Expanded Section 232 Tariffs on Steel and Aluminum

In 2025, President Trump has expanded and increased existing steel and aluminum tariffs, imposed since 2018 under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. §1862, as amended). Section 232 authorizes the President to impose trade restrictions if the Secretary of Commerce determines that imports of a good "threaten to impair the U.S. national security." Since June 2025, the United States has imposed 50% tariffs on steel, aluminum, and products containing steel and aluminum ("derivatives") from nearly all trading partners.

Congress may consider possible implications of steel and aluminum tariffs for the U.S. economy and issues related to congressional trade authorities.

Background

In 2018, President Trump proclaimed a 25% tariff on steel and a 10% tariff on aluminum imports from most trading partners under Section 232 after the Commerce Secretary determined that such imports threaten U.S. national security. In 2020, President Trump expanded the tariffs to include 13 new product codes for steel and aluminum derivatives. The Biden Administration largely maintained these tariffs and, in 2023, increased tariffs on imports of Russian aluminum to 200% in response to Russia's war on Ukraine.

From 2018 to 2022, the United States negotiated country exemptions (see Figure 1) and granted entity-specific exclusions as well as General Approved Exclusions (GAEs) applicable to any importer.

Figure 1. Section 232 Steel and Aluminum Country Exemptions Before March 2025 Eliminated by Proclamations 10895 and 10896

Source: CRS, from various presidential proclamations. With the exception of Ukraine, country exemptions were granted between 2018 to 2022.

2025 Tariff Modifications

In February 2025, President Trump modified the Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs, including to

• increase aluminum tariffs to 25%, eliminate all country exemptions, and terminate all existing GAEs effective March 2025;
• prohibit new product exclusions (entity-specific product exclusions to "remain effective until their expiration date or until excluded product volume is imported, whichever occurs first");
• expand the scope of derivatives covered by tariffs (see Figure 2); and
• direct the Commerce Secretary to establish an "inclusions" process to allow U.S. stakeholders to request the addition of steel and aluminum derivatives to the list of products covered by tariffs.

President Trump stated that he terminated country exemptions and product exclusions because they "undermine" the tariffs' objectives, such as increasing U.S. production. He also cited concerns about increased imports from exempted countries, and other countries legally or illegally avoiding tariffs by investing in and exporting through exempted countries (sometimes called "transshipment"). Regarding steel, President Trump asserted a lack of "sufficient action" by exempted partners "to address non-market excess capacity caused primarily by China, or sufficient cooperation ... on issues like trade remedies and customs matters or monitoring bilateral steel trade."

In June 2025, President Trump increased steel and aluminum tariffs to 50%, except for imports from the United Kingdom (UK), which face a 25% tariff. Taking into consideration the UK's actions to implement the U.S.-UK Economic Prosperity Deal, the Commerce Secretary is to establish a tariff-rate quota to exempt a certain quantity of UK steel and aluminum imports from Section 232 tariffs. The United States and the European Union (EU) have expressed their intent to consider cooperation on steel and aluminum issues, including through potential tariff-rate quotas.

The second Trump Administration has significantly expanded the number of steel and aluminum derivatives covered by tariffs (see Figure 2). In May 2025, the Commerce Department initiated the first inclusions process for steel and aluminum derivatives. In August 2025, Commerce added more than 400 product codes to the previously expanded tariff list. Commerce stated that it will open the inclusions "window" annually in May, September, and January.

Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs apply in addition to

• most-favored nation (MFN) tariffs, which are imposed on goods from most trading partners without a U.S. free trade agreement (FTA) or which do not meet FTA rules;
• trade remedies;
• tariffs on China under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA); and
• tariffs under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.

Goods subject to Section 232 automotive tariffs are exempt from steel and aluminum tariffs. As of June 4, Canadian and Mexican steel and aluminum products face a 50% tariff but are exempt from IEEPA tariffs on Canadian and Mexican goods.

For most derivatives, Section 232 tariffs apply only to the steel or aluminum content and do not apply to derivatives processed abroad using steel or aluminum originally sourced from the United States. Products covered by Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs are exempt from global tariffs implemented under IEEPA (IEEPA tariffs apply to the non-steel, non-aluminum content of derivatives).

Some trading partners have announced retaliatory measures. As of September 2025, Canada is imposing 25% tariffs on C$15.6 billion ($11 billion) worth of U.S. steel and aluminum. The EU voted to reimpose previously suspended retaliatory tariffs but suspended them until 2026 following the conclusion of a U.S.-EU framework agreement.

From January to July 2025, U.S. steel and aluminum imports have declined by value, as compared to the same period in 2024 (Table 1). Some U.S. steel producers assert that tariffs are critical for boosting U.S. production and support the expansion of tariffs on derivatives. U.S. aluminum producers have mixed views on the tariffs. Other groups assert that the rapid tariff expansion has created compliance burdens for businesses and may harm U.S. employment in sectors using steel and aluminum.

Issues for Congress

Congress might consider the potential benefits and costs of steel and aluminum tariffs for the U.S. economy, whether U.S. tariff actions achieve stated policy objectives, and whether these actions are consistent with U.S. international trade obligations.

Congress also may consider whether to support or curb presidential authorities related to Section 232. Some Members have praised the tariffs and advocate for expanding presidential trade authorities (e.g., H.R. 735). Others assert that Congress should play a stronger role in overseeing U.S. trade actions (e.g., S. 348, S. 1272/H.R. 2665, H.R. 1903). Some Members have called for tariff exemptions to mitigate potential impacts on the U.S. economy.

Other Members have called for commissioning a report on the potential economic benefits and costs of tariffs (e.g., H.R. 2287, H.R. 4326). In 2023, at the direction of Congress, the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) analyzed the effects of the Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs on the U.S. economy.

Figure 2. Estimated Number of Product Codes Covered by Steel and Aluminum Tariffs

Source: CRS, compiled from Presidential Proclamations, Federal Register implementing notices, and the U.S. Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS). Notes: Number of product codes added to Section 232 steel and aluminum action, at the 8- or 10-digit level of the HTS. Note, these are estimates, as HTS codes may have been revised over time. Two product codes added in April 2025.