Terrorist Groups in Afghanistan

Terrorist Groups in Afghanistan

Updated April 2, 2024
Terrorist Groups in Afghanistan
Afghanistan’s geography, complex ethnic composition, and
vision of a global caliphate. ISKP has launched attacks
history of conflict and instability have long created space
against Taliban targets since mid-2021, killing several
for Islamist terrorist groups, some of which seek to conduct
senior officials (including provincial governors in March
attacks abroad. United Nations (UN) sanctions monitors
and June 2023), as well as externally-oriented operations,
report that “the high concentration of terrorist groups in
including cross border rocket attacks against Uzbekistan
Afghanistan undermines the security situation in the
and Tajikistan, attacks against the Russian and Pakistani
region.” Two of the most prominent such groups are
embassies in Kabul, and an assault on a Kabul hotel
Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP, the Afghanistan-
frequented by Chinese nationals. The Taliban appear to
based affiliate of the Islamic State) and Al Qaeda (AQ).
view ISKP as the primary threat to their rule and have
Relations between these groups and other actors (including
launched offensives against it. In March 2024, a U.S.
the Afghan Taliban, who returned to power in August 2021)
official said the Taliban “have made progress combating
and the respective threats they pose to U.S. interests are
[ISKP], but they have struggled to dismantle [ISKP]’s
likely to inform congressional assessments of U.S. policy in
clandestine urban cells and prevent attacks on soft targets.”
Afghanistan. U.S. officials have told Congress that since
While ISKP retains the ability to conduct high-profile
the withdrawal of U.S. forces, the United States has no
attacks in Afghanistan, ISKP’s external attacks are raising
military or diplomatic personnel in Afghanistan, but has
alarms in Europe and elsewhere. According to one expert,
maintained “over-the-horizon” capabilities to address
the group is “expanding its external operations capacity,” as
terrorist threats there.
evidenced by its growing media presence (particularly
Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP)
propaganda targeting Central Asian nationals) and planned
or actual attacks in Pakistan, India, Turkey, and Germany.
The group that reportedly poses the “greatest threat within
ISKP claimed responsibility for mass casualty attacks in
Afghanistan” and beyond is ISKP (also known as ISIS-K or
Iran and Russia in January and March 2024, respectively;
IS-K), and ISKP has launched plots and carried out
the United States reportedly sent private warnings to both
operations in multiple countries, including in Russia in
Iran and Russia that ISKP was planning attacks. U.S.
March 2024.
Central Command (CENTCOM) commander General Erik
The Islamic State announced the formation of this Afghan
Kurilla estimated in March 2023 testimony that ISKP could
affiliate in 2015, and ISKP was designated as a U.S.
be capable of conducting “an external operation against
Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in 2016. ISKP was
U.S. or Western interests abroad in under six months,” a
initially concentrated in eastern Afghanistan, bordering the
warning he repeated in March 2024 testimony.
region of Pakistan formerly known as the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). There, ISKP mostly
Al Qaeda
comprised former Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP, see
The presence of AQ’s top leaders (sometimes referred to as
below) militants who fled Pakistani army operations in the
Al Qaeda core) in Afghanistan dates back to the 1990s,
FATA after 2014. Today it recruits across Central Asia, and
when AQ founder Osama bin Laden (killed by U.S. forces
estimates of its size range from 2,000 to 5,000.
in Pakistan in 2011) pledged allegiance to the Taliban, who
in turn provided a safe haven to Al Qaeda as it planned the
ISKP controlled territory in eastern and northern
September 11, 2001, and other terrorist attacks. AQ-Taliban
Afghanistan until it was allegedly “nearly eradicated from
ties were reinforced by their shared battle against U.S.-led
its main Afghan base” by U.S. and Afghan military
international forces in Afghanistan after 2001, as well as
offensives and, separately, Taliban operations in 2018-
through intermarriage and other interpersonal bonds. AQ
2020. ISKP continued to conduct attacks against various
remained a key target of U.S.-led military operations. In
targets, particularly Afghanistan’s Shia minority, the
September 2019, the White House announced that U.S.
Hazaras. ISKP also carried out the suicide bombing at
Kabul’s airpo
forces had killed Hamza bin Laden, son of AQ founder
rt that killed and injured dozens of U.S.
Osama bin Laden and a rising leader in the group, “in the
servicemembers and hundreds of Afghans during the
Afghanistan/Pakistan region.” AQ sympathizers celebrated
August 2021 U.S. military withdrawal. That suicide bomber
the Taliban’s August 2021 takeover as a victory.
was reportedly one of the thousands of ISKP prisoners who
escaped from Afghan prisons after the Taliban takeover.
Since the Taliban’s return to power, AQ-Taliban ties have
The planner of the attack was reportedly killed by the
remained close, but UN sanctions monitors report that the
Taliban in 2023.
Taliban “seek to reduce the visibility of these relationships”
and that the Taliban have taken some steps to “constrain”
While the Taliban and ISKP share some ideological
similarities, they are “
Al Qaeda, leading to tensions between the groups. In July
doctrinally distinct” given the
Taliban’s
2022, the United States killed AQ leader Ayman al
close relationship with IS rival Al Qaeda (see
Zawahiri in Kabul. The circumstances of Zawahiri’s
below) and ISKP’s view of the Taliban’s Afghanistan-
presence there and what they might signify beyond
focused nationalist political project as counter to the IS
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Terrorist Groups in Afghanistan
continued Taliban-AQ ties remain unclear; National
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
Security Advisor Jake Sullivan suggested that some
The TTP, also known as the Pakistani Taliban, has
