army (TNLA) increased, while rival
Hlaing and some of the EAOs to accept the temporary
EAOs also clashed. As in Kachin State, the conflict has
ceasefire in an effort to advance Burma’s prospects for
created thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs).
peace. Other analysts warn that the apparent flexibility may
be a ruse by the Tatmadaw to draw more EAOs into the
The civil war was brought to western Burma’s Chin and
negotiations, while allowing the military to focus operations
Rakhine States in 2018 when the Arakan Army (AA), an
against the AA in Chin and Rakhine State. These observers
EAO established in 2009 to protect the Arakan (Rakhine)
note that the Tatmadaw’s statement does not announce any
people from perceived oppression by the Tatmadaw,
changes in the military’s position on the terms for peace—
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Burma’s Prospects for Peace in 2019
acceptance of the 2008 Constitution and the EAOs disarm,
laws and “national sovereignty” of the current central
demobilize, and reintegrate (DDR). The EAOs had
government. Most of the EAOs have agreed to remain part
previously rejected those terms.
of Burma, but reject the rest of the Tatmadaw’s principles.
Status of the “Peace Process”
Another barrier to peace is a fundamental difference
In 2011, Burma’s military junta, the State Peace and
between the Tatmadaw and many of the EAOs on the final
Development Council (SPDC), transferred power to a
goal of the process. In general, the EAOs seek a more
mixed civilian/military government headed by President
decentralized federated union. The Tatmadaw prefers a
Thein Sein, a retired general and ex-SPDC Prime Minister.
stronger central government with less state autonomy. Aung
As President, Thein Sein initiated a peace process that
San Suu Kyi has not presented her vision of a future
called for the signing of a nationwide ceasefire agreement
federated union in Burma. In addition, the Tatmadaw
to be followed by negotiations over reform of the 2008
continues to insist on DDR, while most of the EAOs have
constitution. In October 2015, Thein Sein signed a ceasefire
called for security sector reform (SSR) that provides a role
agreement with 8 of the more than 20 EAOs.
for the EAOs in the nation’s security and defense.
In November 2015, Aung San Suu Kyi and the National
Issues for U.S. Policy
League for Democracy (NLD) won a supermajority of the
Identifying a path to peace, and what constructive role, if
seats in Burma’s Union Parliament, raising hopes that they
any, the United States can play in helping to end Burma’s
would offer greater autonomy for ethnic minorities and
civil war, raises a number of policy options, including:
facilitate the peaceful resolution of nation’s civil war. In her
role as State Counselor, Aung San Suu Kyi chose to modify
1. Providing assistance to the National Reconciliation and
Thein Sein’s peace process by adding the concept of
Peace Center and/or the peace negotiations. Financial
“Panglong Peace Conferences” at which a broad spectrum
support can potentially boost participation and facilitate
of vested interests would discuss the terms of a ceasefire
negotiations, but donors to the “peace process,” including
agreement and governance reform.
the United States, have found that such assistance was seen
by some EAOs as support for Aung San Suu Kyi, Thein
The 3rd Panglong Peace Conference was held in July 2018,
Sein, and the Tatmadaw, undermining the donors’ ability to
but little progress was made in addressing the differences
be seen as neutral parties to the negotiations.
on the goals of the negotiations between Burma’s military
and many of the EAOs. Frustrations with the talks resulted
2. Encouraging or otherwise applying pressure on the key
in two major EAOs, the Karen National Union (KNU) and
groups in the peace process to negotiate in good faith and
the Reconstruction Council of Shan State (RCSS),
compromise. Certain forms of assistance or support for the
“suspending their participation in the formal peace
NLD-led government, the Tatmadaw, or the EAOs could be
process.” Plans for the 4th Panglong Peace Conference are
made contingent on progress in the negotiations.
currently on hold.
