National Emergency Powers

June 28, 2001 – November 19, 2021 98-505

National Emergency Powers
Updated November 19, 2021
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
98-505

National Emergency Powers

Summary
The President of the United States has available certain powers that may be exercised in the event
that the nation is threatened by crisis, exigency, or emergency circumstances (other than natural
disasters, war, or near-war situations). Such powers may be stated explicitly or implied by the
Constitution, assumed by the Chief Executive to be permissible constitutionally, or inferred from
or specified by statute. Through legislation, Congress has made a great many delegations of
authority in this regard over the past 230 years.
There are, however, limits and restraints upon the President in his exercise of emergency powers.
With the exception of the habeas corpus clause, the Constitution makes no allowance for the
suspension of any of its provisions during a national emergency. Disputes over the
constitutionality or legality of the exercise of emergency powers are judicially reviewable. Both
the judiciary and Congress, as co-equal branches, can restrain the executive regarding emergency
powers. So can public opinion. Since 1976, the President has been subject to certain procedural
formalities in utilizing some statutorily delegated emergency authority.
The National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. §§1601-1651) eliminated or modified some statutory
grants of emergency authority, required the President to formally declare the existence of a
national emergency and to specify what statutory authority activated by the declaration would be
used, and provided Congress a means to countermand the President’s declaration and the
activated authority being sought. The development of this regulatory statute and subsequent
declarations of national emergency are reviewed in this report.
On three occasions, Presidents have activated Title 10, Section 2808, of the United States Code
(10 U.S.C. §2808)—one of the standby authorities available to a President when he declares a
national emergency or subsequently issues a related executive order or proclamation. Upon being
activated, Section 2808 is notable for permitting, under certain conditions, the use of military
construction (MILCON) funds for a declared national emergency. President Donald J. Trump
invoked Section 2808 upon declaring an emergency involving the southern border of the United
States. Congressional efforts to terminate the emergency were unsuccessful.

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ederal law provides a variety of powers for the President to use in response to crisis,
exigency, or emergency circumstances threatening the nation. They are not limited to
Fmilitary or war situations. Some of these authorities, deriving from the Constitution or
statutory law, are continuously available to the President with little or no qualification.
Others—statutory delegations from Congress—exist on a standby basis and remain dormant until
the President formally declares a national emergency. Congress may modify, rescind, or render
dormant such delegated emergency authority.
Until the crisis of World War I, Presidents utilized emergency powers at their own discretion.
Proclamations announced the exercise of exigency authority. During World War I and thereafter,
Chief Executives had available to them a growing body of standby emergency authority that
became operative upon the issuance of a proclamation declaring a condition of national
emergency. Sometimes such proclamations confined the matter of crisis to a specific policy
sphere, and sometimes they placed no limitation whatsoever on the pronouncement. These
activations of standby emergency authority remained acceptable practice until the era of the
Vietnam War. In 1976, Congress curtailed this practice with the passage of the National
Emergencies Act.
Background and History
The exercise of emergency powers had long been a concern of the classical political theorists,
including the 18th-century English philosopher John Locke, who had a strong influence upon the
Founding Fathers in the United States. A preeminent exponent of a government of laws and not of
men, Locke argued that occasions may arise when the executive must exert a broad discretion in
meeting special exigencies or “emergencies” for which the legislative power provided no relief or
existing law granted no necessary remedy. He did not regard this prerogative as limited to
wartime or even to situations of great urgency. It was sufficient if the “public good” might be
advanced by its exercise.1
Emergency powers were first expressed prior to the actual founding of the Republic. Between
1775 and 1781, the Continental Congress passed a series of acts and resolves that count as the
first expressions of emergency authority.2 These instruments dealt almost exclusively with the
prosecution of the Revolutionary War.
At the Constitutional Convention of 1787, emergency powers, as such, failed to attract much
attention during the course of debate over the charter for the new government. It may be argued,
however, that the granting of emergency powers by Congress is implicit in its Article I, Section 8,
authority to “provide for the common Defense and general Welfare;” the commerce clause; its
war, Armed Forces, and militia powers; and the “necessary and proper” clause empowering it to
make such laws as are required to fulfill the executions of “the foregoing Powers, and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department
or Officer thereof.”
There is a tradition of constitutional interpretation that has resulted in so-called implied powers,
which may be invoked in order to respond to an emergency situation. Locke seems to have

1 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Thomas I. Cook (New York: Hafner, 1947), pp. 203-207; Edward S.
Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, 1787-1957, 4th revised edition (New York: NYU Press, 1957), pp. 147-148.
2 See J. Reuben Clark Jr., comp., Emergency Legislation Passed Prior to December 1917 Dealing with the Control and
Taking of Private Property for the Public Use, Benefit, or Welfare, Presidential Proclamations and Executive Orders
Thereunder, to and Including January 31, 1918, to Which Is Added a Reprint of Analogous Legislation Since 1775
(Washington: Government Publishing Office [GPO], 1918), pp. 201-228.
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anticipated this practice. Furthermore, Presidents have occasionally taken an emergency action
that they assumed to be constitutionally permissible. Thus, in the American governmental
experience, the exercise of emergency powers has been somewhat dependent upon the Chief
Executive’s view of the presidential office.
Perhaps the President who most clearly articulated a view of his office in conformity with the
Lockean position was Theodore Roosevelt. Describing what came to be called the “stewardship”
theory of the presidency, Roosevelt wrote of his “insistence upon the theory that the executive
power was limited only by specific restrictions and prohibitions appearing in the Constitution or
imposed by the Congress under its constitutional powers.” It was his view “that every executive
officer, and above all every executive officer in high position, was a steward of the people,” and
he “declined to adopt the view that what was imperatively necessary for the Nation could not be
done by the President unless he could find some specific authorization to do it.” Indeed, it was
Roosevelt’s belief that, for the President, “it was not only his right but his duty to do anything that
the needs of the Nation demanded unless such action was forbidden by the Constitution or by the
laws.”3
Opposed to this view of the presidency was Roosevelt’s former Secretary of War, William
Howard Taft, his personal choice for and actual successor as Chief Executive. He viewed the
presidential office in more limited terms, writing “that the President can exercise no power which
cannot be fairly and reasonably traced to some specific grant of power or justly implied and
included within such express grant as proper and necessary to its exercise.” In his view, such a
“specific grant must be either in the Federal Constitution or in an act of Congress passed in
pursuance thereof. There is,” Taft concluded, “no undefined residuum of power which he can
exercise because it seems to him to be in the public interest.”4
Between these two views of the presidency lie various gradations of opinion, resulting in perhaps
as many conceptions of the office as there have been holders. One authority has summed up the
situation in the following words:
Emergency powers are not solely derived from legal sources. The extent of their invocation
and use is also contingent upon the personal conception which the incumbent of the
Presidential office has of the Presidency and the premises upon which he interprets his
legal powers. In the last analysis, the authority of a President is largely determined by the
President himself.5
Apart from the Constitution, but resulting from its prescribed procedures, there are statutory
grants of power for emergency conditions. The President is authorized by Congress to take some
special or extraordinary action, ostensibly to meet the problems of governing effectively in times
of exigency. Sometimes these laws are of only temporary duration. The Economic Stabilization
Act of 1970, for example, allowed the President to impose certain wage and price controls for
about three years before it expired automatically in 1974.6 The statute gave the President
emergency authority to address a crisis in the nation’s economy.
Many of these laws are continuously maintained or permanently available for the President’s
ready use in responding to an emergency. The Defense Production Act, originally adopted in 1950

