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January 23, 2019
Burma’s Prospects for Peace in 2019
The announcement on December 21, 2018, by Burma’s
from perceived oppression by the Tatmadaw, launched a
Commander-in-Chief, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, of
series of attacks on security outposts and troops on patrol.
a unilateral ceasefire in eastern (but not western) Burma has
The AA is also a member of a coalition with the KIA,
raised many questions about prospects for ending the
MNDAA, and TNLA.
nation’s long-standing civil war. Some observers view the
announcement as a possible breakthrough for the stalled
Figure 1. Map of Fighting in Burma in 2018
“peace process” backed by Min Aung Hlaing and State
Conflict by State or Region
Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi. Others see it as a ruse
designed to promote discord among Burma’s various ethnic
armed organizations (EAOs), continue the military’s
military campaign in western Burma, and possibly set the
stage for Min Aung Hlaing’s political ambitions to be
selected as Burma’s next President in 2020.
Both the Obama and Trump Administrations backed the
“peace process,” both financially and as a matter of policy.
The lack of significant progress in the negotiations and the
escalation in fighting in 2018 has raised questions in
Congress and elsewhere about the effectiveness of U.S.
policy in Burma.
Intensified Fighting in 2018
In 2018, fighting between the Burmese military, or
Tatmadaw, and several EAOs escalated in Kachin and Shan
States, and erupted in Chin, Karen (Kayin), and Rakhine
States, dimming hopes for the peaceful resolution of
Source: CRS; based on data from Armed Conflict Location and
Burma’s 60-year civil war. According to the Armed
Event Data Project (ACLED), accessed January 2019.
Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), fighting
occurred in 7 of Burma’s 14 States or Regions in 2018 (see
Stalled “Peace Process”
Figure 1).
In 2011, Burma’s military junta, the State Peace and
Development Council (SPDC), transferred power to a
In Kachin State, the Tatmadaw launched an offensive
mixed civilian/military government headed by President
against the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) that resulted
Thein Sein, a retired general and ex-SPDC Prime Minister.
in the internal displacement of over 5,000 civilians.
As President, he initiated a peace process that called for the
According to some accounts, the Tatmadaw intentionally
signing of a nationwide ceasefire agreement to be followed
attacked civilians in villages, leading to comparisons with
by negotiations over reform of the 2008 constitution. In
the brutal attacks on Rohingya villages in Rakhine State in
October 2015, Thein Sein signed a ceasefire agreement
late 2017.
with 8 of the more than 20 EAOs, but his subsequent efforts
to get more EAOs to sign were unsuccessful.
In Shan State, fighting between the Tatmadaw and the
combined forces of the KIA, the Myanmar National
In November 2015, Aung San Suu Kyi and the National
Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the Ta’ang
League for Democracy (NLD) won a supermajority of the
National Liberation Army (TNLA) increased, while rival
seats in Burma’s Union Parliament, raising hopes that they
EAOs also clashed. As in Kachin State, the conflict has
would offer greater autonomy for ethnic minorities and
created thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs).
facilitate the peaceful resolution of nation’s civil war. In her
role as State Counselor, Aung San Suu Kyi chose to modify
In Karen State, an apparent dispute over Tatmadaw road
Thein Sein’s peace process; she did so by adding the
construction work led to new combat with Karen National
concept of “Panglong Peace Conferences” at which a broad
Union (KNU) troops. Fighting between the KNU and the
spectrum of vested interests would discuss the terms of a
Tatmadaw had ceased following an October 2015 ceasefire.
ceasefire agreement and governance reform.
The civil war was brought to western Burma’s Chin and
The 3rd Panglong Peace Conference was held in July 2018
Rakhine States when the Arakan Army (AA), an EAO
(six months after it was originally scheduled), but little
established in 2009 to protect the Arakan (Rakhine) people
progress was made in addressing the differences on the
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Burma’s Prospects for Peace in 2019
goals of the negotiations between Burma’s military and
statement also calls on the EAOs to continue to participate
many of the EAOs. Subsequent to the conference, two
in the peace negotiations.
major EAOs, the Karen National Union (KNU) and the
Reconstruction Council of Shan State (RCSS), announced
Some observers believe that China pressured Min Aung
they were “suspending their participation in the formal
Hlaing and some of the EAOs to accept these conditions in
peace process.” Plans for the 4th Panglong Peace
an effort to advance Burma’s prospects for peace. Other
Conference are currently on hold.
analysts warn that the apparent flexibility may be a ruse by
the Tatmadaw to draw more EAOs into the negotiations,
Causes of the Ongoing Conflict
while allowing it to focus its military operations against the
Burma is an ethnically diverse nation in which the ethnic
AA in Chin and Rakhine State. These observers note that
Bamar are a majority of the population, but several other
the Tatmadaw’s statement does not announce any changes
ethnic minorities—including the Chin, Kachin, Karen,
in its position on the terms for peace—acceptance of the
Karenni, Mon, Rakhine, and Shan—are the majority
2008 Constitution and DDR for the EAOs.
population in some regions. Burma’s 1948 constitution
established a federated nation in which the predominately
Issues for U.S. Policy
ethnic minority states retained a fair amount of autonomy.