3. Withholding selected forms of engagement or aid from
Causes of the Ongoing Conflict
parties in Burma’s peace process who the United States
Burma is an ethnically diverse nation in which the ethnic
views as uncooperative. Similarly, engagement or
Bamar are a majority of the population. Several other
assistance could be withheld from parties who are impeding
ethnic minorities—including the Chin, Kachin, Karen,
the peace talks.
Karenni, Mon, Rakhine, and Shan—are the majority
population in some outlying regions. Burma’s 1948
4. Encouraging political reforms that enhance democratic
constitution established a federated nation in which the
governance and protection of human rights. A lasting peace
predominately ethnic minority states retained a fair amount
in Burma may require the federal and local governments to
of autonomy. The 1948 constitution was based in part on
be more responsive to the wishes of their constituencies and
the provisions of the 1947 Panglong Agreement negotiated
recognize the rights of all ethnic groups.
between General Aung San (Aung San Suu Kyi’s father)
and leaders of the Chin, Kachin, and Shan communities.
5. Coordinating with U.S. allies and the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to actively support
Most of the EAOs maintain that Burma’s central
Burma’s pursuit of peace. ASEAN and several U.S. allies
government and the Tatmadaw have never lived up to the
and partners have not been particularly engaged in
Panglong Agreement’s promises. They contend the Bamar
promoting peace in Burma. Finding a common perspective
majority has used the central government and the
and sharing a similar policy may improve peace prospects.
Tatmadaw to oppress Burma’s ethnic minorities. The
Tatmadaw views the EAOs as insurgents threatening the
6. Pressing the Tatmadaw to extend its unilateral ceasefire
nation’s territorial integrity. In January 2019, the Tatmadaw
to Rakhine State and beyond its current deadline. The
labeled several “problem” EAOs as terrorist groups, and
limited scope and duration of the ceasefire has increased
subsequently launched extensive “counterterrorism
speculation that Min Aung Hlaing’s announcement signifies
offensives” to “crush” the AA.
the Tatmadaw’s efforts to foster dissent among the EAOs.
In September 2015, the Tatmadaw set out its “six principles
Michael F. Martin, Specialist in Asian Affairs
for peace,” which require the EAOs to agree to remain part
Kirt Smith, Research Assistant
of Burma, accept the 2008 constitution, and submit to the
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Burma’s Prospects for Peace in 2019
IF11081
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to
congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has
been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the
United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be
reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include
copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you
wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11081 · VERSION 3 · UPDATED
Updated June 19, 2019
Burma’s Prospects for Peace in 2019
The announcement on December 21, 2018, by Burma’s
launched a series of attacks on security outposts and troops
Commander-in-Chief, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, of
on patrol. The AA has stated it seeks to create an
a unilateral ceasefire in eastern (but not western) Burma has
autonomous state in northern Rakhine State, similar to the
raised many questions about prospects for ending the
one created by the United Wa State Army in Shan State.
nation’s long-standing civil war. Some observers viewed
The AA is also fighting alongside the KIA, MNDAA, and
the announcement as a possible breakthrough for the stalled
TNLA in Shan State.
“peace process” backed by Min Aung Hlaing and State
Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi. Others saw it as a ruse
Figure 1. Map of Fighting in Burma in 2018
designed to promote discord among Burma’s various ethnic
Conflict by State or Region
armed organizations (EAOs), continue the military’s
campaign in western Burma, and possibly set the stage for
Min Aung Hlaing’s political ambitions to be selected as
Burma’s next President in 2020.
Min Aung Hlaing’s decision on April 30, 2019, to extend
the ceasefire for an additional two months has done little to
resolve the outstanding issues that are preventing an end to
Burma’s decades-old civil war. Some of the EAOs that
previously were involved in the “peace process” have
suspended their participation; other EAOs are preparing for
an escalation in fighting once the ceasefire is over.
Both the Obama and Trump Administrations backed the
“peace process,” both financially and as a matter of policy.
The lack of significant progress in the negotiations and the
continuing escalation in fighting have raised questions in
Congress about the effectiveness of U.S. policy in Burma.
