Terrorist Groups in Afghanistan




Updated April 19, 2022
Terrorist Groups in Afghanistan
Afghanistan’s geography, complex ethnic composition, and
the United States or its allies. The State Department reports
history of conflict and instability have created space for
some “progress” in Taliban counterterrorism commitments.
numerous armed Islamist groups, some of which engage in
U.S. defense officials assess as of March 2022 that Al
transnational terrorist activity. This product outlines major
Qaeda has the intention, but not the capability, to conduct
terrorist groups present in Afghanistan that are affiliated
external operations; they further assess that Al Qaeda could
and allied with Al Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State (IS,
reconstitute that capability in one to two years in the
also known as ISIS, ISIL, or by the Arabic acronym
Da’esh
absence of sustained counterterrorism pressure.
), and relations between these groups and other
actors, most notably the Taliban. These dynamics may
Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent
inform assessments of U.S. policy in Afghanistan in light of
In September 2014, Zawahiri announced the creation of a
the Taliban’s renewed control of the country.
formal, separate Al Qaeda affiliate in South Asia, Al Qaeda
The Taliban interact with the groups below in varying ways
in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS, designated as a Foreign
that may affect U.S. interests. Observers differ on how
Terrorist Organization, or FTO, in 2016). Because of the
Taliban rule might empower or undermine these terrorist
relative geographical proximity of AQIS and the AQ core,
groups or Taliban behavior toward them. U.S. public
differentiating between the two is difficult, but some key
assessments of the threats these groups pose to U.S.
distinctions exist. AQIS represents an attempt by AQ to
interests, including to the U.S. homeland, vary. President
establish a more durable presence in the region by
Joseph Biden and other U.S. officials have stated that the
enhancing links with local actors, prompted in part by the
United States will maintain “over-the-horizon” capabilities
relocation of some AQ leaders (who are predominantly
to address terrorist threats in Afghanistan. As of mid-March
Arab) to Syria. Former AQIS leader Asim Umar, who was
2022, the United States has not carried out any such strikes
being “sheltered” by Taliban forces when he was killed in a
since the U.S. military withdrawal was completed on
joint U.S.-Afghan operation in Afghanistan in September
August 30, 2021.
2019, was an Indian with roots in Pakistan and his
successor Osama Mahmood is Pakistani.
Al Qaeda Core
The top echelon or “core” AQ leadership
AQIS reportedly solidified its presence in Afghanistan by
was a primary
embedding its members in Taliban ranks and is estimated to
target of post-2001 U.S. operations in Afghanistan. The
have 200-400 fighters in the country.
core includes AQ leader Ayman al Zawahiri (who
reportedly is ailing) and his deputies, an advisory council of
Recent Terrorism-Related Developments
about ten individuals, and members of various AQ
committees such as military operations and finance. In
September 2019, the White House announced that U.S.
forces killed Hamza bin Laden, son of AQ founder Osama
bin Laden and a rising leader in the group, “in the
Afghanistan/Pakistan region.”
Taliban-AQ links date back to the 1990s, when Bin Laden
pledged allegiance to the Taliban, who in turn provided a
safe haven to Al Qaeda as it planned the September 11,
2001, and other terrorist attacks. Those ties were reinforced
by their shared battle against U.S.-led international forces in
Afghanistan as well as through intermarriage and other
personal bonds between members of the two groups. AQ
sympathizers celebrated the Taliban’s August 2021
takeover as a victory for global Islamism.