3 Theodore Roosevelt, An Autobiography (New York: Macmillan, 1913), pp. 388-389.
4 William Howard Taft, Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1916), pp. 139-
140. For a direct response to Theodore Roosevelt’s expression of presidential power, see William Howard Taft, The
Presidency (New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1916), pp. 125-130.
5 Albert L. Sturm, “Emergencies and the Presidency,” Journal of Politics, vol. 11 (February 1949), pp. 125-126.
6 See 84 Stat. 799-800, 1468; 85 Stat. 13, 38, 743-755; and 87 Stat. 27-29.
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to prioritize and regulate the manufacture of military material, is an example of this type of
statute.7
There are various standby laws that convey special emergency powers once the President
formally declares a national emergency activating them. In 1973, a Senate special committee
studying emergency powers published a compilation identifying some 470 provisions of federal
law delegating to the executive extraordinary authority in time of national emergency.8 The vast
majority of them are of the standby kind—dormant until activated by the President. However,
formal procedures for invoking these authorities, accounting for their use, and regulating their
activation and application were established by the National Emergencies Act of 1976.9
The Emergency Concept
Relying upon constitutional authority or congressional delegations made at various times over the
past 230 years, the President of the United States may exercise certain powers in the event that
the continued existence of the nation is threatened by crisis, exigency, or emergency
circumstances. What is a national emergency?
In the simplest understanding of the term, the dictionary defines emergency as “an unforeseen
combination of circumstances or the resulting state that calls for immediate action.”10 In the midst
of the crisis of the Great Depression, a 1934 Supreme Court majority opinion characterized an
emergency in terms of urgency and relative infrequency of occurrence as well as equivalence to a
public calamity resulting from fire, flood, or like disaster not reasonably subject to anticipation.11
An eminent constitutional scholar, the late Edward S. Corwin, explained emergency conditions as
being those that “have not attained enough of stability or recurrency to admit of their being dealt
with according to rule.”12 During congressional committee hearings on emergency powers in
1973, a political scientist described an emergency in the following terms: “It denotes the
existence of conditions of varying nature, intensity and duration, which are perceived to threaten
life or well-being beyond tolerable limits.”13 Corwin also indicated it “connotes the existence of
conditions suddenly intensifying the degree of existing danger to life or well-being beyond that
which is accepted as normal.”14
There are at least four aspects of an emergency condition. The first is its temporal character: An
emergency is sudden, unforeseen, and of unknown duration. The second is its potential gravity:
An emergency is dangerous and threatening to life and well-being. The third, in terms of
governmental role and authority, is the matter of perception: Who discerns this phenomenon? The
Constitution may be guiding on this question, but it is not always conclusive. Fourth, there is the

7 See 64 Stat. 798; 50 U.S.C. §§4501-4568. (The latter citation was originally 50 U.S.C. App. 2061 et seq. (1994).
Subsequently, the appendix in Title 50 of the U.S. Code was eliminated.)
8 U.S. Congress, Senate Special Committee on the Termination of the National Emergency, Emergency Powers
Statutes, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., S.Rept. 93-549 (Washington: GPO, 1973).
9 90 Stat. 1255; 50 U.S.C. §§1601-1651.
10 Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield, MA: G & C Merriam, 1974), p. 372.
11 Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 440 (1934).
12 Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, 1787-1957, p. 3.
13 U.S. Congress, Senate Special Committee on the Termination of the National Emergency, National Emergency,
hearings, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., April 11-12, 1973 (Washington: GPO, 1973), p. 277.
14 U.S. Congress, Senate Special Committee on the Termination of the National Emergency, National Emergency,
hearings, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., April 11-12, 1973 (Washington: GPO, 1973), p. 279.
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element of response: By definition, an emergency requires immediate action but is also
unanticipated and, therefore, as Corwin notes, cannot always be “dealt with according to rule.”
From these simple factors arise the dynamics of national emergency powers.15 These dynamics
can be seen in the history of the exercise of emergency powers.
Law and Practice
In 1792, residents of western Pennsylvania, Virginia, and the Carolinas began forcefully opposing
the collection of a federal excise tax on whiskey. Anticipating rebellious activity, Congress
enacted legislation providing for the calling forth of the militia to suppress insurrections and repel
invasions.16 Section 3 of this statute required that a presidential proclamation be issued to warn
insurgents to cease their activity.17 If hostilities persisted, the militia could be dispatched. On
August 17, 1794, President Washington issued such a proclamation. The insurgency continued.
The President then took command of the forces organized to put down the rebellion.18
Here was the beginning of a pattern of policy expression and implementation regarding
emergency powers. Congress legislated extraordinary or special authority for discretionary use by
the President in a time of emergency. In issuing a proclamation, the Chief Executive notified
Congress that he was making use of this power and also apprised other affected parties of his
emergency action.
Over the next 100 years, Congress enacted various permanent and standby laws for responding
largely to military, economic, and labor emergencies. During this span of years, however, the
exercise of emergency powers by President Abraham Lincoln brought the first great dispute over
the authority and discretion of the Chief Executive to engage in emergency actions.
By the time of Lincoln’s inauguration (March 4, 1861), seven states of the lower South had
announced their secession from the Union; the Confederate provisional government had been
established (February 4, 1861); Jefferson Davis had been elected (February 9, 1861) and installed
as president of the confederacy (February 18, 1861); and an army was being mobilized by the
secessionists. Lincoln had a little over two months to consider his course of action.
When the new President assumed office, Congress was not in session. For reasons of his own,
Lincoln delayed calling a special meeting of the legislature but soon ventured into its
constitutionally designated policy sphere. On April 19, he issued a proclamation establishing a
blockade on the ports of the secessionist states,19 “a measure hitherto regarded as contrary to both
the Constitution and the law of nations except when the government was embroiled in a declared,
foreign war.”20 Congress had not been given an opportunity to consider a declaration of war.

15 While some might argue that the concept of emergency powers can be extended to embrace authority exercised in
response to circumstances of natural disaster, this dimension is not within the scope of this report. Various federal
response arrangements and programs for dealing with natural disasters have been established and administered with no
potential or actual disruption of constitutional arrangements. With regard to Corwin’s characterization of emergency
conditions, these long-standing arrangements and programs suggest that natural disasters do “admit of their being dealt
with according to rule.”
16 1 Stat. 264-265.
17 This authority may presently be found at 10 U.S.C. §254.
18 See James D. Richardson, ed., A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. 1 (New York:
Bureau of National Literature, 1897), pp. 149-154.
19 Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. 7, pp. 3215-3216.
20 Clinton L. Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1963), p. 225.
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The next day, the President ordered the addition of 19 vessels to the navy “for purposes of public
defense.”21 A short time later, the blockade was extended to the ports of Virginia and North
Carolina.22
By a proclamation of May 3, Lincoln ordered that the regular army be enlarged by 22,714 men,
that navy personnel be increased by 18,000, and that 42,032 volunteers be accommodated for
three-year terms of service.23 The directive antagonized many Representatives and Senators,
because Congress is specifically authorized by Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution “to raise
and support armies.”
In his July message to the newly assembled Congress, Lincoln suggested, “These measures,
whether strictly legal or not, were ventured upon under what appeared to be a popular and a
public necessity, trusting then, as now, that Congress would readily ratify them. It is believed,” he
wrote, “that nothing has been done beyond the constitutional competency of Congress.”24
Congress subsequently did legislatively authorize, and thereby approve, the President’s actions
regarding his increasing Armed Forces personnel and would do the same later concerning some
other questionable emergency actions. In the case of Lincoln, the opinion of scholars and experts
is that “neither Congress nor the Supreme Court exercised any effective restraint upon the
President.”25 The emergency actions of the Chief Executive were either unchallenged or approved
by Congress and were either accepted or—because of almost no opportunity to render
judgment—went largely without notice by the Supreme Court. The President made a quick
response to the emergency at hand, a response that Congress or the courts might have rejected in
law but, nonetheless, had been made in fact and with some degree of popular approval. Similar
controversy would arise concerning the emergency actions of Presidents Woodrow Wilson and
Franklin D. Roosevelt. Both men exercised extensive emergency powers with regard to world
hostilities, and Roosevelt also used emergency authority to deal with the Great Depression. Their
emergency actions, however, were largely supported by statutory delegations and a high degree of
approval on the part of both Congress and the public.
During the Wilson and Roosevelt presidencies, a major procedural development occurred in the
exercise of emergency powers—use of a proclamation to declare a national emergency and
thereby activate all standby statutory provisions delegating authority to the President during a
national emergency. The first such national emergency proclamation was issued by President
Wilson on February 5, 1917.26 Promulgated on the authority of a statute establishing the U.S.
Shipping Board, the proclamation concerned water transportation policy.27 It was statutorily
terminated, along with a variety of other wartime measures, on March 3, 1921.28