Source: CRS; based on data from Armed Conflict Location and
Intensified Fighting in 2018
Event Data Project (ACLED), accessed January 2019.
In 2018, fighting between the Burmese military, or
Developments in 2019
Tatmadaw, and several EAOs escalated in Kachin and Shan
As 2018 came to an end, the “peace process” appeared to be
States, and erupted in Chin, Karen (Kayin), and Rakhine
stalled. On December 12, 2018, the AA, MNDAA, and
States. According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event
TNLA announced that they would cease all military
Data Project (ACLED), fighting occurred in 7 of Burma’s
operations if allowed to participate in the peace
14 States or Regions in 2018 (see Figure 1).
negotiations, from which they had previously been
excluded. On December 21, 2018, the Tatmadaw released a
In Kachin State, the Tatmadaw launched an offensive
statement indicating that it would cease all its military
against the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) that resulted
operations in Northern, Northeast, Eastern, Middle East,
in the internal displacement of over 5,000 civilians by the
and Triangle Command regions—effectively Kachin and
end of 2018. According to some accounts, the Tatmadaw
Shan States—until April 30, 2019. The ceasefire
intentionally attacked civilians in villages, mirroring the
announcement did not include Western Command, which
attacks on Rohingya villages in Rakhine State in late 2017.
includes Chin and Rakhine States, where the Tatmadaw is
fighting the AA. The Tatmadaw has since extended the
In Shan State, fighting between the Tatmadaw and the
deadline to June 30, 2019.
combined forces of the KIA, the Myanmar National
Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the Ta’ang
Some observers believe that China pressured Min Aung
National Liberation Army (TNLA) increased, while rival
Hlaing and some of the EAOs to accept the temporary
EAOs also clashed. As in Kachin State, the conflict has
ceasefire in an effort to advance Burma’s prospects for
created thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs).
peace. Other analysts warn that the apparent flexibility may
be a ruse by the Tatmadaw to draw more EAOs into the
The civil war was brought to western Burma’s Chin and
negotiations, while allowing the military to focus operations
Rakhine States in 2018 when the Arakan Army (AA), an
against the AA in Chin and Rakhine State. These observers
EAO established in 2009 to protect the Arakan (Rakhine)
note that the Tatmadaw’s statement does not announce any
people from perceived oppression by the Tatmadaw,
changes in the military’s position on the terms for peace—
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Burma’s Prospects for Peace in 2019
acceptance of the 2008 Constitution and the EAOs disarm,
laws and “national sovereignty” of the current central
demobilize, and reintegrate (DDR). The EAOs had
government. Most of the EAOs have agreed to remain part
previously rejected those terms.
of Burma, but reject the rest of the Tatmadaw’s principles.
Status of the “Peace Process”
Another barrier to peace is a fundamental difference
In 2011, Burma’s military junta, the State Peace and
between the Tatmadaw and many of the EAOs on the final
Development Council (SPDC), transferred power to a
goal of the process. In general, the EAOs seek a more
mixed civilian/military government headed by President
decentralized federated union. The Tatmadaw prefers a
Thein Sein, a retired general and ex-SPDC Prime Minister.
stronger central government with less state autonomy. Aung
As President, Thein Sein initiated a peace process that
San Suu Kyi has not presented her vision of a future
called for the signing of a nationwide ceasefire agreement
federated union in Burma. In addition, the Tatmadaw
to be followed by negotiations over reform of the 2008
continues to insist on DDR, while most of the EAOs have
constitution. In October 2015, Thein Sein signed a ceasefire
called for security sector reform (SSR) that provides a role
agreement with 8 of the more than 20 EAOs.
for the EAOs in the nation’s security and defense.
