Regulation of Commercial Human Spaceflight Safety: Overview and Issues for Congress

Regulation of Commercial Human Spaceflight
June 4, 2024
Safety: Overview and Issues for Congress
Rachel Lindbergh
Regulation of Commercial Human Spaceflight Safety: Overview and Issues for Congress Updated May 21, 2025 (R48050) Jump to Main Text of Report

Contents

• Introduction
• Overview of the Commercial Human Spaceflight Industry
• Types of Commercial Human Spaceflight
• Customers for Commercial Human Spaceflight
• Safety of U.S. Commercial Human Spaceflight
• Current and Proposed Federal Role in Commercial Human Spaceflight Safety
• Existing Regulatory Authorities
• Informed Consent and Other Existing Requirements
• The Learning Period
• The FAA's Proposed Approach to Commercial Human Spaceflight Safety
• Regulating Commercial Human Spaceflight Safety
• Assessments of Government and Industry Readiness for Commercial Human Spaceflight Safety Regulation
• Discussions on the Possible End of the Learning Period
• Developing Industry Standards
• Considerations for Congress
• Extension or Expiration of the Learning Period
• Regulation and Industry Standards
• The FAA's Dual Mandate
• Potential Overlap and Gaps in Existing Regulatory Authorities
• Proposals for On-Orbit Human Safety on Commercial Spacecraft

Tables

• Table A-1. The FAA's Readiness Sets, Areas, and Indicators
• Table B-1. Reports Required by P.L. 114-90

Appendixes

• Appendix A. The FAA's Readiness Sets, Areas, and Indicators
• Appendix B. Reports Required by P.L. 114-90

Summary

Commercial human spaceflight is a nascent but growing industry, and that is reflected in how the Commercial human spaceflight is a nascent but growing industry, and that is reflected in how the
Analyst in Science and
safety of the industry is regulated. Customers for commercial human spaceflight include national safety of the industry is regulated. Customers for commercial human spaceflight include national
Technology Policy
space agencies, such as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), as well as space agencies, such as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), as well as

private citizens. As the industry and its safety evolves, Congress continues to consider how to private citizens. As the industry and its safety evolves, Congress continues to consider how to
approach safety regulations for commercial human spaceflight and the responsibilities of the approach safety regulations for commercial human spaceflight and the responsibilities of the

federal agencies involved.federal agencies involved.
Safety Record
In recent years, the frequency of commercial human spaceflight missions has increased. As of In recent years, the frequency of commercial human spaceflight missions has increased. As of June 2024May 2025, no commercial , no commercial
human spaceflight mission has resulted in the death of a government astronaut, a spaceflight participant (a private citizen on a human spaceflight mission has resulted in the death of a government astronaut, a spaceflight participant (a private citizen on a
commercial flight commercial flight thatwho is not part of the crew), or a member of the general public. is not part of the crew), or a member of the general public. However, anAn accident during a 2014 test accident during a 2014 test
flight of Virgin Galacticflight of Virgin Galactic’'s SpaceShipTwo caused the death of a crew member and injury to another employed by the s SpaceShipTwo caused the death of a crew member and injury to another employed by the
company.company.
Learning Period and Informed Consent Regime
Since the enactment of the Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004 (P.L. 98-575), the Department of Since the enactment of the Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004 (P.L. 98-575), the Department of
Transportation Transportation has(DOT) has had regulatory authority for commercial human spaceflight safety during launch and reentry. The DOT regulatory authority for commercial human spaceflight safety during launch and reentry. The DOT
delegates its authority to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Pursuant to statute (51 U.S.C. §50905(c))delegates its authority to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Pursuant to statute (51 U.S.C. §50905(c)), starting on starting on
January 1, January 1, 20252028, the agency may propose regulations for the safety of human occupants. The period before January 1, , the agency may propose regulations for the safety of human occupants. The period before January 1, 2025,
2028, is referred to as a is referred to as a “"learning period.learning period.”" During the learning period, the FAA cannot propose regulations specific to the safety of humans on spacecraft except under specified circumstances. The learning period allows commercial companies The learning period allows commercial companies the opportunity to mature their to mature their
capabilities without regulatory oversight, which could be capabilities without regulatory oversight, which could be potentially burdensome to the development of this market. burdensome to the development of this market.
Currently, the FAA and industry operate under an informed consent regime, in which customers are informed Currently, the FAA and industry operate under an informed consent regime, in which customers are informed of thethat human spaceflight involves potential potential
risk of human spaceflight risk and that the U.S. government has not certified the spacecraft.and that the U.S. government has not certified the spacecraft.
The potential for an end to the learning period is spurring more discussion on the timing for potential development of
regulations and the status of industry standards that would inform regulations. The FAA maintains the learning period does
not need to be extended and that both the agency and industry are ready to transition to a new safety framework that will
eventually include regulations. In 2023, FAA indicated that, if the learning period is not extended, it may be The learning period, originally set to expire in 2012, has been extended several times. In 2023, the FAA indicated that, absent an extension of the learning period, it would have been able to publish a able to publish a
final rule approximately five years later (i.e., 2028). final rule approximately five years later (i.e., 2028). MajorAt the time, major industry groups industry groups disagree and have disagreed and advocated for an extension advocated for an extension
until the industry until the industry is more mature, hasmatured, had a base of shared safety knowledge, and a base of shared safety knowledge, and hashad made more progress made more progress towardstoward voluntary voluntary
consensus standards.
Issues for Congress
After various extensions from the original expiration date in 2012, the learning period is set to expire on January 1, 2025.
Congress may wish to consider whether to extend the learning period for a fixed time or indefinitely or whether to allow it
expire and allow the FAA to commence the process of developing regulations. Congress’s interest may be driven by concern
for the safety of government astronauts, who are potential customers of the commercial human spaceflight industry.
Some Members of Congress also have raised the issue of the FAA’s dual mandate to both promote the commercial space
industry and regulate its activities in the interest of public safety. Congress may also consider whether to address overlaps
and gaps in federal agency oversight of commercial space activities, such as the lack of regulatory oversight for commercial
activity in space, or on orbit.
Congressional Research Service

---

link to page 4 link to page 4 link to page 5 link to page 5 link to page 6 link to page 7 link to page 7 link to page 8 link to page 9 link to page 10 link to page 12 link to page 12 link to page 12 link to page 14 link to page 15 link to page 16 link to page 16 link to page 17 link to page 17 link to page 18 link to page 19 link to page 20 link to page 22 link to page 20 link to page 22 link to page 23 Regulation of Commercial Human Spaceflight Safety: Overview and Issues for Congress

Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Overview of the Commercial Human Spaceflight Industry ............................................................ 1
Types of Commercial Human Spaceflight ................................................................................ 2
Customers for Commercial Human Spaceflight ....................................................................... 2
Safety of U.S. Commercial Human Spaceflight........................................................................ 3
Current and Proposed Federal Role in Commercial Human Spaceflight Safety ............................. 4
Existing Regulatory Authorities ................................................................................................ 4
Informed Consent and Other Existing Requirements ......................................................... 5
The Learning Period ........................................................................................................... 6
FAA’s Proposed Approach to Commercial Human Spaceflight Safety ..................................... 7
Regulating Commercial Human Spaceflight Safety ................................................................. 9
Assessments of Government and Industry Readiness for Commercial Human
Spaceflight Safety Regulation ......................................................................................... 9
Discussions on the Possible End of the Learning Period ................................................... 11
Developing Industry Standards ......................................................................................... 12
Considerations for Congress.......................................................................................................... 13
Extension or Expiration of the Learning Period ...................................................................... 13
Regulation and Industry Standards ......................................................................................... 14
The FAA’s Dual Mandate ........................................................................................................ 14
Potential Overlap and Gaps in Existing Regulatory Authorities ............................................. 15
Proposals for On-Orbit Human Safety on Commercial Spacecraft .................................. 16

Tables

Table A-1. FAA’s Readiness Sets, Areas, and Indicators ............................................................... 17
Table B-1. Reports Required by P.L. 114-90 ................................................................................. 19

Appendixes
Appendix A. FAA’s Readiness Sets, Areas, and Indicators ........................................................... 17
Appendix B. Reports Required by P.L. 114-90 ............................................................................. 19

Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 20

Congressional Research Service

---

Regulation of Commercial Human Spaceflight Safety: Overview and Issues for Congress

Introduction
consensus standards. In December 2024, Congress changed the expiration of the leaning period from January 1, 2025, to January 1, 2028, in the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (P.L. 118-159, §5702). Before this extension to 2028, the potential end to the learning period spurred discussion on the timing for possible development of regulations and the status of industry standards that would inform regulations. The FAA maintained that the learning period did not need to be extended and that both the agency and industry were ready to transition to a new safety framework, eventually including regulations.

Issues for Congress

Congress may consider whether to extend the learning period for a fixed time or indefinitely, to shorten the period, or to allow it to expire and let the FAA begin developing regulations. Congress's interest may be driven by concern for the safety of government astronauts, who are potential customers of the commercial human spaceflight industry.

Some Members of Congress have raised concerns about the FAA's dual mandate to both promote the commercial space industry and regulate its activities in the interest of public safety, asking whether the agency can appropriately manage a dual mandate. Congress may also consider whether to address overlaps and gaps in federal agency oversight of commercial space activities, such as the lack of regulatory oversight for commercial activity in space or on orbit. The Biden Administration, in December 2023, released a legislative proposal that would have, if enacted, expanded the FAA's authorities for human spaceflight to commercial activities beyond Earth orbit. As of May 2025, the Trump Administration has not indicated its position on potential overlaps or gaps in federal agency oversight of commercial human spaceflight.

Introduction

Commercial human spaceflight is a nascent industry. Congress shapes commercial spaceflight Commercial human spaceflight is a nascent industry. Congress shapes commercial spaceflight
through its actions on the development of safety regulations and its direction to the agencies through its actions on the development of safety regulations and its direction to the agencies
involved in regulation and the scope of regulatory authorities.involved in regulation and the scope of regulatory authorities.
As of June 2024, 42 As of May 2025, 51 Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)-licensed or Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)-licensed or FAA-permitted commercial -permitted commercial
human spaceflight missions have occurred.human spaceflight missions have occurred.11 FAA-licensed or FAA-licensed or FAA-permitted commercial human -permitted commercial human
spaceflights have increased recently, with more launches occurring since 2021 than in the 17 spaceflights have increased recently, with more launches occurring since 2021 than in the 17
years prior.years prior.2
2 The FAA, within the Department of Transportation (DOT), is responsible for regulating the safety The FAA, within the Department of Transportation (DOT), is responsible for regulating the safety
of commercial space launch and reentry, including the safety of humans onboard.of commercial space launch and reentry, including the safety of humans onboard.33 Since 2004, Since 2004,
statute (51 U.S.C. §50905(c)(9)) established a statute (51 U.S.C. §50905(c)(9)) established a “"learning period,learning period,”" during which the FAA is during which the FAA is
prohibited from proposing regulations addressing the safety of humans on commercial spacecraft prohibited from proposing regulations addressing the safety of humans on commercial spacecraft
during launch and reentry, with a few exceptions. This learning period is set to expire on January during launch and reentry, with a few exceptions. This learning period is set to expire on January
1, 2025.
1, 2028. After providing an overview of the commercial human spaceflight industry in the United States, After providing an overview of the commercial human spaceflight industry in the United States,
the report discusses the existing status of safety regulations and authorities and other potential the report discusses the existing status of safety regulations and authorities and other potential
safety considerations for Congress. Specific topics addressed include the term of the learning safety considerations for Congress. Specific topics addressed include the term of the learning
period for regulating the safety of human occupants, the roles and responsibilities of federal period for regulating the safety of human occupants, the roles and responsibilities of federal
agencies (in particular the FAA), and regulatory oversight of commercial human spaceflight after agencies (in particular the FAA), and regulatory oversight of commercial human spaceflight after
launch and before reentry (i.e., on orbit).launch and before reentry (i.e., on orbit).
Human spaceflight missions conducted solely by the U.S. government are not addressed in this Human spaceflight missions conducted solely by the U.S. government are not addressed in this
report, as the responsible federal agency has authority for the safety of such missions.report, as the responsible federal agency has authority for the safety of such missions.
Overview of the Commercial Human Spaceflight
Industry
Industry Until the 2004 launch of SpaceShipOne by U.S. aerospace company Scaled Composites,Until the 2004 launch of SpaceShipOne by U.S. aerospace company Scaled Composites,44 human human
spaceflight was limited to government missions, and spaceflight was limited to government missions, and only a few countries were able to launch few countries were able to launch
humans into space. Currently, three companies—Blue Origin, SpaceX, and Virgin Galactic—are humans into space. Currently, three companies—Blue Origin, SpaceX, and Virgin Galactic—are
able to launch humans into space, with additional companies developing the capability to able to launch humans into space, with additional companies developing the capability to
transport humans to space or host them on private orbital platforms, commonly referred to as transport humans to space or host them on private orbital platforms, commonly referred to as
“"space stations.space stations.”" In the coming years, commercial space companies hope to develop the human In the coming years, commercial space companies hope to develop the human
spaceflight industry, in which private citizens and government astronauts can travel to or stay in spaceflight industry, in which private citizens and government astronauts can travel to or stay in
space on privately owned spacecraft or space stations.