21 Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, p. 225.
22 See Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. 7, p. 3216.
23 Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. 7, pp. 3216-3217.
24 Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. 7, p. 3225.
25 James G. Randall, Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1951). See also
Wilfred E. Binkley, President and Congress (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1947), pp. 124-127; Rossiter, Constitutional
Dictatorship, pp. 233-234; and Woodrow Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United States (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1907), p. 58.
26 39 Stat. 1814.
27 39 Stat. 728.
28 41 Stat. 1359.
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President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued the next national emergency proclamation some 48 hours
after assuming office.29 Proclaimed March 6, 1933, on the somewhat questionable authority of the
Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917,30 the proclamation declared a “bank holiday” and halted a
major class of financial transactions by closing the banks. Congress subsequently gave specific
statutory support for the Chief Executive’s action with the passage of the Emergency Banking Act
on March 9.31 Upon signing this legislation into law, the President issued a second banking
proclamation, based upon the authority of the new law, continuing the bank holiday until it was
determined that banking institutions were capable of conducting business in accordance with new
banking policy.32
Next, on September 8, 1939, President Roosevelt promulgated a proclamation of “limited”
national emergency, though the qualifying term had no meaningful legal significance.33 Almost
two years later, on May 27, 1941, he issued a proclamation of “unlimited” national emergency.34
This action, however, did not actually make any important new powers available to the Chief
Executive in addition to those activated by the 1939 proclamation. The President’s purpose in
making the second proclamation was largely to apprise the American people of the worsening
conflict in Europe and growing tensions in Asia.
These two war-related proclamations of a general condition of national emergency remained
operative until 1947, when certain of the provisions of law they had activated were statutorily
rescinded.35 Then, in 1951, Congress terminated the declaration of war against Germany.36 In the
spring of the following year, the Senate ratified the treaty of peace with Japan. Because these
actions marked the end of World War II for the United States, legislation was required to keep
certain emergency provisions in effect. Initially, the Emergency Powers Interim Continuation Act
temporarily maintained this emergency authority.37 It was subsequently supplanted by the
Emergency Powers Continuation Act, which kept selected emergency delegations in force until
August 1953.38 By proclamation in April 1952, President Harry S. Truman terminated the 1939
and 1941 national emergency declarations, leaving operative only those emergency authorities
continued by statutory specification.39
President Truman’s 1952 termination, however, specifically exempted a December 1950
proclamation of national emergency he had issued in response to hostilities in Korea.40 This
condition of national emergency would remain in force and unimpaired well into the era of the
Vietnam War.
Two other proclamations of national emergency would also be promulgated before Congress once
again turned its attention to these matters. Faced with a postal strike, President Richard Nixon

29 48 Stat. 1689.
30 40 Stat. 411.
31 48 Stat. 1.
32 48 Stat. 1691.
33 54 Stat. 2643.
34 55 Stat. 1647.
35 61 Stat. 449.
36 65 Stat. 451.
37 66 Stat. 54; extended at 66 Stat. 96, 137, and 296.
38 66 Stat. 330; extended at 67 Stat. 18 and 131.
39 66 Stat. c31.
40 64 Stat. A454.
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declared a national emergency in March 1970,41 thereby gaining permission to use units of the
Ready Reserve to assist in moving the mail.42 President Nixon proclaimed a second national
emergency in August 1971 to control the balance of payments flow by terminating temporarily
certain trade agreement provisos and imposing supplemental duties on some imported goods.43
Congressional Concerns
In the years following the conclusion of U.S. Armed Forces involvement in active military
conflict in Korea, occasional expressions of concern were heard in Congress regarding the
continued existence of President Truman’s 1950 national emergency proclamation long after the
conditions prompting its issuance had disappeared. There was some annoyance that the President
was retaining extraordinary powers intended only for a time of genuine emergency and a feeling
that the Chief Executive was thwarting the legislative intent of Congress by continuously failing
to terminate the declared national emergency.44
Growing public and congressional displeasure with the President’s exercise of his war powers
and deepening U.S. involvement in hostilities in Vietnam prompted interest in a variety of related
matters. For Senator Charles Mathias, interest in the question of emergency powers developed out
of U.S. involvement in Vietnam and the incursion into Cambodia. Together with Senator Frank
Church, he sought to establish a Senate special committee to study the implications of terminating
the 1950 proclamation of national emergency that was being used to prosecute the Vietnam War
“to consider problems which might arise as the result of the termination and to consider what
administrative or legislative actions might be necessary.” Such a panel was initially chartered by
S.Res. 304 as the Special Committee on the Termination of the National Emergency in June 1972,
but it did not begin operations before the end of the year.45
With the convening of the 93rd Congress in 1973, the special committee was approved again with
S.Res. 9. Upon exploring the subject matter of national emergency powers, however, the mission
of the special committee became more burdensome. There was not just one proclamation of
national emergency in effect but four such instruments, issued in 1933, 1950, 1970, and 1971.
The United States was in a condition of national emergency four times over, and with each
proclamation, the whole collection of statutorily delegated emergency powers was activated.
Consequently, in 1974, with S.Res. 242, the study panel was rechartered as the Special
Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers to reflect its focus upon
matters larger than the 1950 emergency proclamation. Its final mandate was provided by S.Res.
10 in the 94th Congress, although its termination date was necessarily extended briefly in 1976 by
S.Res. 370. Senators Church and Mathias co-chaired the panel.46

41 84 Stat. 2222.
42 See 10 U.S.C. §12302.
43 85 Stat. 926.
44 The historical record suggests that, prior to 1973, when congressional research revealed their existence, other
outstanding proclaimed national emergencies were not apparent to, or much discussed by, Members of Congress.
45 U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Judiciary, National Emergencies Act, hearings, 94th Cong., 1st sess., March
6, 13, 19, and April 9, 1975 (Washington: GPO, 1975), p. 20.
46 Other members of the Special Committee included Senators Clifford P. Case, Clifford P. Hansen, Philip A. Hart,
James B. Pearson, Claiborne Pell, and Adlai E. Stevenson III.
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The Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers produced
various studies during its existence.47 After scrutinizing the U.S. Code and uncodified statutory
emergency powers, the panel identified 470 provisions of federal law that delegated extraordinary
authority to the executive in time of national emergency. Not all of them required a declaration of
national emergency to be operative, but they were, nevertheless, extraordinary grants. The special
committee also found that no process existed for automatically terminating the four outstanding
national emergency proclamations. Thus, the panel began developing legislation containing a
formula for regulating emergency declarations in the future and otherwise adjusting the body of
statutorily delegated emergency powers by abolishing some provisions, relegating others to
permanent status, and continuing others in a standby capacity. The panel also began preparing a
report offering its findings and recommendations regarding the state of national emergency
powers in the nation.
The National Emergencies Act
The special committee, in July 1974, unanimously recommended legislation establishing a
procedure for the presidential declaration and congressional regulation of a national emergency.
The proposal also modified various statutorily delegated emergency powers. In arriving at this
reform measure, the panel consulted with various executive branch agencies regarding the
significance of existing emergency statutes, recommendations for legislative action, and views as
to the repeal of some provisions of emergency law.
This recommended legislation was introduced by Senator Church for himself and others on
August 22, 1974, and became S. 3957. It was reported from the Senate Committee on
Government Operations on September 30 without public hearings or amendment.48 The bill was
subsequently discussed on the Senate floor on October 7, when it was amended and passed.49
Although a version of the reform legislation had been introduced in the House on September 16,
becoming H.R. 16668, the Committee on the Judiciary, to which the measure was referred, did
not have an opportunity to consider either that bill or the Senate-adopted version due to the press
of other business—chiefly the impeachment of President Nixon and the nomination of Nelson
Rockefeller to be Vice President of the United States. Thus, the National Emergencies Act failed
to be considered on the House floor before the final adjournment of the 93rd Congress.

