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In 2025, President Trump has expanded and increased existing steel and aluminum tariffs, imposed since 2018 under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. §1862, as amended). Section 232 authorizes the President to impose trade restrictions if the Secretary of Commerce determines that imports of a good "threaten to impair the U.S. national security." Since June 2025, the United States has imposed 50%The United States imposes tariffs on steel, aluminum, and products containing steel and aluminum ("derivatives") from nearly all trading partners.
Congress may consider possible implicationswhether to exercise its legislative prerogatives related to trade policy and/or monitor potential effects of steel and aluminum tariffs foron the U.S. economy and issues related to congressional trade authorities.
In 2018, President Trump proclaimed a 25% tariff on steel and a 10% tariff on aluminum imports from most trading partners under Section 232 after the Commerce Secretary determined that such imports threaten U.S. national securityfollowing a Commerce Department investigation. In 2020, President Trump expanded the tariffs to include 13 new product codes for steel and aluminum derivatives. The Biden Administration largely maintained these tariffs and, in 2023, increased tariffs on imports of Russian aluminum to 200% in response to Russia's war on Ukraine.
From 2018 to 2022, the United States negotiated country exemptions (see Figure 1)from the tariffs and granted entity-specific exclusions as well as General Approved Exclusions (GAEs) applicable to any importer.
In February 2025,Modifications During the Second Trump Administration
February 2025. President Trump modified the Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs, including to
President Trump statedstated that he terminated country exemptions and product exclusions because they "undermine" the tariffs' objectives, such as increasing U.S. production. He also cited concerns about increased imports from exempted countries, and other countries legally or illegally avoiding tariffs by investing in and exporting through exempted countries (sometimes called "transshipment"). Regarding steel, President Trump asserted a lack of "sufficient action" by exempted partners "to address non-market excess capacity caused primarily by China, or sufficient cooperation ... on issues like trade remedies and customs matters or monitoring bilateral steel trade."
Figure 1. Section 232 Steel and Aluminum Country Exemptions Terminated in March 2025 Eliminated by Proclamations 10895 and 10896 Source: CRS, from various presidential proclamations. With the exception of Ukraine, country exemptions terminated in March 2025 were granted between 2018 to 2022. August 2025. Following the first-ever inclusions process, the Commerce Department added more than 400 product codes within the scope of tariffs. Relation to Other Tariffs. Goods subject to Section 232 automotive tariffs are exempt from steel and aluminum tariffs. Temporary global 10% tariffs implemented under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 do not apply to products covered by Section 232 tariffs. Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs apply in addition toIn June 2025, President Trump increased
June 2025. President Trump increased both steel and aluminum tariffs to 50%, except for imports from the United Kingdom (UK), which
face a 25% tariff. Taking into consideration the UK's actions to implement faced a 25% tariff pursuant to the U.S.-UK Economic Prosperity Deal. For most derivatives, Section 232 tariffs applied only to the steel or aluminum content and did not apply to derivatives containing only U.S.-sourced steel or aluminum.
Potential Implications for the U.S. Economy
In 2025, the United States imported $25 billion worth of steel articles—20% less than 2024—and $18 billion worth of aluminum—5% less than 2024 (see Table 2), excluding derivatives. Some U.S. steel and aluminum producers assert that tariffs are critical for boosting U.S. production. Other groups assert that the 2025 tariff expansion has negatively affected U.S. manufacturers. Some groups are seeking further expansion of the tariffs. Some groups support the tariff actions while also emphasizing policy alignment in North America through the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). Currently, Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs apply to USMCA-compliant goods. Since September 2025, Canada has imposed 25% tariffs on C$15.6 billion (approximately $11 billion) worth of U.S. steel and aluminum imports. Except for the abovementioned U.S.-UK deal and limited exceptions for aircraft-related goods, U.S. bilateral framework agreements have not addressed steel and aluminum tariffs.