Identifying a path to peace, and what constructive role, if
The 1948 constitution was based in part on the provisions
any, the United States can play in helping to end Burma’s
of the 1947 Panglong Agreement negotiated between
civil war, raises a number of policy options, including:
General Aung San (Aung San Suu Kyi’s father) and leaders
of the Chin, Kachin, and Shan communities.
1. Providing assistance to the National Reconciliation and
Peace Center and/or the peace negotiations. Financial
Most of the EAOs maintain that Burma’s central
support can potentially boost participation and facilitate
government and the Tatmadaw have never lived up to the
negotiations, but donors to the “peace process,” including
Panglong Agreement’s promises. They contend the Bamar
the United States, have found that such assistance was seen
majority has used the central government and the
by some EAOs as support for Aung San Suu Kyi, Thein
Tatmadaw to oppress Burma’s ethnic minorities. The
Sein, and the Tatmadaw, undermining the donors’ ability to
Tatmadaw views the EAOs as insurgents threatening the
be seen as neutral parties to the negotiations.
nation’s territorial integrity. In September 2015, the
Tatmadaw set out its “six principles for peace,” which
2. Encouraging or otherwise applying pressure on the key
require the EAOs to agree to remain part of Burma, accept
groups in the peace process to negotiate in good faith and
the 2008 constitution, submit to “national sovereignty” (the
compromise. Certain forms of assistance or support for the
legitimacy of the current central government), and abide by
NLD-led government, the Tatmadaw, or the EAOs could be
the laws of the central government.
made contingent on progress in the negotiations.
Another barrier to peace is a fundamental difference
3. Withholding selected forms of engagement or aid from
between the Tatmadaw and many of the EAOs on the final
parties in Burma’s peace process who the United States
goal of negotiations. In general, EAOs seek a more
views as uncooperative. Similarly, engagement or
decentralized federated union, and the Tatmadaw prefers a
assistance could be withheld from parties who are impeding
stronger central government with less state autonomy. Aung
the peace talks.
San Suu Kyi has not presented her vision of a future
federated union in Burma. Also, the Tatmadaw has insisted
4. Encouraging political reforms that enhance democratic
that the EAOs disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate (DDR),
governance and protection of human rights. A lasting peace
while most of the EAOs have called for security sector
in Burma may require the federal and local governments to
reform (SSR) that provides a role for the EAOs in the
be more responsive to the wishes of their constituencies and
nation’s security and defense.
recognize the rights of all ethnic groups.
Signs of Tatmadaw Flexibility?
5. Coordinating with U.S. allies and the Association of
Burma’s prospects for peace were rather dim for much of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to actively support
2018. The “peace process” appeared to be stalled while
Burma’s pursuit of peace. ASEAN and several U.S. allies
fighting escalated across the country. On December 12,
and partners have not been particularly engaged in
2018, the AA, MNDAA, and TNLA announced that they
promoting peace in Burma. Finding a common perspective
would cease all military operations in exchange for their
and sharing a similar policy may improve prospects for
participation in the peace negotiations, from which they had
peace.
previously been excluded, apparently with the approval of
Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. On December 21, 2018,
6. Pressing the Tatmadaw to extend its unilateral ceasefire
the Tatmadaw released a statement indicating that it would
to Rakhine State and beyond April 30, 2019. The limited
cease all its military operations in Northern, Northeast,
scope and duration of the ceasefire has increased
Eastern, Middle East and Triangle Command regions—
speculation that Min Aung Hlaing’s announcement is
effectively Kachin and Shan States—until April 30, 2019.
another example of the Tatmadaw’s efforts to foster dissent
The ceasefire announcement did not include Western
among the EAOs.
Command, which includes Chin and Rakhine States, where
the Tatmadaw has been fighting the AA. The Tatmadaw
Michael F. Martin, Specialist in Asian Affairs
IF11081
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Burma’s Prospects for Peace in 2019
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