47 See U.S. Congress, Senate Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers, A Brief
History of Emergency Powers in the United States, committee print, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington: GPO, 1974);
U.S. Congress, Senate Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers, A
Recommended National Emergencies Act, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., S.Rept. 93-1170 (Washington: GPO, 1974); U.S.
Congress, Senate Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers, Executive Orders in
Times of War and National Emergency, committee print, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington: GPO, 1974); U.S.
Congress, Senate Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers, Executive Replies, 3
parts, committee print, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington: GPO, 1974); U.S. Congress, Senate Special Committee on
National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers, National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers,
94th Cong., 2nd sess., S.Rept. 94-922 (Washington: GPO, 1976); U.S. Congress, Senate Special Committee on the
Termination of the National Emergency, Emergency Powers Statutes, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., S.Rept. 93-549
(Washington: GPO, 1973); U.S. Congress, Senate Special Committee on the Termination of the National Emergency,
National Emergency, 3 parts, hearings, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., April 11-12, July 24, and November 28, 1973
(Washington: GPO, 1973).
48 See U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Government Operations, National Emergencies Act, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess.,
S.Rept. 93-1193 (Washington: GPO, 1974).
49 See Congressional Record, vol. 120, October 7, 1974, pp. 34011-34022.
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With the convening of the next Congress, the proposal was introduced in the House on February
27, 1975, becoming H.R. 3884, and in the Senate on March 6, becoming S. 977. House hearings
occurred in March and April before the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental
Relations of the Committee on the Judiciary.50 The bill was subsequently marked up and, on April
15, was reported in amended form to the full committee on a 4-0 vote. On May 21, the
Committee on the Judiciary, on a voice vote, reported the bill with technical amendments.51
During the course of House debate on September 4, there was agreement to both the committee
amendments and a floor amendment providing that national emergencies end automatically one
year after their declaration unless the President informs Congress and the public of a
continuation. The bill was then passed on a 388-5 yea and nay vote and sent to the Senate, where
it was referred to the Committee on Government Operations.52
The Senate Committee on Government Operations held a hearing on H.R. 3884 on February 25,
1976,53 the bill was subsequently reported on August 26 with one substantive and several
technical amendments.54 The following day, the amended bill was passed and returned to the
House.55 On August 31, the House agreed to the Senate amendments,56 clearing the proposal for
President Gerald Ford’s signature on September 14.57
In its final report, issued in May 1976, the special committee concluded “by reemphasizing that
emergency laws and procedures in the United States have been neglected for too long, and that
Congress must pass the National Emergencies Act to end a potentially dangerous situation.”58
Other issues identified by the special committee as deserving attention in the future, however, did
not fare so well. The panel, for example, was hopeful that standing committees of both houses of
Congress would review statutory emergency power provisions within their respective
jurisdictions with a view to the continued need for, and possible adjustment of, such authority.59
Actions in this regard were probably not as ambitious as the special committee expected. A title
of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 granting the President or Congress power to declare a
civil defense emergency in the event of an attack on the United States occurred or was anticipated

50 See U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Judiciary, National Emergencies Act, hearings, 94th Cong., 1st sess.,
March 6, 13, 19, and April 9, 1975 (Washington: GPO, 1975).
51 U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Judiciary, National Emergencies, 94th Cong., 1st sess., H.Rept. 94-238
(Washington: GPO, 1975).
52 Congressional Record, vol. 121, September 4, 1975, pp. 27631-27647; Congressional Record, vol. 121, September
5, 1975, p. 27745.
53 See U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Government Operations, National Emergencies Act, hearing, 94th Cong.,
2nd sess., February 25, 1976 (Washington: GPO, 1976).
54 See U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Government Operations, National Emergencies Act, 94th Cong., 2nd sess.,
S.Rept. 94-1168 (Washington: GPO, 1976).
55 See Congressional Record, vol. 122, August 27, 1976, pp. 28224-28228.
56 Congressional Record, vol. 122, August 31, 1976, p. 28466.
57 90 Stat. 1255; 50 U.S.C. §§1601-1651 (1988). See U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Government Operations and
Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers, The National Emergencies Act (P.L.
94-412). Source Book: Legislative History, Texts, and Other Documents, committee print, 94th Cong., 2nd sess.
(Washington: GPO, 1976).
58 U.S. Congress, Senate Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers, National
Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers, p. 19.
59 U.S. Congress, Senate Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers, National
Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers, p. 10.
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expired in June 1974 after the House Committee on Rules failed to report a measure continuing
the statute.60
A provision of emergency law was refined in May 1976. Legislation was enacted granting the
President the authority to order certain selected members of an armed services reserve component
to active duty without a declaration of war or national emergency.61 Previously, such an activation
of military reserve personnel had been limited to a “time of national emergency declared by the
President” or “when otherwise authorized by law.”62
Another refinement of emergency law occurred in 1977 when action was completed on the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).63 Reform legislation containing this
statute64 modified a provision of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, authorizing the
President to regulate the nation’s international and domestic finance during periods of declared
war or national emergency.65 The enacted bill limited the President’s Trading with the Enemy Act
power to regulate the country’s finances to times of declared war. In IEEPA, a provision
conferred authority on the Chief Executive to exercise controls over international economic
transactions in the future during a declared national emergency and established procedures
governing the use of this power, including close consultation with Congress when declaring a
national emergency to activate IEEPA. Such a declaration would be subject to congressional
regulation under the procedures of the National Emergencies Act.66
Other matters identified in the final report of the special committee for congressional scrutiny
included
 investigation of emergency preparedness efforts conducted by the executive
branch,
 attention to congressional preparations for an emergency and continual review of
emergency law,
 ending open-ended grants of authority to the executive,
 investigation and institution of stricter controls over delegated powers, and
 improving the accountability of executive decisionmaking.67

60 See U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Extending Civil Defense Emergency Authorities, 93rd
Cong., 2nd sess., H.Rept. 93-1243 (Washington: GPO, 1974); Associated Press, “Rules Panel Halts Bill on War
Powers,” Washington Post, September 19, 1974, p. A5.
61 90 Stat. 517; 10 U.S.C. §12304.
62 10 U.S.C. §12302.
63 50 U.S.C. §§1701-1708.
64 91 Stat. 1625.
65 50 U.S.C. §4305(b) and 50 U.S.C. §§4301-4341. (The latter citation was originally 50 U.S.C. App. 5(b) (1976).
Subsequently, the appendix in Title 50 of the U.S. Code was eliminated.)
66 Of related interest to these statutory developments, President Ford, by a proclamation of February 19, 1976, gave
notice that Executive Order 9066, providing for the internment of Japanese-Americans in certain military areas during
World War II, was canceled as of the issuance of the proclamation formally establishing the cessation of World War II
on December 31, 1946. See 3 C.F.R., 1976 Comp., pp. 8-9. Certain statutory authority relevant to this executive order,
concerning the creation of military areas and zones, was canceled by the National Emergencies Act. See 18 U.S.C.
§1383.
67 See U.S. Congress, Senate Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers, National
Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers, pp. 11-18.
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There is some public record indication that certain of these points, particularly the first and the
last, have been addressed in the past two decades by congressional overseers.68
As enacted, the National Emergencies Act consisted of five titles. The first of these generally
returned all standby statutory delegations of emergency power, activated by an outstanding
declaration of national emergency, to a dormant state two years after the statute’s approval.
However, the act did not cancel the 1933, 1950, 1970, and 1971 national emergency
proclamations, because the President issued them pursuant to his Article II constitutional
authority. Nevertheless, it did render them ineffective by returning to dormancy the statutory
authorities they had activated, thereby necessitating a new declaration to activate standby
statutory emergency authorities.
Title II provided a procedure for future declarations of national emergency by the President and
prescribed arrangements for their congressional regulation. The statute established an exclusive
means for declaring a national emergency. Emergency declarations were to terminate
automatically after one year unless formally continued for another year by the President, but they
could be terminated earlier by either the President or Congress. Originally, the prescribed method
for congressional termination of a declared national emergency was a concurrent resolution
adopted by both houses of Congress. This type of “legislative veto” was effectively invalidated by
the Supreme Court in 1983.69 The National Emergencies Act was amended in 1985 to substitute a
joint resolution as the vehicle for rescinding a national emergency declaration.70
When declaring a national emergency, the President must indicate, according to Title III, the
powers and authorities being activated to respond to the exigency at hand. Certain presidential
accountability and reporting requirements regarding national emergency declarations were
specified in Title IV, and the repeal and continuation of various statutory provisions delegating
emergency powers was accomplished in Title V.
Emergency Declarations in Effect and Emergency
Declarations No Longer in Effect
Since the 1976 enactment of the National Emergencies Act, various national emergencies have
been declared pursuant to its provisions. Some were subsequently revoked, while others remain in
effect. Table 1 displays the number of national emergencies in effect (some may refer to these as
“active”) and the number of national emergencies no longer in effect (some may refer to these as
“inactive”), by President. Detailed information regarding the 37 national emergencies in effect
may be found in Table 2. Similar information regarding the 25 national emergencies no longer in
effect may be found in Table 3.