Source: Graphic created by CRS.
Although most official assessments concur that AQ-Taliban
ties remain close, they also indicate Al Qaeda is
Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP)
maintaining “strategic silence” (per U.N. sanctions
The Islamic State announced the formation of its Afghan
monitors) to not undermine Taliban efforts to obtain
affiliate in January 2015. ISKP (also known as ISIS-K) was
international legitimacy. Those assessments also agree that
the Taliban in turn are likely to allow AQ figures to remain
initially concentrated in eastern Afghanistan, particularly in
Nangarhar province, which borders the region of Pakistan
in Afghanistan so long as they do not threaten the United
formerly known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
States or its allies. The February 2020 U.S.-Taliban accord
committed the Taliban to preventing any group, including
(FATA). There, ISKP was mostly comprised of former
Al Qaeda, from using Afghan soil to threaten the security of
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Terrorist Groups in Afghanistan
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP, see below) militants who
the Afghan Taliban against the Afghan government inside
fled Pakistani army operations in the FATA after mid-2014.
Afghanistan (where the TTP has thousands of fighters). An
umbrella organization for a number of Pakistan-based
Arguably one of the Islamic State’s most successful
affiliates, ISKP was “nearly eradicated” from its main base
extremist groups that came into conflict with the
government of Pakistan after 2007, the TTP began to
in eastern Afghanistan in late 2019 by U.S. and Afghan
splinter following the 2013 death of leader Hakimullah
military offensives and, separately, the Taliban. An ISKP
Mehsud. In 2014, some TTP members pledged allegiance to
contingent in northern Afghanistan was similarly defeated
the Islamic State and subsequently relocated to eastern
in 2018. Still, ISKP continued to conduct attacks against
Afghanistan in response to Pakistani army operations that
various targets, including a suicide bombing at Kabul’s
mostly drove the group from its safe havens in the former
airport that killed and injured dozens of U.S. service
FATA. Continued military pressure (Mehsud’s successor
members and hundreds of Afghans in the midst of the
was killed by a U.S. drone strike in Afghanistan’s Kunar
August 2021 U.S. military withdrawal.
province in 2018) greatly reduced the group’s activity in
The fallout from Taliban takeover for ISKP is mixed. The
subsequent years. However, reunification between TTP and
Taliban appear to view ISKP as the primary threat to their
some former splinter groups (possibly facilitated by AQ)
renewed rule and have launched offensives against the
since 2020 has swelled the group’s ranks. The TTP may
group and executed at least one imprisoned former ISKP
benefit further from the Taliban takeover and release of
leader. At the same time, U.N. sanctions monitors assess in
TTP prisoners in Afghanistan. TTP attacks in Pakistan
early 2022 that the number of ISKP fighters has increased
escalated considerably after the Taliban takeover, leading
to as many as 4,000 with the escape of former ISKP
the Pakistani government to seek the mediation of the
prisoners from jails opened after the Taliban takeover.
Afghan Taliban (Sirajuddin Haqqani specifically, per some
ISKP again controls limited territory in eastern Afghanistan
media reports) in brokering a month-long ceasefire that
and has claimed numerous large-scale bombings against
ended in December 2021. Attacks have escalated in 2022.
civilians, mainly targeting Afghanistan’s Shia minority.
ISKP attacks in 2021-2022 include bombings of Shia
“There are no recent signs that the Taliban has taken
mosques in Kunduz, Kabul, and Kandahar, as well as in
steps to limit the activities of foreign terrorist fighters
Peshawar, Pakistan.
in the country. On the contrary, terrorist groups
enjoy greater freedom there than at any time in
U.S. defense officials assessed in March 2022 that ISKP
“could establish an external attack capability against the
recent history.”
-Twenty-ninth report of the Analytical Support and
United States or its allies in twelve to eighteen months, but
Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to
possibly sooner if the group experiences unanticipated
gains in Afghanistan.”
resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida

and associated individuals and entities, February 3, 2022
The Haqqani Network
The Haqqani Network is an official, semi-autonomous
component of the Afghan Taliban, a longtime ally of AQ,
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Designated an
and a U.S.-designated FTO (since 2012). It was founded by
FTO in 2000, the IMU was once a prominent ally of AQ.
Jalaluddin Haqqani, a leading anti-Soviet Islamist
Formed by Uzbeks who fought with Islamist forces in
commander who became a prominent Taliban official and
Tajikistan’s 1992-1997 civil war, the IMU allied with the
eventually a key leader in the post-2001 insurgency. The
Taliban and launched attacks into other Central Asian
Taliban confirmed his death from natural causes in 2018.
states. After U.S. military operations began in 2001, the
The group’s current leader is Jalaluddin’s son
group’s focus
, Sirajuddin
was in Afghanistan and Pakistan. U.N.
Haqqani, who has also served as the deputy leader of the
sanctions monitors report that IMU, along with other
Taliban since 2015. Sirajuddin’s appointment to le
Central Asian terrorist groups, has “greater freedom of
ad the
movement” in Afghanistan under the Taliban government.
network likely strengthened cooperation between the

Taliban and AQ; U.N. monitors have described the Haqqani
Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM). ETIM
Network as the “primary liaison” between the Taliban and
(also known as the Turkistan Islamic Party) seeks to
AQ. In September 2021, Sirajuddin became the acting
establish an independent Islamic state for the Uyghurs, a
Interior Minister in the Taliban government, the highest
Muslim-majority, Turkic-speaking people in western China.
ranking of several Haqqani Network-aligned individuals to
In 2002, the U.S. government designated ETIM as an FTO,
hold cabinet posts. The U.S. Department of State has for
citing the group’s ties to AQ; in late 2020, it removed
years offered a reward of up to $10 million for information
ETIM from another list, the Terrorist Exclusion List (to
leading to Haqqani’s arrest.
which the group had been added in 2004), stating that “for
The Haqqani Network is blamed for some of the deadliest
more than a decade, there has been no credible evidence
attacks of the war in Afghanistan, including the death or
that ETIM continues to exist.” U.N. sanctions monitors
injury of hundreds of U.S. troops, and has historically been
reported in February 2022 that ETIM has hundreds of
described as close to Pakistan’s intelligence agency.
fighters in northern Afghanistan and a larger presence in
Idlib, Syria. The Taliban reportedly have moved Uyghur
Other Groups
militants away from the Afghan-Chinese border in response
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The TTP, also known
to Chinese government concerns.
as the Pakistani Taliban, has “distinctive anti-Pakistan
objectives,” per U.N. monitors, but also fought alongside
Clayton Thomas, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
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Terrorist Groups in Afghanistan

IF10604


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10604 · VERSION 14 · UPDATED