1 The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issues experimental permits for commercial launch or reentry of reusable
suborbital rockets for research and development, demonstrating compliance with licensing conditions, or crew training,
as described in 14 C.F.R. §437.5. The FAA issues licenses for all other types of commercial space launch or reentry.
2 Number of missions determined from the FAA, “Commercial Space Data,” August 31, 2023, https://www.faa.gov/
data_research/commercial_space_data.
3 The FAA’s authorities are limited to commercial missions and, as such, the agency does not oversee missions
conducted by other government agencies.
4 The company Scaled Composites conducted the first commercial spaceflight on June 21, 2004, with the launch of
SpaceShipOne. Tim Sharp, “SpaceShipOne: The First Private Spacecraft,” Space.com, March 5, 2019,
https://www.space.com/16769-spaceshipone-first-private-spacecraft.html.
Congressional Research Service

1

---

Regulation of Commercial Human Spaceflight Safety: Overview and Issues for Congress

Types of Commercial Human Spaceflight
space on privately owned spacecraft or space stations. Types of Commercial Human Spaceflight The commercial human spaceflight industry is composed of companies providing suborbital and The commercial human spaceflight industry is composed of companies providing suborbital and
orbital spaceflight,orbital spaceflight,55 as well as companies developing commercial orbital platforms to host as well as companies developing commercial orbital platforms to host
customers. SpaceX, for example, has launched both National Aeronautics and Space customers. SpaceX, for example, has launched both National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) astronauts and commercial customers into orbit. Virgin Galactic is Administration (NASA) astronauts and commercial customers into orbit. Virgin Galactic is
currently offering suborbital flights.currently offering suborbital flights.66 Blue Origin currently offers suborbital flights and intends to Blue Origin currently offers suborbital flights and intends to
offer orbital flights in the future.offer orbital flights in the future.7
7 Orbital platforms, or Orbital platforms, or “"space stations,space stations,”" are crewed spacecraft that operate in Earth orbit for an are crewed spacecraft that operate in Earth orbit for an
extended period of time. The International Space Station (ISS) is an example of a crewed, extended period of time. The International Space Station (ISS) is an example of a crewed,
government-owned orbital platform. Several companies, such as Axiom Space and NanoRacks, government-owned orbital platform. Several companies, such as Axiom Space and NanoRacks,
intend to operate commercial orbital platforms in low Earth orbit (LEO).intend to operate commercial orbital platforms in low Earth orbit (LEO).⁸8
Customers for Commercial Human Spaceflight
Customers for commercial human spaceflight include both governments and private citizens. Customers for commercial human spaceflight include both governments and private citizens.
Governments can contract with space companies to launch government astronauts and researchers Governments can contract with space companies to launch government astronauts and researchers
or to host them on commercial orbital platforms.or to host them on commercial orbital platforms.
NASA relies on commercial human spaceflight services for three of its programs: the NASA relies on commercial human spaceflight services for three of its programs: the
Commercial Crew program, which transports NASA astronauts to the ISS; the Artemis program Commercial Crew program, which transports NASA astronauts to the ISS; the Artemis program
through its Human Landing System, which NASA plans to use to transport its astronauts to the through its Human Landing System, which NASA plans to use to transport its astronauts to the
Moon’Moon's surface; and the Commercial LEO s surface; and the Commercial LEO DevelopmentDestinations program, which NASA program, which NASA hopes willhas indicated that it hopes will support commercial platforms to host host
its astronauts in Earth orbit. For all of these programs, NASA does not plan to develop its own its astronauts in Earth orbit. For all of these programs, NASA does not plan to develop its own
capabilities; the agency plans on using commercial human spaceflight services instead. The capabilities; the agency plans on using commercial human spaceflight services instead. The
commercial providers offer transportation or orbital hosting commercial providers offer transportation or orbital hosting as a service, retaining ownership of , retaining ownership of
their spacecraft.their spacecraft.
Private citizens may also pay to travel to space for recreation, tourism, privately funded research, Private citizens may also pay to travel to space for recreation, tourism, privately funded research,
or other purposes. So far, relatively few private citizens have traveled to space on either orbital or or other purposes. So far, relatively few private citizens have traveled to space on either orbital or
suborbital flights. The first crewed private spaceflight occurred in 2004, with the flight of suborbital flights. The first crewed private spaceflight occurred in 2004, with the flight of
SpaceShipOne. Between 2001 and 2009, seven private citizens traveled to the ISS on RussianSpaceShipOne. Between 2001 and 2009, seven private citizens traveled to the ISS on Russian
-government-owned Soyuz spacecraft.government-owned Soyuz spacecraft.99 No additional commercial human spaceflight missions No additional commercial human spaceflight missions
occurred until 2018. In the years since, Blue Origin, SpaceX, and Virgin Galactic have each occurred until 2018. In the years since, Blue Origin, SpaceX, and Virgin Galactic have each
transported private citizens to space on multiple missions.10

5 Although both suborbital and orbital spacecraft reach space, only orbital spacecraft reach sufficient speed (known as
orbital velocity) to complete at least one orbit—or more commonly, several orbits—around the Earth. In contrast, a
suborbital flight reaches space and then returns without making a full orbit around the Earth, usually after a few
minutes.
6 Doug Messier, “U.S. Commercial Human Spaceflight Set to Accelerate as Regulatory Battle Looms,” Parabolic Arc,
April 10, 2023, https://parabolicarc.com/2023/04/10/current-state-future-commercial-spaceflight/.
7 Eric Berger, “Blue Origin Just Validated the New Space Movement,” ArsTechnica, October 6, 2016,
https://arstechnica.com/science/2016/10/blue-origin-just-validated-the-new-space-movement/.
8 National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), “NASA Selects Companies to Develop Commercial
Destinations in Space,” press release, NASA, December 2, 2021, https://www.nasa.gov/news-release/nasa-selects-
companies-to-develop-commercial-destinations-in-space/.
9 Mike Wall, “An Interview with the First Space Tourist,” SpaceNews, May 2, 2011, https://spacenews.com/interview-
first-space-tourist/.
10 Sissi Cao, “Every Person Launched into Space by Blue Origin, So Far,” Observer, June 22, 2023,
https://observer.com/2023/06/blue-origin-passenger-list/; William Harwood, “Virgin Galactic Launches Third
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service

2

---

Regulation of Commercial Human Spaceflight Safety: Overview and Issues for Congress

transported private citizens to space on multiple missions.¹⁰ The number of private citizens who have visited space, while still relatively small, is The number of private citizens who have visited space, while still relatively small, is expectedanticipated to to
grow, given expectations that these companies may increase the frequency of their missions and grow, given expectations that these companies may increase the frequency of their missions and
that more companies may enter the commercial human spaceflight market. The industry has that more companies may enter the commercial human spaceflight market. The industry has
already grown and increased the frequency of its spaceflights in recent years. grown and increased the frequency of its spaceflights in recent years. In fact, moreMore FAA- FAA-
licensed or licensed or FAA-permitted commercial human spaceflights occurred since 2021 than in the 17 years -permitted commercial human spaceflights occurred since 2021 than in the 17 years
prior.prior.¹¹11
Safety of U.S. Commercial Human Spaceflight
As of As of June 2024May 2025, no U.S. commercial human spaceflight mission has resulted in the death of a , no U.S. commercial human spaceflight mission has resulted in the death of a
government astronaut, a spaceflight participant,government astronaut, a spaceflight participant,1212 or a member of the general public. An accident or a member of the general public. An accident
during a 2014 test flight of Virgin Galacticduring a 2014 test flight of Virgin Galactic’'s SpaceShipTwo caused the death of a crew member s SpaceShipTwo caused the death of a crew member
and injury to another employed by the company.and injury to another employed by the company.¹³ 13
The FAA, which regulates and licenses commercial space launch and reentry, tracks U.S. human The FAA, which regulates and licenses commercial space launch and reentry, tracks U.S. human
spaceflight data—from both government and commercial missions—including the numbers of spaceflight data—from both government and commercial missions—including the numbers of
persons launched, casualties, and catastrophic failures. The FAA defines a persons launched, casualties, and catastrophic failures. The FAA defines a “"catastrophic failurecatastrophic failure”
" as an accident that caused death or serious injury to the people onboard.as an accident that caused death or serious injury to the people onboard.1414 CRS analysis of FAA CRS analysis of FAA
data shows a catastrophic failure rate of data shows a catastrophic failure rate of 3.32.78% for commercial % for commercial suborbital missions and 0% for missions and 0% for
commercial commercial orbital missions. missions.1515 Out of the Out of the 3036 suborbital commercial human launches licensed or suborbital commercial human launches licensed or
permitted in the United States, the 2014 SpaceShipTwo test flight is the only catastrophic failure permitted in the United States, the 2014 SpaceShipTwo test flight is the only catastrophic failure
recorded.recorded.
Comparisons may provide useful, yet limited, points of reference, as commercial human Comparisons may provide useful, yet limited, points of reference, as commercial human
spaceflight is a developing activity with relatively little flight history. In spaceflight is a developing activity with relatively little flight history. In 20222023, U.S. commercial , U.S. commercial
air carriers had an accident air carriers had an accident rate16rate¹⁶ of less than 0. of less than 0.315 per 100,000 scheduled flights, or less than per 100,000 scheduled flights, or less than
0.0003%.17
0.00015%.¹⁷ Companies that wish to participate in NASACompanies that wish to participate in NASA’'s Commercial Crew program must demonstrate their s Commercial Crew program must demonstrate their
ability to meet the agencyability to meet the agency’'s safety standards. For these companies to meet NASAs safety standards. For these companies to meet NASA’'s safety s safety
standards, their proposed spacecraft design must meet a standards, their proposed spacecraft design must meet a “"loss of crewloss of crew”" threshold of 1 in 270, or threshold of 1 in 270, or

Suborbital ‘Space Tourist’ Flight,” CBSNews, September 8, 2023, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/virgin-galactic-
launches-third-suborbital-space-tourist-flight/; Will Gendron, “Virgin Galactic’s First Space Tourism Flight Took off
This Week. Here Are the Players Taking Civilians to Space,” Business Insider, August 12, 2023,
https://www.businessinsider.com/virgin-galactic-blue-origin-spacex-commercial-space-flights-tourism-cost-2023-7.
11 Between January 2021 and June 2024, 27 FAA-licensed or -permitted commercial human spaceflights occurred.
From 2004 through 2020, 15 such spaceflights occurred. FAA, “Commercial Space Data,” August 31, 2023,
https://www.faa.gov/data_research/commercial_space_data.
12 The FAA considers a spaceflight participant “[a]n individual, who is not crew, carried aboard a launch vehicle or
reentry vehicle.” FAA, Human Space Flight, February 1, 2024, https://www.faa.gov/space/human_spaceflight.
13 National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), In-Flight Breakup During Test Flight, Scaled Composites
SpaceShipTwo, N339SS, Near Koehn Dry Lake, California, October 31, 2014, NTSB/AAR-15/02, 2015, p. 1,
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR1502.pdf.
14 FAA, “U.S. Human Space Flight Safety Record (As of 20 May 2024),” FAA, May 20, 2024, https://www.faa.gov/
media/77636.
15 Ibid. The FAA lists SpaceShipTwo as having conducted 19 spaceflights, while the agency’s “Commercial Space
Data” dashboard only lists 18 licensed- or permitted- SpaceShipTwo launches.
16 The NTSB uses the definition of “aircraft accident” provided by 49 C.F.R. §830.2, which is substantively similar to
the definition the FAA uses to define “catastrophic failures” for commercial human spaceflight. The FAA uses the
definition of “catastrophic failures” found in 14 C.F.R. §460.45(c).
17 NTSB, “Aviation Accident Rates, 2003-2022,” spreadsheet, 2023, https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/StatisticalReviews/
Documents/AviationAccidentStatistics_2003-2022_20231228.xlsx.
Congressional Research Service

3

---

Regulation of Commercial Human Spaceflight Safety: Overview and Issues for Congress

0.37%. This threshold is for a probabilistic risk assessment of the proposed spacecraft designs, as 0.37%. This threshold is for a probabilistic risk assessment of the proposed spacecraft designs, as
there is not yet sufficient flight experience to determine a number based on actual accidents.there is not yet sufficient flight experience to determine a number based on actual accidents.¹⁸ 18
A 2023 RAND Corporation report, A 2023 RAND Corporation report, Assessing the Readiness for Human Commercial Spaceflight
Safety Regulations: Charting a Trajectory from Revolutionary to Routine Travel, conducted in , conducted in
response to congressional direction to the Secretary of Transportation, noted that the commercial response to congressional direction to the Secretary of Transportation, noted that the commercial
human spaceflight industry has a strong incentive to ensure that missions are safe and that no human spaceflight industry has a strong incentive to ensure that missions are safe and that no
accidents occur.accidents occur.1919 Accidents—particularly those that are high profile—could discourage potential Accidents—particularly those that are high profile—could discourage potential
customers, negatively impacting the economic prospects of either single companies or even the customers, negatively impacting the economic prospects of either single companies or even the
industry more broadly. In addition, the RAND report posited that Congress or regulating agencies industry more broadly. In addition, the RAND report posited that Congress or regulating agencies
might be motivated to impose additional oversight or regulation in response to an accident.might be motivated to impose additional oversight or regulation in response to an accident.20
20 The RAND report noted several factors that may negatively impact the safety of the industry.The RAND report noted several factors that may negatively impact the safety of the industry.21
21 Some companies—particularly new entrants to the industry—may not have sufficient knowledge Some companies—particularly new entrants to the industry—may not have sufficient knowledge
of and expertise in various safety measures. Implementation costs could also discourage of and expertise in various safety measures. Implementation costs could also discourage
companies from adopting some safety measures or processes. Companies may also be reluctant to companies from adopting some safety measures or processes. Companies may also be reluctant to
share lessons learned or mishap data, as they may fear sharing proprietary data may hurt their share lessons learned or mishap data, as they may fear sharing proprietary data may hurt their
competitiveness. The report noted that this concern may, in turn, inhibit the creation of voluntary competitiveness. The report noted that this concern may, in turn, inhibit the creation of voluntary
industry standards or voluntary safety reporting systems, both of which could improve safety.industry standards or voluntary safety reporting systems, both of which could improve safety.
Current and Proposed Federal Role in Commercial
Human Spaceflight Safety
This section discusses the FAAThis section discusses the FAA’'s regulatory oversight of commercial human spaceflight during s regulatory oversight of commercial human spaceflight during
launch and reentry by U.S. citizens or launching from areas within U.S. jurisdiction, including the launch and reentry by U.S. citizens or launching from areas within U.S. jurisdiction, including the
learning period; the FAAlearning period; the FAA’'s proposal for future regulatory action for commercial spaceflight safety s proposal for future regulatory action for commercial spaceflight safety
for launch and reentry; and stakeholder positions on the federal role in commercial human for launch and reentry; and stakeholder positions on the federal role in commercial human
spaceflight safety.spaceflight safety.
Existing Regulatory Authorities
The Commercial Space Launch Act (P.L. 98-575) gave the DOT the authority to regulate the The Commercial Space Launch Act (P.L. 98-575) gave the DOT the authority to regulate the
launch and reentry of commercial spacecraft, as codified in launch and reentry of commercial spacecraft, as codified in 51 U.S.C. Chapter 509Title 51, Chapter 509, of the U.S. Code. The . The
Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-492) extended the scope of Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-492) extended the scope of
DOT’the DOT's regulatory authority to address the health and safety of humans onboard launch and s regulatory authority to address the health and safety of humans onboard launch and
reentry vehicles.reentry vehicles.2222 These authorities are implemented by the FAA Office of Commercial Space These authorities are implemented by the FAA Office of Commercial Space

18 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), NASA Commercial Crew Program: Plan Needed to Ensure
Uninterrupted Access to the International Space Station, GAO-18-476, July 2018, pp. 22-24, https://www.gao.gov/
assets/gao-18-476.pdf; NASA Office of the Inspector General, NASA’s Management of Crew Transportation to the
International Space Station, IG-20-005-, November 14, 2019, p. 14, https://oig.nasa.gov/docs/IG-20-005.pdf.
19 Doug C. Ligor, Benjamin M. Miller, Maria McCollester, et al., Assessing the Readiness for Commercial Human
Spaceflight Safety Regulations: Charting a Trajectory from Revolutionary to Routine Travel, RAND Corporation,
October 2023, p. 34, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2466-1.html. Hereinafter RAND 2023.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid., p. 36.
22 See various subsections in 51 U.S.C. §§50903-50905. The Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004
(P.L. 108-492; 51 U.S.C. §50902) defines three types of human occupants on commercial spaceflight missions:
government astronauts, crew, and spaceflight participants. Per §50902, government astronaut is a designation either
assigned by NASA under 51 U.S.C. §20113(n) or referring to an employee of the U.S. government or its international
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service