68 See, for example, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Government Operations, Presidential Directives and Records
Accountability Act, hearing, 100th Cong., 2nd sess., August 3, 1988 (Washington: GPO, 1989); U.S. Congress, House
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Emergency Preparedness and the Licensing Process for Commercial
Nuclear Power Reactors, 2 parts, hearings, 98th Cong., 1st sess., April 18 and July 8, 1983 (Washington: GPO, 1985).
69 See Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
70 See 99 Stat. 405, 448.
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Table 1. Number of Emergencies in Effect and Emergencies No Longer in Effect,
by President
1979-2019
Number of National
Number of National
Emergencies No
President
Emergencies in Effect
Longer in Effecta
Total
James E. Carter
1
1
2
Ronald W. Reagan
0
4
4
George H. W. Bush
0
4
4
Wil iam J. Clinton
5
10
15
George W. Bush
10
2
12
Barack H. Obama
9
3
12
Donald J. Trump
10
2
12
Joseph R. Biden Jr.
1
0
1
Total
36
26
62
Source: Information compiled by CRS.
Note:
a. This column includes three national emergencies whose status is unknown. One each is associated with
Presidents Carter, Clinton, and Obama. Searches for information involving the three presidential directives
(which are identified in the text below and in Table 3) did not yield any results indicating whether each
declaration has been modified, continued, or revoked.
The second column in Table 2 and Table 3 identifies the national emergency declaration, which
is either an executive order (E.O.) or a presidential proclamation (Proc.).
Table 2. Declared National Emergencies Under the National
Emergencies Act in Effect
Declaration
and Date
Federal Register
President
Signed
(FR) Citationa
Title
Carter
E.O. 12170
44 FR 65729
Blocking Iranian Government Property
Nov. 14, 1979
Clinton
E.O. 12938
59 FR 58099
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Nov. 14, 1994
Clinton
E.O. 12957
60 FR 14615
Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to the
Mar. 15, 1995
Development of Iranian Petroleum Resources
Clinton
E.O. 12978
60 FR 54579
Blocking Assets and Prohibiting Transactions With
Oct. 21, 1995
Significant Narcotics Traffickers
Clinton
Proc. 6867
61 FR 8843
Declaration of a National Emergency and Invocation of
Mar. 1, 1996
Emergency Authority Relating to the Regulation of the
Anchorage and Movement of Vessels
Clinton
E.O. 13067
62 FR 59989
Blocking Sudanese Government Property and Prohibiting
Nov. 3, 1997
Transactions With Sudan
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Declaration
and Date
Federal Register
President
Signed
(FR) Citationa
Title
G. W.
E.O. 13219
66 FR 34777
Blocking Property of Persons Who Threaten
Bush
June 26, 2001
International Stabilization Efforts in the Western Balkans
G. W.
Proc. 7463
66 FR 48199
Declaration of National Emergency by Reason of Certain
Bush
Sept. 14, 2001
Terrorist Attacks
G. W.
E.O. 13224
66 FR 49079
Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With
Bush
Sept. 23, 2001
Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support
Terrorism
G. W.
E.O. 13288
68 FR 11457
Blocking Property of Persons Undermining Democratic
Bush
Mar. 6, 2003
Processes or Institutions in Zimbabwe
G. W.
E.O. 13303
68 FR 31931
Protecting the Development Fund for Iraq and Certain
Bush
May 22, 2003
Other Property in Which Iraq Has an Interest
G. W.
E.O. 13338
69 FR 26751
Blocking Property of Certain Persons and Prohibiting the
Bush
May 11, 2004
Export of Certain Goods to Syria
G. W.
E.O. 13405
71 FR 35485
Blocking Property of Certain Persons Undermining
Bush
June 16, 2006
Democratic Processes or Institutions in Belarus
G. W.
E.O. 13413
71 FR 64105
Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to
Bush
Oct. 27, 2006
the Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
G. W.
E.O. 13441
72 FR 43499
Blocking Property of Persons Undermining the
Bush
Aug. 1, 2007
Sovereignty of Lebanon or Its Democratic Processes and
Institutions
G. W.
E.O. 13466
73 FR 36787
Continuing Certain Restrictions With Respect to North
Bush
June 26, 2008
Korea and North Korean Nationals
Obama
E.O. 13536
75 FR 19869
Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to
Apr. 12, 2010
the Conflict in Somalia
Obama
E.O. 13566
76 FR 11315
Blocking Property and Prohibiting Certain Transactions
Feb. 25, 2011
Related to Libya
Obama
E.O. 13581
76 FR 44757
Blocking Property of Transnational Criminal
July 24, 2011
Organizations
Obama
E.O. 13611
77 FR 29533
Blocking Property of Persons Threatening the Peace,
May 16, 2012
Security, or Stability of Yemen
Obama
E.O. 13660
79 FR 13493
Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to
Mar. 6, 2014
the Situation in Ukraine
Obama
E.O. 13664
79 FR 19283
Blocking Property of Certain Persons With Respect to
Apr. 3, 2014
South Sudan
Obama
E.O. 13667
79 FR 28387
Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to
May 12, 2014
the Conflict in the Central African Republic
Obama
E.O. 13692
80 FR 12747
Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of Certain
Mar. 8, 2015
Persons Contributing to the Situation in Venezuela
Obama
E.O. 13694
80 FR 18077
Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in
Apr. 1, 2015
Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities
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Declaration
and Date
Federal Register
President
Signed
(FR) Citationa
Title
Trump
E.O. 13818
82 FR 60839
Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious
Dec. 20, 2017
Human Rights Abuse or Corruption
Trump
E.O. 13848
83 FR 46843
Imposing Certain Sanctions in the Event of Foreign
Sept. 12, 2018
Interference in a United States Election
Trump
E.O. 13851
83 FR 61505
Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to
Nov. 27, 2018
the Situation in Nicaragua
Trump
E.O. 13873
84 FR 22689
Securing the Information and Communications
May 15, 2019
Technology and Services Supply Chain
Trump
E.O. 13882
84 FR 37055
Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of Certain
July 26, 2019
Persons Contributing to the Situation in Mali
Trump
E.O. 13894
84 FR 55851
Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of Certain
Oct. 14, 2019
Persons Contributing to the Situation in Syria
Trump
Proc. 9994
85 FR 15337
Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Novel
Mar. 13, 2020
Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Outbreak
Trump
E.O. 13920
85 FR 26595
Securing the United States Bulk-Power System
May 1, 2020
Trump
E.O. 13936
85 FR 43413
The President’s Executive Order on Hong Kong
July 14, 2020
Normalization
Trump
E.O. 13959
85 FR 73185
Addressing the Threat from Securities Investments That
Nov. 12, 2020
Finance Chinese Military Companies
Biden
E.O. 14014
86 FR 9429
Blocking Property With Respect to the Situation in
Feb. 10, 2021
Burma
Sources: Adapted from CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10252, Declarations under the National Emergencies Act, Part 1:
Declarations Currently in Effect, by Emily E. Roberts, and updated as of December 3, 2019; “Declaring a National
Emergency Concerning the Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Outbreak,” March 18, 2020, 85 Federal
Register 15337.
Note:
a. The citation format in this column shows the volume number and then the page number. For example, the
citation for E.O. 13857 (84 FR 509) shows that it may be found in volume 84 of the Federal Register, p. 509.
Table 3 includes declared national emergencies that are no longer in effect.
Table 3. Declared National Emergencies Under the National Emergencies Act
No Longer in Effect
Action That
Federal
Rendered
Declaration
Register
Declaration
and Date
(FR)
Inactive and
FR
President
Signed
Citationa
Title
Date Signed
Citationa
Carter
E.O. 12211
45 FR 26685 Further Prohibitions on
The prohibitions
46 FR 7925
Apr. 17, 1980
Transactions with Iran
were revoked by
E.O. 12282.
Jan. 19, 1981.
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Action That
Federal
Rendered
Declaration
Register
Declaration
and Date
(FR)
Inactive and
FR
President
Signed
Citationa
Title
Date Signed
Citationa
There is no
notice of
continuation of
the national
emergency
declaration itself
as of April 17,
1981.b
Reagan
E.O. 12513
50 FR 18629 Prohibiting Trade and Certain Revoked by E.O.
55 FR 9707
May 1, 1985
Other Transactions Involving
12707
Nicaragua
Mar. 13, 1990
Reagan
E.O. 12532
50 FR 36861 Prohibiting Trade and Certain Revoked by E.O.
56 FR 31855
Sept. 9, 1985