elements of the Taliban might not have supported or even
“distinctive anti-Pakistan objectives,” per UN sanctions
been aware of Zawahiri’s presence in Kabul. Neither the
monitors, but also fought alongside the Afghan Taliban
Taliban nor Al Qaeda have acknowledged Zawahiri’s
inside Afghanistan. An umbrella organization for a number
death; his presumed successor as AQ leader, Sayf al Adl, is
of Pakistan-based extremist groups that came into conflict
reportedly in Iran.
with the government of Pakistan after 2007, the TTP began
to splinter in 2014, when some TTP members pledged
A June 2023 report from UN sanctions monitors assessed
that Al Qaeda is “in a reorganization phase, establishing
allegiance to the Islamic State. Reunification between TTP
new training centers” in
and some former splinter groups (possibly facilitated by
eastern Afghanistan; U.S. 2023
AQ) since 2020 has swelled the group’s ranks in
intelligence assessments in contrast described AQ as “at its
historical nadir in Afghanistan and Pakistan”
Afghanistan to 4,000-6,000 fighters.
and unlikely
to revitalize. A January 2024 report from UN sanctions
TTP attacks in Pakistan have increased considerably since
monitors perhaps split the difference, reporting that Al
2021, including a January 2023 attack targeting a police
Qaeda operates training camps, madrasas, and safe houses
compound that killed over 100 Pakistanis, prompting
in Afghanistan but assessing that “the group cannot at
Pakistan to carry out airstrikes in Afghanistan and force
present project sophisticated attacks at long range.”
Afghan refugees to leave Pakistan. UN sanctions monitors
report that TTP draws support both from Al Qaeda and the
Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent
Taliban (described as “generally sympathetic to TTP aims”)
In 2014, Zawahiri announced the creation of a separate Al
and has increasingly focused on recruiting Afghans.
Qaeda affiliate in South Asia, Al Qaeda in the Indian
Other Groups
Subcontinent (AQIS, designated as an FTO in 2016). AQIS
Designated an FTO in 2000, the Islamic Movement of
represents an attempt by AQ to establish a more durable
Uzbekistan (IMU) was once a prominent ally of AQ.
presence in the region by enhancing links with local actors
Formed by Uzbeks who fought alongside Islamist forces in
(particularly the TTP), prompted in part by the relocation of
Tajikistan’s 1992-1997 civil war, the IMU allied with the
some AQ leaders (who are predominantly Arab) to Syria.
Taliban and launched attacks into other Central Asian
Former AQIS leader Asim Umar, an Indian national who
states. After U.S. military operations began in 2001, the
was being “sheltered” by Taliban forces when he was killed
group’s focus was in Afghanistan and Pakistan. UN
in a joint U.S.-Afghan operation in Afghanistan in
sanctions monitors report that the IMU, along with other
September 2019, had roots in Pakistan; his successor
Central Asian terrorist groups, has “greater freedom of
Osama Mahmood is Pakistani. The State Department
movement” in Afghanistan under the Taliban government.
designated Mahmood and two of his deputies as Specially
Designated Global Terrorists in December 2022.
The Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM, also
known as the Turkistan Islamic Party) seeks to establish an
The Haqqani Network
independent Islamic state for the Uyghurs, a Muslim-
The Haqqani Network is an official, semi-autonomous
majority, Turkic-speaking people in western China. ETIM
component of the Afghan Taliban, a longtime ally of AQ,
was designated as an FTO in 2002 and delisted in 2020,
and a U.S.-designated FTO since 2012. It was founded by
when the State Department said in that “for more than a
the late Jalaluddin Haqqani, a leading anti-Soviet Islamist
decade, there has been no credible evidence that ETIM
commander who became a prominent Taliban official and a
continues to exist,” and the group is not mentioned in the
key leader in the post-2001 insurgency. The Haqqani
most recent Country Reports on Terrorism. UN sanctions
Network was blamed for some of the deadliest attacks of
monitors reported in January 2024 that ETIM is
the war in Afghanistan, including the death or injury of
“headquartered” in northwestern Afghanistan and has been
hundreds of U.S. troops, and has been described as close to
“restrained by the Taliban,” who reportedly moved ETIM
Pakistan’s intelligence agency.
militants away from the Afghan-Chinese border in response
to Chinese government concerns.
The group’s current leader is Jalaluddin’s son, Sirajuddin
Haqqani, who has also served as the deputy leader of the
Issues For Congress
Taliban since 2015. Sirajuddin’s appointment to lead the
All of the groups above (except ETIM) face U.S. sanctions
network likely strengthened cooperation between the
as designated FTOs. Congress may consider additional
Taliban and AQ; UN monitors have described the Haqqani
sanctions measures related to terrorism in Afghanistan (e.g.,
Network as the “primary liaison” between the Taliban and
S. 1768) and examine the Administration’s application of
AQ, and Zawahiri was reportedly killed in a Haqqani-
existing sanctions authorities. U.S. counterterrorism
linked safe house. The Department of State has for years
strategy is another potential oversight opportunity; some
offered a reward of up to $10 million for information
Members have expressed concern with the U.S. ability to
leading to Haqqani’s arrest. Since September 2021,
conduct “over-the-horizon” counterterrorism operations.
Sirajuddin has been the acting Interior Minister in the
Actions by ISKP or others beyond Afghanistan’s borders
Taliban government, the highest ranking of several Haqqani
may heighten many of these issues.
Network-aligned individuals to hold cabinet posts, and in
February 2023 voiced discontent with other Taliban leaders.
Clayton Thomas, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
UN sanctions monitors reported in June 2023 that the
Haqqanis are “increasingly involved in the production and
IF10604
trafficking of methamphetamine and synthetic drugs.”
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Terrorist Groups in Afghanistan

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