4

---

Regulation of Commercial Human Spaceflight Safety: Overview and Issues for Congress

Transportation (AST), which oversees a licensing process for commercial space launch and Transportation (AST), which oversees a licensing process for commercial space launch and
reentry.reentry.2323 Its regulatory focus is public health and safety. Its regulatory focus is public health and safety.2424 It does not have the authority to It does not have the authority to
regulate mission assurance (i.e., the design or operations of vehicles), as the FAA does for the regulate mission assurance (i.e., the design or operations of vehicles), as the FAA does for the
commercial aviation industry.commercial aviation industry.25
25 The Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004 directed the FAA to implement an The Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004 directed the FAA to implement an
“"informed consentinformed consent”" regime and medical and training requirements for commercial human regime and medical and training requirements for commercial human
spaceflight, as well as to develop and implement regulations on liability insurance and financial spaceflight, as well as to develop and implement regulations on liability insurance and financial
responsibility (referred to as responsibility (referred to as indemnification). The Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act ). The Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act
of 2004 also created the learning period, during which the FAA cannot propose regulations of 2004 also created the learning period, during which the FAA cannot propose regulations
specific to the safety of humans on spacecraftspecific to the safety of humans on spacecraft. 26
Informed Consent and Other Existing Requirements
except under specific circumstances. The FAA may propose regulations in response to instances in which a design feature or an operating practice has resulted in serious or fatal injury to crew, government astronauts, or spaceflight participants or has contributed to an unplanned event or series of events during a licensed or permitted flight that posed a high risk to crew, government astronauts, or spaceflight participants. When issuing such regulations, the FAA must describe the instance or instances when the design feature or operating practice in question contributed to a qualifying injury, unplanned event, or unplanned series of events.²⁶ Informed Consent and Other Existing Requirements The Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004 directed the FAA to develop and The Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004 directed the FAA to develop and
implement informed consent requirements for commercial human spaceflight companies. The implement informed consent requirements for commercial human spaceflight companies. The
companies must inform spaceflight participants in writing of the safety records of their intended companies must inform spaceflight participants in writing of the safety records of their intended
launch vehicle and of the risks of launch and reentry more broadly.launch vehicle and of the risks of launch and reentry more broadly.2727 Both crew and spaceflight Both crew and spaceflight
participants must be informed that the U.S. government has not certified their intended launch participants must be informed that the U.S. government has not certified their intended launch
vehicle.vehicle.2828 These requirements are often referred to as the These requirements are often referred to as the informedinformed consent regime..29
29 Spaceflight participants were also included in the existing regime for liability and indemnification Spaceflight participants were also included in the existing regime for liability and indemnification
by the Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004. The FAA must require licensees to by the Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004. The FAA must require licensees to
sign reciprocal waivers of claims with their spaceflight participants, its contractors, and the U.S. sign reciprocal waivers of claims with their spaceflight participants, its contractors, and the U.S.
government.government.3030 These waivers ensure that each party releases claims against the others and These waivers ensure that each party releases claims against the others and
assumes financial responsibility for any property damage or bodily injury. The FAA established assumes financial responsibility for any property damage or bodily injury. The FAA established
the regulations for these requirements in the regulations for these requirements in 14 C.F.R. Part 440Title 14, Part 440, of the Code of Federal Regulations. The current indemnification regime . The current indemnification regime
for spaceflight participants is set to expire on September 30, for spaceflight participants is set to expire on September 30, 2025.31
2028.³¹ The Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004 also directed the FAA to establish basic The Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004 also directed the FAA to establish basic
medical and training requirements for spaceflight participants and crew.32 Among these

partners. Crew is defined as an employee of a launch provider that is involved in operating a launch or reentry vehicle.
The term spaceflight participant refers to an individual being transported on a human spaceflight mission who is neither
crew nor a government astronaut.
23 51 U.S.C. §50904(d).
24 George C. Nield, John Sloan, and David Gerlach, “Recommended Practices for Commercial Human Space Flight,”
International Astronautical Congress, Toronto, Canada, 2014, p. 2, https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/space/
additional_information/international_affairs/
recommended_practices_human_space_flight_iac_toronto_nield_october_2014_508.pdf.
25 Ibid, p. 2.
26 51 U.S.C. §50905(c).
27 51 U.S.C. §50905(b)(4); 14 C.F.R. §460.45.
28 51 U.S.C. §50905(b)(4); 14 C.F.R. §§460.9 and 460.45.
29 FAA, U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most
Appropriate for New Safety Framework, September 29, 2023, p. 11, https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/
2023_10_06%20PL_114-90_Sec_111_7_Commercial_Human_Spaceflight_Activities.pdf. Hereinafter, FAA, U.S.
Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most Appropriate for a New
Safety Framework.
30 51 U.S.C. §50914.
31 51 U.S.C. §50914.
32 P.L. 108-492, Sec. 2(c)(13); 51 U.S.C. §50905(b); 14 C.F.R. Part 460.
Congressional Research Service

5

---

Regulation of Commercial Human Spaceflight Safety: Overview and Issues for Congress

medical and training requirements for spaceflight participants and crew.³² Among these requirements, human spaceflight companies must give their pilots vehicle and mission-specific requirements, human spaceflight companies must give their pilots vehicle and mission-specific
training and train spaceflight participants on how to respond to emergency situations.training and train spaceflight participants on how to respond to emergency situations.
Per 51 U.S.C. §50905(c)(10) Per Title 51, Section 50905(c)(10), of the U.S. Code, the FAA may implement these and other regulations and , the FAA may implement these and other regulations and
requirements in support of its mission to protect the public. For instance, the FAA has imposed requirements in support of its mission to protect the public. For instance, the FAA has imposed
regulations and requirements for spacecraft crew, as the crew is considered by the agency to be regulations and requirements for spacecraft crew, as the crew is considered by the agency to be
part of the flight safety system. The FAA has requirements for crew qualifications, medical part of the flight safety system. The FAA has requirements for crew qualifications, medical
screening, life support, and similar basic safety elements (14 C.F.R. screening, life support, and similar basic safety elements (14 C.F.R. §Part 460) and has implemented 460) and has implemented
basic security requirements for spaceflight participants to protect the crew and public (14 C.F.R. basic security requirements for spaceflight participants to protect the crew and public (14 C.F.R.
§460.53).§460.53).
The Learning Period
The Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004 The Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004 originally set a period of eight years in which the set a period of eight years in which the
FAA cannot propose regulations specifically addressing the safety of persons on commercial FAA cannot propose regulations specifically addressing the safety of persons on commercial
space vehicles—space vehicles—absent specified exceptions and aside from the informed consent, liability and indemnification, medical, and aside from the informed consent, liability and indemnification, medical, and
training requirements—codified at training requirements—codified at 51 U.S.C. §50905(c). Title 51, Section 50905(c), of the U.S. Code. The learning period provides The learning period provides
commercial companies with the opportunity to mature their capabilities without regulatory commercial companies with the opportunity to mature their capabilities without regulatory
oversight, which could be oversight, which could be potentially burdensome to the development of this market. The length burdensome to the development of this market. The length
of the learning period has been extended multiple times since it was first set to expire on October of the learning period has been extended multiple times since it was first set to expire on October
1, 2012.1, 2012.3333 Most recently, the learning period was extended to January 1, Most recently, the learning period was extended to January 1, 20252028, by the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (P.L. 118-159, §5702). , by the FAA
Reauthorization Act of 2024 (P.L. 118-63, Section 1111).
During the learning period, the FAA may During the learning period, the FAA may only issue human occupant safety regulations issue human occupant safety regulations only in in
response to a serious or fatal injury to an in-flight event or events with a high risk of such response to a serious or fatal injury to an in-flight event or events with a high risk of such
casualties.casualties.3434 Should such an incident occur, the FAA may develop and implement regulations in Should such an incident occur, the FAA may develop and implement regulations in
response, but the agency is not obligated to do so. For instance, the FAA did not issue new response, but the agency is not obligated to do so. For instance, the FAA did not issue new
regulations after the only event that met these criteria—the 2014 SpaceShipTwo accident, in regulations after the only event that met these criteria—the 2014 SpaceShipTwo accident, in
which a Virgin Galactic suborbital spacecraft crashed.which a Virgin Galactic suborbital spacecraft crashed. 3535 Notably, the National Transportation Notably, the National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB)—which was the lead investigator of that accident—did not recommend Safety Board (NTSB)—which was the lead investigator of that accident—did not recommend
additional regulations in its report.additional regulations in its report.36
36 The Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act (CSLCA) of 2015 (P.L. 114-90) required the The Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act (CSLCA) of 2015 (P.L. 114-90) required the
FAA to produce several reports to inform a transition from the learning period to a safety FAA to produce several reports to inform a transition from the learning period to a safety
framework that mayframework that may includeinclude safety regulations.safety regulations.3737 The CSLCA directed the FAA to consult and The CSLCA directed the FAA to consult and
coordinate with the Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee (COMSTAC)coordinate with the Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee (COMSTAC)3838 to to
develop these reports for the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and develop these reports for the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and
the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology. The required reports were to address

33 Prior to the most recent extension in P.L. 118-41, the learning period had been extended to October 1, 2015, by the
FAA Modernization and Reform of 2012 (P.L. 112-95); to October 1, 2023, by the Commercial Space Launch
Competitiveness Act (CSLCA) of 2015 (P.L. 114-90); to January 1, 2024, by the Continuing Appropriations and Other
Extensions Act, 2024 (P.L. 118-22); to March 9, 2024, by the Airport and Airway Extension Act of 2023, Part II (P.L.
118-34); and to May 11, 2024, by the Airport and Airway Extension Act of 2024 (P.L. 118-41).
34 51 U.S.C. §50905(c)(2).
35 RAND 2023, pp. 3-4.
36 NTSB, In-Flight Breakup During Test Flight, Scaled Composites SpaceShipTwo, N339SS, Near Koehn Dry Lake,
California, October 31, 2014, NTSB/AAR-15/02, 2015, pp. 70-71, https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/
AccidentReports/Reports/AAR1502.pdf.
37 P.L. 114-90, Sec. 111; 51 U.S.C. §50905.
38 For more information on COMSTAC, see FAA, “Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee
(COMSTAC),” https://www.faa.gov/space/additional_information/comstac.
Congressional Research Service

6

---

link to page 22 Regulation of Commercial Human Spaceflight Safety: Overview and Issues for Congress

• the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology. The required reports were to addressthe commercial space transportation industrythe commercial space transportation industry’'s progress in developing voluntary s progress in developing voluntary
consensus standards and best practices, by December 2016 and every 30 months consensus standards and best practices, by December 2016 and every 30 months
thereafter;thereafter;39
• 39 key industry metrics that could be used to indicate the industrykey industry metrics that could be used to indicate the industry’'s readiness to s readiness to
transition to a safety framework that may include regulations, by August 2016;transition to a safety framework that may include regulations, by August 2016;40
and
• 40 and the activities most appropriate for a new safety framework, which could include the activities most appropriate for a new safety framework, which could include
regulatory action and a possible transition plan, by March 2018 with an update by regulatory action and a possible transition plan, by March 2018 with an update by
March 2022.March 2022.41
41Similarly, the CSLCA required the FAA to contract for an independent report, due by December Similarly, the CSLCA required the FAA to contract for an independent report, due by December
2022, assessing the readiness of the federal government and commercial industry to transition to a 2022, assessing the readiness of the federal government and commercial industry to transition to a
safety framework that may include regulations.safety framework that may include regulations.42 To produce this report, the42 The FAA contracted with FAA contracted with
the RAND Corporation, which published the congressionally mandated independent assessment the RAND Corporation, which published the congressionally mandated independent assessment
in April 2023.in April 2023.⁴³ 43
The FAA has delivered several reports The FAA has delivered several reports addressing thesefollowing these reporting requirements. A list of these reports can requirements. A list of these reports can
be found inbe found in Appendix B.
In 2023, in preparation for the learning period’s potential end, In 2023, the FAA detailed its proposed the FAA detailed its proposed
approach for a safety framework inclusive of regulations. The proposed approach is described in approach for a safety framework inclusive of regulations. The proposed approach is described in
the following section.the following section.
FAA’ The FAA's Proposed Approach to Commercial Human Spaceflight
Safety
Safety The CSLCA required the FAA to submit a proposed transition plan before the expiration of the The CSLCA required the FAA to submit a proposed transition plan before the expiration of the
learning periodlearning period (which at the time was January 1, 2025); the agency delivered the report to Congress, titled ; the agency delivered the report to Congress, titled U.S. Department of
Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most Appropriate for
New Safety Framework, in September 2023., in September 2023.44
44 The FAA outlined a phased approach to develop a safety framework that includes regulation. The The FAA outlined a phased approach to develop a safety framework that includes regulation. The
FAA intends to develop regulations FAA intends to develop regulations “"only to the extent necessaryonly to the extent necessary”" and as one element of a and as one element of a
broader safety framework.broader safety framework.4545 Elements of such a safety framework may also include industry Elements of such a safety framework may also include industry
consensus standards, best practices, inspections, compliance monitoring, safety management

39 51 U.S.C. §50905(c)(5); FAA, Final Report on Voluntary Industry Consensus Standards Development, December
20, 2022, https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/PL_114-90_Sec111-5-Voluntary_Industry_Consensus_Standards.pdf.
40 51 U.S.C. §50905(c)(6); FAA, FAA Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Safety Frameworks and Key
Industry Indicators, 2017, https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/2021-11/CSLCA_Sec111_Report_to_Congress.pdf.
Hereinafter, FAA, FAA Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Safety Frameworks and Key Industry
Indicators.
41 51 U.S.C. §50905(c)(7); FAA, U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight
Activities Most Appropriate for New Safety Framework.
42 51 U.S.C. §50905(c)(8).
43 RAND 2023.
44 FAA, U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most
Appropriate for New Safety Framework.
45 Ibid., p. 3.
Congressional Research Service