Other Transactions Involving
12769
South Africa
July 10, 1991
Reagan
E.O. 12543
51 FR 875
Prohibiting Trade and Certain Revoked by E.O.
69 FR 56665
Jan. 7, 1986

Transactions Involving Libya
13357
Sept. 20, 2004
Reagan
E.O. 12635
53 FR 12134 Prohibiting Certain
Revoked by E.O.
55 FR 13099
Apr. 8, 1988
Transactions With Respect to 12710
Panama
Apr. 5, 1990
G. H. W.
E.O. 12722
55 FR 31803 Blocking Iraqi Government
Revoked by E.O.
69 FR 46055
Bush
Aug. 2, 1990

Property and Prohibiting
13350
Transactions with Iraq
July 29, 2004
G. H. W.
E.O. 12735
55 FR 48587 Chemical and Biological
Revoked by E.O.
59 FR 58099
Bush
Nov. 16,
Weapons Proliferation
12938
1990
Nov. 14, 1994
G. H. W.
E.O. 12775
56 FR 50641 Prohibiting Certain
Revoked by E.O.
59 FR 52403
Bush
Oct. 4, 1991
Transactions With Respect to 12932
Haiti
Oct. 14, 1994
G. H. W.
E.O. 12808
57 FR 23299 Blocking “Yugoslav
Revoked by E.O.
68 FR 32315
Bush
May 30, 1992
Government” Property and
13304
Property of the Governments May 28, 2003
of Serbia and Montenegro
Clinton
E.O. 12865
58 FR 51005 Prohibiting Certain
Revoked by E.O.
68 FR 24857
Sept. 26,
Transactions Involving
13298
1993
UNITA
May 6, 2003
Clinton
E.O. 12868
58 FR 51749 Measures To Restrict the
Revoked by E.O.
59 FR 50475
Sept. 30,
Participation by United States
12930
1993
Persons in Weapons
Sept. 29, 1994
Proliferation Activities
Clinton
E.O. 12930
59 FR 50475 Measures to Restrict the
Revoked by E.O.
59 FR 58099
Sept. 29,
Participation by United States
12938
1994
Persons in Weapons
Nov. 14, 1994
Proliferation Activities
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Action That
Federal
Rendered
Declaration
Register
Declaration
and Date
(FR)
Inactive and
FR
President
Signed
Citationa
Title
Date Signed
Citationa
Clinton
E.O. 12947
60 FR 5079
Prohibiting Transactions With Revoked by E.O.
84 FR 48041
Jan. 23, 1995
Terrorists Who Threaten to
13886
Disrupt the Middle East
Sept. 9, 2019
Process
Clinton
Proc. 6907
61 FR 35083 Declaration of a State of
There is no
N/A
July 1, 1996
Emergency and Release of
notice of
Feed Grain From the Disaster continuation as
Reserve
of July 1, 1997.b
Clinton
E.O. 13047
62 FR 28301 Prohibiting New Investment
Revoked by E.O.
81 FR 70593
May 20, 1997
in Burma
13742
Oct. 7, 2016
Clinton
E.O. 13088
63 FR 32109 Blocking Property of the
Revoked by E.O.
68 FR 32315
June 9, 1998
Governments of the Federal
13304
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia May 28, 2003
and Montenegro), the
Republic of Serbia, and the
Republic of Montenegro, and
Prohibiting New Investment
in the Republic of Serbia in
Response to the Situation in
Kosovo
Clinton
E.O. 13129
64 FR 36759 Blocking Property and
Revoked by E.O.
67 FR 44751
July 4, 1999
Prohibiting Transactions With 13268
the Taliban
July 2, 2002
Clinton
E.O. 13159
65 FR 39279 Blocking Property of the
Superseded by
77 FR 38459
June 21, 2000
Government of the Russian
E.O. 13617
Federation Relating to the
June 25, 2012
Disposition of Highly
Enriched Uranium Extracted
From Nuclear Weapons
Clinton
E.O. 13194
66 FR 7389
Prohibiting the Importation of Revoked by E.O.
69 FR 2823
Jan. 18, 2001
Rough Diamonds From Sierra 13324
Leone
Jan. 15, 2004
G. W.
E.O. 13348
69 FR 44885 Blocking Property of Certain
Revoked by E.O.
80 FR 71679
Bush
July 22, 2004
Persons and Prohibiting the
13710
Importation of Certain
Nov. 12, 2015
Goods from Liberia
G. W.
E.O. 13396
71 FR 7389
Blocking Property of Certain
Revoked by E.O.
81 FR 63673
Bush
Feb. 7, 2006
Persons Contributing to the
13739
Conflict in Cote d'Ivoire
Sept. 14, 2016
Obama
Proc. 8443
74 FR 55439 Declaration of a National
There is no
N/A
Oct. 23, 2009
Emergency With Respect to
notice of
the 2009 H1N1 Influenza
continuation as
Pandemic
of Oct. 23, 2010.b
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Action That
Federal
Rendered
Declaration
Register
Declaration
and Date
(FR)
Inactive and
FR
President
Signed
Citationa
Title
Date Signed
Citationa
Obama
E.O. 13617
77 FR 38459 Blocking Property of the
Revoked by E.O.
80 FR 30331
June 25, 2012
Government of the Russian
13695
Federation Relating to the
May 26, 2015
Disposition of Highly
Enriched Uranium Extracted
From Nuclear Weapons
Obama
E.O. 13712
80 FR 73633 Blocking Property of Certain
Revoked by E.O.
86 FR 66149
Nov. 22,
Persons Contributing to the
14054
2015
Situation in Burundi
Nov. 18, 2021
Trump
Proc. 9844
84 FR 4949
Declaring a National
Revoked by Proc.
86 FR 7225
Feb. 15, 2019
Emergency Concerning the
10142
Southern Border of the
Jan. 20, 2021
United States
Trump
E.O. 13928
85 FR 36139 Blocking Property of Certain
Revoked by E.O.
86 FR 17895
June 11, 2020
Persons Associated with the
14022
International Criminal Court
Apr. 1, 2021
Source: Adapted from CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10253, Declarations under the National Emergencies Act, Part 2:
Declarations No Longer in Effect, by Emily E. Roberts, and updated as of December 3, 2019.
Notes:
a. The citation format in this column shows the volume number and then the page number. For example, the
citation for E.O. 13617 (77 FR 38459) shows that it may be found in volume 77 of the Federal Register, p.
38459.
b. Per 50 U.S.C. §1622(d), “Any national emergency declared by the President in accordance with this
subchapter, and not otherwise previously terminated, shall terminate on the anniversary of the declaration
of that emergency if, within the ninety-day period prior to each anniversary date, the President does not
publish in the Federal Register and transmit to the Congress a notice stating that such emergency is to
continue in effect after such anniversary.”
Invoking 10 U.S.C. §2808
Declaring a national emergency pursuant to the National Emergencies Act does not automatically
provide access to funds, or a means for obtaining funds, to be used to respond to or mitigate an
emergency. As discussed above, when a President declares a national emergency or subsequently
issues a related executive order or proclamation, he may invoke or activate one or more so-called
standby authorities. Upon being activated, Section 2808 is notable for permitting, under certain
conditions, the use of military construction (MILCON) funds for a declared national emergency.71
To date, three Presidents have activated Section 2808 when declaring a national emergency or
subsequent to the declaration of a national emergency. President George H. W. Bush declared a
national emergency in 1990 in E.O. 12722, Blocking Iraqi Government Property and Prohibiting
Transactions with Iraq. Invocation of Section 2808 occurred in a separate yet related executive
order, E.O. 12734, which reads in part: “To provide additional authority to the Department of