In November 2015, Aung San Suu Kyi and the National
Issues for U.S. Policy
League for Democracy (NLD) won a supermajority of the
Identifying a path to peace, and what constructive role, if
seats in Burma’s Union Parliament, raising hopes that they
any, the United States can play in helping to end Burma’s
would offer greater autonomy for ethnic minorities and
civil war, raises a number of policy options, including:
facilitate the peaceful resolution of nation’s civil war. In her
role as State Counselor, Aung San Suu Kyi chose to modify
1. Providing assistance to the National Reconciliation and
Thein Sein’s peace process by adding the concept of
Peace Center and/or the peace negotiations. Financial
“Panglong Peace Conferences” at which a broad spectrum
support can potentially boost participation and facilitate
of vested interests would discuss the terms of a ceasefire
negotiations, but donors to the “peace process,” including
agreement and governance reform.
the United States, have found that such assistance was seen
by some EAOs as support for Aung San Suu Kyi, Thein
The 3rd Panglong Peace Conference was held in July 2018,
Sein, and the Tatmadaw, undermining the donors’ ability to
but little progress was made in addressing the differences
be seen as neutral parties to the negotiations.
on the goals of the negotiations between Burma’s military
and many of the EAOs. Frustrations with the talks resulted
2. Encouraging or otherwise applying pressure on the key
in two major EAOs, the Karen National Union (KNU) and
groups in the peace process to negotiate in good faith and
the Reconstruction Council of Shan State (RCSS),
compromise. Certain forms of assistance or support for the
“suspending their participation in the formal peace
NLD-led government, the Tatmadaw, or the EAOs could be
process.” Plans for the 4th Panglong Peace Conference are
made contingent on progress in the negotiations.
currently on hold.
3. Withholding selected forms of engagement or aid from
Causes of the Ongoing Conflict
parties in Burma’s peace process who the United States
Burma is an ethnically diverse nation in which the ethnic
views as uncooperative. Similarly, engagement or
Bamar are a majority of the population. Several other
assistance could be withheld from parties who are impeding
ethnic minorities—including the Chin, Kachin, Karen,
the peace talks.
Karenni, Mon, Rakhine, and Shan—are the majority
population in some outlying regions. Burma’s 1948
4. Encouraging political reforms that enhance democratic
constitution established a federated nation in which the
governance and protection of human rights. A lasting peace
predominately ethnic minority states retained a fair amount
in Burma may require the federal and local governments to
of autonomy. The 1948 constitution was based in part on
be more responsive to the wishes of their constituencies and
the provisions of the 1947 Panglong Agreement negotiated
recognize the rights of all ethnic groups.
between General Aung San (Aung San Suu Kyi’s father)
and leaders of the Chin, Kachin, and Shan communities.
5. Coordinating with U.S. allies and the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to actively support
Most of the EAOs maintain that Burma’s central
Burma’s pursuit of peace. ASEAN and several U.S. allies
government and the Tatmadaw have never lived up to the
and partners have not been particularly engaged in
Panglong Agreement’s promises. They contend the Bamar
promoting peace in Burma. Finding a common perspective
majority has used the central government and the
and sharing a similar policy may improve peace prospects.
Tatmadaw to oppress Burma’s ethnic minorities. The
Tatmadaw views the EAOs as insurgents threatening the
6. Pressing the Tatmadaw to extend its unilateral ceasefire
nation’s territorial integrity. In January 2019, the Tatmadaw
to Rakhine State and beyond its current deadline. The
labeled several “problem” EAOs as terrorist groups, and
limited scope and duration of the ceasefire has increased
subsequently launched extensive “counterterrorism
speculation that Min Aung Hlaing’s announcement signifies
offensives” to “crush” the AA.
the Tatmadaw’s efforts to foster dissent among the EAOs.
In September 2015, the Tatmadaw set out its “six principles
Michael F. Martin, Specialist in Asian Affairs
for peace,” which require the EAOs to agree to remain part
Kirt Smith, Research Assistant
of Burma, accept the 2008 constitution, and submit to the
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Burma’s Prospects for Peace in 2019
IF11081
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to
congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has
been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the
United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be
reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include
copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you
wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11081 · VERSION 3 · UPDATED