Issues for Congress
Some Members support the tariffs and advocate for expanding the President's tariff authorities, including under Section 232the U.S.-UK Economic Prosperity Deal, the Commerce Secretary is to establish a tariff-rate quota to exempt a certain quantity of UK steel and aluminum imports from Section 232 tariffs. The United States and the European Union (EU) have expressed their intent to consider cooperation on steel and aluminum issues, including through potential tariff-rate quotas.
The second Trump Administration has significantly expanded the number of steel and aluminum derivatives covered by tariffs (see Figure 2). In May 2025, the Commerce Department initiated the first inclusions process for steel and aluminum derivatives. In August 2025, Commerce added more than 400 product codes to the previously expanded tariff list. Commerce stated that it will open the inclusions "window" annually in May, September, and January.
Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs apply in addition to
Goods subject to Section 232 automotive tariffs are exempt from steel and aluminum tariffs. As of June 4, Canadian and Mexican steel and aluminum products face a 50% tariff but are exempt from IEEPA tariffs on Canadian and Mexican goods.
For most derivatives, Section 232 tariffs apply only to the steel or aluminum content and do not apply to derivatives processed abroad using steel or aluminum originally sourced from the United States. Products covered by Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs are exempt from global tariffs implemented under IEEPA (IEEPA tariffs apply to the non-steel, non-aluminum content of derivatives).
Some trading partners have announced retaliatory measures. As of September 2025, Canada is imposing 25% tariffs on C$15.6 billion ($11 billion) worth of U.S. steel and aluminum. The EU voted to reimpose previously suspended retaliatory tariffs but suspended them until 2026 following the conclusion of a U.S.-EU framework agreement.
From January to July 2025, U.S. steel and aluminum imports have declined by value, as compared to the same period in 2024 (Table 1). Some U.S. steel producers assert that tariffs are critical for boosting U.S. production and support the expansion of tariffs on derivatives. U.S. aluminum producers have mixed views on the tariffs. Other groups assert that the rapid tariff expansion has created compliance burdens for businesses and may harm U.S. employment in sectors using steel and aluminum.
Congress might consider the potential benefits and costs of steel and aluminum tariffs for the U.S. economy, whether U.S. tariff actions achieve stated policy objectives, and whether these actions are consistent with U.S. international trade obligations.
Congress also may consider whether to support or curb presidential authorities related to Section 232. Some Members have praised the tariffs and advocate for expanding presidential trade authorities (e.g., H.R. 735). Others assert (e.g., H.R. 735). Others argue that Congress should play a stronger role in overseeing U.S. trade actions (e.g., S. 348, S. 1272/H.R. 2665, H.R. 1903). Some Members have called for more targeted tariffs or tariff exemptions to mitigate potential adverse impacts on the U.S. economy.
Other Members have called for commissioning a reportreports on the potential economic benefits and costseffects of tariffs (e.g., H.R. 2287, H.R. 4326). In 2023, at the direction of Congress, the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) analyzed the effects of the Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs on the U.S. economy.