71 See CRS Insight IN11017, Military Construction Funding in the Event of a National Emergency, by Michael J.
Vassalotti and Brendan W. McGarry.
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Defense to respond to [the threat described in E.O. 12722] … I hereby order that the emergency
construction authority at 10 U.S.C. 2808 is invoked.”72 E.O. 13350 revoked both E.O. 12722 and
E.O. 12734.73 Five days after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, President George W. Bush declared a
national emergency but did not include the activation of Section 2808 in his declaration
(Proclamation 7463).74 Approximately two months later, he issued E.O. 13235, which invoked
Section 2808 pursuant to the national emergency declaration in Proclamation 7463 and included
language similar to that found in E.O. 12734. As noted in Table 2, Proclamation 7463 remains in
effect, as does E.O. 13235.75
Declaration of an Emergency at the Southern Border
In the third instance, President Trump released a proclamation that declared a national emergency
concerning the southern border of the United States and that activated Section 2808 (and Title 10,
Section 12302, of the United States Code (10 U.S.C. §12302). Proclamation 9844, dated February
15, 2019, remains in effect. The set of events that occurred prior to and after the proclamation
was issued includes a dispute regarding the amount of funds appropriated for a border wall, a 35-
day partial government shutdown, the eventual enactment of an appropriations bill to end the
shutdown, and an unsuccessful effort by Congress to terminate the national emergency. The
circumstances surrounding Proclamation 9844 are potentially instructive from the perspectives of
congressional oversight, legislative procedure, and appropriations.
The set of events that preceded the declaration of a national emergency and culminated in an
unsuccessful congressional effort to terminate the emergency began in fall 2018. In September,
President Trump signed two bills providing regular appropriations, which partially funded the
federal government for FY2019. H.R. 5895, Energy and Water, Legislative Branch, and Military
Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act, was enacted as P.L. 115-244 on September
21, 2018. H.R. 6157, Department of Defense and Labor, Health and Human Services, and
Education Appropriations Act, 2019 and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2019, was enacted as
P.L. 115-245 on September 28, 2018. Division C of this act provided continuing appropriations
for the remainder of the federal government through December 7, 2018. On December 7, 2018,
the President signed H.J.Res. 143 (P.L. 115-298), which provided an extension of continuing
appropriations for the remaining agencies through midnight, December 21, 2018.
An ongoing disagreement between President Trump and Congress regarding the amount of
funding to provide for construction of a wall along the border between the United States and
Mexico was associated with the partial shutdown of the government through January 25, 2019.
Throughout fall 2018 and early 2019, President Trump stated repeatedly that approximately $5.6
billion was needed for construction of a wall and indicated that he was stymied by Congress’s
refusal to provide this level of funding. For example, the President commented on January 2,
2019, that “they [Congress] won’t approve $5.6 billion for a wall.”76 Two days later, in a letter to

72 Executive Order 12734, “National Emergency Construction Authority,” 55 Federal Register 48099, November 14,
1990.
73 Executive Order 13350, “Termination of Emergency Declared in Executive Order 12722 with Respect to Iraq and
Modification of Executive Order 13290, Executive Order 13303, and Executive Order 13315,” 69 Federal Register
46055, July 30, 2004.
74 Proclamation 7463, “Declaration of National Emergency by Reason of Certain Terrorist Attacks,” 66 Federal
Register 48199, September 14, 2001.
75 National Archives and Records Administration, “2001 Executive Orders Disposition Tables,”
https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/executive-orders/2001-wbush.html.
76 GPO, “Remarks in a Cabinet Meeting and Exchange with Reporters,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential
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Congress, the President wrote that “current funding levels, resources, and authorities are woefully
inadequate to meet the scope of the problem [concerning the southern border of the United
States.]”77 In mid-January, President Trump stated, “The federal government remains shut down
because Congressional Democrats refuse to approve border security.”78 In December 2018, the
New York Times reported that the shutdown occurred “after congressional and White House
officials failed to find a compromise on a spending bill that hinged on President Trump’s
demands for $5.7 billion for a border wall.”79 Several weeks later, a Washington Post article
stated that the President “has refused to sign any funding bill to reopen the federal agencies that
doesn’t include $5.7 billion to begin construction of the wall.”80
The partial government shutdown continued until a continuing resolution, H.J.Res. 28 (P.L. 116-
5), was enacted on January 25, 2019, which funded the remaining agencies through February 15.
President Trump signed H.J.Res. 31 (P.L. 116-6), Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2019, a
full-year regular appropriations bill, on February 15.
Section 230(a)(1) of P.L. 116-6 provides $1.375 billion “for the construction of primary
pedestrian fencing, including levee pedestrian fencing, in the Rio Grande Valley Sector,” which is
less than the amount President Trump had sought for border wall construction. On the same day
he signed H.J.Res. 31, the President issued Proclamation 9844, which states that “a national
emergency exists at the southern border of the United States.” The President “invoked and made
available” Section 12302 and “the construction authority provided in” Section 2808.81 Section
2808(a) provides that, in “the declaration of war or the declaration by the President of a national
emergency in accordance with the National Emergencies Act … that requires the use of the armed
forces,” the Secretary of Defense “may undertake military construction projects … not otherwise
authorized by law that are necessary to support such use of the armed forces.” However, only
funds that have been appropriated for MILCON, including family housing projects, but have not
been obligated can be accessed through the activation of Section 2808.82 President Trump’s letter
to Congress regarding his declaration of a national emergency stated, in part, that in invoking
Section 2808, he was authorizing the Secretary of Defense, “and at his discretion, the Secretaries
of the military departments, to exercise the authority under [Section 2808] to engage in