7

---

Regulation of Commercial Human Spaceflight Safety: Overview and Issues for Congress

consensus standards, best practices, inspections, compliance monitoring, safety management systems, and accident investigations.systems, and accident investigations.4646 Using an incremental approach Using an incremental approach over five years, the FAA , the FAA
hopes to create a safety framework that can evolve as industry develops.hopes to create a safety framework that can evolve as industry develops.47
47 As the first stepAs the first step in creating its safety framework, the FAA updated its , the FAA updated its Recommended Practices for Human Space Flight Occupant
Safety, which is a nonbinding set of practices developed by the FAA to aid human spaceflight , which is a nonbinding set of practices developed by the FAA to aid human spaceflight
companies.companies.4848 The FAA intends the updated document to be used by standards development The FAA intends the updated document to be used by standards development
organizations as the basis for human spaceflight standards.organizations as the basis for human spaceflight standards.49
49 In 2023, the FAA indicated that it planned to increase its efforts to solicit industry input to In 2023, the FAA indicated that it planned to increase its efforts to solicit industry input to
potential regulations. In April 2023, the FAA chartered the Human Space Flight Occupant Safety potential regulations. In April 2023, the FAA chartered the Human Space Flight Occupant Safety
(HSFOS) Aerospace Rulemaking Committee (SpARC), an advisory group formed of industry (HSFOS) Aerospace Rulemaking Committee (SpARC), an advisory group formed of industry
representatives and subject matter experts.representatives and subject matter experts.5050 The FAA has directed the HSFOS SpARC to submit The FAA has directed the HSFOS SpARC to submit
its recommendations within 18 months of its establishment. its recommendations within 18 months of its establishment. After receiving the SpARC
recommendations, the FAA intendsAs of May 2025, this report has not been publicly released. Before the most recent extension of the learning period, the FAA intended to draft a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to solicit to draft a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to solicit
public commentpublic comment.51 The FAA plans on draft regulations after receiving the SpARC recommendations.⁵¹ The FAA had planned to develop a phased transition plan using the HSFOS SpARC to develop a phased transition plan using the HSFOS SpARC
recommendations, as well as drawing on case studies from other transportation modes.recommendations, as well as drawing on case studies from other transportation modes.5252 The The
agency agency projectsprojected that it that it will takewould have taken approximately five years to publish a final rule from the start of approximately five years to publish a final rule from the start of
the SpARCthe SpARC (April 2023), with an effective date to be set sometime after publication., with an effective date to be set sometime after publication.5353 The FAA is directed in The FAA is directed in
statute to statute to “"take into consideration the evolving standardstake into consideration the evolving standards”" of the commercial human spaceflight of the commercial human spaceflight
industry.industry.5454 The agency plans to create performance-based regulations. The agency plans to create performance-based regulations.5555 According to the FAA, According to the FAA,
Performance-based regulatory regimes can be positive guardrails allowing innovation and Performance-based regulatory regimes can be positive guardrails allowing innovation and
development within established bounds for safety. These requirements also development within established bounds for safety. These requirements also allow allow
voluntary consensus standards to be developed to provide a means of compliance and can voluntary consensus standards to be developed to provide a means of compliance and can
be the basis for updating or establishing new performance requirements for the industry to be the basis for updating or establishing new performance requirements for the industry to
increase the safety of participants.56

46 Josef S. Koller, Samira Patel, Angie Buckley, et al., Commercial Human Spaceflight Safety Regulatory Framework,
Aerospace Corporation, Aerospace Report No. ATR-2002-02101, September 28, 2022, p. 1, https://aerospace.org/sites/
default/files/2023-03/ATR-2022-02101.pdf.
47 FAA, U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most
Appropriate for New Safety Framework, p. 11.
48 FAA, Recommended Practices for Human Space Flight Occupant Safety: Version 2.0, September 2023,
https://www.faa.gov/media/71481.
49 FAA, U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most
Appropriate for New Safety Framework, p. 11. For information on the standards development organizations involved in
commercial human spaceflight, see FAA, Final Report on Voluntary Industry Consensus Standards Development,
December 20, 2022, https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/PL_114-90_Sec111-5-
Voluntary_Industry_Consensus_Standards.pdf.
50 FAA, “Human Space Flight Occupant Safety Aerospace Rulemaking Committee Charter,” FAA, April 21, 2023,
https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/index.cfm/document/information/
documentID/5883.
51 FAA, U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most
Appropriate for New Safety Framework, pp. 11-12.
52 Ibid., p. 12.
53 Ibid., p. 12.
54 51 U.S.C. §50905(c)(9).
55 Performance-based regulations focus on performance and desired outcomes, giving companies flexibility in how to
meet the mandated standard. Conversely, prescriptive regulations specify the processes, design, or technology
standards that companies must use.
56 FAA, U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most
Appropriate for New Safety Framework, p. 11.
Congressional Research Service

8

---

Regulation of Commercial Human Spaceflight Safety: Overview and Issues for Congress

increase the safety of participants.⁵⁶ Should the FAA promulgate safety regulations, Should the FAA promulgate safety regulations, the FAAit must use a structured process that would must use a structured process that would
provide opportunities for public comment and possibly benefit-cost analysis on the potential provide opportunities for public comment and possibly benefit-cost analysis on the potential
impact of proposed regulations. This rulemaking would be subject to the Administrative impact of proposed regulations. This rulemaking would be subject to the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) (P.L. 79-404, as amended). The APA sets forth a structured process by Procedure Act (APA) (P.L. 79-404, as amended). The APA sets forth a structured process by
which regulations can be promulgated, with opportunities for public comment. Depending on the which regulations can be promulgated, with opportunities for public comment. Depending on the
economic effects of the regulations, the FAA could also be required to conduct a benefit-cost economic effects of the regulations, the FAA could also be required to conduct a benefit-cost
analysis of any proposed regulation of human spaceflight, per Executive Order 12866 and analysis of any proposed regulation of human spaceflight, per Executive Order 12866 and
consistent with guidance provided in Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-4.consistent with guidance provided in Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-4.⁵⁷57
Regulating Commercial Human Spaceflight Safety
The The expiration date of the learning period was most recently extended from January 2025 to January 2028. Before the most recent extension, the possible end of the learning period and the FAApossible end of the learning period and the FAA’'s 2023 s 2023 proposal haveproposed safety framework spurred discussions spurred discussions
between government and industry about whether the learning period should be extended and the between government and industry about whether the learning period should be extended and the
status of the development of industry standards.status of the development of industry standards.
Many government officials, commercial stakeholders, industry group representatives, and Many government officials, commercial stakeholders, industry group representatives, and
standards development organizations agree that commercial human spaceflight regulations are standards development organizations agree that commercial human spaceflight regulations are
“inevitable.”58"inevitable."⁵⁸ Disagreement generally stems from differing views on when such regulations Disagreement generally stems from differing views on when such regulations
would be appropriate and how to assess when that point is reached.would be appropriate and how to assess when that point is reached.
This section briefly summarizes the major approaches to This section briefly summarizes the major approaches to how to assessassessing whether the industry is whether the industry is
ready for the end of the learning period; perspectives on whether the learning period should be ready for the end of the learning period; perspectives on whether the learning period should be
extended; and progress on and challenges to developing industry standards.extended; and progress on and challenges to developing industry standards.
Assessments of Government and Industry Readiness for Commercial Human
Spaceflight Safety Regulation
While statute does not define or describe regulatory readiness in the context of commercial While statute does not define or describe regulatory readiness in the context of commercial
human spaceflight, statute (as codified at 51 U.S.C. §50905(c)(6)) directed the Secretary of human spaceflight, statute (as codified at 51 U.S.C. §50905(c)(6)) directed the Secretary of
Transportation to deliver to Congress Transportation to deliver to Congress “"a report specifying key industry metrics that might indicate a report specifying key industry metrics that might indicate
readiness of the commercial space sector and the Department of Transportation to transition to a readiness of the commercial space sector and the Department of Transportation to transition to a
safety framework that may include regulations.safety framework that may include regulations.”" Additionally, Congress directed the Secretary of Additionally, Congress directed the Secretary of
Transportation to contract with Transportation to contract with “"an independent systems engineering and technical assistance an independent systems engineering and technical assistance
organization or standards development organizationorganization or standards development organization”" to report on to report on “"the readiness of the the readiness of the
commercial space industry and the Federal Government to transition to a safety framework that commercial space industry and the Federal Government to transition to a safety framework that
may include regulations,may include regulations,”" using the key industry metrics for readiness submitted by the Secretary using the key industry metrics for readiness submitted by the Secretary
of Transportation.of Transportation.59
59 Pursuant to Pursuant to 51 U.S.C. §50905(c)Title 51, Section 50905(c), of the U.S. Code, in its 2017 report to Congress, , in its 2017 report to Congress, FAA Evaluation of Commercial
Human Space Flight Safety Frameworks and Key Industry Indicators, the FAA developed three , the FAA developed three
sets of readiness areas and associated indicators to assess whether industry and government are sets of readiness areas and associated indicators to assess whether industry and government are
prepared to transition to a new safety framework.60

57 Office of Management and Budget, “OMB Circular A-4” (Washington, DC): Executive Office of the President,
Office of Management and Budget, November 9, 2023, pp. 27-41, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/
2023/11/CircularA-4.pdf; Executive Order 12866, “Regulatory Planning and Review,” 58 Federal Register 190,
October 4, 1993, https://www.archives.gov/files/federal-register/executive-orders/pdf/12866.pdf.
58 RAND 2023, p. 48.
59 51 U.S.C. §50905(c)(8).
60 FAA, FAA Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Safety Frameworks and Key Industry Indicators, 2017.
Congressional Research Service

9

---

link to page 20 Regulation of Commercial Human Spaceflight Safety: Overview and Issues for Congress

• For industry readinessprepared to transition to a new safety framework.⁶⁰For the "industry readiness" indicator, the readiness areas are the , the readiness areas are the "purpose of people flying purpose of people flying into
in space,space," the the "size and complexity of the industry,size and complexity of the industry," and the and the "safety of the industry.safety of the industry.61
• For industry’"⁶¹ For the "industry's progress in developing a safety framework" indicator, the readiness areas are , the readiness areas are
"a voluntary safety reporting system,a voluntary safety reporting system, " "voluntary consensus standards,voluntary consensus standards," and compliance with safety standards.⁶² and
compliance.62
• For For the "Department of Transportation’s readiness readiness" indicator, the readiness areas are the , the readiness areas are the
DOTDOT's and FAA and FAA’s 's "authority to transition to a safety frameworkauthority to transition to a safety framework" and their and their "expertise expertise
in human spaceflight safety.in human spaceflight safety.63
"⁶³The FAA notes that, rather than being pass/fail criteria, the readiness indicators were designed to The FAA notes that, rather than being pass/fail criteria, the readiness indicators were designed to
provide provide “"maximum flexibility for Congress in assessing readiness to transition to a safety maximum flexibility for Congress in assessing readiness to transition to a safety
framework that may include regulations.framework that may include regulations.”64"⁶⁴ Each of these areas has specific readiness indicators, Each of these areas has specific readiness indicators,
which are described which are described inin Appendix A.
In its 2017 report, the FAA noted that In its 2017 report, the FAA noted that “proactive”"proactive" industry participation in a safety framework industry participation in a safety framework
(e.g., through the development of consensus standards, systems for data sharing) may (e.g., through the development of consensus standards, systems for data sharing) may “"influence influence
the timing and extent of government regulatory involvement, and successful implementation of the timing and extent of government regulatory involvement, and successful implementation of
an industry-led framework could minimize the need for government involvement.an industry-led framework could minimize the need for government involvement.”65
"⁶⁵ Some groups are skeptical of the FAASome groups are skeptical of the FAA’'s readiness indicators. RAND, in its 2023 report on s readiness indicators. RAND, in its 2023 report on
assessing the readiness for regulation of the human commercial spaceflight industry, noted that assessing the readiness for regulation of the human commercial spaceflight industry, noted that
the FAAthe FAA’'s indicators do not allow for s indicators do not allow for “"an appropriate and scientifically valid assessmentan appropriate and scientifically valid assessment”" of of
progress, as the metrics are not sufficiently defined or specific.progress, as the metrics are not sufficiently defined or specific.6666 How data would be collected is How data would be collected is
also undefined, and RAND notes that the FAA did not provide targets to signify readiness.also undefined, and RAND notes that the FAA did not provide targets to signify readiness.67
67 COMSTAC, in response to a draft version of the FAACOMSTAC, in response to a draft version of the FAA’'s 2023 report to Congress, expressed s 2023 report to Congress, expressed
skepticism of the FAAskepticism of the FAA’'s assessment that industry and the agency were ready for the transition to s assessment that industry and the agency were ready for the transition to
regulation and requested clarification on how regulation and requested clarification on how the FAA used its metrics FAA used its metrics in order to verify the agencyto verify the agency’s
's conclusions.conclusions.6868 Although it did not address each individual indicator, COMSTAC did specifically Although it did not address each individual indicator, COMSTAC did specifically
note that industry continued to work note that industry continued to work towardstoward consensus standards, that missions are still consensus standards, that missions are still
infrequent, and that there are few operational providers.infrequent, and that there are few operational providers.6969 It stated that regulatory readiness will It stated that regulatory readiness will
not be reached until commercial human spaceflight missions are not be reached until commercial human spaceflight missions are “"routine and the flight rates routine and the flight rates
substantial, which could take decades.substantial, which could take decades.”70
"⁷⁰ More broadly, some industry stakeholders maintain that regulation will be appropriate when the More broadly, some industry stakeholders maintain that regulation will be appropriate when the
industry is more mature, has a base of shared safety knowledge, and has made more progress

61 Ibid., pp. 16-18.
62 Ibid., pp. 19-21.
63 Ibid., pp. 22-24.
64 FAA, FAA Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Safety Frameworks and Key Industry Indicators, 2017, p.
2.
65 Ibid., p. 3.
66 RAND 2023, p. 25.
67 Ibid.
68 COMSTAC Human Space Flight Working Group, Report to Congress: U.S. Department of Transportation
Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most Appropriate for New Safety Framework, July 11, 2023,
p. 2, https://www.faa.gov/media/68011. Hereinafter, COMSTAC Human Space Flight Working Group, Report to
Congress: U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most
Appropriate for New Safety Framework.
69 Ibid., p. 2.
70 Ibid., p. 2.
Congressional Research Service