|
2024 Annual |
2025 YTD (Jan.-July) |
|||
|
Partner |
Value ($ mil.) |
% Share Total Imports |
Value ($ mil.) |
% Change (2025/2024 YTD) |
|
Steel |
||||
|
Canada |
$7,177.9 |
23% |
$3,212.9 |
-30% |
|
European Union |
$6,804.2 |
22% |
$3,902.8 |
0.4% |
|
Mexico |
$3,530.3 |
11% |
$1,594.0 |
-29% |
|
South Korea |
$2,938.3 |
9% |
$1,670.8 |
-6% |
|
Brazil |
$2,910.4 |
9% |
$1,584.6 |
-17% |
|
Japan |
$1,703.9 |
5% |
$886.6 |
-14% |
|
Taiwan |
$1,316.2 |
4% |
$920.4 |
17% |
|
Vietnam |
$1,129.4 |
4% |
$369.0 |
-41% |
|
China |
$818.7 |
3% |
$407.6 |
-19% |
|
India |
$495.5 |
2% |
$506.1 |
94% |
|
All Other |
$2,704.7 |
9% |
$1,656.5 |
-5% |
|
Total Steel Imports |
$31,529.7 |
100% |
$16,711.3 |
-14% |
|
Aluminum |
||||
|
Canada |
$9,721.9 |
47% |
$4,937.9 |
-13% |
|
European Union |
$1,828.1 |
9% |
$1,090.4 |
3% |
|
China |
$1,351.3 |
7% |
$528.9 |
-35% |
|
United Arab Emirates |
$1,151.4 |
6% |
$1,023.9 |
53% |
|
Mexico |
$862.6 |
4% |
$403.0 |
-20% |
|
South Korea |
$840.2 |
4% |
$657.6 |
44% |
|
Bahrain |
$605.7 |
3% |
$410.4 |
26% |
|
India |
$535.6 |
3% |
$458.9 |
44% |
|
Argentina |
$498.2 |
2% |
$217.3 |
-22% |
|
South Africa |
$434.7 |
2% |
$380.6 |
57% |
|
All Other |
$2,902.3 |
14% |
$1,781.4 |
-6% |
|
Total Aluminum Imports |
$20,732.1 |
100% |
$11,890.4 |
-1% |
Source: CRS. General imports data from the U.S. Census Bureau (accessed via Trade Data Monitor, September 25 2025) using U.S. Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) product codes covered under Proclamations 9704 and 9705 of March 8, 2018.
Notes: This table excludes derivative products that were added to the Section 232 actions in 2020 and in 2025. Columns may not sum due to rounding.
April 2026 Revisions
|
Annex I-A (steel and aluminum articles, certain copper articles, certain steel/aluminum derivatives) |
|
|
Annex I-B (certain steel/aluminum derivatives, certain copper articles) |
|
|
Annex II (items not subject to tariffs) |
|
|
Annex III (items with reduced tariffs until December 31, 2027) |
|
|
Annex IV (items not subject to tariffs) |
|
|
Other provisions |
|
Source: CRS, summary of key provisions from annexes in Proclamation 11021 of April 2, 2026; U.S. Customs and Border Protection Cargo Systems Messaging Service (CSMS) #68253075, April 3, 2026; and U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, "Notice of Technical Corrections to the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States for Duties Imposed by Presidential Proclamation 11021," 91 FR 23056, April 29, 2026.
Note: In the same proclamation, President Trump also modified copper tariffs. See CRS Insight IN12614, Section 232 National Security Tariffs on Copper Imports.
Millions of U.S. Dollars
2024
2025
Partner
Value
% Share Total Imports
Value
% Share Total Imports
Steel
Canada
$7,177.9
23%
$4,560.1
18%
European Union
$6,804.2
22%
$5,831.2
23%
Mexico
$3,530.3
11%
$2,238.0
9%
South Korea
$2,938.3
9%
$2,448.8
10%
Brazil
$2,910.4
9%
$2,259.0
9%
All Other
$8,168.5
26%
$7,581.2
30%
Total Steel Imports
$31,529.7
100%
$24,918.3
100%
Aluminum
Canada
$9,440.1
51%
$7,535.4
43%
European Union
$1,540.4
8%
$1,618.3
9%
United Arab Emirates
$1,147.3
6%
$1,512.3
9%
China
$827.1
4%
$528.9
3%
South Korea
$797.8
4%
$1,062.2
6%
Bahrain
$605.7
3%
$671.7
4%
All Other
$4,214.1
23%
$4,568.4
26%
Total Aluminum Imports
$18,572.4
100%
$17,566.0
100%
Source: CRS. General imports data from the U.S. Census Bureau (accessed via Trade Data Monitor, April 23, 2026) using U.S. Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) product codes for "articles of aluminum" and "articles of steel" attached to U.S. Customs and Border Protection CSMS #68253075.
Notes: Table sorted by top import sources in 2024. This table excludes derivative articles. Columns may not sum due to rounding.