Documents, January 2, 2019, p. 3, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-201900001/pdf/DCPD-201900001.pdf.
77 GPO, “Letter to Members of Congress on Border Security,” January 4, 2019, pp. 1-2, https://www.govinfo.gov/
content/pkg/DCPD-201900004/pdf/DCPD-201900004.pdf.
78 GPO, “Remarks by President Trump and Vice President Pence Announcing the Missile Defense Review,” January
17, 2019, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-vice-president-pence-
announcing-missile-defense-review/.
79 Julie Hirschfeld Davis and Emily Cochrane, “Impasse Over Wall Shuts Down Government,” New York Times,
December 22, 2018, p. A1.
80 Paul Sonne, “To Build Wall Under National Emergency, Trump Needs to Tap Existing Funds,” Washington Post,
January 8, 2019, p. A8.
81 GPO, “Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Southern Border of the United States,” Proclamation 9844,
84 Federal Register 4949, February 15, 2019.
82 10 U.S.C. §2808(a). A fact sheet posted on the White House website and dated February 15, 2019, indicated that “up
to $8.1 billion … will be available to build the border wall once a national emergency is declared and additional funds
have been reprogrammed, including: … Up to $3.6 billion reallocated from Department of Defense military
construction projects under the President’s declaration of a national emergency (Title 10 United States Code, section
2808).” The White House, “President Donald J. Trump’s Border Security Victory,” February 15, 2019, p. 3,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumps-border-security-victory/.
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construction as necessary to support the use of the Armed Forces and respond to the crisis at our
southern border.”83
Congress’s Response84
Congress responded to the declaration of the emergency by passing a joint resolution to terminate
it. As originally enacted, the National Emergencies Act had allowed the House and Senate, acting
together, to terminate a national emergency declared by the President. They could do this by
approving a concurrent resolution under special, expedited legislative procedures intended to
preclude a filibuster in the Senate. The Supreme Court, however, invalidated that process in 1983,
when it ruled (in relation to a different statute) that taking such an action through a concurrent
resolution would violate the Presentation Clause of the Constitution.85 Congress and the President
therefore amended the National Emergencies Act in 1985 to change the resolution that terminates
a national emergency from a concurrent resolution (which only requires approval in the House
and Senate) to a joint resolution (which requires approval in both chambers and the signature of
the President).86
The special expedited legislative procedures of the act remained; they apply now to consideration
of a qualifying joint resolution. The House passed H.J.Res. 46, a joint resolution to terminate the
national emergency declared in Proclamation 9844, on February 26, 2019, by a vote of 245-182.87
In the Senate, H.J.Res. 46 was eligible to be considered under the expedited procedures created
by the National Emergencies Act. These procedures allow a joint resolution terminating an
emergency to reach approval in the Senate with simple majority support.88 Under regular Senate
procedures, in contrast, it can be necessary to obtain agreement among at least three-fifths of the
Senate (normally 60 Senators) to advance consideration of legislation. On March 14, the Senate
passed the joint resolution by a vote of 59-41.
President Trump vetoed H.J.Res. 46 on March 15, 2019.89 Bills vetoed by the President are
returned to the originating chamber, which in this case was the House. On March 26, 2019, by a

83 GPO, “Letter to Congressional Leaders on Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Southern Border of the
United States,” February 15, 2019, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-201900081/pdf/DCPD-
201900081.pdf.
84 This section was written by Elizabeth Rybicki, Specialist on Congress and the Legislative Process.
85 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). For more information, see CRS Report RL33151, Committee Controls of
Agency Decisions, by Louis Fisher.
86 99 Stat. 405, 448, §801 (1985).
87 The House considered the joint resolution n under the terms of a resolution reported by the Rules Committee rather
than under the procedures described in in the National Emergencies Act. In the House, unlike the Senate, the same
numerical majority that can pass a bill can set the terms for its consideration. For this reason, the House often brings up
legislation eligible to be considered under statutory expedited procedures under the regular procedures used for other
legislation.
88 Specifically, under the special procedures of the act, a majority of Senators can discharge a committee from
consideration of a joint resolution to terminate an emergency, and the Senate can take up the joint resolution without
the need for a cloture process. In addition, the act requires the Senate to vote on the joint resolution within three
calendar days of beginning consideration, again making a cloture process unnecessary. In the case of H.J.Res. 46, the
Senate reached a unanimous consent agreement to discharge the Armed Services Committee and to take up the
legislation the following day (“Orders for Thursday, March 14, 2019,” Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 165
[March 13, 2019], p. S1853). The unanimous consent agreement also prevented amendments from being offered.
During debate on the joint resolution, the Senate reached a second unanimous consent agreement to limit further debate
to 90 minutes (“Relating to a National Emergency Declared by the President on February 15, 2019,” Congressional
Record, daily edition, vol. 165 [March 14, 2019], pp. S1857-S1882).
89 The White House, “Veto Message to the House of Representatives for H.J.Res. 46,” veto message, March 15, 2019,
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vote of 248-181, the House failed to achieve the necessary two-thirds vote required to override a
veto.
Termination of an Emergency at the Southern Border
On January 20, 2021, President Joe Biden issued Proclamation 10142, which terminated this
emergency.90 Among other actions, the proclamation directs the appropriate federal government
officials to (1) “pause work on each construction project on the southern border wall,” (2) “pause
immediately the obligation of funds related to construction of the southern border wall,” and (3)
“compile detailed information on all southern border wall construction contracts, the status of
each wall construction project, and the funds used for wall construction since February 15,
2019.”91 The proclamation also requires the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland
Security, in consultation with certain other federal government officials, to develop a plan for
redirecting “funds concerning the southern border wall, as appropriate and consistent with
applicable law.”92
When a President Does Not Explicitly Declare a
National Emergency
An anomaly in the activation of emergency powers appears to have occurred on September 8,
2005, when President George W. Bush issued a proclamation suspending certain wage
requirements of the Davis-Bacon Act in the course of the federal response to the Gulf Coast
disaster resulting from Hurricane Katrina.93 Instead of following the historical pattern of declaring
a national emergency to activate the suspension authority,94 the President set out the following
rationale in the proclamation: “I find that the conditions caused by Hurricane Katrina constitute a
‘national emergency’ within the meaning of section 3147 of title 40, United States Code.”95 A
more likely course of action would seemingly have been for the President to declare a national
emergency pursuant to the National Emergencies Act and to specify that he was, accordingly,
activating the suspension authority. Although the propriety of the President’s action in this case
might have been ultimately determined in the courts, the proclamation was revoked on November
3, 2005, by a proclamation in which the President cited the National Emergencies Act as
authority, in part, for his action.96
Concluding Remarks
The development, exercise, and regulation of emergency powers, from the days of the
Continental Congress to the present, reflect at least one highly discernable trend: Those
authorities available to the executive in time of national crisis or exigency have, since the time of

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/veto-message-house-representatives-h-j-res-46/.
90 Proclamation 10142, “Termination of Emergency with Respect to the Southern Border of the United States and
Redirection of Funds Diverted to Border Wall Construction,” 86 Federal Register 7225, January 20, 2021.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid., p. 7226.
93 See Federal Register, vol. 70, September 13, 2005, pp. 54227-54228.
94 Currently found at 40 U.S.C. §3147; formerly codified at 40 U.S.C. §276a-5.
95 Federal Register, vol. 70, September 13, 2005, p. 54227.
96 Federal Register, vol. 70, November 8, 2005, p. 67899.
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the Lincoln Administration, come to be increasingly rooted in statutory law. The discretion
available to a Civil War President in his exercise of emergency power has been harnessed, to a
considerable extent, in the contemporary period.
Due to greater reliance upon statutory expression, the range of this authority has come to be more
circumscribed, and the options for its use have come to be regulated procedurally through the
National Emergencies Act. Since its enactment, the National Emergencies Act has not been
revisited by congressional overseers. The 1976 report of the Senate Special Committee on
National Emergencies suggested that the prospect remains that further improvements and reforms
in this policy area might be pursued and perfected.
Author Information

L. Elaine Halchin

Specialist in American National Government

Acknowledgments
This report was originally written by Harold C. Relyea, who has retired from CRS. Congressional clients
with questions about this report’s subject matter may contact L. Elaine Halchin. Emily Roberts, Law
Librarian, assisted with the update of this report.

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
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