10

---

Regulation of Commercial Human Spaceflight Safety: Overview and Issues for Congress

towardsindustry is more mature, has a base of shared safety knowledge, and has made more progress toward voluntary consensus standards. voluntary consensus standards.7171 Some industry stakeholders maintain that as the Some industry stakeholders maintain that as the
industry matures, it will develop a shared base of safety knowledge, which will in turn enable industry matures, it will develop a shared base of safety knowledge, which will in turn enable
industry to develop, reach consensus on, and individually adopt voluntary consensus standards.industry to develop, reach consensus on, and individually adopt voluntary consensus standards.72
72 While developing shared safety expertise may be aided by a larger number of providers with While developing shared safety expertise may be aided by a larger number of providers with
frequent missions, the diversity of industry vehicle designs and operating conditions may be a frequent missions, the diversity of industry vehicle designs and operating conditions may be a
limiting factor.limiting factor.73
73 Discussions on the Possible End of the Learning Period
The FAA maintains Before the most recent extension of the learning period in 2024, the FAA maintained that both the agency and industry that both the agency and industry arewere ready to transition to a new safety ready to transition to a new safety
framework that framework that willwould eventually include regulations and that the learning period eventually include regulations and that the learning period doesdid not need to not need to
be extended. be extended. The FAA inIn its 2023 report its 2023 report stated that “, the FAA stated, "The human space flight industry is moving at The human space flight industry is moving at
the pace of innovation, and the FAA believes that as the leader in transportation safety, the United the pace of innovation, and the FAA believes that as the leader in transportation safety, the United
States is ready for the sunset of the moratorium.States is ready for the sunset of the moratorium.”
"⁷⁴ The FAA report states that, given the recent growth of the commercial human spaceflight The FAA report states that, given the recent growth of the commercial human spaceflight
industry, the expiration of the learning period would allow for the implementation of a new safety industry, the expiration of the learning period would allow for the implementation of a new safety
framework.framework.7475 RAND, in its 2023 report, recommends that the learning period be allowed to expire RAND, in its 2023 report, recommends that the learning period be allowed to expire
and that Congress take steps and that Congress take steps “"to concurrently resource the FAA appropriately to engage in to concurrently resource the FAA appropriately to engage in
additional actions and activities to meet its statutory responsibilities.additional actions and activities to meet its statutory responsibilities.”75
"⁷⁶ The FAA The FAA anticipatesanticipated that a final rule could be published approximately five years after that a final rule could be published approximately five years after “"the start the start
of a SpARC,” if the learning period is not extended.76of a SpARC," absent an extension of the learning period.⁷⁷ The HSFOS SpARC was chartered in April The HSFOS SpARC was chartered in April
2023. Both RAND and the FAA note that industry standards may be developed concurrently with 2023. Both RAND and the FAA note that industry standards may be developed concurrently with
regulations. Doing so, they note, may allow for industry standards to inform regulations, while regulations. Doing so, they note, may allow for industry standards to inform regulations, while
also giving direction and motivation for the development of industry standards.also giving direction and motivation for the development of industry standards.7778 The FAA argues The FAA argues
that regulations provide performance requirements that establish boundaries and direction for that regulations provide performance requirements that establish boundaries and direction for
standards development,standards development, that the that the “"development of robust voluntary consensus standards is ... not as development of robust voluntary consensus standards is ... not as
advanced as expected,advanced as expected,”" and that the lack of regulations to date may have contributed to the and that the lack of regulations to date may have contributed to the “"less-less-
than robust number of published standards.than robust number of published standards.”78"⁷⁹ The RAND 2023 report did not The RAND 2023 report did not “"find that the find that the

71 Michael Lopez-Alegria, “The Future of Human Spaceflight Safety Is in the Hands of Congress,” SpaceNews,
September 8, 2023, https://spacenews.com/the-future-of-human-spaceflight-safety-is-in-the-hands-of-congress/.
Testimony of William H. Gerstenmaier, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, Subcommittee on Space and Science, Promoting Safety, Innovation, and Competitiveness in U.S.
Commercial Human Space Activities, hearings, 118th Cong., 1st sess., October 18, 2023, p. 11,
https://www.commerce.senate.gov/services/files/ADC08FC1-E28D-4178-8D39-16E02BB803CE. Hereinafter,
Testimony of William H. Gerstenmaier.
72 Testimony of Sirisha Bandla, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Subcommittee on Space and Science, Promoting Safety, Innovation, and Competitiveness in U.S. Commercial Human
Space Activities, hearings, 118th Cong., 1st sess., October 18, 2023, p. 5, https://www.commerce.senate.gov/services/
files/07881B07-FCFF-4B7C-8857-432BF66216C6.
73 Testimony of William H. Gerstenmaier, p. 11.
74 FAA, U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most
Appropriate for New Safety Framework, p. 3.
75 RAND 2023, p. 74.
76 FAA, U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most
Appropriate for New Safety Framework, p. 12.
77 Ibid, p. 7; RAND 2023, p. 61.
78 Ibid, p. 7.
Congressional Research Service

11

---

Regulation of Commercial Human Spaceflight Safety: Overview and Issues for Congress

moratorium has supported, per se, the development of voluntary consensus standards, key moratorium has supported, per se, the development of voluntary consensus standards, key
metrics, or regulation readiness.metrics, or regulation readiness.”79
"⁸⁰ The commercial human spaceflight operators serving on COMSTAC, which includes all such The commercial human spaceflight operators serving on COMSTAC, which includes all such
companies operating in the United States, companies operating in the United States, “"unanimously agree that the learning period is crucial unanimously agree that the learning period is crucial
to supporting a robust and safeto supporting a robust and safe”" human spaceflight industry. human spaceflight industry.8081 A senior SpaceX executive argued A senior SpaceX executive argued
that ending the learning period and implementing that ending the learning period and implementing “"premature occupant safety regulationspremature occupant safety regulations”" could could
“"risk freezing the industry at an early stage, slowing or inhibiting the development of risk freezing the industry at an early stage, slowing or inhibiting the development of
technologies that would materially improve safety.technologies that would materially improve safety.”81"⁸² According to RAND According to RAND’'s 2023 report, some s 2023 report, some
commercial operators are concerned that regulations may compel them to divulge sensitive and commercial operators are concerned that regulations may compel them to divulge sensitive and
proprietary information, which they view as hindering their competitiveness. RAND, however, proprietary information, which they view as hindering their competitiveness. RAND, however,
found no quantifiable evidence to support these concerns.found no quantifiable evidence to support these concerns.82
83 Some industry representatives have expressed concern that the FAA may not have sufficient Some industry representatives have expressed concern that the FAA may not have sufficient
resources to develop human spaceflight safety regulations should the learning period end.resources to develop human spaceflight safety regulations should the learning period end.83 A
84 In 2023, a senior SpaceX official senior SpaceX official has claimed that the agency is claimed that the agency is “"overwhelmed in executing its core launch overwhelmed in executing its core launch
and reentry missionand reentry mission”" and that diverting resources would cause further delays and and that diverting resources would cause further delays and “"would not would not
improve safety.”84
Developing Industry Standards
improve safety."⁸⁵ A 2024 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on the FAA's role in commercial human spaceflight safety discussed similar concerns relating to staffing. The GAO noted that FAA AST has faced challenges in filling open positions across its office and has regularly had fewer staff than positions authorized.⁸⁶

It is unknown how the Trump Administration's ongoing restructuring of the federal workforce might impact the office's staffing, if at all, and how staffing changes may or may not affect the efficiency and efficacy of its commercial spaceflight activities. For example, in April 2025, public reporting indicated that the head of FAA AST, Kelvin Coleman, was anticipated to be "leaving the agency through a deferred resignation program."⁸⁷ Reportedly, the FAA has indicated that safety-critical employees are not eligible for the deferred resignation program. Industry officials in early 2025 have reportedly "expressed concerns about the departure of Coleman and, potentially, other key people at AST. They worry that the loss of senior leadership would exacerbate workforce challenges in the office."⁸⁸

Developing Industry Standards The FAA must consider industry standards when developing regulations. Following the expiration The FAA must consider industry standards when developing regulations. Following the expiration
of the learning period, the FAA has a statutory mandate (51 U.S.C. §50905(c)(9)) to of the learning period, the FAA has a statutory mandate (51 U.S.C. §50905(c)(9)) to “"take into take into
consideration the evolving standards of the commercial space flight industryconsideration the evolving standards of the commercial space flight industry”" when proposing when proposing
regulations, specifically those identified in the three reports mandated by the regulations, specifically those identified in the three reports mandated by the Commercial Space
Launch Competitiveness Act (CSLCA) of 2015 (CSLCA (P.L. 114-90). Additionally, P.L. 114-90). Additionally, 51 U.S.C.
§50901(a)(15)Title 51, Section 50901(a)(15), of the U.S. Code, stipulates that stipulates that “"regulatory standards governing human space flight must evolve as regulatory standards governing human space flight must evolve as
the industry matures so that regulations neither stifle technology development nor expose crew, the industry matures so that regulations neither stifle technology development nor expose crew,
government astronauts, or space flight participants to avoidable risks.government astronauts, or space flight participants to avoidable risks.”" More broadly, federal More broadly, federal
agencies are directed by statute and executive branch policy to use voluntary consensus standards agencies are directed by statute and executive branch policy to use voluntary consensus standards
in their regulatory and procurement activities, when feasible, by the National Technology in their regulatory and procurement activities, when feasible, by the National Technology
Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (P.L. 104-113) and Office of Management and Budget Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (P.L. 104-113) and Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) Circular A-119, respectively.(OMB) Circular A-119, respectively.85
89 RAND noted that individual commercial human spaceflight companiesRAND noted that individual commercial human spaceflight companies’' compliance with compliance with
standards is standards is “"not quantified or well characterized.not quantified or well characterized.”86"⁹⁰ COMSTAC has described the commercial COMSTAC has described the commercial
human spaceflight industryhuman spaceflight industry’'s use of published safety standards as s use of published safety standards as “"minimal,minimal,”" but urged the FAA to conduct an assessment of industry compliance once a set of "high-priority" but urged the FAA

79 RAND 2023, p. 74.
80 COMSTAC Human Space Flight Working Group, Report to Congress: U.S. Department of Transportation
Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most Appropriate for New Safety Framework, pp. 1-3.
81 Testimony of William H. Gerstenmaier, p. 11.
82 RAND 2023, p. 50.
83 Testimony of William H. Gerstenmaier, p. 12; COMSTAC Human Space Flight Working Group, Report to
Congress: U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most
Appropriate for New Safety Framework, p. 3; testimony of Sirisha Bandla, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Space and Science, Promoting Safety, Innovation, and
Competitiveness in U.S. Commercial Human Space Activities, hearings, 118th Cong., 1st sess., October 18, 2023, p. 4,
https://www.commerce.senate.gov/services/files/07881B07-FCFF-4B7C-8857-432BF66216C6.
84 Testimony of William H. Gerstenmaier, p. 10.
85 P.L. 104-113; Office of Management and Budget, Circular No. A-119 Revised, Executive Office of the President,
February 10, 1998, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Circular-119-1.pdf.
86 RAND 2023, p. 39.
Congressional Research Service

12

---

Regulation of Commercial Human Spaceflight Safety: Overview and Issues for Congress

to conduct an assessment of industry compliance once a set of “high-priority” standards are standards are
developed.developed.87
91 COMSTAC recommended that the FAA COMSTAC recommended that the FAA “"consider incentives for operators to participate in consider incentives for operators to participate in
industry voluntary standards [development] and ensure that the agency devotes sufficient industry voluntary standards [development] and ensure that the agency devotes sufficient
resources to enable such activities.resources to enable such activities.”88"⁹² COMSTAC did not specify in its recommendation what COMSTAC did not specify in its recommendation what
form that the proposed incentives should take.form that the proposed incentives should take.
Data Protections
The FAA and RAND have identified the potential reluctance among private-sector companies to The FAA and RAND have identified the potential reluctance among private-sector companies to
share data due to proprietary concerns as a barrier to the development of voluntary consensus share data due to proprietary concerns as a barrier to the development of voluntary consensus
standards and sharing safety data.standards and sharing safety data.8993 Unlike for voluntarily provided aviation industry safety data, Unlike for voluntarily provided aviation industry safety data,
there are currently no statutory data protection safeguards specific to the commercial space there are currently no statutory data protection safeguards specific to the commercial space
industry safety information shared with the U.S. government.industry safety information shared with the U.S. government.9094 Aside from industry-specific Aside from industry-specific
provisions, information constituting trade secrets or commercial information shared with the U.S. provisions, information constituting trade secrets or commercial information shared with the U.S.
government may be withheld from public disclosure under certain Freedom of Information Act government may be withheld from public disclosure under certain Freedom of Information Act
exemptions.exemptions.9195 The 2023 RAND report recommended that The 2023 RAND report recommended that “"the FAA and industry explore a means the FAA and industry explore a means
to identify, collect, report, and analyze these data in a manner that prevents public release of to identify, collect, report, and analyze these data in a manner that prevents public release of
sensitive or otherwise proprietary data and information,sensitive or otherwise proprietary data and information,”" while recognizing the potential role for while recognizing the potential role for
legislation and FAA rulemaking to enable this.legislation and FAA rulemaking to enable this.92
96 Considerations for Congress
Per statute, the learning period for the commercial human spaceflight industry is set to expire on Per statute, the learning period for the commercial human spaceflight industry is set to expire on
January 1, January 1, 20252028. Congress may . Congress may wish to consider whether to extend the learning period for a fixed consider whether to extend the learning period for a fixed
period of time or indefinitelyperiod of time or indefinitely, to shorten it, or or whether to let it expire and have the FAA to let it expire and have the FAA commence the process
ofbegin developing regulations. Some Members of Congress have also raised concerns over the FAA developing regulations. Some Members of Congress have also raised concerns over the FAA’s
's dual mandate to promote the commercial space industry and protect the general public and its dual mandate to promote the commercial space industry and protect the general public and its
potential impact on commercial human spaceflight. Congress may also consider whether to potential impact on commercial human spaceflight. Congress may also consider whether to
address overlaps and gaps in federal agency oversight of commercial space activities.address overlaps and gaps in federal agency oversight of commercial space activities.
Extension or Expiration of the Learning Period
Congress may consider whether to extend the learning period Congress may consider whether to extend the learning period againbefore its scheduled expiration in 2028, for a fixed amount of time or , for a fixed amount of time or
indefinitely, or to allow the learning period to lapse. The FAA and some other stakeholders have indefinitely, or to allow the learning period to lapse. The FAA and some other stakeholders have
suggested that, given the growth of the commercial human spaceflight industry, the learning

87 COMSTAC Safety Working Group, “COMSTAC Safety WG Report—DRAFT,” FAA.gov, September 14, 2020, p.
2, https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/space/additional_information/comstac/presentations/
COMSTAC_Safety_WG_white_paper_14_Sept_2020.pdf; COMSTAC Safety Working Group, “COMSTAC Safety
Working Group Report, May 2023,” FAA, May 2023, https://www.faa.gov/media/31151.
88 COMSTAC Human Space Flight Working Group, Report to Congress: U.S. Department of Transportation
Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most Appropriate for New Safety Framework, p. 3.
89 FAA, U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most
Appropriate for New Safety Framework, p. 7; RAND 2023, p. 19.
90 49 U.S.C. §40123 (for the protections of voluntarily provided aviation industry safety data); FAA, U.S. Department
of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most Appropriate for New Safety
Framework, p. 7.
91 For more information, see CRS Report R46238, The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA): A Legal Overview, by
Daniel J. Sheffner.
92 RAND 2023, p. 76.
Congressional Research Service

13

---

Regulation of Commercial Human Spaceflight Safety: Overview and Issues for Congress

suggested that, given the growth of the commercial human spaceflight industry, the learning period should be allowed to lapse and the FAA should begin the process of developing period should be allowed to lapse and the FAA should begin the process of developing
regulations.regulations.
ConverselyConversely, as 2028 approaches, Congress may determine that the industry is not yet ready for regulation specific to , Congress may determine that the industry is not yet ready for regulation specific to
the safety of human occupants and that the learning period should be extended for a set duration. the safety of human occupants and that the learning period should be extended for a set duration.
For example, For example, thelegislation introduced during the 118^th Congress would have, if enacted, extended the learning period beyond 2028. The Space Transformation and Reliability Act (H.R. 5617), as introduced Space Transformation and Reliability Act (H.R. 5617), as introduced during the
118th Congress, would extend, would have extended the learning period until October 1, 2031, and the Commercial the learning period until October 1, 2031, and the Commercial
Standards Paramount to Accelerating Cosmic Exploration (SPACE) Leadership Act (S. 4064Standards Paramount to Accelerating Cosmic Exploration (SPACE) Leadership Act (S. 4064), as introduced, would have extended), as
introduced during the 118th Congress, would extend the learning period for five years from date the learning period for five years from date
of enactment. Another option could be to extend the learning period indefinitely, relying on the of enactment. Another option could be to extend the learning period indefinitely, relying on the
informed consent regime to inform potential customers of risks.informed consent regime to inform potential customers of risks.
Regulation and Industry Standards
Congress may consider whether to provide specific direction to the FAA or industry on the Congress may consider whether to provide specific direction to the FAA or industry on the
development of industry standards, the creation of potential regulations, or other matters relating development of industry standards, the creation of potential regulations, or other matters relating
to commercial human spaceflight safety. For instance, Congress could direct the FAA to evaluate to commercial human spaceflight safety. For instance, Congress could direct the FAA to evaluate
or develop potential mechanisms to incentivize industry participation in standards development. or develop potential mechanisms to incentivize industry participation in standards development.
Another option could be to require additional input from the FAA and industry. For example, the Another option could be to require additional input from the FAA and industry. For example, the
Commercial Space Act of 2023 (H.R. 6131), as ordered to be reported out of the House Commercial Space Act of 2023 (H.R. 6131), as ordered to be reported out of the House
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, would Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, would directhave directed the FAA to continue providing the FAA to continue providing
updates to relevant congressional committees on the status of voluntary industry consensus updates to relevant congressional committees on the status of voluntary industry consensus
standards until 2031.standards until 2031.93
Congress may also consider potential 97 The most recent act extending the learning period neither included additional reporting requirements nor requested updated versions of previously provided reports.⁹⁸ Congress may also consider data protection safeguards for the commercial spaceflight data protection safeguards for the commercial spaceflight
industry. Such an approach could include directing the FAA to develop a method of collecting and industry. Such an approach could include directing the FAA to develop a method of collecting and
handling sensitive data to facilitate collaboration across industry or implementing statutory data handling sensitive data to facilitate collaboration across industry or implementing statutory data
protections for voluntarily submitted information through legislation, similar to those of the protections for voluntarily submitted information through legislation, similar to those of the
aviation industry (49 U.S.C. §40123). Addressing potential concerns over the protection of aviation industry (49 U.S.C. §40123). Addressing potential concerns over the protection of
proprietary or sensitive data could help facilitate industryproprietary or sensitive data could help facilitate industry’'s development of voluntary consensus s development of voluntary consensus
standards.standards.
The FAA’'s Dual Mandate
The FAAThe FAA’'s statutory mission s statutory mission is with respect to commercial spaceflight is both to with respect to commercial spaceflight is both to “"encourage, encourage,
facilitate, and promotefacilitate, and promote”" commercial space launch and reentry, as well as to regulate those commercial space launch and reentry, as well as to regulate those
activities to protect the general public.activities to protect the general public.9499 As the commercial space industry grows, Congress and As the commercial space industry grows, Congress and
other stakeholders have discussed the appropriateness of this dual role. The potential impact on other stakeholders have discussed the appropriateness of this dual role. The potential impact on
commercial human spaceflight, in particular, has driven many of these discussions, due to commercial human spaceflight, in particular, has driven many of these discussions, due to
concerns for the safety of humans onboard.95

93 H.R. 6131 was order to be reported, but has not been reported. While the official reported text of H.R. 6131 is not yet
available, the amendments adopted during the markup did not appear to change the introduced bill provisions related
the FAA’s updates on the status of voluntary industry consensus standards. (House Committee on Science, Space, and
Technology, “Full Committee Markup of H.R. 6213 & H.R. 6131,” November 29, 2023, https://science.house.gov/
2023/11/markup-h-r-6213-h-r-6131.)
94 51 U.S.C. §§50901, 50903.
95 Prepared Testimony of GAO Director of Physical Infrastructure Heather Krause, in U.S. Congress, House
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Aviation, Stars and Stripes Forever—An
Examination of the FAA’s Role in the Future of Spaceflight, hearings, 117th, 1st sess., June 16, 2021, p. 14,
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-105268.pdf.
Congressional Research Service

14

---

Regulation of Commercial Human Spaceflight Safety: Overview and Issues for Congress

concerns for the safety of humans onboard.¹⁰⁰ Representative Babin of Texas stated in a Representative Babin of Texas stated in a June 2021 hearing of the House Committee on 2021 hearing of the House Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on AviationTransportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Aviation, on the role of the FAA in spaceflight on the role of the FAA in spaceflight
that the dual mandate creates that the dual mandate creates “"a tension thata tension that results in a balanced and measured relationship results in a balanced and measured relationship
between the public and private sectorbetween the public and private sector.”96 In."¹⁰¹ In the same hearing, the same hearing, then-FAA Associate Administrator FAA Associate Administrator
Wayne Monteith stated that safety is the foundation of the dual mandate, and that it allows for Wayne Monteith stated that safety is the foundation of the dual mandate, and that it allows for
“"the right regulations or the right scope at the right time to ensure safety, while also allowing the right regulations or the right scope at the right time to ensure safety, while also allowing
these companies to innovate and grow and continue to lead on the global stage.these companies to innovate and grow and continue to lead on the global stage.”97
"¹⁰² At the At the June 2021 hearing, 2021 hearing, Government Accountability Office (GAO)GAO Director of Physical Director of Physical
Infrastructure Heather Krause noted that the dual role Infrastructure Heather Krause noted that the dual role “"could give rise to a potential conflict of could give rise to a potential conflict of
interest”interest" and could hinder the FAA and could hinder the FAA’'s ability to regulate the industry. Krause also pointed to the s ability to regulate the industry. Krause also pointed to the
DOT’DOT's 2008 statutorily required assessment of the dual mandate, the last formal review to date, s 2008 statutorily required assessment of the dual mandate, the last formal review to date,
which recommended that the DOT which recommended that the DOT “"periodically review its dual role specifically for safety and periodically review its dual role specifically for safety and
promotion of human space flight.promotion of human space flight.”98
"¹⁰³ At the same 2021 hearing, Representative DeFazio—who was, at the time, chair of the House At the same 2021 hearing, Representative DeFazio—who was, at the time, chair of the House
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure—drew a comparison to commercial aviation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure—drew a comparison to commercial aviation,
pointing to Congresspointing to Congress’'s decision to remove the FAAs decision to remove the FAA’'s similar dual mandate for aviation in the s similar dual mandate for aviation in the
Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-264Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-264, §, Sec. 401) after a high-profile 401) after a high-profile
aviation accident.aviation accident.99104 Similarly, a 2006 GAO report on commercial space launch described this Similarly, a 2006 GAO report on commercial space launch described this
decision as decision as “evidence "evidence of the importance of maintaining FAAof the importance of maintaining FAA’'s focus on safety oversights focus on safety oversight”" and as a and as a
cautionary tale for commercial spaceflight.cautionary tale for commercial spaceflight.100
105 In light of these In light of these contrastingvaried perspectives, options for Congress could include evaluating the perspectives, options for Congress could include evaluating the
FAA’FAA's dual mandate, through congressional oversight or by directing the FAA or another s dual mandate, through congressional oversight or by directing the FAA or another
organization to conduct a review; amending the statute codified at organization to conduct a review; amending the statute codified at 51 U.S.C. §50903Title 51, Section 50903, of the U.S. Code to redefine to redefine
the FAAthe FAA’'s statutory mission; or allowing the dual mandate to remain unaltered.s statutory mission; or allowing the dual mandate to remain unaltered.
Potential Overlap and Gaps in Existing Regulatory Authorities
Multiple federal agencies have jurisdiction over aspects of commercial space operations.Multiple federal agencies have jurisdiction over aspects of commercial space operations.101106 The The
FAA has authority for commercial launch and reentry, including for spacecraft carrying FAA has authority for commercial launch and reentry, including for spacecraft carrying
humans.humans.102107 The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulates commercial satellite communications as part of its role in managing spectrum allocation for nonfederal U.S. entities.¹⁰⁸ The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulates satellite

96 Representative Brian Babin of Texas, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Subcommittee on Aviation, Stars and Stripes Forever—An Examination of the FAA’s Role in the Future of Spaceflight,
hearings, 117th, 1st sess., June 16, 2021, p. 73, https://www.congress.gov/117/chrg/CHRG-117hhrg46249/CHRG-
117hhrg46249.pdf.
97 Testimony of FAA Associate Administrator Wayne Monteith, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Transportation
and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Aviation, Stars and Stripes Forever—An Examination of the FAA’s Role in the
Future of Spaceflight, hearings, 117th, 1st sess., June 16, 2021, pp. 30-31, 39-40, https://www.congress.gov/117/chrg/
CHRG-117hhrg46249/CHRG-117hhrg46249.pdf.
98 Ibid., p. 14.
99 Representative Peter DeFazio of Oregon, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Subcommittee on Aviation, Stars and Stripes Forever—An Examination of the FAA’s Role in the Future of Spaceflight,
hearings, 117th, 1st sess., June 16, 2021, p. 14, https://www.congress.gov/117/chrg/CHRG-117hhrg46249/CHRG-
117hhrg46249.pdf.
100 GAO, Commercial Space Launches: FAA Needs Continued Planning and Monitoring to Oversee the Safety of the
Emerging Space Tourism Industry, GAO-07-16, October 2006, p. 31, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-07-16.pdf.
101 For more information, see CRS Report R45416, Commercial Space: Federal Regulation, Oversight, and Utilization,
by Daniel Morgan.
102 P.L. 108-492; 51 U.S.C. Ch. 509.
Congressional Research Service

15

---

Regulation of Commercial Human Spaceflight Safety: Overview and Issues for Congress

communications.103 The Department of Commerce, through the National Oceanic and The Department of Commerce, through the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), regulates private satellite remote sensing.Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), regulates private satellite remote sensing.104109 These These
authorities do not address all current or potential commercial space activities, particularly those authorities do not address all current or potential commercial space activities, particularly those
on orbit or beyond Earth orbit, including human safety on commercial spacecraft. For example, on orbit or beyond Earth orbit, including human safety on commercial spacecraft. For example,
the FAAthe FAA’'s launch and reentry authorities do not extend to operations in space. Authorities that s launch and reentry authorities do not extend to operations in space. Authorities that
would cover activities in space are referred to interchangeably as would cover activities in space are referred to interchangeably as “"on-orbit authorityon-orbit authority”" or or “"mission mission
authorization.authorization.”
" Proposals for On-Orbit Human Safety on Commercial Spacecraft
Stakeholders have long discussed which federal agency should assume the responsibility of Stakeholders have long discussed which federal agency should assume the responsibility of
mission authorization, including for on-orbit human safety on commercial spacecraft. Some mission authorization, including for on-orbit human safety on commercial spacecraft. Some
stakeholders propose granting broad mission authorization authority to either the FAA or the stakeholders propose granting broad mission authorization authority to either the FAA or the
Office of Space Commerce within NOAA.Office of Space Commerce within NOAA.105110 Others propose a framework that splits authorities, Others propose a framework that splits authorities,
granting authority over commercial human activities in space to the FAA, while commercial granting authority over commercial human activities in space to the FAA, while commercial
missions without humans onboard would be overseen by another agency or agencies.missions without humans onboard would be overseen by another agency or agencies.106
111 In September 2022, Vice President Kamala Harris, In September 2022, Vice President Kamala Harris, then chair of the National Space Council, directed chair of the National Space Council, directed
the Council to develop a proposal for authorization and supervision of the Council to develop a proposal for authorization and supervision of “"commercial novel space commercial novel space
activities.activities.”" The National Space Council released its proposal on December 20, 2023. The National Space Council released its proposal on December 20, 2023.107112 Among Among
other provisions, the other provisions, the Administration’Biden Administration's legislative proposal would s legislative proposal would extendhave extended the FAA the FAA’'s authority for s authority for
human spaceflight safety regulation to human activities in outer space, such as commercial space human spaceflight safety regulation to human activities in outer space, such as commercial space
stations or operations on the Moon, rather than only launch and reentry as under current law.stations or operations on the Moon, rather than only launch and reentry as under current law.108
113 H.R. 6131 (Commercial Space Act of 2023) would H.R. 6131 (Commercial Space Act of 2023) would assignhave assigned mission authorization for all mission authorization for all “"space space
objects”objects" to the Department of Commerce. This legislation to the Department of Commerce. This legislation doesdid not include provisions specific to not include provisions specific to
commercial human spaceflight, although orbital platforms with humans onboard would appear to commercial human spaceflight, although orbital platforms with humans onboard would appear to
fall into the category of fall into the category of “"space objectsspace objects”" and, therefore, and, therefore, would appear tomay fall under the proposed fall under the proposed
purview of the Department of Commerce.purview of the Department of Commerce.

As of May 2025, the Trump Administration has not indicated its position as to whether there is a current or future gap in mission authorization authorities or, if there is a perceived gap, what a potential framework for those authorities should look like.

Congress may consider whether existing regulatory authorities are sufficient to address nascent Congress may consider whether existing regulatory authorities are sufficient to address nascent
commercial space activities, including commercial human spaceflight, and if it is determined that commercial space activities, including commercial human spaceflight, and if it is determined that
additional authorities are needed, could consider legislation to assign mission authorization additional authorities are needed, could consider legislation to assign mission authorization
authority, in whole or in part, to one or more federal agencies. Alternatively, Congress may judge authority, in whole or in part, to one or more federal agencies. Alternatively, Congress may judge
that existing regulatory authorities are sufficient, given the nascence of commercial activity on that existing regulatory authorities are sufficient, given the nascence of commercial activity on
orbit.


103 47 U.S.C. §§151-614.
104 P.L. 102-555; 51 U.S.C. §§60101, et seq.
105 Jeff Foust, “An extended mission for authorization,” The Space Review, December 18, 2023,
https://www.thespacereview.com/article/4712/1.
106 Josef Koller and Carson Coursey, “Hazards Don’t Stop at the Kármán Line,” SpaceNews, December 26, 2022,
https://spacenews.com/op-ed-hazards-dont-stop-at-the-karman-line/.
107 The White House, “FACT SHEET: U.S. Novel Space Activities Authorization and Supervision Framework,”
December 20, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/12/20/fact-sheet-u-s-novel-
space-activities-authorization-and-supervision-framework/.
108 The White House, “Draft Bill Text, ‘Authorization and Supervision of Novel Private Sector Space Activities Act,’”
December 20, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Authorization-and-Supervision-of-
Novel-Private-Sector-Space-Activities_Legislative-Text_final.pdf.
Congressional Research Service

16

---

Regulation of Commercial Human Spaceflight Safety: Overview and Issues for Congress

orbit. Appendix A. The FAA' FAA’s Readiness Sets, Areas, and
Indicators
Indicators Table A-1. FAA’The FAA's Readiness Sets, Areas, and Indicators
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) framework from 2017 to assess whether industry and the The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) framework from 2017 to assess whether industry and the
federal government are ready to transition to a new safety framework that may include regulation in federal government are ready to transition to a new safety framework that may include regulation in
response to 51 U.S.C. §50905(c)(6)response to 51 U.S.C. §50905(c)(6).
Readiness
Readiness Indicator Set
Readiness Area
Readiness Indicator

Industry Readiness

Industry
Purpose of People Purpose of People
•
Flying in Space The extent to which people are flying for adventure purposes; part The extent to which people are flying for adventure purposes; part
Readiness
Flying in Space
of their occupation; or as a mode of transportationof their occupation; or as a mode of transportation
Size and
•

Size and Complexity of the Industry

The number of suppliers of orbital or suborbital spaceflight, as well The number of suppliers of orbital or suborbital spaceflight, as well
Complexity of the
as of similar spaceflight types (e.g., vertical suborbital, horizontal as of similar spaceflight types (e.g., vertical suborbital, horizontal
Industry
suborbital, and balloon)suborbital, and balloon)
•
The extent to which there is a broad supplier networkThe extent to which there is a broad supplier network
•
The extent to which operations occur internationallyThe extent to which operations occur internationally
Safety of the Safety of the
Industry •
The extent to which there is evidence of unsafe operationsThe extent to which there is evidence of unsafe operations
Industry
•
The extent to which industry is having difficulty attracting new The extent to which industry is having difficulty attracting new
customers
•
customers The extent to which insurance companies are The extent to which insurance companies are wil ingwilling to insure to insure
human spaceflight operationshuman spaceflight operations
Industry’s
Voluntary Safety
•

Industry's Progress in Developing a Safety Framework

Voluntary Safety Reporting

The extent to which individual companies have an internal The extent to which individual companies have an internal
Progress in
Reporting
voluntary reporting system to identify and address potential voluntary reporting system to identify and address potential
Developing a
precursors to accidentsprecursors to accidents
Safety
•
The extent to which industry members share safety data with each The extent to which industry members share safety data with each
Framework
other, with a common data format and taxonomyother, with a common data format and taxonomy
Voluntary
•

Voluntary Consensus Standards

The extent to which industry has formed a consensus on top-level The extent to which industry has formed a consensus on top-level
Consensus
performance standardsperformance standards
Standards
•
The extent to which industry has developed and maintains The extent to which industry has developed and maintains
voluntary consensus standards in high-priority areasvoluntary consensus standards in high-priority areas
•
The extent to which industry has developed and maintains a The extent to which industry has developed and maintains a
robust set of voluntary consensus standardsrobust set of voluntary consensus standards
Compliance
•

Compliance

The extent to which individual companies self-verify compliance The extent to which individual companies self-verify compliance
with voluntary consensus standardswith voluntary consensus standards
•
The extent to which a third party verifies compliance with The extent to which a third party verifies compliance with
voluntary consensus standardsvoluntary consensus standards

Department of Transportation Readiness (Particularly that of the FAA)

FAA Authority to Transition to a Safety Framework

Status of the learning period

FAA Expertise in Human Spaceflight Safety

Department of
FAA Authority to
•
Status of the learning period
Transportation
Transition to a
Readiness
Safety Framework
Congressional Research Service

17

---

Regulation of Commercial Human Spaceflight Safety: Overview and Issues for Congress

Readiness
Indicator Set
Readiness Area
Readiness Indicator
(Particularly
FAA Expertise in
•
The extent to which the FAA has helped create elements of a The extent to which the FAA has helped create elements of a
That of FAA)
Human Spaceflight
space safety frameworkspace safety framework
Safety
•
The extent to which the FAA has engaged with industry regarding The extent to which the FAA has engaged with industry regarding
standards developmentstandards development
•
The extent to which the FAA has published safety practices The extent to which the FAA has published safety practices
related to commercial human spaceflightrelated to commercial human spaceflight
•
The extent to which the FAA has experience participating in a The extent to which the FAA has experience participating in a
space safety frameworkspace safety framework
Source: CRS using FAA, CRS using FAA, FAA Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Safety Frameworks and Key Industry
Indicators, 2017, pp. 17-24, https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/2021-11/, 2017, pp. 17-24, https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/2021-11/
CSLCA_Sec111_Report_to_Congress.pdfCSLCA_Sec111_Report_to_Congress.pdf.

Congressional Research Service

18

---

Regulation of Commercial Human Spaceflight Safety: Overview and Issues for Congress

. Appendix B. Reports Required by P.L. 114-90
Table B-1. Reports Required by P.L. 114-90
Human spaceflight reports submitted by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to Congress in Human spaceflight reports submitted by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to Congress in
fulfillment of requirements from the Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015fulfillment of requirements from the Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015 ((P.L. 114-90P.L. 114-90,
Sec. , §111), as codified in 51 U.S.C. §50905(c)111), as codified in 51 U.S.C. §50905(c).
Report

Report

Statutory Requirements Addressed in Report
FAA, U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of FAA, U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of
•
activities most appropriate for a new safety
Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most
framework that could include regulatory action
Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most Appropriate for New Safety Framework, September 29, 2023, https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/2023_10_06%20PL_114-90_Sec_111_7_Commercial_Human_Spaceflight_Activities.pdf.

Activities most appropriate for a new safety framework that could include regulatory action and a possible transition plan

Doug C. Ligor et al., Assessing the Readiness for Human Commercial Spaceflight Safety Regulations: Charting a Trajectory from Revolutionary to Routine Travel, RAND Corporation, RR-A2466-1, 2023, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2466-1.html.

Readiness of the federal government and commercial industry to transition to a safety framework that may include regulations

FAA, Final Report on Voluntary Industry Consensus Standards Development, December 20, 2022, https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/PL_114-90_Sec111-5-Voluntary_Industry_Consensus_Standards.pdf.

Industry's progress in developing voluntary consensus standards and best practices

FAA, Report to Congress: Interim Report on Voluntary Industry Consensus Standards Development—January 2022, January 14, 2022, https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/2022-04/PL_114-90_Sec_111_5_Voluntary_Industry_Consensus_Standards.pdf.

Industry's progress in developing voluntary consensus standards and best practices

FAA, Report to Congress: U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most Appropriate for New Safety FrameworkAppropriate for New Safety Framework, February 26, 2019, https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/2021-11/New-Safety-Framework-for-Commercial-Human-Space-Flight-Completed-report.pdf.

Activities most appropriate for a new safety framework that could include regulatory action and a possible transition plan

FAA, FAA Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Safety Frameworks and Key Industry Indicators, 2017, , September 29,
and a possible transition plan
2023, https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/2021-11/CSLCA_Sec111_Report_to_Congress.pdf.

Industry's progress in developing voluntary consensus standards and best practices

Key industry metrics to indicate industry's readiness to transition to a safety framework that may include regulations

Activities most appropriate for a new safety framework that could include regulatory action and a possible transition plan

Source: Collected by CRS from several sources, as noted.

Note: The reports are listed in reverse chronological order.

Footnotes

1.

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issues experimental permits for commercial launch or reentry of reusable suborbital rockets for research and development, demonstrating compliance with licensing conditions, or crew training, as described in 14 C.F.R. §437.5. The FAA issues licenses for all other types of commercial space launch or reentry.

2.

Number of missions determined from FAA, "Commercial Space Data," August 31, 2023, https://www.faa.gov/data_research/commercial_space_data.

3.

The FAA's authorities are limited to commercial missions, and, therefore, the agency does not oversee missions conducted by other government agencies.

4.

The company Scaled Composites conducted the first commercial spaceflight on June 21, 2004, with the launch of SpaceShipOne. Tim Sharp, "SpaceShipOne: The First Private Spacecraft," Space.com, March 5, 2019, https://www.space.com/16769-spaceshipone-first-private-spacecraft.html.

5.

Although both suborbital and orbital spacecraft reach space, only orbital spacecraft reach sufficient speed (known as orbital velocity) to complete at least one orbit—or more commonly, several orbits—around the Earth. In contrast, a suborbital flight reaches space and then returns without making a full orbit around the Earth, usually after a few minutes.

6. Doug Messier, "U.S. Commercial Human Spaceflight Set to Accelerate as Regulatory Battle Looms," Parabolic Arc, April 10, 2023, https://parabolicarc.com/2023/04/10/current-state-future-commercial-spaceflight/. 7. Eric Berger, "Blue Origin Just Validated the New Space Movement," ArsTechnica, October 6, 2016, https://arstechnica.com/science/2016/10/blue-origin-just-validated-the-new-space-movement/. 8. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), "NASA Selects Companies to Develop Commercial Destinations in Space," press release, NASA, December 2, 2021, https://www.nasa.gov/news-release/nasa-selects-companies-to-develop-commercial-destinations-in-space/. 9. Mike Wall, "An Interview with the First Space Tourist," SpaceNews, May 2, 2011, https://spacenews.com/interview-first-space-tourist/. 10. Sissi Cao, "Every Person Launched into Space by Blue Origin, So Far," Observer, June 22, 2023, https://observer.com/2023/06/blue-origin-passenger-list/; William Harwood, "Virgin Galactic Launches Third Suborbital 'Space Tourist' Flight," CBSNews, September 8, 2023, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/virgin-galactic-launches-third-suborbital-space-tourist-flight/; Will Gendron, "Virgin Galactic's First Space Tourism Flight Took Off This Week. Here Are the Players Taking Civilians to Space," Business Insider, August 12, 2023, https://www.businessinsider.com/virgin-galactic-blue-origin-spacex-commercial-space-flights-tourism-cost-2023-7. 11.

Between January 2021 and June 2024, 27 FAA-licensed or FAA-permitted commercial human spaceflights occurred. From 2004 through 2020, 15 such spaceflights occurred. FAA, "Commercial Space Data," August 31, 2023, https://www.faa.gov/data_research/commercial_space_data.

12.

The FAA considers a spaceflight participant "[a]n individual, who is not crew, carried aboard a launch vehicle or reentry vehicle." FAA, "Human Space Flight," February 1, 2024, https://www.faa.gov/space/human_spaceflight.

13.

National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), In-Flight Breakup During Test Flight, Scaled Composites SpaceShipTwo, N339SS, Near Koehn Dry Lake, California, October 31, 2014, NTSB/AAR-15/02, 2015, p. 1, https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR1502.pdf.

14.

FAA, "U.S. Human Space Flight Safety Record (as of April 14, 2025)," April 14, 2025, https://www.faa.gov/media/77636; FAA, "Commercial Space Data," August 31, 2023, https://www.faa.gov/data_research/commercial_space_data.

15.

FAA, "U.S. Human Space Flight Safety Record (as of April 14, 2025)," April 14, 2025, https://www.faa.gov/media/77636. The FAA's Human Space Flight Safety record lists SpaceShipTwo as having conducted 20 spaceflights, while the agency's Commercial Space Data dashboard lists only 19 licensed or permitted SpaceShipTwo launches as human spaceflight missions. The FAA's U.S. Human Space Flight Safety Record does not include orbital missions until the reentry is complete.

16.

The NTSB uses the definition of "aircraft accident" provided by 49 C.F.R. §830.2, which is substantively similar to the definition for "catastrophic failure" used by the FAA in determining human spaceflight safety records. The FAA defines a catastrophic failure as "causing death or serious injury to the people on board. Launch or reentry aborts, regardless of the cause, are not counted as a catastrophic failure unless death or serious injury occurs." FAA, "U.S. Human Space Flight Safety Record (as of April 14, 2025)," April 14, 2025, https://www.faa.gov/media/77636.

17.

NTSB, "2004-2023 Accident Statistics," spreadsheet, 2024, https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/data/Documents/AviationAccidentStatistics_2004-2023_20241217.xlsx.

18.

Government Accountability Office (GAO), NASA Commercial Crew Program: Plan Needed to Ensure Uninterrupted Access to the International Space Station, GAO-18-476, July 2018, pp. 22-24, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-18-476.pdf; NASA Office of the Inspector General, NASA's Management of Crew Transportation to the International Space Station, IG-20-005-, November 14, 2019, p. 14, https://oig.nasa.gov/docs/IG-20-005.pdf.

19. Doug C. Ligor et al., Assessing the Readiness for Commercial Human Spaceflight Safety Regulations: Charting a Trajectory files/
2023_10_06%20PL_114-
90_Sec_111_7_Commercial_Human_Spaceflight_Activit
ies.pdf.
Doug C. Ligor, Benjamin M. Mil er, Maria McCol ester,
•
readiness of the federal government and
et al., Assessing the Readiness for Human Commercial
commercial industry to transition to a safety
Spaceflight Safety Regulations: Charting a Trajectory
framework that may include regulations
from Revolutionary to Routine Travel, RAND from Revolutionary to Routine Travel, RAND
Corporation, Corporation, RR-A2466-1, 2023, October 2023, p. 34, https://www.rand.org/https://www.rand.org/
pubs/research_reports/RRA2466-1.htmlpubs/research_reports/RRA2466-1.html.
FAA, Final Report on Voluntary Industry Consensus
•
industry’s progress in developing voluntary
Standards Development, December 20, 2022,
consensus standards and best practices
https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/PL_114-
90_Sec111-5-
Voluntary_Industry_Consensus_Standards.pdf.
FAA, Report to Congress: Interim Report on Voluntary
•
industry’s progress in developing voluntary
Industry Consensus Standards Development—January 2022,
consensus standards and best practices
January 14, 2022, . Hereinafter RAND 2023. 20.

RAND 2023, p. 34.

21.

RAND 2023, p. 36.

22.

See various subsections in 51 U.S.C. §§50903-50905. The Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-492; 51 U.S.C. §50902) defines three types of human occupants on commercial spaceflight missions: government astronauts, crew, and spaceflight participants. Per §50902, government astronaut is a designation either assigned by NASA under 51 U.S.C. §20113(n) or referring to an employee of the U.S. government or its international partners. Crew is defined as an employee of a launch provider who is involved in operating a launch or reentry vehicle. The term spaceflight participant refers to an individual being transported on a human spaceflight mission who is neither crew nor a government astronaut.

23.

51 U.S.C. §50904(d).

24.

George C. Nield et al., "Recommended Practices for Commercial Human Space Flight," International Astronautical Congress, Toronto, Canada, 2014, p. 2, https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/space/additional_information/international_affairs/recommended_practices_human_space_flight_iac_toronto_nield_october_2014_508.pdf.

25.

George C. Nield et al., "Recommended Practices for Commercial Human Space Flight," International Astronautical Congress, Toronto, Canada, 2014, p. 2, https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/space/additional_information/international_affairs/recommended_practices_human_space_flight_iac_toronto_nield_october_2014_508.pdf.

26.

51 U.S.C. §50905(c).

27.

51 U.S.C. §50905(b)(4); 14 C.F.R. §460.45.

28.

51 U.S.C. §50905(b)(4); 14 C.F.R. §§460.9 and 460.45.

29.

FAA, U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most Appropriate for New Safety Framework, September 29, 2023, p. 11, https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/2023_10_06%20PL_114-90_Sec_111_7_Commercial_Human_Spaceflight_Activities.pdf. Hereinafter FAA, U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most Appropriate for New Safety Framework.

30.

51 U.S.C. §50914.

31.

51 U.S.C. §50914; Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (P.L. 118-159, §5702).

32.

P.L. 108-492, §2(c)(13); 51 U.S.C. §50905(b); 14 C.F.R. Part 460.

33.

Prior to the most recent extension in P.L. 118-59, the learning period had been extended to October 1, 2015, by the FAA Modernization and Reform of 2012 (P.L. 112-95); to October 1, 2023, by the Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act (CSLCA) of 2015 (P.L. 114-90); to January 1, 2024, by the Continuing Appropriations and Other Extensions Act, 2024 (P.L. 118-22); to March 9, 2024, by the Airport and Airway Extension Act of 2023, Part II (P.L. 118-34); and to May 11, 2024, by the Airport and Airway Extension Act of 2024 (P.L. 118-41).

34.

51 U.S.C. §50905(c)(2).

35.

RAND 2023, pp. 3-4.

36.

NTSB, In-Flight Breakup During Test Flight, Scaled Composites SpaceShipTwo, N339SS, Near Koehn Dry Lake, California, October 31, 2014, NTSB/AAR-15/02, 2015, pp. 70-71, https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR1502.pdf.

37.

P.L. 114-90, §111; 51 U.S.C. §50905.

38.

For more information on COMSTAC, see FAA, "Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee (COMSTAC)," https://www.faa.gov/space/additional_information/comstac.

39.

51 U.S.C. §50905(c)(5); FAA, Final Report on Voluntary Industry Consensus Standards Development, December 20, 2022, https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/PL_114-90_Sec111-5-Voluntary_Industry_Consensus_Standards.pdf.

40.

51 U.S.C. §50905(c)(6); FAA, FAA Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Safety Frameworks and Key Industry Indicators, 2017, https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/2021-11/CSLCA_Sec111_Report_to_Congress.pdf. Hereinafter FAA, FAA Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Safety Frameworks and Key Industry Indicators.

41. 51 U.S.C. §50905(c)(7); FAA, https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/
2022-04/PL_114-
90_Sec_111_5_Voluntary_Industry_Consensus_Standar
ds.pdf.
FAA, U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of
•
activities most appropriate for a new safety
Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most
framework that could include regulatory action
Appropriate for aCommercial Human Space Flight Activities Most Appropriate for New Safety Framework. 42.

51 U.S.C. §50905(c)(8).

43.

RAND 2023.

44.

FAA, U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most Appropriate for New Safety Framework.

45.

FAA, U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most Appropriate for New Safety Framework, p. 3.

46.

Josef S. Koller et al., Commercial Human Spaceflight Safety Regulatory Framework, Aerospace Corporation, Aerospace Report No. ATR-2002-02101, September 28, 2022, p. 1, https://aerospace.org/sites/default/files/2023-03/ATR-2022-02101.pdf.

47.

FAA, U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most Appropriate for New Safety Framework, p. 11.

48.

FAA, Recommended Practices for Human Space Flight Occupant Safety: Version 2.0, September 2023, https://www.faa.gov/media/71481.

49. FAA, U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most Appropriate for New Safety Framework New Safety Framework, p. 11. For information on the standards development organizations involved in commercial human spaceflight, see FAA, Final Report on Voluntary Industry Consensus Standards Development, December 20, 2022, , February 26,
and a possible transition plan
2019, https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/2021-11/
New-Safety-Framework-for-Commercial-Human-Space-
Flight-Completed-report.pdf.
FAA, FAA Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight
•
industry’s progress in developing voluntary
Safety Frameworks and Key Industry Indicators, 2017,
consensus standards and best practices
https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/2021-11/
•
CSLCA_Sec111_Report_to_Congress.pdf.

key industry metrics to indicate industry’s
readiness to transition to a safety framework that
may include regulations
•
activities most appropriate for a new safety
framework that could include regulatory action
and a possible transition plan
Source: Col ected by CRS from several sources, as noted.
Notes: The reports are listed in reverse chronological order.


Congressional Research Service

19

---

Regulation of Commercial Human Spaceflight Safety: Overview and Issues for Congress


Author Information

Rachel Lindbergh

Analyst in Science and Technology Policy



Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

Congressional Research Service
R48050 · VERSION 4 · UPDATED
20
https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/PL_114-90_Sec111-5-Voluntary_Industry_Consensus_Standards.pdf. 50.

FAA, "Human Space Flight Occupant Safety Aerospace Rulemaking Committee Charter," April 21, 2023, https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/index.cfm/document/information/documentID/5883.

51.

FAA, U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most Appropriate for New Safety Framework, pp. 11-12.

52.

FAA, U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most Appropriate for New Safety Framework, p. 12.

53.

FAA, U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most Appropriate for New Safety Framework, p. 12.

54.

51 U.S.C. §50905(c)(9).

55.

Performance-based regulations focus on performance and desired outcomes, giving companies flexibility in how to meet the mandated standard. Conversely, prescriptive regulations specify the processes, design, or technology standards that companies must use.

56.

FAA, U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most Appropriate for New Safety Framework, p. 11.

57.

Office of Management and Budget, Regulatory Analysis, Circular A-4, September 17, 2003, pp. 10-12, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/circulars/A4/a-4.pdf; Executive Order 12866 of September 30, 1993, "Regulatory Planning and Review," 58 Federal Register 51735, October 4, 1993, https://www.archives.gov/files/federal-register/executive-orders/pdf/12866.pdf.

58.

RAND 2023, p. 48.

59.

51 U.S.C. §50905(c)(8).

60.

FAA, FAA Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Safety Frameworks and Key Industry Indicators.

61.

FAA, FAA Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Safety Frameworks and Key Industry Indicators, pp. 16-18.

62.

FAA, FAA Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Safety Frameworks and Key Industry Indicators, pp. 19-21.

63.

FAA, FAA Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Safety Frameworks and Key Industry Indicators, pp. 22-24.

64.

FAA, FAA Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Safety Frameworks and Key Industry Indicators, p. 2.

65.

FAA, FAA Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Safety Frameworks and Key Industry Indicators, p. 3.

66.

RAND 2023, p. 25.

67.

RAND 2023, p. 25.

68.

COMSTAC Human Space Flight Working Group, Report to Congress: U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most Appropriate for New Safety Framework, July 11, 2023, p. 2, https://www.faa.gov/media/68011. Hereinafter COMSTAC Human Space Flight Working Group, Report to Congress: U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most Appropriate for New Safety Framework.

69.

COMSTAC Human Space Flight Working Group, Report to Congress: U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most Appropriate for New Safety Framework, p. 2.

70.

COMSTAC Human Space Flight Working Group, Report to Congress: U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most Appropriate for New Safety Framework, p. 2.

71. Michael Lopez-Alegria, "The Future of Human Spaceflight Safety Is in the Hands of Congress," SpaceNews, September 8, 2023, https://spacenews.com/the-future-of-human-spaceflight-safety-is-in-the-hands-of-congress/. Testimony of William H. Gerstenmaier, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Space and Science, Promoting Safety, Innovation, and Competitiveness in U.S. Commercial Human Space Activities, hearings, 118^th Cong., 1^st sess., October 18, 2023, p. 11, https://www.commerce.senate.gov/services/files/ADC08FC1-E28D-4178-8D39-16E02BB803CE. Hereinafter Testimony of William H. Gerstenmaier. 72.

Testimony of Sirisha Bandla, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Space and Science, Promoting Safety, Innovation, and Competitiveness in U.S. Commercial Human Space Activities, hearings, 118^th Cong., 1^st sess., October 18, 2023, p. 5, https://www.commerce.senate.gov/services/files/07881B07-FCFF-4B7C-8857-432BF66216C6.

73.

Testimony of William H. Gerstenmaier, p. 11.

74.

FAA, U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most Appropriate for New Safety Framework, p. 4.

75.

FAA, U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most Appropriate for New Safety Framework, p. 3.

76.

RAND 2023, p. 74.

77.

FAA, U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most Appropriate for New Safety Framework, p. 12.

78.

FAA, U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most Appropriate for New Safety Framework, p. 7; RAND 2023, p. 61.

79.

FAA, U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most Appropriate for New Safety Framework, p. 7.

80.

RAND 2023, p. 74.

81.

COMSTAC Human Space Flight Working Group, Report to Congress: U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most Appropriate for New Safety Framework, pp. 1-3.

82.

Testimony of William H. Gerstenmaier, p. 11.

83.

RAND 2023, p. 50.

84. Testimony of William H. Gerstenmaier, p. 12; COMSTAC Human Space Flight Working Group, Report to Congress: U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most Appropriate for New Safety Framework, p. 3; testimony of Sirisha Bandla, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Space and Science, Promoting Safety, Innovation, and Competitiveness in U.S. Commercial Human Space Activities, hearings, 118^th Cong., 1^st sess., October 18, 2023, p. 4, https://www.commerce.senate.gov/services/files/07881B07-FCFF-4B7C-8857-432BF66216C6. 85.

Testimony of William H. Gerstenmaier, p. 10.

86.

GAO, Commercial Space Transportation: FAA's Oversight of Human Spaceflight, GAO-24-106184, February 2024, pp. 27-29 https://www.gao.gov/assets/d24106184.pdf.

87. Jeff Foust, "Head of FAA's Commercial Space Office Takes Buyout," SpaceNews, April 28, 2025, https://spacenews.com/head-of-faas-commercial-space-office-takes-buyout/. 88. Jeff Foust, "Head of FAA's Commercial Space Office Takes Buyout," SpaceNews, April 28, 2025, https://spacenews.com/head-of-faas-commercial-space-office-takes-buyout/. 89.

P.L. 104-113; Office of Management and Budget, Federal Participation in the Development and Use of Voluntary Consensus Standards and in Conformity Assessment Activities, Circular No. A-119 Revised, February 10, 1998, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Circular-119-1.pdf.

90.

RAND 2023, p. 39.

91.

COMSTAC Safety Working Group, "COMSTAC Safety WG Report—DRAFT," FAA, September 14, 2020, p. 2, https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/space/additional_information/comstac/presentations/COMSTAC_Safety_WG_white_paper_14_Sept_2020.pdf; COMSTAC Safety Working Group, "COMSTAC Safety Working Group Report, May 2023," FAA, May 2023, https://www.faa.gov/media/31151.

92.

COMSTAC Human Space Flight Working Group, Report to Congress: U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most Appropriate for New Safety Framework, p. 3.

93.

FAA, U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most Appropriate for New Safety Framework, p. 7; RAND 2023, p. 19.

94.

49 U.S.C. §40123 (for the protections of voluntarily provided aviation industry safety data); FAA, U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most Appropriate for New Safety Framework, p. 7.

95.

For more information, see CRS Report R46238, The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA): A Legal Overview, by Benjamin M. Barczewski.

96.

RAND 2023, p. 76.

97.

H.R. 6131 was ordered to be reported but was not reported. While official reported text of H.R. 6131 is not available, the amendments adopted during the markup did not appear to change the introduced bill provisions related to the FAA's updates on the status of voluntary industry consensus standards. House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, "Full Committee Markup of H.R. 6213 & H.R. 6131," November 29, 2023, https://science.house.gov/2023/11/markup-h-r-6213-h-r-6131.

98.

Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (P.L. 118-159, §5702).

99.

51 U.S.C. §§50901, 50903.

100.

Prepared testimony of GAO Director of Physical Infrastructure Heather Krause, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Aviation, Stars and Stripes Forever—An Examination of the FAA's Role in the Future of Spaceflight, hearings, 117^th Cong., 1^st sess., June 16, 2021, p. 14, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-105268.pdf.

101.

Rep. Brian Babin, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Aviation, Stars and Stripes Forever—An Examination of the FAA's Role in the Future of Spaceflight, hearings, 117^th Cong., 1^st sess., June 16, 2021, p. 73, https://www.congress.gov/117/chrg/CHRG-117hhrg46249/CHRG-117hhrg46249.pdf.

102.

Testimony of FAA Associate Administrator Wayne Monteith, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Aviation, Stars and Stripes Forever—An Examination of the FAA's Role in the Future of Spaceflight, hearings, 117^th Cong., 1^st sess., June 16, 2021, pp. 30-31, 39-40, https://www.congress.gov/117/chrg/CHRG-117hhrg46249/CHRG-117hhrg46249.pdf.

103.

Testimony of FAA Associate Administrator Wayne Monteith, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Aviation, Stars and Stripes Forever—An Examination of the FAA's Role in the Future of Spaceflight, hearings, 117^th Cong., 1^st sess., June 16, 2021, p. 14, https://www.congress.gov/117/chrg/CHRG-117hhrg46249/CHRG-117hhrg46249.pdf.

104.

Rep. Peter DeFazio, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Aviation, Stars and Stripes Forever—An Examination of the FAA's Role in the Future of Spaceflight, hearings, 117^th Cong., 1^st sess., June 16, 2021, p. 14, https://www.congress.gov/117/chrg/CHRG-117hhrg46249/CHRG-117hhrg46249.pdf.

105.

GAO, Commercial Space Launches: FAA Needs Continued Planning and Monitoring to Oversee the Safety of the Emerging Space Tourism Industry, GAO-07-16, October 2006, p. 31, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-07-16.pdf.

106.

For more information, see CRS Report R45416, Commercial Space: Federal Regulation, Oversight, and Utilization, by Rachel Lindbergh.

107.

P.L. 108-492; 51 U.S.C. Ch. 509.

108.

47 U.S.C. §§151-614.

109.

P.L. 102-555; 51 U.S.C. §§60101 et seq.

110.

Jeff Foust, "An Extended Mission for Authorization," The Space Review, December 18, 2023, https://www.thespacereview.com/article/4712/1.

111. Josef Koller and Carson Coursey, "Hazards Don't Stop at the Kármán Line," SpaceNews, December 26, 2022, https://spacenews.com/op-ed-hazards-dont-stop-at-the-karman-line/. 112.

White House [Biden Administration], "FACT SHEET: U.S. Novel Space Activities Authorization and Supervision Framework," December 20, 2023, https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/12/20/fact-sheet-u-s-novel-space-activities-authorization-and-supervision-framework/.

113.

White House [Biden Administration], "Draft Bill Text: 'Authorization and Supervision of Novel Private Sector Space Activities Act,'" December 20, 2023, https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Authorization-and-Supervision-of-Novel-Private-Sector-Space-Activities_Legislative-Text_final.pdf.

---